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ARE RURAL PEOPLE MORE ANTI-IMMIGRANT THAN URBAN PEOPLE? A COMPARISON OF ATTITUDES TOWARD IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES

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and

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ABSTRACT

Immigration to the United States has increased markedly in the past two decades, including significant growth in rural areas. Using General Social Survey data we compare rural and urban attitudes toward immigration in the United States. Our analyses reveal that, first, overall opposition is more pronounced in rural areas. Second, notions of a distinct American identity matter for urban, but not rural, residents. Third, beliefs about immigration are salient predictors in both regions. Fourth, political ideology is a determinant exclusively among rural residents, whereas political affiliation is a determinant solely among urban residents. Fifth, race and education level are significant determinants of immigration attitudes among both rural and urban individuals. Finally, when holding key factors constant, community residence does not predict immigration attitudes. Our findings suggest cohesion among Americans when it comes to beliefs about the "costs" of immigration, yet differences between rural and urban regions shaped by American identity and political persuasion.

Immigration trends in the United States over the last two decades have been distinct from previous waves of immigration in two vital ways. First, before 1965 the leading countries sending immigrants were European (Schmid 2003), but by the year 2000 this trend had shifted, with most of the foreign-born population originating from Latin America with Mexico as the top sending country (Malone et al. 2003; USBC 2005). Second, while previous waves of immigrants often settled in urban areas, recent trends show that the Latino population has expanded at a faster rate in rural areas (Donato et al. 2007; Kandel and Parrado 2006). As immigrants have dispersed to new locations in search of employment in manufacturing and meatpacking, the Latino population has grown in rural locations (Baker and Hotek 2003; Garcia 2010; Grey 1995; Hernandez-Leon and Zuniga 2000). Though Latinos made up 5.5 percent of the rural population in 2000, they

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accounted for more than 25 percent of the population growth in rural areas in the 1990s (Kandel and Cromartie 2004). In addition, because immigrants are newcomers to these areas, residents are often unaccustomed to their presence and problems incorporating the new residents arise (Koball et al. 2008; Lichter 2012).

The social and economic characteristics of rural people and places (see Haynie and Gorman 1999; Tickamyer and Duncan 1990) suggest that the response to the recent influx of immigrants should be distinct from those occurring in urban areas, yet research comparing rural with urban attitudes toward immigration is conspicuously deficient. This deficiency is notable given the implications of such a large influx of newcomers to rural areas. If rural residents are, in fact, more resistant to immigrants, then the inevitability of immigration to rural areas strongly suggests challenges for immigrant assimilation and integration. The potential for rejection (Chavez 2005), and possibly even violence, directed toward immigrant communities (Shihadeh and Winters 2010) may negatively affect overall social cohesion in rural areas.

Generally speaking, research documenting Americans’ attitudes toward immigrants shows contradictions. While negative attitudes are commonly reported (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Jarret 1999; Simon 1985; Simon and Alexander 1993; Stephan et al. 2005; Wilson 2001), recent Gallup polls show that two in three Americans think immigration is a “good thing” for the country (Jones 2006). In this paper we build on previous public opinion research by examining different determinants of attitudes toward immigrants based on rural and urban region. In addition, while research assessing the attitudes of rural residents has largely been qualitative (see Chavez 2005; Fennelly 2008) and therefore generally community-specific in its conclusions1, the findings reported here are more generalizable because they are based on national observations. Using data from the 1996 and 2004 General Social Survey, we disaggregate a national-level sample to compare attitudes toward immigration in rural and urban areas.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

When new immigrant populations possess distinct language, culture, and traditions they may be perceived as a threat to residents who feel their way of life is endangered. This is particularly the case in rural areas, which are generally characterized by demographic and economic homogeneity (Tickamyer and Duncan 1990), network ties of greater intensity, and long-term social relations (Beggs, 1

1For a national-level analysis, see Fennelly and Federico (2008).
This, in turn, suggests that rural people may express resistance to newcomers or anyone perceived as an outsider. A set of social relations often observed in rural communities, consisting of similarity, tradition, and a consensus of goals, attitudes, and beliefs encompass the concept of *gemeinschaft* developed by Ferdinand Tonnies (1961). *Gemeinschaft* is positioned at one end of a continuum and contrasts with relations based on formality, rationality, and heterogeneity (*gesellschaft*). Though these are ideal types, they have come to typify descriptions of rural and urban communities, respectively (Keller 1988; Mellow 2005).

Despite the documented homogeneity of rural areas, however, changes such as economic restructuring, population loss, and improved transportation and communication have made rural areas less distinct (see Albrecht and Albrecht 2004). The challenge to the simplified Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft typology is not new. Claude Fischer’s (1982; 1984) research on urban life and experiences problematized clear distinctions between urban and rural people. Challenging assumptions about the negativity of urban existence and idyllic nature of rural life, Fischer found little difference in the psychological well-being, happiness, and social isolation variables that might have reinforced Tonnies’ typology. Notably, Fischer did report a difference between rural and urban dwellers on societal attitudes measuring tolerance and traditionalism. Taken as a whole, however, his work strongly suggests that a stark dichotomy is too simplistic to characterize rural and urban people and places. Tittle and Grasmick’s (2001) research further challenged this view, arguing that all Americans share a “culture of place” perspective acquired through the process of socialization. This perspective views city dwellers and rural folks as thinking and acting in particular and distinct ways. Thus, any differences observed are not due to actual structural realities, but are acquired beliefs and assumptions about behavior in different locales. The authors argued further that, if all Americans are ultimately socialized for similar traits such as tolerance and respect for diversity, eventually those traits may no longer be salient markers of difference by location.

While acknowledging this complexity, the notion of rural residence as a marker of personal and community identity that is distinct from urban is persistent (Bell 1992; Tauxe 1998). Gemeinschaft marks a community and set of social interactions in rural areas that many feel exemplify distinctly American values of hard work, honesty, familial connections, and self-sufficiency (Logan 1997). Tauxe (1998) has labeled these images and ideals the “heartland myth” and argued that they are a powerful mechanism in local identity formation. Fennelly and Federico (2008)
suggest that this “rural nostalgia” becomes a means by which anti-immigrant groups frame threats to a perceived American way of life in rural areas. Tonnies' Gemeinschaft-Gesselschaft typology provides a framework through which to better understand the foundation upon which rural residents base their individual and community identity and foster a sense of cohesion in the face of demographic change. Based on this theoretical framework, we expected that rural residents, feeling a stronger sense of identity and cohesion based on place, would exhibit higher levels of opposition to recent immigration than their urban counterparts.

Little research has looked at differences in rural and urban public opinion toward immigration. The research that does exist suggests that those living in urban areas have more positive attitudes toward immigration than those in rural locations (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Fennelly and Federico 2008). This finding has been further illustrated in various case studies looking at immigrant and native interactions in rural locations in nontraditional immigrant destinations in the Northeast (Dunn, Aragones, and Shivers 2005; Rabrenovic 2007) and in the South and Midwest (Grey and Woodrick 2005; Rich and Miranda 2005). These case studies have generally documented the tension that exists between natives and immigrants. This evidence strongly suggests consequences for the cohesion of rural communities and the harmonious incorporation of Latino immigrants.

Thus, through this study, we have sought to answer three specific research questions. First, do rural people express more opposition to immigration than urban people? Second, what are the different reasons (if any) rural and urban individuals may hold for opposition to immigration? Third, is rural residence a significant determinant of opposition to immigration when other factors are taken into account? The following sections summarize the extant literature on determinants of attitudes toward immigrants and immigration.

ATTITUDES TOWARD IMMIGRANTS AND IMMIGRATION

Research on public opinion toward immigrants and immigration has uncovered several factors that influence American attitudes. Those factors include: concerns about a threat to an American identity, beliefs about the costs of immigration, political identification and ideology, labor market competition, and demographic characteristics.

American Identity

Frequently public opinion toward immigrants is negative because newcomers are regarded as a symbolic threat to American identity. American identity refers to
an ideological or political commitment to a set of shared principles viewed as embodying what it means to be an American (Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990). For example, in a study of Californians, Citrin and associates (1990) found voting, speaking English, “trying to get ahead,” and beliefs in equality to be core American values. Many view the endorsement of these values as a requirement for being considered American. Perhaps it is because immigrants are not perceived as having these characteristics or holding these values, and hence pose a symbolic threat, that public opinion toward immigrants is negative (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Esses et al. 2001). Particularly important in the assertion of American identity is English language proficiency, as the ability to speak English is seen as a major part of being an American (Citrin 1990). Ultimately, the native population’s definition of what it means to be an American and their perception of immigrants clearly plays a role in public opinion. The “symbolic politics” model (Sears, Hensler, and Speer 1979) suggests that these important cultural symbols, such as language, trigger an emotional reaction related to underlying biases or prejudices and can ultimately shape political responses. Thus, those who have a deep investment in certain symbols of “Americanism” may view immigrants as violating these definitions and respond by opposing immigration and immigration-related policies.

The Cost of Immigration

The role of the perceived cost of immigration is still unclear, although some evidence suggests that Americans’ attitudes toward immigration are informed by their views on the economy and other perceived detriments of immigration (Buck et al. 2003; Davidson, Garcia, and Malech 2010). Wells (2004) noted that the negative shift in attitudes toward immigrants in the early 1990s began when immigrants came to be blamed for various social and economic ills. The events of September 11, 2001 seemed to exacerbate concerns about outsiders. Indeed, some studies have shown opposition to immigration to be related to concerns about immigrant crime (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Palmer 1996). In addition, economic anxiety and fear of immigrants may be tied to one another (Jarret 1999), as attitudes toward immigration are shaped by the perception that immigrants compete with the native population for resources (Esses et al. 2001). For example, Pantoja (2006) found that respondents who were pessimistic about their own finances and the nation’s economic well-being were more likely to favor limiting legal immigration than those who were not. Similarly, other research has found that those with negative views of the economy are less receptive toward immigrants and
immigration (Burns and Gimple 2000; Citrin, Muste, and Wong 1997; Lee, Ottati, and Hussein 2001).

**Labor Market Competition**

The “split labor market” thesis argues that antagonistic attitudes toward racial or ethnic groups result from the perception that they compete with the dominant group for employment (Bonacich 1972). Moreover, racial and ethnic minorities may effectively shut competing groups out of certain markets if they are willing to work for lower wages. Labor market competition theory thus asserts that opposition to immigration is a product of this competition between natives and immigrants for low-skill, low-wage jobs (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996). Natives’ economic self-interest is vulnerable to competition from immigrant labor (Wilson 2001) and leads to hostility toward immigrants. In this framework we expect that rural residents will have particular concerns about immigration for two reasons. First, immigration to rural areas of the United States is a relatively recent phenomenon bringing demographic complexity to areas that may be unaccustomed to this reality (Donato et al. 2007; Lichter and Johnson 2006). Second, demand-side transformations in industries such as meat processing and construction have drawn foreign-born workers, including Hispanics, to rural communities (Kandel and Parrado 2006; Kochar, Suro, and Tafoya 2005), setting the stage for economic competition.

**Political Identification and Ideology**

Political party affiliation and political ideology also may be related to views about immigration, yet the findings are mixed on which factor has the most influence. Generally speaking, those with more conservative political orientations often hold negative views of immigration, when compared with their more liberal counterparts. However, while Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) found Republicans to express more restrictive views on immigration, Fennelly and Federico (2008) found that conservative ideological orientation, rather than party affiliation, determined support for restrictive immigration policy. Others have similarly found conservative political ideology to be predictive of negative views of immigration (Chandler and Tsai 2001; Hood and Morris 1997).

**Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics**

Past research has demonstrated that various background characteristics can shape attitudes toward immigration, including: gender, race, income, education, and region of residence. Findings regarding gender are mixed. Some studies have found
that males often express more opposition to immigration than females (Chandler and Tsai 2001), yet other research has found no such effect (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Fennelly and Federico 2008; Haubert and Fussell 2006).

Though findings regarding race are also mixed, several studies suggest that it is an important factor in feelings about immigration and immigration-related policies. Some have found that racial minorities often express more positive sentiments toward immigration and related policies (Day 1989, 1990; Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Garcia and Bass 2007; Lee et al. 2001). Nonetheless, other studies have shown no effect of race (Chandler and Tsai 2001).

Findings regarding income are also contradictory. Wilson (2001) demonstrated that higher levels of household income predicted greater opposition to immigration, while others (Hood and Morris 1997; Neal and Bohon 2003) found no such relationship. Haubert and Fussell (2006) found that a graduate education was significantly related to pro-immigrant sentiment and others have similarly shown that higher levels of education often reduce opposition to immigration (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Chandler and Tsai 2001; Neal and Bohon 2003).

Regarding region, recent settlement patterns in the Southern United States (Kandel and Cromartie 2004; Kochar et al. 2005; Passel 2004) have resulted in remarkable increases in immigrant populations in areas that have historically been unaccustomed to outsiders (Griffin and McFarland 2007). This suggests that those in southern states may be more likely to oppose immigration. Neal and Bohon (2003) found that long-term residents in Georgia were more likely to express negative attitudes than newcomers to Georgia. Though there has been little empirical research to establish an attitudinal difference between those inside and outside the South, the research that does exist suggests that southerners will hold more oppositional views toward immigration and related policy (Schmid 2003; Wainer 2006).

EXPECTED RELATIONSHIPS

In light of the theoretical and empirical literature suggesting differences between rural and urban people and places, we expected that rural residents would be more likely to express opposition to immigration than those in urban areas. We thus made the initial prediction that:

1. A greater proportion of rural residents would desire decreased immigration levels than their urban counterparts.
Next, we tested a series of factors for their effect on attitudes toward immigration, with the goal of uncovering any attitudinal differences based on rural or urban residence. In that portion of our analysis, we identified key differences that exist between rural and urban individuals that shape feelings about immigration. Based on the extant literature, we made the following predictions:

2. Those who endorse a more restricted view of what it means to be American would desire decreased immigration.
3. Those who perceive high costs from immigration would desire decreased immigration.
4. Those who identify as Republican, and those who endorse a conservative political view, would desire decreased immigration.
5. Those in the manufacturing and construction industries would perceive labor market competition and would desire decreased immigration.
6. Males, whites, those with higher income, those with lower levels of education, and southern residents would desire decreased immigration.
7. More recent responses would reflect a greater desire for decreased immigration.

Finally, we tested directly for the effect of rural residence on attitudes toward immigration. That final analysis assessed whether rural versus urban residence is a salient determinant of opposition to immigration when other factors are considered. Thus, holding constant measures of American identity, beliefs about the cost of immigration, labor market competition, political identification and ideology, and demographic characteristics, we predicted that:

8. Rural residence, when compared with non-rural residence, would significantly predict opposition to increased immigration.

DATA AND METHODS

To address our hypotheses we used data from the 1996 and 2004 General Social Surveys (GSS) conducted by the National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago (Davis and Smith 2000). GSS data were particularly useful for our analyses because the survey provides a specific collection of measures, not found in this combination in other datasets, that allowed us to test our key research questions. The GSS uses probability sampling techniques to select respondents from English-speaking non-institutionalized adults. There is a core set of questions asked of all respondents, and certain years contain particular topical modules asked of a subset
of the sample. We chose the 1996 and 2004 data years because they each include a module assessing various attitudes about immigration and American identity. A total of 2,089 individuals provided responses to the items upon which we based our analyses.

To gauge variation in attitudes toward immigration by rural or urban residence we used a measure indicating the type of community in which respondents live. These measures were derived from the GSS variable “SRC Beltcode,” which assigns codes based on the place of interview. We created a dichotomous measure where “rural” reflects those counties having no towns of 10,000 or more (see GSS appendix D, Davis and Smith 2000). Suburban areas, as well as large and small cities, are grouped together as “urban.”

Dependent Variable
We used the variable LETIN1 (“Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased a lot, increased a little, left the same as it is now, decreased a little, or decreased a lot”) to measure attitudes toward immigration. We dichotomized responses to reflect those who would like immigration decreased either a little or a lot, with the reference group as those who would like it increased or to remain the same.

Independent Variables
Our independent variables are categorized into the five conceptual groups described in the literature review: American identity, beliefs about the cost of immigration, labor market competition, political beliefs and perceptions, and basic demographics.

To assess American identity, we used three measures. Our first variable was an index based on six GSS questions with Likert-scale responses. Respondents were asked, to “truly be American,” how important they feel it is to: (1) have been born in America, (2) have American citizenship, (3) have lived in America for life, (4) be able to speak English, (5) feel American, and (6) have American ancestry. The response options included: very important, fairly important, not very important, and not important at all. A factor analysis was conducted and all of the items loaded

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While the authors acknowledge that this may be an imperfect measure of “rural”, there is precedent for this conceptualization. See, for example, Beggs, Haines, and Hurlbert (1996) and Davidson, Garcia, and Malech (2010).
onto one factor. Therefore, we combined the six measures and created an index (AMERICAN) with a Cronbach’s alpha of .809. We also included two additional measures. BELIKEUS asks respondents if “the world would be a better place if other people from other countries were more like Americans” and AMBETTER asks if “America is a better country than most other countries.” For both measures, responses were re-coded such that 1 = strongly agree or agree; and 0 = neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.

Next we measured three specific beliefs about immigration: are immigrants good for the economy (IMMAMECO), do immigrants increase crime rates (IMMCRIME), and do immigrants take jobs away from people born in America (IMMJOBS)? All were re-coded such that 1 = strongly agree or agree; and 0 = neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.

The next two variables measured labor market competition. Using information about employment, the GSS places respondents into an industrial category using the 3-digit industrial classifications provided by the U.S. Bureau of the Census (USBC) for 1972-1990. Because Latinos, particularly those that are foreign-born, have high rates of employment in the construction and manufacturing industries (Donato et al. 2007; Kandel and Parrado 2004; Kochar et al. 2005), we created two industry measures: manufacturing (INDMANUF) and construction (INDCONST). These were dummy variables with all other industries serving as the reference category.

Variables assessing political beliefs and perceptions comprised our fourth set of measures. Political party identification (PARTYID) was a dummy variable reflecting Republican identification with Independents and Democrats as the reference category. The GSS also asks about political views (POLVIEW) using a 7-point scale with response options ranging from “extremely liberal” to “extremely conservative.” Those who identified as slightly conservative, conservative, and extremely conservative were combined into one “conservative” category, with moderates and liberals as the reference category.

The final group of variables included background characteristics used as controls in our models. Gender (GENDER) was coded such that 1 = males and 0 = females. Race was coded such that 1 = white and 0 = black or other. Income was a measure of family income, which we dummy coded to reflect income (INCOM) so that 1 = $25,000 or more, and lower values served as the reference category.³

³The General Social Survey income measure has 12 response categories, beginning with “less than $1000 per year” to the final category of “$25,000 or more”.

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Education (COLLEGE) was dummy coded such that 1 = college degree or higher and 0 = less than a bachelor’s degree. We controlled for southern region, using a typology defined by the USBC (see Mackun and Wilson 2000). The variable for the South (SOUTH) included respondents from 17 states: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Washington DC, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. This variable was dichotomized such that all other regions of the country served as the reference category.

FINDINGS

Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 presents the descriptive findings for the rural and urban models. We compared means for each measure using the ANOVA test of significance. Our rural sample contains 214 respondents and the urban sample contains 1,875. Seventy percent of rural residents would like to see immigration decreased compared with 59 percent of those in urban areas. This difference is statistically significant, supporting our first hypothesis.

Two of our three measures of American identity showed statistically significant differences between rural and urban residents. Again, our first measure was an index reflecting the importance of six attributes that define what it means to be American. Lower values indicate more importance placed on these characteristics to be considered American. Rural residents averaged a slightly lower value on these characteristics (1.45) than did urban residents (1.61), indicating more investment in the notion of what it means to truly be American. Rural dwellers were also more likely to agree that the world would be a better place if people were more like Americans (52 percent) than were urban individuals (40 percent). Eighty-five percent of rural residents expressed a belief that America is a better country and about 81 percent of urban residents felt this way, though this difference is not statistically significant.

Distinctions between rural and urban residents were also apparent on two measures reflecting beliefs about the effects of immigration. First, rural residents (41 percent) were significantly more likely than their urban counterparts (32 percent) to agree that immigrants would increase crime rates. Additionally, rural residents (62 percent) were significantly more likely to agree that immigrants would take jobs away from the native population than urban residents (46 percent). Finally, approximately 35 percent of rural residents and 41 percent of urban
### Table 1. Sample Statistics for Rural and Urban

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Minim.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>Sig. Diff.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decrease Immigration. . .</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>American Identity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Identity Index.</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be More Like Us. . . . . . . . .</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America Better Country.</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<td><strong>Beliefs about Immigration</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Good for Economy. . . . . . . .</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase Crime Rates. . . . . .</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take Jobs. . . . . . . . . . . .</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>***</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Labor Market Competition</strong></td>
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<td>Construction Industry. . . . .</td>
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<td>.06</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manufacturing Industry.</td>
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<td>.14</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>*</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Political Beliefs</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Republican. . . . . . . . . . .</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservative. . . . . . . . . .</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Controls</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male. . . . . . . . . . . . . .</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White. . . . . . . . . . . . . .</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<td>Income $25,000 or Higher.</td>
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<td>.64</td>
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<tr>
<td>College Degree or Higher.</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southern Region</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( n = 214 \quad 1875 \)

**NOTE:** ***\( p \leq .001 \), **\( p \leq .01 \), *\( p \leq .05 \)
residents expressed the belief that immigration is good for the economy, but again that difference was not significant.

Regarding occupation, roughly 19 percent of rural individuals and 14 percent of urban individuals work in manufacturing, reflecting a significant difference. There was no significant difference based on rural and urban residence regarding employment in the construction industry.

No significant differences were found regarding political identification and beliefs, with 32 percent of rural residents, and 29 percent of urban residents claiming a Republican affiliation. Fourteen percent of rural residents and just less than 18 percent of urban residents indicated that they consider themselves conservative in their political views.

Regarding our control variables, about 44 percent of rural respondents and about 47 percent of urban respondents were male. Race shows a significant difference as nearly 90 percent of rural respondents and roughly 82 percent of urban respondents were white. Almost 60 percent of rural respondents and 64 percent of urban respondents reported earning $25,000 per year or more—not a statistically significant difference. Significantly fewer rural (24 percent) than urban (37 percent) respondents had earned a college degree. Finally, almost 44 percent of urban and just 33 percent of rural respondents reported living in the southern region of the United States; again, a statistically significant difference.

**Logistic Regression Results**

Table 2 presents the odds-ratios for our rural and urban models that test hypotheses 2 through 7. Our first model examines the determinants of attitudes toward immigration among rural residents. Among the significant predictors we identified are two of our measures of beliefs about immigration. Specifically, those who feel that immigration is good for the economy are less likely to desire decreases in immigration than those who do not. Additionally, those who feel that immigrants take jobs are significantly more likely to desire decreased immigration than those who do not. Political views, rather than party affiliation, are also important in this model. Those who label themselves conservative, rather than moderate or liberal, are more likely to oppose immigration. In fact, this measure represents a particularly salient predictor of opposition with an odds-ratio of 11.253. Finally,

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4Correlations show significant, but weak, relationships for rural and urban coefficients on political identification and political beliefs, suggesting identification and belief are distinct categories of meaning.
Table 2. Logistic Regressions: Determinants of Rural and Urban Attitudes Toward Decreasing Immigration; Odds-Ratios and Standard Errors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Model 1 Rural</th>
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<th>Model 2 Urban</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Odds-Ratio</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
<td>Odds-Ratio</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>American Identity</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Identity Index</td>
<td>1.04**</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.65**</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be More Like Us</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.71**</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America Better Country</td>
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**Note:** ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05

Two of our control variables are also significant predictors of immigration attitudes. Namely, whites are significantly more likely than nonwhites to oppose increases in immigration; and higher levels of education decrease the likelihood of opposition to immigration.

Several variables in Model 1 failed to demonstrate statistical significance. Regarding the American identity index, the feeling that those from other countries should be more like us, and beliefs that America is a better country than others, these items show no relationship to our dependent variable. Regarding beliefs about immigration, there is no relationship between concerns about crime rates and our dependent measure. Our measures of labor market competition, those who work in
construction and manufacturing industries, also show no relationship to immigration attitudes. Finally, regarding demographic variables, gender, income level, southern residence, and the year in which the survey was taken have no bearing on attitudes.

Our second model predicts urban residents’ attitudes toward immigration. All of our measures of American identity are predictive in this model. Those who have a more restrictive definition of what it means to be American are more likely to desire decreases in immigration, as are those who feel others should be more like Americans. Likewise, those who feel America is a better country than most others are more likely to be opposed to increased immigration.

Beliefs about immigration are also significant predictors in our urban model. Those who feel immigrants are good for the economy are less opposed to increases in immigration. Those who feel immigrants increase crime rates and take jobs from citizens are more likely to desire decreases.

Regarding political beliefs, political affiliation shows significance while political views do not. Those who identify as Republican are significantly more likely to desire decreases in immigration when compared with Democrats and Independents.

As in our previous model, two of our six control measures are significantly related to immigration attitudes. Specifically, whites are more likely than nonwhites to oppose immigration, and those with at least a college degree are less likely to oppose immigration. Gender, income, southern residence, and year of survey show no relationship to immigration attitudes. Finally, our labor market competition variables show no relationship to attitudes toward immigration.

Table 3 presents our final model with rural residence as a predictor variable. While the first two tables detail the differences between rural and urban individuals on the question of immigration, our final analysis can assess the importance of rural residence along with other key predictors. Overall, when accounting for other factors such as American identity, beliefs about immigration, and demographics, rural residence is not a salient factor predicting desires to decrease immigration. Thus, our final hypothesis is not supported. All of the American identity measures are significant, indicating that endorsement of this identity predicts desires to decrease immigration. Similarly, all measures of beliefs about immigration are significant predictors. As with our previous two models, labor market competition is not a predictor. Republican affiliation, but not conservative ideology, significantly predicts opposition to increased immigration. Regarding our control variables, only race and education are significant. Whites are more likely than minorities to oppose
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increases, and those with a college degree are more likely to support increases in immigration levels.

TABLE 3. LOGISTIC REGRESSION: DETERMINANTS OF ATTITUDES TOWARD DECREASING IMMIGRATION; ODDS-RATIOS AND STANDARD ERRORS

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NOTE: ***p ≤ .001, **p ≤ .01, *p ≤ .05

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

We began this research with the overarching presupposition of attitudinal differences between rural and urban residents toward immigration. Indeed, one of our main goals was to identify the different reasons rural and urban residents have for their opposition to immigration. Engaging in this analysis is particularly timely given the growth of immigrant populations in rural locations (Donato et al. 2007; Kandel and Parrado 2004). In addition, existing theoretical frameworks (Tauxe 1998; Tonnies 1961) assert that rural residents differ from urban residents in consequential ways and that this difference forms an important part of a distinct
identity for rural individuals. Further, rural individuals' investment in this personal and community identity suggests a marked opposition to groups or individuals who threaten this presumably distinct and homogenous world-view and way of life (Fennelly 2008). We found some support for the expectation of differences between rural and urban residents on their attitudes toward increasing immigration. Consistent with expectations, our descriptive statistics showed that rural people are much more likely to desire decreased immigration when compared with urban people, though noting that a majority in both types of communities feel this way is important.

Our regressions further examined the nuances between rural and urban individuals on the question of immigration. Most notably, and contrary to our expectations, investment in a distinct American identity shows no relationship to immigration attitudes among rural residents. These factors are, however, important attitude determinants for urban residents. Though our descriptive results showed that rural residents are more highly invested in the notion of American identity, it is only urban residents for whom this predicts attitudes toward immigration. It is possible that the salience of American identity in determining certain attitudes may be more important for some segments of the urban population. For example, studies have shown that immigrants have begun to settle in suburban areas (Walker 2008) and that suburban residents express a notable opposition to immigration and related policy (Fennelly and Federico 2008) relative to their urban counterparts. Some argue that suburban and exurban areas have begun to serve as an “escape hatch” for those individuals, generally white, who are disconcerted with the encroaching diversity of new immigrant populations (see Benjamin 2009). In contrast to other urban residents who hold a more “cosmopolitan” worldview that rejects ethnocentrism and embraces diversity (Haubert and Fussell 2006), some suburbs serve as a haven for those who exemplify what Benjamin (2009) terms the “patriot-American.” This perspective views hard work, patriotism, and loyalty to one’s nation as delineating the “true” American. While these individuals may not live in rural America, they may still endorse Tauxe’s heartland ideals and view their communities as exemplifying a Gemeinschaft existence of simplicity, honesty, and self-sufficiency. Indeed, as Bell (1992) has shown, identification with particular ideals, values, and social relations are quite salient, and these often become attached to “place.” Because of the return to rural locations by the native population and the growth of the immigrant population in rural locations, further research should investigate the demographic makeup of suburban areas and the subsequent political and social attitudes of residents. Increasing immigrant settlement in these areas
suggests a pronounced need to understand natives’ attitudes with the goal of ensuring the successful integration of newcomers.

Another possible explanation for urban residents’ greater investment in an American identity is that the cultural diversity among city-dwellers results in lower levels of identification with local community, and thus, its politics (Fischer 1984). As a result, urban residents may feel more connection to a national-level political involvement and identity when compared with their rural counterparts. The emphasis is thus on an allegiance with being American, rather than a member of one’s local community. This national allegiance may result in increased opposition to those deemed non-American.

It should also be pointed out that beliefs about the costs of immigration are central determinants of attitudes toward immigration in both rural and urban areas. In fact, these beliefs prove more important than our measures of actual labor market competition. Perceptions about the effect on the economy, crime rates, and jobs determine opposition to immigration among urban residents, and concerns about the economy and jobs determine opposition among rural residents. Clearly, the “symbols” of immigration matter more than actual competition in the labor market and these symbols thus direct policy preferences (see Citrin 1990; Citrin et al. 1990; Garcia and Bass 2007; Sears et al. 1979).

Rural and urban residents are also similar in that whites in both areas are more likely than nonwhites to desire decreased immigration. This finding is consistent with other research (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Garcia and Bass 2007; Lee et al. 2001), although the effect of race-based opposition is stronger in rural areas. In addition, a college degree has the effect in both rural and urban areas of reducing opposition to immigration, as others have similarly demonstrated (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Chandler and Tsai 2001; Neal and Bohon 2003). Interestingly, this effect is weaker in rural than in urban areas.

A noteworthy contradiction to previous research is our finding that political views matter for rural residents while political affiliation matters for urban residents. It is well established that political beliefs determine attitudes toward immigration (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Chandler and Tsai 2001; Citrin et al. 1997; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996), yet most studies show that ideology rather than party affiliation matter. We found that being Republican predicts opposition to immigration in urban areas. In fact, had conservative ideology been significant, it would have predicted less opposition to immigration among urban residents. By contrast, Republican affiliation had no effect, and conservative ideology was the strongest predictor (11.253) in our model of opposition to immigration among rural
residents. Political conservatism is more salient even than concern about jobs and racial identification among rural respondents. While we predicted that rural residents’ definitions of American would demonstrate the most importance in immigration attitudes, we found a conservative identity to be most predictive. Hummon (1980) examined how Americans feel about place as a form of community. While both urban and small town residents in his study depicted rural areas as places of conservatism and tradition, rural residents, unlike their urban counterparts, often viewed this label as complementary. In their view, conservatism represents a better way of life characterized by family connections, friendliness, and community safety. Small towns have preserved these important features that constantly-changing urban areas do not possess. The rural residents in our analysis who highly value a conservative identity may see encroaching immigration as a threat to their cohesive communities, a threat to long-established traditions, and an overall unwanted change. Conservatism may be an expression of local allegiances (Fischer 1984) that immigrant newcomers threaten to disrupt. Future research should explore what the notion of “conservative” means for rural individuals. Qualitative research could uncover the values and ideals symbolized by a conservative label and evaluate how this informs individual and collective identity, and ultimately, policy preferences.

Noting that our final analysis (Table 3) shows no effect of rural/urban residence on attitudes toward immigration is important. With all other factors taken into account, community residence proves irrelevant. While it is clear from our first two analyses that rural people have different reasons for their opposition to immigration than urban people, this final analysis suggests that as a whole, societal opposition is not wholly determined by residence. It should be noted that, in our sample, a higher proportion of rural residents are white, less-educated, and southern residents. These demographic characteristics likely contribute to the higher level of opposition to immigration observed in those rural areas. Nonetheless, our findings support for a more nuanced assessment of rural and urban people and places than proposed by Tonnies. It is also possible that our dichotomous measure of rural/urban obscures differences that might be apparent if rural and urban were measured on a continuum of community size (see Measuring Rurality: What is Rural? [Economic Research Service 2010]). Future research with other data might consider an investigation with more fluid measures of community than were possible here.

In sum, our findings indicate key similarities and differences between rural and urban residents on the question of immigration policy. Beliefs about immigration,
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race of respondent, and college education are important predictors among rural and urban respondents. It is important to note, however, that while these factors are predictors in both regions, opposition is more pronounced among rural residents. Most noteworthy is the salience of an American identity in predicting opposition to immigration for urban, but not rural, residents. Our comparative study suggests that acceptance and assimilation of immigrants may be inconsistent, depending upon community of settlement. As the demography and economies of rural locations continue to undergo change, local and state measures designed to incorporate immigrants should consider natives’ symbolic predispositions, along with economic and material conditions, to facilitate assimilation and constructive social relations. Indeed, the well-being of rural people and their communities may depend on it.

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES

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REFERENCES


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