The Chinese Inquisition: Xi Jinping's War on Corruption

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The Chinese Inquisition: Xi Jinping’s War on Corruption

By Harriet E. Fisher

A thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for completion
Of the Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies
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For Mom and Pop, who taught me to learn,
and Helen, who taught me to teach.
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ABSTRACT

HARRIET ELIZABETH FISHER: The Chinese Inquisition: Xi Jinping’s War on Corruption

Under the direction of Gang Guo

An integral part of Chinese political life is the rampant corruption that infests every level of Chinese government. China’s current leader, Xi Jinping, has initiated a hardline anti-corruption campaign that, for the first time in history, has targeted both low-level officials (small flies) and high-level officials (big tigers). This thesis is concerned with the factors that have motivated Xi to initiate these unprecedented reforms. I have identified three potential motivations: office, policy, and legitimacy. The office motivation refers to Xi’s attempt to consolidate his own power as leader of China, as well as the power of his political faction, represented by how many positions of power they hold. Xi may also be trying to achieve a policy goal in one of three areas: monetary policy, policy concerning economic development, or policies to bolster legitimacy. Finally, legitimacy is concerned with the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, which has deteriorated with the spread of corruption. I posit that Xi is driven by all three motivations, which I seek to prove by doing a survey of the media concerning the general situation surrounding the “swatting” of little flies, as well as a series of case studies, one for each of the big tigers that have been caught in Xi’s campaign.
Through this analysis, I have arrived at two conclusions. First, based on the evidence collected, Xi is driven by all three motivations, as they are all interconnected. Secondly, as to the specific kind of policy Xi is trying to adopt, there is evidence for the initiation of economic development policies and legitimacy policies, although there was no mention of monetary policy. Unfortunately, these results are only speculation at best. The study of corruption is notorious for its inherent lack of transparency; this fact, coupled with the Chinese government’s lack of transparency, make Chinese corruption particularly difficult to study with any measure of certainty. Thus, we cannot discern what has motivated Xi to initiate his anti-corruption campaign, and may never know.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Following Xi Jinping’s ascension to the position of General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (henceforth CCP or the Party) and leader of the People’s Republic of China, there have been many changes to China’s status quo, but none more dramatic than the adoption of China’s most recent anti-corruption campaign. Xi’s promises to deal with the rampant corruption in the Chinese government by prosecuting not only low-level officials, or “flies,” but also “tigers,” or high-level officials seems to be winning the hearts of the Chinese people. More than that, Xi seems to be keeping his promises; he has placed several high-ranking officials under investigation for corruption, among them a former politburo standing committee member, Zhou Yongkang, and the former vice-chairman of China’s Central Military Commission and retired general, Xu Caihou. Through the critical examination of those officials caught in the course of Xi Jinping’s campaign, I will address why Xi Jinping has undertaken the herculean task of resuscitating a government that has so long suffered under the plague of corruption.

In order to proceed, one must first have a basic understanding of Chinese corruption and anti-corruption campaigns. Corruption in the Chinese sense is unique, especially when one considers the causes of Chinese corruption. There are two basic theories concerning the cause of corruption in China. One is that the One-Party system is
to blame for the high degree of corruption. The other contends that it is a result of *guanxi*, or connections, and how pervasive that concept is in Chinese society.¹

Adherents of the first theory believe that corruption is a direct result of the CCP’s power monopoly in China; indeed, statistics show that the majority of corruption cases in China deal with Party cadres of state.² Minxin Pei, an expert in Chinese governance, believes that roughly one third of officials are lawful, and the numbers are decreasing day by day because of the CCP’s unrivaled and absolute power, a power that, as the saying goes, corrupts absolutely.³ The other school of thought maintains that corruption is part of the historically based *guanxi* practices of China. For instance, Chinese politics is traditionally steeped in nepotism. Moreover, much of the ruling class is made up of the taizidang or “princeling party,” the children of those who had power and influence in the Maoist era.

Kilkon Ko and Cuifen Weng, researchers of Chinese corruption, have found that in most of the existing corruption and anti-corruption literature, authors define corruption as “the misuse of public office for private gains,” or some variant thereof.⁴ They then counter this definition with a broader one of their own: “Publically unacceptable misbehavior committed by state functionaries for private gains at the expense of public interests, and/or causing intentional and unintentional damage to public interests and

³ Ibid., 134; ; Ibid., 101.
This definition takes into account the fact that corruption in China does not merely encompass illegal activities, but also includes offenses such as dereliction of duty, gambling, and other actions that, according to the Chinese, constitute morally questionable behavior. Along similar lines, He Zengke, a Chinese political theorist, categorizes corrupt acts into three categories: black corruption, grey corruption, and white corruption. Black corruption is what most people think of when they hear the phrase “corruption”—economic crimes such as embezzlement, bribery, etc. Grey and white corruption are much less cut and dried. Grey corruption refers to individuals in positions of power using their influence to better the welfare of their institutions and the staff of those institutions via both legal and illegal means. Corrupt acts that fall under this category include setting up satellite companies or charging “service fees,” and subsequently taking a cut of the income generated. Grey corruption also includes what are referred to in China as “unhealthy practices,” such as spending public money on lavish, wasteful banquets and extravagant foreign cars for business-related travel. Finally, white corruption refers to culturally accepted corruption, such as nepotism and bending the laws for family members and friends. White corruption is particularly important to the Chinese case, as Chinese culture puts a heavy emphasis on guanxi, or relationships. Guanxi are the threads that hold Chinese society together, and people use them for their own gain. For instance, one might use one’s guanxi to obtain a government position, or dispose of bureaucratic red tape—acts that are inherently corrupt, but sanctioned by Chinese cultural values. This adds a level of complication to Chinese corruption that one
must understand before proceeding. It is also important to note that, while all investigated officials have committed acts of black corruption, Xi Jinping’s campaign claims to target corruption in all forms. Xi himself has publically encouraged officials to purge overly complicated bureaucracy and “corrupt work practices,” as well as other behaviors classified as grey or white corruption.

Prior to Xi’s campaign, the Chinese government enacted many laws and employed multiple anti-corruption campaigns to eradicate corruption in all forms. These anti-corruption campaigns all involve a “clemency” phase during which officials are encouraged to confess for a reduced punishment, and a “crackdown” phase during which all offenders are dealt with harshly. These campaigns increase the intensity of internal monitoring, increase prosecutorial efficiency, change the incentive structure for turning oneself in, and mobilize extra-judicial monitoring forces (i.e. the Chinese people). Overall, anti-corruption campaigns are meant to wage psychological warfare on corrupt officials by convincing them they will definitely be caught in order to scare them into confessing for a lesser penalty.8

In addition to these core characteristics, anticorruption campaigns also include a number of specific measures for all types of corruption. He Zengke states that anti-corruption campaigns also put into effect measures concerning what he classifies as “grey” and “white” corruption. Such measures might include prohibiting public officials and their institutions from engaging in business activities and running satellite companies, regulating the extra-budget income of various departments accrued by imposing fines and

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administrative fees, and, finally, restricting extravagance and waste by officials (i.e. banquets).

He goes on to point out the importance of moral education to anti-corruption reforms. This education ranged from studying CCP political theory, to public criticism, to the blind worship of clean, “model” officials. He, however, also criticizes the efficacy of such policies by pointing out that under current party organization the criticism of one’s superiors is next to impossible, and as such, it is hard for them to set an example because, even if they were corrupt, those beneath them would still be obligated to follow dutifully. Moreover, the so-called model officials are often too perfect, which results in a failure to inspire others, thus further undermining moral education.9

These anti-corruption campaigns are considered ineffective tools of enforcement.10 While they do raise the instances of detection for the course of the campaign, it is not by much. Andrew Wedeman, a professor of political science whose research focuses on corruption in China, relies on the work of Melanie Manion, another political science professor and noted scholar of Chinese corruption, to suggest that, at the highest, less than 1 in 5 corrupt officials are detected. While this is still a 20-25% gain, these campaigns may intensify corruption by causing the amounts of money given in bribes to rise, rather than eliminating bribery, and does not result in higher instances of officials turning themselves in. †11 Wedeman adds that, as it is impossible to know the actual rate of corruption, it is impossible to have concrete evidence on whether or not campaigns really are effective. Despite these shortcomings, Wedemen still finds

9 He, pp. 267-269.
10 He, p. 27.; Wedeman, p. 113-114.
†This may be disputed, as the 1989 campaign had a high rate of confession.
campaigns to be effective in reaching other goals, namely shoring up regime legitimacy, and sowing seeds of doubt in those officials who may engage in corrupt activities.  

These findings raise yet another question: if anti-corruption campaigns have occurred in the past, but failed to solve the problem of corruption, why are China’s people so excited about Xi’s campaign? The answer lies in the features particular to Xi’s campaign.

To be sure, the most prominent feature of Xi’s anti-corruption measures is his promise to crack down on not just “little flies,” but “big tigers” as well. While this might seem like an obvious part of combatting corruption, this particular characteristic has been absent from all anti-corruption campaigns since that of Mao Zedong. Most of the senior leaders caught in Xi’s campaign have connections with former Party leaders—yet another important feature specific to Xi’s campaign. It appears that officials surrounding a given leader are taken out first, culminating in the investigation of the leader himself, as evidenced by the systematic takedown of Zhou Yongkang.

These actions were followed closely by the baixiang guiding, or the “8-point code,” which restricts the behavior of government officials. Under this code, officials are required to reconnect with their constituents, as well as eliminate many aspects of their lavish lifestyles, including buying fewer luxury cars and reducing the excess of government-funded meals. The baixiang guiding is closely linked to Xi’s call for a

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12 Wedeman, pp. 113-115.  
“thorough cleanup” of the *sifeng* or “four undesirable work styles,” namely formalism, bureaucratic, hedonism, and extravagance.\(^{15}\)

A final factor explaining the popularity of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is its ever-expanding scope. Not only does this campaign pursue corrupt officeholders, it also extends to a variety of economic sectors, which were overlooked in previous campaigns. These economic sectors include state-owned enterprises and other Party-state interests. More than that, anti-corruption reforms have also targeted members of the People’s Liberation Army, which had also remained untouched in previous anti-corruption campaigns.\(^{16}\)

\(^{15}\) Yuen, pp. 41-42.
\(^{16}\) Yuen, p. 43
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

With this background, we can move on to my primary question: why has Xi initiated these sweeping reforms? For purposes of analysis, I will be using the theoretical framework presented in Policy, Office, or Votes? by political scientists Wolfgang C. Müller and Kaare Strøm. They posit that leaders make all their choices with an end goal of obtaining a political office, a policy objective, or votes from their constituency.  

The first of these choices is perhaps the most straightforward—office refers, quite simply, to political positions. This could include the leader’s own office or other offices within the government that the leader would want his party to control. Obviously, as the CCP is the only political party in China, Xi Jinping is not fighting a rival political party, but rather rival factions within the CCP. Many think of the Party as one united front, but it is actually riddled with complex factional alliances. Xi himself has at least two factional alliances—both to the declining “Shanghai Gang,” led by former General Secretary of the CCP Jiang Zemin and to the “Princeling Party” or taizidang, made up of guanerdai, or the sons of prominent former Party members. In order to ensure that his

18 Ibid., p. 5-6.
interests are preserved, Xi would naturally want to install officials loyal to him in any office he can find. Thus, his anti-corruption campaign could be a tool for securing his own political power through the allocation of offices.

Not only may Xi want to consolidate his factions’ power, but also, he may likewise be using his anti-corruption campaign to strengthen his individual political power. Jon S.

T. Quah, one of the first scholars of Chinese corruption, contends that many officials use anti-corruption campaigns as a weapon to target their political opponents, and goes on to cite Joseph Fewsmith, who argues that charging one’s political rivals with corruption has become an increasingly popular political power play. Quah’s explanation on this point is particularly salient to research on Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption policies, as he discusses the case of Bo Xilai, the Party Chief of Chongqing who was recently sentenced to life imprisonment on charges of corruption. Bo was also a known contender for the position of General Secretary of the CCP; the corruption charges brought against him neatly dovetailed with the appointment of Xi to that very position. Even more recently, the systematic indictment of Bo’s alleged corruption ring, which culminated in the on-going investigation of Zhou Yongkang, a former member of the CCP Central Committee who backed Bo’s bid for power, further supports the idea that


21 Quah, p. 80.
anti-corruption campaigns are aimed at power consolidation. As one can see, it is entirely possible that Xi is employing his anti-corruption campaign for the purpose of his own political gain.

The second potential motivation is realizing a policy goal. The gains from this are twofold. First, it will unite the party/faction under a common policy goal. According to Müller and Strøm, the less unity among members of a party/faction, the more complicated it is for that leader to bargain for gains. Moreover, this unity could benefit the leader as well, by giving him more credibility within his constituency (or, by earning him more legitimacy), or simply by giving him the satisfaction of implementing a policy he truly believes in. Ko and Weng also suggest that the CCP uses anti-corruption measures to further strengthen its control over the lives of its officials. These authors argue that the CCP already controls much of its members’ lives through various administrative regulations, and that the government investigative and supervisory organs are subject to the political will of the upper echelons of the Party. These two factors lead to a situation where the Party can then carry out an overarching political scheme under the guise of an anti-corruption campaign.

Based on previous research, I have identified three potential areas where Xi Jinping may want to affect a change in policy. The first of these areas is that of monetary

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23 Wolfgang and Strøm, pp. 7-8, 26.

24 Ko and Weng, pp. 374-375.
policy. Four of the major reform-era anti-corruption campaigns in China have occurred in conjunction with economic austerity policies meant to curb inflation. This suggests that these anti-corruption campaigns were never meant to deal with corruption at all, but, rather, had the primary purpose of combatting economic overheating by forcing local-level officials to comply with the directives of the central government. Evidence shows that the start of anticorruption campaigns typically coincides with peaks in inflation and, furthermore, as soon as inflation is brought under control, the severity of the corruption crackdown lessens, which is visible in the abating numbers of corruption investigations.

Along a similar vein, Xi may be trying to affect change in the realm of economic development. For instance, it is a proven fact that corruption has a negative impact on economic development—economic corruption alone costs China an estimated 3-5% of GDP. Using Ko and Weng’s expanded definition for corruption, procuratorate (Chinese agency of prosecution and investigation) statistics reflect that economic corruption makes up 80% of corruption cases in China. This massive economic blow is compounded by the fact that other forms of corruption Ko and Weng mention also have huge economic impact—the average amount of money involved in dereliction of duty cases is ten times the amount involved in economic corruption cases. The Chinese view anti-corruption campaigns as “‘a stone that can kill [the] two birds’ of improving the economic environment and winning public support.”

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26 Ibid., pp. 69-70.
28 Ko and Weng, pp. 370-371.
29 Quah, p. 221.
In a complete departure from economic policy, it is also possible that Xi Jinping is using his anti-corruption campaign to force through policy changes in other areas that will benefit the CCP’s image, thereby increasing their legitimacy. For example, in Mao Zedong’s cultural revolution, his quest to root out rightists and capitalist-roaders (which, in Cultural Revolution China was essentially corruption) allowed him to push through certain policies that rid the CCP and China of what he considered to be outdated, uncultured values that had no place in New China. Xi seems to be enacting similar measures, which will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter Three.

The third and final potential motivation is votes, or the winning of public support. Originally, Müller and Strøm employed their theory in the study of European democracy leaders, hence the “votes” option. For my purposes, I will equate votes to party legitimacy, because both are achieved through public support. Leaders seek votes, or legitimacy, in order to maximize their control in all areas. While one might not think popular support is very important, the CCP is actually very responsive to public opinion. This stems from an ever-present paranoia that every small protest will become a full-blown revolution. When faced with this challenge, the CCP has two options: summarily crush any resistance with force, or try to head off resistance by heeding the demands of their people in a timely fashion. Clearly the latter is the path of least resistance, as well as that most likely to end in peace rather than further revolt. Furthermore, this expedient
resolution of the Chinese people’s grievances seems to work to maintain legitimacy—
average Chinese citizens rate their support for their government as an eight out of ten.\textsuperscript{30}†

For the Chinese Communist Party, unprecedented economic development and the
increase in prosperity it has brought to the Chinese people has been the basis of its
legitimacy since Deng Xiaoping’s “Reform and Opening Up.”\textsuperscript{31} Thus, it stands to reason
that the CCP may very well be initiating anti-corruption reforms for the purpose of
improving the economy, and thereby reaffirming its own legitimacy. Indeed, corruption
scholar Elizabeth Quade makes this point by connecting the phenomenon of inflation-
induced austerity measures and anti-corruption reforms, which she believes to be
methods of restoring legitimacy.\textsuperscript{32}

On a more basic level, corruption by its very nature is detrimental to regime
legitimacy. As He Zengke argues, “Political legitimacy derives from public support while
public support is based on the government’s ability to provide public goods and improve
its citizens’ lives.”\textsuperscript{33} Thus, if the Chinese government misuses its power in a way that is
detrimental to its people, it will lose their support. Put more simply, if a government is
corrupt, it inherently loses legitimacy. This point is corroborated by Ko and Weng,
whose modified definition of corruption implies that corruption does not merely affect

\textsuperscript{30} Tang, Wenfang, Michael S. Lewis-Beck, and Nicholas F. Martini. "Government for the People in
† This study gives a detailed explanation discounting the supposed effect of media censorship and
government control on the data obtained in the study cited.
<http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/china%E2%80%99s-third-era-end-reform-growth-and-
stability>.
\textsuperscript{32} Quade, p. 66.
\textsuperscript{33} He, p. 260.
the individuals involved, but also has a negative impact on the CCP. Manion is also in agreement with this point, and believes this is the root of anticorruption campaigns, which she suggests are initiated to produce short-term “enforcement peaks” that offset the low level of success the CCP has in day-to-day anti-corruption enforcement.

With all that said, it is important to know, however, that none of the goals are mutually exclusive. For instance, policy objectives are often seen as a supplement to office appointments. In other words, to facilitate the realization of a policy goal, a leader will want his party (or, in our case, faction within a party) to hold more offices, thus realizing an office goal. Furthermore, depending on its motive, achieving a policy goal can help increase public satisfaction, thereby increasing legitimacy. Therefore, any policies enacted for the purpose of legitimacy are indicative of both policy and legitimacy goals. The same kind of link exists between legitimacy and office—in order for the leader to ensure his own office and the offices of those in his faction, he must continue to ensure gains for those players who keep him in power. In this case, as he is kept in power by the CCP as a whole, he must ensure its legitimacy. In light of the overlap between motivations and their individual significance to Xi’s reign as leader of China, I hypothesize that there will be strong evidence suggesting that Xi’s motivation behind is anti-corruption campaigns is, in fact, a combination of all three potential motivations. Moreover, in regard to the three different policy options mentioned above (monetary policy, policies to bolster economic development, and legitimacy-oriented policies), I

34 Ko and Weng, p. 374.
36 Müller and Strøm, p. 8.
suspect that research will reveal that Xi is trying to achieve some policy objective in each of the three categories.

However compelling they may be, all of these theoretical motivations are just that: theories. In order to determine which of these theories—if any—are driving Xi Jinping to initiate his anti-corruption reforms, one must engage in a critical examination of those cases brought against corrupt officials during Xi’s time in power. In order to effectively complete this task, I have broken the cases down into two categories, which are named for the colloquial Chinese used to describe each investigated official: smaller, local-level officials, who are aptly dubbed as “Little Flies,” and powerful, high-level officials are known as “Big Tigers.”
Chapter 3: Little Flies

At first glance, any findings regarding the purging of corrupt “little flies,” or grassroots officials, seems to pale in comparison to the significance surrounding the purge of a big tiger. As reporter Yeh Young-June correctly points out, the reality is quite the reverse—it is the flies, not the tigers, that are more harmful to the Chinese people.\(^{37}\) Thus, it is important that one take into account this aspect of Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign, even though the idea is not unique to his campaign.

One must also bear in mind that corrupt behaviors of local-level officials are somewhat different from those of high-level officials. While high-level officials can rely on their extensive webs of connections, local-level officials are limited in scope by their lower status. This limitation is, however, not as much of an obstacle as one might think; in fact, grassroots-level officials receive huge economic benefits from corruption. For example, when Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region local official Wu Zhizhong was investigated, luxury goods and jewelry worth with a total cost equivalent to 300 years of his salary were confiscated from only one of the 33 apartments he owned.\(^{38}\)

This raises the question of how local officials with such limited power can amass so much wealth from corruption. Local officials engage in a variety of corrupt acts, which


\(^{38}\) Ibid.
I have classified into four distinct domains: real estate corruption, public funds misappropriation, public manipulation, and environmental corruption.

Real Estate corruption has been a hot topic of discussion in Chinese society, particularly with the country’s ever-expanding real estate bubble. Throughout China, CCP authorities are trying to move 250 million rural people into urban areas by 2025. China has no private property; urban land is rented to individuals by the government, while villagers collectively own rural land. While the process should involve moving people from their homes and giving them a new abode as compensation, it is much easier for local governments to bribe village leaders into keeping land prices low and then requisition the land and flip it to developers. Through these land grabs, officials make huge profits, while the villagers are left with inappropriately small compensation for their lost land. This is precisely why “small villages within big cities” and outlying villages and towns are a perfect breeding ground for corruption—so many local officials and large local businesses receive under-the-table benefits from the corrupt real estate and construction deals they are able to negotiate.

Aside from appropriating funds that would otherwise go toward benefitting local citizens, corrupt local officials will also manipulate their citizens into aiding their personal corruption. Such manipulation occurs in one of two ways. First and foremost, as stated in my theoretical framework, because the Chinese political system is perceived as being corrupt, many citizens accept that they will have to grease the palms of the

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appropriate officials to complete certain tasks. Indeed, many Chinese find it hard to believe that any government official can leave office without engaging in corruption.41 This phenomenon is quite pervasive, and the revenues generated are massive—in a 2003 survey of bank employees, it was reported that the average borrower paid the bank a bribe worth 9% of the amount borrowed.42 The second is by forcing citizens to make purchases or conduct business transactions with an official as an intermediary. For example, Hou Zuchang, a village chief in Hubei province, forced his citizens, at the threat of violence, to purchase firecrackers and then proceeded to take the profits. He also forced locals to go through him in order to buy or sell livestock and purchase rotten maize.43 No matter what method employed, the outcome is always the same: officials make a fortune from the exploitation of their people.

There is, however, one final method in which local-level officials harm their citizens, and it is perhaps the cruelest and most inhumane of all: their callous disregard of environmental degradation. Following China’s increased emphasis on environmental awareness many officials have begun to interfere with environmental assessments and will illegally grant pollutant-discharge permits. As a result, many rural citizens have suffered from polluted water supplies and land contamination.44 Environmental pollution is so serious in China’s villages that some have become part of the infamous “cancer

43 Young-June, "Flies Are More Harmful than Tigers."
villages.” These unfortunate villages have rates of cancer are far higher than the national average, generally due to water supplies contaminated by nearby factory pollution. More than that, when citizens have tried to protest or make a legal case against these factories, local officials have harassed them.\(^4^5\) Because of the severity of this particular facet of local-level corruption, the CCDI has turned its attention to corruption in the environmental sector both at the local level and even within the Ministry of Environmental Protection.\(^4^6\)

Xi Jinping’s campaign appears to be making progress as far as little flies are concerned. Between December of 2012 and 2014, 75,000 low-level officials were investigated for corruption.\(^4^7\) Ultimately, whether fly or tiger, Xi’s motives still remain the same; all three goals are represented in Xi’s persistent “swatting” of little flies.

In terms of policy motives, Xi seems to be trying to push a variety of policy reforms on grassroots government. First, there is the economic perspective; corruption as a whole costs China at least three percent of its GDP, so eliminating corruption at a local scale would definitely leave slightly more budget for implementing policy reform, as well as improve the nation’s economy as whole. Specifically at the local level, many officials take advantage of public funds in their corrupt behaviors—Xi might want to ensure that the money allocated for the people actually gets to them. Another possibility is that, with the advent of a new property tax and a real estate registration system in 2014, Xi might be

\(^4^6\) Neill, "Alexander Neill: Catching Flies in China.”
trying to force officials to comply with these new regulations.\textsuperscript{48} As stated previously, real estate is one of the main avenues of corruption for local-level officials. Therefore, regulating the industry would undoubtedly meet with vocal resistance. With the anti-corruption campaign cracking down on any and every official, however, many of Xi’s enemies might think twice before questioning one of his policies.

In addition to economic and business-related policy, Xi appears to be trying to push through several legitimacy-oriented policies that should have a lasting impact on the nature of anti-corruption enforcement long after Xi’s campaign has drawn to a close. The first of these is his “mass line” campaign, which involved eliminating the “four undesirable work styles,” namely formalism, bureaucracy, hedonism, and extravagance. This campaign has the secondary goal of making Party officials accountable to the public, and encourages them to engage in self-criticisms and increase their “good deeds” done for their communities, all of which is reminiscent of Maoist China.\textsuperscript{49} Xi has also continued to push forward his new policy that decries luxury spending, “long, boring speeches,” red carpet welcomes, and alcohol-fuelled banquets. He promotes the idea that officials should live an austere, reserved life as dedicated civil servants. These reforms, in particular, are popular among China’s people.\textsuperscript{50} Finally, there has been a reform made to the Party’s disciplinary mechanism to stress the importance of officials’ obligation to crack down on corruption and undesirable working practices, thereby purifying the Party of corruption. This reform works from the top down, encouraging each level of


\textsuperscript{49} Tiezzi, "China's Real Corruption Challenge: Swatting Thousands of ‘Flies.’"

government to eliminate its own corruption before assisting lower levels to do the same.\textsuperscript{51}

Naturally, none of these reforms are popular with officials, who at the same time, when faced with the repercussions promised by the anti-corruption campaign, have no choice but to adopt these policies. As Xi Jinping himself said, “bureaucrats must not be allowed to get away with skirting rules and orders from above or choosing selectively which policies to follow.”\textsuperscript{52}

As far as the motive of obtaining offices is concerned, Xi has two possible interests in going after local-level officials with renewed vigor. First, as shown in his quote above, it is imperative to Xi that local-level officials immediately implement the decisions and policies issued by the central government and Xi himself.\textsuperscript{53} Regardless of whether Xi is the leader of China or not, if those beneath him will not take his direction, it makes him appear weak; thus, Xi would want to eliminate those who do not toe his party line and replace them with others who would. Secondly, in order to catch a big tiger, authorities must first work their way through his or her network of little flies that have benefited from that official and simultaneously facilitated his or her corrupt behavior. This bottom-up method is necessary, because, before one can take on the challenge of going after a big tiger, one must first acquire evidence and build a strong case to persuade the political powers-that-be that it is vital that this official be purged. This was true in the Zhou Yongkang case, where the first official to be taken down was

\textsuperscript{51} China daily (anti-graft watchdog); reuters China’s Xi urges swatting


\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
the Sichuan province deputy party chief, Li Chuncheng. Thus, if Xi wants to arrest big tigers in order to centralize important industries and government departments under his own power, he must first eliminate all their underlings, hence the continued emphasis on swatting flies.

The reasoning behind this process leads us to our next motive: that of legitimacy. Despite the fact that corruption is one of the top threats to Party legitimacy, going after corrupt officials must also be sensitive to the issue of legitimacy. This is a multifaceted process, as Xi must take into account the public and well as government opinions on the matter. The bottom-up process for eliminating big tigers thus becomes necessary, as it helps overcome any opposition to charging an official with corruption. This, in turn, keeps the Party united and also prepares the public for a scandal that might do harm to the Party’s legitimacy. Xi must literally get the approval of all the senior or retired senior leaders before going after a big tiger; thus, the process of weeding through all the small flies is necessary.

Another important factor tying Party legitimacy to the purging of little flies is the fact that little flies have more of a direct effect on the average Chinese citizen. Thus, if Xi wants to improve the Party’s reputation, he must deal a heavy blow to low-level corruption. Indeed, many riots, or “mass incidents” (as Chinese political jargon dubs them), have occurred out of frustration with local-level corruption in particular. As Xi Jinping himself said “… if we don’t redress unhealthy tendencies and allow them to

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54 Shi, Oster, and Guo, "How Xi Jinping Swatted Flies to Trip Biggest China Tiger.
55 Kaiman, "Xian: The Chinese Village That Took on Corruption and Won."
56 Shi, Oster, and Guo, "How Xi Jinping Swatted Flies to Trip Biggest China Tiger."
57 Tiezzi, "China's Real Corruption Challenge: Swatting Thousands of 'Flies.'"
develop, it will be like putting up a wall between our party and the people, and we will lose our roots, our lifeblood and our strength.”

Here, it seems that policy motives are the most important—Xi is trying to force through a lot of economic policies, including one concerning economic development, that will ultimately be to the benefit of China and its people. Moreover, legitimacy-oriented policies are particularly important on the local level, as it is there that the changes are most visible to the people of China, and thus have the greatest impact. One must not, however, discount the other two motivations; legitimacy is obviously very important at the local level, as it is the local people who must be appeased. Office is still a concern for Xi, although not nearly as great—he wants people in power who will enact his policies, but securing every village’s mayoral position seems hardly worth the trouble. Xi would be more likely to concentrate on upper-level positions of power.

While the anti-corruption campaign is going strong, ultimately it will be the satisfaction of the Chinese people that determines whether Xi’s campaign was effective. As such, local-level anti-corruption is particularly important to Xi’s prestige, the Party’s longevity, and the continued societal harmony of China.

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59 Blanchard and Wee, "China’s Xi Urges Swatting of Lowly Flies in Fight on Everyday Graft."
60 Tiezzi, "China's Real Corruption Challenge: Swatting Thousands of 'Flies.'"
Chapter 4: Big Tigers

Case Study: Bo Xilai

Although Xi Jinping and Bo Xilai appear to stand diametrically opposed to one another, the two have more in common than one might think. Most importantly, both are Chinese “princelings,” meaning they were born into elite political families and reaped all the benefits that privilege provided. Moreover, as princelings, both were leaders of separate princeling factions, a fact that is particularly germane to Bo’s downfall, as explained below. Both had fathers who were comrades of Mao Zedong and rose to fame as high-ranking officials under Deng Xiaoping. Before this rise to fame, however, both fathers were purged from the government during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, resulting in their sons being sent to the countryside to do manual labor.61 Because of their family lineage, both Xi and Bo are hongerdai and guanerdai—second-generation Party members and second-generation government bureaucrats, respectively. So, what led one to become the leader of China, while the other faces life in prison for charges of corruption?

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Fast-forward approximately ten years: Bo became the mayor of Dalian, a city in Liaoning province. After turning the port city into a model of economic efficiency, Bo’s political career took off. In 2001 he became governor of Liaoning province and in 2004 was promoted to the position of Commerce Minister. In 2007, he was given a politburo position, and was vying for a spot in the Politburo Standing Committee—the ruling body of China.62

Unfortunately for him, Bo did not succeed in gaining a spot in the Politburo and was instead appointed as Party chief of Chongqing in 2007. Once again, he brought new life to the city via several reforms. The first of these is an anti-crime and Maoist revival campaign, known as the changhong dahei—sing red songs and fight crime—campaign. 63 During this campaign, Bo decided to take a hardline approach toward corruption in Chongqing while promoting a return to the Cultural Revolution policies of Mao Zedong, in which government officials were required to wear uniforms similar to their Cultural Revolution counterparts and students were sent down to the countryside in an effort to bridge the urban-rural gap.64 The other major reform was an advancement of the “Chongqing model” of economic development, which advocated investment in infrastructure and the use of state funds to increase consumption. Because of his revamp of the city and his push for a Maoist revival, Bo was incredibly popular not only in Chongqing, but throughout China. Thus, it came as a surprise to all when Bo’s alleged...
life of crime was exposed.65

Bo’s downfall began in November of 2011 with the death of British businessman Neil Heywood; it took another six months before Bo was implicated in Heywood’s murder. In February of 2012, the police chief of Chongqing, Wang Lijun was demoted because of a “falling out” with Bo Xilai—Wang subsequently sought refuge in the United States consulate in the neighboring city of Chengdu, but emerged the following day and was arrested and later investigated. In March, rumors began circulating that Wang’s demotion was a result of an investigation into Bo Xilai and his family and that Bo had a hand in Neil Heywood’s death. In April, these rumors were confirmed when Bo was divested of his CCP posts and his wife, Gu Kailai, was investigated in relation to Heywood’s death.66 It was also around this time that the CCP began to investigate all those with ties to Bo and his immediate family—the members of his guanxi web—which, in Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, is indicative of an imminent takedown of the official at the center of the web. News reports of the CCP detaining and investigating 39 people with potential relations to the Bo Xilai Case began to circulate. Among the people probed were Xu Ming, a Chinese billionaire who owns the Dalian Shide industrial conglomerate (conveniently located in one of Bo’s former cities), and Xia Deling, the former party chief of Nan’an district in Chongqing, who was rumored to have supplied the cyanide used to murder Neil Heywood. His loyalties to Bo Xilai go back to the time that Bo helped promote him from the countryside to his post in Nan’an.67 Besides his business

65 “Bo Xilai Scandal: Timeline.”, 2013
66 Ibid.
connections, members of both Bo and Gu’s families were investigated. Indeed, most of Bo and Gu’s siblings were incredibly wealthy, and, in a couple instances, it appears they had help from Bo in acquiring this wealth. For example, Bo’s younger brother, Bo Xicheng, held stakes in two different companies, one in Chongqing, on in Dalian, that Bo had his governments subsidize. While none of Bo’s family members have been charged with crimes, it is apparent that they used Bo’s position for their personal gain.68

The investigation of Bo’s immediate family continued until July, when Gu Kailai and her aide, Zhang Xiaojun, were charged with homicide.69 The pair was tried in August—the aide was sentenced to nine years in prison, while Gu was sentenced to death. In September, Wang Lijun’s trial for various forms of corruption was held, which resulted in him being sentenced to 15 years in jail.70

Finally, after all those in his guanxi web were investigated and convicted, it was Bo’s turn. Shortly after Wang’s trial, Bo was expelled from the CCP and the Chinese legislative body. In July of 2013, Bo was charged with corruption, bribery, and abuse of power. After his trial in August, Bo was found guilty on all charges and was sentenced to life imprisonment. His subsequent appeal was denied.71 It is believed that this sentence was decided by China’s leadership in an effort to bring an end to the “Bo Xilai

70 "Bo Xilai Scandal: Timeline.", 2013
71 Ibid.
Scandal.”72 Bo is currently serving his life sentence in Qincheng prison on the outskirts of Beijing.73

The significance of the Bo scandal is manifold. First, the Bo Case was a big win for Xi in terms of his personal power consolidation, which falls in line with trying to achieve an office goal. Bo was, after all, Xi’s major competition for the position of General Secretary of the CCP, and the leader of a rival “Princeling Party,” making his claim to power very similar to Xi’s. Furthermore, Bo was immensely popular among the people of China for his work in Chongqing and Liaoning, another threat to Xi’s claim to power. Some sources suggest that Xi was deliberately harsh in dealing with Bo in order to eliminate him as a political rival. They allege that Xi wanted to defame Bo publically and prove to China that he has come out on top of the political power struggle. Indeed, for all intents and purposes, Xi has done so—by taking out Bo, Xi ensured that he would hold the highest office in all of China. Furthermore, Bo’s sentence, passed down from Party leadership, has ruined any chances Bo might have had at a political career. As one can see, it was almost too convenient that the Bo Xilai scandal coincided with Xi’s appointment as leader of China, thus calling into question the idea of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign being about altruistic motives, and confirming that the campaign is, at least in part, for Xi’s personal gain.

Not only did Xi want to, quite literally, gain his own office, he wanted to assure that this office had a power base. It bears repeating that Bo’s popularity was a major threat to Xi. Even if XI had been appointed as China’s leader over Bo, those people

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already loyal to Bo would have maintained their loyalty. Xi wants all of China united under him—this requires ensuring nothing is blocking Xi receiving 100% of popular support. This is exemplified by Xi’s tour of Bo’s old stomping grounds of Dalian, a show of power that took place mere days after Bo’s conviction.74

In further regard to Xi’s pursuit of office motives, it is possible that he wanted to procure more government offices to support his own. For instance, in taking out Bo, Xi took out the leader of the leftist and Maoist factions in the CCP.75 While the Maoists were not supportive of the manner in which the Bo Xilai case was handled, the dismissal of their leader left them in a power vacuum—one which Xi can now fill.76 In fact, Xi has already begun a Maoist revival, in which he has called on the rest of the nation to strengthen its adherence to Marxism and Maoist ideals, and has been hailed as the next Mao Zedong.77

Moreover, Xi’s pursuit of office motives allows him to do some strategic reshuffling of Party members. In imprisoning Bo Xilai, Xi was then able to install Zhang Dejiang as leader of the Chongqing CCP Branch. Zhang was, until that point, the premier of China’s State Council. Were he to have stayed in his position of power, he may have been considered for one of the upcoming available positions on the Politburo Standing

76 “Why Is the Bo Xilai Case so Important?”, 2013.
Committee. Once in power, Zhang would have promoted policies strengthening the development of state-owned enterprises, which Xi opposes for those reasons explained below. Moreover, his take down freed up a Standing Committee spot for one of Xi’s loyalists—Zhang is part of Jiang Zemin’s faction.78

As to a policy motivation, the speed of Bo’s trial served a secondary purpose—to close the book on the Bo Xilai scandal once and for all in anticipation of the Party plenum of November 2013, where Xi was scheduled to announce major economic reforms that were sure to invoke the ire of state-owned enterprises and bureaucrats.79 As predicted, Xi did unveil the anticipated reforms. First, he wanted the government to take a hands-off approach toward resource allocation in favor of allowing market forces to distribute resources naturally. Second, he wanted to subject state-owned enterprises to greater regulation and competition, as well as increase their efficiency. Both measures were indicative of a departure from a planned economy, which was bound to anger the leftist and Maoist elements in the CCP.80 Once Bo was dealt with, the party elite would be forced to recognize Xi’s power and accept his economic reforms without complaint.81 Thus, the Bo case also demonstrates Xi using anti-corruption campaigns for the achievement of a policy goal.

Finally, the Bo case was important in regard to Xi’s pursuit of a legitimacy objective. Bo’s conviction and heavy sentence gave Xi’s words substance, making his

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79 Page, 2013.
81 Page, 2013.
promises about cracking down on corruption believable to the Chinese people. This is important to the CCP as a whole, for two reasons: first, because all of Xi’s policies reflect on the Party itself—if he is keeping his promises, then the people are more inclined to view the Party in a favorable light—and secondly, because corruption tarnishes the Party’s reputation. If the Party is perceived as plagued with corrupt officials who are out only for their own interests and personal gain, then citizens will see the government, too, as working, not for the people, but, rather, for the private benefit of government officials. As suggested by Manion’s aforementioned examination of previous anti-corruption campaigns, however, if Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is seen as being effective—regardless of its actual efficacy—then people will believe that the Party is dedicated to purging itself of its corrupt elements.

Xi Jinping’s deft dealing with Bo Xilai has even further bearing on the CCP’s legitimacy. The Bo case was the biggest political crisis since the Tiananmen incident in 1989, in that it apparently showed how officials could commit heinous crimes with carte blanche from the Party. Therefore, not only did Xi have to reconstruct the Party’s image, he also had to take on the task of rebuilding the fractures between Bo Xilai’s former supporters and his opponents, thus making the Party whole again. These undertakings require a great deal of finesse. Xi had to simultaneously deal with the problem of a blatant Party cover-up while not exposing too many Party scandals to the incensed public,
and at the same time balance the wishes of the many different factions within the Party.\textsuperscript{84} When all is said and done, however, Xi’s hard work is likely to pay off: not only will he have repaired a Party rift, but he will also have taken a big step in leading the Party from beneath the shadow of corruption.

In conclusion, it is plausible that Xi’s priority in the Bo case was securing his place as leader of China. Nevertheless, the first of Xi’s tiger hunts appears to have been spurred along by a combination of all three potential motivations, as predicted.

\textbf{Case Study: Zhou Yongkang}

The Bo Xilai Case had one other significant outcome—it was the first step in the investigation of former Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang, who became the highest-level official to be investigated since the Maoist era.\textsuperscript{85} As previously stated, one of the key characteristics of Xi’s campaign is that his targeting of an official begins with the investigation of those officials who belong to his \textit{guanxi} web. Both Bo and Zhou were members of Jiang Zemin’s political faction; Zhou openly supported Bo Xilai’s bid for leader of the CCP. Thus, in Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, taking down Bo was a critical step in taking down Zhou.\textsuperscript{86}

\textsuperscript{84} Page, 2013.
Zhou was born in Wuxi City of Jiangsu Province in 1942. He became a member of the Chinese Communist Party in 1964 and graduated from Beijing Petroleum Institute two years later. He spent the majority of his career (32 years, to be precise) working in China’s oil sector. He began as a lowly technician in Daqing oil field, and made his way through the ranks to become the general manager and Party secretary of the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) in 1998. In 1999, he became the Party secretary of Sichuan province, and in 2002 he received an appointment to the Politburo. Later that same year he became the Minister of Public Security. In 2007, Zhou received a coveted Politburo Standing Committee position.  

During Zhou’s time in office, his principal responsibility was maintaining stability in China, specifically by “preventing and combating sabotage of hostile forces from inside and outside China.” For this task, Zhou was allotted a budget of 700 billion yuan—more than China’s entire defense budget. Zhou’s already immense influence in the oil sector grew with his increasing obligation—unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang as well as the security challenges posed by the 2008 Beijing Olympics allowed Zhou’s power to flow over into many difference spheres, including the courts and intelligence agencies. This allowed his corruption to expand as well—he detained many prisoners illegally, not to mention other abuses of power.  

His high political status notwithstanding, Zhou’s luck began to run out in 2012, when the systematic investigation and termination of his underlings commenced. Zhou, apparently heedless of the threat to his power, made what many argue was his fatal move

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87 Ibid.  
88 Ibid.
in appearing with Bo Xilai during the March 2012 Chinese National People’s Congress, effectively announcing his support for Bo’s candidacy—mere days before Bo was stripped of all his Party positions. In December of 2013, his son, Zhou Bin, was arrested and charged with corruption.⁸⁹ By the time the Party placed an official probe on Zhou on July 29, 2014, 64 members of his guanxi web, including Zhou Bin and Bo Xilai, had some sort of disciplinary action taken against them.⁹⁰ As of September, over 100 people have been implicated in the Zhou Yongkang case, and all will be included in the trial.⁹¹ Zhou was formally arrested and expelled from the CCP on December 5, 2014.⁹² In addition to the expected crimes of embezzlement, keeping mistresses, and abusing his power to aid his family and friends, the former security czar has been accused of “leaking,” or selling state secrets.⁹³ While he already would be facing a suspended death sentence based on the amount of money he and his associates stole ($14.5 billion), sources believe that, should he be convicted, Zhou will in fact be executed.⁹⁴

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⁸⁹ Ibid.


Zhou’s arrest had many far-reaching effects. In terms of office goals, while Bo Xilai may have been the first to be taken down, Bo was not officially part of Xi’s campaign, as Xi had not yet come to power when charges were brought against Bo. Therefore, Zhou was actually Xi’s first official “big tiger.” More than that, he was the biggest of the big tigers—he was a former Politburo Standing Committee member, a position that guaranteed a blind eye from the law, and yet Xi Jinping was able to bring him to his knees. This was a major coup for Xi himself, as it proved that his power was far reaching, thereby giving him more political clout.

In taking out Zhou, Xi was not only eliminating a big tiger, but also a political adversary. As previously stated, Zhou supported Bo Xilai, who was the biggest threat to Xi’s ascension to power. Zhou also had a vast amount of power in his own right—his positions in the highest levels of Chinese government and the state-controlled petroleum industry gave him nearly unbounded influence. This influence could have been used to support Jiang Zemin’s political motives, rather than assist Xi in achieving his. Thus, taking Zhou out of power ensured that Xi would have one less and very powerful enemy.

In engineering Zhou’s downfall, Xi accomplished three goals. He was able to gain control over China’s security sector and oil industry; he took down the web of officials who had pledged their fealty to Zhou, and, finally, he demonstrated his own supreme power. Removing Zhou opened up a variety of positions, including the deputy general manager of the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and the vice...
minister of public security, which could then be filled with officials loyal to Xi Jinping. Although Zhou’s connections fell mainly in these two areas, he also had a variety of other connections including those from his time in Sichuan, those that go through his wife, Jia Xiaoye, and her former job with China Central Television (CCTV), and those related to his son, Zhou Bin, who was the chairman of Zhongxu Yangguang Energy and Technology Ltd. This does not include his connections to the military through Xu Caihou or to Shanxi province through Ling Zhengce (which will both be touched on below), nor does it touch on his independently powerful family members. With all these connections systematically disposed of, Xi, in theory, would be able to have tendrils of influence in the Sichuan provincial government and local CCP government, the energy industry, CCTV (China’s most important television network), and more. With all these aspects of China’s political, social, and economic life under his control, Xi’s personal power, as well as that of his faction, will be uncontestable.

These gains will also allow Xi to press forward in pursuit of economic policy motives. As mentioned in the case study of Bo Xilai, Xi’s on-going consolidation is giving him the power necessary to push through economic reforms that some members of the Party would see unfavorably, namely those seeking to introduce more competitive market forces into the Chinese economy. This is relevant in the case of Zhou Yongkang’s takedown, because oil, energy, and security are all state-run; any sort of

95 “How To Catch a Tiger.”
97 “How To Catch a Tiger.”
market forces would cause those officials in charge of these industries to suffer losses, thus they would be vehemently opposed to these reforms, were it not for the fear of being investigated for corruption. This follows the logic of Quade’s theory that leaders use anti-corruption campaigns to bring local-level officials to heel so said leaders can advance their economic policies. In Xi’s campaign, this is taken one step further, in that he is also targeting the upper echelons of the government as well as the lower levels.

As for motives of legitimacy, the Zhou Yongkang case is important for two major reasons. As previously mentioned, Zhou’s reach was immense; during the course of his investigation, more than 60 other corrupt officials were arrested, and Zhou was the factor connecting them all. This scope is significant because, in one fell swoop, Xi was able to clean up, at least in part, eight different sectors of China, including the media, the coal industry, and the security industry.

Moreover, since Zhou had such a high political and societal status, he was thought to be untouchable by any law, let alone an anti-corruption campaign. All this was disproved when Xi was able to bring him to his knees, showing that no official, no matter their position, is above the law, or Xi and the Party. This, in turn, is helping China to institute rule of law, previously mentioned in Chapter Three, by making clear the fact that even “big tigers” are bound by the law. In theory, this will give the Chinese people the law and order they so desperately desire, thereby ensuring the CCP’s popularity and legitimacy for years to come. Whether this will indeed come to pass is another story.

The outcome of the Zhou Yongkang case is much the same as that of Bo Xilai. Once again, all three potential motivations are reflected in the Zhou Yongkang case.
Again, research has failed to furnish any evidence of any of the predicted policy motivations, and has instead revealed policies geared toward furthering the growth of a market economy in China. Finally, we see, yet again, Xi’s desire to solidify his own power, as well as that of his faction overriding both policy and legitimacy motives.

Case Study: Xu Caihou

The most recent addition to the ranks of those upper-level officials caught in the net of Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign is former People’s Liberation Army (henceforth PLA) General Xu Caihou. Xu’s downfall is also bound to Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang, in that they were all a part of the Jiang Zemin faction, as explained further below. Xu was also a member of Zhou and Bo’s respective guanxi webs. This was particularly true in Bo’s case—when Xu lived in Dalian, Bo gave special privileges to Xu’s family, and the two families forged a deep relationship. This particular investigation is important because it shows that Xi is cracking down on the military, a notoriously corrupt sector of China. Other than a relatively ineffective crackdown in the 90s, where military officials were banned from the business sector of China, corruption has been allowed to fester in all levels of the Chinese armed forces. Furthermore, Xu is

99 “How to Catch a Tiger.”
another “biggest of big” tigers—he is the highest-ranking military officer ever to face corruption charges.\textsuperscript{102}

Xu Caihou was born in 1943 in Liaoning province. He began his military career in 1963, and subsequently joined the Party eight years later in 1971. In 1972, he became the secretary and deputy chief of the political department of the military command in the northeastern province of Jilin, where he spent most of his career accruing power.\textsuperscript{103} In 1999, Xu took his place as one of China’s military elite when he became a general and the executive deputy director of the PLA. He continued climbing up the political ladder, and in 2000 was appointed to the 16\textsuperscript{th} CCP Central Military Commission. He held various positions in the Central Military Commission, among them as secretary of the Commission for Discipline Inspection, which is particularly ironic in light of recent events, as well as the position of vice-chairman. In 2007, when the 17\textsuperscript{th} CCP Central Military Commission came to power, Xu retained his position, which he kept until his retirement from the PLA and Politburo in 2012.\textsuperscript{104}

Unfortunately for him, Xu was to meet the same fate as Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang, the two big tigers who fell from power before him. In mid-March of 2014, Xu was taken from a Beijing hospital where he was being treated for bladder cancer, and was detained pending his assistance in the investigation of Lieutenant-General Gu Junshan, who had been under investigation since 2012. Gu was charged with corruption, misuse


of state funds, and abuse of power, causing a huge scandal for China’s military. Thus, Xu Caihou, as a member of Gu’s guanxi web, is viewed as a tacitly complicit, as he failed to report Gu’s misdeeds. On October 28, after being expelled from the Party and PLA and stripped of his military ranking, Xu confessed to taking bribes. With this admission of guilt, the investigation into his case was concluded and its findings released. Xu was found to have misused his position to promote his friends and family, accepting huge bribes both personally and through his family. It was also determined he sought profits for others in exchange for bribes, and thus it was obvious that charges will be filed against him. Even so, many believed he would be treated leniently because of his cancer.

In an ironic twist of fate, Xu’s cancer did give him lenient treatment, in a sense. On March 15, 2015, Xu Caihou died because of his bladder cancer, and all charges against him were dropped. Already rumors are floating that the CCP has found a replacement scapegoat for Xu—Guo Boxiong, another former vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission.

The Xu Caihou case is important for a myriad of reasons, primarily because it signifies that Xi Jinping is still on a mission to achieve his office motive, this time by asserting his control over the military. Previously, the PLA was rather removed from China’s political leadership, despite the fact that the leader of China is also the commander of the PLA. This situation became increasingly severe under the reign of Hu

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105 FlorCruz and Wang, 2014.
107 FlorCruz and Wang, 2014; Lim, Kang, and Blanchard, 2014.
Jintao, when the PLA tested a stealth fighter without his knowledge. Not only did Xi knock out Xu Caihou, a corrupt follower of Jiang Zemin, in the process he was able to eliminate Gu Junshan, the former PLA General Logistics Department deputy director, and Yang Jinshan, the former PLA Chengdu military region deputy commander, who were both members of Xu’s guanxi web. 109 This freed up several positions in the upper strata of the military for Xi to fill with those loyal to him. Indeed, following Xu’s detention, 18 of the top generals in the PLA made public declarations of loyalty to Xi Jinping by publishing one article each in the Liberation Army Daily.110 Xi seems to have adopted the teachings of Machiavelli—it seems that, when ruling China, “it is better to be feared than to be loved.”

On a side note, the take down of Xu Caihou is only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to restoring Party power over the military—sources suggest that Xu’s capture indicates a large-scale overhaul of the military.111 This may be necessary to further ensure Xi’s power over the military and will definitely open up lots of new offices for those loyal to Xi. Currently, Jiang Zemin’s hold on the military is still particularly strong, as evidenced by Xu Caihou retaining his position of power. Jiang’s influence is strong from decades of building—thus, the guanxi web Xu heads up could include hundreds of military members.112

111 “Xu Caihou’s Vast Network Of Relationships May Cause Big Cleansing In Military”
112 Ibid.
To further consolidate the power of his own office, Xi needed to bring the military under his command. Not only did he accomplish this initial goal, he simultaneously realized a policy goal. The first major step in that direction was adopting a policy that established China’s National Security Council.\textsuperscript{113} In addition to addressing issues pertinent to national security, this council also seeks to increase the sharing of information between the PLA and other branches of the government.\textsuperscript{114}

In addition, Xi also passed new regulations, in this case policies geared toward shoring up CCP legitimacy, directed to curb the luxurious lifestyle led by the majority of military officials, including a law banning officers from staying in luxury hotels on business trips.\textsuperscript{115} Along similar lines, the Chinese government under Xi has decided to bring the PLA’s auditing office back under the jurisdiction of the Central Military Commission from its previous position in the PLA’s Logistics Department. The government hopes that this action will allow the auditing office to have more autonomy, thereby giving it more leeway to root out corruption in the military.\textsuperscript{116} All of these policies would previously have met with serious resistance, but, since the military is no longer safe from Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, Xi was able to enact these reforms with minimal resistance.


\textsuperscript{115} Lim, Kang, and Blanchard, 2014.

As far as motives of legitimacy are concerned, the investigation of Xu Caihou proved that not even the highest of military statuses can save someone from Xi’s anti-corruption sweeps, further cementing China’s supposed burgeoning rule of law. This has resulted in both increased unity between the military and the government, and increased fear on the part of the military, which never before had to worry about being caught in an anti-corruption campaign. In addition, the legitimacy policies Xi is trying to enact will boost the people’s faith in the military, which was previously viewed as lazy and out-of-control. Ensuring that its military members are “toeing the line,” as well as not eating and drinking themselves into stupors and renting expensive cars, reflects the Party’s commitment to regaining its legitimacy and its zero-tolerance policy on corruption.117

Yet again, all three motivations are represented, and again the desire for office seems to be the strongest of all the driving forces behind Xi’s anti-corruption campaign. The only significant departure from the Bo and Zhou cases is that Xu’s takedown revealed that Xi is pursuing legitimacy-oriented policy motives where the military is concerned. With the supposed chaos looming on the horizon for the military, Xi may be trying to reassure the public that such corruption will not be allowed to exist in the military from this point forward.

Case Study: Shanxi Gang

The coal-rich province of Shanxi has become one of the main arenas for the executing of Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign. Because I am focusing on big tigers in this section, I will not be able to encapsulate fully the far-reaching nature of the crackdown in Shanxi. It is important to note, however, that since the beginning of the campaign two years ago, one third of Shanxi’s 13-member politburo standing committee and over 40 officials throughout the province have been placed under investigation.\textsuperscript{118}

The officials I will cover in this chapter include those who belong to the upper echelons of the Shanxi Government; those officials are Ling Jihua, Ling Zhengce, Song Lin, Du Shanxue, Jin Daoming, Bai Yun, Ren Runhou, and Nie Chunyu.\textsuperscript{119}

The vast majority of Shanxi’s wealth lies in the state-owned coal industry, which presents innumerable opportunities for engaging in corrupt behavior. The breeding ground for corruption in Shanxi was made all the more fertile by the privatization of the coal industry and its almost immediate re-nationalization, which all occurred within the last ten years. With this massive exchange of power came extreme confusion, thus creating a prime opportunity to misuse public power and authority for personal gain. Thus, in some provinces, corruption spread from the head official in charge of coal and spread to other departments, including the Work Safety Bureau, the Land and Resources Bureau, etc. Many officials will become shareholders in coal production, manipulate others involved with their official powers (also known as a “protective umbrella”), or even directly manage coalmines. In addition, the coal industry also allows for corruption


\textsuperscript{119} "Tigers and Flies: How Two Years of Graft Probes Have Shaken China’s Political Elite."
via *guanxi* webs; if a business wants to share in the benefits of the coal industry, the owner must maintain “good relations” with the official who has the power to divvy up the rights to coal wealth by giving said officials bribes and others benefits. Finally, officials will also buy and sell posts, and, with these posts, acquire more coal and more money in yet another fashion. Thus it becomes obvious why many in China say that the coal industry is an “official-coal collaborative.”

Another factor unique to the Shanxi case is that most of the officials in the “Shanxi Gang” are clearly connected. Below is a chart depicting the connections of the big tigers of the Shanxi Gang and other officials that have been investigated during the course of Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign.

Much like the takedown of Jiang Zemin’s corrupt connections in government, the dismantling of the Shanxi Gang was a bottom up process. The first Shanxi official caught in Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign was Jin Daoming, the assistant vice chairman of the provincial legislature’s standing committee, who was put under investigation on February 27 of 2014. Jin would allegedly use his authority to interfere in the court cases of corrupt officials to help them receive lighter sentences for their crimes. Jin was

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122 Sūn fù lǐ, p. 41.
subsequently relieved of his duties as a Shanxi official on March 2, 2014, after which his position went to Du Shanxue.\textsuperscript{124}

The next official to be placed under investigation was Song Lin, the former China Resources chairperson, who was detained on April 17, 2014.\textsuperscript{125} Suspicions were aroused about Song when his underling, Wang Yujun, president of China Resources Power, came under investigation. China Resources Power is a branch of China Resources Holdings, a state-owned conglomerate whose chairman is Song. Together in 2010, the two companies purchased three mines, among other facilities, in Shanxi. The price for these assets was set at $1.6 billion, much more than their estimated worth.\textsuperscript{126} Song has since been purged from his position.\textsuperscript{127}

Following Song’s investigation, Xi’s anticorruption campaign turned its attention/trained its guns on a familiar face: Du Shanxue, former Shanxi vice governor was placed under investigation on June 19, 2014 despite having taken over the position from the corrupt Jin Daoming.\textsuperscript{128} Du was expelled from the CCP for bribery, adultery, and abuse of power.\textsuperscript{129}

\textsuperscript{127} "Tigers and Flies: How Two Years of Graft Probes Have Shaken China's Political Elite."
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid.
The investigation of Ling Zhengce was announced the same day as that of Du Shanxue. Zhengce was the former Shanxi Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference vice chairman. He is facing allegations of “grave violations of regulations of law,” which, in China, is code for corruption. To date, he has not been charged with any specific corrupt acts.

On August 23, 2014, an investigation was launched against Chen Chuanping, former Taiyuan (provincial capital of Shanxi) party secretary. Considering that Chen hosted a televised conference on anti-corruption two days prior, this is particularly ironic.

The next target of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign was Nie Chunyue, on August 23, 2014. Nie was a senior administrator of Shanxi’s Standing Committee. Nie was accused of using his power and authority to secure benefits for others, taking immense bribes, and adultery. He was stripped of both his party membership and office on February 3, 2015.

Closely following Nie was Bai Yun, former member of the provincial party’s standing committee, who was caught in the crosshairs of Xi’s campaign on Aug 29, 2014. Bai was also head of the United Front Work Department of the provincial Party committee, which is in charge of communicating with different political parties. She

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130 "Tigers and Flies: How Two Years of Graft Probes Have Shaken China's Political Elite."
131 Forsythe, Buckley, and Ansfield, "Brother of Aide to Former Chinese Leader Comes Under Investigation."
132 Buckley, "China’s Antigraft Campaign Expands to a Coal-Rich Northern Province."
133 “Shanxi Official Sacked, Expelled from Party for Bribes, Adultery.”

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too was suspected of the familiar and all-encompassing “serious violations of discipline and law.”

The (so far) penultimate case of corruption in Shanxi was that of Ren Runhou, former deputy governor of Shanxi and former chairman of a mining company in Shanxi. He was placed under investigation on August 29, 2014. Following the trend, he was arrested for “serious violations of the law.”

Finally, Ling Jihua is the ringleader of the Shanxi Gang. Aside from this, Ling was the chief aide to Hu Jintao, former leader of China, and is a member of his “Youth League Faction.” Ling was in the running for a Politburo position when his fall from grace began with his cover-up of his only son’s, Ling Gu’s, car wreck, where Gu crashed his Ferrari, killing himself and injuring his two female passengers. Allegedly, Ling Jihua bribed the passengers to keep silent on the matter, and did not announce his son’s death publically, but it was discovered all the same. Despite this, Ling was allowed to keep his position as Hu’s aide. Over two years later on December 22, 2014, Xinhua News Agency announced that Ling Jihua was under investigation for “suspected serious discipline violations,” in other words, corruption. His investigation will finish out the systematic takedown of all the big tigers associated with corruption in Shanxi.

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136 Buckley, "China’s Antigraft Campaign Expands to a Coal-Rich Northern Province."
More importantly, the implications of the Shanxi takedown represent all three of the potential motivations Xi Jinping could have for initiating his anti-corruption campaign.

The Shanxi case at its very essence reflects Xi’s desire to strengthen his personal power through the obtaining of political offices in the name of his faction. Every official caught in Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is a new government post open for an official loyal to him. Plus, in the case of Shanxi, most of the big tigers are not just any officials; they are officials loyal to a separate faction, the Shanxi Gang, which could have ties via Ling Jihua to previous leader of China, Hu Jintao, and his “Youth League” faction. With the upcoming 2017 19th Party Congress looming on the horizon, Xi’s elimination of high level officials (including the members of the Shanxi Gang, Bo Xilai, Zhou Yongkang, etc.) is a method of ensuring that he can stack the Politburo Standing Committee (the seven-person governing body of China) with members of his “Princeling Party.” This is particularly important, considering five of the seven current Politburo Standing Committee members are supposedly stepping down.139 While these officials have not made any outwards moves in opposition to Xi, they have no loyalty to him either—that, combined with their power over China’s coal industry makes them perfect targets for Xi’s anti-corruption campaign.

Coal is another factor in Xi’s quest to solidify his own power. Under previous leaders, provincial and lower level officials were essentially given free reign and many took advantage of that fact and abused their official powers for personal gain. This, as stated above, was very true for Shanxi’s coal industry, which began to serve the greedy

139 Ibid.
government officials and business owners, rather than China as a whole. Xi’s targeting of those officials at the heart of Shanxi’s coal-related corruption is therefore reminiscent of his purging of Xu Caihou—Xu controlled the military and, in order to bring the military under his authority, Xi purged him so that a Xi loyalist could take his place. The same is true for coal—although the industry is state-owned, it was really controlled by the Shanxi gang and other corrupt officials in Shanxi—Xi simply purged the officials to regain power over coal.

The coal industry is also a new arena for Xi to implement new policy goals. For instance, the Chinese government is trying to open state-owned enterprises, like the coal industry, to private and foreign investment. In addition, the government announced at the 2013 and 2014 plenums that it is attempting to implement pro-market restructuring policies. These policies are vehemently opposed by the ruling elite of China, who personally profit from continued state control. By getting rid of the big tigers who resist implementing the economic reform policies adopted by the Xi regime, Xi can appoint a loyal official who will follow every order issued by the central government. Moreover, this crackdown on elite officials scares those lower-level officials straight, so to speak; if these big tigers, who’s circle of influence is often beyond measure, can still be captured in Xi’s anti-corruption campaign and not even their powerful position can save them, the outcome for a local-level official who was caught would be even worse.

Finally, Xi is also trying to preserve the legitimacy of the CCP. Chinese workers are upset by the rampant government corruption. These corrupt officials make their money by exploiting workers and state funds and resources, thus further deepening the

140 McGrath, "World Socialist Web Site."
already existing social inequality in China. As Cheng Li of the US Brookings Institute said: “Corruption is ruining the Chinese Communist Party, causing a serious legitimacy crisis…if there was a similar event [to Tiananmen] would the public and the military support the party? No, because they are too corrupt.”¹⁴¹ Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is a “desperate effort” to appease public opinion and assure military allegiance, both by eliminating the supposedly corrupt officials in all areas of government and government-controlled industries for all the public to see, as well as replacing them with people who are tied to Xi and would stand behind him in times of turmoil.¹⁴²

After being plagued with several successive sets of corrupt officials, Shanxi has a lot of re-building to do as far as the province’s political ecology is concerned. Shanxi has already adopted policies to eliminate corruption in the coal industry. These changes certainly will not be an overnight occurrence, but many people are optimistic for the future of anti-corruption reform in the province.¹⁴³

Again, my research shows that all three potential motivations are present and accounted for. Market reforms still appear to be dominating the policy concerns, while office concerns seem the most important.

¹⁴² McGrath, "World Socialist Web Site."
¹⁴³ 宋馥李, p. 42.
Chapter 5: Conclusion

After sifting through the massive amount of information concerning Xi Jinping’s motives in initiating his unprecedentedly ruthless anti-corruption campaign, it becomes obvious that, even with the myriad of differences between each case study and level of government analyzed, each scenario leads to the same conclusions. Based on the research presented above, it appears that my primary hypothesis was indeed correct: Xi is trying to pursue all three possible motives through his anti-corruption campaign.

To summarize briefly, there is strong evidence suggesting personal power consolidation through the acquisition of political office, which seems to be the driving motivation in the majority of the cases involving big tigers. This is most likely because big tigers and those in their guanxi webs are in strategic positions of power—that is, Xi wants their offices because they will add to the range of his faction’s power. For instance, in the case of Xu Caihou, Xi wanted to bring the military under his own control— one of the members of Xi’s political faction will undoubtedly fill Xu’s now vacant position, and will likely use his or her newfound power to benefit others within the guanxi web of Xi’s political faction. The same is true in the case of Shanxi province—Xi appears to be eliminating one official after another, thereby opening strategic positions of power within the coal-rich province that his faction can then take over. Moreover, Xi is eliminating his own political foes; all of the big tigers were in a position to threaten Xi directly and had
the power and connections to foment opposition against him. Bo high-ranking officials who control China’s state-owned enterprises. Thus, removing Zhou Yongkang from his position of power in the oil industry, as well as the majority of officials who control Shanxi’s coal industry, was essential to the success of these reforms.

Finally, regarding the motive of shoring up Party legitimacy, the desire to sway public opinion in favor of the Party to preserve its hegemonic power over all aspects of China was also obvious throughout all the case studies, whether they were little flies or big tigers. As legitimacy is so vital to the CCP, every action the Party takes as a whole, as well as every action of every CCP-affiliated individual must consider that legitimacy. The unparalleled numbers of little flies that have been “swatted” and the extraordinary investigation of multiple big tigers are indicative of just how much the CCP cares about public opinion. Those in power worry that if they continue allow corruption to fester in their ranks, it will serve as the impetus of such a rebellion; but, if the Party appears as though it is taking a hardline approach towards corruption, it may preserve its power. That explains why Xi has chosen to implement legitimacy-seeking policies, such as the abolishing of wasteful banquets that are funded by public coffers. It also explains his choice to carry out his personal power consolidation under the façade of an anti-corruption campaign designed to maintain the illusion that the Party is slowly purifying itself of corruption at all levels. While anti-corruption campaigns have been initiated in the past, never before has their reach extended to the upper-echelons of the government; thus, every big tiger caught in the jaws of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is improving the Party’s image by slowly proving its supposed commitment to purging corruption. After
considering the lengths they will go to in order to ensure their political longevity, is apparent that legitimacy is key both to Xi and the Party he leads.

It has also become clear that, despite trying to divide actions into one of the motivation categories, most actions have elements of two or more motivations. Rarely is there ever a policy that fails to work for both the benefit of office and legitimacy, and rarely does seeking office only benefit the individual doing the seeking and not his or her own faction, etc. This can be attributed to the nature of politics—strategy is everything, and politicians will try to maximize their personal gains, the gains of their faction, and the gains of their people wherever possible.

In considering the complex nature politics, I must admit that I have presented Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign in a rather positive light. I have made the case that he is ensnaring both big tigers and small flies, for the purposes listed above, which include actually eliminating corruption. In light of this fact, there are some criticisms of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign that deserve mention.

First, while many people are optimistic about Xi’s increased resolve to crush corruption at both the local and central levels of government, others are not as confident. For instance, there is the issue of “the sky is high and the emperor is far away”; that is, it is hard to weed out corrupt local-level officials when those with real power are not on-hand to do so. While there are websites and hotlines for people who wish to report a corrupt official, they are largely ineffective, mostly because users may not report
anonymously. Besides that, going outside one of these sanctioned avenues for informing on an official will incur harsh penalties.144

Another, somewhat humorous, criticism of the anti-corruption campaign is that one of the more effective whistleblowing entities are the jilted mistresses of corrupt officials.145 While undeniably humorous, the message behind this fact is clear: if mistress reporting is one of the more effective methods of catching corrupt officials, it means that the government crackdown has not been very effective.

There have been many calls from the Chinese people for an independent judiciary system. This would provide an impartial organ that would bring previously nonexistent rule of law to China; as it stands, the current judiciary is controlled by the Party and government, and thus is essentially impotent, which has led to the spread of corruption. Unfortunately for the future of anti-corruption, however, the Party refuses to be swayed on this issue and will not allow itself to be subject to the authority of any other entity.146 Consequently, while Xi may want to appear as though he is bringing a system of rule of law to China, any changes he may enact will only be surface-level, at best. As discussed previously, China’s complex economy provides ample opportunity for corruption.147 In addition, some sources suggest that some of Xi’s Maoist tendencies and desires to strengthen government control are precipitating the rise of authoritarian rule in China.148

144 Tiezzi, "China's Real Corruption Challenge: Swatting Thousands of 'Flies.'"
146 Blanchard and Wee, "China's Xi Urges Swatting of Lowly Flies in Fight on Everyday Graft."
If this is true, any prospects of adopting rule of law will undoubtedly fall by the wayside. Many citizens lament the lack of transparency, and believe that, without initiating rule of law and adopting a separate judiciary organ, corruption can never be eradicated.\textsuperscript{149}

As a final criticism, I must concede that it is almost impossible to determine what Xi’s actual motivations are. The media analysis presented in this thesis has yielded results that support all of the motivations, but even so, corruption has an inherent opacity. It is impossible to know if anything is exact when dealing with corruption; in the Chinese context, this is further compounded by the fluidity of the definition of corruption, Party cover-ups, and the necessity of \textit{guanxi} webs. For instance, one cannot truly tell if Xi’s campaign is effective or not, because we cannot know whether the charges brought against the officials mentioned are valid or trumped up. Without a doubt, there is cause to question the validity of the charges brought against all the officials caught in the anti-corruption campaign. After all, there is strong evidence that Xi is trying to neutralize the threats to his power, and, to that end, there exists a clear precedent in China for bringing false charges of corruption upon one’s political enemies in an effort to eliminate them.\textsuperscript{150} If Xi has truly adopted the anti-corruption campaign to eliminate his adversaries, however, we cannot know for sure until it has concluded, as the Chinese government will never speak truthfully on the matter. So, sadly, one can only speculate; for the purposes of this work, one must ignore this nagging truth, as it is ultimately not important in finding potential motives—what it might add or detract one must be content with not knowing.

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\textsuperscript{149} Tiezzi, "China’s Real Corruption Challenge: Swatting Thousands of ‘Flies.’"
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That being said, there is nothing to do but wait; ultimately, no one knows what Xi’s next move is. He may go after a former leader of China, either Hu Jintao or Jiang Zemin—after all, he has already eliminated, or at least begun eliminating, their *guanxi* webs. Either of these possibilities is doubtful, however, because, as previously stated, taking down a former leader of China may irreparably harm the CCP’s legitimacy. I believe it is more likely that Xi will dismantle their *guanxi* webs, and then leave them powerless. Hu was already perceived as being weak, as mentioned in the Xu Caihou case study. Jiang, on the other hand, is fast approaching 90 years of age—it would make more sense for Xi to let his influence die with him, rather than damaging the Party’s image by investigating one of its former leaders. Another possibility is that, after all of his people are placed in strategic areas throughout the Chinese government, his policies implemented, and the CCP’s future secured, Xi might simply allow the anti-corruption campaign to fizzle out—he got what he wanted, so why keep it around any longer? On a more optimistic note, Xi may also truly be invested in purifying the CCP, in which case we will continue to see the Party purge itself of corrupt officials at all levels. Ultimately, it is only Xi Jinping himself who truly understands the motives behind his campaigns. Whatever the case, one has no way of knowing how Xi will proceed; only time will tell how this saga will draw to a close.
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