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The Barriers They Face: The Legal, Social, and Economic Obstacles Immigrants Encounter as They Attempt to Gain Acceptance in French Society

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The Barriers They Face: The Legal, Social, and Economic Obstacles Immigrants Encounter as They Attempt to Gain Acceptance in French Society

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By Kara Chobot

A thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for completion
Of the Bachelor of the Arts degree in International Studies
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# Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION: .................................................................................................................................................. 3

CHAPTER ONE: Citizenship in France................................................................................................................10

Legal Barriers to Acceptance of Immigrants in France.................................................................11

Citizenship and Nationalism vs. Culture and Communautraisme......................................................16

Attitudes Towards Religion in French Society.........................................................................................21

Conclusion......................................................................................................................................................... 23

CHAPTER TWO: Economic Acceptance.........................................................................................................25

The First Generation ........................................................................................................................................25

Religion and Economic Integration...........................................................................................................33

The Second Generation .............................................................................................................................35

Conclusion......................................................................................................................................................... 40

CONCLUSION: ................................................................................................................................................. 42

WORKS CITED: ............................................................................................................................................... 45

# Note on Translation

All translations were conducted by the author, unless otherwise noted.
INTRODUCTION

“If the conditions were right, there could be great acceptance. Often it is only when they pose an economic or political threat that it turns really ugly.”

-Iris Chang

Anti-immigrant sentiment is rampant in French politics and media. While living in France, every time I turned on the television to a news station, I heard at least one report of an attack by immigrants or a politician denouncing immigrants, an announcement of a new law or policy against immigrants. I then heard a round of arguments or comments along the lines of, “They are stealing our jobs and taking advantage of our government,” “Government aid should be used for French people,” and “There are homeless French people but they give housing to immigrants first” from those who were watching the news with me.

Since I have an interest in coming to France to study at a graduate level and work there after finishing my education, I asked my news watching partners how I would be received in France were I to do these things. After all, I would be stealing a job from native French person and accepting government aid in terms of CAF (Caisses d’Allocations Familiales), which is a sum of money that is allocated to students by the French government to help pay for student accommodations with the amount depending on the type of accommodation and your income. These are all things my fellow news watchers claimed made them dislike immigrants. I was immediately reassured that I would be welcomed in France. When I pointed out that I would be an immigrant, they dismissed it saying I was okay because I was learning the language and wanted to work and contribute to French society. These opposing reactions to the same subject piqued my interest into French acceptance of immigrants, which lead me to ask the question: What are the legal, social, and
economic barriers to acceptance of immigrants in France? This question is important and worth being studied because of the recent immigrant crises in Europe and the fact that the majority of the immigrants in question pass through France or end up settling there. Between 2015 and 2016, 12.3% of France’s population was foreign born and 1 million people applied for asylum in Europe, which is sure to result in a rise of the foreign-born population in all European nations (Connor et al). Many illegal immigrants also work their way through Europe and France in hopes of reaching nations such as Germany or Britain but end up detained in camps.

In order to fully comprehend why current immigrants face the legal, social, and economic barriers they do, it is important to have a base knowledge of the historic attitudes and policies of France towards immigrants since the times of the French colonial empire. During the times of the French colonial empire, the dominant ideology in Europe said that the superior races, that is to say the Europeans, were obligated to civilize the inferior races, that is to say non-white, non-Europeans. Additionally, those conquered by the French were required to assimilate into French culture. They were legally required to renounce their culture and espouse the values of the universal republic (Révision du bac). These ideologies set standards for the centuries to come on who can be considered truly French and how they should comport themselves. During the French Revolution, a clear distinction was set between French citizens and foreigners: To be a French citizen, one must have been born in France with French parents. This idea of exclusive citizenship prevailed for a short while and then died.

During the 1800s, the need for workers dramatically increased due to Industrialization. Many immigrants came to France during this time and did the work that
French natives would not do and for much less money. It is estimated that 100,000 foreigners were present in 1800, 380,000 in 1851 and one million in 1886 (Collectif des luttins).

However, between 1825 and 1848 and 1866 to 1896, recessions affected laborers.

Unemployment exploded and so did xenophobia. Throughout France there were demonstrations against immigrants who were accused of taking jobs from the French and lowering wages by accepting lower pay. Immigrants had to register at city halls and get registration numbers. Violence was rampant. During the 1870s, train loads of Italians were sent back to Italy. The Italian language, way of dress, and religion all publicly marked them as immigrants and targets during this time (Collectif des luttins). The idea of who is French and who is not changed with the loi de 1889, which it declared that a child is French if it is born in France and at least one of their parents was also born in France. For those children born of two foreign parents, the child could accept or denounce French nationality once they reached the majority.

In April 1917, perhaps due to the influx of colonial soldiers, the “carte d’identité d’étranger” was introduced. It was the first time in Europe that identification was aimed at all foreigners, and it marked a fundamental stage in the history of immigration controls in France (La documentation Française : La librairie du citoyen). It was also when usage of the term “immigré” took the place of “étranger” and was used to describe foreign workers until the middle of the 20th century to describe labor immigrants. World War I mobilized eight million French people. By 1918, 1.4 million were dead and three million were wounded (Collectif des luttins). The birth rate also dropped significantly from 604,000 births in 1813 to 313,000 births in 1916 (Collectif des luttins). Immigrants were needed to replace the working population of France.
During World War I troops were recruited from the French colonies and told if they fought for France, their status would improve. Many soldiers came from the colonies and promptly died as they were used as throw away troops in battles (Révision du bac). After the war, those troops who survived found their military service swiftly overshadowed by newly developed racist stereotypes. There was a special ministry dedicated to sending them back to their home country, and the colonial soldiers and workers who came during the war and were replaced with Italian and Polish workers. It was the first “immigration choisie” policy of France (Gérard). Thus continued the traditional ideas developed during the French Colonial Empire of who is truly French - white people born in France, and who is not- anyone who is not white and/or born in France.

After the war came the booming twenties. Reconstruction was needed and Spanish, Armenian, and Russian workers, as well as Jews all fleeing persecution, and Algerians who came in great numbers were a considered a god-send. The war had re-established the need for foreigners to have passports and the French State took charge for the questioning of immigrants. In 1929, there was a worldwide economic crisis and 16% of the French working population were unemployed by 1935 (Collectif des luttins). As happens when there are not enough jobs, xenophobia rose rapidly. Many unemployed immigrants were sent back to their native countries. During the Second World War the Vichy regime relied on xenophobia to push through policies of denaturalization of immigrants and undesirable foreigners. In 1942, it was decreed that French Jews could also be interred in camps leading to the deaths of many.

After World War II, around 600,000 French citizens were dead, 9,000 bridges, 115 train stations, 91,000 factories, and 550,000 houses needed to be rebuilt. Immigrants were
once again called upon to help rebuild France (Collectif des luttins). To help re-populate France the 1945 Code de la nationalité was instituted which liberalized who was considered French and who was not. L’Office National d’Immigration actively recruited immigrants. Immigration from French colonies and former colonies increased significantly. Decolonization of the French Colonial Empire during the 1950s, 60s, and 70s and the resulting influx of people from these colonies moving to France factored heavily into the changing face of immigrants. Immigrants were coming from more and more religiously, culturally, and linguistically diverse places than ever before. Immigration from the Algeria alone was 210,000 in 1945 and reached 711,000 by 1974 (Collectif des luttins). What followed is called the Thirty Glorious Years, an economic boom. However, in the early 1970s, a new economic crisis occurred and in 1974, the French government decided to close the borders with the objective of controlling immigration (Collectif des luttins). Xenophobia, once again rose.

The nomenclature of French citizenship has evolved in the past, to be French one must be white and have been born in France with French parents. Now to be French one can been born in France with immigrant parents. Before World War I immigrants were referred to as “étrangers” or foreigners. The ends of World War I and World War II brought acceptance of naturalized immigrants, and the use of the word “immigré,” immigrant, instead of foreigner. More recently the 1991 High Conseil of Integration (INSEE) defined an immigrant as “personne née étrangère à l’étranger et résident en France,” a person born abroad and a resident in France (La documentation Française : La librairie du citoyen). This definition means that even if a person becomes French, he or she will always be considered an immigrant, thus the terms “immigrés devenus français,” immigrant become French, and
“immigrés étrangers,” foreigner immigrant. To the native French population, it would seem, a naturalized citizen will never truly be French. The title of immigrant will precede a naturalized citizen wherever they go and whatever they do. Because of the restriction of immigrant workers in the 1970s most immigration to France is now family reunification rather than economic. Immigration of “séjour délivrés” or non-economic immigration reached 210,000 in 2014, while only 20,000 immigrants with economic motives came to France (La documentation Française : La librairie du citoyen). Many of these immigrants to France now come from countries that are culturally, religiously, and linguistically very different from France. There is still the push for immigrants to assimilate but many French natives fear that it is impossible for these new immigrants to assimilate, because their culture, values, and mode of life are too different from the native French populations. Barriers to acceptance of immigrants by the French population have risen in modern legal, social, and economic forms and will be examined in this thesis.

Chapter one will discuss and analyze the legal and social barriers immigrants face as they arrive in France and attempt to enter French society. I will begin the chapter analyzing the legal requirements for immigrants to become French citizens. After examining this, an initial conclusion will be drawn on what it takes to be accepted by France. I will then analyze French ideas about citizenship and culture to establish what is socially expected of an immigrant as they attempt to become French. Next I will explain what communautarisme is and the growing discord between communautarisme and nationalism, as well as how outward expressions of religion do not fit in French social life. At this point, readers should understand French social expectations of immigrants and how these expectations can be barriers to acceptance into French society.
Chapter two analyses immigrant integration into the French labor market and economy. I will begin the chapter by explaining the factors that shape labor market outcomes for immigrants in France and how these factors affect employment levels and earnings - both signs of economic integration - of different sets of immigrant groups. I will then discuss specific examples to demonstrate how religion can affect an immigrant group’s economic integration ability. Long term labor market outcomes for immigrant groups will also be examined as I look into the outcomes of the second generation of immigrants. Readers should have an understanding of the different barriers immigrants face as they attempt to integrate into the French economy and how success or failure of each immigrant group can influence how each group is received by the native French population by the end of this chapter.

Xenophobia is on the rise in France due to the numerous economic crises that have affected the EU in the last decade. French attitudes and laws have historically required an immigrant assimilate to everything French, including the culture, religion, and language. With so many immigrants now coming from regions that are completely different in these aspects it is becoming harder and harder for the French to tolerate them. History is repeating itself but the immigrants now coming to France are unlike any of the European immigrants that came before them. It will be interesting to see how these newer immigrants integrate into French society and if France can change its expectations of assimilation in order to accept a population that does not wish to fully adopt the French way of life.
CHAPTER ONE: Citizenship in France

“We must force the government to stop the bird migration. We must shoot all birds, field all out men and troops...and force migratory birds to stay where they are.”

- Vladimir Zhirinovsky

This chapter will examine what it takes to become a citizen legally as well as what it takes to be considered a French person by the native French population. Rapid changes in society, such as this current massive wave of immigrants, make people feel like their safe and familiar surroundings are disappearing, which can result in hostile attitudes towards those who are making it disappear, in this case, immigrants. It can also engender resentment of everything that is unknown and unfamiliar (Extramiana and Van Avermaet 6). Rapid changes, such as the current immigrant crisis, can often bring about extreme ideas of assimilation so as to ensure cultural norms of the host country and often revive “us vs. them” attitudes. As such, ideas like “they have to integrate into our society,” “adapt to our culture,” or “learn our language” become prevalent (Extramiana and Van Avermaet 7). For the French, multiculturalism or “communautarisme” is a negative word and immigrants will only ever really be accepted into French society if they can outwardly comport themselves in the manner of native French citizens and are not a part of a visible minority. That is to say they are not to outwardly different from the “average” French citizen. Finally, nationalism is rising as France is inundated with crisis after crisis and Muslims, as a visible minority, become less and less able to assimilate into French society and more and more of a target.
Legal Barriers to Acceptance of Immigrants in France:

To assess the barriers to acceptance that immigrants face in France, analysis will start at the beginning of the acceptance process by looking at what legal barriers an immigrant must tackle to become a French citizen. There are four ways an immigrant can become a French citizen:

1.) Le droit du sang, one who has a parent who is a French citizen.

2.) Le droit du sol, one was born on French soil.

3.) Naturalization

4.) Marriage

For the purpose of this thesis, I will only be examining the legal process of naturalization to obtain French citizenship.

On the public service website verified by the French government, there is a detailed list of the seven main requirements that any potential citizen needs to fulfill before being considered for citizenship. There is also a warning that even if all the conditions are meant, it is still possible that the administration can refuse the application of the potential citizen (Republic Française).

The first four requirements for immigrants to become French citizens are either technical or have to do with quality of character. An immigrant who wishes to become French must be at least eighteen years of age. Eighteen is the legal age of adulthood and when, technically, a person should be able to support his or her self. They must also decide which nationalities to keep and which ones to renounce. That is to say, if an immigrant legally can and wishes to be both French and another nationality, they must declare this. In terms of quality of character and economic self-sufficiency, an immigrant must demonstrate
that they will have stable and sufficient resources to live on while in France and must be in possession of morality, judged by the timely payment of taxes and lack criminal charges. Although it is not a requirement that the immigrant in question have a job, it is preferable.

The assessment of an immigrant’s possession of morality and lack of criminal charges will be evaluated by the administrative center and will review the applicant’s civic comportment, mostly manifesting in the payment of taxes. An applicant must also not have been convicted of crimes of terrorism nor have been incarcerated for more than six months without reprieve (Republic Française). These requirements demonstrate the overall desire of the French government that immigrants not be a societal and economic strain on their new country but an asset instead.

The last three conditions to become a French citizen requires a willingness to assimilate. These three conditions entail living in France for a specified amount of time, living in France from the moment the naturalization papers are signed, and proof of assimilation into the French community. Insistence that immigrants be assimilated can be seen in the exceptions that reduce the time an immigrant is required to live in France before applying for citizenship and the notion behind the requirement that insists that an immigrant live in France from the moment the naturalization papers are signed.

The amount of time an immigrant has to spend in France before he or she can apply for citizenship is typically five years, but there are three main exceptions where the duration of residence can be reduced to two years. The first entails successfully completing two years of studies in the process of obtaining a diploma at a French school. The second requires a personal contribution to the “rayonnement” or prestige of France (Republic Française). The third allows a two-year duration of residence if one can present proof of exceptional
integration, which can include accomplished actions in the realms of civics, the sciences, economics, culture, or sports. This differs from the second exception because the action is on the part of the individual rather than on the part of France. An immigrant can also be exempted from this particular requirement if they serve in the French armed forces, provided exceptional services to France, are a refugee, or if the French language is their native language and they have had five years of formal education in a French speaking school, in a country where the official language is French.

Upon naturalization, an immigrant’s working and family life must be based in France. The requirement that an immigrant must live in France from the moment of naturalization comes from the idea that “La notion de résidence est plus large que la notion habituelle de domicile. Elle implique que vous devez avoir en France le centre de vos intérêts matériels (notamment professionnels) et de vos liens familiaux” or “The notion of residence is larger than the notion of habituel domicile. It implies that you must have, in France, the center of your material interests (notably professional) and your family ties” (Republic Française).

There is also a warning that if an immigrant’s spouse and children live in a different country, one’s application for French citizenship can be refused. This warning highlights just how serious the French government is when it says that the immigrant’s life must be uprooted and replanted in France.

Reductions and exceptions in the duration of the residence requirement indicate that France favors citizens that are well-educated, will serve France, and who speak the French language. The requirement that new citizens must live in France and the expectation that they will give up one’s family and working life in one’s old country indicate the level of roots
these new citizens are expected to put down in France. They are fully expected to disassociate from their country of birth and have primarily French work and family ties.

Assimilation into the French community is a two-pronged requirement and begins with knowledge of the French language. Learning the host country’s language is the first part of the assimilation process. The “Language Requirements for Adult Migrants in Council of Europe Member States: Report on a Survey” indicates that France requires language knowledge to gain admission to the host country, obtain permanent residency, and to acquire citizenship (Extramiana and Van Avermaet 9). The required language level for entrance into France is A1.1, and for permanent residency it is also A1.1, which are very low levels. However, for citizenship an immigrant is required to conduct and pass an interview in French (Extramiana and Van Avermaet 18). Exceptions of this rule are given to immigrants older than sixty and those suffering a handicap or having deficient health. An immigrant can be exempt from this rule if they are a refuge, a regular and habitual resident in France from the age of fifteen onward, or older than seventy years of age (Republic Française).

The second part of the assimilation requirement is a proof of knowledge of the values of the Republic of France, which will be given in an interview at the consulate. One must demonstrate an attachment to these principles and values, as well as a sufficient knowledge of the history, culture, and society of France in the form of a citizenship test. It is also required that the immigrant sign the Charter of Rights and Obligations of a French Citizen at the consulate (Republic Française).

Requirements of assimilation by way of speaking the French language, knowledge of the values of the Republic, demonstration of attachment to these principles and values, and knowledge of French history, culture, and society all demonstrate the French government’s
desire that new citizens become socially French and leave their native country’s habits, culture, and language behind.

Legally it appears to be relatively easy to become a French citizen. The wait time to apply to become a citizen is reasonable, as is the language requirement, which is beneficial to the new citizen, in that it allows them a greater access to parts of their new country. The expectation that the new citizen lives in France after obtaining citizenship and the requirements of being of good moral value and lacking a criminal record are also reasonable in that the government wishes its citizens to contribute to rather than be a strain on France.

Upon closer examination three out of seven of these requirements - duration of residence beforehand, place of domicile after citizenship, and proof of assimilation - require that the immigrant wanting to become a citizen is already somewhat assimilated into French society, while just two out of seven - age of and nationalities of immigrant - deal with technicalities and two out of seven - able to survive economically and lack of morality and criminal charges - requires a demonstration of quality of character and economic self-sufficiency. Only one of the three requirements for assimilation specifically mentions the word assimilation and that is the one that requires knowledge of the French language and the values of the Republic, demonstration of attachment to those values, and knowledge of French history, culture and society. However, assimilation expectations can be found in the lessening of the duration of residence. Most significantly, is the requirement that the citizen in question must live in France form the moment that the naturalization papers are signed. This seems reasonable but if we consider the notion behind this requirement, the idea that family and material interests should rest centrally in France, this requirement has the
intention of assimilation. A new citizen is supposed to give up their family life and work contacts in their old country and completely redevelop these ties in France.

*Citizenship and Nationalism vs. Culture and Communautraisme*

Legally speaking it is easy to become a French citizen, to gain social acceptance is less so. In “Theoretical Inquiries in Law: The Culture of Citizenship”, Leti Volpp examines the relationship between culture and citizenship. Volpp says

Citizenship is both a cultural and anti-cultural institution, by which I mean that citizenship positions itself as oppositional to specific cultures, even as it is constituted by quite specific cultural values. The citizen is assumed to be modern and motivated by reason; the cultural other is assumed to be traditional and motivate by culture. In order to be assimilated into citizenship, the cultural other needs to shed his excessive and archaic culture. (574)

Citizenship is both cultural and anti-cultural in the case of France. To put this into context, let us look at loi n° 2004-228 instituted in 2004 which bans conspicuous religious symbols in government funded schools (Adida et al. 1). Loi n° 2004-228 is more popularly known as the headscarf ban, because it was primarily introduced to put a stop to Muslim girls wearing headscarves in school. The headscarf is an outward symbol of “opposition” to French culture, therefore, it was not to be tolerated so as to protect French Republicanism. In 2003, the President of France, Jacques Chirac, convened the Stasi Commission to examine how the French principal of laïcité (secularity) should be practiced (Volpp 572). The idea of strict separation of church and state has been around since the French Revolution, and it is believed
that this separation fosters French republicanism. So, to uphold this pillar of the French Republic and to further homogenize immigrants in France, the ban was implemented.

Interestingly, Chirac said that the ban “protects our schools from breaking down along ethnic lines” (Volpp 573). Why did he use the word ethnic and not religious, when the law dealt with a religious matter? This word play allows us to see what else is at work behind this law, because the state view on Muslim religious practices is joined with concerns over ethnic differences, culture and religion become one consideration. The force behind this debate over headscarves in the school is, in fact, a reflection of the desire to see the greater Muslim community more visibly assimilated into French culture (Volpp 574). Thus, we can see how a cultural other, a visible minority, is perceived as a threat to the culture of French citizenship and France’s attempts at eradicating the perceived threat to Republicanism.

The idea expressed by Volpp can be described by the French term: *communautarisme*. Le Petit Robert dictionary was the first to define *communautarisme* in 1993 as “a system that develops a formation of communities (ethnic, religious, cultural, social) that can divide the nation to the detriment of integration (qtd. in Montague 220). Powerful emotional reactions are evoked by the idea of *communautarisme*. It is now a term that is used to primarily to warn against perceived intents of minority groups to create distinct communities and make specific racial or ethnic demands that are considered to violate Republican norms. This is because the French Constitution proclaims that the French Republic only recognizes equal citizens, “without distinction of origin, race, or religion” promoting the ideas of colorblindness and universalism. However, the French connect the idea of being a racial minority with not being French, or being an immigrant. This is where the expressions of “second generation” or “of immigrant descent” comes from, and racial
minorities are viewed as the “foreigners from within” regardless of their citizenship status (des Nieges Léonard 83.). Anti-communautraisme discourse asserts that recognizing group demands for equality would fracture the Republican community and create discord within the nation itself (Montague 220). Anti-communautraisme is seen to represent the principles of French Republicanism and is considered rational, while communautraisme is seen to represent the undemocratic and irrational. This system puts minorities in a difficult situation. They suffer from discrimination because they are minorities but because of anti-communautraisme they cannot demand legal protections based on their minority status or even promote cultural pride because to do so would promote communautraisme. This leaves minorities with the option of eliminating their differences from the native French population, which involves rejecting things they value and is often impossible.

In the past, colonial domination in general, and slavery in particular, was related to skin color. Whether an immigrant is a French citizen, if they have a different skin color they will never be seen as such (Des Nieges Léonard, 77). If their skin color is not white, they must come from somewhere else, which makes them a de facto immigrant. Race is said not to be taken into account in the French constitution and there is still not information collected in the French census. This is intended to promote the idea that all French citizens are the same, when, in fact, it does not. “Real” French national identity is white and is demonstrated by the fact that no one can be counted differently. An immigrant must not be too outwardly different from the native French population to be accepted as truly French. So, citizenship is both cultural and anti-cultural. France demands that all immigrants become as outwardly French as possible. However, given the institutionalized racism prevalent in France this becomes almost impossible for immigrants of visible minorities.
The Grand Debate on National Identity held in 2009 at the behest of then President Sarkozy was intended to promote a new collective understanding of what it means to be French. The instructions sent out for the debate centered around “the theme of immigration and the place of French people of immigrant origin within the national fabric” (Goodliffe 2). During the Grand Debate on National Identity, Eric Besson, the Minister of Immigration, Integration and National Identity and Cooperative Development re-asserted these ideas by starting the debate with a provocative declaration that the French had a set of “shared values” most notably, their republicanism, secularism and belief in universal values (Adida et al. 1). The Grand Debate almost exclusively focused on immigration and Islam, with the ultimate result of giving the impression that Islam is incompatible with the Republic. It also resulted in public sentiment that at least a Muslim citizen should always be asked to reaffirm their allegiance to the Republic before being proven innocent, thereby assigning them a separate identity rather than regarding them first and foremost as a citizen (Goodliffe 6).

French identity is restricted to those who are not too culturally different, which reflects the existence of a French national identity of religious secularity. The status of truly “French” is more connected to membership of a specific historical group. That is to say, possessing a French passport does not guarantee being viewed as a citizen, rather than a migrant. Citizenship in the state does not constitute citizenship in the nation, which is created through notions of kinship and belonging. If an immigrant does not leave their old cultural practices behind to fully adopt citizenship practices, he or she will not be seen as French.

The past decade has seen the European Union go through crises after crises resulting in a re-emergence of nationalism. Profound political and social trends are reflected by the efforts of each government to defend their national self-interest in the EU and with the rise
of rightwing populist nativism (Barber). France’s center-right opposition Republicans are well placed to win the 2017 presidential election and the later legislative elections and would like to see stricter national border controls, a reduced role for the commission, and more national influence over common EU policies, all parts of moderate nationalism (Barber). Additionally, radical right-wing populism is rising due to parts of society are not only offended by multiculturalism or losing out in a globalized economy, but by liberal values that espouse these ideals. The Radical right-wing populist is both Islamophobic and anti-immigrant and can easily go hand in hand with the protectionist center-right opposition Republicans, the most likely 2017 presidential candidate and legislative majority.

Already there are laws in place or attempting to be put in place that will limit immigrant access to French life. One such example is the passage of the March 2017 “clause Molière” included in the ironically English named “Small Business Act,” passed in Paris, which requires all laborers hired on publicly funded building projects to use French as their working language (Huguen). Similar measures are already in place in Normandy, Hauts-de France, and Auvergne-Rhone-Alpes, which like the Paris region are run by the conservative Les Républicains party and centrists allies. All of these regions are now considering creating special brigades to patrol building sites to check workers’ language skills (Huguen). The official reason for this clause is to funnel more business to small French firms, however, advocates make no secret that the clause is used to push foreign workers out of construction jobs so “real French workers” can take their place. Philippe Martinez, the head of France’s leading CGT union is quoted as finding the clause “regrettable and dangerous” that the mainstream right seems to be “following in the footsteps of the National Front” (Huguen). Thus, the French citizenship idea that one should speak exclusively French in public life and
*anti-communautarisme* go hand in hand with the current rise in nationalism to erect social barriers to acceptance of immigrants in France.

**Attitudes Towards Religion in French Society**

The presidential agenda for defining “Frenchness” in 2009 was broad and continues today but the main purpose was to address the concerns of the ability of Europe, in general, and France in particular, to assimilate the vast number of Muslim immigrants in a post-World War II world of immigration. Muslims in particular are less able to hide their cultural differences from the native French population. Additionally, as Muslims immigrate from areas such as Africa and the Middle East, they are more and more identified by their skin tone, thus becoming an even more visible “visible minority.” A Pew survey shows that 76 percent of non-Muslim respondents in France expressed concern over Muslim extremism in their country, indicating the worry about the implications of a non-assimilating Muslim population (Adida et al. 2). The apparent failure to assimilate Muslims in France compared to earlier waves of immigrant’s leads the French population to consider Muslim immigrants a threat, particularly given recent terrorist attacks. Characteristics that are commonly considered factors of assimilation, such as high education and job qualifications, reverse integration and thus, religious secularization, among Muslims rather than accelerate it (Adida et al. 2). The loyalty of the Muslim immigrants to their adopted country is also questioned because of their reluctance to leave their religion in the private sphere and adopt a public persona of a loyal French Republican. This results in increased “us” and “them” rhetoric when talking about this minority group.
As the popular and re-occurring discourse of what is “Frenchness” continues, democratic citizenship and the upholding of the values of the Republic are viewed as a solution to the problems posed by multiculturalism, because “cultural attachments are thought to inhibit one’s ability to engage in several distinct forms of citizenship” (Volpp 577). The headscarf debate in France hides the deeper question of the cultural specificity of the French policy of secularism. Supposed secularism is one of the foundational pillars of the Republic, however, it is a secularism that heavily favors Christianity in that there are numerous Christian holidays in the French calendar, the government funds approximately nine hundred private Catholic school as opposed to one Muslim one, and chaplains can be found in public school staff (Volpp 590).

The idea of religion as a private practice is arguably a Christian idea as Jewish and Islamic religious practices of a social community following visible religious rules. France tends to display hostile feelings against Muslim immigrants, partly because European states are defined by their historic nationalities, all of them with strong Christian traditions that have had a historically bad relationship with the Islamic world going back to the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans. This makes it difficult when the majority of new immigrants to Europe and France are Muslim. The idea that to be French, one must be Christian is manifested in political parties such as the Front National in France, which have mobilized public opinion to fight what a potential Muslim demographic predominance in parts of France. Many French cities have tried to use zoning regulations to restrict construction of Mosque’s because they fear that it would mean permanent Muslim presence, not realizing that Muslims are already in France to stay (qtd. in Volpp 3). The type of secularism claimed by France is at best a watery secularism. The headscarf ban serves to preserve the idea of
France and “Frenchness” as Christian and anything else as other, under the guise of the concept of Republicanism. From this rises the problem of the “eternal migrant” (Volpp 592). Where certain citizens, born, raised, and educated in France are treated as second-class citizens because they cannot be sent back home nor are they considered truly French.

**Conclusion**

It is very easy to become a French citizen legally speaking. An immigrant only has to wait five years to apply for citizenship, the language requirement is relatively minimal and beneficial to the new citizen, and the requirements of being in possession of good moral value and lacking a criminal record, as well, as residing in France after obtaining citizenship are reasonable. However, upon closer examination of the stipulations to French citizenship the most extensive requirements request proof of and continued assimilation into French society. However, as the European Union undergoes continuous economic crises, France has seen a resurgence in nationalism which has place protectionist center-right opposition Republicans in a prime position to win the 2017 presidential office and legislative majority. Center-right opposition Republican ideology goes hand in hand with the newly popular radical right-wing populist party which expresses Islamophobic and anti-immigrant ideals. Additionally, secularism in the French manner entails rejecting any outward signs of culture, religion, and ethnicity in favor of expressing the values of Republicanism. Rising nationalism and a historic dislike of any identity marker that is not French makes it incredibly difficult for immigrants to gain acceptance in French society.

Here we see that assimilation is not a linear process. Because assimilation and citizenship correspond so strongly it is impossible to talk about citizenship without
simultaneously discussing assimilation. Due to this assimilation/citizenship correlation 
gaining citizenship is not a process of leaving something behind but more of why does the 
immigrant want to be French? Why should the French government accept him or her as a 
citizen? An immigrant has have to have a good reason to want to become French. To already 
have a reason as to why the French should accept him or her, as to why he or she wants to 
become French entails a degree of assimilation already occurring. This fact, rising 
nationalism, and a greater attachment to French Republican values raises two questions in 
terms of French social acceptance of immigrants. Are the French requesting assimilation to a 
certain point and when that point is reached the assimilation goal is increased? Or is it a 
matter of immigrants saying they will assimilate but not actually meaning it? Perhaps, it is a 
little of both. There is always a further demand of assimilation: speak our language, work 
like we do, live like we do, worship like we do, become one of us, give up his or her old self 
entirely. This is nearly impossible to do, especially when one is a newly immigrated, but it is 
what the French want. On the other hand, many immigrants might say they will learn the 
French language but then never learn past the required level. They might give lip service to 
certain Republican values but actually dislike certain ones. Required assimilation in so far as 
they must in order to gain legal status already makes it difficult for immigrants to gain 
acceptance into French society. Rising nationalism which results in moving the proverbial 
goal post of assimilation once it is reached makes it that much more difficult. This can also 
lead to many immigrants asking why try, if the goal will only increase once reached.
CHAPTER TWO: Economic Acceptance

“Where asylum is used as a route to economic migration, it can cause deep resentment in the host community.”

- David Blunkett

In this chapter, we will be examining immigrant’s integration into the French labor market and economy. Immigrant integration in these areas is important. This is because the more successful immigrants are in the labor market, the higher their net economic and fiscal contribution to the host economy will be and the more well-received they are by the host nation. However, if immigrants have poor economic success, social and economic exclusion of immigrants and their descendants may result. This can lead to social unrest by immigrants and natives alike. Given this, immigration policy can be affected by immigrant’s ability to successfully integrate into the French labor market and economy.

It is important to look at the factors that shape labor market outcomes – region of origin, level of education, reason for migration, gender – as well as the employment levels and earnings of different sets of immigrants to see why one group is more accepted by the French than another group. Specific examples will also be examined to assess how religion can negatively affect an immigrant’s economic integration ability. Finally, long-term labor market outcomes for immigrant groups will be examined as we look into the outcomes of the second generation.

The First Generation

France’s labor market is notoriously hostile to new entrants, immigrants and native young people seeking their first jobs alike. However, there are many more restrictions put in
place to prevent immigrants from obtaining certain jobs. A variety of laws and regulations have resulted in restriction of foreign nationals from working in six million jobs, approximately one-third of the labor market, including all public-sector jobs, fifty private sector careers, such as being a veterinarian or pilot, and self-employed regulated professions, such as being a doctor, lawyer, architect or pharmacist (qtd. in Simon and Steichen 2). The European Union has forced France to open up certain jobs to European nationals, and in professions such as medicine, law, and architecture an immigrant can participate after a lengthy and intense examination of credentials (*Observatoire des inégalités*). These restrictions have had a negative effect on immigrant integration into the French labor market. For example, a doctor from South Africa has immigrated to France. He cannot practice medicine, because his credentials have yet to be approved by the French government. Meanwhile, he must support himself and works in a factory. He is underemployed and not contributing his maximum economic ability to France. This in turn causes the French natives to view him and by extension South African immigrants in a bad light. Now, we take a doctor from Hungary. He can practice medicine, because he is a member of the European Union. He contributes his maximum economic and fiscal ability to France and as such French natives view him and his Hungarian compatriots as beneficial immigrants.

Employment and earnings are indicative of economic integration and in terms of region of origin, European immigrants tended to display the best employment rates while North Africans were especially prone to unemployment and sub-Saharan Africans were most likely to be employed in the lowest skilled jobs, and both groups of Africans were susceptible to unstable work (Simon and Steichen 1). From their date of arrival, European migrants had the highest employment rates at forty-six percent employment one year after arrival,
compared to less than thirty percent for other migrant groups (Simon and Steichen 10).

Employment rates increased for groups of all origins with time, but non-European migrants did not catch up with European migrants. In fact, the gap between European migrant and non-European migrant employment increased, because nine years after arrival the employment rates were seventy-nine percent and fifty-five percent respectively (Simon and Steichen 10). Of all origin groups, North African migrants are especially prone to unemployment, and both groups of Africans had lower employment rates than other migrants and natives. This has led to easier acceptance of European immigrants by French natives and general rejection of African immigrants. As will be discussed later discrimination also leads to lower employment for this group and thus an endless spiral of economic exclusion occurs.

Earnings are the second indicator of economic integration. “The Economic Situation of First and Second-Generation Immigrants in France, Germany and the United Kingdom” used simple earning functions that were estimated separately for men and women to identify gaps in earnings. Log net hourly wages is the dependent variable and a basic set of characteristics including experience and education, for which both acquired in the country of origin and the destination country were controlled. This analysis also uses groups labeled as immigrants from Africa, Northern Europe, Eastern Europe, Southern Europe, Turkey, Maghreb, and Asia. There were only three groups of men that earn significantly less than comparable native men. These are immigrants from Africa who earn 0.262 log points less, immigrants form the Maghreb who earn 0.161 log points less, and immigrants from Turkey who earn 0.099 log points less (Algan et al. F19). This indicates difficulty in economic integration for men from Africa, the Maghreb and Turkey.
(Algan et al. F17).

For women, the overall earnings pattern is similar to men except that now Eastern European women do poorly at 0.164 log points less than native women while Turkish women did relatively well at 0.072 log points less than native women. This is interesting given how, overall, this immigrant group earns much less than comparable French natives. Maghreb and African women earn 0.089 and 0.227 log points less than comparable native women respectively. All first-generation immigrant groups earn at least 0.13 log points less than comparable, native, French citizens, with the exception of Northern Europeans who earn significantly more, and Eastern European men and Asians who earn about the same as natives (Algan et al. F19).
Viewed in terms of economics, this would mean that Northern Europeans are viewed as the most successful immigrant group and therefore the more accepted group, while Eastern European and Asians would be somewhat less accepted though still moderately successful as immigrants. Other immigrant groups are more likely to disgruntle and be rejected by the native French population. The lack of economic success by immigrant groups fuels stereotypes and prejudices against immigrants as people who will not work and are burdensome to French nationals.

Employment and earnings are both signs of economic integration, but the region of origin, level of education, reason for migration, and gender are the factors that shape the immigrant labor market in France. Region of origin has already been discussed in terms of employment and earnings and appears to play a significant role in an immigrant’s economic life. However, level of education plays the second most important role in shaping the French immigrant labor market. Education is largely determined prior to labor market outcomes and is crucial in influencing these outcomes later in life. In “The Economic Situation of First and Second-Generation Immigrants in France, Germany and the United Kingdom” education is measured by the age left full time education. French men leave education around the average age of 18.3 years. Men from Africa, Northern Europe, and Eastern Europe are 19.3 or 20.3 years older when leaving French education, while men from Southern Europe and Turkey are on average 15.3 and 15.2 years old when they leave school. Men from the Maghreb and Asia are about the same age as native Frenchmen when leaving French education (Algan et al. F13).

Only women from Northern and Eastern Europe are at least as old as native French women when they leave full time education, and all other groups are significantly younger
than their French women and male immigrant counterparts (Algan et al. F13). Highly skilled immigrants also show better employment rates than immigrants of other education levels. This is because individuals with higher education have skills in high demand, thus holding a tertiary education diploma increases the likelihood of employment drastically. In nine years, starting in 2000, tertiary degree holding French natives experienced 5.4 percent unemployment and secondary educated natives experienced 7.9 percent. During the same time period, highly educated immigrant unemployment was 13.2 percent and secondary educated immigrant unemployment was 23 percent (Simon and Steichen 9). One common finding of studies on immigrants’ access to employment is that they are more likely to be overqualified for jobs. Some studies find that, over time, immigrants will find it easier to move out of low skilled work and find jobs matching their skill set and experience as they develop host-country capital, but others suggest that immigrants are prone to stagnation in low skilled work. Proportions of working immigrants in low-skilled jobs increases with time of residence. The increase is sharp for the first two years moving from fifteen to twenty and then to twenty-five percent, then it remains stable until the sixth year, after which it slowly decreases (Simon and Steichen 15). This indicates that it is not just lack of host-country capital or education that is preventing immigrants from entering high skilled employment and gaining fiscally.

Another important factor for immigrant labor outcomes is the reason for migration. The majority of immigrants, forty-five to fifty-four percent depending on the years, arrive in France for family reunification, others enter as asylum seekers or for studies. The smallest portion, just seventeen to ten percent, migrate to France with an employment contract and enter directly into the French labor market (Simon and Steichen 4). The French government
suspended unskilled migration following the 1973 oil crisis resulting in a severe decrease in labor migration. Recently, the French government has attempted to increase labor migration and decrease non-labor migration with its immigration choisie policy. Policies, such as, Loi n° 2006-911 and Décret n° 2016-288 have been implemented to do just this. Loi n° 2006-911 has four main objectives: recruiting skilled workers, facilitating foreign students’ stay, tightening the rules on family reunification, and limiting access to residence and citizenship. This law reflects France’s desire to change the main form of immigration from family reunification to labor driven. These policies have been far from successful. Between 2006 and 2010, economic immigration rose from six percent to just nine percent, while family immigration declined from fifty-four percent to forty-four percent of total immigration (Simon and Steichen 3). If immigrants come to France to primarily re-unite with family, rather than join the labor force that can harm that immigrant groups overall ability to economically integrate into France.

More recently we see Loi n° 2011-672 and Décret n° 2016-288. Loi n° 2011-672, initiated in 2011 that creates a temporary residence card to admit and allow greater mobility to highly qualified non-EU nationals with an employment contract of at least a year. The card can be issued up to three years and is renewable, however to renew this card the immigrant in question must have abided by the integration contract that they signed in order to settle in France long term. Décret n° 2016-288 introduces a Talent Passport residence permit for highly skilled workers and waives work permit requirements for them. The law also overhauls intracompany transfer routes for greater mobility within the European Union in France’s continuing fight to increase labor driven immigration. These laws exemplify France’s attempt at “immigration choisie,” attempting to pick immigrants that wish to come
to France for economic reasons by giving them special passports. Immigrants from within the EU receive, to an extent, special treatment. This makes sense because France is within in the EU trading bloc and subject to its rules and laws but it does put immigrants outside the EU at a greater disadvantage when trying to economically integrate.

In the seventeen years since 2000, approximately two million immigrants from outside the European Union entered France on a permanent basis (Simon and Steichen 4). The early labor performance of these new immigrants was not particularly good. Many immigrants failed to enter the workforce within the first few years due to inability to find work, choosing not to look for work, or discouragement in their search. Those who arrived through marriage migration or family reunification were especially prone to labor inactivity. In fact, a 2006 Longitudinal Survey of the Trajectories and Profiles of Migrants found that economic inactivity was prevalent among sixty percent of immigrants who arrived as spouses of a French citizen and eighty-three percent of those who came through family reunification. Data from the Labor Force Survey analyzed in “Slow Motion: The Labor Market Integration of New Immigrants in France” confirmed that only fifty-two percent of immigrants arriving between 2003 and 2005 were active in the labor market and only forty-three percent of the 2006 through 2008 cohort were active, one-third of both groups were unemployed and employment rates were thirty-five and thirty percent respectively (Simon and Steichen 6). Participation in the labor market increases overtime and the 2000 to 2002 group of immigrants’ participation rate almost caught up with the native population after nine years in France (Simon and Steichen 6). Employment rates also improve over time although immigrants fail to catch up with natives and unemployment is persistent. In both the 2003-2005 group and the 2006-2008 group the unemployment rate exceeded thirty percent in the
first year of arrival, however unemployment decreases dramatically during the next five years (Simon and Steichen 7). Those who arrive through family unification or marriage migration are particularly likely to be inactive a year after arrival but their activity rates show the greatest gains over time, indicating a small type of integration into France.

The final factor that plays a role in labor market outcome is gender. Women tend to display lower employment rates more due to inactivity rather than unemployment. This is in part because the family structure, marriage, the number and age of children, play an important part in their economic activity. Men have greater employment stability than women and are more likely to be employed than women, seventy-one percent versus forty percent, and are more likely to remain employed the next year, eighty-seven percent compared to seventy-nine (Simon and Steichen 11). However, men are more likely to become unemployed while women are more likely to become inactive. The gender gap even persists over time, because after nine years the it is around twenty-five percent while the gap among natives declined from eleven percent to nine percent between 2003 and 2012 (Simon and Steichen 12). Gender inequalities are extreme as women are not only more concentrated in low-skilled jobs when they arrive but this concentration increases over time, while the percent of newly arrived immigrant men in low-skilled work remains stable after the first year (Simon and Steichen 15). Women make up a significant part of the potential immigrant workforce and their lack of activity in the labor market tends to bring down overall averages.

Religion and Economic Integration

Region of origin, level of education, reason for immigration, and gender determines the economic abilities of each immigrant group. However, religion plays a role in limiting or
widening of the pool of jobs available to an immigrant in France. Testing of job applications or housing applications with a CV including different individual characteristics such as name and volunteer work, social scientists have demonstrated the existence of discrimination based on presumed names, national origin, residence or photos of the tested individual. “Integration into Europe: Identifying a Muslim Effect” conducts a study focusing on the comparative success of Muslim immigrants and their descendants in the French speaking labor market and asks the question “do French Muslims suffer in economic integration in France in ways that would not be so if everything about were the same, but they were not Muslim” (4).

This study consists of a CV experiment which means sending letters from fictitious applicants in response to job advertisements and analyzing the response rate of these applications. To make sure region of origin was not a factor two of the women were given an obviously Senegalese last name, Diouf, but one of whom had the well-known Muslim first name of Khadija while the other had the well-known Catholic first name of Marie. The third CV was from a woman with a typical French name and minimal religious connotations, Aurélie Ménard. All three applicants had two years of post-secondary education, were unmarried, and had three years of experience on the job market to reflect experience in the advertised job sector. Religious identification was reinforced when one of Khadija’s past positions was with “Secours Islamique”; one of Marie’s was with “Secours Catholique” while Aurélie worked only with secular firms. Khadija also did voluntary work for the Scouts Musulmans de France, while Marie did the same for Scouts et Guides de France, the comparable Catholic organization (Adida et al. 9). The results put Aurélie as the consistent favorite but more remarkably so when put against Khadidja. Marie and Khadidja fared significantly differently with Marie receiving call backs twenty-one percent of the time
compared to eight percent for Kahdija, both in competition with Aurélie, who did two and a half times better than both the Diouf applications (Adida et al. 9).

Given that 89.13% of the Maghreb population is Muslim and 98.30% of Turkey practices Islam and the job discrimination that results from being outwardly religious, it makes sense that immigrants from the Maghreb and Turkey would be so much less able to economically integrate than their counterparts form other regions (North Africa, Turkey). The outlier is the immigrant group from Sub-Saharan Africa. This group ranks consistently with immigrants from the Maghreb and Turkey and yet is 82.38% Christian and just 1.53% Muslim, which means they should face significantly less job discrimination (Southern Africa). That is until it is taken into account that immigrants from this area are most likely to come from former French colonies such as Mali, Senegal and Niger, which have large Muslim populations at 90%, 94%, and 95% respectively, and that individuals with presumed characteristics of someone originating from North Africa or Sub-Saharan Africa are five times less likely than a presumed white person to receive a positive response on job or housing applications (Muslim Population & Des Neiges Léonard 78). This test and others like it suggests a strong link between job discrimination and economic returns, and thus economic acceptance and integration, for Muslim immigrants in France.

The Second Generation

To determine long term labor market outcomes for each immigrant group education and labor market integration in terms of employment and earnings will be examined. While employment and earnings are the main focus of this discussion, education will also be analyzed largely because it is determined prior to entry into the labor market and can be
controlled to a certain extent unlike gender and parental region of origin. Education in the French school system rather than the parental country’s school system should affect the employment and earning capabilities of the second generation.

Algan et al. find that from the first to the second generation, the educational attainment gap narrows for most immigrant groups, and that includes those who did initially better and those who did initially worse. For example, the negative gaps for Southern European men decreased from 3.3 years to 0.7 years and from 3.2 years to 0.4 years for Turkish men (Algan et al. F13). However, there is also an improvement from the first to the second generation among the most disadvantaged groups of the first generation, in educational attainment. Second generation Asian women had a 2.6-year edge of educational attainment relative to native French women (Algan et al. F13). The Economic Situation of First and Second-Generation Immigrants in France, Germany and the United Kingdom” concluded that any education gaps that exist for the first generation are generally being narrowed for the second so that education systems are not reinforcing inequalities that exist between natives and first-generation immigrants.

Brinbaum et al., authors of “The Children of Immigrants in France: The Emergence of a Second Generation” however, find that inequalities between natives and first-generation immigrants are carried into the second generation. In fact, Brinbaum et al. site:

A large body of research has established that children of immigrants are at a disadvantage compared with native French children (Richard 2004; Brinbaum and Werquin 1997,1999; Canaméro et al. 2000; Dupray and Moullet 2004; Frickey et al 2004; Meurs et al. 2006; Silberman and Fournier 1992,20006). The results of these studies are consistent with may qualitative observations that identify mechanisms of
discrimination in access to training courses, public service assistance in job searches and the private sector labor market… While differences in educational success are explained largely by social origin and parental educational attainment, this is not true in the labor market, where differential results among groups must in part be attributed to the effects of discrimination. (34)

This study finds that second generation immigrant youth are more likely to be outside the French educational system. This is in part due to difficulties involving the French language. A 1992 geographic mobility and social integration survey found that only twenty percent of all immigrants used their native language exclusively rose with their children, although nearly all young people with two immigrant parents understood the native language of their parents (Brinbaum et al. 22). Many families communicate on two levels; the parents communicate in the native tongue while the children speak French. The tendency to maintain use of the native language or to use French varies considerably according to country of origin, age at arrival in France and gender (Brinbaum et al. 23) Despite many children of immigrants speaking French among themselves, they face barriers because it is not their first language. New arrivals face many obstacles during the enrollment in the regular school system, because student’s difficulties in French are often considered intellectual shortcomings or that they have limited potential for academic success, non-native French speakers are often placed into classes with low achievers or students with special needs (Brinbaum et al. 28). There is an emphasis on proficiency in French that is detriment to other educational attainments. Additionally, loi n° 94-665, that mandates the use of French language all workplaces and any form of commercial communication activity. Taking into account the reduced educational attainments that result from being placed in remedial classes
due to difficulty with the French language and being required to use French in the workplace and with work documents immigrant’s children are two times more likely to leave secondary education with no qualifications than their French counterparts (Brinbaum et al. 29, 31). “The Children of Immigrants in France: The Emergence of a Second Generation” also finds that second generation immigrant youth experience between 1.5 and 2.0 times more unemployment than their native peers (35). Labor force participation rate also varies between young French men and women and their second-generation immigrant peers at 48.4 percent to 40.4 percent and 41.2 percent to 34.5 percent respectively (Brinbaum et al. 33). This can be contributed, in part, to the quality of education received by each group, but also to the region of origin of each group, as well as the gender of each individual. It is true that the educational attainment increases from the first-generation to the second-generation immigrant group as stated by Algan et al. but that does not mean that the inequalities that existed between the first generation and the native group are not reinforced. Inequalities faced by the first generation are reinforced as the second generation attempts to integrate into the labor market.

Employment gaps between immigrant groups and natives in France are large. For people in immigrant groups from the Maghreb, Africa, and Turkey, the employment gap widens from the first generation to the second generation. Second-generation men in the immigrant groups from the Maghreb, Africa, and Turkey can expect to face 26.7 percentage points, 47.9 percentage points, and 41.6 percentage point gaps in terms of employment compared to native men, thus facing significantly higher unemployment (Algan et al. F24). Women from these same groups face even larger gaps from the first generation to the second.
Most other groups manage to successfully close the employment gap to comparable natives from one generation to the next.

Earnings is the second indicator of economic integration of each immigrant group, because how much a group earns demonstrates how much they fiscally contribute to France. The more a group earns the more they contribute, and the more accepted they are into French society. Second-generation men from the Maghreb find that their wage gap decreases from the first generations by 0.097 log points, while it remains constant for immigrants from Africa and actually increases around 0.173 log points for immigrants from Turkey (Algan et al. F19). This does not necessarily mean that second generation Turks earn less than first generation Turks, because second-generation Turks do have better education. However, compared to natives with the same educational attainment, second-generation Turks do earn less (Algan et al. 19). The second generation from the immigrant groups of men from Southern Europe and women from Eastern Europe, Turkey, and Asia improve earnings significantly. The other second generation immigrant groups improve earnings modestly from generation to generation.

Using earnings and employment as signs of economic integration, second generation immigrants from the Maghreb, Africa, and Turkey show less integration than their Asian and European counterparts. This means the former immigrant groups have lower net economic and fiscal contribution than the later immigrant groups. Immigrants from the Maghreb, Africa, and Turkey poor economic successes, even a generation after immigration, has led to social unrest and economic exclusion of these groups. Immigration policy in France is less favorable to these immigrant groups because of their inability to economically immigrate for one reason or another.
Conclusion

The level of successful economic integration of immigrant groups in terms of employment and earnings greatly contributes to how accepted each group will be by French natives. The more employed and higher earning groups such as Northern, Eastern, and Southern Europeans, and Asians are much more easily accepted by the native French population as immigrants, because in the first and second generation they have similar employment and earning levels as those of comparable French natives. Meanwhile, immigrants from the Maghreb, Africa, and Turkey are not as employed and earn much less than their comparable French counterparts from generation to generation. This means that ultimately these groups contribute less economically and fiscally to the host country and are not considered desirable as immigrants. However, there may be a secondary reason as to why these three groups have so much difficulty integrating economically: religion.

People with Muslim identifiers are inordinately more likely to have a difficult time finding a job. Given this it makes sense that immigrants from the Maghreb and Turkey are so much less able to integrate economically. Religion explains these two groups economic difficulties but not Sub-Saharan Africans difficulties, because Sub-Saharan Africans are majority Christians. That is until it is taken into account that individuals with presumed characteristics of someone originating from North Africa or Sub-Saharan Africa are five times less likely than a presumed white person to receive a positive response on job or housing applications (qtd. in Des Nieges Léonard 78). Economic integration is a strong factor in whether an immigrant group will be accepted or not and religion and skin color plays a strong factor in a group’s ability to integrate in this manner. French ideas of assimilation and what “French” looks like extends into the economic sphere and determines acceptance of
immigrant groups. Because immigrants from the Maghreb, Turkey, and Sub-Saharan Africa cannot change their skin color and are highly reluctant to change their religion they are at a much greater disadvantage than other immigrant groups. They are also easily identifiable as a target of anti-immigrant sentiment, which would explain why when the French media and politicians speak of immigrants a brown skinned, Muslim is whom they are referring to rather than a Polish, white person. Social unrest is rife when discussing these three groups and lack of economic integration due to a variety of reasons, but none more so than religion, is why.
CONCLUSION

Current French attitudes and policies towards acceptance of immigrants have a base that goes back to the beginning of the French Colonial Empire. From then to now, immigrants that were too outwardly different from the native French population, whether that be due to race or cultural markers, were always less accepted and more reviled than other immigrants. Attitudes and policies also became kinder or harsher depending on whether or not France was in an economic boom or an economic crisis. Following economic booms and busts was the ebb and flow of nationalism and xenophobia. Recent terrorist attacks by immigrants in France have also resulted in a more xenophobic atmosphere, however, France produced the environment that allowed extremism to flourish.

In chapter one the legal requirements to become a French citizen are examined and found to reflect France’s passion for assimilation policy. When three out of the seven requirements show a need for a new citizen to be culturally French in some way or another. France also has a long-held tradition of cultural citizenship, that rejects any and all other types of public culture that is not French. This is also seen in how reviled the term *communautarisme*, multiculturalism is. To be a supporter of *communautarisme* is to go against the values and culture of the Republic. Additionally, recent economic crises the EU has faced has contributed to the rise of nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiment in France, making it that much more difficult for immigrants to gain acceptance.

In chapter two the economic integration of different immigrant groups is analyzed in the short and long term. It is discovered that immigrants from the Maghreb, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Turkey are the least able to economically integrate in the long and short term. As a result, economic exclusion in terms of laws, and social unrest regarding immigrants from
these areas is prevalent. It also does not help that many immigrants from these areas are Muslim and thus visibly different than the native French population which hinders acceptance of these groups.

France is balancing on the edge of a knife regarding its future as a global player. During the May 2017 presidential elections and June 2017 legislative elections, the French population will pick a side and jump. Parties that promote crackdowns on immigration and globalization are highly popular for this election cycle. National Front presidential candidate Marie Le Pen is much in favor with the French population at the moment because her party’s rhetoric is in line with popular ideas. Indeed, Le Pen is leading national opinion polls as of March 24, 2017, according to the Financial Times. In French, presidential elections, unless a candidate wins an unprecedented fifty percent of the popular vote during the first round, the two leading candidates go into a run-off. French pollsters are focusing on three candidates. Le Pen, Emmanuel Macron, a socially liberal centrist, and François Fillon, a center-right conservative. The run-off will currently result in two scenarios: Le Pen vs. Macron, or Le Pen vs. Fillon (Locke et al.).

Related to the French election is Brexit. Brexit occurred June 23, 2016, and Britain voted to leave the European Union for good. Why did this happen: A distrust of the European Union, a suspicion that Great Britain was getting the short straw when it came to deals made within the trading bloc, and a view of immigration that gained hues of Islamophobia as migrants surged from Middle Eastern conflicts to Britain. These three factors were the primary reason Britain voted to part with the European Union. These are also three factors that we see in play as debates rage between French candidates for political offices. Popular rhetoric in these debates insists that France is getting a raw deal with trade agreements in the
EU and that immigrants, particularly Muslim immigrants, are ruining everything for France. This raises the question of a potential Frexit.

Given the top two scenarios, Le Pen vs. Macron and Le Pen vs. Fillon, and anti-globalization and anti-immigrant sentiment found in France’s political atmosphere that was also found during the Brexit vote, I think that France will leave the EU within the next five years if either Le Pen or Fillon is elected. If it comes down to a Le Pen vs Marion run-off I believe Le Pen will win due to the protectionist platform she espouses and the rising nationalism in France today.
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Décret n° 2016-288 du 10 mars 2016 portant diverses dispositions d'adaptation et de simplification dans le domaine de la prévention et de la gestion des déchets


LOI n° 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics

LOI n° 2006-911 du 24 juillet 2006 relative à l'immigration et à l'intégration

LOI n° 2011-672 du 16 juin 2011 relative à l'immigration, à l'intégration et à la nationalité

LOI n° 94-665 du 4 août 1994 relative à l'emploi de la langue française