La Alegría Ya Viene: How Chile's Youth are Reshaping History

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ABSTRACT
ANNA GRAY TERRY: La Alegría Ya Viene: How Chile’s Youth are Reshaping History
(Under the direction of Professor Kate Centellas)

The highly controversial military dictatorship in Chile lasted from 1973 to 1989. General Augusto Pinochet’s neoliberal policies saved the country from economic ruin in the 1980’s, but Chile became highly socially unequal as a result. After he was democratically voted out of office, politicians decided not to change his economic policies in order to avoid a collapse, and those policies are still in place today, specifically in terms of education. Therefore, an entire generation of Chileans has grown up after the dictatorship under these same highly unequal education policies, and as a result, they have begun to protest. What started in 2011 has become a national movement for a more equal education system. This has manifested itself in violent protests as well as negative imagery of Pinochet throughout Chile. This thesis explores the relationship between the education movement and formation of public memory about the dictatorship, and further, what role young Chileans play in said formation. By highlighting how young Chileans view Chile’s relationship to the past, it is possible to assess what kind of future they want their country to have.
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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction

Mid-way through my semester abroad in Valparaíso, Chile, in the spring of 2013, the university I was attending, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso, was declared to be *en paro*, at a stop. This was not because of a natural disaster or some disgruntled employees, but because its students had voted it so. For the entire second half of the semester, only the foreign students attended classes. Meanwhile, there were dozens of demonstrations where hundreds of students would dress in black and march through the town, and they often became violent: Students would release tear gas, break windows, and deface buildings. This happened with enough frequency to the point that residents became immune to the fuss. At one point, our building’s status went from *en paro* to *en toma*, taken over, and students barricaded the classrooms with chairs and desks and walked around on the roofs to make sure no one could enter. It was terrifying for me, but for the average Chilean student, this was normal. Violent protests were happening in universities throughout Chile, and they had been happening every semester since 2011.

Students are demanding change. The current secondary and tertiary education system is highly unequal: high-quality high schools and universities are expensive, the cheap universities lack distinction, and there are laws keeping this in place. It has not always been this way, though. Before the 1970’s, higher learning was universally free, but Chile’s right-wing dictatorship of 1973-1990 put an end to free education. Among other neoliberal reforms, General Augusto Pinochet completely privatized the education
system, offering no subsidies to public high schools and universities or grants or loans for students, leaving students with the only option for quality education as expensive private schools. This made the education system highly unequal, and although some policies have changed since Chile’s transition to democracy in 1989, the education system remains almost completely the same as the way it did when it was instituted by Pinochet.

One of the most interesting things about the movement for educational reform is that Chileans are only beginning to protest this now. There have been sporadic protests since 2007, but only in the last two years has Chile made waves in demanding change. Curiously, protests for educational reform did not happen as soon as Chile became a democracy. Rather, twenty years later, especially while the rest of Latin American countries’ higher education systems have been either free or very cheap and Chile’s higher education system is some of the most expensive in the world. So why is Chile protesting now specifically?

Public Memory

The lens through which I would like to answer this question is public memory, because the generation of Chileans who are protesting is the generation whose only frame of reference of the Pinochet regime is public memory and personal recollections of their elders. Before defining what public memory is, it should be noted that the term “public” refers to what can be seen or accessed by anyone in a given area. In the context of my studies, this will refer to newspapers, movies, documentaries, artwork, buildings, monuments, music, and so on, which are all vehicles through which people can express
their perspectives in a way that anyone can see. It is with this definition that public memory can be understood. According to a John Bodnar, a leading public memory theorist and historian, public memory is defined as a

body of beliefs and ideas about the past that help a public or society understand both its past, present, and by implication, its future. . . [It] speaks primarily about the structure of power in society because that power is always in question in a world of polarities and contradictions and because cultural understanding is always grounded in the material structure of society itself. (Bodnar 15-17)

In other words, public memory is a way to understand how a culture attempts to understand itself from a historical perspective. People can create public memory by using the media aforementioned to reflect upon past events, which will ideally influence those who view it to consider what the creators want the viewers to believe about the historical event and be changed by it. And then, if enough people’s perspectives on a historical event are influenced by a display of public memory, that can have important implications on what the society chooses to let happen in the future. Therefore, the creation of public memory ultimately attempts to mold the future of society by making statements about the past.

According to anthropologist and public memory specialist Alexander Dent, there are two types of cultural practice that create public memory: “inscribing ones, in which participants pay explicit attention to the inculcation of memory, and incorporating ones, where memory slips in without much being said” (Dent 188). Inscribing cultural practices take shape in museums, statues, slogans, and so on, whereas the latter consists of “performances that inculcate history through the physical experience,” meaning physical
experiences like ritual (Dent 189). In other words, inscribing practices are the active formation of public memory while incorporating practices are passive. Inscribing practices specifically and intentionally create a particular interpretation of a historical moment, and are thus a highly active and calculated way to create an argument about something. While incorporating cultural experiences are an important aspect of the creation of public memory, the majority of my studies will be about the inscription of public memory because I want to find out if there is an intentionally created link between public memory of the dictatorship and the student protests, on which I will elaborate in the next section.

The use of inscribed public memory in order to shape perceptions has been used throughout post-conflict societies all over the world. For example, after the deadly Chechen War in Russia from 1994-1996, public memory of the war’s atrocities became a tool for political power: “The right to memory was transformed into the ‘right to justice’ and the ‘never again’ rhetoric was used by the separatist faction within the Chechen nationalist movement to defend its yet contested political project” (Campana 141). In this case, politicians used negative public memory of the war by making it part of their campaigns in order to gain followers. Further, in Tours of Vietnam: War, Travel Guides, and Memory, the author argues that after the Vietnam War, American guidebooks of Vietnam “repeatedly represented events in ways that favor the global ambitions of the United States” (Laderman 94). While the Vietnam War happened on Vietnamese soil, Americans were able to influence the creation of public memory through travel books for tourists who would be visiting Vietnam so they could deepen American nationalism and
imperialism. These examples prove that public memory is intentionally created to make the audience-- whoever that may be-- perceive events in the way that the maker wants them to, which can have important, lasting social and political effects on society.

Two of the most striking displays of public memory that I encountered in Chile were a brand new, state-of-the art museum called the Museum of Human Rights Memory\textsuperscript{1} and a photo that I came across in an exhibit within a small history museum called Londrés 38. The Memory Museum had three floors that walked its guests through exhibits representing the years from approximately 1970 to 1990, recounting the coup d’état, the political atmosphere during the regime, personal accounts of human rights abuses, and the plebiscite that ended the dictatorship. At the end of the tour, there was a glass room illuminated by electric candles that looked upon an enormous blue wall featuring a framed, black-and-white photograph of every single person who was killed or tortured by the Chilean government. The room had an interactive map, where viewers could search for names, click on pictures, and learn the stories of each person on the wall, making the museum incredibly intimate and personalized. It was emotionally overwhelming to experience as an American, so I cannot imagine how it would feel to see it as a Chilean. However, from personal conversations I had about the museum with friends, professors, and my host family, there were some who were not interested in going, some who insisted how important it was to experience, and some who told me they would never go.

\textsuperscript{1} Museo de la Memoria de los Derechos Humanos
The other artifact that struck me in my time abroad was a photograph I found in an exhibit within a small history museum in Santiago. The museum was called Londrés 38, named after its street address. It was a small, unmarked house—practically invisible in an affluent neighborhood in the heart of Santiago, but it had a very dark past: It was one of the many offices where Chilean dissidents were interrogated, tortured, and ultimately disappeared by the government. The house was empty; they left no torture tools, no pictures on the walls, nothing. There were just facts written on a few of the walls.
This was the only picture I got of some of the writing— It was in the first room of the house, and after that, it felt disrespectful to take photographs. Below are the picture I took of the writing as well as its translation:

“This place, right in the middle of Santiago, functioned as the detention, torture, and extermination center known as Londrés 38. From here began forced disappearances as a systematic practice of terrorism by the State imposed in Chile in September of 1973.
A number of people not yet determined were detained here, and as far as can be established, 96 prisoners were either executed, forced to disappear, or died afterwards as a consequence of the torture; of them, 83 men and 13 women, two of the women pregnant. The majority were young militants,
primarily from the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR), the Communist Party and the Socialist Party.
Before the denunciation of these crimes, and as a form of concealment, the dictator substituted the number 38 for the number 40, which still existed until recently.
If not for the action of the ex-detained, relatives of the victims and social organizations, this center would still be ignored. Virtually “erased” from the city.”

A guide solemnly explained to me and a group of foreign students the human rights abuses that had taken place here, along with the historical context. He told us that leaving the house empty was intentional-- we were supposed to make up our own minds about what happened there, and about how we wanted to remember it. While this was all very moving, what I found curious was that on the top floor, one empty room was dedicated to the student movement for education reform. There were professional photographs displayed neatly through the room, each telling a story about the protests. One that I found particularly interesting was of a man in the middle of a protest, holding up a sign that read, “Pinochet: May your legacy die!”

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2 En este lugar, en pleno centro de Santiago, funcionó el recinto de detención, tortura y exterminio conocido como Londrés 38. Desde aquí se dio inicio a la desaparición forzada, como práctica sistemática del terrorismo de Estado impuesto en Chile, en septiembre de 1973.
Un número aún no determinado de personas permaneció detenido aquí y, hasta donde se ha podido establecer, 96 prisioneros fueron ejecutados, hechos desaparecer o murieron posteriormente a consecuencia de las torturas; entre ellos 83 hombres y 13 mujeres, dos de ellas embarazadas. En su mayoría eran jóvenes militantes, principalmente del Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR), del Partido Comunista y del Partido Socialista.
Ante la denuncia de estos crímenes, y como forma de ocultamiento, la dictadura sustituyó el número 38 por el 40, el que hace poco aún permanecía.
De no haber sido por la acción de los ex detenidos, familiares de las víctimas y organizaciones sociales, este recinto aún permanecería ignorado. Virtualmente “borrado” de la ciudad.

3 “Pinochet: ¡Que muera tu herencia!”

13
Pinochet:
¡Que muera tu herencia!
To me, seeing this photograph within the torture house meant that, at least to the organization who runs Londrés 38, there is a direct connection between the dark past of the Pinochet regime of the 1970s and 80s and the education movement of today. This could be because of the significant amount of students who were victims of human rights abuses during the Pinochet regime, and it could also be because Pinochet’s policies still have a grip on the education system. Either way, the fact that an art exhibit about current education protests was intentionally placed inside of a museum about torture during the Pinochet regime demonstrates a compelling link between two of Chile’s most important moments in history, and it was what sparked my interest in exploring how Chileans are currently forming their own public memory of the Pinochet regime and how that is linked to today’s student protests.

Research Question and Hypothesis

My goal is to explore what kind of relationship the education movement has with the formation of public memory about the dictatorship, and further, what role young Chileans play in said formation. In order to do this, I must also find out if there is a correlation between approval of Pinochet and age (to see if changes in perception are generational), if those perceptions affect opinions on current political movements like educational reform, and what that means for Chilean society. I have chosen to focus on generation instead of any other category of identity because of the varying relationships
each age category has with the dictatorship: Chileans older than 50 grew up under his regime, experiencing the best and the worst of his ways-- Pinochet saved Chile’s economy both after he took office and during the 1980s while the rest of Latin America was experiencing the Lost Decade, but tortured and killed thousands of Chileans in the process. Meanwhile, people from approximately 25-50 years of age remember the regime, but in different ways: They were young when it happened-- maybe too young to understand his economic policies and more removed from the human rights abuses than their parents. Lastly, there is the generation of Chileans under 25-- namely college students, for the purpose of my research-- who are the first generation to have no memory of the dictatorship whatsoever, meaning that their perception of him is created mainly by what their elders tell them and public memory rather than personal experience. Because younger generations of any democratic society tend to hold much political sway and have a direct influence on the future of their societies, it is important to investigate exactly how the upcoming generation of post-dictatorship Chileans feel about their past, and in turn, their future.

Therefore, I predict that there is indeed a correlation between approval of Pinochet and age. I think that the youngest generation will have a highly negative perception of the Pinochet regime, as they are the most open about political reform and are the most removed from the dictatorship. However, they have no memory of the atrocities that happened during his regime and have only been alive while Chile was prospering from the relatively untouched architecture of his policies, making their stance more ambivalent. I believe that the middle generation will be even more negative in their
beliefs about Pinochet because they may have actual memory of the regime and can thus recall the atrocities for themselves, perhaps even knowing some of the victims who may be parents or other older loved ones. Furthermore, I predict that because older-generation Chileans were old enough to experience the emotional trauma of the human rights abuses and social stratification of Pinochet’s dictatorship, yet also witnessed his policies save their economy, they will have a much more nuanced perception of Pinochet’s regime.

Methodology

The first thing I did in order to test my hypothesis was administer surveys to Chileans via Facebook and email regarding their opinions on Pinochet, the education protests, and public memory. I administered the surveys through Facebook and email so that I could reach all age groups. I also interpreted already-existing Chilean data about current perceptions of Pinochet to further my analysis of the surveys. I additionally examined trends in popular culture since Chile’s transition to democracy through films, music, and media to see what kind of public memory is being formed surrounding the legacy of Pinochet, and by whom.

Upcoming Chapters

In Chapter Two, I will present a history of Chile since 1970 by looking into the policies and politics of Salvador Allende, Augusto Pinochet, and following presidents. In Chapter Three, I will give an in-depth account of the education system and the student protests, as well as a snapshot of current politics in the country. In Chapter Four, I will
present my findings about the creation of public memory within Chile by looking at music, art, film, and so on. In Chapter Five, I will present the findings of my surveys in order to answer my research question about the relationship between Pinochet, the education movement, and age. In Chapter Six, I will discuss how those two are related, place my findings in the larger context of Latin America, and present my conclusions.
CHAPTER TWO: A Brief History of Chile

From Socialism to Authoritarianism: 1970-1990

Elected in 1970 as a member of the Socialist Party, which was a part of the Unidad Popular (UP) coalition, Socialist President Salvador Allende faced challenges to his presidency from before he stepped into office until the day he was overthrown. Having run for president four times before winning, he only narrowly secured the nomination of the Socialist Party, and only won with 36 percent of the vote. While he did make reforms like giving every child free milk, his promises to “nationalize the economy, implement a massive program of income redistribution, end the dominance of the latifundia, transform the political system through the creation of a unicameral legislature,” and so on, were almost always restricted by both the opposition he faced and the lack of organization and support within his own party (Bethell 158).

Lasting only three years, his presidency was marred with an economic recession, internal factionalization, and political violence. In Allende’s first year as president, Chile’s GDP grew in 1971 by 7.7% overall and unemployment fell from 8.3% to 3.8% (Bethell 161). While this was great for his presidency, the economic boom was short-lived: The price of copper-- Chile’s most important raw export-- fell significantly in 1971, and the trade balance turned from a US $95 million surplus in 1970 to a deficit of $90 million in 1971, which was a serious blow to his presidency. Further, Chile’s other
economic problems, like “breakdowns in the distribution system, industrial conflict, the
growth of a black market, the decline in private investment, [and] uncontrolled monetary
expansion” all multiplied in 1972 and 1973, which were all serious blows to his
credibility (Bethell 163). While Allende was very successful in decreasing income
disparity, nationalizing copper mines, and accelerating land reform, the aforementioned
external factors were enough for Allende to lose a significant portion of his popularity.

Chile’s increasing economic turmoil only furthered the polarization of those
within government. Members of his own Socialist Party declared that “revolutionary
violence [was] inevitable and necessary,” essentially endorsing violence in the name of
Socialism, which “embarrassed the Allende government and gave an opportunity to the
Right to create fears about the intentions of the UP as a whole” (Bethell 159). On top of
that, the opposition obtained the majority in house, causing the political center to
essentially disappear; and Allende’s “own moderation made [him] increasingly isolated as
his supporters developed new forms of political organization outside the control of the
executive” (Bethell 167). Many Chileans felt that the government had lost control, so
political violence rose among citizens in both rural and urban areas. For example, after a
proposal to increase state control over supplies to the trucking companies in October
1972, workers “virtually paralyzed” the transport sector by having “powerful” solidarity
strikes that sparked military intervention (Bethell 174).

The military felt threatened by the Allende government for multiple reasons.
Because worker uprisings like this were not uncommon during Allende’s presidency, the
military had to frequently become involved in order to keep the peace, which created
resentment between them and the UP government. Additionally, Latin American revolutionaries like Castro established relationships with Allende and began making extended visits Chile to share ideas, which sparked rumors that there might be an armed revolution like ones that Castro had led. Obviously, the military was opposed to this notion, as political violence was already surging within the country and they were bearing the brunt of trying to keep the peace. The army even resented Allende’s personal bodyguards called the Group of Friends of the President, who were from the extreme left wing of the UP. Throughout Allende’s presidency, the Right constantly called on the military to hold a coup, and eventually, the military became involved even though they previously “had intervened only intermittently in the political process” (Bethell 175). When the military entered the cabinet to oversee the March 1973 elections and there were inconclusive results, the politicians of the Right convinced the military that the only solution was to hold a coup d’état to get rid of Allende, who was, in their eyes, destroying the peace and prosperity of their country.

Therefore, on September 11, 1973, there was a military coup to overthrow the Allende government, placing the military general Augusto Pinochet into power as a dictator. The coup was “warmly embraced” by the United States (who had tried and failed to organize a military coup three years earlier) because Allende’s presidency was perceived as a threat to democracy; the coup was also embraced by the Chilean elite, who believed Allende’s policies were economically destroying the country, and in turn, their wealth (Dinges 3). Tanks and soldiers stormed the capital building, La Moneda, and when Allende realized what was happening, he killed himself in his office rather than surrender
to the military. The next day, General Augusto Pinochet was placed at the head of the military junta, thus becoming the dictator of Chile for the next 17 years.

One of the first things Pinochet did upon becoming president was drastically change Chilean fiscal policy in order to recuperate the economy that fell apart during Allende’s term. With the help of the Chicago Boys, a group of young Chilean economists educated at the University of Chile and the University of Chicago, Pinochet created a fiscal policy that was based on the belief that “private forces should guide economic and social activities, not the state,” widely referred to as neoliberalism, which ultimately placed the majority of the country’s wealth into the pockets of a small elite (Hecht 139). In the first years of Pinochet’s regime, for example, the military government began selling enterprises that had been under Allende’s state control, and the only people who were already wealthy could afford to buy them. By 1979, “135 of the 250 largest private enterprises were under the control of the ten largest financial conglomerates” (Hecht 144). Banks were also privatized, which facilitated the growing concentration of wealth because the conglomerates could “acquire enterprises through leveraged buyouts financed by the banks, which had, in turn, borrowed the money from private foreign banks” (Hecht 144). Not only did this lead to a burgeoning amount of foreign debt, but it also meant that a very small group of people held incredible amounts of power. As for the majority of Chileans who could not afford to buy privatized enterprises or stock, real wages fell steadily and income distribution worsened. Not only this, but because the Chicago Boys-- who were educated under the Milton Friedman, the father of conservative economic practices-- believed that the free market approach should be
applied not only economically, but socially as well, social services were also privatized. This included health care, education, and the pension system. Ultimately, these reforms made it so that the level of quality in a person’s education, access to medical services, and social security became directly correlated to the amount of money he or she was able to pay. This created a vast difference in quality of life between the rich and poor since only the rich had access to quality health care and education (Hecht 151).

Throughout the 1900s, Latin American countries’ economies were largely based on raw materials, meaning that other countries were producing these materials and selling finished products back to them. While exporting said raw materials was good for the economy in that it kept people employed, peripheral countries like those of Latin America ultimately began falling into serious debt. In 1982, the president of Mexico declared that it would be unable to pay back its debts, sparking the worst recession Latin America had seen since the Great Depression, throwing essentially every Latin American country into economic disarray (Alcántara, Paramio, Freidenberg and Déniz 11). The crisis obviously posed a threat to Pinochet’s regime, but “economic recuperation and greater attention to the economic interests that were the core’s support, coupled with Pinochet’s political intransigence and the continued use of repression” prevented a transition of power once the economy crashed (Hecht 143). And, because the grand majority of Chile’s goods had been privatized, unlike the rest of Latin America whose goods were national, Chile survived the Lost Decade practically unscathed. Surviving the recession of the Lost Decade along with how quickly he recuperated the economy after the Allende presidency played a large part of Pinochet’s popularity and endurance as dictator over 17 years.
However, it is important to mention the unthinkable human rights abuses that happened during his regime. Operation Condor, led by Pinochet from 1973 to 1980, was an international operation to stop communism by way of torture and assassination. Countries in the Southern Cone-- Chile, Argentina and Uruguay-- were all involved, and were supported by the United States; the goal was to “eradicate all traces of political movements akin to Allende’s-- in all of Latin America” in order to stop the spread of communism (Dinges 3). Political dissidents (i.e., Allende’s supporters and anyone who identified as a leftist) were kidnapped, brought to detention centers, and were tortured or killed by the government in a way that was a “very intense and relatively undiscriminating use of violent repression” (Roniger and Sznajder 21). As mentioned by the photo of Londrés 38 in Chapter One, many of the victims were members of MIR, a Leftist organization, the Communist Party, and the Socialist Party-- but they were not the only ones affected. Below are some demographics on torture victims:

Table 2.1: Victim Classification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Percentage of Victims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working Class</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed/misc.</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.2: Victims by Age
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Range</th>
<th>Percentage of Victims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Below 16</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-25</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-35</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-45</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 46</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: US Institute of Peace

As made evident by the charts, no type of person was spared: There were students, housewives, elderly people, and even members of the armed forces who were subject to unspeakable violence. One torture victim who was a member of the Socialist Party, Leopoldo García Lucero, shared his story with the Guardian shortly after the 40th anniversary of the coup:

I was repeatedly tortured for months, first in the basement of a police station, and then in the national stadium, which the military regime had turned into a large concentration camp for political prisoners. I was blindfolded and handcuffed for most of the torture, so I couldn't see my torturers.

I was beaten on my head and body countless times; they broke my arm in several places after smashing it with a rifle and I almost lost an eye; they held my head under cold water and electrocuted me; they kicked me in my testicles, burned me with cigarettes and suspended me by a hook with weights on my legs. I heard of people being executed by firing squads.

At the police station, there were bags of concrete covered in blood. The police interrogated me about the whereabouts of politicians close to Allende; I wouldn't give them any information. They threatened to kill my
six-year-old daughter. They said they would shoot her in front of the concrete bags, and then do the same to me.

I didn't know if my family members were dead or alive for eight months. I spent almost two years in several concentration camps. In June 1975, I was expelled from Chile by a government decree. I received refugee status in the UK, and my wife and three daughters joined me in exile. (Lucero 1)

Stories like Leopoldo’s are not uncommon. In 2011, the Valech Commission reported that the newest total number of people who had been held as political prisoners and tortured is 40,018 and the official number of those killed or forcibly disappeared is now 3,065, while the unofficial numbers are probably much higher (Long 1). It is evident from the tables above that many of the victims were young people-- typically students or workers. Currently, anyone over just 25 years old was alive during his regime, and therefore the memories of human rights violations like his are still fresh for many Chileans.

By the late 1980’s, word had gotten out about the human rights abuses of the Pinochet regime, so democratic countries and international human rights organizations like Amnesty International began placing pressure on Chile to hold a plebiscite with the hopes that Chileans would vote him out of office. After Pinochet was reelected in 1986 in a similar plebiscite, forces to get him out of office strengthened. In 1988, 55% of the population voted no, ending 17 years of authoritarian rule and finally commencing the democracy Chile enjoys today.

Chile in Democracy: 1990 to Today
One of the conditions of the plebiscite was that if voted out of office, Pinochet would have two years to transition out. Therefore, in his final two years, he reformed the constitution that he created in 1980 and constructed the binomial system under which Chile governs itself today, which has created significant problems in Chilean politics. In most countries in the world, a country is divided into districts, and each district has one representative. This is not the case in Chile, where each district has two representatives, and both seats are up for grabs by either party. In order for a party to take both seats in a district, it must “gain more than twice the votes of the next most voted list,” which makes it almost impossible for any one party to gain dominance (Angell 284). Because of this, even if a party has a large following and high popular legitimacy, this same dominance is not translated into the legislature. Because of this imbalance, parties have been forced to band together for support and success. Though there are many parties within the country, these parties have coalesced into two major blocs. These two blocs are known as the Alianza, a center-right coalition, and the Concertación, a center-left coalition. While this appears similar to the American two-party system, it creates less fair representation for smaller parties within the coalitions. This system makes little sense for a democratic society where all citizens are free to identify with whatever party they wish, but Pinochet’s constitution reformers created a system that “overrepresent[ed] parties of the Right and reduc[ed] the number of significant parties in the country” (Siavelis 58). This fit perfectly into Pinochet’s goal to cripple the strength and number of all political parties, since he was not affiliated with any one party himself. This electoral system profoundly shapes party interactions in the country, and the central question scholars struggle over
today concerns how “the coalitions have held together for so long” (Angell 285). Instead of creating a healthy party system that expresses the needs of the people, the electoral system has “consistently proven to be a stumbling block” in Chilean politics, and former President Ricardo Lagos even said that it would be “the death of [Chile’s] democratic system” (Pastor 56). In terms of popular protests, this means that an entire coalition would have to be convinced that change is needed in order for protestors’ demands to be met.

Despite the political system, Chile is still relatively politically stable. In fact, when compared to other countries on the Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index in terms of democratic stability, Chile has a score of 42, a “stable” status in terms of their democracy (Failed States Index 2013). The index measures factors such as economic decline, human flight, delegitimization of the state, human rights abuses, education, and public services. However, Chile is less stable than it was in 2006, before any of the student protests began: It scored a 32, and its score has been declining ever since. However, when comparing Chile to the rest of the world, a score of 42 is still very high, meaning that overall, Chile has a very stable democracy.

Chile’s success as a politically stable country is, at least in part, due to the fact that when Chile transitioned into democracy, the Concertación Coalition, who held the power at the time, decided to make minimal changes to the policies already in place. This was because they did not want to make any drastic changes for fear that the military might see reason to intervene (Hecht 172). Therefore, the Constitution made in 1980 by Pinochet himself was kept in place, and the unfair binomial system was kept in place and
has yet to be changed (Siavelis 58). In other words, Pinochet’s grip on how Chile functions politically and economically is still as tight as ever.

Before discussing what the Pinochet’s neoliberal legacy looks like within the education system, though, it is important to frame where Chile lies within the rest of Latin America in terms of social problems. With a human development index of roughly 0.8, Chile is among the most “developed” countries in Latin America (International Human Development Indicators: Chile 2013). Furthermore, statistics show that Chile is doing better than not only just Latin America, but than the world average. According to the Human Development Index, Chile ranks at a .819, while the rest of Latin America ranks at .741 and the world average is .694 (International Human Development Indicators: Chile 2013). And because “very high human development” ranks at .905, which factors in health, education, income, gender inequality, poverty, and so on, Chile is indisputably a socially developed country. This does not mean that Chile is without significant social problems, though.

At the end of the Pinochet regime in 1990, Chile had a GINI index of 0.58, where 0 is perfect equality and 1 is perfect inequality. Since then, the GINI index has fluctuated some, but mostly remained between 0.57 and 0.58. As of 2012, it was only slightly better, scoring at 0.52-- On par with the rest of Latin America (World Bank Database 1). Additionally, the top ten percent of Chileans currently possess roughly 40% of the total income in the country, and this unequal distribution has not gotten any better since the fall of the Pinochet regime (Hecht 196). When comparing these statistics to the ones above, it is clear that while Chile can be considered a socially developed country overall,
the country still has significant issues with inequality (not unlike the United States, for example). But ultimately, these statistics indicate that the unequal socio-economic hierarchy that Pinochet created with his policies has largely remained in place, and economic inequality is a pressing problem within the country. This is especially evident when examining the country’s education system, which I will discuss in the next chapter.
CHAPTER THREE: Education and Protest

Chilean Education System

Before the dictatorship, Chile’s education system operated under the ideology of
*estado docente*, a teaching State, which meant that education was completely centralized:
In the late 1960s, primary education had been “practically universalized,” meaning it
either free or very cheap for students throughout the country (Delannoy 7). While Allende
was president, he sought to broaden educational opportunities and align them with
Marxist ideology, specifically by planning a revolution. However, Allende never achieved
this revolution— or any sort of educational reform during his term— due to all of his
administration’s aforementioned hardships.

However, after the coup d’état, the military government flipped *estado docente* on
its head by introducing a subsidiary role of government, meaning “the rights of private
agents ought to supersede the state’s prerogatives whenever possible,” which obviously
hand-in-hand with Pinochet and the Chicago Boys’ neoliberal ideology (Delannoy 8).
Specifically, the subsidiary education plan sought to “promote greater efficiency through
administrative decentralization, capitation-based financing, labor regulation and open
competition between public and privately administered schools” (Delannoy 1). This
meant that teachers were subject to private sector labor laws which allowed for local
determination of wages, schools were financed based on average monthly student
attendance, and parents had the choice to send their children to private schools if they could pay, essentially privatizing everything. While the administration was successful in completely privatizing the education system, it came at a price: overall quality of education decreased drastically, and the poor were the hardest hit. Various evaluations conducted in 1990 reflected that “40 percent of 4th graders in the poorest half of the population could not understand what they were reading. . . [and] net secondary enrollment ratios were 97.6 percent for the richest quintile, but only 73.6 percent for the poorest quintile” (Delannoy 12). Today, vast economic inequality within the education system still exists.

When a student enters school at age six, his/her parents are allowed to choose which kind of school they would like their child to attend: municipal, state-funded (which includes training schools like Professional Institutes (IPs) and Centers of Technical Formation (CFTs)), or private. Municipal schools are funded by the municipalities themselves; state-funded schools charge, but are less expensive than private schools. It is generally acknowledged that the private schools are attended by the rich, state-funded schools by the middle class, and municipal schools by the poorer students (Tertiary Education in Chile 26). The graph below illustrates this trend:
In order to enroll in any tertiary institution, students must take the standardized admission exam called Prueba de Selección Universitaria (PSU), much like the SAT in the United States, which is the most important factor--if not the only factor--considered for admission. In order to do well on the PSU, many well-to-do students choose to enroll in pre-university schools after graduating high school in order to train for the test. While private schools can normally successfully get through their curriculum before the school year is over, leaving extra time for PSU training, municipal schools are typically unable to sufficiently complete their curriculum by the end of the year, leaving less time for PSU training. (This is reminiscent of state testing within the United States: More affluent schools tend to do better on state tests because their teachers can more effectively teach the curriculum and so they have more time to train students to take the test, whereas less affluent schools do not have this advantage (Mackenzie 7).) One option for students to make better scores on the test is to enroll in a year-long PSU training school, called a pre-
universitaria. However, it is not funded by municipalities or the state, meaning that students who go to the lower-performing municipal schools likely cannot afford to enroll. In the graph below, it is clear how much better students who go to private schools perform on the PSU than those who go to municipal schools:

![Graph showing PSU scores for municipal, subsidized, and private schools.]

Source: Kathy Trabue via DEMRE

There are two types of universities that students can attend: Traditional and non-traditional. Traditional universities like the Catholic University of Chile and the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile are members of the Council of Rectors of Chilean Universities (CRUCH), which are state-funded, while non-traditional schools are private.
(The university I attended was a CRUCH school.) CRUCH schools are historically funded by the Catholic Church, but were privatized by the military government in 1981. After 1990, the Concertación administration began partially funding them and allowed for the creation of other private schools, but they are still more expensive than other private universities. Today, CRUCH schools carry more prestige and are more selective even though private and non-traditional schools offer the same types of degrees and are roughly the same price. Below is a graph of prices for private and CRUCH schools versus technical schools:

![Graph of prices for private and CRUCH schools versus technical schools](image)

Source: Kathy Trabue via CNED Database

Interestingly, CRUCH schools also provide more access to funding for students, yet cost about the same as non-traditional schools. According to the OECD,

the publicly-financed student support system consists of a number of different loan and scholarship schemes… Though many of these schemes are targeted specifically at young people from poorer households, their

4 There are roughly 500 CLP to 1 USD.
PSU-dependency limits the numbers they can help. Secondly, most of the schemes appear to have been designed with CRUCH institutions in mind, and students at private universities, IPs and CFTs – two-thirds of tertiary students – are far less likely to be eligible for them. (Tertiary Education in Chile 43)

In other words, CRUCH schools offer more scholarships for students who are more competitive—meaning students who are wealthier—than for the students who choose to go to non-traditional schools or IPs and CFTs, which are attended by people with less money than those who would attend CRUCH schools yet offer the same types of degrees. In fact, in 2008, almost eighty percent of government-funded scholarship money went to students attending CRUCH schools (Trabue 49).

One would assume that since the transition to democracy, politicians would have swiftly changed this structure, as its faults were evident and it was so directly related with the dictatorship. However, on his last day in office, March 10, 1990, Pinochet passed a Constitutional Law on Education (LOCE), which was designed to “lock up” the aforementioned education reforms by “making any amendment subject to a political quorum, which was and remains largely unattainable” (Delannoy 13). While LOCE served to perpetuate the neoliberal model within the education system, many people believed that it was a “model for post-welfare reforms,” and so reversing them would have required a “sustained and and difficult political fight with the opposition that the Concertación would not want to risk” in such a fragile political state (Gauri 88). As aforementioned, the Concertación coalition, while left-leaning, has kept many neoliberal reforms in place, and LOCE was no different. It was not until massive student-led
protests in 2006 when students demanded change that LOCE would finally come to an end.

Student Protests

In a broader context, protests have proven to be a legitimate and effective way to create change throughout Latin America. Due to rapid urbanization and democratization within the last hundred years, some Latin American cities have turned into segregated centers of rich and poor. In places like São Paulo, the poor have begun to do something about it in what is known as insurgent citizenship. According to the anthropologist who coined the term, James Holston, “city people live in impoverished urban peripheries in various conditions of illegal and irregular residence, around urban centers that benefit from their services and their poverty. . . Precisely in these peripheries, residents organize movements of insurgent citizenship to confront the entrenched regimes of citizen inequality that the urban centers use to segregate them” (Holston 245). Movements of insurgent citizenship can have the goal of gaining the “right to reside with dignity, security, and mobility,” and often take the form of protests and violence (Holston 248). The people living in the favelas of São Paulo have seen significant gains in rights since they began to use violence as a means of voicing their needs, and large cities in Chile like Santiago and Valparaíso are no different: Citizens are using violence and protests in order to create important and necessary social change.

Some of the more well-known protests in Chile include the 2011 peaceful protests where the indigenous Mapuches of Patagonia rode into Punta Arenas on horseback to
object the construction of a dam in Patagonia which would destroy their livelihoods (and, not to mention, the environment, which was protested by people in Santiago that year as well), and of course, the 2011 student protests, which were particularly violent. In these instances, insurgent citizenship was practiced in that marginalized groups like the Mapuches and students came together in a public setting to voice their demands. However, protests have become such an effective manner of communicating that it is not just marginalized groups protesting, but rather, Chileans of different socio-economic groups have come together in solidarity. In my four months in Chile alone, I witnessed countless protests for a plethora of different causes, ranging from workers rights on Labor Day to the legalization of marijuana, from LGBT rights to the objection of a mall that is to be built in a historic part of Valparaíso; each protest included people from many different socio-economic groups. In retrospect, it is unsurprising that the CRUCH university I attended shut down: Even though I went to a traditionally rich school with privileged students who didn’t necessarily need free education or more state funding to attend a good university, the students still voted for their school to go en paro. Because rich students would have no other incentive to vote this way as they are the ones receiving all the benefits of this unequal system, voting to go en paro was likely just so that their poorer counterparts might have the opportunity to attend better schools, which is an impressive and important act of solidarity.

June 2006 marked the first major student protest in the country and the largest in Chile’s history up to that point, with over a million students rioting for over ten hours in Santiago (Franklin 1). Concerns about the education system had been voiced since the
transition to democracy, but a new fee for the PSU and rumors that public transportation benefits for students would be cut off sent students to the streets to protest. Students demanded that they receive free public transportation to and from school, waivers for the fee to take the PSU, the placement of students on the presidential advisory committee, the end of LOCE, and ultimately, quality education for all (Riesco 244). The protest, which became known as the March of the Penguins (in reference to the black and white student uniforms everyone wore) was largely successful in that LOCE was abolished and was replaced with the General Law of Education\(^5\) which limits the authority that universities have from discriminating against students for economic reasons, but the demand for better education for everyone was still not met.

\(^5\) Ley General de Educación
In 2011, student protests escalated to an extent that was more organized and more violent than in 2006. Some people I spoke with in Chile believed that the students who led the 2006 secondary school-oriented protests were the same people who led the 2011 university-oriented protests, but others claimed that the rise in massive protests in 2011 were inspired by similar student protests in Spain as well as the Arab Spring-- the reason protests escalated in 2011 is likely a combination of the two. Either way, there were countless, massive protests throughout the country that quickly became violent among both protesters and the police: One student, Manuel Gutiérrez Reinoso, was shot and killed by the police (Chilean president seeks answers on protest death 1). The Atlantic created a photo album to capture the essence of the protests. The photo above in particular caught my attention, not only because of its location (directly in front of my university, PUCV), but because of the students wearing gas masks and throwing stones at what is most certainly the police.

While there was lots of violence involved in the 2011 protests, as this photograph effectively displays, the student movement did not lack organization.Prominent leaders
such as Giorgio Jackson, president of a prominent organization called the Federation of Students of the University of Chile (FEUC) that organizes and mobilizes students at the University of Chile, and Camila Vallejo, president of a similar organization for students at multiple universities called the Federation of Chilean Students (FECh), quickly became prominent leaders and spokespersons for the student protests. Together, they also led an even broader, more mobile organization called CONFECH, the Confederation of Chilean Students,\(^6\) which published a definitive list of demands in July of 2011. The list included sweeping educational reform, not only for tertiary education but for primary and secondary as well. Some of the demands included constitutional reform, less emphasis on the PSU for university admission, increased state support for public universities, dismunicipalization of public schools, free public transport for students, a new system for scholarships and student financing, student participation in university governance, a new system for accreditation, and increased state support for public universities (Bases para un acuerdo social por la educación chilena 1). On the first of August, the then-president Sebastián Piñera responded with a proposal that would increase scholarships and allow student participation in university governance, but would still allow for schools to be for-profit (Salazar 1). Unsurprisingly, CONFECH rejected his proposal, and through Facebook, Twitter, its blog, and flyers and posters in universities, it organized massive protests throughout the country for August 5th (Franklin 1).

Because of protests like that, which have been happening semi-consistently from 2011 until today, reforms like waived entrance exam fees, reduced-cost student

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\(^6\) Confederación de Estudiantes de Chile
transportation, and even a replacement of LOCE have been implemented, which abolished for-profit schools (Setterfield 1). In other words, the protests have made significant progress in changing the education system. However, many critics argue that this progress is not long-term enough: reforms made only put a bandaid on the bullet hole, and LOCE’s replacement has been essentially useless because it has done so little to constrain market forces. However, in June of 2013, Bachelet, who was running for reelection at the time, promised that if she were president, she would make education free for all within six years (Ahumada 1). This is a significantly different stance on education, considering she did relatively little when she was president in 2006. I even remember graffiti outside of PUCV that said that voting for Bachelet would be like returning to an ex-partner after he or she had cheated, but with much more graphic vocabulary. However, her 2013 election platform was to establish education as a “social right,” creating “explicit guarantees to access, quality, and financing,” and she was indeed reelected (Arzola 1). If she will follow through with promise, though, is something that has yet to unfold.

2013 Presidential Elections

In the 2013 elections, Michele Bachelet of the Nueva Mayoria Coalition (formerly Concertación-- it now includes the Communist Party) and Evelyn Matthei of the Alianza Coalition faced a runoff as neither candidate gained over 50% of the vote in the general elections, which is necessary to win the presidency. Bachelet gained 47% of the vote
while Matthei only gained 25%, and in the runoff, Bachelet won with 62.3% of the vote (Presidency Postponed 1).

This election demonstrated an interesting dialogue between the past and present in terms of politics. In a survey done by the Center for Public Studies in September 2013, people associated Michelle Bachelet with the left and Matthei very much to the right (Estudio Nacional de Opinión Pública 93). Interestingly, each candidate had a powerful connection with the Pinochet dictatorship: Bachelet herself was interrogated and tortured by the Pinochet government because she was a Socialist (and still is), while Matthei’s father was a military general during the dictatorship (Modiano 1). This information, while not the most important aspect of the election, was widely discussed in various media outlets as well as among my Chileans friends and host family, and everyone discussed how their personal histories represent how much the politics of the dictatorship is still prevalent in Chilean politics. Because of the certain parallel between the politics of 1973 and the 2013 elections, Bachelet’s win was perceived as a metaphorical victory. In this case, Allende was ultimately triumphant against Pinochet in the long run, working to end Pinochet’s legacy that was called to die in the protest poster I mentioned in the first chapter. Themes of metaphorical victory like this are recurrent in the Chilean public; I will discuss them further in the chapters to come because they make strong arguments that Chileans want to disassociate from Pinochet and what he represents.

Another important aspect of the 2013 presidential election was that some of the student movement’s most important student leaders, like Camila Vallejo, Giorgio Jackson, Karol Cariola and Gabriel Boric, were all elected to congress. When asked about
what she wanted to do in office, Vallejo responded, “We want to interrupt the institution in order to change it, because it is antidemocratic in many respects. It has many enclaves that have persisted since the military dictatorship until today. The grand majority of people understand that Chile has changed. . . And also the more traditional political world, that has realized that there is a new political moment that requires structural changes” (Los exlíderes estudiantiles que arrasaron en las elecciones en Chile 1). Some of her most important priorities in office include drafting a new constitution, strengthening social and worker’s rights, and, of course, reforming education. While some Chileans think joining the traditional political realm and teaming up with Bachelet, who did little to implement educational reform in her first term, is hypocritical, having young people insert themselves into office is an important step for young Chileans to actively achieve their political agenda in another way than through simply protest. Again, whether or not Vallejo and the other student leaders actually make a difference is a question that cannot yet be answered, but their newfound presence in the government is an important step for the youngest generation of Chileans, whose ideals will be explored further in the following chapters.

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7 Queremos irrumpir en la institucionalidad para cambiarla, porque es antidemocrática en muchos aspectos. Tiene enclaves que persisten desde la dictadura militar hasta el momento. Hay una gran mayoría que entendió que Chile cambió. . . También el mundo político más tradicional, que se dio cuenta que hay un nuevo momento político que requiere cambios estructurales.
CHAPTER FOUR: Displays of Public Memory in Chile

Since the transition to democracy and especially within the student movement, many Chileans have expressed their feelings about the dictatorship in the form of memorials, music, artwork, theater, and public spectacle. As mentioned in the first chapter, public memory is a tool that ultimately attempts to mold the future of society by making statements about the past; it is a way to understand how a culture attempts to understand itself from a historical perspective. People can create public memory to reflect upon past events, which will ideally influence those who view it to believe what the creators want the viewers to believe about the historical event and be changed by it. Therefore, displays of public memory in Chile regarding the dictatorship are extremely important because they make a statement about how Chileans envision the past and, in turn, the future of Chile. Of course, this is the same goal as the student protesters, who want to improve their education system and move past the policies of the dictatorship. This becomes even more important when the age of the memory creators is considered: Younger people tend to have more sway when making political statements because their vote is so important, so if a group of young people unites against something, this will make an impact on society and affect its future. Therefore, when one considers that many young artists and musicians who have been leaders in the student movement have also explored themes of the dictatorship-- and that those two themes tend to run together in displays of public memory, as I will explore below-- one can argue that the student
protests are just as much about making educational reform as they are about making a statement about Chilean history and how they want to redefine it. This is what I will investigate in this chapter in order to ultimately understand the relationship between public memory, Pinochet, and education reform.

I must mention that while there are surely hundreds of signs, symbols, songs, movies, paintings and so on used during student protests that have pointed blame at Pinochet for the problems in today’s education system, I do not have access to more of them for obvious reasons. However, the examples given below clearly demonstrate that students and leaders of the movement believe that the source of the problem in the education system is Pinochet, and are fearlessly willing to make a stand to change how he is remembered.

Music

Music is an invaluable medium for the creation of public memory. According to the Ethnomusicology Forum, “Music-making and subsequent recollections of the musical experience bridge the divide between individual and collective memory. . . Music is valued as an experience that joins individuals with a group. Music as at once the outcome of individual creativity and creativity’s grounding as a social act” (Shelemay 22-23). In other words, music creates a relationship between listeners and an idea-- in this instance, a historical event-- which then makes an impact on the listener’s perspective of that idea. Therefore, music is an important tool for group identity formation. In the case of Chile, musicians form group identity through songs about both the dictatorship and the student
protests, uniting students simultaneously in their discontent for the dictatorship and their demand for education reform.

Ana Tijoux is one of the most up-and-coming Latin American artists from Chile, having been nominated for best Latin American rock albums in both 2009 and 2011. Her first album, “1977,” and her second album, “La Bala,” both have strong undertones of political activism in regards to both the education movement and to the dictatorship. According to the Los Angeles Times, who did an interview with the artist, “Tijoux's . . . "La Bala" (The Bullet), released in January [2011] in the United States, gave a sympathetic shout-out to Chile's recent wave of youth-led street protests demanding education reforms and attacking the country's growing gulf between rich and poor. ‘1977’ alluded to Tijoux's generation of Chileans whose parents had fled the brutal 17-year regime of Gen. Augusto Pinochet and had gone into European exile’” (Johnson 1). It is important to note that Tijoux herself was a refugee in France until the dictatorship ended when she was fourteen because her parents were leftist activists. Her experience as a young victim of the dictatorship makes her a credible activist, and ultimately enhances her clout as a leader in the student movement because rhetoric between the two is so intertwined.

Her most famous song, “Shock,” was released in 2011 at the height of the student protests and quickly became the anthem for the student movement. In the song, Tijoux addresses a leader, presumably President Piñera, when she says, “Your state of control / your corrupt throne of gold / your politics and your wealth.” The chorus of the song is essentially a cry to battle, making demands that the “stealing” stops now, which is in
obvious reference to the education system as images of the 2011 protests flash during her music video. Further, “this condemned economic model from dinosaur times” that she critiques is an obvious reference to the Neoliberal economic model that political leaders like Piñera, Bachelet, and every democratic president have upheld since the transition to democracy, and she also blatantly references the constitution created by Pinochet as one of the many problems that should be risen up against. The music video is equally polemic: There are images of Chilean leaders contrasted with images of students violently protesting. Because the height of its popularity was during the height of the protests, this song represented, validated, and encouraged the emotions of the students in the education movement, making it one of the most iconic and important songs of the year.

Most importantly, the platform from which the artist makes her stance is not from that of a student-- because she is not one-- but of a Chilean who was victimized by the dictatorship. As mentioned above, the title of her whole record, “1977,” is a tribute to those who are her age, born in the heat of the dictatorship. Because public memory is defined as a way to remember the past in order to make an argument about the present and the future, her entire album, her protest song, and ultimately her image, are all a display of public memory. Therefore, there is a significant link between her work as a leader in the student movement and public memory of the dictatorship that has important implications: Because of her platform, high school and college students listen to her music as a source of inspiration for their cause, and she is thus inscribing public memory onto them about what happened in the past as well as what Chile is today. Tijoux sends
the message that Chile has a dark past that needs to be revolutionized.

While Ana Tijoux is certainly the pronounced artist of the student protests, there are other bands that have had an impact on the movement. In the “CultPop” section of El Dínamo, an independent Chilean news source, a list of influential songs was published that were said to represent the student movement in 2011. While some classic resistance songs like “Freedom” by Rage Against the Machine and “Revolution” by the Beatles made the list, there were multiple Chilean artists who are most widely known for their work during the dictatorship. Victor Jara, an immortalized Chilean musician from the 1960’s, is one poignant example: A member of the Communist Party and part of the New Chilean Song Movement, a musical movement that consisted of a group of left-leaning artists during Allende’s time who sang for peace and social justice, Jara was a famous theater director, singer-songwriter, poet and activist under the Allende administration. Unsurprisingly, he was tortured and killed by the Pinochet government shortly after the coup. According to El Dínamo, “the Chilean composer concurs with university students and their desires to change the Chilean education system. He was captured by the military regime, his hands were smashed and he was later killed, but his legacy remains intact. There are men who death can’t even silence” (Carrasco 1). The author of the web article intentionally highlights Jara’s tragic relationship to the military dictatorship while discussing the student movement and makes the argument that he and the students fighting for change have the same dream. This is a clear example of the type of

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8 Movimiento de la Nueva Canción Chilena

9 el compositor chileno se cuadra con los estudiantes universitarios y sus deseos de cambiar el sistema educativo chileno. Fue apresado por el régimen militar, sus manos destrozadas y luego asesinado, pero su legado está intacto. Hay hombres a los que la muerte no puede hacer callar.
relationship that Chilean activists believe the dictatorship has with the current education movement.

Another important band that the article mentions is called Los Prisioneros. While not part of the New Chilean Song Movement, this band became famous during the dictatorship for their social commentary, even though music was censored. Los Prisioneros became popular in the early 1980’s for its social critiques on things like machismo, but once the dictatorship was over, its turned to political critique. According to the article, their song “El baile de los que sobran,” which came out in 1986, is “perhaps the most important song to the student movement. [The band members] were against the Chilean education system and this song, which is over 25 years old, denounces it, remaining current today. One of the eloquent verses: ‘They said the truth to others, that thing called education10’” (Carrasco 1). In the eyes of Chilean protesters, the band whose message was repressed during the dictatorship carries the same message today, which validates their frustration and motivates social change. This is the same case as Ana Tijoux and Víctor Jara: The band’s platform is their experience with and stance against the dictatorship, yet their singles are considered quintessential anthems of the 2011 student protests-- evidence that rhetoric about the dictatorship and the student movement is constantly being intertwined, and students are receptive to it.

Art

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10 Es tal vez la canción más contingente al movimiento estudiantil. González, Narea y Tapia se fueron en picada contra el sistema educativo chileno y esta canción de más de 25 años de antigüedad así lo denuncia, manteniéndose vigente hasta el día de hoy. Una de las frases es decidora: “A otros dieron de verdad, ésa cosa llamada educación”.
One of the most prominent displays of memory I encountered in my time abroad was the movie No, directed by Pablo Larraín, which came out in 2012 and ultimately won an Oscar. The movie takes place in the late 1988, just before the plebiscite, where Gael García Bernal plays the creative director of an advertisement campaign for Chileans to vote against another two years of Pinochet in office. Stylistically, the film takes form of a documentary, where it is shot to match the film quality of the era. Much of the film uses real footage of not only the No commercial itself, but of protests and unrest that took place during the time as well. The campaign in the movie frequently references the NO+ campaign of 1983. This was a real art project created by Chile’s most influential artists, including Lotty Rosenfield, Diemela Eltit, Raúl Zurita, Juan Castillo an Fernando Balcells, who banded together to form a group called the Collective Actions of Art\textsuperscript{11} (CADA), which used performance to challenge their country’s politics. On the ballot of the plebiscite, voters were to make a vertical line down a horizontal line next to either Yes -- or No --, making a + formation. In Spanish, the + sign means más, meaning both ‘plus’ and ‘more,’ making the NO+ mean ‘no more.’ “Wall tagging was the first form of NO+, but the slogan was soon used by different collectives all over the country as a massive public symbol of political resistance and non-conformity” (NO+ 1983-Present 1).

The use of NO+ became an important symbol leading up to the plebiscite, and although the movie does not directly address CADA as a group, their project was obviously an important contribution to the recent film because of its influence at the time and therefore to public memory of Chile. The movie is also about the making of the No

\textsuperscript{11} Colectivo de Acciones de Arte
campaign song, “La Alegría Ya Viene,” which means “Happiness is Coming.” All the while, the campaign director, played by Gael García Bernal, is a doubtful Chilean who does not think that Chileans will vote Pinochet out of office yet receives threats from the government due to his work. The end of the film shows the massive, exuberant celebration of the plebiscite’s results and casts a message of positivity and hope for the future of Chile.

While the No campaign song itself is so upbeat and catchy that every older Chilean I spoke to told me that they still remembered all the words, it was a common saying among them that la alegría nunca llegó, or happiness of democracy promised during the plebiscite never came. This opinion is embodied perfectly by an op-ed journalist at El Ciudadano when talking about the film:

*No* won, but instead of changing the Pinochet constitution, Concertación governed and legitimized it. *No* won, but the breach between rich and poor is still one of the most unequal in the world. . . *No* won, but education, health, precaution, highways and basic services are all still in private hands today which have indebted and isolated us Chileans. [. . .]

And even though in 1988 *No* won, in 2012 nothing has really changed. The famous “happiness” never arrived. But what did arrive was a pile of material goods, microwaves, televisions, loan sharks, pharmaceutical and retail collusions, trash television, and a profound cultural shallowness that has spiritually impoverished and isolated us.12

(Sánchez 1)

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12 Ganó el NO pero en lugar de cambiar la constitución de Pinochet, la Concertación gobernó con ella y la legitimó. Ganó el NO pero la brecha entre ricos y pobres se mantiene como una de las más desiguales del mundo. . . .Ganó el NO y la educación, la salud, la previsión, las carreteras y los servicios básicos permanecen hasta el día de hoy en manos de privados que tienen endeudados y alienados a los chilenos. [. . .]

Y pese a que en 1988 haya ganado el “NO”, en el 2012 las cosas no han cambiado tanto. La famosa alegría nunca llegó. Sí llegó un montón de bienes materiales, microondas, televisores y autos último modelo. Pero llegaron de la mano de las deudas, los créditos usureros, las colusiones de farmacias y retail, la televisión basura y una profunda chatura cultural que hoy nos tiene empobrecidos y extraviados espiritualmente.
Sánchez obviously has a very negative perception of Chile’s current state. The film attempts to glorify the transition to democracy as an amazing achievement, but the journalist notes that upon the release of the film, the Chilean government made no comment that there was still work to be done in regards to Pinochet’s remaining constitution and economic model and instead took pride in Chile’s positive image from the film. It is also important to note that the Chilean education system was listed as one of the things still wrong with Chile in the context of the public memory of the dictatorship--To the journalist, education is a major problem that is worth mentioning in the context of No.

This is what another blogger had to say:

Larraín intermediates the surface of history, so the... format [of the movie]matches the skin of a history that is still being told, a fiction story that unites with archive material and varnishes-- trivializes-- the collective memories that get confused with history or conform to history. At the same time, it is interesting that the Yes and No campaigns are what construct the tension of the film-- images already seen, already forgotten--and come to propel a discussion that was once unpresentable. That current democracy is a product of marketing strategy. (Urrutia 1).

Urrutia makes the argument that there is an interplay between the time period of the movie and current day which is found both through the style of filming and suspense of not knowing the outcome of something that’s already happened. She believes that this

13 Larraín interviene la superficie de la historia, por eso el formato Umatic que permite igualar la piel de una historia que aún se está contando, un relato de ficción que se reúne con el material de archivo y va barnizando –banalizando- las memorias colectivas que se confunden con la historia o que conforman la historia. Por lo mismo, es interesante que las campañas del SI y del NO sean las que construyen la tensión del filme, imágenes –ya vistas, ya olvidadas-, las que llegan para proponer un discurso –otrora- impresentable. Que la actual democracia es producto de una estrategia de marketing.
ultimately means that the film argues that Chile’s current democracy, like the No campaign, is something that is simply being constructed by the hands of a private enterprise, which has been a recurring critique of the film (Khazan 1). Both bloggers believe that Chile’s transition to democracy has been a failure because of the government’s resistance to change. And for both of them, the conversation about the movie is important and necessary, which is exactly the desired result of a display of public memory: To cause the viewer to reflect on the display’s argument and to establish their own opinion, whether or not it is alignment with the display’s.

In the survey I administered to Chileans (upon which I will expound in the next chapter), I asked whether the respondents had seen this movie and whether or not they planned to in the future, and I received some interesting responses. Out of the 24 respondents, only half said they had seen it. Most of the people who said they had seen it didn’t give any response, but those who said no I had some interesting responses as to why:

“I haven’t seen it, I don’t plan to see it, it’s a difficult history to remember.”

“I’m not interested in seeing it, in Chile it incites too much to look into the past and I think this movie only generates more division.”

“No, eventually. But I think this movie didn’t generate the same effect as Machuca when it came out, that which made public and massive the theme of social differences that are

14 “No la he visto, no pienso verla, es una historia pasada difícil de recordar”

15 “No, no me interesa verla, en chile se fomenta demaciado mirar el pasado y esta pelicula solo creo que genera más división”
behind today’s political problems.”

“Yes and no, I started to watch but got bored, I didn’t find that it represented what really happened in the country.”

“I’m not interested in watching Gael García Bernal try to talk like a Chilean. Also Chilean cinema is too politicized.”

As we can see, this movie been received in a myriad of ways. These respondents think that the film is too political and have chosen not to engage with this form of public memory, while some of the others who took the survey thought it was a well-made, important movie. I found some similar pushback when asked about another new form of public memory: The Museo de la Memoria discussed in the first chapter. When asked about whether or not they had been to the Memory Museum, a brand new, state-of-the-art museum in Santiago that focuses on the dictatorship, only seven people said they had, and only one student was of that seven. While multiple people said it was too far away from Valparaíso (a two hour drive) and almost everyone said that they did want to go in the future, I also had some interesting responses as to why people didn’t want to go:

“No, I haven’t thought to go, but I think it’s necessary that it exists.”

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16 “No, eventualmente. Pero considero que esa película no generó el mismo efecto que Machuca cuando se estrenó, la que hizo público y masivo el tema de las diferencias sociales que está detrás de los problemas políticos aquella época y esta.”

17 “Sí y no, la empecé a ver pero me aburrió, no encontré que representara lo que sucedía realmente en el país.”

18 “No, no me interesa ver a Gael García Bernal intentando hablar como chileno. Además el cine chileno está demasiado politizado.”

19 “No, no me ha llamado la atención ir, pero encuentro necesario de que este exista.”
“No, one day maybe, but I think that it’s necessary to look towards the future and not keep ourselves in the past, filling ourselves with resentment.”

“No, maybe, I think they abuse the theme of the disappeared detainees and human rights. Man does have rights and also should have duties and the Museum doesn’t mention that nor does it mention those in uniform who died at the hand of the UP guerrillas.”

The first response was something I found to be very typical of most of the respondents: There was an appreciation that it was there, but they did not show interest in making the trip to Santiago like I did while I was there. The third response was from the person who approved of Pinochet, who is biggest outlier in the survey. The mixed responses about not wanting to watch the “too politicized” movies or go to the museum were surprising at first, but on a deeper level, this resistance indicates an initiative to move forward into the future and not spend time dwelling on their country’s dark past. While going to the museums, watching the movies and learning the history of the dictatorship was extremely important to me as a foreigner who was trying to understand the country’s history and culture, experiencing those things was very jarring-- jarring enough for me to write my thesis on it. It is understandable, then, why a Chilean would think that it was good that those forms of public memory exist, but they would not necessarily go out of their way to see them.

Public Memory in Protests

While I have focused mainly on Chile’s student protests, as I mentioned in the

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20 “No, algún día quizás, pero creo que es necesario mirar hacia el futuro y no quedarnos pegados en el pasado, llenándonos de rencor.”

21 “No, tal vez, siento que abusan del tema de los detenidos desaparecidos, al igual que de los DD.HH. El hombre si tiene derechos también debe tener deberes y el Museo no lo menciona, como tampoco lo hace por aquellos uniformados que murieron en mano de los guerrilleros de la UP”
first chapter, Chileans have begun protesting everything-- Malls, taxes, electric plants.

2013 marked the 40th anniversary of the coup d’état, and something interesting happened: In a rally for presidential candidate Marco Enríquez Ominami, Slate Magazine reports this scene:

“We’re going to make history today!” says the MC, a heavyset hype-man in an orange hoodie, as Latin rock pumps through the northeast corner of the Plaza de Armas. “A thousand people in Allende’s glasses! Yeah!” Campaign workers leave the stage with cardboard boxes full of imitation glasses—plastic lenses in the same kind of chunky black frames that the Chilean president wore up until the day he killed himself in the presidential palace as Gen. Augusto Pinochet’s forces bombed the building. The crowd, several thousands strong, surges against the barricades to grab the glasses.

Amid a spike in Salvador Allende’s popularity, particularly among younger Chileans, those glasses are icons—stenciled on sidewalks, printed on T-shirts, the inspiration for songs like “Allende’s Glasses” by Manuel García. And in the midst of a heated presidential campaign that just happens to fall on the 40th anniversary of Allende’s death, one could be mistaken for thinking that Allende himself was on the ballot. (Thornburgh 1)
Along with this rally, a giant replica of Allende’s glasses as they were found after the bombing were displayed outside of La Moneda for the anniversary of the coup. Above, children are photographed with the glasses, wearing matching T shirts that honor his memory.

These displays of public memory represent a paradigm shift in perception about Chilean history. On the 40th anniversary of the commencement of Pinochet’s regime, it is not Pinochet who is being celebrated like he probably was during the dictatorship—Rather, the celebration is for the leader who was technically defeated that day in 1973. While the anniversary activity mentioned above was not necessarily a protest, it was a public display of memory that students like the ones photographed above did attend, which makes a statement about how teachers want that historical event to be remembered.

As for the student protests themselves, memories of the dictatorship can be found openly in signs and artwork, demonstrating a certain relationship. One example is of a photo below of two protestors: One woman holds up a sign that says “Students teach us to be valiant” while the other’s says “Pinochet: Death to your Legacy,” a very similar
tagline as the photo I found of a protest sign in the Londrés 38 museum as discussed in Chapter 1. This protest took place in June of 2013 in Santiago, which was the most recent large protest. The word choice used in the first poster invokes strength and bravery of students while the second invokes death of Pinochet. Because these two protestors likely know each other (by the fact that they are standing and posing together for the picture), this indicates that to them, there is indeed a relationship between the student movement and the legacy of Pinochet. There is an intentional juxtaposition between the strength and death to argue that there is something to be learned from the students who are striving to kill Pinochet’s legacy. Obviously, this type of public memory makes a very specific argument about how Pinochet should be remembered.
Another example of the presence of Pinochet in the student protests is when a group of artists called Colectivo Casagrande, famous for their projects involving political statements, created a 10 x 4 meter, inflatable, King Kong-esque Pinochet and put it in front of the University of Chile in November 2012. Besides Pinochet hangs a sign that reads “170 years: The University of Chile United in the Strengthening of Public Education as a Right for a More Just Society.” According to the article posted about it, the inflatable figure served to “threaten public education,” which ultimately makes the argument that Pinochet was not a leader who believed in a “more just society” through education as the sign next to him suggests (Foto 1). Furthermore, this caricature of Pinochet does not actually invoke fear: King Kong is typically viewed as an antiquated
monster who fails to actually scare anyone anymore. The artists essentially argue that Pinochet’s education policies, while still present in the education system, should no longer affect education policy because they are, like King Kong, antiquated and diminished in power.

In April 2012, there was another protest in Santiago reported on by Aporrea, a Venezuelan news source that publishes articles on social issues in Latin America. In the photo they used to report on the protests, a college-aged girl is holding a sign that reads “Piñera = Pinochet. Education for the people, but quality education” (Primera de 2012 1). This student clearly believes that Piñera, the president at the time, was just like Pinochet
in that he was not providing quality education for rural Chileans. This poster is a call to action for students to get rid of Piñera, and therefore to get rid of the rest of Pinochet’s legacy, in order to achieve the goals of the student movement.
Conclusion

In all of the examples of public memory mentioned above that were part of various protests within the last three years, it is clear that students and leaders of the education movement believe that Pinochet’s remaining policies are what is wrong with the current education system, and they are fearlessly willing to make a stand to change how he is remembered. This lack of inhibition to protest and speak out against Pinochet, despite his lingering popularity and policies, is indicative that perceptions of Pinochet are changing: Images of him that are associated with things like King Kong, violence, and corrupt politics are all displays of public memory that argue that his legacy is not one of prestige like he probably would have wanted, but rather, his counterpart Allende is being celebrated as the winner of the last 40 years. Public memories of Allende are more and more positive as Pinochet’s are more and more negative. This bombardment of negative imagery upon the public has polarized Chileans, and the youngest adult generation is proven to be not only the group who is perpetuating it, but they are highly receptive to it, as made evident by the results of the 2013 presidential election and their active participation in the student protests of 2013. Their beliefs about the past will ultimately affect future social and economic policies in Chile as the youngest generation becomes political and social leaders, which will greatly reshape Chile’s future as a democratic nation. To further my argument that displays of memory like the ones in this chapter do
indeed make an impact on Chile’s youngest generation, my next chapter provides statistical evidence that young Chileans feel worse about Pinochet than older generations.
CHAPTER FIVE: Measuring Generational Feelings towards Pinochet

In order to evaluate generational shifts in thinking about Pinochet as well as some of the other indicators of change in public memory, I decided to create a survey that asked questions that might help me gauge how people were feeling. The survey did not gain much traction-- I only had 24 respondents-- but the results are useful and insightful in terms of giving a snapshot of how Chileans feel about their past, especially among college students. In order to supplement my own results, I also found a survey done by a Chilean survey group that asked similar questions to a larger sample size. I will first discuss my results and then compare them to the larger survey in order to make an argument about generational change in perception of Pinochet, and then apply my findings to my discussion about protest and public memory.

Methodology

I decided to use SurveyMonkey to administer my surveys to Chileans. The surveys were in Spanish and shared through Facebook. I asked my friends to post the survey on their Facebook pages and to share it with their friends and family so I could get a wide distribution of respondents of all ages. I also emailed my professors and asked them to take the surveys and share them.
While my sample size was small, my aim was not to find statistical significance, but rather to get a snapshot of ideas, which proved effective because of the amount of response I received from university students. 24 people responded to the survey; of them, 17 were students and 7 were not. Everyone who took the survey who was between 18-24 was a student. There were 5 respondents who were between 25 and 49, and two respondents who were 50 and older. In other words, 70% of the respondents were in the first generational age group, 28% were in the second age group, and only 8% were in the third age group as defined by my first chapter. This is how they responded:

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<th>Age</th>
<th>Student</th>
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<th>Q2</th>
<th>Q3</th>
<th>Q4</th>
<th>Q5</th>
<th>Voted</th>
<th>Protested</th>
<th>Museum</th>
<th>Movie</th>
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I chose to organize this chart by age, going from youngest to oldest, in order to see any trends that might emerge in the questions. The different colors in the chart range from lowest numbers being the most red with the highest numbers being most green to show level of intensity in certain responses. While the rest of the survey questions are listed in the appendix, the most important questions I asked are listed on the graph below.
as Q1-Q5, which were statements that they rated from 1-10 in how much they agreed with it. For the sake of clarity, I will list them here: Q1 was “Pinochet’s economic policies benefitted Chile in the 1970s and 1980s”; Q2 was “The economic policies were successful in transforming Chile into the stable country it is today”; Q3 was “Pinochet’s social policies were beneficial for Chilean society during the 1970s and 80s”; Q4 was “Pinochet’s social policies still influence social policies today”; Q5 was “General opinion about Pinochet.” The scale goes from 1 as strongly disagree to 10 as strongly agree. From here, it was easy to see certain trends.

Age Trends

The students between 19 and 21 answered questions in the same way consistently. They believed that Pinochet’s economic policies did not benefit Chile during the 1970s and 1980s and they were not successful in transforming Chile into the country it is today, Pinochet’s social policies were not beneficial for Chile but still affect Chile’s social policies today, and they all very strongly disliked Pinochet.

Students between 22 and 24, however, had different answers. Question 1, regarding whether or not Pinochet’s economic policies benefitted Chile during the dictatorship, was answered with answers ranging from 5 to 8-- a sharp contrast between the 1’s and 3’s that the 19-21 year-olds responded with. They also answered question 2 with mostly 7’s, whereas the highest ranking the 19-21 year-olds ranked it 5 and under with mostly 1’s. They also believed that Pinochet’s social policies still affect today’s social policies in number 4, but not as much as the 19-21 year olds, who almost
exclusively answered with 10’s. Instead, there were only two 10’s, three 7’s and one 5. In
the last question about feelings towards Pinochet in general, only one person answered
with a 1 (whereas everyone but one person answered with a 1 in the younger group), and
one person even responded with an 8, meaning they rather liked him.

The difference in responses between the 19-21 and the 22-24 age group is rather
striking. This could be because the 19-21 age group is still in college, and they all stated
that they participated in protests—likely both the 2011 and 2013 rounds. However, the
22-24 age group was not as eager to participate in the student protests: Only 3 of the 6
people said that they had protested. (Unfortunately, there is no credible data available to
see how many students have participated in protests throughout Chile, making this hard
to compare with a national perspective.) While this dichotomy could be due to the fact
that there were less 22-24 year-olds than 19-21 year-olds in my sample, it is interesting to
note that the youngest Chileans in the survey were the most passionate about how they
felt about Chile’s past. This could certainly be because participation in protest requires a
great deal of passion, so they are more likely to have stronger opinions about the
questions than those who have not protested.

The 24-49 group was also rather nuanced. There were two 24-year-olds, three 27-
year-olds, one 28-year-old and one 30-year-old, so this group was much less concentrated
than the group of students, and therefore my results are likely less accurate in
representing the entire generation than they could have been. For the first question, this
group was split down the middle, with 3 answers above 5, 3 answers below 5, and one
five, which was labeled as “neither agree nor disagree.” In question two, this age group
believed that Pinochet’s economic policies helped transform Chile into the stable country it is today much more than the students who were in college, with only one 3, one 7, and three 10’s. Question three was answered with all low numbers, which is consistent with the other age groups. They gave question four numbers between 5 and 7, much unlike the previous age groups, indicating that they believe-- but to a lesser extent-- that Chile’s social policies affect today’s social policies. Lastly, the three 27-year-olds gave a one for their general opinion of Pinochet, but the 28-year-old gave a neutral 5 and the 30-year-old gave a 3. This age group has an overall less negative perception about Pinochet and how his policies affect today, but their opinions vary greatly by age. This could be for a variety of reasons, such as whether or not they knew victims of the human rights abuses, had family associated with the regime, benefitted from his economic policies, and so on.

Finally, the 50 and 51 year old both gave 1’s to the first question, meaning they believed that they did not believe his economic policies were beneficial for Chile in the 1970s and 80s. However, they both gave yellow answers-- a 4 and a 7-- to the question about whether those economic policies helped transform Chile into the stable country it is today. Neither of them agreed that Pinochet’s social policies were good for Chile during the dictatorship, but only one of them thought that those policies affected Chile’s social policies today: One gave that question a 7 while the other one gave it a 1. Finally, they both gave a 1 for their overall opinion of Pinochet. These results were surprising because I thought they would be the most nuanced age group because they had experienced the coup, the dictatorship and now democracy, but the two respondents were rather polarized. However, only having two respondents does not give a clear picture of the generation at
all, so these results are not very telling. Overall, the age trends found in my survey concurred with my hypothesis that the youngest generation of Chileans— that is, 18-24 year-olds— were the most vehemently opposed to Pinochet’s legacy.

Again, I must acknowledge how remarkably small my data set was. However, it still validates my argument about the effects of displays of public memory on the Chilean public because, at least among people in higher education (i.e., the grand majority of my respondents), there is a pattern of passionate distaste for Pinochet by the youngest generation of Chileans. As we saw in the last chapter, displays of public memory are being shown mostly to students, meaning they are indeed responding to the displays.

Voting Trends

Only three respondents said they did not vote in the last election. Out of those three, two of them participated in the student protests. One was 20 and the other was 27. When asked why or why not they chose to protests and vote, the 20 year-old stated that he was an “anarchist” who was “not interested in the presidential system” but protested because it was the “only medium for struggle against the dictatorial system.”

The 27 year-old said that he was out of the country during the election period, but he also said while he tended to associate with the moderate left, he would have not voted for Bachelet because she would not be able to fulfill her promises. Everyone else voted, and of them there were only four that did not participate in protest. One said he thought they “only serve to make delinquency;” one said she thought that “institutional changes in education...

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22 No estoy interesado en el sistema presidencial. . . [es el] único medio de lucha contra un sistema dictatorial.
are generated by participating through internal means.” One girl stated it was because she was just *floja*, the Chilean slang term for lazy, and the other person who did not participate was the same person who gave Pinochet a positive score. My data set does not necessarily reflect the level of political activism as the rest of the country: Only around 50% of the Chilean population turned out to vote in the 2013 elections, which was their first-ever voluntary election, which differs from the 92% voter participation in my survey (Estudio Nacional de Opinión Pública N°70 Septiembre - Octubre 2013 93). This shows that on the whole, my data group was very politically active and passionate about their beliefs, and their views were largely in line with one another’s.

Along the same lines, this proves once more that my specific data set is not representative of the Chilean population, so my results cannot necessarily speak for Chile as a whole. However, my data set does reflect the attitudes of upper-class, educated Chileans. While one could argue that this discredits my argument because the whole purpose of the student protests is for the poor to have more access to education, which would mean the opinions of rich, educated Chileans would be irrelevant, I will reiterate that the rich university students of PUCV, the University of Chile, and all the other wealthy CRUCH schools are highly active in the student protests. Therefore, my data set reflects the attitudes of the Chileans who are instrumental to the protests and will have the power to change the future of Chile in the long run.

It is certainly worth mentioning, however, that this survey was not adequate in defining changes in popular opinion between generations. While this part of my original

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23 *los cambios institucionales en educación se generan participando por las vías internas*
hypothesis was not necessarily answered in a way that I would have liked, my data was sufficient for helping define the young generations’ attitudes, which is quintessential to my argument about how public memory has played a part in creating change in Chile because the displays’ target demographics have been the younger generations.

(Because I did not get a good scope of anyone older than 22, and those who did answer the survey all had similar beliefs, I understand that this does not reflect the rest of the population. In order to compensate for this lack in my data, later in the chapter I will compare my study to a study done by CERC, the Center for Contemporary Reality Studies,\textsuperscript{24} which is a private organization known for its surveys on political topics, who did a similar study in September 2013 which had many more respondents of all ages.)

Trends in Feelings about Pinochet

The general pattern I saw in my data was that the younger people were much more united in their feelings towards each statement, believing that Pinochet did not make any positive attributions to Chile either during the dictatorship or now. Their practically unanimous response to question four was, essentially, a social commentary about Chile: The grand majority of students had participated in the student protests, meaning that they disagreed with Chile’s current social policies, and their unified response to question four reflected that they blamed Pinochet for the education policies they are trying to change. In this sense, my hypothesis was correct: The youngest students

\footnote{\textsuperscript{24} Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Contemporánea}
feel the worst about the legacy of Pinochet-- Or at least 15 students who (likely) attend prestigious private schools in Valparaíso do.

The youngest group also did not believe that Pinochet’s economic policies were beneficial at all during the 1970’s and 80’s and generally did not believe that those policies have an effect on today, but the latter half of the respondents did. The 24-50 groups gave much higher numbers to question two, meaning that they do give some credit to Pinochet for his economic policies whereas the younger people do not. Further, 3 out of 9 of the latter age group had not protested while only 2 out of 15 of the younger group had not. This shows that the younger respondents are more actively against the remaining education policies from the Pinochet regime, and likely more ready to take a strong stance against his legacy.

In terms of question 3, every single respondent besides one answered with a 5 or below, and the grand majority of the responses were 1’s. This indicates that there is a general consensus across the board that Pinochet’s social policies were not beneficial for Chile in the 1970’s and 80’s, which is important because it demonstrates that there is no nostalgia when thinking about Pinochet’s policies, which is an important aspect of memory. There was one respondent who answered with a 7, but all of his answered generally favored Pinochet, giving his/her overall of him as an 8. This is also important because it demonstrates that there are still people-- even students-- who still support Pinochet today.

Overall, while the younger respondents were more passionate, the older Chileans who were surveyed had very similar outlooks on how they felt about Pinochet, but they
were less passionate, indicating that their feelings about him are more nuanced. My original hypothesis was that 25-50 year-olds would have the most negative perceptions of Pinochet, followed by 18-24 year-olds and then by Chileans older than 50. However, my survey results show that 18-24 year-olds were the most vehemently against Pinochet, and that passion decreases with age. This could be because the 18-24 respondents were all students who almost all have participated in protests and are therefore bombarded with rhetoric against Pinochet (such as the displays of public memory discussed in the previous chapter) while the older respondents have had more space to reflect on Pinochet’s legacy in a less polemic environment.

Survey Comparison

As I mentioned above, my survey was not a very adequate indicator of how Chileans feel as a whole, so to compare my responses, I found a survey done in September 2013 by CERC. The survey asked 1200 people throughout the country about various opinions they had on Pinochet and measured their responses by age. Their results are illustrated in graphs, of which I have chosen three to discuss in terms of my findings. The first one is a graph entitled “Opinion of the General Pinochet Regime, 1989-2013”:
In this graph, we see how many people said whether the regime was “Some good some bad” (blue), “It was only bad” (red), “It was only good” (green), and “Don’t know/no response” (purple). We see that the most popular response from 1989 until now has been “Some good some bad,” although it (along with “only good”) has generally decreased and “only bad” and “I don’t know” have increased. This not only provides insight into how people’s opinions have generally changed over time, but gives an indicator of how people feel now— In 2013, the “only bad” belief is almost as popular as “some good some bad,” and almost no one thinks it was “only good,” which is in line with my survey responses.

The next graph is labeled “Opinion of the General Pinochet Regime, according to age”:  

lxxv
This graph has four categories: “It was only bad,” “It was good as a whole,” “In part good, in part bad” and “I don’t know/no response.” The youngest age group was divided rather evenly between bad, so-so and no response, whereas the 26-40 group mostly responded with bad or so-so, with more people saying it was bad and less people not responding. The 41-60 group also had more “in part good in part bad” than “only bad” answers, but they were not as polarized as the 41-60 group, and the 61+ group had similar answers. The age group who believed the regime to be good overall more than the other groups was the 61 and older group. The most important information to take from this graph is that the 26-40 year-olds believed more strongly than anyone else that the regime was only bad, and the 41-60 age group thought it was partly good and partly bad. Both of those findings line up with my original hypothesis that 26-50 year-olds would
feel the most negatively towards Pinochet while older Chileans would have a more
nuanced view.

While my own data set suggests that 18-24 year-olds are more passionate about
their opposition to Pinochet, the survey done by CERC indicates that 26-40 year-olds are
more passionate. While the results do seem to conflict, the 18-25 year-olds surveyed by
CERC had a significantly higher portion of people who said that they either didn’t know
or didn’t respond, which could potentially make the results less accurate. Either way,
more research needs to be done in order to fully evaluate the question of generational
shifts in thinking among Chileans, especially in regards to public memory.

Conclusion

In sum, my survey data reflects that there is indeed a correlation between
perceptions about Pinochet and age because the youngest generations of Chileans who
took the survey were the most passionate in their answers. While the results for the other
generations were less conclusive, I had significantly less respondents who were out of
college, making my results less accurate. However, their opinions did essentially follow
the general pattern of being less passionate with age. Because my results did not line up
completely with the second survey, more research should be done on the subject of
generational gaps in feelings towards Pinochet, and more research should be done about
how that is affected by public memory.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

Since the transition to democracy in 1990 until rather recently, Chileans have not sufficiently separated themselves from the legacy of their right-wing dictator, Augusto Pinochet. Their current voting system and constitution were set up by Pinochet just before he left office and still remain in place; his neoliberal educational policies are still intact. Many older Chileans argue that the alegría, or happiness, promised by the transition to democracy never came because the neoliberal policies imposed by Pinochet have hardly changed within the last 20 years. However, the youngest generation of Chileans is doing what no other generation has dared to do-- create that alegría themselves. They are protesting for reform, engaging in the discussion of his legacy through public memory, entering congress, becoming more and more passionate in their opinions, and ultimately, setting the precedence for the future of their country. What exactly these young Chileans do with their passion for creating a nation that is free from the grip of the Pinochet regime will unfold with time, but it is certain that Chile’s alegría is in their hands, and hopefully, what the No campaign song chanted 20 years ago-- la alegría ya viene-- is finally coming true; maybe happiness really is on its way.
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APPENDIX

Survey questions:

Name (Open answer)

Age (Open answer)

Are you a student? (Yes or no)

Political affiliation (Open answer)

Based on your experiences, rate the following statements from 1 to 10 (1 being disagree, 5 being neither, 10 being agree)

Q1: Pinochet’s economic policies benefitted Chile in the 1970s and 1980s.

Q2: The economic policies were successful in transforming Chile into the stable country it is today.

Q3: Pinochet’s social policies were beneficial for Chilean society during the 1970s and 80s.

Q4: Pinochet’s social policies still influence social policies today.

Q5: General opinion of Pinochet

Did you vote in the 2013 presidential election? For whom? Why/why not? (Open answer)

Have you participated in the student protests? Why/why not? (Open answer)

Have you visited the Memory Museum? Do you plan to? Why/why not? (Open answer)
Have you seen the film No that came out in 2011? Do you plan to? Why/why not?

(Open answer)