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Matthew Thomas Becker

University of Mississippi

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How Do Schools Affect Ethnic Saliency Levels of Students in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

MATTHEW THOMAS BECKER

This article measures the role of schools in the ethnic socialization and identity formation processes of high school seniors in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) via ordinary least squares regression analysis and attempts to contribute to a better understanding of educational transitions in the postsocialist space and youth identity formation in a postconflict society. BiH has three ethnonational curricula (Bosniak, Croat, and Serb), each with an ethnocentric focus. Although nationality and school curricula are highly correlated in BiH, in the case of the Serbs, it was found that students who do not study the “appropriate” Serbian curriculum experienced a statistically significant effect on lowering ethnic saliency levels ($P < .001$ and $P < .05$). Data were gathered via field surveys of high school seniors at 78 high schools in 53 cities and towns located across the country, the selection of which was based on a nonprobability sampling approach.

This article measures the role of schools in the ethnic socialization and identity formation processes of high school seniors in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) via ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis and attempts to contribute to a better understanding of educational transitions in the postsocialist space and youth identity formation in a postconflict society (Roper 2005; Miller-Idriss 2009; Silova 2009, 2010). BiH is currently experiencing two simultaneous and complicated transitions: postwar interethnic reconciliation and postcommunist democratization. This article departs from previous scholarly work on education in postwar BiH in two ways: it is quantitative and countrywide. The current literature on education in postwar BiH may be broken down into four broad categories: qualitative content analyses of history textbooks at various grade levels, a descriptive overview of the primary/secondary educational systems and situation, localized case studies (i.e., Hjort and Frisén 2006; Hromadžić 2008, 2011, 2015), and reviews of higher education (i.e., Sabić-El-Rayess 2009, 2013, 2014). As BiH is a postwar society, studies on minority-returnee issues have been conducted as well.

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1 Donia (2000); Baranović (2001); Low-Beer (2001); Bartulović (2006).
3 Phuong (2000); Kukić (2001); Belloni (2005); Dahlman and Ó Tuathail (2005a, 2005b); Ó Tuathail and Dahlman (2006); Sivac-Bryant (2008).
This article proceeds in the following manner: a short overview of the specific historical context of BiH, a review of literature with a focus on socialization, a review of the postwar educational systems in the country, an explanation of the data and research methodology, statistical results, and finally general conclusions.

The End of Armed Conflict in BiH

The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, better known as the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, brought the 3.5-year Bosnian War to an end. It established the current consociational (Lijphart 1977) ethnic power-sharing arrangement, as well as the de facto partition of BiH between the Bosnian-Serbs and the Bosniaks/Bosnian-Croats (Malcolm 2002, 270), through the creation of the two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Federation of BiH) and Republika Srpska. Although it institutionalized ethnic division, it also promoted the return of refugees and displaced persons to their prewar homes of origin, through its Annex VII (“Refugees and Displaced Persons”). The Dayton Peace Accords were unable to solve one issue, however—the contentious status of the strategic municipality of Brčko. In March 1999, it was ruled that the municipality would be held “in condominium” between the two entities and established the Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Brčko District of BiH) as a special political-administrative unit (Chap. I Article 1[1] of the Statute of the Brčko District of BiH; Vlada Brčko Distrikta Bosne i Hercegovine 2010) under the direct sovereignty of the state of BiH.

Literature Review

According to Phinney (1996, 143), the study of ethnic identity emphasizes how individual group members understand and interpret their own

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4 The constitution of BiH, which is derived from Annex IV of the Dayton Peace Accords (1995), specifically lists Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs as the three “constituent peoples” who have ethnic rights. Those who do not identify with one of the three are considered “other citizens” and currently do not have the right to run for high office or be appointed to positions that are reserved for the three constituent peoples. In 2009 and 2014, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the country’s ethnic electoral laws violate minority rights (Protocol XII of the European Convention) in two separate cases: (1) Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina and (2) Zomić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (European Court of Human Rights 2014). See Milanović (2010) for the Sejdić-Finci case note. The most visible example of the ethnic power sharing may be seen through the fact that the country has three presidents: a Bosniak, a Croat, and a Serb.

5 BiH is divided into two administrative units: the Federation of BiH, which consists of 51 percent of the country, and Republika Srpska, which consists of 49 percent of the country. The Federation of BiH is further broken down into 10 cantons. Of the 10 cantons, five are majority Bosniak (Bosnian-Podrinje Canton Goražde, Canton Sarajevo, Tuzla Canton, Una-Sana Canton, and Zenica-Doboj Canton), three are majority Croat (Hercegbosanska Canton, Posavina Canton, and West Herzegovina Canton), and two are ethnically mixed between Bosniaks and Croats (Central Bosnia Canton and Herzegovina-Neretva Canton). Bosniaks (Sunni Muslim), Croats (Roman Catholic), and Serbs (Serbian Orthodox) are all South Slavs. It is religion that differentiates the three ethnic groups.
identity. The majority of researchers have taken a descriptive approach to the study of ethnic identity (Phinney 1990, 499, 511). “Ethnic identity” itself refers to the degree to which individuals have explored their ethnicity, are clear about what group membership means to them, and identify with the said ethnic group (Phinney 1996). “Ethnic saliency” refers to how important their ethnic identity/background is to them (Roberts et al. 1999). According to identity formation theory, ethnic saliency is the outcome of ethnic identity search (Phinney 1993).

Having an identity is an important aspect of being human (Erikson 1968, 130). The process of identity formation does not begin or end during adolescence, but adolescence is a time that is much more critical than other periods of life for identity formation (Marcia 1980, 160). Identity formation in adolescence may be influenced by a number of socialization agents, such as schools (Ehman 1980; Roper 2005; Torsti 2007), families (Erikson 1963; Bringa 1995, 84), or the mass media (Zaller 1996; Friedman 2004).

The process in which ethnic identity is formed is known as “ethnic socialization,” which refers to the manner in which young people “acquire the behaviors, perceptions, values, and attitudes of an ethnic group, and come to see themselves and others as members of such groups” (Rotheram and Phinney 1987, 11). Anderson (2006) refers to such a group, the nation, as an “imagined community.” Phinney and Rotheram (1987, 276) also note that ethnicity and ethnic socialization differ depending on the majority/minority status of children in schools; ethnic-minority children are more aware than the ethnic-majority children are. Ethnicity, or race, would thus be much more salient in heterogeneous schools, in comparison to homogenous schools (McGuire and McGuire 1982). McGuire and McGuire (1982) as well as Phinney and Rotheram (1987) are set in the American context, where one’s skin color easily shows group belonging; in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian context, however, there are no physically distinguishing features or characteristics that set the three main ethnic groups apart: Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs are all South Slavs.6

While scholars such as Erikson (1963), Bringa (1995, 84), and Umaña-Taylor et al. (2006) argue that the primary domain of socialization and ethnoreligious identity formation is the family, others focus on the role of schools in this process. Schools affect conceptualization of student identity because school education is a central form of political socialization for young people (Ehman 1980, 112; Roper 2005, 503; Torsti 2007, 92), and schools in postwar societies serve as a particularly strong socialization agent (Ajduković and Biruški 2008, 340). In postwar ethnically divided communities, such as

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6 In BiH, your name tells people what, and thus who, you are (Bringa 1995, 19). This is also the case in Northern Ireland, where one’s religious affiliation is ascertained by asking one’s name (Donnelly 2004, 268).
in Vukovar, Croatia (in this case, divided between Croats and Croatian-Serbs), the “children grow up within a context loaded with social signs saying the community wants you to stay within your own ethnic group” (340). When schools become divided along ethnic lines, children have limited opportunity to meet and have contact with others across the ethnic divide. When it came to the possibility of the reintegration of schools in Vukovar, Biruški and Ajduković (2007, 105) found that “children are least supportive of joint education and social integration . . . and are most ready to discriminate against their peers from the other ethnic group.” In such circumstances, students are socialized to not interact with the “other.” Indeed, the central concept of socialization theory is that educational institutions transmit norms, values, and models of behavior that are considered appropriate in a given society. Gellner (1983, 34) goes so far as to argue that “the monopoly of legitimate education is now more important, more central than is the monopoly of legitimate violence” for the state because of its role in the socialization of students. History textbooks serve as an instrument in this regard, for the power of history politics serves as the central factor in maintaining conflict and preventing reconciliation in a postconflict, multicultural society. For Torsti (2008, 56–57), history education in postconflict societies is a “security issue.” Hutton and Mehlinger (1987, 141) acknowledge that there are many sources of socialization in modern society; however, the authors state that “none compare to textbooks in their capacity to convey a uniform, approved, even official version of what youth should believe.”

Depending on the dominant “official” interpretation of history, a nation can perceive itself as a forceful, dominant, and rising nation, as a cooperative and tolerant neighbor, or as a victim of aggressive foreign invasions (Stojanović 2009, 144–46, 155). A nation also can portray others as aggressive (e.g., all Croats are Ustaše), uncivilized, or treacherous (e.g., Bosnian-Muslims as “race traitors” who “forfeited” their Slavic identity; Sells 1996, 40–50; 2002, 64) to justify its own policies and actions toward other nations (Stojanović 2009, 141).9 Murgescu (2002, 97) argues that geography, literature, religion,

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7 A recent example of this may be seen in how the 1992–95 Bosnian War is portrayed: Bosniak history portrays it as a war of international aggression (which may be seen in the Bosniak name for the war: the War of Aggression on Bosnia and Herzegovina); Serb history portrays it as a defensive war, while Croat history portrays it as a war of aggression as well as defensive (which may be seen in the Croat name for the war: Domovinski rat, or Homeland war).

8 The Ustaše (plural: Ustaše) was the Nazi-allied Croatian fascist party during World War II, headed by Ante Pavelić, who ruled the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska). Ustaše has come to be an ethnic slur for Croats. Ustaše symbols are still used by nationalist Croats.

9 Bosnian-Muslims (Bosniaks) have been viewed as “race traitors” by Serbs because they converted from Christianity to Islam after the conquest of BiH by the Ottoman Empire, thus surrendering their Slavic identity (Sells 1996, 2002). Bosniaks acknowledge that their ancestors were Christians, although they were neither Orthodox nor Catholic but rather members of the Bosnian Church, an indigenous church that existed during the Bosnian Kingdom. Establishing a connection between Islamization and
and civics classes often disseminate a higher level of hatred of the “other” than history textbooks do. Kostovicova (2004, 282) concurs with the important role of geography classes and textbooks, stating that geographical imaginaries forge the symbolic and physical limits of a territory that is sought for the ethnic nation. The state thus views public schooling as a strong socialization agent; according to Oder (2005, 80), early public schools were used to “fashion societies” in such a way so as to prevent conflict between Catholics and Protestants. Although states may hold the view that schools are strong socialization agents, Wertsch (2000) and Worden (2014) have found that the role of schools is actually quite limited as a vehicle of socialization and identity transmission—at least in the Soviet and post-Soviet contexts. For former communist bloc states, numerous issues relating to postcommunism must be dealt with, and the focus of the next section relates to issues of identity coupled in the context of school education.

Since the fall of communism, all postcommunist states are facing the problem of defining their identity at two levels: the group level and the individual level. In most of the postcommunist states, changes have taken place in the history curriculum, which reflects the influence of political change (Baranović 2001; Koren and Baranović 2009; Stojanović 2009, 2011). Education is supposed to serve as a unifying factor and socialization agent among citizens of a state; teaching them who they are (e.g., national identity; Bartulović 2006) and what their country expects of them, such as the civic duties of the citizen (Baranović 2001; Oder 2005). The role of the educational system is important for the state in building identity and patriotism among students. As Heyneman (2002–3, 81) notes, “the public school experience is intended to mold desired behavior of future citizens.” According to Sivac-Bryant (2008, 115), postwar education “is a vital part of the transition from conflict to peace.” This is because schools “are the crucible used by the state to instil [sic] a national identity. As such, they [serve] in teaching the history that led up to the conflict.” The primary and secondary educational system after intrastate conflict thus becomes “a site in which the politics of accountability and acknowledgement are played out” (107).

All of this leads to the situation in which history textbooks portray historical events in starkly different terms, depending on the ethnicity of the authors. For example, in Ukraine, history textbooks portray the “Ukrainian people” as eternal victims of Russia and the Holodomor (Hunger plague) as genocide of the Ukrainian people, whereas Russian textbooks portray the Holodomor in Ukraine as a Soviet-wide food shortage (Korostelina 2010). In the Czech Republic, history textbooks represent the expulsion of the Sudetenland-

members of the Bosnian Church, as well as the nature of the Bosnian Church in general, has been and continues to be one of the most argued over topics of the country’s history (Bringa 1995, 14–15; Malcolm 2002, 27). In the case of general church practices and especially specific beliefs, there exists very little written evidence (Bringa 1995, 17), thus making this a topic that can never be put fully to rest.
Germans as “justified retaliation” for collaborating with the Nazis (Ingrao 2009, 186). In the Romanian history textbook *History of Romanians* (2000), students learn that the Romanian people are one of the most ancient peoples in Europe and are “born Christians” and that they have defended Christianity “against the invasion of the Islamised ‘pagans’” (Murgescu 2002, 92). In Slovenia, history textbooks have portrayed the World War II-era *Slovensko domobranstvo* (Slovene home guard) as anticommunist freedom fighters, rather than the fascist Slovenian paramilitary force (Ingrao 2009, 186) that was under German military command. In Croatian history textbooks, the history of BiH has been covered only in chapters on Croatian history, as part of the history of the Croatian people, lands, and “Croatian national history” (Baranović 2002, 14). This obsession with the past, according to Zakošek (2008, 32), is typical for the ethnic nationalisms of Eastern Europe, and the discourse is primarily focused on uncovering and commemorating the suffering of one’s own ethnic group that was caused by members of a different ethnonational group. In this context, history textbooks are used “to create and maintain a suitable version of collective memory” (Bartulović 2006, 52), and with the fall of communism, history textbooks have been employed “to establish continuity with a suitable historical past” (Koren and Baranović 2009, 97).

In BiH, there are three truths and three official versions of history. Three specific ethnonational curricula and textbooks are used in the country. In her analyses of how the 1992–95 Bosnian War is represented in the primary and secondary school history textbooks used in Republika Srpska, Bartulović (2006, 64) finds that the message portrayed is that “new conflicts will erupt sooner or later, since Serbs are separated from their fatherland and are being forced to sacrifice the unity of their nation.” This underscores the concept of nationalism as a political theory of legitimacy, where political state borders should not cut across ethnic ones (Gellner 1983, 1), and that all people of a certain nation should live in the same nation-state. Anzulović (1999) notes that sacrifice through suffering has also been a historically important aspect for the Serbs; this harkens back to the sacrifice of Serbian Prince Lazar Hrebeljanović at the 1389 Battle of Kosovo Polje, which was fought against the Ottoman Empire.\(^\text{10}\)

In another analysis of history textbooks in BiH (Bosniak, Croat, and Serb), Baranović (2001, 24) found that these textbooks contribute “to the creation of a closed, ethnocentric identity of children, rather than to an identity open to diversity.” This ethnocentric focus was most predominant in the Croat history textbooks, followed by the Serbian and Bosniak books (24).

\(^\text{10}\) On the eve of the battle, Prince Lazar Hrebeljanović is said to have been visited by Saint Elias, who gave the prince a choice: a military victory and expanded earthly empire or defeat—and death—with the promise of securing a place for his people in heaven; Prince Lazar chose the heavenly kingdom (Anzulović 1999). This gave rise to what is known as the “Kosovo Myth.”
Ramet (2006, 482) argues that the history textbooks used in schools have the potential to promote what she terms “interethnic bitterness” and contribute to a continuing distance between the three constituent peoples. History narratives presented in textbooks do not cause or initiate conflict directly, but they can become a powerful tool of social mobilization (Korostelina 2010, 136). In BiH, the educational system has been used by the ethnonationalist political parties to socialize students in nationalist ideologies (OSCE 2005, 1; Stabback 2007, 453), thus making school education “the heart of the political” (Hromadžić 2008, 560) in the country. I derive two hypotheses from the literature review, couched in the specific BiH context:

H1: Because of the institutionalization of ethnicity, students will choose the ethnic rather than civic identity.

H2: Divisive ethnonational curricula serve to create a distinct ethnic separation of the three constituent peoples.

Overview of the BiH Educational System

The current educational system in the country came about as a consequence of the various constitutions and especially the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. It failed in addressing primary and secondary education issues—that is, the educational system played a secondary role in the peace treaty (Pingel 2009, 258). The consequence of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords and the decentralized educational systems is that educational policy is left in the hands of ethnonationalist parties who wish to cement the ethnic cleansing that took place during the war; indeed, since authority for creating and implementing educational policy was given to the individual cantons under the Constitution of the Federation of BiH (1994, Sec. III Article 4.b), the cantons have “organized their individual school systems according to national dividing lines” (Bartulović 2006, 54). The Ministry of Civil Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina—Department of Education, which is the nominal state-level ministry, has no authority over the entity ministries of education or the Brčko District of BiH Department of Education. The municipality of Žepče has a “special status” within Zenica-Doboj Canton since it is a Croat-majority municipality within a Bosniak-majority canton; this means that the cantonal ministry has no authority within this municipality.11 Likewise, the Federation of BiH ministry of education has no authority over the cantonal

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11 Educational affairs for Žepče Municipality used to fall under the Herzegovina-Neretva Canton Ministry of Education but now fall under the Department of Administrative and Social Affairs of Žepče Municipality. Section V Article 2(2) of the Federation of BiH Constitution stipulates for the devolution of power to the municipal level when the majority group of the municipality is different from that of the canton as a whole.
ministries of education; there is no oversight of the curricula above the cantonal ministries. Republika Srpska, however, is highly centralized with only one ministry of education; there is no oversight above this ministry of education.

Education is mandatory until the eighth grade in BiH. The country has three ethnonational curricula based on language: the Bosnian National Plan and Program (B-NPP), Croatian National Plan and Program (H-NPP), and Serbian National Plan and Program (S-NPP). In Bosniak schools the B-NPP is sometimes referred to as the “Federal” curriculum, although it is only used in their schools. In this article, I refer to the B-NPP as the Bosniak curriculum for clarity purposes. The three ethnonational curricula thus represent three competing official educations within the state. Along with schools following one of the three ethnonational curricula, the country has seven Catholic high schools (which use their own curricula) and six madrassas. Within the Brčko District of BiH, a separate, unified curriculum is used. The Catholic schools are open to all students, regardless of ethnicity.

Two Schools under One Roof

Within the Federation of BiH, a policy known as dvije škole pod jednim krovom (two schools under one roof) exists in schools within three of the 10 cantons (Central Bosnia, Herzegovina-Neretva, and Zenica-Doboj), in which students of two different ethnonational groups (Bosniaks or Croats) have classes within the same school building, but only with students and teachers of their nationality. This occurs by either having morning/afternoon shifts (such as in Busovača or Stolac) or separate wings/floors (such as in Gornji Vakuf-Uskoplje or Bugojno). Both schools are considered two separate legal entities existing at the same address and building. This policy was initially launched in 2000 in the Herzegovinian town of Stolac to encourage refugees to return to their prewar homes of origin (Božić 2006, 331–33; Hromadžić 2008, 554). This school type is located in multiethnic towns,

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12 The three national curricula and segregation of children in schools are postwar phenomena in BiH that did not exist during the Yugoslav period.

13 The three different versions of history follow the dominant histories of the three ethnic groups. The H-NPP follows the curriculum of Croatia (and thus Croatian history, geography, literature, etc.); the S-NPP follows the curriculum of Serbia (and thus Serbian history, geography, literature, etc.). According to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE 2012, 1), the existence of these three separate curricula and history textbooks, which often have mutually opposed versions of history, poses “a considerable threat to social cohesion and a shared sense of citizenship and future in BiH.”

14 The exception to this is the school in Travnik, which operates on the dvije škole pod jednim krovom system and is for Croats.

15 According to Kukić (2001), the slowest to return to their prewar homes have been the Serbs to the Federation of BiH. Phuong (2000) found that this was mainly due to political obstruction by local officials in the Federation of BiH. At the same time, the authors found that minority returnees to Republika Srpska more than doubled. Sivac-Bryant (2008) states the town of Kozorac (Prijedor Municipality, Republika Srpska) is the most successful returnee community in BiH.
yet students are officially segregated along ethnonational lines. In Gornji Vakuf-Uskoplje, the local high school building has two entrances: one for Bosnian-Croat students and the other for Bosniak students; the former use the classrooms located on the first floor, and the latter use the second floor. In regard to the existence of the “two schools under one roof” system in Central Bosnia Canton, the then-minister of education of Central Bosnia Canton, Greta Kuna, stated in 2007 that “apples and pears should not be mixed and neither should Bosniak and Croat children” (Kaletović 2011, 1).16

No such policy existed in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Bosniak and Croat children whose parents reside in Republika Srpska have the option of either attending the local Bosnian-Serb school or crossing the Inter-entity Boundary Line and attending a school in the Federation of BiH if they wish to study from “their” respective ethnonational curricula. According to Clark (2010, 347), many Bosniak students who reside in the towns Čelopek, Osmaci, and Zvornik do just that by going to school in Kalesija, located in Tuzla Canton. Similarly, rather than sending their children to local schools in the Federation of BiH, many Serb parents who reside in Stolac send their children to schools in nearby Berkovići or Ljubinje, in Republika Srpska (347).

Mono-Ethnic Schools

Within the Federation of BiH, mono-ethnic schools are schools designated, officially or unofficially, as for either Bosniaks or Bosnian-Croats. This designation comes in the form of which language-program curriculum the school operates on. Schools in Republika Srpska are considered mono-ethnic due to the high degree of ethnic homogeneity within Republika Srpska, and all high schools operate on the Serbian curriculum, with the exception of the Catholic high school in Banja Luka, which uses the Catholic school curriculum.

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16 On April 27, 2012, the Municipal Court of Mostar (Herzegovina-Neretva Canton) ruled the existence of dvije škole pod jednim krovom as unconstitutional and that it must be abolished. Judge Rabija Tanović ordered the cantonal ministry to establish completely integrated schools by September 1, 2012 (Radio Slobodna Evropa 2012, 1). This was the first such ruling in all of BiH; however, the court order has not been followed by the cantonal ministry, and students are still segregated along ethnic lines (Inzko 2012, 1). The minister of education of Herzegovina-Neretva Canton, Zlatko Hadžiomerović, stated that the cantonal ministry has no authority to enforce such a ruling (Dnevnik 2012, 1). In October 2012, the Municipal Court of Travnik (Central Bosnia Canton) ruled that this policy is not unconstitutional and does not violate any antidiscrimination laws (Karabegović 2012, 1). Another ruling occurred 2 years after the start of my field research; on November 4, 2014, the Supreme Court of the Federation of BiH ruled that this policy was discriminatory and that “organising school systems based on ethnic background and implementing curriculums on ethnic principles, which divide children” must end and that these schools must establish “common integrated multicultural education facilities” (Džidić 2014, 1). The court lacks enforcement mechanisms at the cantonal level, however, as power over primary and secondary education was given to the individual cantons under the Constitution of the Federation of BiH (1994, Sec. III Article 4.b). In addition, Sec. IV(5) Article 17(a) stipulates for the protection of “vital national interests,” which includes education, religion, and language being part of the “identity of one constitutive people.” As of this writing, there have been no announced abolitions of this policy at the cantonal or the individual-school level.
**Administratively Unified Schools**

A third school system exists within the Federation of BiH as well, known as “administratively unified schools.” In these schools, students attend school at the same time but do not share the same classes; rather, they attend classes with other students of their ethnic group, with teachers of their respective ethnicity, using either the Bosniak or the Croatian curricula. The most well known of these schools is Mostar Gymnasium, located in Mostar. It was the first administratively reunified school in the country. The symbolism of the reunification of Mostar Gymnasium is immense; in practice, the reunification has maintained the use of separate Bosniak and Bosnian-Croat curricula. Hromadžić (2008, 549) terms this as “preserving ethnic segregation through unification.” Another such high school is located in Žepče (Zenica-Doboj Canton), which “administratively unified” from being *dvije škole pod jednim krovom* on May 18, 2005 (Srednja mješovita škola Žepče 2012, 1). Unlike at Mostar Gymnasium, however, the administratively unified school in Žepče maintains two separate wings; Bosniak students use the left wing and Bosnian-Croat students use the right wing, having no contact between classes. The school has a common entrance, but only a small corridor connects the two wings of the school, thus not allowing for a “common area” for interaction.

**Schools in the Brčko District of BiH**

All schools in the Brčko District of BiH are integrated, with students and teachers of the three constituent peoples sharing and attending classes together. However, students have the right to use textbooks (Bosniak, Croat, or Serb) of their choice within the same classroom. Integrated schools/classrooms were not always the case, however. The Brčko District of BiH used to have ethnically segregated schools, following one of the three ethno-national curricula used in either the Federation of BiH or Republika Srpska. The integration of schools was forced on the people by the International Supervisor of Brčko on July 5, 2001, through the “Single Law on Education and Harmonized Curriculum” (Perry 2003, 78). I derive hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c from the unique BiH school system/types and curricula.

**H3a:** Students attending school in the Brčko District of BiH will have lower levels of ethnic saliency.

**H3b:** Students studying following a nonethnically appropriate curriculum will have lower levels of ethnic saliency compared to those who study following the “appropriate” ethnic curriculum.

**H3c:** Students who attend Catholic schools will have lower levels of ethnic saliency compared to students who do not.

17 Students are segregated in one subject, however: that of “mother-tongue” (Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian) language classes.
Data and Methodology

Data were gathered via paper field surveys in BiH using the Revised Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM-R; Roberts et al. 1999) as well as general demographic questions during the 2012–13 academic year (Becker 2015). High school seniors were given the survey and answered the questions in class. These students would have no memorable personal experiences with the Bosnian War; rather, their knowledge mainly comes from older family members and what they learn in school. A total of 5,749 surveys were conducted at 78 high schools in 53 cities and towns located across the country. The selection of these cities and towns was based on a nonprobability sampling approach, and this study constitutes a natural experiment. The surveys were written in the Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian languages. To enter schools, I had to gain permission from the Republika Srpska Ministry of Education and Culture, the Brčko District of BiH Department of Education, each of the 10 cantonal ministries of education within the Federation of BiH, the Žepče Municipality Department of Administrative and Social Affairs, and each high school principal. Within the Federation of BiH, a total of 4,288 surveys were gathered; in Republika Srpska, a total of 1,149 surveys were gathered; and in the Brčko District of BiH, a total of 312 surveys were gathered.

MEIM-R was first developed by Roberts et al. (1999) and consists of 12 statements plus three self-identification items. The 12 statements are

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18 The exception to this are data gathered from two schools in Stolac (dvije škole pod jednim krovov; B-NPP and H-NPP) and one school in Vareš, which were visited in November and December 2013. I also revisited the school in Čitluk (H-NPP) during this time; when I visited in May 2013 it was the last day of the school year, and I was only able to survey one senior class (n = 28) out of a total of 207 seniors that normally would have been there. Similarly, I visited the school in Kiče (B-NPP) in May 2013 on their last day but was unable to visit any students; I was given permission to survey students during the next academic year.

19 I was able to visit 53 of my originally proposed 80 cities and towns throughout the country, or 66.25 percent. In the Federation of BiH, surveys were conducted in nine of the 10 cantons (I did not receive permission to visit schools in Posavina Canton). In Republika Srpska, surveys were conducted in six of the seven administrative regions. In the Brčko District of BiH, surveys were administered at three schools in the city of Brčko. Within the Federation of BiH, I was able to visit 74.07 percent of my proposed cities and towns; in Republika Srpska, I was able to visit 48 percent. As for Catholic high schools, I was able to visit four (Banja Lučka, Bilać, Tuzla, and Žepče) of the seven. Madrassas were not included in this study. In regard to the three national curricula (NPP) used in the country, I was able to visit 36 schools on the Bosniak curriculum, 24 on the Croatian curriculum, and 13 on the Serbian curriculum: 44.89 percent of surveyed students attended schools on the Bosniak curriculum, 27.10 percent on the Croatian curriculum, 19.22 percent on the Serbian curriculum, 5.43 percent on the unified Brčko District of BiH curriculum, and 3.36 percent on the Catholic high school curriculum. Of the 53 visited cities and towns, 39.87 percent of students went to high school in an urban/large city, and 60.13 percent went to high school in a rural/small town. Of all respondents, 59.38 percent were female, 38.25 percent were male, and 2.36 percent did not provide their gender.

20 Students were given the survey in the curriculum (NPP) that their school uses. The exception to this were students who attend schools in the Brčko District of BiH (see n. 22). Catholic high schools were given the Croatian-language version since Croatian is the language of instruction. When designing field surveys to be conducted in a foreign state with a highly charged political environment, such as in BiH, one must be mindful of language (Greenburg 2008; Pašalić-Kreso 2008, 367). The official Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian versions of the survey are available on request to the author.
designed to measure two subfactors: (1) ethnic identity search and (2) affirmation, belonging, and commitment (ethnic saliency). The original Multi-group Ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM-O) was developed by Phinney (1992) and consisted of 20 statements plus three self-identification items. Respondents must answer MEIM-R along a four-point Likert scale, using the following options: (4) strongly agree, (3) agree, (2) disagree, or (1) strongly disagree. Items 13, 14, and 15 are used for the purposes of national self-identification and categorization, in which the respondents have the following options: (1) Bosniak, (2) Croat, (3) Serb, (4) Bosnian, (5) Roma, and (6) Other. If respondents choose “other,” they have the option to write in a national/ethnic group of their choice. For schools in the Brčko District of BiH, I was required to modify possible responses to items 13, 14, and 15 by the Brčko District of BiH Department of Education in order to carry out the survey in their schools. MEIM-R has frequently been used in multicultural research in countries such as Australia (e.g., Dandy et al. 2008), the United States (i.e., Roberts et al. 1999; Umaña-Taylor et al. 2006), and Zimbabwe (e.g., Worrell et al. 2006), where it has shown to be consistently reliable. The MEIM was also used by Hjort and Frisén (2006) in their case study on Mostar, BiH. This research is the first to use MEIM-R in a BiH-wide analysis. The country represents an excellent case for the use of MEIM-R because of the presence of three indigenous ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs); MEIM-R was also chosen for this study because it is the most often used social battery for attempting to measure ethnic identity (Čorkalo and Kamenov 2003, 86) and was originally developed by Phinney (1992) to be a general social measure rather than a group- (i.e., Suinn et al. 1992; Felix-Ortiz et al. 1994; Sellers et al. 1997) or country-specific social measure.

Stata 12.1 was used to conduct a principal component analysis (PCA) on the data, which is a descriptive statistical technique (Jackson 2003, 4) that allows us to learn more about the underlying structure of the data (Anderson 1963, 137). After running the PCA, I tested for Cronbach’s α; if Cronbach’s α was above 0.70, an additive scale test was conducted. Stata 12.1 was then used to run four OLS linear regression analyses, focusing on those who self-

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21 Roberts et al. (1999) revised MEIM-O in two ways: by dropping two statements from the measure and separating an additional six statements as a unique measure known as the Other-Group Orientation Scale (the scale is not used in this article).

22 I was only allowed to offer the following options: (1) Bosniak, (2) Croat, (3) Serb, and (4) other (Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995). The reason given for this is that possible responses had to be in accordance with the Bosnian-Herzegovinian constitution, which states that the country is composed of Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, as well as other citizens. For schools in the Brčko District of BiH, students were given the Bosnian-language version of the survey. The reason for this is because the Brčko District of BiH Department of Education asked for a copy of the survey “in one of the official languages used in Bosnia and Herzegovina” for them to review, and I submitted the Bosnian-language version.

23 Hjort and Frisén (2006, 156–57) found that in their sample (n = 89), ethnic saliency received a higher score compared to ethnic identity search, and they attribute this to individuals having a high emotional attachment to their ethnonational group—which my findings also support.
identify as being Bosniak (Sunni Muslim), Croat (Roman Catholic), Serb (Serbian Orthodox), and Bosnian (civic identity). Statistical analysis, in this case running four OLS linear regressions on the data, allows for a better understanding of the possible root causes of ethnic saliency rather than simply presenting mean scores as the stand-alone analysis. The quantitative approach has been advocated previously by Aboud (1987, 55), and she believes that the use of advanced statistics pushes the study of ethnic socialization forward. The statistical approach thus allows for a more nuanced understanding of the causes of ethnic socialization and its effects on saliency, rather than simply looking at (mean) saliency scores.

Upon running a PCA on the set of variables measuring ethnic saliency in BiH, it was found that the first principal component accounts for 62.17 percent of the variance in the variables ($\alpha = 0.8937$). After conducting an additive scale test, I determined that item 3 had to be dropped from the analysis and mean score computation. The countrywide mean ethnic saliency score is 3.3493 ($n = 5,611; \alpha = 0.9019$). For the set of variables measuring ethnic identity search in BiH, the first principal component accounts for 47.76 percent of the variance in the variables ($\alpha = 0.7198$). After conducting the additive scale test, it was found that no variables needed to be dropped from the analysis. The countrywide mean ethnic identity search score is 2.7770 ($n = 5,622; \alpha = 0.7198$).

Results

According to the 1991 Census of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the constituent Yugoslav republic had a population of 4,377,033 people: 43.47 percent identified as Muslim by nationality, 31.21 percent as Serb, 17.38 percent as Croat, 5.54 percent as Yugoslav, 0.23 percent as Montenegrin, 0.05 percent as Slovenian, 0.03 percent as Macedonian, and 2.09 percent as other (Zavod za statistiku Bosne i Hercegovine 1991). Postwar, the term “Bosniak” has come to replace the “Muslim by nationality” ethnonational group. In my fieldwork, I found that 37.48 percent of students self-identified as Bosniak, 28.74 percent as Croat, 22.15 percent as Serb, 8.05 percent as Bosnian, 0.26 percent as Roma, 0.95 percent as Bosniak/Bosnian, and 1.54 percent as other. And 0.83 percent identify with more than one ethnonational group. Hypothesis 1, which states that “because of the institutionalization of ethnicity, students will choose the ethnic rather than civic identity,” can be accepted due to the fact that 88.37 percent of students chose one of the three constituent ethnic identities (Bosniak, Croat, Serb), whereas only 8.05 percent chose the Bosnian civic identity. The contentious issue of a Bosnian identity may also be seen from the following unsolicited comment by a male Bosniak.

24 Item 3 of MEIM-R states: “I have a clear sense of my national background and what it means for me.”
from the Bosniak mono-ethnic high school in Mostar (Herzegovina-Neretva Canton); he wrote, in English: “What is this? It doesn’t exist. You are uninformed.” This message was written on the page of the survey asking students the nationality (national self-identification) of themselves and their parents.25

Next, I test the effects that the three ethnonational curricula, the unified Brčko District of BiH curriculum, and Catholic school curriculum have on ethnic saliency. The OLS regressions cover the three constituent peoples, plus those who self-identified as being Bosnian. Models 1a–1d are designed to measure the effects of the curricula on Bosniak, Croat, Serb, and Bosnian ethnic saliency levels. These models are specifically designed to test hypotheses 2, 3a, 3b, and 3c. The dependent variable is mean ethnic saliency (Saliency), derived from MEIM-R (Roberts et al. 1999). The three constituent peoples have, on average, high levels of ethnic saliency with no statistical difference between them: 3.3932 (Bosniaks), 3.4365 (Croats), and 3.3518 (Serbs). Self-identifying Bosnians have a mean ethnic saliency score of 3.0214. The independent variables are school curricula, frequency of religious service attendance, whether the school is located in an urban or rural area (Urban), student gender (Male), and parental education levels (Mom Education and Dad Education). See table 1 for the OLS regression results of models 1a–1d.

Model 1a (Bosniak): Saliency = Croat Curriculum + Serb Curriculum + Brčko District Curriculum + Catholic School + Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Urban + Male + Mom Education + Dad Education

Model 1b (Croat): Saliency = Bosniak Curriculum + Serb Curriculum + Brčko District Curriculum + Catholic School + Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Urban + Male + Mom Education + Dad Education

Model 1c (Serb): Saliency = Bosniak Curriculum + Croat Curriculum + Brčko District Curriculum + Catholic School + Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Urban + Male + Mom Education + Dad Education

Model 1d (Bosnian): Saliency = Croat Curriculum + Serb Curriculum + Brčko District Curriculum + Catholic School + Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Urban + Male + Mom Education + Dad Education

25 The country conducted its first postwar census in October 2013. Ethnic data from the official census have yet to be released, and no date has been given for its eventual disclosure. General population figures have been disclosed, however. These preliminary population figures show 62.55 percent of citizens live in the Federation of BiH, 35 percent live in Republika Srpska, and 2.45 percent live in the Brčko District of BiH (Agencija za statistiku Bosne i Hercegovine 2013, 5). The October 2013 census also highlighted the institutionalization of ethnicity; Bosniak elites ran a campaign urging “their” people to declare as Bosniak and not as Bosnian or other.
Studying following the unified Brčko District of BiH curriculum only had a statistically significant effect on lowering ethnic saliency among self-identifying Serbs ($P < .05$). There were no statistical effects on Croats or Bosniaks. I was unable to test the effects on (possible) self-identifying Bosnians, as I was not allowed to offer “Bosnian” as a possible option for nationality by the Brčko District of BiH Department of Education. The reason given for this was that all possible responses had to be in accordance with the BiH constitution, which states that the country is composed of Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, as well as other citizens. No students wrote in “Bosnian” if they chose other ($n = 3$) for their nationality in the three schools visited in Brčko. Hypothesis 3a, which states that “students attending school in the Brčko District of BiH will have lower levels of ethnic saliency” can only be accepted among Serbs.

Hypotheses 3b and 2 could not truly be tested between all three of the constituent peoples or those who self-identify as being Bosnian. The reason for this is that nationality and curricula are too closely matched, and 91.56 percent of self-identifying Bosnians studied following the Bosniak curriculum. There is one exception, however; Serbs were the only ethnonational

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## TABLE 1

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bosniak</th>
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<th>Serb</th>
<th>Bosnian</th>
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<td>(.133)</td>
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<td>.157***</td>
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<td>(.0147)</td>
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</table>

Note.—Dependent variable is mean ethnic saliency, derived from MEIM-R (Roberts et al. 1999). Standard errors in parentheses.

* $P < .10$.
* $P < .05$.
** $P < .01$.
*** $P < .001$.

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26 In this analysis, e.g., only one self-identifying Croat studied following the Serbian curriculum.
group that had a high enough amount of students studying following a “nonappropriate” ethnic curriculum. For Serbs, studying following the Bosniak curriculum was statistically significant \((P < .001)\) for lowering saliency levels; studying following the Croatian curriculum was less so, giving a significance level where \(P < .10\). Although I am unable to determine which of the three ethnonational curricula espouses a higher level of ethnocentrism in comparison to the other two, we are able to see, in the case of the Serbs, that if students do not study following the “appropriate” Serbian curriculum, their ethnic saliency scores are lowered in a statistically significant way. Hypothesis 3b, which states that “students studying following a nonethnically appropriate curriculum will have lower levels of ethnic saliency compared to those who study following the ‘appropriate’ ethnic curriculum” can be accepted in the case of Serbs. Although 91.56 percent of self-identifying Bosnians studied following the Bosniak curriculum, I did find that for those who studied following the Croat curriculum, saliency was lowered in a statistically significant manner \((P < .001)\). Attending a Catholic school had no statistical effects on lowering or raising saliency levels across all four groups in BiH;\(^{27}\) hypothesis 3c, which states that “students who attend Catholic schools will have lower levels of ethnic saliency compared to students who do not,” must be rejected.

Next, I explore findings related to three other independent variables from the OLS regressions, as they raise possible areas of future research due to the highly homogenous nature of secondary schools in the country. Frequency of religious service attendance has a statistically significant \((P < .001)\) effect on ethnic saliency across all four groups. This means that the act of going to church or mosque, on average, increases ethnic saliency levels among Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs, and Bosnians. School location (Urban) had no statistical effect on ethnic saliency among Bosniaks or Bosnians, but it did for Serbs and Croats. For Serbs, attending school in a rural/small town increased ethnic saliency levels \((P < .05)\), whereas for Croats, attending school in a rural/small town decreased ethnic saliency levels \((P < .05)\). Gender had no effect on ethnic saliency for Serbs, but it was statistically significant for Croats, Bosniaks, and Bosnians. Female Bosniaks \((P < .01)\) and female Bosnians \((P < .01)\) had statistically significant, higher saliency scores compared to their respective male counterparts; in the case of Croats \((P < .01)\), the role of gender was reversed. The statistical effect of gender on ethnic saliency for the three previously mentioned groups, but its noneffect among Serbs, is an

\(^{27}\) In this analysis of Catholic schools, 131 students self-identified as Croat, 27 as Serb, 15 as Bosniak, and 12 as Bosnian. I was unable to visit the Catholic school in Travnik, which is only for Croats (dvije škole pod jednim krovom policy). I was able to survey students in four (Banja Luka, Bihać, Tuzla, and Zepče) of the seven Catholic schools in BiH. I was unable to visit the Catholic schools in Sarajevo, Travnik, or Zenica.
interesting finding to be pursued in future research. See table 1 for the full OLS regression results.

General Conclusions

The ethnic salience scores across schools and groups show that identity is important to responding students. This is to be expected, as identity politics continues to dominate political discourse, in particular among Croats, who perceive that they are particularly aggrieved. This may be seen through an unsolicited message written by a female Croatian student from Postušje (West Herzegovina Canton), next to the survey question asking about Bosnian-Herzegovinian civic pride.\textsuperscript{28} She wrote, in Croatian:

\vspace{12pt}

\begin{quote}
Uopće nisam ponosna, al’ niti malo. Jer je položaj Hrvata nebitan, nemamo nikakva prava. Ima nas samo 17%, te smo manjina. To bi se trebalo promijeniti da imamo neka prava i da donosimo bitne odluke u državi—HERCEGOVINA.
[I am not proud at all, not even a little. This is because the position of Croats [in this country] is irrelevant; we do not have any rights. At only 17% of the population, we are a minority. This needs to be changed so that we can have some rights and bring about essential decisions in the state—HERCEGOVINA.]
\end{quote}

However, a second finding, that students are not sure what group membership means for their lives (ethnic identity search),\textsuperscript{29} suggests that their stated strong identity is possibly weakly rooted and represents less their personal experience and more the broader environment and messaging in their communities; this is especially interesting since identity formation theory posits that ethnic saliency is the outcome of ethnic identity search (Phinney 1993). A number of factors could explain such responses: family life, church/mosque socialization, BiH’s divided media, and the divisive political discourse in the country. Indeed, frequency of religious service attendance has a statistically significant effect ($P < .001$) on increasing ethnic saliency, which is a topic that should be explored further. The possible weakly rooted identity of youth is an important finding in that if community messaging is changed, ethnic saliency may easily decrease. The role of elite political discourse within the country was stressed by the director of US National Intelligence, James R. Clapper, in his 2013 worldwide threat assessment report to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; the report stated that within the country, “differences among Serb, Croat, and Bosniak elites are intensifying, threatening BiH’s state institutions . . . [and that] secessionist rhetoric from the leadership of the political entity Republika Srpska has further chal-

\textsuperscript{28} Responses to the civic pride question were not part of the OLS regressions or MEIM-R and are not included in this article.

\textsuperscript{29} Mean ethnic identity search scores, derived from MEIM-R: Bosniak (2.7967), Croat (2.8732), Serb (2.7590), and Bosnian (2.5097).
lenged Bosnia’s internal cohesion” (Clapper 2013, 29–30). The country’s divided media also hinders democratic consolidation (Sivac-Bryant 2008, 107; USAID 2013, 1). If we accept identity formation theory (Phinney 1993), this provides support to my previous claim that the surveyed students’ stated strong identity is possibly weakly rooted and represents less their personal experience and more the broader environment and messaging in their communities. Framed in a broader context, youth identity formation in postconflict and transitional societies (i.e., Roper 2005; Miller-Idriss 2009) would be of interest for the policy and academic communities, for it relates to the process of democratic consolidation and reconciliation. Rather than serving their current role of attempting to divide students, schools can be used to reconcile differences and build tolerance among the citizenry. School education could also be used to build a civic identity over an ethnic one when the proper political will is present.

An example of this is the case of the de facto independent Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), unrecognized except by Turkey, in which ethnocentric and ethnonationalist history textbooks and lessons were changed to promote civic-mindedness along with coexistence and reconciliation (Vural and Özuyanık 2008). This change came about through the electoral victory of the Republican Turkish Party (CTP) and the This Country is Ours Platform (BMBP) coalition over the ethnonationalist National Unity Party (UBP) and Democratic Party (DP) in 2003 (Vural and Özuyanık 2008, 134–35). The new TRNC government had the Ministry of National Education and Culture produce new textbooks that promoted a Cypriot (“territorial”) identity, which coincided with the CTP political goal of a reunified, federal Cyprus (Vural and Özuyanık 2008); a similar undertaking in the Republic of Cyprus by the Greek-Cypriots has yet to occur, however (150). What does the TRNC example mean for BiH and other transitional societies? It shows that reconciliation and the promotion of a shared civic identity is possible in a postconflict society when the proper political will is present. This political will, unfortunately, is not currently present in BiH, as identity is currently seen as a zero-sum game for ethnic elites. This political will was also not present in Northern Ireland, but because of cross-community initiatives at the local level, parents who wanted their children to be educated together established integrated schools (Smith 2001, 564).

Because of issues of multicollinearity, it cannot be quantitatively determined which of the three ethnonational curricula espouses a higher level of ethnocentrism in comparison to the other two in BiH. We are able to see, however, in the case of Serbs who live in the Federation of BiH and the Brčko District of BiH, that if students do not study following the “appropriate” Serbian curriculum, their ethnic saliency scores are lowered in a statistically significant way (table 1). Building off of this, a qualitative approach (face-to-face interviews) would perhaps be the best way to analyze the specific impact
of curricula on students. Additional quantitative research exploring the role of families, living in a divided town, divided schooling, media discourse, and other-group contact/friendship should be conducted in order to better analyze student (ethnic) socialization in BiH. Testing specific effects of divided schooling on out-group tolerance and ethnic saliency would be of special interest, as it would also allow for the testing of Allport’s (1958) contact hypothesis in a postwar society where a high level of interethnic distrust is still present.\(^{30}\)

Given the findings from the data, three questions must be put forth. Can BiH be successfully rebuilt on the premise of “separate but equal?” How can educational equality (and quality) be guaranteed across the three national curricula? Should divided schools be integrated, as many in the international community want/recommend, and if so, how? Language is an important aspect of identity, and this will be a sticking point in any attempt to fully integrate schools. Schools are only one part of the fabric of society, and there is no easy answer.

Although these are difficult questions, it would behoove us to attempt—even speculatively—to answer them, for the data present interesting results for the academic and policy communities. I would like to address the first and third questions together. Can the country be successfully rebuilt on the premise of “separate but equal”? The basic premise of the contact hypothesis is that contact lowers prejudice (Allport 1958), which has shown to be effective in the United States and Northern Ireland. BiH has become largely homogenous, divided into three separate (ethnic) societies, thus making school integration relevant to a small number of areas (Central Bosnia Canton, Herzegovina-Neretva Canton, and Zenica-Doboj Canton). Within the Federation of BiH, integration of schools could follow the Brčko District model, thus circumventing the issue of language(s); it must be noted, however, that integrated schools were not always the case in Brčko District—they were imposed on the local people by the United States (Perry 2009). The second theoretical question is perhaps, then, the most important because of the postwar emergence of three separate societies within the same state: how can educational equality (and quality) be guaranteed across the three national curricula?

In theory, BiH has a body to negotiate across the three national curricula—in reality, it is nothing but an additional layer of an overbloated system, serving no real purpose. The Ministry of Civil Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina—Department of Education, which is the nominal “state level” ministry,

\(^{30}\) The strong animosity and distrust that now exists between the Bosniaks and Croats of central Bosnia came about due to the Muslim-Croat War, when Afghan mujahideen began to arrive, along with Bosniak refugees fleeing Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) advances, streaming into Croatian Defense Council (HVO)-controlled towns, thus changing the ethnic balance of places such as Travnik and Bugojno (Tanner 2001, 287; Shrader 2003; Ramet 2006, 435).
has no authority over the entity ministries of education, cantonal ministries of education, or the Brčko District of BiH Department of Education because of the highly decentralized nature of the state. This means that the state cannot enforce state-level standards but must rather rely on the local ministries to cooperate on their own accord. A “Conference of Ministers of Education” was established to serve as a forum for BiH’s many education ministries to meet to establish cooperation between the three national curricula, but it is barely functional, lacks funding, and has no enforcing mechanisms.

Given the current political climate in the country, school integration and reform will come about in one of two ways: implementation at the local level via cross-community parental initiatives (as in Northern Ireland) or imposition by the international community (as in the Brčko District of BiH; Perry 2009). Involvement by the international community via the Office of the High Representative of BiH is highly unlikely, as the Europeans currently prefer the “hands-off/local ownership” approach, and the position of high representative is reserved for a European. The postwar ethnic power-sharing arrangement also hinders the development of a Bosnian-Herzegovinian civic identity. The country has three presidents, one from each of the three constituent peoples, and government institutions fall along ethnic distribution and ethnic rights. Ethnic politics is deeply entrenched in the country; in the October 2014 general elections, voters once again returned the ethnonationalist parties to power (Central Election Commission 2014, 1), and nationalist discourse seems to have no end in sight.

This study provides a unique contribution to the comparative inter(curricula) influence on students. By better understanding educational policies in the postcommunist space—and especially local circumstances, such as dvije škole pod jednim krovom—political scientists and social psychologists can better understand identity formation processes of youth in postconflict, postcommunist, multicultural societies. For comparative education scholars, BiH presents a complex educational system ripe for study (e.g., Hromadić 2008) by those willing to navigate its multiple bureaucratic and ethnic structures. At the policy level, identity formation has an impact on voting behavior and choices, especially as a consolidating democracy. These include social choices, such as

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31 There is secessionist rhetoric from Republika Srpska (Jukić 2013, 1; Imko 2014, 1; Katana 2015, 1; Latal 2015, 1) as well as calls for a third, Croat entity that would be separate from the Federation of BiH.

32 A movement by parents for an integrated education system in Northern Ireland began in the late 1970s, with the first integrated school, Lagan College, opening its doors in 1981 (Smith 2001, 563–64; Donnelly 2004, 263). The first integrated school may have opened in 1981, but it was not supported or financed by the government. Rather, these schools operated outside of the official education system and relied on parents and charities for funding (Donnelly 2004, 264).

33 This also breaks with past qualitative research in BiH, which only provided a descriptive overview of the primary/secondary educational systems and situation (i.e., Perry 2003, 2009; Torsti 2007, 2009; Pašalić-Kreso 2008; Pingel 2009; Clark 2010), by introducing curricula as a quantitative variable.
willingness to interact with an individual outside of one’s own ethnonational group, which could be quantitatively measured using the Other-Group Orientation Scale, developed by Roberts et al. (1999) as part of their revision of the MEIM-O (Phinney 1992). In the context of BiH, cross-ethnic contact may also be viewed as a political act against the ethnonationalists, especially in divided towns. BiH and its various official and unofficial levels of school segregation thus represents a fertile testing ground for Allport’s (1958) contact hypothesis and effects on interethnic reconciliation (i.e., Čehajić et al. 2008; Čehajić and Brown 2010). This study, then, should serve as a stepping stone for further research on socialization and ethnic politics in BiH.

References


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34 Putnam (1995, 75) quips that “the last refuge of a social-scientific scoundrel is to call for more research.” Like him, however, “I cannot forbear from suggesting some further lines of inquiry” (75).


