Changes in United States Foreign Assistance Allocation and its Effect on Terrorism

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Changes in United States Foreign Assistance Allocation and its Effect on Terrorism

by

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A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of Mississippi in partial fulfillment of the requirements for completion of the Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies
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Chapter 1: Introduction

In 1987, President Ronald Reagan said, “What they can do because of our assistance, we don't have to do. And we should never forget that we aren't buying friends; we're helping friends. We're helping them open the roads of enterprise and opportunity for their own people, helping them build their own institutions of pluralism and democracy, and helping them defend themselves against externally sponsored pressures and subversion,” (Reagan). This paper will examine United States assistance to foreign countries. I will explore who receives assistance and the effects of this assistance in both recipient nations and their surrounding areas. However, it would be too large a study to include all facets affected by U.S. assistance. In order to make this a more manageable study, I will study the effects of U.S. foreign assistance on terrorism.

The United States has used foreign assistance as a tool of statecraft for almost 70 years. Since the end of World War II, the United States has consistently implemented plans to distribute foreign aid around the world. These plans continue today. This foreign assistance has been used for such initiatives as stopping the spread of communism and promoting education. There are several theories regarding foreign assistance. One theory is that foreign assistance is given to reach, or uphold, a nation’s strategic goals including supporting allies and protecting interests of the donor nation. Another theory is that assistance is given for humanitarian reasons such as promoting health and education.

In this study, United States foreign aid is only part of the story. Terrorism is the other. Terrorism is a concern for most countries across the globe. It is one of the foremost security issues for the United States. Since the attack on September 11, 2001, the United States has
looked for ways to combat terrorism. Scholars and the government alike have studied terrorism, its roots, and its processes. As with foreign assistance, there is no one singular theory regarding terrorism. I will discuss theories that have proven to be the most important to the United States in terms of quelling the terrorist threat. As the research on terrorism has developed, the directives that control United States foreign assistance have changed to better support U.S. efforts to combat terrorism.

The crux of my research is focused on how the United States uses foreign aid to fight terrorism around the world. However, this is much too large a topic to reasonably and thoroughly study in a single paper. Because of the limitations of this particular study, I will instead focus on the strategic vs. humanitarian debate surrounding foreign aid and the ways in which those types of aid affect terrorism. The question guiding my research and analysis of these two variables asks, “How have changes in United States foreign assistance allocation since the end of the Cold War affected observable terrorist activities?” In order to answer this question I will use foreign assistance as the independent variable and terrorist activities as the dependent variable.

I will also examine this issue and the future effectiveness of foreign assistance as a counterterrorism tool. In order to answer the secondary question, I will utilize one of several intelligence analysis techniques including an analysis of competing hypotheses and a future scenario analysis. The format of this section will be that of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE).
Purpose of Study and Hypothesis

As one of the foremost concerns of the intelligence community and lawmakers, terrorism and the ways to stop it are constantly under study. There are several ways of combating terrorism. These include military action, political action, and monetary assistance (“National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism, 2003”). In this paper, I will focus on monetary assistance given by the United States to foreign nations in order to combat terrorism. I will focus on the financial aspect because it is the most straightforward, in terms of completeness of information and availability, of the methods used by the U.S. to combat terrorism. This is because the federal budget of the United States must be fully reported and made publicly available, whereas there is the possibility of a myriad of covert military operations and political back-channels that may never be made public. It is also worthy noting that military operations can be relatively ineffective or have the opposite effect and attract terrorism (Azam and Thelen, 3). I seek to prove that the use of strategic aid to foreign nations by the United States decreases the number of observable terrorist activities in the target area.

Structure of Paper

In order to best describe and investigate the elements of the study, this paper will follow a well defined structure. There will be three main sections of this thesis. I will begin by describing history and theory of United States foreign assistance. I will then discuss terrorism including its beginnings, the theories about it, and the methods of combatting it. Next, I will begin the discussion of my data. I will describe the data and the problems that go along with it. After this, I will begin the analysis of data. Then, the results and conclusions of the quantitative data analysis will be presented. After these conclusions, I will begin a description and analysis of a case study of U.S. foreign assistance to Colombia to combat narco-terrorism.
The final substantive section of this paper will consist of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) which will examine future affects of foreign assistance on terrorist activities, especially in the scenario of long-term budget constraints on these particular funds. The Council on Foreign Relations says, “A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) represents the U.S. intelligence community’s most authoritative and coordinated written assessment of a specific national-security issue,” (Bruno and Otterman). The National Intelligence Estimate conducted in this project will rely solely on open-source information to investigate the future effectiveness of foreign aid. Within the NIE, I will also use several other analytic techniques used by the intelligence community, such as an analysis of competing hypotheses and a scenario analysis set forth in *Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis* by Richards Heuer and Randolph Pherson. The NIE will consist of facts and evidence presented in earlier sections of the paper and specialized information presented only in this section. These facts will be analyzed in a format that is the standard for the United States intelligence community. Finally, I will present my conclusions for the entirety of the study.
Chapter II: Brief History of Foreign Assistance

Today, foreign aid is thought of as assistance to other nations in terms of finances, technology, or military assistance. This model is came into existence at the end of World War II. During this time in history, Europe was war-torn and unstable. Then Secretary of State George Marshall rolled out a plan, commonly known as the Marshall Plan, to give financial and technical assistance to Europe (Tarnoff and Lawson, 2). This plan was the beginning of modern foreign assistance in the United States and provided the framework for future plans. The Marshall Plan brought U.S. foreign assistance to an all-time high in the 1940s and 1950s. The plan was a success that aided Western Europe in rebuilding its infrastructure and economy and achieving regional stability (“USAID History”).

After the success of the Marshall Plan, President Harry Truman proposed the Point Four Plan that focused on reducing poverty and increasing productivity in developing countries and reducing the threat of communism across the globe. This plan was the first step in foreign aid becoming an integral part of U.S. foreign policy. In 1961, President Kennedy signed into law a bill that officially created the U.S. Agency for International Development, or USAID, to administer foreign aid. That year also brought the Alliance for Progress for Latin America. In the 1970s, foreign aid was mostly directed toward global needs such as food, population planning, health, education, and human resource development. However, in 1979, the Camp David Middle East Peace Accords were signed. This changed in the 1990s when the focus became sustainability and democracy, especially in places like Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The 2000s brought war and change to USAID as the United States entered conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan. During these years USAID was charged with rebuilding almost all aspects of life in these two nations in particular (“USAID History”).

Even though there were many aid initiatives and even the creation of USAID during the decades after the Marshall Plan, the foreign aid budget actually decreased. Aid continued to decrease until it was at an historic low in 1996 and 1997 and then experienced a drastic and rapid increase in the early 2000s because of United States involvement in conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. This increase was still not enough to bring foreign aid back to Marshall Plan levels. In 2010, foreign assistance spending accounted for 3.2% of the discretionary budget authority and just over 1% of the total budget (Tarnoff and Lawson, 11-12).

The use of aid began as a foreign policy tool to assist the current and possible future allies of the United States. By examining the history of United States foreign assistance, historical patterns begin to emerge. There is a back and forth between the use of foreign aid as a strategic political tool and seemingly altruistic giving. There could be several reasons for this including changing political stances in the United States and the rest of the world. Times of conflict and peace also have an effect on the changing state of foreign assistance. As evidenced by history, foreign aid seems to be used to aid allies during or after times of conflict. By the same token, foreign aid seems to be part of peace-time operations to improve the standard of living in other countries.
Chapter III: Underlying Theory of Foreign Assistance

There are several theories regarding foreign assistance. This paper will focus on the theories that are concerned with foreign aid allocation, or why a nation decides to give money to another nation. There are two main schools of thought on this issue. The first is that foreign aid is allocated for strategic purposes such as national security or supporting allies. The opposing school holds that aid is allocated for humanitarian purposes like education or disaster relief.

General Theories of Foreign Assistance

According to Hans Morgenthau, there are six general types of foreign aid. These different types are humanitarian, subsistence, bribery, military, prestige, and economic. Humanitarian aid is traditionally extended by governments to nations that are victims of natural disasters such as floods or famines (Morgenthau, 301-302). This is the only type of aid identified by Morgenthau as non-political. Morgenthau considers the next five types of aid to have some political, or strategic, basis. Subsistence aid is given to nations who cannot maintain minimal operations without assistance from other nations. This type of aid is given in the hopes of maintaining order in the region, while also maintaining the status quo. Morgenthau describes bribes in two ways, historical and modern. Historical bribes are the giving or taking of money in exchange for a service. According to Morgenthau, almost any type of foreign aid could be considered a modern bribe because it is basically payment for political services. Military aid is a way for countries to support their allies and to gain political advantage in uncommitted nations. This traditionally takes up most of the foreign aid budget. Prestige aid is similar to bribery types of aid. In the case of prestige aid, “conspicuous industrialization” may take place in the recipient country at the cost
of the donor country. This makes the recipient country appear more modernized and economically developed. This appearance increases the recipient nation’s prestige which goes on to increase the donor nation’s reputation as a giver of aid. Economic aid can look like prestige aid, but has much deeper goals that increasing international favor. Economic aid can be used to create economic development and, in the eyes of the United States, more social stability and democratic institutions (Morgenthau 303-304).

The basic ideas of aid theory given by Morgenthau demonstrate that countries really only give assistance to other countries in order to meet strategic goals or to fulfill humanitarian efforts, which usually also have strategic goals like future national stability. In Morgenthau’s definition, humanitarian aid is rather more narrow in definition than the strategic aid. This could be because politics are so closely tied to foreign assistance. Scholarly literature generally takes a similar attitude toward humanitarian aid. This type of aid is altruistic and is usually given in times of crisis or after natural disasters. Humanitarian aid can also be given to promote education and health initiatives. Some scholars consider theories of humanitarian foreign assistance to be outdated because this type of aid can be easily used as a statecraft tool to reach strategic and political goals under the guise of charitable giving (McKinlay and Little, 59).

According to the Foreign Policy Initiative, a think tank that studies American foreign policy, foreign aid is a statecraft tool that can be used to further “America’s strategic, economic, and moral objectives throughout the world and should be seen as “neither national bribery nor altruistic charity, but rather strategic investment” (FPI Analysis). Strategic aid, or sometimes called foreign policy aid, has a much different goal than humanitarian aid. Strategic aid is given to reach a specific goal. The political element of aid is amplified because strategic aid involves
the recipient country taking money in return for taking some kind of action. This model exactly represents the sentiments of President Reagan, which are to allow other countries to take action instead of the United States. The strategic model of aid also promotes the interests of the donor and provides a certain level of control over recipient nations for the donor nations. Strategic aid is more prevalent than humanitarian aid and scholars suggest that it is because of this relationship between donor and recipient nations (McKinlay and Little, 62).

Which Kind of Aid is More Useful?

Both humanitarian aid and strategic aid have important functions in diplomacy. Humanitarian aid is important because it provides assistance to other nations in times of great need. It can provide a sense of goodwill among nations because the aid is given without anything asked in return. This kind of aid is also useful on the political front in some cases (Morgenthau, 301). In some models of strategic aid, the donor country expects a particular action from the recipient country. In other models, the donor country gives aid without expectation of a particular action from the recipient nation, but rather expects that the aid itself will produce the desired result of the donor country. However, for both political reasons and for the purpose of this paper, strategic models of aid are considered more useful.

Strategic aid is often used as the implementation of foreign policy. In the past, the United States has given aid packages to “proxy nations” in order to reach a political goal. Specific to the topic of this investigation is strategic aid used as counterterrorism policy. Strategic aid is used by the United States to combat terrorism in various ways. Aid is used to combat terrorism most
often when the threat affects the United State and its interests directly, as opposed to when the threat is directed at U.S. allies and their interests (McKinlay and Little, 62).

Experts disagree on the effectiveness of foreign aid as method of combatting terrorism. The prevailing negative view is that terrorism does not stem from problems that could be solved by foreign aid, such as poverty and under-education, and so cannot be defeated by foreign aid. Many studies also find that much foreign aid does not solve the targeted problems with any degree of efficiency or certainty (Graham, Carol). However, Jean-Paul Azam and Véronique Thelen find that the West, including the United States, gives foreign aid with the “[explicit] view to induce political alignment in recipient countries.”
Chapter IV: Terrorism

Terrorism has been identified as a threat to the United States and its allies by the Director of National Intelligence (Clapper, 1-2). In “Vision 2015,” a document by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, terrorism is identified as one of fifteen persistent threats and emerging missions that need to be combatted by the United States. “Vision 2015” identifies only the most important threats to the United States and puts them at the top priority to prevent (“Vision 2015”). Other organizations from the National Counterterrorism Center to Congressional committees also identify terrorism as a threat. The United States government uses a fairly specific definition of terrorism and this study will also use this definition. The United States intelligence community defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents,” according to Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d) (“Terrorism FAQs”). This definition does not make a distinction between domestic and international terrorism; however, such a distinction is helpful. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the United States authority on terrorism, defines domestic terrorism as an act of terrorism that occurs primarily within the borders of the United States. The FBI defines international terrorism as an act of terrorism that “occur[s] primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S., or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum (“Definitions of Terrorism in the U.S. Code”). Based on all of the definitions and descriptions of terrorism alongside the purpose of study, domestic terrorism in the United States will not be considered.
Causes of Terrorism

In order to solve any problem, its causes must be identified. Only the basics of this complicated situation will be given. Like any other subject studied in academia, there is not just a single theory as to what actually causes terrorism. Part of this is that not all that many studies look for the causes of terrorism, but rather give an historical account of terrorism throughout the different points in history. Another reason that a cause for terrorism is difficult to pinpoint is that there are many and varied situations that can foster terrorism (Crenshaw, 381-384). The United States identifies several factors that contribute to terrorism. These factors are poverty, corruption, religious conflict, and ethnic strife (National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism 2003, 22). Martha Crenshaw suggests that “the existence of concrete grievances among an identifiable subgroup of a larger population” may contribute to terrorism. Crenshaw’s analysis also adds that it is not necessarily any one factor, but rather that that factor is imposed unfairly on a part of society that fosters terrorism (Crenshaw, 381-384). These roots of and factors that affect terrorism do not provide the answer to ending terrorism, but they can provide insight when thinking about combatting terrorism.

Ways to Combat Terrorism

Combating terrorism became a national priority for the United States after September 11, 2001. In the aftermath of the terrorist attack, the United States had to craft an official “counterterrorism” policy that would shape and guide the efforts to keep America safe from the threat of terrorism. There is still an ongoing debate among academics about how to best go about preventing terrorist attacks. Some say that countries can take a defensive stance and actively
guard their assets. Others are of the opinion that counties can be proactive by limiting resources available to terrorists (Bandyopadhyay, et al., 423). In addition to keeping this important debate in mind, this policy had to allow for both immediate action and a long-term plan. Within two years of the September 11 attacks, the United States had laid out such a policy.

The document, “National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism 2003” establishes a clear, official strategy to combat terrorism. This “4D” strategy is a plan to “defeat, deny, diminish, and defend” and calls for the use of diplomatic, financial, military, and intelligence, and other means. In order to defeat terrorist organizations, the United States will partner with allies to remove criminal safe-havens, leadership, finances, and infrastructure. The second part of the plan is to deny resources such as the ones listed above to terrorist organizations in the future. A third part of the plan, diminish, will combat terrorism by reducing the risks that terrorist seek to exploit.

The final part of the plan is to defend United States citizens and interests. The strategy recognizes that a “victory” against terrorism will not be decisive, but rather an ongoing operation to keep terrorism at bay (“National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism 2003,” 15-28). More than ten years on, the “4D” strategy is still in place. However, the strategy has become more specific. For instance, the target now is not necessarily “terrorism,” but rather al-Qaeda, the most pressing terrorist threat (“National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism 2011”, 2) For the purposes of this particular investigation, I will focus on the financial means of combatting terrorism, mainly the giving of aid money to foreign countries in order to combat terrorist activities in those countries.
How Can Foreign Aid Combat Terrorism?

Bandyopadhyay, Sandler, and Younas present a model of foreign aid as counterterrorism policy. This model of foreign policy is considered an alternative to using defensive maneuvers to protect assets and limit the success of terrorists. Foreign aid as a counterterrorism policy is a proactive approach and can reduce the threat of terrorism not only to the donor country, but also to other at-risk nations. The model suggested by the authors of “Foreign Aid as Counterterrorism Policy” is that the targeted, or home country, gives aid to a recipient country to support its efforts against a transnational terrorist group in the recipient country. Examples of this type of aid flow are U.S. aid to Pakistan and Afghanistan after September 11, 2001. This model and the examples fall in line with the United States counterterrorism policy as a whole in which the United States aids nations that work with the U.S. and need some form of assistance (Bandyopadhyay, et al., 424-427). Boutton and Carter assume that the United States is using strategic allocation of fund to combat terrorism around the world. However, they argue that the United States uses foreign assistance with discretion. It is unclear how urgent the United States considers terrorist threats to its allies compared to terrorist threats to the United States (Boutton and Carter, 6-7). Boutton and Carter show that aid is more likely to flow to nations where terrorist activity is based and threatens the United States directly. In other words, the United States does not necessarily send foreign aid only to its allies, but also to countries that directly threaten U.S. security. Not only are aid flows from the United States determined by the threat level posed by a recipient nation, but also the amount of aid that is given to a country is directly associated with the amount of terrorist activity in the recipient nation. As a contrast for this approach, terrorism targeted at non-U.S. interests, even allies, does not affect aid flows (Boutton and Carter, 8).
This model of foreign assistance as the United State’s counterterrorism policy can be used as an example of the process of creating the political alignment presented by Azam and Thelen. This theory is based on the particular status quo of the donor nation holding a superior position to the recipient nation because of the flow of aid. This status quo, mentioned by Morgenthau and Fleck and Kilby, is the driving force that can “induce political alignment” and ultimately reduce terrorism in a new “ally” nation. Azam and Thelen cite earlier studies that found that wealthy donor nations are experiencing marked success in reducing terrorist activities in recipient countries by donating foreign aid (Azam and Thelen, 2). In this model, any aid given, whether to improve infrastructure or targeted specifically to anti-terrorism in the recipient country, is strategic aid precisely because it is given to reach a strategic goal.
Chapter V: Data

Theoretical Basis for Data Analysis

Because September 11, 2001, is such a landmark date in recent history, I will be using it as a jumping off point to compare changes in United States foreign aid policy. It is important to look at aid both before and after the event in order to present a full picture of the situation. It is also important to have data for before and after to show how particular changes in aid affected the distribution of foreign aid.

Fleck and Kilby describe three stages of relatively recent foreign aid. The first is the Cold War era. During this time, aid was given to those countries that were primarily anti-communist. Fleck and Kilby state that “anti-communist dictators... could count on substantial U.S. funding despite widespread corruption, human rights abuses, and often counterproductive domestic policies,” while poorer nations with fledgling democracies were often overlooked (Fleck and Kilby, 185). Aid given during the Cold War period can be considered strategic aid because it attempted to use a status quo to promote political ideals similar to those of the United States in order to stop the spread of communism, which was a strategic goal at the time. After the Cold War ended, there was a period of relative peace during which many expected that aid flows would be directed toward humanitarian efforts, rather than strategic efforts to stop the spread of communism. This time of peace began in the early 1990’s and lasted until 2001. This era was short-lived and many of these expectations for humanitarian aid were not met because there was not enough time to get aid projects off the ground (Fleck and Kilby, 185-187).
After September 11, aid flows once again returned to objectives that were strategically advantageous, rather than humanitarian. In this case, “strategically advantageous” means that aid was flowing in greater amounts to countries with terrorism troubles, rather than to countries with good human rights records or a need for education improvements. This was seen by many as a return to the aid situation of the Cold War. Fleck and Kilby also investigate the relationship between the type of government in power and the allocation of funds. They find that more left-leaning governments tend to allocate more developmental, or a type of humanitarian, aid than their right-leaning counterparts (Fleck and Kilby, 186).

These trends identified by Fleck and Kilby can be confirmed by documents from the Congressional Research Service. One such document, “Foreign Aid: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy,” recounts trends in foreign aid. From 1990 until 1995, or the beginning of Fleck and Kilby’s inter-war period, development and humanitarian aid rose roughly 10%, from 38% to 48% of the aid budget. On the other hand, civilian security aid increased from 3% before 2001 to accounting for 9% of total aid by Fiscal Year 2010. There has also been a marked decline in specifically military aid in the past 20 years. Military aid reached its peak amounts in Fiscal Year 1984 and began decreasing after that because other programs increased foreign aid (Tarnoff and Larson, 11-12).

The chart below is provided by the Congressional Research Service and is an excellent representation of aid flows from 1977 to 2009 along with the historical events that coincided with changes in aid flows. This is most useful as a point of reference for Fleck and Kilby’s recent stages of aid.
Moss, Roodman, and Standley study the change in United States foreign assistance programs caused by the attacks of September 11, 2001. The data they analyzed begins in 1998 and ends in 2005. There was concern that with the beginning of Fleck and Kilby’s third stage of recent foreign aid, the return to strategic aid, the increase in funds allocated to combat terrorism would take away funds from development and other forms of humanitarian aid. Moss, Roodman, and Standley do not find that the systemic diversion of funds away from humanitarian aid has yet occurred. The authors do find that foreign aid allocated to fight the Global War on Terror is only effective in a few countries, though those countries are considered critical. Critical countries include those with a terrorist presence or those that border a country with a terrorist presence (Moss, et al., 2-5).
Description of Data

For this study, two main datasets will be examined. These are the Global Terrorism Database and the United States Overseas Loans and Grants data. By comparing these datasets, it will be possible to draw conclusions about the effect United States foreign aid has on terrorism.

The first source of data is the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The GTD is an open-source database compiled by The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), a program from the University of Maryland. This database includes information on domestic, transnational, and international terrorist events that have occurred from 1970 to 2011 (“Overview of the GTD”). The data is divided into categories including the date of the attack, the country in which it occurred, the type of attack, type of weapon, casualties, fatalities, and more (“Using GTD”). The data were compiled by a group of researchers as each event occurred until 1997 and then again from 2008 until present. The data from 1998 until 2008 were compiled retroactively. Unfortunately, the data for 1993 is incomplete because the data was lost (“Frequently Asked Questions”).

Another source of data that I will be using is the “United State Overseas Loans and Grants,” more commonly known as the USAID GreenBook. I will use the Economic and Military data from the GreenBook. These data will reflect the 2011 value of the United States dollar. I will not use the data from 1945 to 1969 because the Global Terrorism Database does not account for terrorist accounts during these years.

This data set is considered “the authoritative data set of U.S. foreign assistance (“The GreenBook”).” The GreenBook contains data regarding United States foreign aid since 1945 and is updated yearly. USAID records foreign aid as economic assistance or military assistance and
also by recipient country and geographic region. The data presented in the GreenBook are compiled by USAID from reports from the different aid programs supported by USAID (“The GreenBook”). The GreenBook dataset is fairly complete. However, there are a few problems with the dataset for the purposes of this study. The data are listed by program name, then country name, then year. In order for this data to be compatible with the GTD data, it had to be aggregated such that the sum total, instead of individual program totals, of all aid funds per year were listed. Another drawback for this study is that data for regions instead of individual countries were listed. The regional data were removed to make comparison results more clear.

When taken by itself, the GreenBook data is out of context and does not make sense. Some countries only receive thousands of dollars while other countries receive millions. Without proper context, it may appear that foreign aid accounts for a large portion of the United States federal budget. A brief explanation of the United States federal budget will help put the foreign aid data into perspective. In 2010, foreign aid, or international affairs, made up only 1.5% of the entire federal budget (“Foreign Assistance and the US Budget”).
Basic Analysis of United States Foreign Aid Flows

Analysis of United States foreign aid flows begins in the year 1970. This starting year was chosen for several reasons including the availability of reciprocating terrorism data and in order to have a sufficient number of years during the Cold War period to study.

The total amount of aid that given fluctuates from year to year. However, this is to be expected considering coinciding historical events such as the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. These fluctuations are also in line with Fleck and Kilby’s stages of aid. Figure 3, below, shows the amount of aid given by the United States to other countries between the years 1970 and 2011, excluding 1993. Most of the aid packages given are relatively small. However, there are disproportionately large aid packages given. Some of these

(Figure 2.

![U.S. Federal Budget Composition (FY 2010)](image)

(“Foreign Assistance and the U.S. Budget”)

(“The Foreign Assistance and the U.S. Budget”)
larger aid packages coincide with important years. The best example of this is 2001, the year of the September 11 attacks and the year the largest amount of aid was given.

**Figure 3. Aid Amount per Year, 1970-2011**

Another helpful way to look at foreign aid data is to look at the countries that received the most aid before September 11, 2001 and after that date. This analysis will show changes in allocation that may have occurred. These changes in allocation can provide insight into the ways foreign aid can be used as strategy.
Figure 4.

Top Foreign Aid Recipients, FY 1998

(Tarnoff and Lawson, 14)

The above chart, provided by the Congressional Research Service, shows the 15 countries that received the most aid from the United States in 1998 (Tarnoff and Lawson). This particular year falls in the middle of Fleck and Kilby’s second stage of aid during which funds were just beginning to flow toward less strategic targets. In addition to the time frame, this chart also shows that considerably large amounts of money were spent on Israel and Egypt, two key nations for a relatively peaceful Middle East, while the other top recipients received significantly less. Thirteen of the top fifteen recipients received less than one-sixth the amount that Israel, the top recipient, was given (Tarnoff and Lawson, 14).
Figure 5.
Top Foreign Aid Recipients, FY 2008

(Tarnoff and Lawson, 14)

Figure 4, also provided by the Congressional Research Service, shows the fifteen countries that received the most aid from the United States for the year 2008. This particular year is a good year for comparison because it is after 2001 and because enough time has passed between the two reports for substantive changes in aid flow to have been made. This chart clearly reveals that the top fifteen recipients of foreign aid had changed quite a bit. Israel remained the primary recipient while more Middle Eastern and African nations filled in the res (Tarnoff and Lawson, 8-9). The data from 2008 also shows a marked increase in the amount of aid across the board.
Basic Analysis of Observable Terrorist Activities

Figure 6. Number of Attacks Over Time

The figure entitled, “Number of Attacks Over Time” is a depiction of the number of terrorist attacks from 1970 until 2011, with the exception of 1993. While most years have a relatively low number of attacks, some years have high numbers of attacks. Although this graph does not show the countries in which the attacks occurred, useful information can be gathered. On the whole, terrorism has fluctuated greatly throughout the years. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, terrorist attacks dropped. After this drop in attacks, there was a rise in the number of attacks. It is difficult to pinpoint the exact cause of this increase because
the data present here covers all events worldwide.

Conclusions from Basic Analysis

From the data presented above, we can see that something occurred in the late 2000s that caused foreign aid to the top 9 recipients to drop, and most likely to the rest of recipients as well. In the years following this drop in foreign aid, terrorist attacks begin to go on the rise again, according to the Global Terrorism Database. It is not obvious that the drop in foreign assistance directly caused the rise in terrorist attacks. However, it is not out of the realm of possibility that the two events are connected.

Complex Data Analysis

After analyzing the individual factors of terrorist attacks and foreign aid and finding that there may be a deeper connection, a more complex statistical analysis was performed. This analysis includes a correlation analysis and a linear regression analysis. A correlation can provide insight into the relationship between two variables. Usually, the closer a correlation is to 1, the more significant the relationship. In this case, the correlation is significant at 0.01 In the correlation conducted to study the relationship between terrorist attacks and foreign aid, shown below, the correlation was 0.087. This indicates that there may be a statistically significant relationship between terrorist attacks and United States foreign aid. However, correlations only give a basic idea of the statistical relationship between variables and more in-depth analysis will be conducted.
After the correlation analysis was performed, a linear regression was performed and analyzed. The results of the regression also indicates that there is a correlation of 0.087 between terrorist attacks and United States foreign aid. Figure 7 is a graphic depiction of the linear regression and it clearly shows that when little aid was given, there were more attacks and when more aid was given there were less attacks. This relationship was also shown through the basic analysis of separate graphs.

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AttackNumber</th>
<th>AidAmount</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Correlation</strong></td>
<td>0.087**</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sig. (2-tailed)</strong></td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>3129</td>
<td>2146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Correlation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.087**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sig. (2-tailed)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>2146</td>
<td>5265</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Even though there is some statistical significance in the relationship, there is not enough significance to fully explain changes in terrorist attack amounts. This can be explained by the many factors that affect terrorism and the multi-faceted approach the United States has taken to combat terrorism. There is no definitive cause for terrorism and so it is difficult to use only one method to combat the threat. Based on this notion that many things can cause and support terrorism, the United States uses foreign assistance, among many other resources to deter terrorism ("National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism 2003," 15-28).
Case Study: Plan Colombia

Before September 11, 2001, the United States was not preoccupied with Afghanistan, Iraq, or the Middle East in general, but rather with South America and Colombia. Colombia had become a dangerous country for its citizens and also posed a risk to the United States because of drug trafficking and its proximity to the U.S. A solution to this problem was found in Plan Colombia, a joint venture between the United States and Colombia in which the United States gives assistance to Colombia to help Colombia fight the narcotics industry and the terrorism that accompanies it. What follows is a case study of Plan Colombia. It will include the basic facts leading up to the violence of the drug cartels and the attempts to end drug related violence and terrorism. This case study will also include an analysis of the results of Plan Colombia and a comparison between Plan Colombia and other United States foreign aid.

Colombia is a Spanish speaking nation in northern South America, a region that is typically low on the counterterrorism agenda. It is roughly twice the size of Texas and had a population of 45,745,783 as of June 2013. So why is it being used as a case study in a larger examination of the affect of United States foreign aid on terrorism? Colombia does not have any known ties to al-Qaeda or other global terrorist networks. However, Colombia has become a safe-haven for terrorists (“Terrorism Havens: Colombia”). Three groups native to Colombia have been designated by the United States Department of State as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). These groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the National Liberation Army, and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, are responsible for much of the violence and drug trafficking in Colombia and to the United States (Sullivan, 2). In a visit to Colombia, then Drug Enforcement Agency head, Asa Hutchison said, “There used to be a
distinction between drug traffickers and insurgency groups in Colombia. Now that the proof is clear that the terrorists are engaged in trafficking as well, our support for Colombia should recognize that the traffickers are also terrorists (Leinwald).” The presence of drug trafficking in combination with terrorism has been identified as a threat to U.S. national security (“Vision 2015”). With drug trafficking, terrorism, and aid flows from the United States, Plan Colombia fits in perfectly with the larger study and will be able to provide an inside look into how aid works in a specific country.

Colombia did not become a haven for crime and terrorism overnight. The country has a long history of domestic struggle and strife. From 1948 until 1958, and intense civil war called *La Violencia* ravaged the country. This conflict took the lives of nearly 200,000 Colombians. After *La Violencia*, there were only a few years of relative peace. In the early 1960s, several groups who were unhappy with the new government situation emerged. These groups, the leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), fought against the new government throughout the country. In the 1980s, Colombia became a hotspot for violent drug cartels that only added to the tumultuous situation. These cartels funded their own violence and also funded the rightist United Self Defense Forces of Colombia, whose violence continued into the 1990s (“Terrorism Havens: Colombia”). These events and organizations set the stage for Colombia to become a terrorist haven and, eventually, the recipient of aid from the United States.

In the mid 1990s, Colombia’s President Pastrana sent out a call for help to the international community. The United States responded to that call and worked with Pastrana to form a plan that would be beneficial to both the United States and Colombia (“Plan Colombia”).
This plan, Plan Colombia, proposed that the United States send $1.3 billion dollars to Colombia to help improve conditions and end terrorism and conflict (Vaicius and Isacson). Pastrana envisioned the plan as a six year program that would eventually send $7.5 billion to Colombia. While the plan had money set aside for starting alternate development projects and improving conditions in Colombia, most of the funds were set aside for projects to stop the growth of the coca and poppy plants and to stop smuggling. This aid might appear as if it is humanitarian aid because it is directed towards typically “humanitarian” causes. However, I posit that because this aid was given with the goal of ending drug trafficking and terrorism in Colombia, it is actually strategic aid.

Plan Colombia has experienced moderate success. By 2003, terrorist group desertion had increased by 80%. Ten years after its inception, Plan Colombia has reduced coca cultivation by 40% and cocaine production by 60%. The number of homicides has gone down by half and terrorism and kidnappings have been reduced by 90%.

In 2001, Colombia was about to fail because of an insurgency of narco-terrorists. Today, in comparison, Colombia is a relatively prosperous, democratic nation. Since 2001, Colombia’s trade with the United States has increased to a total of $12 billion in 2011 (“FPI Analysis”). In recent years, the FARC has been weakened by the Colombian government’s efforts. In 2012, the FARC and the Colombian government began exploratory peace talks in Norway and continued in Cuba (Beittel, 17). With these successes and others, both the current governments of Colombia and the United States have shifted their focus to improving government initiatives and programs throughout Colombia (Friedman).
The above representation of data shows increasing number of terrorist attacks in Colombia until the beginning of Plan Colombia and then the sharp decline in terrorist attacks in Colombia after the implementation of Plan Colombia. This decline in terrorist attacks supports the idea that foreign aid is useful in combatting terrorism. While this decline in terrorist attacks certainly coincides with the implementation of Plan Colombia, foreign assistance is not the only factor at play. Just as with terrorism, there is a multi-faceted problem with a multi-faceted solution. The GTD data is only current until 2013 and so the chart cannot account for the recent peace talks between the FARC and Colombian government.
Even though Plan Colombia was not immediately successful and has taken longer than its initially planned five years, it has made great progress and can be considered a milestone success. In 2011, Paul Wolfowitz and Michael O’Hanlon suggested that Plan Colombia be used as a framework for success in Afghanistan. This new plan for Afghanistan, or the creative “Plan Afghanistan” would follow the structure of Plan Colombia. The United States would help fight the insurgency of the Taliban and other organizations while the Afghans rebuilt their own government infrastructure so that they could, in the future, manage their own insurgency problems and governmental problems with success (Wolfowitz and O’Hanlon).

So, why did Plan Colombia work? There are many factors that led to the relative success of Plan Colombia. One of the most important factors was the government support of the plan. Although the “alignment” in this case is not necessarily political, there is an agreement between the two governments to achieve the same goal. Plan Colombia also followed another key element of strategic foreign aid which is to create an obligation of the recipient nation to the donor nation.

The example of Colombia and the aid that it received from the United States through Plan Colombia is an example of the hypothesis that when assistance is given to foreign nations, observable terrorist activity in the area decreases. The results of this case study support this hypothesis as much as a single case is able. This case study also shows that the United States routinely makes strategic decisions with foreign aid. In this case, Colombia was not aided because it was an ally or an enemy, but because something in Colombia threatened the security of the United States. The U.S., along with the Colombian government, worked out a plan that would use $8.6 billion in U.S. foreign aid to strategically quell the illicit trafficking of drugs in and through Colombia (“FPI Analysis”).
Chapter VI: National Intelligence Estimate

Analysis of the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid Against Terrorism

Scope Notes

This National Intelligence Estimate assesses the effectiveness of United States strategic foreign aid as a counterterrorism method in both the present day and up to 10 years in the future. This time frame is appropriate for analyzing and assessing the effectiveness of foreign aid because the current assessment establishes a base for which to compare the future estimations. A shorter time frame may not be of very much use because the effects of aid are far reaching and may not be immediately implemented or felt in the recipient nations. A longer time frame may be too far-reaching because there would be much speculation based on what could or would happen in the coming years. This NIE will specifically look at recipient nations from the Middle East and Colombia. The Middle East was selected as an example because it is the main region in which the United States attempts to combat terrorism. Colombia was selected because it was used as a case study. Colombia is an interesting example of foreign aid used to combat terrorism because it is relatively close to the United States and the type of crime is specifically narco-terrorism. In presenting the assessment of the current and future effectiveness of foreign aid to combat terrorism, this NIE reviews available open source information, describes key factors that would drive or impede foreign aid and its implementation, and explores reasonable future scenarios.
Key Questions

- What is the current effectiveness of United States foreign aid against terrorism?

- What will the effectiveness of foreign aid be in the next 5-10 years?

- What factors will affect foreign aid?

- Will foreign aid be affected by the United States government shut down?

- If foreign aid is affected by the shut down, what effect will it have on counterterrorism efforts?

Initial Hypothesis

Preliminary analysis indicates several things. The first is that aid sent to other countries by the United States is somewhat effective as a means to combat terrorism. I also hypothesize that foreign aid from the United States will continue to be somewhat effective for the next 5-10 years. Some factors that can affect foreign aid are the majority political party, the economic situation in American and globally, world events such as conflicts and natural disasters, and many more (Morgenthau, 303). It seems likely that the recent United States economic sequestration and ensuing government shut down will affect the United States’ foreign aid budget. It is worth noting that, especially considering the general trend of allocating less and less money for foreign aid, the foreign aid budget is likely decrease. This is not to say specifically that less aid will be allocated to combat terrorism, but rather that the budget may decrease. In the case of a budget decrease, it is unclear how aid would be re-allocated, if at all. It is not certain if these factors will negatively or positively impact the effectiveness of foreign aid as a tool against terrorism.
Key Assumptions

For the duration of researching and writing this National Intelligence Estimate, certain things were assumed. By the same token, other things were not taken as fact. The writer of this NIE acknowledges that the following factors may change during the time frame of the Estimate, but cannot confidently predict these changes or implications of these changes.

This National Intelligence Estimate assumes that The United States gives aid in a strategic manner in order to pursue the important goal of fighting terrorism. Another assumption is that aid had historically been relatively successful in fighting terrorism. A third assumption is that the foreign aid budget is affected by outside factors including the economy. The economy may affect the foreign aid budget, but it is assumed that the United States will continue to give foreign aid, though possibly reduced, even in the face of dire economic straits. A final assumption is that terrorism will continue to be a main threat to the United States.

This National Intelligence Estimate does not assume that any possible or actual reduction of foreign aid will affect non-military counterterrorism efforts in any certain way or at all.

Estimative Language

Phrases such as “I judge,” “I assess,” and “I estimate,” as well as terms such as “probably” and “likely” are used to highlight analytic assessments and judgements. These statements are not facts or proof, but rather, are based on open source information which is often incomplete. Some assessments will rely on previous judgements and assessment. Assessments
and judgements will be rated based on the assessed likelihood of an event and the level of confidence we have in the judgement.

Terms of likelihood used are in the following order of relationship:

- Remote

- Very Unlikely

- Unlikely

- Even Chance

- Likely/ Probably

- Very Likely

- Almost Certainty

Terms such as “might” or “may are used when it is difficult to assess the likelihood of a situation because information is unavailable or incomplete. Other phrases such as “cannot dismiss,” “cannot rule out,” and “cannot discount” are used when a situation is unlikely or improbable but the consequences are worth mentioning.

Confidence in assessment is noted as “high,” “moderate,” or “low” confidence levels.

- “High confidence” indicates a judgment based on high quality information or an issue that allows for a solid judgement to be made.
- “Moderate confidence” means that the information presented comes from a reliable source and is possible, but not to such an extent that it is corroborated sufficiently to be ascribed a higher level of confidence.

- “Low confidence” means that the information is of questionable reliability and possibility. This can also mean that the information is too incomplete or poorly supported to make sound inferences.

**Key Judgements**

A. I judge with high confidence that it is likely that foreign aid is somewhat effective against terrorism. I judge with high confidence that foreign aid is one prong of a multi-pronged approach to combat terrorism.

The United States has seen success in curbing terrorism by creating “alignments” with nations that receive U.S. foreign aid (Azam and Thelen, 2).

Statistical analysis of United States foreign aid and number of terrorist attacks indicates that there is a somewhat significant relationship between increased foreign aid and decreased terrorist attacks.

Foreign aid alone may not be effective to stop terrorism because not all terrorists come from poor countries.

Economic aid can actually increase inequality in the short term (Graham).
The United States 4D strategy utilizes foreign aid, but also military action, diplomacy and agreement with other nations, and constant monitoring (“National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism 2003, 1-28”).

B. I estimate with moderate confidence that in the next 5-10 years, the foreign aid budget will be reduced and will be somewhat less effective as a tool to combat terrorism.

U.S. foreign aid budget was cut by 5.3% in fiscal year 2013.

U.S. foreign aid budget will be cut by $50 billion in the next 10 years (Christy and Moore).

“The only certainty right now is that the US foreign aid budget will be smaller than before.”

Old programs may struggle and new programs may have trouble getting started.

The Obama administration called for reforms such as selectivity and transparency in 2009 (Staats).

C. I judge with high confidence that there are many factors, including the economic situation, politics, and global events, that affect the foreign aid budget of the United States.

U.S. foreign aid budget will be cut by $50 billion in the next 10 years (Christy and Moore).

Fleck and Kilby find that “left leaning governments allocate more money to developmental aid than do right leaning governments (Fleck and Kilby, 186).”
Humanitarian aid is given in the wake of a natural disaster such as an earthquake or hurricane (Morganthau, 302).

D. I judge with moderate confidence that it is very likely that the foreign aid budget is affected by sequestration and the October 2013 United States government shutdown.

U.S. foreign aid budget will be cut by 5.3% in fiscal year 2013.

U.S. foreign aid budget will be cut by $50 billion in the next 10 years (Christy and Moore).

“The only certainty right now is that the US foreign aid budget will be smaller than before.”

Old programs may struggle and new programs may have trouble getting started (Staats).

E. I judge with moderate confidence that less money will be allocated to the foreign aid budget because of the economic situation. However, I also judge with high confidence that it is unlikely that a funding cut to the foreign aid budget would be completely put an end to the United States’ efforts against terrorism.

Sequestration calls for long-term budget cuts to many foreign aid programs. Defense spending, which was already cut by President Obama, will be cut again under sequestration (Christy and Moore).
With the multi-pronged approach to national security and counterterrorism, there are other available avenues combat terrorism ("National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism 2003", 1-28).

Analysis of Competing Hypotheses

An Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) will be conducted to further explore Judgement B. This will help make clear the most likely future scenario for Judgement B. Judgement B was chosen for ACH analysis because it is an issue of important future actions and decisions, rather than a current assessment.

Hypothesis 1: External factors will not have much of an effect on the foreign aid budget.

Hypothesis 2: A factor, such as sequestration, will cut the foreign aid budget, making foreign aid somewhat less effective.

Hypothesis 3: The foreign aid budget will be reduced, but the United States will introduce a more efficient way to combat terrorism.

Hypothesis 2 is the most likely.

Hypothesis 1 is the least likely.

Hypothesis 2 has the biggest impact.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facts and Evidence</th>
<th>Hypothesis 1</th>
<th>Hypothesis 2</th>
<th>Hypothesis 3</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. foreign aid budget will be cut by 5.3% in fiscal year 2013.</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. foreign aid budget will be cut by $50 billion in the next 10 years.</td>
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<td>“The only certainty right now is that the US foreign aid budget will be smaller than before.”</td>
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<td>Old programs may struggle and new programs may have trouble getting started.</td>
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<td>The Obama administration called for reforms such as selectivity and transparency in 2009.</td>
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<td>Humanitarian aid is given in the wake of a natural disaster such as an earthquake or hurricane.</td>
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</table>
Chapter VII: Conclusion

Throughout this thesis, the over-arching idea was that strategic foreign aid given by the United States had some kind of effect on terrorism. This idea led to the formulation of the question “How have changes in United States foreign assistance allocation since the end of the Cold War affected observable terrorist activities?” The initial hypothesis was that an increase in foreign aid led to a decrease in terrorism. This hypothesis was tested through the analysis of existing literature and data.

Through analysis of literature and data, the hypothesis was neither proven nor refuted. Following the analysis, the best explanation for this is that many factors, including foreign aid affect terrorism around the world. In order to fully understand what causes decreases in and how foreign aid truly affects terrorism, much larger and more comprehensive studies would have to be completed. While this analysis produced no definitive results, lessons can still be learned from this study. Analysis of literature showed that strategic aid, rather than just humanitarian aid after disasters, can have a great impact on foreign relations. Strategic aid can also be used as the implementation of foreign policy.

The National Intelligence Estimate portion of this thesis focused on the future effectiveness of foreign aid. The NIE focused on the future of foreign aid because of the United State’s financial situation and the recent sequestration of government funds. The NIE found that lessening the foreign aid budget for any reason, including sequestration, could lessen the effectiveness of that aid. Other potential hypotheses for the future were that the foreign aid budget would not be affected by external factors or that the budget would be cut, but that the United States will introduce a more efficient way to combat terrorism.
There are some questions that arose during the writing of this thesis that are compelling questions, but ones that could not be answered in the scope of this project. One of the most interesting of these questions is “Did foreign aid really stop terrorism in places that terrorism decreased, or did the terrorists simply move to another location?” This question needs to be noted because it is related to the question and hypothesis of this thesis.


Leinwald, Donna. "Colombia Rebels Could Be Target in Terror War."


