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"By gift of my chaste body": Female Chastity and Exchange Value in *Measure for Measure* and *A Woman Killed With Kindness*

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1.

In his chapter "Of Virginity" in *The Instruction of a Christian Woman* (1529), Spanish humanist Juan Luis Vives insists on the pricelessness of female chastity, locating it beyond the reach of calculated exchange values: "I pray thee understand thine own goodness, maid, thy price cannot be estimated" (104). While scholars of early modern England have analyzed how the subject of female chastity is taken up with particular intensity in the period,[1] insufficient attention has been paid to how the discourses of female chastity are inflected by the early modern preoccupation with the instability of value in ever-widening networks of commodity exchange. Given this preoccupation, the effort to keep personal relations beyond the reach of commodity exchange, within an idealized sphere of the gift, adds special urgency to the construction of female chastity. At the same time, however, the uneasy status of female sexuality and the contradictory constructions of its "value" — even, or especially, within marriage — unsettles the cultural efforts to construct a strict division between gift and commodity.

I want to continue recent discussions of early modern culture's obsessive concern with what William Carroll calls "the fetishized commodity that is and is not" (296) by turning to two plays that participate in that fetishizing. Both Thomas Heywood's *A Woman Killed with Kindness* — first performed in March 1603 — and William Shakespeare's *Measure for Measure* — performed in December 1604, perhaps

for the first time — offer plots that explicitly position a woman's chastity as an object of exchange, but in so doing they enact the conceptual slippage that this positioning entails. By setting these two plays in dialogue, we open a window onto how women and women's chastity overlap the two systems of exchange, slide between them, or escape them.[2] This slippage is a problem for a culture interested in drawing strict boundaries between gift and commodity exchange — a culture facing a radical reworking of how value is constituted. The *plays* become problems when they expose the contradictions entailed in the effort to position women as gifts, commodities, or currency, when the resolution of plots relies on women used in these ways, or on women who refuse to be used in these ways, raising questions about what constitutes women's value. *Measure for Measure* and *A Woman Killed with Kindness*, both of which enjoy critical histories as problem cases,[3] reveal that marriage itself can exacerbate the contradictory status of female chastity and the confusion entailed in the effort to keep its value beyond estimation.

If for Vives the price of maiden chastity "cannot be estimated," for Seneca in *De Beneficiis* (1578)[4] — a manual for good giving which insistently distinguishes "benefiting" from "merchandizing," or ordinary bargains and loans — "the estimation of so noble a thing should perish if we make a merchandise of benefits" (sig. $I2^{V}$). The treatise focuses on the proper methods and motives for giving, receiving, and requiting benefits, methods and motives which, when abused or misunderstood, are seen to threaten the distinction Seneca so insists on: "In debts it is a most upright speech . . . to say, Pay that thou owest. But it is the foulest word that can be in benefiting, to say, Pay." Like the effort to purify chastity of the taint of calculation, Seneca eschews those who would "reckon" their gifts: "It is a vile Usury to keep a reckoning of benefits, as of expenses" (sig. $A2^{V}$). Those who wish to bestow a benefit "must tread profit underfoot" (sig. $M2^{V}$). Unlike ordinary merchandizing, the motive for exchanging benefits is not to profit, but to establish perpetual bonds of fellowship:

> [T]o him that lends me money, I must pay no more than I have taken; *and when I have paid it, I am free and discharged.* But unto the other [one who gives a benefit] I must pay more; and when I have requited him, yet nevertheless I am still beholden to him. For when I have requited I must begin new again, & friendship warneth me to admit no unworthy person. So is the Law of benefits a most holy law, wheroutof springeth friendship.
>
> (sig. E4; emphasis added)

Here we see that the debt of gratitude is not only unmeasurable and "priceless" but it also extends beyond an immediate transaction or set of transactions. The thing given, whether it is money, a material object, or a favor, is merely the "badge" of the giver's "good will" (sig. B2); the essence of the benefit is the bond of friendship and obligation between transactors which the thing given signifies. Further, benefits are the very source of friendship; for Seneca, they not only affirm social links but are the wellspring of them.

This view of gift exchange as the foundation of social life is precisely the formulation offered in Marcel Mauss's *The Gift*, a formulation that Lévi-

Strauss extends to the laws of marriage, moving from the exchange of material goods like food or manufactured objects to "that most precious category of goods, women" (61). In Lévi-Strauss's paradigm, woman is "the supreme gift among those that can only be obtained in the form of reciprocal gifts" (65). Combined with the incest taboo, the exchange of women creates kinship, which is, for anthropologists, the founding organizational structure of human society. According to Gayle Rubin, the concept implies

> a distinction between gift and giver. If women are the gifts, then it is men who are the exchange partners. And it is the partners, not the presents, upon whom reciprocal exchange confers its quasi-mystical power of social linkage. The relations of such a system are such that women are in no position to realize the benefits of their own circulation. As long as the relations specify that men exchange women, it is men who are the beneficiaries of the product of such exchange — social organization.
>
> (174)

Rubin continues with a thorough discussion of the potential limits, from an anthropological perspective, of the "traffic in women" concept.[5] Despite her discussion of the concept's limits, it is her influential essay — combined with Lawrence Stone's theses about arranged marriages and the patriarchal family in *Family, Sex, and Marriage in England* — which has prompted many literary critics to import Lévi-Strauss's paradigm uncritically into early modern England. Part of my goal in reading the representation of female chastity and marriage in Heywood and Shakespeare is to refute the wholesale application of the "traffic in women" paradigm to early modern drama and culture.[6]

2.

A number of relationships and institutions in early modern England are conceptualized by means of the imaginative systems of gift and commodity exchange. As market forces began to cast a wider net across the economy at large, bonds of loyalty or allegiance between patron and artist or courtier, master and apprentice, master and servant, local landowner and tenant could be subordinated to the desire for individual gain, structured by the commodity logic that emphasizes the primacy of profit and codified contracts over the desire for "gift-debtors." Relations between friends, mothers and children, husbands and wives are often signified in terms of idealized gift exchange. The marital bond often bears the weight of cultural questions about what constitutes and ratifies relations of exchange in the early modern social order more generally. Despite efforts such as Seneca's to keep gift and commodity separate, the period's discourses of marriage, like those of many other social relations and institutions, incorporate elements of the symbolic economies of both gift and commodity for its conceptual articulation. Thinking through the "economics of love," Richard Horwich argues that many Jacobean comedies

> employ the institution of marriage itself as a testing ground for many of the new economic ideas which were surfacing at the time. The marital relationship is often seen through an economic prism, so that human transactions, as well as mercantile ones, come to seem matters of debit and credit, profit and loss.
>
> (256)

He argues that the plays often oppose the bond of constancy in marriage to the "hustle of the marketplace" (259) and the circulation of money. Although Horwich offers helpful readings of commercial and monetary imagery in the plays he discusses, his notion of the "economic" is too general, especially given the multiple forms of exchange available in the period. Not only does Horwich's argument that marriage is a "testing ground" for newer economic ideas rely on a totalized and imprecise notion of the "economic" but it also assumes that marriage itself is stable and knowable "ground." The bond of marriage *can* be conceived as a gift relation, as a mutual bestowing of selves. It can be a trust-based and insoluble personal bond; in the words of the "Homily of the State of Matrimony," marriage allows its partners to live in "perpetual friendly fellowship" ("Homily" 13), a phrase resembling Seneca's descriptions of the insoluble bonds forged in benefiting. Marriage is a religious sacrament that is a "singular gift of God"; those who enter the state of matrimony "must acknowledge this benefit of God with pure and thankful minds" (14). At the same time, however, marriage is a legal, contractual, and economic arrangement that ensures the legitimate transfer of property. The giving of selves among the propertied is accompanied by the transfer of dowry, jointure, and rights of access to property, transfers which are formally contracted, quantified, and legally regulated. Given the legal status of wives, it is difficult to consider these transfers as mutual exchanges.[7] The marital relation straddles the competing symbolic economies of gift and commodity. Both as trust-based and legally binding, as a mutual bestowing of selves and a hierarchy in which women have no autonomous legal status, and as an insoluble personal bond and a contract accompanied by the transfer of money and property, marriage reveals the difficulties of purifying personal relations of the taint of calculation and contractual obligation.

There are difficulties, moreover, in establishing what exactly comprises true matrimony. Henry Swinburne's treatise *Of Spousals* (1686) begins by cataloguing the competing definitions of spousals, and goes on to develop how competing legal codes not only differ in defining this term but also in identifying what constitutes matrimony itself.[8] Although he describes several mitigating conditions, Swinburne basically maintains that public solemnization, the giving of portions of goods, and even carnal copulation do not supersede the insoluble bond created by the free consent offered in spousals *de praesenti*:

> A present & perfect Consent . . . alone maketh Matrimony, without either Publick Solemnization or Carnal Copulation; for neither is the one, nor the other of the Essence of Matrimony, but Consent only. . . . Spousals de prae-

> senti, though not consummate, be in truth and substance very Matrimony, and therefore perpetually indissoluble.
>
> (14-15)[9]

Swinburne repeatedly refers to the love tokens and gifts that commonly symbolize the exchange of consent in spousals, but like Seneca's benefits — in which objects exchanged are the "mere badge" of good will between transactors — these tokens are merely the expression, not the essence, of the bond between transactors. Thus, in defining the essence of matrimony, conscience and intention figure more prominently than the exchange of material objects, even if the "objects" exchanged are bodies in intercourse. Swinburne's definition therefore positions the marital relation as a bond, like that forged by means of benefiting, in the sphere of the gift.

Despite the mitigating conditions and the competition in Swinburne's treatise between several potential ratifying acts or objects — "effects" such as the kiss, taking of hands, or gifts; "subarration"; public solemnization; and consummation — he nonetheless adheres to the position that present consent alone constitutes the essence of matrimony. The exchange of trust-based vows that is the spousal, rather than more external and publicly regulated practices, constitutes the essence of matrimony. Swinburne's response to questions about the relationship between public ratification and intention offers an ideal that is difficult to achieve in practice, because the intentions of marital "transactors" are often difficult, if not impossible, to verify in a court of law. Yet the ideal persists — even in a legal treatise. Concerned as they are with exploring what makes relations of exchange binding, *A Woman Killed with Kindness* and *Measure for Measure* exert tremendous pressure on this ideal, exposing the contradictory function of female chastity and how it can preclude the happy union of gift and commodity in the institution of marriage. Because they slide between the competing imaginative economies, female chastity and marriage reveal the contradictions entailed in the effort to purify personal relations of the taint of calculation and contractual obligation.

3.

In the final scene of *Measure for Measure*, Angelo trivializes his and Mariana's original spousals — a trust-based vow of constancy — calling them "some speech of marriage" (5.1.222). Calculated considerations weigh more heavily for him than his verbal promises: Mariana's "promised proportions / Came short of composition" (224-5). These justifications, along with Angelo's specious claim that Mariana's "reputation was disvalued" (226), might at first be seen as the best illustration of how the institution of marriage straddles the economies of gift and commodity, and might tempt us to see Angelo as the sole figure of a commodity mentality that disrupts an ideal of marriage of true minds. But Angelo's deceitful self-defenses are not the only impediments to this ideal. After Mariana unmasks, she explains that "this is the body / That took away the match from Isabel, / And did supply thee at thy garden-house /

In her imagin'd person" (214-17). When the duke asks Angelo, "know you this woman?", Lucio puns, "Carnally, she says" (217-18). Mariana goes even further than Lucio, however, claiming Angelo "knew me as a wife" (235); her claim that Angelo knew her as wife even though he "imagined" she was Isabel implies that carnal exchange alone is sufficient to make them husband and wife. For Swinburne, this is "not true Matrimony in conscience." It isn't just that Mariana has not read her Swinburne, for the duke-as-friar makes this claim as well when he justifies the bed trick to her (4.1.71-4), elevating the "rules and precepts of law" over trust-based intention. The whole play shares in the nervousness of Mariana's statement that "I am affianc'd as strongly / As words could make up vows" (232-3). Couched in this assertion is a question: just how strongly *can* words make up vows? Mariana's "could" indicates a distrust of verbal promises that the entire play shares. In Shakespeare's Vienna, promises are unreliable and there is no guarantee that people, including the duke, will not say one thing and mean another.

Seneca's treatise on gift-giving rejects recourse to the law as the means of enforcing the bonds of fellowship created by benefits. Seneca insists on "mens' consciences" rather than "surety" to guarantee obligation:

> Thou stainest [benefits], if thou make them a matter of Law. . . . Would God that no surety might be taken of the purchaser by the seller, nor bargains and covenants be made under hand & seal: but rather, that the performance of them were referred to the faithfulness and upright meaning of mens consciences.
>
> (sig. I2^{v})

Just as Seneca calls for trust rather than "surety" — a legal bond or piece of property used to guarantee fulfillment of an obligation — as the binding force of exchange, duke Vincentio, disguised as the friar, condemns "security," or contractual obligations, as the solvent of trust-based fellowship:

> There is scarce truth enough alive to make societies secure, but security enough to make fellowships accurs'd. Much upon this riddle runs the wisdom of the world.
>
> (3.2.221-4)

Although the duke's opposition here between contractual obligation and trust-based transactions parallels the Senecan view of what binds men in fellowship, the duke's assertion remains an empty aphorism, for the logic of exchange operating in *Measure* belies the duke's aphoristic wisdom. Despite his repeated invocation of the language of the benefit to justify the bed trick, the duke betrays the calculated, and calculating, understanding underpinning his plan. He tells Isabella that "the satisfaction I would require is likewise your own benefit" (3.1.154-5) and that "I do make myself believe that you may most uprighteously do a poor wrong'd lady a merited benefit" (197-9). Claiming that the bed trick and Mariana's pregnancy "may compel [Angelo] to her recompense" (3.1.250), the duke corrupts the language of idealized benefiting with the taint

of deceit and coercion. (He also assumes that the one-night stand will result in conception, the confirmation of sexual exchange.) The coercion and deceit the duke's benefits entail align them with the debased forms of exchange against which Seneca posits the economy of the benefit. In the duke's alliterative justification of deceit — "the doubleness of the benefit defends the deceit from reproof" (254-6) — he quantifies gains, undermining the Senecan notion that it is "a foul shame . . . a vile Usury to keep a reckoning of benefits, as of expenses" (sig. A2^{v}). Further, the duke *relies on* rather than rejects "security" when he rationalizes the deceit of the bed trick to Mariana:

> He is your husband on a pre-contract;
> To bring you thus together, 'tis no sin,
> Sith that the justice of your title to him
> Doth flourish the deceit.
>
> (4.1.71-4)[10]

Likening his plan to a speculative agrarian enterprise, the duke again betrays the commodified imagination underlying the "benefits" he doles out to his subjects: "Our corn's to reap, for yet our tithe's to sow" (75). The impersonal sexual exchange of the bed trick is likened to sowing grain to pay tithe dues; doing this will lead to the harvest, the contractually enforced marital union.

The duke further reveals a calculating, "measured" understanding of marriage and social exchange by positing an economy of craft, vice, and deceit that is necessary in order to "exact" the "performance" of the "old contracting" between Mariana and Claudio:

> Craft against vice I must apply.
> With Angelo tonight shall lie
> His old betrothed but despised;
> So disguise shall, by th' disguised,
> Pay with falsehood false exacting,
> And perform an old contracting.
>
> (3.2.270-5)

Victoria Hayne suggests that this passage "crown[s] the developing intimacy between the audience and the Duke-friar," inviting the audience's complicity in the opposition to vice that the disguised duke enacts (26). The plodding tetrameter of the duke's lines emphasizes the measure-for-measure logic that he follows, a logic that underlies the complicated exchanges and substitutions that generate the play's final marriages. In addition to presenting the duke as a "kind of inverted Vice figure," the play presents him as constructing a kind of inverted gift economy, one that draws on the rhetoric of benefits. Rather than inviting the audience's complicity in the opposition to vice, the play invites its complicity in the deceit and contractual vision of marriage and social relations that the duke "performs."

For the duke, virtue itself functions like currency. In order to have value, he claims, Angelo's virtue must circulate. Vincentio calls nature a "creditor" to

whom Angelo owes "thanks and use" (1.1.39-41) for the attributes she has loaned him. Rather than hoarded in the convent, Isabella's chastity must be put into circulation as well, the controlled circulation of marriage.[11] After presenting his "offer" of marriage in imperative form, "Give me your hand and say you will be mine" (5.1.497), the duke corrects himself in order to make his proposal more suited to the staged princely magnanimity of his final pardons: "I have a motion much imports your good, / Whereto if you'll a willing ear incline, / What's mine is yours and what is yours is mine" (540-2).[12]

The parodic "good turns" between Pompey and Abhorson approximate the Senecan ideal of benefits more closely than any other exchanges we see in the play:

> ABHORSON Come on, bawd. I will instruct thee in my trade; follow.
> POMPEY I do desire to learn, sir; and I hope, if you have occasion to use me for your own turn, you shall find me yare. For truly, sir, for your kindness I owe you a good turn.
>
> (4.2.54-9)

The jocular goodwill between the bawd and hangman — a parodic rendering of the relation between master and apprentice — is set in relief against the shady "good turns" between the duke and the Provost in the same scene: the duke asks for a "dangerous courtesy" (162), and has much ado to convince the fearful Provost to grant his suit. Except for the parodic good turns between Pompey and Abhorson, the closest we come to a gift ethos in *Measure for Measure* emerges in the final scene, as the duke requites his subjects with pardons, merciful punishments, and marriage offers. However, the play exposes the machination and calculation that buttress the duke's display of sovereign clemency, as well as exposing how his pose as the liberal gift-giver at the end of the play relies on the very antithesis of the gift, the "security" that he earlier decries. The play's project therefore diverges starkly from one of its probable sources, Whetstone's *Right Excellent and Famous History of Promos and Cassandra* (1578), which aims to show "the perfect magnanimitye of a noble kinge, in checking Vice and favouringe Vertue: Wherein is showne, the Ruyne and overthrowe, of dishonest practices, the advauncement of upright dealing" (title page). Rather than "upright dealing" and "perfect magnanimitye," the duke himself engages in deceitful substitutions and "dishonest practices." Despite Vincentio's (largely ineffective) efforts to interrogate and reform his subjects' consciences, *Measure* reveals the extent to which sovereign power enforces contracts as a way of regulating sexual desire.[13] Sexual desire, including marital sexuality, is subordinated in the play to a contractual, commodified logic that barely acknowledges the personal bonds of constancy associated with the gift. While Angelo enforces legal bonds he tries to evade them himself, the duke, as we have seen, relies on legally enforceable contractual obligations even as he condemns them.

The duke and Angelo are not alone in Vienna, of course, in adopting a commodified perspective of sexual relations. The bawds most frankly acknowledge, and profit from, the link between sexuality and commodity exchange.

Pompey, for example, envisions the ramifications of the new law against fornication for the housing market: "If this law hold in Vienna ten year, I'll rent the fairest house in it after threepence a bay" (2.1.239-41).[14] He conflates the "two usuries," money-lending and procuring for fornication, pointing to the capriciousness of the law that condemns one while allowing the "worser" (3.2.6-8). Even the chastened Claudio betrays a commodified understanding of virtue when he claims that Authority "make[s] us pay down for our offense by weight / The words of heaven" (1.2.121-2). Lucio jestingly responds that he would send for his creditors if he were so eloquent under arrest (133). Here Lucio, like Pompey, conflates sexual and financial crimes, as does Angelo when he describes fornication as "coining heaven's image in stamps that are forbid" (2.4.45-6). Behind the conflation of bastardizing and counterfeiting lurks the assumption that producing legitimate children is like minting coins.[15] Unlike bastard children, legitimate ones are authorized by the "stamp" of public authority, or "outward order" (1.2.149), as Claudio calls it when vouching for the legitimacy of his marriage to, "mutual" sexual commerce with, and "possession of" Juliet:

> Thus stands it with me: upon a true contract
> I got possession of Julietta's bed.
> You know the lady; she is fast my wife,
> Save that we do the denunciation lack
> Of outward order. This we came not to,
> Only for propagation of a dow'r
> Remaining in the coffer of her friends,
> From whom we thought it meet to hide our love
> Till time had made them for us. But it chances
> The stealth of our most mutual entertainment
> With character too gross is writ on Juliet.
>
> (145-51)

While waiting publicly to solemnize their marriage in the hopes of "propagating" a dowry — wresting the wealth of Juliet's "friends" out of their coffers and into circulation — Juliet and Claudio "unhappily" (157) propagate a child. These confusions between sexual desire, procreation, and legally-based financial exchanges even infiltrate the insulated world of the moated grange where Mariana resides; just before the duke arrives, the boy's song images kisses as the "seals of love" that are "seal'd in vain" (4.1.5-6).

Hence, the play does not merely elide *illicit* sexual exchange with commodity exchange and the circulation of money. The pervasiveness of substitution in *Measure for Measure*[16] reveals how female chastity can be made to function like currency in the enforcement of "true" marriage contracts. As long as she is chaste — a difficult "fact" to determine — one woman can stand in for another; their very interchangeability renders them equivalent,[17] precluding the possibility of personal bonds that are the definitive feature of a gift transaction. This impersonal exchangeability is even more clear in the case of the duke's machinations than in the case of prostitution; the bawds trade bodies *for* money,

whereas in the bed trick, as Marc Shell points out (125), Isabella's and Mariana's chaste bodies function *like* money. In his efforts to close the deal that will force Isabella to yield up what she calls the "gift of my chaste body" (5.1.102), Angelo simply makes explicit how the "most holy law" of the benefit is a staged affair, based on substitutions, legitimated by the logic of the commodity. Words alone *cannot* create the faithful intentions that should make up vows, but neither can formal contracts alone. The play exposes the need for staged sovereign liberality — the pretense of a gift economy — to supplement strict legal enforcement on the one hand[18] and conscience on the other, both of which, on their own, fail to bind men, and men and women, in fellowship. Through its treatment of female chastity, the play shows how the pretense of sovereign liberality actually reinforces the measured, commodified basis of social relations.

The duke's argument that Angelo owes nature "use," or interest, for the virtue she has loaned to him parallels Aristotelian arguments about money appealed to in the defense of usury. Based on the idea that usury is a crime of intent, rather than a factual, contractual matter, Du Moulin argues that usurers create "a relationship between those who have money and those who need money. Without them money would be nearly useless. Moreover, money is the most useful when it is most used, and usurers see to it that it is kept in use" (quoted in Jones 17). Money is only productive when it is kept in circulation, not hoarded. Keeping female sexuality out of circulation likewise curtails its productivity, a line of argument familiar from Parolles's speeches on virginity in *All's Well that Ends Well*:

> It is not politic in the commonwealth of nature to preserve virginity. Loss of virginity is rational increase, and there was never virgin got till virginity was first lost. . . . Keep it not; you cannot choose but lose by 't. Out with 't! Within t' one year it will make itself two, which is a goodly increase, and the principal itself not much the worse. Away with 't! . . . 'Tis a commodity will lose the gloss with lying; the longer kept, the less worth. Off with 't while 'tis vendible; answer the time of request.
>
> (1.1.128-31, 147-50, 154-6)

Although Helena's own socially-based transacting with the King of France and the Florentine women in *All's Well* come to complicate this notion of how virginity acquires its value in the "commonwealth of nature," Parolles offers a clear, if facetious, sense of how arguments about the relation between use, exchange, and value can easily be appropriated to discuss women's sexuality. Female sexuality does indeed gain cultural value by circulating, but it is often circulation controlled by authorities other than young women themselves.[19]

We can thus see how these texts' figurations of female chastity jostle against the ideological strategies in Seneca's *De Beneficiis*, and in the wider cultural discourses of exchange, for keeping the forces of commodification at bay. Golding's Seneca offers a moral economy of the benefit that purifies personal relations from the taint of commerce by keeping them distinct from traffic in quantifiable, alienable objects that rely on formal contract and the law as the guarantors of honest dealing. Like Seneca's "benefits," the construction of

female chastity is, in part, an ideological strategy for keeping sexual relations distinct from commodity relations. The obsession with women's chastity in the period is an elaborate defense against how, in some contexts, a chaste woman can be made to function as a kind of currency — an arbitrarily authorized unit of measure with no use-value of its own — to ensure the legitimacy of a system of private property.[20] Barbara Baines asserts that chastity is a theologically prescribed virtue that is "appropriated as the standard upon which the economy of secular power is based" (284).[21] A market economy depends on just such a set standard by which the values of commodities can be measured. The construction of women's sexuality through the moral virtue chastity in plays, homilies, conduct books, is an effort to keep it priceless, a matter of conscience — as Vives implores, "I pray thee, understand thine own goodness, maid, thy price cannot be estimated" (104) — out of the reaches of a system of exchange governed by calculated exchange values. Although it does so less directly than Parolles's witty speech, *Measure* exposes such a system as that which often determines the "value" of female chastity. The complex, calculating negotiations that generate the play's marriages expose that the gift ethos is a ruse — albeit a necessary one — that both relies on and buttresses the logic and motives of the commodity.

4.

If in *Measure for Measure*, female chastity helps to expose the economy of the gift as a necessary ruse, in Thomas Heywood's *A Woman Killed with Kindness* — another play with a critical history as a problem case — marital chastity exposes the limits of a conscious gift ethos. Unlike the pervasive commodity mentality of Vienna, Heywood's gentry have an acute sense of the gift ethic, even among those such as Wendoll and the usurer Shafton who violate it. The play opens with the celebration of John and Anne Frankford's marriage. Although Heywood does not stage the precise moment at which the couple exchanges "present consent" (as Swinburne would call it), its definitive elements — the exchange of vows and the taking of hands — are scattered throughout the opening scene and the play generally, indicating some nervousness over trust-based marital vows. Francis Acton, Anne Frankford's brother, "borrows" her hand to dance: "By your leave, sister — by your husband's leave / I should have said — the hand that but this day / Was given you in the church, I'll borrow" (1.6-8). Anne Frankford's hand is her husband's hand, but her husband's itself was "given" to her. Acton and Charles Mountford clasp hands in a friendly wager ("here's my hand" [101]), as do their followers Cranwell and Wendoll ("What, clap you hands? / Or is't not bargain?" "Yes, and stake them down" (106-7)). When Charles Mountford is first freed from prison for murdering one of Acton's followers during a hunt, Shafton soon reveals that his friendly offers of money and hands — "Sir Charles, a hand, a hand — at liberty!" (5.21) — are disingenuous: "If I can fasten but one finger on him, / With my full hand I'll grip him to the heart. / 'Tis not for love I proffered him this coin, / But for my gain and pleasure" (50-3). In all cases, the moment of promise or

friendly wager — rendered physically in the taking of hands — modulates to antagonism, violence or the betrayal of trust, or, in the case of Shafton, was insincere to begin with.[22] Anne will be borrowed from Frankford by Wendoll; the hunting competition between Acton and Charles quickly escalates to violence that culminates in Charles committing murder; and Charles's loan (with interest, of course) from Shafton leads to his second arrest and ultimate bondage to vengeful Acton who pays his debts. The play's anxiety over the nuptial spousal manifests itself first by the dispersal of the moment of promise throughout the opening scene, and then through the eruption of violence or betrayal in the scenes that follow. Heywood's play shares in the fear of Shakespeare's Vienna that words cannot "make up vows" and the concomitant fear that perhaps it is only formal legal regulation (the "bond") that can bind men, and men and women, or that can guarantee honest dealing in all forms of exchange.

Of all the play's characters, Shafton is certainly the least compelling and the least "developed" or "motivated"; in fact, he disappears from the play completely after having Charles arrested for debt in scene seven, making him seem like a gratuitous plot device. But his function is central: he plays out the logic by which competing forms of exchange can only be articulated relationally.[23] His repeated references to and delight in litigation (5.35-8; 7.29-30, 57-62, 70-1) counter the appeals to conscience throughout the play, thus serving as the antithesis to the gift ethic.[24] Willfully disregarding the knowledge that "love" should be what motivates his offers, the bad giver Shafton serves as the necessary foil to the disinterested liberality of Frankford, which erupts inexplicably in the scene immediately preceding Shafton's equally inexplicable usurious offers.

It is in this scene that we finally witness John Frankford taking vows — not with his wife Anne, but with Wendoll.[25] Here, John offers all at his disposal in order to forge a friendship with him:

FRANKFORD I will allow you, sir,
Your man, your gelding, and your table,
All at my own charge. Be my companion.
WENDOLL Master Frankford, I have oft been bound to you
By many favours; this exceeds them all
That I shall never merit your least favour.
But when your last remembrance I forget,
Heaven at my soul exact that weighty debt.
FRANKFORD There needs no protestation, for I know you
Virtuous, and therefore grateful. Prithee Nan,
Use him with all thy loving'st courtesy.
ANNE As far as modesty may well extend,
It is my duty to receive your friend.
FRANKFORD To dinner, come sir; from this present day,
Welcome to me forever. Come away!

(4.70-84)

Except for the lines between John and Anne, this interchange could be read as a staging of *De Beneficiis*: John creates perpetual companionship by liberal giving ("Welcome to me forever"), and Wendoll is conscious that he is bound by the "weighty debt" of gratitude, gratitude that Frankford elides with virtue and sees as its logical result ("I know you / Virtuous, and therefore grateful"). As with the earlier examples, this moment of promise will be violated; Wendoll seduces Anne and is "profuse in Frankford's richest treasure [that is, Anne]" (11.116). But the problem at the heart of this plot and of the play is not adultery, but rather how an ethic of absolute generosity expressed in gift-giving conflicts with the control of wifely chastity as a privately owned, semi-commodified object. The scene in which this interchange occurs opens with John's catalogue of his treasured possessions, "chief / Of all" being his "fair" and "chaste" wife (4.1-14). John wants to share all his stuff with Wendoll, but unlike his other possessions — table, purse, horses, servants — Anne has to be proper to him, and can't be given. Her response to John's command to "use" Wendoll suggests that she is aware of the limits her "modesty" places on John's ability to be a liberal giver. Rather than viewing friendship with Wendoll as a gift freely given, Anne views Wendoll as one whom it is a contractual "duty to receive" (82). John cannot say without qualification to Wendoll "what's mine is yours," because Anne is proper to him; unlike all other property in a commodity economy, however, she is not alienable, she can't be transferred or loaned to another "owner."[26]

In Wendoll's prolonged soliloquy before the seduction scene (6.1-52) — a dramatized struggle with conscience — he acknowledges John's generosity, the bond it creates, as well as the consequences of being ungrateful to his liberal donor. In his witting violation of the gift ethic, the play clearly constructs Wendoll's crime not as adultery with Anne but as ingratitude to her husband:

> He doth maintain me; he allows me largely
> Money to spend—
> . . .
> My gelding and my man.
> . . .
> This kindness grows of no alliance 'twixt us
> . . .
> I never bound him to me by desert;
> . . .
> He cannot eat without me,
> Nor laugh without me; I am to his body
> As necessary as his digestion,
> And equally do make him whole or sick.
> And shall I wrong this man? Base man! Ingrate!
> Hast thou the power straight with thy gory hands
> To rip thy image from his bleeding heart?
> . . .
> . . . or rend his heart
> To whom thy heart was joined and knit together?
> (6.27-28, 31, 33, 35, 40-46, 49-50)

When Anne relays John's message that Wendoll is to "be a present Frankford in his absence" (6.78), we discover that the problem is not only that Anne is a possession that cannot be given but that John cannot fully fuse with his "companion" Wendoll. Although the gift-generated bond between the two men is so strong that it makes their desire for the same woman seem almost inevitable, their loss of the "proper" self should not extend to John's relationship with Anne. During the seduction scene, Anne reiterates what Wendoll has already articulated, that John "esteems" Wendoll "even as his [own] brain, his eye-ball, or his heart" (6.113-14). The two hearts "joined and knit together" are torn asunder by the disruptive force of heterosexual desire, a force that cannot be contained by the ethic of the gift, an ethic of which Wendoll is wholly aware. Wendoll's repeated willingness to "hazard all" (129, 137) in order to have Anne reveals that conflicting social and sexual relations can entail the kinds of risks associated with commodity exchange. However, the play pointedly constructs Wendoll's crime as a breach of the gift ethic. Just as Golding's Seneca argues that one finds "an unthankful person" beneath all social vices (sig. B3^{v}), Wendoll's ingratitude to John is presented as the root of the marital and social disorder in *Woman Killed.* For him, adultery is an incidental crime. He plans to wander on the continent "where the report of my ingratitude / Cannot be heard," and then to return once this crime, not adultery, is forgotten so that he can seek honor and praise at court (16.129-37).[27]

Honor, of course, is not gender neutral, and in Anne's case adultery is not an incidental crime. Upon his servant's disclosure of Wendoll and Anne's actions, John's thoughts immediately turn to her birth, education, repute, carriage, and demeanor, all of which previously indicated that she was "modest, chaste, and godly. / Is all this seeming gold plain copper?" (8.99-105). John's reaction and question points to the fragility of the usual means by which the value and "surety" of wifely chastity is constructed. Anne's homiletic address to the women in the audience once her crime has been discovered suggests that unchaste wives debase something other than their own value:

> O women, women, you that have yet kept
> Your holy matrimonial vow unstained,
> Make me your instance: when you tread awry,
> Your sins like mine will on your conscience lie.
>
> (13.142-5)

Anne's "yet" hints at the tenuousness of that holy vow, as if the women she addresses were just on the verge of doing some staining. Significantly, the matrimonial *vow* is what would be stained, not the womens' value or reputation, or even their bodies. Like Swinburne, who posits the exchange of vows as the essence of matrimony, Anne's address to her female audience suggests that the exchange of faithful vows outweighs the giving of bodies in intercourse in making a true marriage. It is her sin of "staining" not her chaste body but this trust-based vow that lies on Anne's conscience after John discovers her.

Illustrating how liberal giving can be used to express enmity, John keeps offering gifts and courtesies as he plots to entrap Anne and Wendoll (11.38-40,

48-9, 63-4). His novel form of punishment of Anne for committing adultery — the titular "kindness" and Heywood's innovation in the revenge plot — is appropriate because it reveals John's effort to keep his relationship to Wendoll and to Anne in the sphere of the gift. Rather than taking legal action, taking their lives, or physically punishing them (as Anne begs him to do just before addressing the women in the audience), he lets them contemplate their violation of the "most holy law" of the gift; he tells Wendoll:

> When thou record'st my many courtesies
> And shalt compare them with they treacherous heart,
> Lay them together, weigh them equally,
> 'Twill be revenge enough.
>
> (13.72-5)

This weighing and calculating takes place within the sphere of the gift, since conscience, rather than the law, is to serve as the agent of punishment. John doles out to Anne a "judgment" that is even more "liberal":

> Woman, hear thy judgment:
> Go, make thee ready in thy best attire,
> Take with thee all thy gowns, all thy apparel;
> Leave nothing that did ever call thee mistress,
> Or by whose sight being left here in the house
> I may remember such a woman by.
> Choose thee a bed and hangings for a chamber;
> Take with thee everything that hath thy mark,
> And get thee to my manor seven mile off,
> Where live. 'Tis thine; I freely give it thee.
> My tenants by shall furnish thee with wains
> To carry all thy stuff, within two hours,
> No longer, will I limit thee my sight.
> Choose which of all my servants thou likest best,
> And they are thine to attend thee.
>
> (158-72)

In "freely" giving Anne all this "stuff," John uses the same acts of generosity by which he had tried to establish his friendship with Wendoll to "torment [Anne's] soul" (156) and to mark his estrangement from her.[28] "It was thy hand," he tells her, "cut two hearts out of one" (186). The heart joined in matrimony is not the only "one" that has been sundered, since the two hearts of John and Wendoll were also "joined and knit together"; as Wendoll addressed himself before seducing Anne: "Ingrate! / Hast thou the power straight with thy gory hands / To rip thy image from his bleeding heart? . . . or rend his heart / To whom thy heart was joined and knit together?" (6.44-6, 49-50)

In the final scene of *Measure for Measure*, I have argued, the friar-duke has to use the pretense of princely magnanimity to supplement his earlier unsuccessful efforts to shape and interrogate his subjects' consciences rather than

enforce the law against fornication. In staging that magnanimity he relies on the commodity logic that is usually seen as its antithesis. When the law against adultery and ingratitude has been violated in John Frankford's "little commonwealth," his liberal, gift-driven punishment of Anne allows her to repent on her own so that John is able to shape the consciences of his subjects as Duke Vincentio could not. John deploys the same generosity by which he had forged a bond with Wendoll to force Anne to repent. Repentance is itself an internalized process centered on the individual subject's conscience, so that John's enabling of it through his "kindness," unlike external punishments or execution, resides within the sphere of the gift.[29] His gift-based punishment allows Anne herself to repent her crimes, but only on the condition that her connection with her husband and *his* children is broken:

> But, as thou hopest for heaven, as thou believest
> Thy name's recorded in the book of life,
> I charge thee never after this sad day
> To see me, or to meet me, or to send
> By word, or writing, gift, or otherwise
> To move me, by thyself, or by thy friends,
> Nor challenge any part in my two children.
>
> (13.173-9)

As John's prohibitions here indicate, Anne's estrangement from him is signified by her inability to approach him as a gift-giver. Anne proceeds to repent with a vengeance, symbolized when she bids Nick to break her beloved lute, which John, wishing to remove all material traces of Anne, has sent after her. Anne wishes to break the lute "not as my husband's gift, but my farewell / To all earth's joy" (16.74-5). She does not reject the gift that constitutes part of his punishment but rather renounces the material and sensual pleasures that the instrument signifies; with them she renounces life itself, as she proceeds to starve herself to death. Anne's death finally allows John to forgive her — "Though thy rash offence / Divorced our bodies, thy repentant tears / Unite our souls" (17.107-9) — and to restore them to their married state, the "singular gift of God," as the *Homily of Matrimony* calls it.[30]

No matter how successfully Frankford keeps his "judgment" and forgiveness of Anne in the sphere of the gift, however, it is the status of her marital chastity partially outside of this sphere that gets them in trouble in the first place. Having been given in marriage, Anne's chastity is out of circulation. Unlike the other possessions which he offers to Wendoll, her chaste body cannot serve as a "badge" of Frankford's good will; it cannot be given or shared, and therefore cannot help cement the relationship between the two men as John's other gifts do. The following exhortation from Vives is therefore only partially accurate:

> And know thou this, woman, that the chastity and honesty which thou hast is not thine, but committed and betaken unto thy keeping by thine hus-

band. Wherefore thou dost the more wrong to give away that thing which is another body's, without the owner's license.

(113)

If, as Vives cautions, a woman's chastity is not hers to give — or if, as Ruth Kelso states, it is the "greatest gift to her husband" (97) she brings in marriage — once the marriage transaction takes place, a woman's chastity is not her husband's to give either. Anne's value as a wife derives from her being the private and inalienable property of John. Neither gift nor commodity (since the definitive feature of a commodity is its exchangeability), the ambiguous status of wifely chastity conflicts with the ethic of open generosity and loss of proper identity which constitutes John's friendship with Wendoll.

5.

In Heywood's play, we encounter another plot in which a woman's chastity (again a sister's as in *Measure for Measure*) is figured as an object of exchange.[31] Like Isabella, Susan Mountford faces the choice between preserving her chastity and preserving her brother. Unlike Claudio, however, Charles Mountford's life is not at stake. Rather, Susan is called on to save his honor, an honor that is wholly constituted by adhering to an ethic of the gift. When Susan fears that Acton will pursue legal action, Charles responds that "my conscience is become my enemy / And will pursue me more than Acton can" (3.70-3). Like a good Senecan (and not unlike the Frankfords) he recognizes the binding power of conscience over that of legal enforcement. Charles is later imprisoned a second time because he refuses to sell his ancestral home to the usurer Shafton to whom he owes money. He refuses, in short, to acknowledge the commodification of his ancient home; he figures the sale as a defloration, calling the title to the house a "virgin title never yet deflowered" (7.23). Because he resists Shafton's seductive offers to buy the estate, Charles goes to prison owing the principal and the "use." Literalizing the metaphor of defloration by which he figured the sale of the family home, he calls on Susan to offer her chastity to repay his debt to Acton, who has freed him from prison. Charles's metaphor — and the subsequent actions (and transactions) that explore this metaphor's explanatory power — draw the connection between a crucial cluster of properties that have to be passed on and transferred in order to have value, but that have to be kept in controlled circulation by being cautiously given as gifts or traded as "terminal commodities": female chastity, the family name and estate, and the sense of personal honor that derives from them.[32]

In a double movement that illustrates the relationality of gift and commodity, the play juxtaposes an idealized gift ethic with rigorous scrutiny of its material and calculable consequences. This attention to materiality is especially true in the Mountford plot. Charles's refusal to capitulate to commodity exchange, and the play's excessive emphasis on the Mountford's refusal to sell their remaining land, is accompanied by great specificity in what they lose, 2,500 pounds a year in patrimony, and what they retain, 500 pounds and a sum-

mer house. This careful bookkeeping combines with explicit attention to the Mountfords' changing relation to the means of production; Cranwell reports that Charles has "turned a plain countryman" (5.7), indicating that he is no longer a landlord. The play continues to emphasize the labor this new relation to the land entails, zeroing in on its bodily effects. In order to sustain themselves, Charles is "enforced to follow husbandry" and Susan to "milk" (7.3-4). Charles points to "this palm" roughened by labor (39) and "her silver brow" blasted by the elements (40-1). Susan tells Shafton, "we feed sparing and we labour hard, / We lie uneasy, to reserve to us / And our succession this small plot of ground" (44-6). Through Charles's efforts to adhere to an idealized gift ethic, the Mountford plot, contrary to the Senecan vision of benefits which effaces the material domain, reinstates the material as a locus of value.

In the very materiality of its unrelenting attention to the consequences of Charles and Susan's efforts to "keep this poor house we have left unsold" (7.2), the play virtually idealizes their downward mobility. As he tries to dissuade Shafton from his efforts to buy, Charles tells him how the "crisis of the landed gentry" *feels*:

> I have so bent my thoughts to husbandry
> That I protest I scarcely can remember
> What a new fashion is, how silk or satin
> Feels in my hand; why, pride is grown to us
> A mere, mere stranger. I have quite forgot
> The names of all that ever waited on me;
> I cannot name ye any of my hounds,
> Once from whose echoing mouths I heard all the music
> That e'er my heart desired. What should I say?
> To keep this place I have changed myself away.
>
> (47-65)

Here, Charles recounts a series of alienations and forgettings, both material and immaterial, from the feel of rich fabrics and the sounds of barking hounds, to the names of servants. Charles personifies pride in order to express his alienation from it. This series of losses culminates in Charles's alienation from his former self: "I have changed myself away." He endures all these losses in order to hold on to his last vestige of the old order, the ancestral land. These paradoxically ennobling losses cause Charles to bend his thoughts to husbandry, so that he becomes a most devoted husband to the land, refusing to let it pass outside of the family.

But the honorable exchange of "good turns" that ideally expresses the bonds between family members is obstructed when Charles's kinfolk reject his suit for help to get out of debtor's prison. When Susan seeks assistance from their kin and friends, they not only refuse to offer help but also refuse to recognize their former ties to Charles. His uncle rejects the bond of kinship, saying Charles "lost my kindred when he fell to need" (9.17); Sandy rejects friendship, "I knew you ere your brother sold his land" (22); and Cousin Tydy claims, "I am no cousin unto them that borrow" (36). Sandy, a former tenant whom Charles

gave a farm "rent-free" (27), refuses to requite the favor. With the rebuff from family and friends to help free Charles from prison, the whole range of social and personal relations — family/kin, friend, tenant — dissolves, a dissolution that is expressed by their refusals to grant good turns. When he discovers the refusal of his kin, Charles laments the fetters of disgrace that their ingratitude brings to the family name: "Unthankful kinsmen! Mountfords all too base! / To let thy name lie fettered in disgrace!" (10.5-6). Familial ingratitude, like deflowering the virgin title to the land, is a violation of the gift ethic; both are seen, therefore, to disgrace the family name.

Upon the news that it is the bounty of Acton and not of his kin that frees him from prison, Charles reveals that the accrued debt of honor diminishes his sense of self. Ever true to the gift ethic, Charles believes physical imprisonment would be less onerous than the weighty debt of honor to Acton. He expresses great distress and identity confusion upon the news that Acton freed him from prison:

> By Acton freed! Not all thy manacles
> Could fetter so my heels as this one word
> Hath thralled my heart, and it must now lie bound
> In more strict prison than thy stony gaol.
> . . .
> Had this proceeded from my friends, or [father]
> From them this action had deserved my life,
> And from a stranger more, because from such
> There is less execution of good deeds.
> But he, nor father, nor ally, nor friend,
> More than a stranger, both remote in blood
> And in his heart opposed my enemy,
> O there I lose myself. What should I say?
> What think? what do, his bounty to repay?
>
> (10.92-5, 109-18)

If before, Charles "changed [him]self away" in bending his thoughts to husbandry, here, his debt to a gift-giving enemy causes him to "lose [him]self." He plans to use Susan as a semi-commodified return gift to Acton in order to redeem himself: "Though poor, my heart is set / In one rich gift to pay back all my debt" (123-4). Refusing to deflower the virgin title to the family home retains the honor of the family name; now that that name "lies fettered in disgrace" due to familial ingratitude, Charles offers the defloration of Susan to retain his sense of personal honor.

Susan wavers uncontrollably in Charles's language between gift, commodity, currency, *and* fellow transactor as he tells her why he has "tricked [her] like a bride" (14.1). By claiming that she should "stand / In joint-bond bound to satisfy the debt" (74-5), he situates her as a potential transactor in the deal. But by referring to Susan as "such a present, such an acquittance for the knight to seal" (94-5), he positions her both as a gift and as the legal document discharging his debt which Acton's "seal" would formalize. Charles also figures

her as currency when he values her "rich jewel" (48) at 500 pounds plus "interest" (46), ignoring Vives' pleas to chaste maids: "I pray thee, understand thine own goodness, maid, thy price cannot be estimated" (104). Finally, he offers Susan to Acton as a "pawn" in absence of "ready coin" (14.105-6). Susan's vacillating figuration as gift, money and potential transactor contributes to rather than allays anxieties about the distinctions between personal and legal exchanges, and those between gift and commodity.

Because he is freed from the burden of redeeming his family's name, Charles can enlist the riches of Susan to save him from incurring "the world's disgrace" (14.12) by dying indebted to his enemy. When he tells Susan, "tricked . . . like a bride" (1), "It lies in thee . . . to acquit me free, / And all my debt I may outstrip by thee" (16-17), she responds much as does Isabella, "tricked" like a novice nun, to Lucio's suggestion that she might "assay what pow'r you have" to help Claudio (*Measure* 1.4.76). Isabella's halting questions — "Alas, what poor / Ability 's in me to do him good? . . . My power? Alas, I doubt —" (74-5, 77) — parallel those of Susan, who stammers: "By me? Why I have nothing, nothing . . . I am not worth —" (14.18-20). Charles interrupts her faltering questions:

> O sister, say not so.
> It lies in you my downcast state to raise,
> To make me stand on even points with the world.
> Come, sister, you are rich! Indeed you are!
> And in your power you have, without delay,
> Acton's five hundred pound back to repay.
>
> (20-5)

Like Charles, Lucio interrupts Isabella's "Alas, I doubt —":

> Our doubts are traitors,
> And makes us lose the good we oft might win,
> By fearing to attempt. Go to Lord Angelo,
> And let him learn to know, when maidens sue,
> Men give like gods.
>
> (1.4.77-81)

Both sisters have to put the power of the virtue that lies "in" them into circulation in order for its value to be realized. Both might therefore seem to be figured merely as ransom money or gift-bribes, since both sisters, unbeknownst to themselves, are brides-(and bribes)-to-be. However, both are also themselves transactors. Just as Charles positions Susan as a transactor "in joint-bond bound," Lucio positions Isabella as a suitor ("when maidens sue / Men give like gods"). Susan, moreover, has repeatedly refused the gifts Acton has offered in his efforts to woo her ("He dotes on me, and oft hath sent me gifts, / Letters, and tokens: I refused them all" [10.121-2]). Because of this continual slippage, we cannot assert that either Susan or Isabella is merely a medium or object of exchange, whether gift, commodity, or money.

To understand how Susan does not function merely as an object of exchange, a commodity or currency without value unless put in circulation, we must attend to her interactions/transactions with Acton before Charles becomes aware of them. Recalling that Charles has a sister, Acton plans to use her defloration as a means of revenge, and bribing Susan with gifts is to be the means for executing this plan: "I'll proffer largely, but the deed being done / I'll smile to see her base confusion" (7.83-4). When Acton first sees Susan, however, sudden desire for her disrupts this original plan,[33] as she becomes invested with value for him independent of the relationship with Charles. Acton's sudden desire for Susan means that she is no longer an empty means of revenge, but a desirable thing with a kind of use-value, as well as a means of representing the personal enmity between Charles and Acton. Like Euphues, courted by "sundry devices" of flatterers, Susan has to resist participating in a corrupted form of exchange. She is therefore not only a desirable thing with a use-value but a transactor, a position that enables her to refuse Acton's gifts: "See, I spurn his gold; / My honour never shall for gain be sold" (9.53-4). Acton laments that he cannot "woo her with gifts" since she refuses them (62-3). At this point he hatches his plan to free Charles: "I will fasten such a kindness on her / As shall o'ercome her hate and conquer it" (66-7). The "kindness" Acton plans to "fasten" on Susan links this plot to John's liberal "judgment." Combined with Acton's assertion that "In her I'll bury my hate of him" (72), Acton's new plan to secure Susan's indebtedness by using Charles illustrates that Charles serves as a medium to solidify the relationship between Susan and Acton as much as Susan serves to eradicate the antagonism between the two men.[34]

We can also understand the obsession with female chastity, then, as a defense against how, in some contexts, a woman's desirability for heterosexual men can incite efforts to bribe her with gifts, not just use her as a semi-commodified gift; heterosexual male desire becomes a problem because it encourages the use of corrupt gifts and turns women not only into sullied objects of exchange but into potentially corrupted transactors.[35]

Acton, overcome first by his desire for Susan, and then by what he calls Charles's "honourable wrested courtesy" (14.121), suddenly relents, recognizing that his former desire for revenge cannot be weighed against the debt of gratitude he would owe to Charles if he accepted Susan as "pawn":

> Stern heart, relent
> . . .
> Was ever known in any former age
> Such honorable wrested courtesy?
> Lands, honors, lives, and all the world forgo
> Rather than stand engaged to such a foe.
>
> (14.118, 120-3)

Despite his former efforts to bribe and exact revenge, Acton is finally forcibly converted to the gift ethic. Although he offers marriage almost as unexpectedly as Duke Vincentio, Acton does so as part of a competitive display of liberal-

ity and gratitude between himself and the Mountfords. Unlike the duke, who had to emend his proposal from a command to a generous offer, Acton has quickly internalized the ethic of the gift. Acton's proposal comes as both an acceptance — "Your metamorphised foe receives your gift / In satisfaction of all former wrongs" — and a return offer: "All's mine is yours" (14.141-2, 153).

Just as Angelo refuses Isabella's prayers, which she calls a "bribe" (2.2.150) whose value is above the "fond"rate (154) of the market, the "metamorphised foe" Acton receives Charles's "gift." Both sisters are spared from yielding up their chastity. Rather than the bed trick substitutions and pretense of liberality that spare Isabella from Angelo in *Measure for Measure*, Susan is spared by the tortured ethos of the gift operating in the play, an ethos strained almost to the breaking point by the logic of contractual, calculated debts, and by the malleable status of Susan's chastity as it slides between gift, commodity, and currency. In its very insistence on refusing commodity exchange, the subplot enacts the collapse of the imaginative economies of gift and commodity. The language of calculated debts commingles with that of debts of honor which are beyond calculation. I therefore disagree with Nancy Gutierrez when she argues that Susan's use as repayment makes "all too explicit the patriarchy's attitude that a woman's chastity, in spite of the idealized descriptions of its value as a sign of worthiness and character, is a mere commodity, to be bought and sold at male discretion" (280). Despite its centrality in "burying" the antagonism between Acton and Charles, the status of Susan's chastity is far too unstable to be conceived as a "mere commodity." Seeing it as such discounts the way in which Susan, refusing Acton's bribes, acts as a willful non-transactor, not an object of exchange. Moreover, as we have seen, the *inability* of a husband to buy, sell, or give his wife's chastity at his discretion drives the main plot of the play. In fact, the way in which Susan's chastity can be maneuvered in the subplot — the way it combines use and exchange value — brings into relief how brittle the means for determining the value of a wife's chastity is. Although the language and logic at work most centrally in the subplot once Acton is "metamorphised" figures Susan as a gift, the movement back to alliance has been enabled by the figurative malleability and maneuverability of her maiden chastity, and her refusal to be a corrupted recipient of Acton's initial gifts.

6.

The volatility of Susan's status in *Woman Killed* belies Gutierrez's assertion that "Lévi-Strauss's thesis that the exchange of woman is the basis of culture is applicable to early modern England" (272). In addition to discounting the complexity of Susan's representation, the claim that Lévi-Strauss's paradigm is "applicable to early modern England" assumes that kinship is the primary organizational structure of this culture, since, as Rubin points out, the exchange of women functions as the basis of the social order in those cultures based primarily on kinship as an organizational structure, in the absence of other governing institutions, such as the law or the state. England in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries was not devoid of other governing institutions;

moreover, several historians object to grounding social analysis, including analysis of the construction of gender, in kinship. Joan Scott, for example, argues that historical analysis must aim to discover the struggle that leads to the "appearance of timeless permanence in binary gender representation" (43). Scott critiques scholarship that focuses exclusively, or even primarily, on kinship as the domain where gender is constructed for helping to efface such struggle:

> Some scholars, notably anthropologists, have restricted the use of gender to the kinship system (focusing on household and family as the basis for social organization). We need a broader view that includes not only kinship but also . . . the labor market (a sex-segregated labor market is a part of the process of gender construction), education (all-male, single-sex, or coeducational institutions are part of the same process), and the polity (universal male suffrage is part of the process of gender construction). . . . Gender is constructed through kinship, but not exclusively; it is constructed as well in the economy and the polity, which, in our society at least, now operate largely independently of kinship.
>
> (43-4)[36]

Although he does not claim that kinship bears no relation to other institutions or organizations, Keith Wrightson argues convincingly against the view that kinship is the basic organizational unit of the local community in early modern England. He points to great variation in who was recognized as kin, illustrating how "kinship shaded into friendship in its practical importance. It was one of many social bonds, rather than a dominant principle in the social structure, one of many foundations on which the individual might build up a network of social contacts" (50).

A wholesale importation of the exchange-of-women concept into England in our period introduces the potential for making inaccurate generalizations. Regarding marriage and inheritance practices, it only applies to those with property (and even among those with property, not just fathers and potential suitors "bargain"),[37] it fails to consider the legal and social status of widows, and many historians question the prevalence of arranged, enforced marriage even among the propertied.[38] The uncritical use of the exchange-of-women concept also has the potential of effacing the extent to which women were transactors themselves — at market, in the household, at birthings and christenings, as patrons, as providers of charity, as audiences at the theater[39] — in addition to conveyors of their own vows and bodies. Susan and Isabella are situated as transactors as much as they function as gifts or money. Although she functions partially as a gift between Charles and Acton, Susan, in her very refusal to transact with Acton, is a potential transactor. Using the concept uncritically not only ignores women's potential as transactors but also can efface the extent to which women could and did resist their positioning as objects of exchange.

The uncritical application of the traffic-in-women paradigm needs modification not only when one thinks of it as a literal structure organizing the social formation; for early modern England, it needs careful refinement if used as a figurative construct or even as a governing fiction. To assert that women are

objects of exchange ignores the fact that there is more than one kind of object of exchange, and that there is more than one system of exchange by which objects circulate. One cannot assert that women function like commodities, or that women's sexuality is a commodity, without considering the distinctions between commodities and gifts. Strictly speaking, a commodity is alienable; that is, although it is a possession, it is distinct from its owner. As Marx says at the opening of *Capital*: "A commodity is, in the first place, an object outside us" (43), and hence it is transferable to others. Though owned by, or proper to, an individual or group, a commodity is transferable to others through sale or barter. Once a marriage "transaction" takes place, thinking literally, a woman no longer has exchange-value; she is no longer transferable, at least according to dominant, normative ideologies of marriage. As husband and wife become "one flesh," the maid/commodity is no longer an "object outside" her husband. As the Frankford-Wendoll plot painstakingly unravels, a married woman is "out of circulation," and a married man cannot become one with both his wife and his beloved friend. Also strictly speaking, the exchange-value of a commodity is calculable according to the going rate. The value of a woman's chastity, at least in the ideal construction of it, exceeds calculation, is priceless, and hence is positioned conceptually in the gift economy. Unlike the exchange of commodities, as Nancy Hartsock notes, the exchange of women

> transforms all participants in the transaction. The buyer or seller of a commodity remains buyer or seller after the purchase/sale, but after a woman is exchanged, those who were strangers are now affines, and the woman herself becomes part of another lineage, a married woman, an adult. Every participant occupies a different place afterward.
>
> (275)[40]

This social transformation of both transactors and transacted approximates the effects of gift exchange that forges ongoing affiliations between transactors.

But however much the exchange of women approximates the exchange of gifts, and despite the effort to position women's chastity in the gift sphere, the gift of chastity is one that cannot really be given. Rather, it is more often seen as potentially *lost* or violated. Chastity is a woman's virtue, but once she is married it is not hers to give. Rights of sexual access belong to a husband, but his wife's chastity is not a gift which he can bestow on others either. A woman can *lose* her chastity or *give it up* — for money, to save her brother's life or honor — but she exchanges the *loss* of it for this other thing. She is forced to weigh the negative value of its loss against the value of what she is losing it for. Moreover, if desired sexually, women's chaste bodies do not, like gifts, function as the "mere badge" of transactors' goodwill. In the idealist gift scheme, the locus of value is not in the "matter of the benefit," but things need to be exchanged in order to manifest or betoken the "benefit itself." This need for a transaction event in order to express idealized ties between men becomes a problem when one or both of the exchange partners has desire for the material object itself. The best intentions of a giver cannot control the power of the *matter* of the benefit to engage the affective or erotic energies of the recipient. This is yet

another way in which the gift relation cannot be utterly separated from the commodity relation. The gift, as a thing, is in principle the "badge" or token of some other good, not valued or even desired in its own right. Once they are valued/desired in their own right (as objects or things or even as persons) women cannot be used as gifts between men. Once the transactors' erotic or affective energies are engaged, woman-as-object-of-exchange slips into a different register.

Deliberately or not, the drama that centers on questions of female chastity and marriage exposes how a sharp distinction cannot be drawn between gift and commodity exchange. In the plays, marriage is seen to incorporate elements of both forms of exchange, disrupting other social bonds and itself being disrupted by them. The ethic of the gift, markedly absent in *Measure for Measure*, has to be manufactured by the duke in order to keep female chastity in controlled circulation. In *A Woman Killed with Kindness* this ethic, and the power of conscience that underlies it, is pushed almost to the breaking point. The plays are problems because they expose the contradictions that arise when one tries to distinguish sharply between exchange motivated by the desire for personal or social bonds, enforceable only by trust, and that motivated by the individual's desire for profit, enforceable only by legal coercion. By offering plots and characters who try to position women as objects of exchange, the plays expose that such a sharp distinction between gift relations and commodity relations cannot be drawn; in the process, they show how female sexuality exceeds the means for establishing value in either system of exchange. However central to the maintenance of the dominant social order, female chastity confounds the economic imagination by eluding its governing constructs.

Notes

1. In "Constructing Female Sexuality in the Renaissance," Neely aptly articulates the reasons for the period's concern with female chastity:

> Female sexuality is at the center of Renaissance definitions of female gender roles. The source of women's power, it demands their subordination. Female sexuality is necessary for men to satisfy their desires and to fulfill their gender role requirements appropriately. . . . But it is potentially uncontrollable or unobtainable; it reminds men that they are all vulnerable mother's sons, that all children are potentially illegitimate. . . . The reiterated admonitions in the prescriptive literature that women should be chaste, modest, silent, and obedient are directed to a single end. Modesty, silence, and obedience all ensure chastity.
>
> (212-3)

See also the discussions of the cultural and dramatic discourses of female sexuality in Breitenberg, Carroll, and DiGangi.

2. I have benefited from Carroll's attention to the importance of negation in Shakespeare's representation of virginity. Rose explores how in *Hamlet* and

Measure for Measure "femininity" functions as excess that is beyond interpretive schema and beyond representation (114). We will see in *A Woman Killed With Kindness* and *Measure for Measure* how female sexuality, especially a wife's chastity, exceeds the means for determining value of both gift and commodity exchange. In "The Cultural Biography of Things," Kopytoff explains the notion of the "singular" or "sacralized" versus the "common," notions that provide a way to understand some of the confusions surrounding female chastity and the need to complicate the "exchange of women" concept that I have been stressing here. He asserts: "To be saleable for money or to be exchangeable for a wide array of other things is to have something in common with a large number of exchangeable things that, taken together, partake of a single universe of comparable values. . . . [T]o be saleable or widely exchangeable is 'common' — the opposite of being incomparable, singular, unique, and therefore not exchangeable for anything else" (69). Although Kopytoff argues that these are "ideal polar types" that no "real economic system could conform to either" (69-70), he suggests, following Durkheim, that "societies need to set apart a certain portion of their environment, marking it as 'sacred,'" and that "singularization is one means to this end" (73). Singularized, sacralized, female chastity is constructed again and again in the sphere of the gift; but it serves as a gift that has "terminal" exchange status — once given, it can't be exchanged again. Women have relatively greater "commodity candidacy," mainly in the marriage transaction, but female chastity, which defines women's marriageability, is constructed partially as a gift. The repeated efforts to mark their chastity as a prime value, one that cannot be priced, shows a defensive effort to sacralize their sexuality, to singularize it so that it is not exchangeable for counterpart values. We will see how the duke's machinations and the bed trick in *Measure for Measure*, and the "honorable wrested courtesy" of the Mountfords, belie this effort.

3. See Neely's *Broken Nuptials* (58-64) for a history of the term "problem plays." On *Measure* in particular, see 92-102. On the critical history of *A Woman Killed with Kindness*, see Baines's *Thomas Heywood* (79-103), Spacks, Bromley, and the introduction in Scobie's edition. It is interesting to me that much of the negative evaluation of Heywood's drama lambasts him for pandering to commercial tastes; he is attacked for being "a purveyor of this kind of ware" (xi), a phrase coined by A. C. Swinburne in 1908 and made famous by T. S. Eliot.

4. The first three books of *De Beneficiis* were translated by Nicholas Hayward, *The Line of Liberalitie Dulie Directinge the Wel Bestowing of Benefits* (1569; STC 12939). Seneca's work was also translated by Thomas Lodge, the author of *An Alarum Against Usurers*, a cautionary tale of one young man's victimization by a usurer and his agent. Lodge's first translation of *De Beneficiis* appears with a translation of all of Seneca's prose works in 1613, enlarged in a second edition in 1620 (STC 22213, 22214).

5. See Cowie for a discussion of how Lévi-Strauss's exchange of women concept presupposes what it aims to explain, positing the "value" of woman prior to culture. Hartsock's critique of Rubin (293-303) is a wonderfully lucid theoretical account of how Rubin replicates the problems in Lévi-Strauss. Also see Henrietta Moore, especially 60-2, on the debate over the exchange of

women concept among anthropologists. She points to a fundamental conceptual distinction between discussing women's access to property and seeing them as a kind of property. This conceptual issue is explored in Strathern. The difference between women as autonomous subjects and as objects in Renaissance ideologies of marriage is addressed by Belsey.

6. See my "Peopling, Profiting and Pleasure in *The Tempest*" for a reading of Miranda that likewise complicates the notion of woman as object of exchange.

7. See *The Lawes Resolution of Womens Rights*, 41-7, on dower and jointure, the exchanges of property that accompany marriage.

8. Swinburne was a leading ecclesiastical lawyer whose work on testaments and spousals remained standard references for over a century. *Of Spousals* was published posthumously. For a discussion of Swinburne and the relation between common and civil law, see Palliser 359. See Ingram 125-67 for a full discussion of the legal jurisdiction over marriage. On the difficulties encountered because of competing conceptions of what constituted matrimony, see Cook, chapter 8. Hayne offers an excellent discussion of how *Measure for Measure* intervenes in the debates about the social practices and legalities of betrothal and marriage as well as helpful summary of critical commentary on these issues in the play.

9. By de-emphasizing the importance of consummation, Swinburne departs from *The Lawes Resolution of Womens Rights*, in which consummation is more central. See Book II, section xxi and Book III, section i.

10. As Wheeler points out, despite his expression of contempt for Pompey's profession (3.2.20-8), the duke approaches it himself (121-2). He argues that the duke nonetheless is exalted over Angelo by play's end. The exaltation of the duke takes the form of his liberality; because the play exposes the machinations and reliance on degraded forms of exchange entailed in staging the duke's liberality, I disagree with Wheeler's reading of him as the "unacknowledged victim" of the comic design. In her focus on the duke as a theatricalist who arouses the conscience of his spectators, Diehl offers a more salutary view of him than my reading allows for. Diehl acknowledges, however, that the duke figures as an "imperfect playwright" who can be understood in terms of Calvinist notions of depravity.

11. McFeely argues that the play registers Shakespeare's respect for monasticism, and for Isabella's efforts to keep her chastity out of circulation by entering the convent. She points to the convent as a locus of hospitality (203), one of the period's most salient forms of gift exchange, as Heal's extensive study demonstrates.

12. Sundelson argues that the duke earns Isabella's perpetual gratitude by defining a hierarchy — patron and debtor — in his marriage offer (88). Also see Baines, "Assaying the Power of Chastity" on how the duke's marriage offer exploits the pretense of liberality.

13. Dollimore discusses sexual offense as a seeming threat to authority that in fact legitimates it.

14. Pompey's sensitivity to the relation between the law against fornication and the "laws" of supply, demand, and market value is like that of Launcelot in

The Merchant of Venice when he jests that the conversion of Jews will raise the price of pork:

> We were Christians enough before, e'en as many as could well live one by another. This making of Christians will raise the price of hogs. If we grow all to be pork eaters, we shall not shortly have a rasher on the coals for money.
>
> (3.5.20-8)

15. Shell makes a similar point (98-9). Watson explores the implications of the play's pervasive coining imagery as well (137-8).

16. See Leonard and Kott. Also see Shell, especially chapters four and five, on the function of exchange in the play. On the role of human bodies as fungible coins in the play's vision of state-sponsored procreative love, see Watson, 135-6. Diehl examines the pattern of substitutions in the play in terms of Calvinist notions of representation and idolatrous devotion (see especially 397-403).

17. See Halpern on how the "ideology of self-equivalence" is the basis of commodity logic (173-4).

18. Elbow, the "poor Duke's constable" who "lean[s] upon justice" (2.1.47-9), embodies the ineffectiveness of formal legal regulation of sexuality and marriage contracts. His malaprop-filled accusations against Froth and Pompey point to the blurring of licit and illicit sexuality, and to the inability of the law to interrogate sexual intentions. Although he is the only legally married man in the play, his wife is "done" (2.1.118, 140, 142) in Mistress Overdone's brothel, or so the cryptic scene suggests. Pompey punningly hints that it is Elbow's wife's own pregnancy-induced "longing" that brings her into the brothel (89-90). Arguing that chastity is a political principle because it is the principle of the integrity of the family, itself a political unit, Jaffa comments that Elbow is ironically the play's only "family man" (182-4).

19. Parolles's arguments for forsaking virginity are echoed by Lucilla's father Ferardo, early in *Euphues* when he tries to control her sexuality by convincing her to marry:

> This grieveth me most, that thou art almost vowed to the vain order of the vestal virgins. . . . If thy mother had been of that mind when she was a maiden, thou hadst not now been born to be of this mind to be a virgin. Weigh with thyself what slender profit they bring to the commonwealth, what slight pleasure to themselves, what great grief to their parents. . . . Therefore, Lucilla, if thou have any care to be a comfort to my hoary hairs or a commodity to thy commonweal, frame thyself to that honourable estate of matrimony,
>
> (Lyly 71)

By abandoning her vow to remain a virgin, the argument runs, Lucilla will be a "comfort" and a "commodity," combining the performance of filial duty and service to the state. Interestingly, Ferardo's argument also appeals to the satisfaction of young women's own "pleasure."

20. For a discussion of how feudal property relations establish a link between landholding, marriage and procreation, and how this link in turn defines women's subordinate position and leads to efforts to control female sexuality, see Middleton. The violation of marital chastity could bring legal action in the period, although questions remain about how enforceable these laws were. See Fletcher and Stevenson 32-3, on the increased attention on the part of nonecclesiastical court justices to efforts to enforce such laws in 1600-1660. Also see Ingram.

21. Baines thus explains why the violation of chastity in particular is the vice selected to reestablish law and order in Vienna. She argues that the play exposes that chastity is a socially and politically determined virtue, rather than a religious one. As Shell points out, the play focuses on fornication because its prohibition is the "bulwark of politics and the law itself" (33).

22. The crucial exception to this pattern comes in the second scene when a quarrel between the servants and "country fellows" ends with the friendly clasping of hands in dance. Thus, the corruption or dissolution of promise is class-marked; Heywood's country folk easily overcome the antagonisms that impede the friendly handclasp that betokens a faithful promise.

23. My efforts to use the drama to historicize the particular forms of exchange at work in early modern England are indebted to the theoretical work of Gregory and the essays by Appadurai and Kopytoff.

24. The usurer is the scapegoat for the whole culture, which uses usury to explain the economic and social upheaval precipitated by the move toward capitalistic forms of production and the rise of money form. The plays with usurers often manipulate the contrasts and overlaps between the bond of fellowship and legal bonds. Cf. Shylock in *The Merchant of Venice* and Sir Giles Overreach in *A New Way to Pay Old Debts*.

25. Bach asserts that the play "is not about the heterosexual couple in any way that that couple is now recognizable to us" (504). She argues that the focus in the critical tradition on the married couple "has obscured some the play's central issues" (505), especially its exploration of homosocial relations between men. I am indebted to Bach's attention to Anne and John as "enmeshed in the network of friendship, service and kinship relations that the play continually represents" (509). Gutierrez suggests that the play exposes the inadequacy of marriage, family, and patriarchal authority as the source of social order, and, with Wendoll's disruption of the husband-wife dyad, the tension between "family interrelationships and extra-familial bondings" (268). Christensen offers a convincing analysis of the tensions in the play and in the culture that follow from the transitional nature of household economy in the period.

26. Cf. Orlin's argument that the old code of Renaissance male friendship and beneficence can no longer obtain under the new domestic ethic (138, 180). Bach's reading of Wendoll is likewise instructive: Wendoll "endangers the bonds between men by identifying too closely with the source of economic power — Frankford — without possessing a means of allying to that power — without a female affine who can be traded to form an alliance" (517).

27. Again we see how corrupted exchange is class-marked for Heywood. Wendoll says "I will return. / And I divine, however now dejected, / My worth

and parts being by some great man praised, / At my return I may in court be raised" (16.134-7). As in Lyly's *Euphues*, aristocrats and courtiers are constructed as corrupt transactors.

28. Christensen notes how Frankford dwells at length on the wasted gifts that he has bestowed on Anne, despite the fact that Wendoll has been his primary recipient (333-6).

29. See Wentworth on how the main plot of the play "domesticates" the fall and repentance pattern of the medieval morality. McLuskie discusses the iconic, static nature of the play's presentation of Anne's punishment and repentance (134-6).

30. For a wonderful reading of the way the play blunts and parodies its own didacticism, see Moisan, who argues that the play destabilizes "the fixity of the social order in which the husband would claim his victory" (173). His analysis of how the play "exposes the weaknesses in the very patriarchalist prescriptions it ostensibly affirms" (178) is consistent with my argument here.

31. Moisan reads the relation between the main plot and subplot in terms compatible with my own; see 178ff.

32. McLuskie points out the combination of metaphor and dramatic structure concerning honor and the jewel of virginity at work in Heywood's subplot (127). Charles Mountford's metaphor of defloration equates commodifying the land with female sexual despoliation. His metaphor not only shows the interdependence of gendered constructions of honor, it feminizes aristocratic male/family honor. This same metaphorical move is made in discussions of the sale of titles and honors under James I. In their efforts to impeach James's favorite Buckingham, members of both houses of Parliament attacked "[t]he introduction of this new trade and commerce of honor" (Peck 194); they claimed that before Buckingham "honor was a virgin and undeflowered" (194-5). These metaphors of defloration — the conceptual equation of commodification and female sexual despoliation that they enact — reveal the interrelated concerns over what should or should not be passed in unrestricted exchange — the exchange status of objects, whether land or women, and the gendered notions of honor that inhere in them.

33. The way in which Acton's desire for Susan disrupts his desire for revenge might be compared to how Volpone's desire for Celia disrupts his scheme to cheat the legacy hunters who "contend in gifts, as they would seem in love" (Jonson 1.1.84). Like Susan, Celia is positioned as a slippery combination of gift and commodity, but it is "funnier" in Celia's case because it is her *husband* who is doing so.

34. My argument here departs from Bach's emphasis on the centrality of homosocial bonds in the play.

35. Swinburne betrays discomfort over how gifts can be used both to solidify a spousal and as "bait" (210) or a means of seduction (209). He both idealizes the exchange of the ring as a symbol of the matrimonial bond (207-8) and laments how its significance can be debased by desire for the material object itself.

36. Scott is to some extent mistaken in her critique since, for anthropologists, kinship does not simply refer to "household and family," as she implies here.

37. See Cook, chapter five, especially 105-9. Greene and Kahn address the need to consider women as matchmakers and bearers of wealth (10-12).

38. See, for example, Wrightson and Ingram

39. See Cahn's *Industry of Devotion* and Chaytor and Lewis's introduction to Clark for a discussion of the changing relation of women and the "domestic economy" to the market in this period. See Heal on birth celebrations as an "essentially female ritual" (81) and on women's use of the household as a "sphere of social action through generosity" (178-83). Harris discusses elite women as politically influential patrons and gift-givers. Willen discusses ordinary women's varying roles as dispensers of charity in poverty relief programs. Arguing that women's work in this area shows the inapplicability of our definitions of public and private (197), she reveals how women "routinely worked in the public marketplace to sustain their households; when employed by civic authorities to perform social welfare services, they served a public function, extending welfare services to the general population" (198). See also Howard. Gurr presents good evidence of women as playgoers.

40. My formulation, here and throughout, of how women function variously as gifts, commodities, and non-gifts and non-commodities — and of the important differences between materialist and idealist conceptions of value — is greatly indebted to Hartsock's critique of Lévi-Strauss and of Rubin's use of Lévi-Strauss's kinship theory in "The Traffic in Women." For research assistance on this essay, I would like to thank John Crossley.

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