The Historical Impact Of Philosophical Naturalism On American Aesthetic Education: Bennett Reimer’s Philosophy Of Music Education As Aesthetic Education

Jeremy Edwin Scarbrough
University of Mississippi

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd

Part of the Music Education Commons

Recommended Citation
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd/706

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.
THE HISTORICAL IMPACT OF PHILOSOPHICAL NATURALISM ON AMERICAN AESTHETIC EDUCATION: BENNETT REIMER’S PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC EDUCATION AS AESTHETIC EDUCATION

A Dissertation presented in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Music
The University of Mississippi

by

JEREMY EDWIN SCARBROUGH

June 2015
ABSTRACT

Philosophical naturalism is the view that all of reality reduces to natural explanation. The resulting so-called fact-value split biases language against universal, objective values—where empirical observation is said to determine truth, while values are reduced to private emoting or socio-cultural human construction. This research questioned the definition of aesthetic value as determined by the music education as aesthetic education (MEAE) movement in the United States, and the justification of aesthetic education as a universally applicable and comprehensive approach to a course in general music/music appreciation. As the MEAE movement seems to have been largely defined by Bennett Reimer, his philosophy was assessed critically.

This study investigated the historical impact of philosophical naturalism on aesthetic philosophy in general, and the potential impact of a fact-value-bias upon the value language of Bennett Reimer’s philosophy of aesthetic education in particular. It was determined that there was a noteworthy historical shift following the Enlightenment—i.e., the rise of aestheticism curiously coincided with the rise of philosophical naturalism. It was further determined that philosophical naturalism indeed seems to have influenced Bennett Reimer’s view of aesthetic value. It was concluded that non-naturalist positions must be allowed to vie in the classroom, if aesthetic education is to speak comprehensively of value. Some contemporary alternatives are suggested concerning the possibilities of what a more holistic approach to aesthetic education might look like, and it is posited that the most comprehensive and inclusive approach will be a
dialogical approach that uses the arts to encourage students to think critically concerning questions at the heart of inquiry into the very nature of goodness and the meaning of beauty.

Aesthetics, Music Education, Philosophical Naturalism, Fact/Value Split, Worldview, Theology
The true order of going, or being led by another . . . is to begin from the beauties of earth and mount upwards for the sake of that other beauty, using these as steps only, and from one going on to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair practices, and from fair practices to fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty is. This . . . is that life above all others which man should live, in the contemplation of beauty absolute.

—Plato
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my dissertation committee for their guidance: Dr. Alan Spurgeon, Dr. Michael Gardiner, Dr. Robert Westmoreland, and Dr. Michael Worthy. I would especially like to thank Dr. Spurgeon. I contacted several universities seeking an institution where I could pursue my interdisciplinary research interests. While many of the universities I considered were too uncomfortable encouraging such interdisciplinary emphases, Dr. Spurgeon was very welcoming of my interests, and has been continually encouraging of my studies. I would also like to add a special word of appreciation for Dr. Westmoreland, as his Problems in Ethics course was one of the most enjoyable courses that I have had the pleasure of taking at Ole Miss.

I want to thank the NAfME History SRIG for being so supportive of research that I have presented while formulating my ideas for this dissertation. Additionally, an essay taken from the third chapter of this study was invited for presentation at the 10th conference of the International Society for the Philosophy of Music Education held in June 2015, in Frankfurt am Main, Germany. I am grateful for the feedback that I received from ISPME, amidst the peer-reviewed selection process, as it has helped me to articulate my thoughts more clearly and carefully herein.

I especially want to thank Estelle Jorgensen for encouraging my philosophical pursuit. She saw something special in my interests, and encouraged my professor in cultivating these interests. Her confidence is humbling. Similarly, I must thank Nancy Pearcey for encouraging my work. Few have understood my passion as she. I am grateful to Dr. Douglas Groothuis for his willingness to critique much of my work and help me to think through some of the toughest
issues addressed herein. I also thank Dr. Tim McGrew for his support and encouragement, and David McGrew for sharing several points of thoughtful inquiry.

Thank you to the officers and members of the Ole Miss chapter of Ratio Christi for working to ensure that the University has an open forum of free inquiry concerning issues of pop culture, value pluralism, ethics, and philosophy of religion. Thank you Dr. Robert Stewart, as your investment in the apologetics program at NOBTS has been a great investment in my abilities as a philosopher. Dr. Jeffrey Riley, I must thank you especially, for working with me to design an independent study in the philosophy of ethics and the relationship between worldview studies, the fact/value split, and aesthetics.

I am so thankful to my wife, Abigail, for having patience all these years, as I have pursued somewhat unusual interests across seemingly unrelated fields. I also extend my thanks to the support, prayers, and confidence of all my friends and family. Finally, as the great musical theologian, J.S. Bach understood, I must include: Jesu juva and Soli Deo gloria.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**ABSTRACT** .......................................................................................................................... ii

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS** ........................................................................................................ v

**CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION** ............................................................................................... 1

- **STATEMENT OF PURPOSE** .............................................................................................. 3
- **RESEARCH QUESTIONS** ..................................................................................................... 4
- **METHODOLOGY** ............................................................................................................... 4
- **DELIMITATIONS** ............................................................................................................... 5

**CHAPTER II: A REVIEW OF LITERATURE CONCERNING MEAE** .................................... 7

- **MUSIC EDUCATION, JUSTIFICATION, AND AESTHETIC PHILOSOPHY** ................. 7
  - On the Justification of Aesthetic Education ........................................................................ 10
  - **THE HISTORY OF THE MEAE MOVEMENT IN THE U.S.** ......................................... 15
  - **THE CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHICAL STALEMATE** ........................................... 23
    - Bennett Reimer .................................................................................................................. 23
    - David Elliott ....................................................................................................................... 25

**CHAPTER III: LITERATURE RELATING TO PHILOSOPHICAL NATURALISM** .............. 30

- **PHILOSOPHICAL NATURALISM AND THE FACT-VALUE SPLIT** ................................. 30
- **THE HISTORICAL REDUCTION OF BEAUTY** ................................................................. 40
  - Aesthetic Inquiry and the Pre-Modern Dialogue ................................................................. 43
  - The Fact-Value Split and Aesthetic Theory ....................................................................... 48
  - The Two Dogmas of Musical Modernism ......................................................................... 55
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter/Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A World without Dichotomy: Facts and the Fact of Values</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRIDGING THE CHASM</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referential Education: Truth, Desire, and the Human Condition</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OF DIFFERENCE AND DICHOTOMY</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUSICAL VALUE, AESTHETIC EDUCATION, AND PHILOSOPHER KINGS</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESEARCH QUESTIONS REVISITED</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINAL REMARKS</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF APPENDICES</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX A: DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX B: REIMER’S PHILOSOPHICAL INFLUENCES AND BIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOHN DEWEY (1859-1952)</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUSANNE K. LANGER (1895-1985)</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAUL TILLICH (1886-1965)</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEONARD B. MEYER (1918-2007)</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHARLES LEONHARD (1915-2002)</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BENNETT REIMER (1932-2013)</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I:
INTRODUCTION

There is an observable tension within the field of music education in the U.S., between the aesthetic philosophy of Bennett Reimer—which defines music education as the education of feeling—and the praxial philosophy of David Elliott—which argues that music is best valued amidst the process of becoming a performing musician. While it falls to the efforts of other authors to deliberate between the two camps of aesthetic and praxial tradition—as to whether one is better than the other—the current study assumes aesthetic education to be an endeavor worth careful consideration, but questions whether contemporary definitions of aesthetic value are adequate to speak robustly of aesthetic inquiry. This study is primarily concerned with the definition of aesthetic value as determined by the music education as aesthetic education (MEAE) movement, and the justification of aesthetic education as a universally applicable and comprehensive approach to general music/music appreciation. If aesthetic value is universally significant, then aesthetic education will be warranted. If, however, aesthetic experience has no universal, objective truth to which it may refer, then a skepticism concerning universal aesthetic value will be warranted—and the justification of an aesthetic education as universally applicable will seem unconvincing to many. As the MEAE movement seems to have been largely defined by Bennett Reimer, his philosophy represents the primary position to be assessed herein.
More specifically, this study questions the extent to which philosophical naturalism has influenced the contemporary understanding of aesthetic value. Contemporary philosophers beyond the field of music education have charged that post-Enlightenment philosophies of value have been heavily biased by philosophical naturalism—which has attempted to separate fact from value. Philosophical naturalism is the belief that there are no universal objective or immutable truths beyond the material world; values must therefore reduce simply to private or socio-cultural human constructions. The resulting so-called fact-value split biases language against universal, objective values. In the “lower story,” the world of proof, scientific observation is said to determine truth, while values are reduced to an “upper story” of human construction—of imagination or private emoting. The biased assumption of such naturalistic reduction is said to have dominated the philosophical mainstream, following the Enlightenment. The current research will critically assess the nature of a robust philosophy for music aesthetic education by considering the historical impact of philosophical naturalism upon contemporary aesthetic philosophy in general, and the philosophy of Bennett Reimer in particular. Is Reimer working with a robust definition of aesthetic value that is able to justify the universal value of aesthetic education? If not, is this due to the influence of philosophical naturalism?

Several authors have noted that classical philosophies involving the aesthetic value of music education were deeply entwined with holistic theories of music’s relation to the world.¹ Value was a question of objectivity in a full-bodied sense. With the rise of the Enlightenment, however, this is said to have historically given way to a mainstream emphasis upon scientific

objectivity as the arbiter of truth.² Thereafter, value became largely a question of subjectivity. This historical trajectory will be explored in detail and related to the question of aesthetic education, and the philosophical position of Bennett Reimer will be investigated thoroughly in order to discern whether he offers a comprehensive understanding of aesthetic value.

Reimer’s historical contribution to methodology is undeniable, and his encouragement to educators within the field was profound. What is in question is not whether Reimer has contributed significantly to the methodology of, and advocacy for, music education in the United States, but whether Reimer’s approach speaks robustly of aesthetic value and inquiry, and how his theory of value might have influenced his understanding of aesthetic education. It is possible that Reimer has cultivated a successful theory for developing one’s musical attentiveness. But if Reimer’s theory is unable to ground music as universally valuable, then it will be unclear as to why music education—moreover his particular method—is justified in any universal sense. Furthermore, if his view is unable to speak comprehensively of aesthetic inquiry, it will seem problematic for his philosophy to represent the default representation of aesthetic education.

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The current study presumes that aesthetic education may be an effective paradigm for teaching music appreciation, if it is able to speak comprehensively and inclusively of different theories of value. What then is aesthetic education, as related to music education, and has it been historically understood in an appropriately robust way? This research will survey the historical

impact of philosophical naturalism upon mainstream philosophies of music aesthetics in general, and Bennett Reimer’s philosophy of music education as aesthetic education in particular.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The question driving initial inquiry is: (1) has philosophical naturalism influenced Bennett Reimer’s philosophy of aesthetic value? This encompasses a series of inquiries: (2) has Reimer been able to justify aesthetic value in a universally applicable way, and present a model of education that is able to speak comprehensively and inclusively of aesthetic discourse? Two additional questions follow and will propel the study forward: (3) what have the mainstream philosophies of musical value historically been, and is there a noteworthy historical shift in aesthetic theory following the rise of philosophical naturalism? If so, (4) to what extent, if at all, has philosophical naturalism influenced Bennett Reimer’s aesthetic philosophy for music education? Finally, (5) are there any alternative contemporary suggestions that might improve Reimer’s case for aesthetic education as a universally applicable and valuable endeavor?

METHODOLOGY

After surveying the purpose of music education philosophy (especially as it relates to the issue of justification), the history of the MEAE movement, and the praxial-aesthetic dichotomy in contemporary music education philosophy, this study will investigate the historical impact of philosophical naturalism on aesthetic philosophy in general, and the potential impact of a fact-value-bias upon the value language of Bennett Reimer’s aesthetic education philosophy in particular. It will be asked whether Reimer is able to speak convincingly of music’s universal value, and whether he is using an adequate definition of aesthetic education. First, the researcher
will situate historically the relationship between the rise of philosophical naturalism and the rise of aestheticism. Next, Reimer’s aesthetic philosophy will be thoroughly searched for cognitive, non-cognitive, reductionist, and intuitionist language. The extent to which Reimer allows for representational and referential meaning will be investigated. If a reduction in value language is found, the researcher will draw suggestions from other philosophers, in order to posit a framework that will allow for a more robust understanding of music education as aesthetic education. If no reduction is found, the researcher will articulate why Reimer’s view succeeds.

DELIMITATIONS

This study includes several delimitations. First, while other MEAE advocates may have offered a more robust approach, only Reimer’s aesthetic philosophy will be so thoroughly evaluated. This is due simply to the fact that Reimer has become the face of the MEAE movement. Second, any historical surveys to be offered are not to be understood as comprehensive. Understanding of a correlation between the rise of philosophical naturalism and the history of aesthetic theory is necessary for understanding the question posed.

Reimer’s music philosophy is situated within a historical context in which aesthetic education was becoming an ideal in vogue. Assumptions concerning aesthetic value were largely influenced by philosophers of the day. Aesthetic philosophy of the twentieth century seems to have grown largely (though not necessarily exclusively) out of the sensory-reductionist assumptions of the Enlightenment, the subjective emphasis of the Romantics, and aestheticism. Each of these details is significant, as is the consideration of how questions like ‘what is good?’ and ‘what is beautiful?’ were answered in pre-modern western traditions. If the classical dialogue
is predetermined to be antiquated and irrelevant to contemporary aesthetics, then perhaps the contemporary definition of aesthetics cannot be said to be entirely comprehensive.

Finally, there is a need for caution and specificity concerning terminology. When reduction is addressed, for example, what is in question is value reduction. Also, it must be understood that philosophical naturalism does not refer to scientific method. It refers instead to a specific philosophical worldview. Scientism, for example, bespeaks far more than observation. It will be important to distinguish method of observation from value justification.
CHAPTER II:
A REVIEW OF LITERATURE CONCERNING MEAE

MUSIC EDUCATION, JUSTIFICATION, AND AESTHETIC PHILOSOPHY

The purpose of this chapter is, first, to consider the nature of a philosophy of music education, especially as it relates to the issue of justification. There is little need to justify music education to musicians or students who desire to learn about music. It is for this reason, that the researcher will adopt the skepticism of a non-musician who finds it hard to believe that music education is truly valuable to a non-musician, when one is already able to appreciate music without the classroom. Second, as the primary model of educational justification to be analyzed is that of aesthetic education, and since this approach has dominated the majority of late twentieth-century music education in the United States, a brief survey of the Music Education as Aesthetic Education movement (MEAE) will be presented. Finally, while this research is concerned primarily with Bennett Reimer—rather than David Elliott—both views will be succinctly presented, as they represent the contemporary stalemate in the U.S.

The first task in prefacing such a study is to consider the nature and purpose of a philosophy of music education. First, it is a system of beliefs that form a basis for operation in an educational setting. Second, it offers a forum for critical examination of these beliefs.

thereby allowing us to posit and assess various approaches to education, as well as potential presuppositions therein.⁴ Therefore, it is both a collective and an individual enterprise⁵ that shapes and transforms music education—as each judgment made amidst the teaching context is determined according to some sense of justification, and may be critically examined in order to improve the overall aims of the profession.⁶ Moreover, one’s philosophy of music education will be influenced by one’s philosophy of music in general.⁷ This could also be said of one’s larger philosophy of life—i.e., one’s theory of knowledge, reality, and value.

There appears to be an assumption pervasive across the field, in which philosophy is thought to be primarily an activity of personal opinion, while music education is considered a primarily pragmatic matter.⁸ That is, music educators are often more interested in doing and less interested in theorizing.⁹ Teaching is necessarily philosophical, however.¹⁰ Decisions

---


implemented into the classroom are crucial to the success of one’s teaching.\textsuperscript{11} Unfortunately, while music educators indeed make decisions influenced by philosophical positions, they often do not really know why they believe what they believe concerning the academic criteria that they have assimilated into their practices.\textsuperscript{12} So, a philosophy of education helps to explain and articulate various positions—therein assessing possible strengths or potential weaknesses, presuppositions, or biases, and thereby unifying the field in a broader dialogue of considerations.

There is a deeper task, however, for educational philosophies—namely, that of justification. Why ought anyone have any knowledge of music? One of the fundamental purposes of music education philosophy in the mid-twentieth century was to investigate the question of what grounds a justification for the right, necessity, or benefit of music education. How does one justify the time and expense of an educational endeavor that may seem dispensable to many?\textsuperscript{13} Timothy Valentine has explained well the difficulties of philosophical justification, and has offered an astute synopsis of what music education philosophy must entail:

One of the tasks facing music educators today seems to be the development of a coherent, compelling rationale for the study of music. Why is it necessary? . . . A convincing, systematic explanation helps those within the field see their work as meaningful, and helps non-musicians appreciate the benefits of music for human existence.

However commendable it may be, formulating a suitable apologia for music in schools is difficult, for it requires a consensus about the educational value of music, even for the vast majority of students who are not destined for musical careers. Well-intentioned but misguided justifications of music are based on the supposed ‘non-musical’ skills it imparts—a shaky claim in itself—as if the enjoyment of music were an unworthy educational goal. Teachers must consider the special features of music education, and how it supplies what is lacking in other subjects. The ensuing

\textsuperscript{11}Estelle R. Jorgensen, \textit{Transforming Music Education} (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2003), 10.


\textsuperscript{13}Alperson, “What Should One Expect,” 216.
conversation inevitably reveals divergent, sometimes, conflicting opinions about the substance, meaning, and role of music. Hence, there seems to be a need for a philosophy of music education that (1) takes seriously the sensuous nature of music, as well as the kind of intelligence required to appreciate it; (2) is sufficiently inclusive to cover the broad spectrum of experiences that are called 'musical'; (3) is responsive to the needs and abilities of most students; and (4) incorporates the study of music into the large aims of education.  

Such a full-bodied approach would seem to justify music education beyond the field of music, and instead views music as a field of general education in which it plays a key role in the imparting of meaningful contemplation in an integrated and far-reaching sense.

On the Justification of Aesthetic Education

The predominant philosophical approach in North America during the late twentieth century has been the Music Education as Aesthetic Education movement (MEAE)—though the field has become largely divided between aesthetic and praxial schools of thought since the turn of the twenty-first century. Historically, there have been three primary justifications for aesthetic education: contribution to enjoyment; the unique awareness found only in experience; and special knowledge found in the contemplation of works. Some have contested, however, that music education in the U.S. has been deficient in its applications to curricula, research, and instruction. For such skeptics, the aesthetic approach sets music upon an elitist pedestal.


Estelle Jorgensen has recounted the history of thought concerning musical value and the justification for music in a general curriculum.\textsuperscript{17} Beginning with a critique of Peter Kivy—who concluded that there exists no real justification for the humanities to be concerned with particular western masterworks—Jorgensen traces this struggle for justification back to ancient Greece. She notes that Plato believed music to be a lowly yet fundamental means of reaching for higher ideals and therefore placed music within the quadrivium in his proposal for a general education, while Aristotle saw music as a means of knowing—but one to which science is superior.

Jorgensen reveals how figures such as Martin Luther, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Schiller, and Herbert Reid believed that the arts were both good and essential in moral development. She contrasts these philosophers with John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and John Dewey, who championed science. While Dewey wrote one of the classic texts on aesthetics, Jorgensen notes that he nonetheless emphasized “the supremacy of scientific understanding.”\textsuperscript{18}

William Woodbridge, circa the Boston school music movement of the 1830’s, drew inspiration from Luther and Plato—defending music both philosophically and theologically, and presenting a case for social, psychological, religious, political, physical, and moral benefit. Approaching the nineteenth century, however, religious values slowly gave way to secular political and economic demands. The shift away from value as complementary to theology and moral realism, and toward scientific emphases, has led to difficulties in value justification.\textsuperscript{19} Critiquing twentieth century efforts in justification, Jorgensen points out that “other subjects


\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 229.

\textsuperscript{19} See: R. Scott Smith, \textit{In Search of Moral Knowledge}. 
besides the arts can potentially accomplish the selfsame ends as those claimed by the proponents of the arts . . . . Scientific study can develop and enliven the imagination; physical education can strengthen the physique; geography, history, and literature can provide social benefits.” Further, there is the point that other subjects can also foster aesthetic sensibilities. Suggesting that the arts promote such benefits fails to explain why the arts should be valued over other subjects.

Jorgensen offers two principles for forming a philosophy that will withstand scrutiny. First, value is an essential matter for justification. She takes issue with the contributions of philosophers like Wayne Bowman, David Elliott, and Francis Sparshott, who reduce music making to context so as to negate universals. This weakens any grounds for justification of general music curricula. If value is only relative to context, then there can be no universal value of music education. Second, in addition to avoiding such reduction of value, she notes the need to emphasize relevance. The public is more accepting of that which seems more readily applicable to socio-cultural life. She concludes that the arts, if they are to survive, will need to be adequately justified.

Some scholars have contended that focusing on a philosophical justification for education is not necessary for building effective curricula. According to Marja Heimonen, however, a curriculum is more important than national standards, and should motivate learning and stress moral behavior—thereby fostering an educated society of ethics and humanity. Additionally, since an education built upon work and abstract ideas is less likely to engage students, the curriculum should instead be built upon a practical dialogue of tangible ideas and critical inquiries that require students to engage ideas—both aesthetic and problematic. As William

---

Gaudelli and Randall Hewitt have insisted, meaning emerges from cross-curricular aesthetic connections.\textsuperscript{21}

It is worth noting that interests in aesthetic education initially grew from interdisciplinary interests in the humanities.\textsuperscript{22} Kathryn Bloom has taken issue with the arts’ emphasis on material and performance, when works of art are so deeply interconnected with cultural heritage. “The arts, which illustrate man’s perceptions of his world and reflect the values to which he has aspired, surely are as important as the battles he has won and lost.”\textsuperscript{23} In an effort to encourage aesthetic education in a sense meaningful to the non-artist/non-musician, she wrote:

> We know, realistically, that few of the students graduating high school will go on to professional careers in the arts. If you consider the much more typical youngster who will spend his life in other ways, what kinds of knowledge and understanding should he have about theatre? Or music? Or the visual arts? . . . . Education in the arts must be concerned with building a broad base of understanding, not for the privileged few, but for all people.\textsuperscript{24}

A primary question to be pursued, then, is as follows: What is aesthetic education as related to music education, and has it been understood in an appropriately vigorous way?

If aesthetics as an issue worth pondering is justifiable beyond the field of music, then it should be justifiable as an approach to music education as well. Therefore, given that aesthetics is (1) the study of beauty and (2) a branch of axiology—which is the philosophical study of value in general—it seems plausible to argue that, if anything is justifiably valuable to education then it


\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 89, 96-7.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 99.
is the study of value. So long as there remain any notions of value, or rights, or justice, then the 
study of value itself, as well as any conflicting theories that surround it, would seem to be a 
warranted endeavor. Aesthetics, then, warrants contemplation. Paradoxically, to deny that the 
study of value is valuable is in fact to assert a value judgment.\textsuperscript{25} It seems consequently 
convincing that the study of value is indeed relevant to any student. The arts therefore serve well 
as a unique door to such dialogue.

An assumption of this study is that value language cannot be removed from objectivity; 
this research therefore assumes the positions of moral/value realism—i.e., the belief that 
universal, objective values are real; that the notion of goodness or beauty points to a universal 
and objective truth that lies beyond the material world, and that value language is able to 
reference said universals in an objective and meaningful way—and value intuitionism—i.e., the 
three of knowledge which holds that the truth of objective value is known via the intuition of 
pragmatic experience. It is for this reason that the current research presumes aesthetic education 
(robustly understood) to be an appropriate paradigm for teaching music appreciation. But what 
is aesthetic education as it relates to music education? In Bennett Reimer’s own words, “If 
music education is to be aesthetic education, an understanding of the meaning of that term must 
exist.”\textsuperscript{26} Since the Music Education as Aesthetic Education (MEAE) movement has dominated 
the second half of the twentieth century, a secondary question follows necessarily: has aesthetic 
education been accurately understood, appropriately defined, and effectively implemented?

\textsuperscript{25} If ‘X is valuable’ has any relation to ‘X is good’ how is the assertion ‘X is not valuable’ (‘X 
has no value’) so different from ‘X is not good’?

\textsuperscript{26} Reimer, “Aesthetic Behaviors in Music,” in \textit{Toward an Aesthetic Education} (Washington, 
This research will investigate the historical impact of philosophical naturalism upon philosophies of music education as aesthetic education in general, and Bennett Reimer’s aesthetic philosophy of music education in particular. However, the MEAE movement should first be situated contextually, and the problem of philosophical naturalism explained.

THE HISTORY OF THE MEAE MOVEMENT IN THE U.S.

The notion of aesthetics broadly defined—i.e., the question of beauty and value central to the term—has ancient origins.27 Aesthetics as a subject of systematic theory and scientific assessment is a modern term, however, dating from the British empiricists of the 1700s.28 Following Alexander Baumgarten’s coining of the term, Lord Shaftesbury and Francis Hutcheson developed theories of taste and disinterestedness—which were drawn out by Immanuel Kant.29 The 1746 publication of Charles Batteux’s Les beaux arts re duit a meme principe30 solidified the concept of fine arts as distinct from mechanical arts.31 The impact of European social factors; the rise of instrumental music and the need for a music theory accounting for the value of strictly instrumental music; and the rise of interest in Cartesian thought—which stressed human consciousness; these variables influenced a number of philosophers who explored aesthetic principles. The classical question of how beauty within

27 Plato has been credited as the founder of philosophical aesthetics. See Rudolph E. Radocy and J. David Boyle, Psychological Foundations of Musical Behavior (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1979), 203.

28 See Townsend; Lippman; and Arnstine; See also Salinas-Stauffer, 5-7.

29 Salinas-Stauffer, 7.

30 Translated, “The fine arts reduced to a single purpose.”

31 Salinas-Stauffer, 7-8.
particular things reflected cosmological order and ideal goodness within the universals was refined to questions of standards of taste, proper distance of interest, and perception.\textsuperscript{32} Since these things are generally denied by the postmodern world, art becomes removed from anything beyond the whims of cultural or individual expression. But, then, what makes it good or bad?

Concerning music education, aesthetic theory as a philosophy of education does not come onto the scene until the mid 1900s. By the nineteenth century, music education had developed a tradition of stressing historical western music and the biographies of great composers.\textsuperscript{33} This tradition continued into the twentieth century, though the nature of music education went through many changes. In the early 1900s, Eleanor Smith began to explore aesthetic development in children, while Will Earhart established history and theory classes, Osbourne McCarthy (student of Lowell Mason) developed a high school curriculum that included music appreciation, and Francis Elliot Clark advanced music appreciation with an emphasis upon listening through the use of recording technology.\textsuperscript{34}

The rise of aesthetic education to the forefront of music education is intricately tied to several contextual considerations. First, in addition to the dehumanizing impact of the Industrial Revolution\textsuperscript{35} and a lack of philosophical support and unity in education following the failure of


\textsuperscript{34} Heller, George N. “From the Melting Pot to Cultural Pluralism: General Music in a Technological Age, 1892-1992.” Journal of Historical Research in Music Education 33 (2011): 59-84.

\textsuperscript{35} Ralph Smith, 142-143.
the progressive education movement, a new and unifying philosophy was a critical need for the music education profession. Second, a post-WWII fear of scientific potential accompanied by a growing sense of global competition left many in the field of arts education desperate for justification, when the 1957 Soviet launch of the first satellite into space prompted a shift in educational focus toward the sciences and quantifiable standardized achievement. While all fields began to focus on the pursuit of excellence, the music education profession concurrently stressed the need for a justification of “music for every child.”

The first voice in aesthetics as a foundation for music education in America was Harry Broudy. Prior to the 1950s, North America had no official forum for theorists and/or researchers. In 1953, Allan Britton provided the forum, with *The Journal of Research in Music Education*, and it was through this forum that Broudy articulated the first philosophy for music education in the United States. To Broudy, music was the capturing of a subjective experience into analyzable patterns of objective elements. He was concerned with value and ethics; as a realist, he stressed a distinction between what one liked and what was “good,” and he rejected relativism (the notion that truth and value are relative to individual, culture, or context). He stressed art music, but not because pop music holds no value. Rather, he understood that a general socialization and appreciation concerning popular music is inevitable, whereas the pondering of aesthetic value is not necessarily the concern of popular socialization.

---


Broudy understood education as the pondering of aesthetic value. It was this realist understanding of value by which he envisioned a deep connection in education between aesthetics and ethics—the two should not be segregated. If the question of universal, objective value is central to an understanding of morality, and if the arts offer an invitation to ponder objective value, then aesthetic education would seem, at face value, to need no justification. Rather than emphasizing art for art’s sake, he held that imagination cultivated through the arts is essential to other functions of an educated mind.\(^{39}\)

The 1959 work by Charles Leonhard and Robert House, *Foundations and Principles of Music Education*, offered one of the first clear articulations of the value of music education. This helped to encourage a developed MEAE philosophy.\(^{40}\) The writings of Susan Langer,\(^{41}\) John Dewey,\(^{42}\) and Leonard B. Meyer\(^{43}\) became the foundational works of the new philosophical movement. The central agreement of these books was their recognition of music as being expressive of feeling. While Dewey focused upon feeling in the context of pragmatic experience, Langer and Meyer emphasized the value of studying the expressivity of feeling

---


\(^{39}\) Bresler, 43-9.

\(^{40}\) Mark and Gary, 419.


within the formal relationships of western art music—Langer stressed expressive meaning within the experience of symbolization;\(^{44}\) Meyer focused upon the psychological experience of the formalized musical elements engaging, prolonging, fulfilling, or denying one’s expectations.

Following the 1960s, Aesthetic Education became the dominant educational paradigm for the arts in the United States.\(^{45}\) Still, not everyone has agreed on what exactly aesthetic education is. Abraham Schwadron encouraged aesthetic education, but concomitantly stressed a broader view of music education. As his research crossed the fields of religion, anthropology, and musicology, he was more interested in studying value as socio-musical.\(^{46}\) For Charles Ball, all that one can value is the experience of one’s own consciousness, and so; “The experience of an art work is the most important element in aesthetic education. Since the perception of aesthetic values is the ultimate goal, the experiencing of aesthetic objects must be the starting point.”\(^{47}\) Some have defined aesthetic sensitivity as a capacity to respond to emotional values and cognitive meanings in art.\(^{48}\) But this is still too vague an articulation. What is value?

\(^{44}\) This refers to the idea that humans evolved a system of communication in which feelings are conceptualized and mediated via symbolic expression—e.g., music. Once conceptualized, the symbolic variables of experience can be pondered beyond the experience—e.g., musical form.


\(^{46}\) Mark and Gary, 421.


While positions have varied, aesthetic education has traditionally been associated with works of ‘fine art,’ ‘taste,’ and ‘experience.’ According to Knieter, the main focus of arts education should be upon the work of art, which should be viewed via an educated aesthetic orientation. Courses should therefore stress a structural approach. That is, the aesthetic encounter is guided via an educated system of stylistic evaluation. In becoming a concertgoer, one becomes “sensitive and intelligent in musical matters.”

By the late 1960s, Charles Leonhard had convinced Harry Broudy to teach a course in music education philosophy at the University of Illinois. Among the students enrolled were Wayne Bowman and Bennett Reimer. Leonhard later invited his student, Reimer, to write a book on the matter of music education philosophy and aesthetic education. Reimer’s 1970 work, *A Philosophy of Music Education*, became a keystone in the literature of music education. Few names have resounded throughout the field’s discussion of aesthetics as that of Bennett Reimer. He influenced the orientation of music education curricula, such as the 1970s and 1980s Silver Burdett textbooks—to which Reimer served as consultant. Eventually, his approach to aesthetics influenced curriculums, methodologies, and both undergraduate and graduate studies.

49 Salinas-Stauffer, 6.

50 Knieter, 17-19.

51 Bresler, 44, 49.

52 Mark and Gary, 420.

53 For a biographical sketch of Reimer and his predominant philosophical influences—John Dewey, Susan Langer, Leonard Meyer, Charles Leonard, and Paul Tillich—refer to Appendix B.

54 Salinas-Stauffer, 9.
Following his retirement in 1997, the impact of Reimer’s influence on American education was celebrated with the dedication of an entire issue of *The Journal of Aesthetic Education*—wherein he was hailed as “the pre-eminent thinker and philosopher of music education for the second half of the twentieth century.”

In the foreword of Reimer’s first edition, Leonhard articulates Reimer’s philosophical position clearly; “His basic premise holds that a systematic statement of philosophy of music education must be the result of a systematic investigation of the nature and value of music itself. This premise inevitably led him to the study of the aesthetics of music and subsequently to the adoption of the theoretical position in aesthetics known as Absolute Expressionism.” Reimer argued that a philosophy was needed “that shows how and why music education is aesthetic in its nature and its value.” Salinas-Stauffer summarizes Reimer’s aesthetic assumptions:

First, the nature and value of music determine the nature and value of music education. In addition, the meaning and value of art are internal functions and cultural qualities. Music is valued for its expressive qualities; its meaning comes from its expressive form. Music education becomes the education of feeling while aesthetic education concentrates on an aesthetic experience that is intrinsic, disinterested, and distanced. The actual work of art is the object of the aesthetic experience. Finally, primary goals of music education include improving students’ taste in music and developing their capacities as listeners who will be able to have an aesthetic experience.

---


59 Salinas-Stauffer, 7.
Value, according to Reimer, is the ultimate outcome of perceiving, reacting, valuing, producing, conceptualizing, analyzing, and evaluating. “To the extent that people are moved by, absorbed in, touched by, affected by what they perceive aesthetically . . . they are likely to value the experience and want more of it.”

Eventually, praxial schools of thought began to emerge, championing music as action. Canadian scholar David Elliott, former student of Bennett Reimer, followed others in accusing aesthetic education of being unable to accommodate non-Western music, and stressed participation over listening. Essential to Elliott’s philosophy were the psychological theories of Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi—primarily, the psychological experience of enjoyment and concentration, termed, flow. As the Praxial School grew, criticism of the aesthetic school seemed foundational to their efforts. While Philip Alperson’s *What is Music?* warrants mention, it was Elliott’s *Music Matters* that became for the praxial movement what Reimer’s *A Philosophy* had become for the aesthetic education movement.

Other philosophers have contributed to the discussion of educational paradigms—e.g., Estelle Jorgensen, Wayne Bowman, Thomas Regelski, and Marja Heimonen, to name a few. Despite additional perspectives, however, Reimer’s aesthetic position and the praxial approach of Elliott have become the two predominant philosophical positions of music education in the U.S. since the turn of the twenty-first century. Therefore, much of the profession has been split

__________________________


61 Ibid., 82-3.

philosophically, as the aesthetic/praxial dichotomy remains unresolved.\textsuperscript{63} Although the emphasis of the current study is upon that of aesthetic education in general, and Reimer’s aesthetic philosophy in particular, it will be helpful to understand Reimer’s philosophy in contrast to that of David Elliott’s praxial approach—since these two views have represented a stalemate in music education philosophy since the 1990s.

THE CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHICAL STALEMATE

Bennett Reimer

Reimer portrays musicing as a process of engaging meanings in a manner similar to that of reading and writing. But the process of perception involves a precondition of feeling. “Knowing within” experience requires an educated sense of feeling—a perceptual sensitivity.\textsuperscript{64} Feelings are often informed by, or dependent upon, individual experiences and/or socio-cultural contexts. Further, all musical experiences educate and deepen our felt, lived experience. One should therefore be educated musically in order to grasp a sense of what musicing means, both within one’s immediate context and in a broader scope of musical meaning. Through a progression in attentiveness to formal elements, one becomes more efficient in the process of perception. One learns to write by learning to read, and to read more effectively by learning to write—all the while strengthening one’s ability to perceive more efficiently through the engagement of meanings.

\textsuperscript{63} Mark and Gary, 422-4.

\textsuperscript{64} Reimer, \textit{A Philosophy of Music Education} (2003), 93-4.
Although the musicing process resembles the communicative process, Reimer ultimately feels that “communication” is an unhelpful term because it implies a specific message. His focus therefore is upon the direct involvement of creating and perceiving entwined with the concept of feeling. “Creating music as musicians, and listening to music creatively, do precisely and exactly for feeling what writing and reading do for reasoning.” Creativity is informed through the engaging of sensual perception, and music education is the education of feeling.

Reimer acknowledges a problematic dichotomy in western music, where feelings are divorced from intellect. He feels this to be misinformed; we make intellectual distinctions according to the way we feel about those distinctions and what makes sense. Paradoxically, we cannot “know” anything apart from experiences by which we assess ideas. Musically, objective ideas are observed and engaged via subjective perspectives (experiences informed by feelings).

Reimer identifies both “quantitative and qualitative difference between emotion and feeling, emotion being at a large level of activation and a broad level of awareness, whereas feeling is the actual, specific awareness of what is transpiring and its connection with the details of whatever is triggering it [emphasis in the original].” He explains, “Emotions are nameable in word. Feelings are the nonverbal, ‘newly minted’ crossings into consciousness of felt information, or knowing, consisting of ‘feeling-beyond-language.’” Reimer gives an example in the word ‘love.’ While it may be objectively generalized, the exact way in which an individual experiences it cannot be fully known if it cannot be fully expressed. If another has not

65 Ibid., 139.
66 Ibid., 93.
67 Ibid., 77.
68 Ibid., 82.
experienced that individually personalized subjective occurrence of love, then how is one to understand what is meant when another speaks of love? What bridge exists in language to cross the chasms of ambiguity between actual experiences and the words given to them as representative of a universally identifiable quality?

For Reimer, music offers an aesthetic experience wherein one’s sensitivity to felt experience is deepened. Similar to the boundaries of verbalization, music engages the listener in experiences that lie beyond objectively specifiable language. The education of music then becomes an education of feeling; the more one is able to engage the idea of forms that lie beyond one’s abilities to express knowledge, the more sensitive he or she becomes to meanings in general. As one becomes more sensitive to meanings, one discovers more effective ways of communicating meanings. Reimer gives the example of written and spoken words, which began as an attempt to capture an inexpressible idea. The world is known through felt experiences.

It is unclear what Reimer means when describing the experience as ineffable. Does he mean that the value of the felt experience is an end in itself, and the ineffable represents the deepened sensitivities found only within that sort of felt experience? Or is he suggesting that the experience is a means by which one encounters an ineffable truth that lay beyond the experience itself? The former position is circular; we should listen in order to ponder why we listen. The latter position suggests a rich understanding of value. It is unclear, however, which position should be attributed to Reimer.

David Elliott

David Elliott envisions music education as “praxial.” In contrast to aesthetic notions of music education, which he rejects, Elliott feels that music education should focus upon the experience of the musicing process. “Praxis connotes action that is embedded in, responsive to,
and reflective of a specific context of effort . . . The term praxial emphasizes that music ought to be understood in relation to the meanings and values evident in actual music making and music listening in specific cultural contexts. 69 On the view that musicking and listening are learned by musicking and listening, the philosophies of Reimer and Elliott are not so far removed. The difference is that Reimer emphasizes the assessment of feeling while Elliott’s approach is an emphasis upon doing.

Elliott describes the musicing process as musicians experiencing active engagement (musicing) of an ongoing experience known as music. Music is then experienced praxially by listeners; they similarly engage the meaning and assess through a process called listening. Both the process of creation and transmission, and the process of reception, having become an experience solidified in time, create the potential for a recurring process of reflection. Education becomes a process of engaging experiences, assessing meanings, and applying acquired skills and meaning toward a deepening of understanding and a strengthening of musical ability. 70

An essential concept in Elliott’s philosophy is the concept of “flow.” Elliott describes this as the point when “consciousness is ordered by incoming information that matches the goals of the self.” 71 Whereas the aesthetic concept describes a point in which the self is fulfilled in the processes of meaningfully engaging the ideas of another, flow specifically represents a moment of deep satisfaction prompted by the self-realization that (1) a meaningful experience compliments one’s desires and is indeed beneficial to oneself, or (2) a meaningful experience has in fact been created at the hands of one’s own ability or doings.

69 Elliott, 14.

70 Ibid., 39-76.

71 Ibid., 114.
Flow, resulting from the process of doing creates a drive for furthering similarly rewarding experiences. Repetition of and reflection on the process of engaging and creating meaningful experiences become rewarding in themselves, as students begin to experience flow amidst praxial learning activities. The process of musicing and listening becomes most fulfilling when flow is present, and flow is most potent when experienced as a result of one’s own hard working toward the goals being fulfilled via the experience of flow.

The concept of self-esteem is significantly entwined with the idea of flow. Elliott cites Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi; “Teenagers who report more flow tend to be happier . . . . Individuals who cannot experience flow, or who enjoy only passive and simple activities, end up developing selves that are often in turmoil, riven by frustration and disappointment.”72 Elliott says that self-esteem “manifests itself as an interpersonal kind of knowledge: as a feeling that one is successful . . . capable or productive.”73 This drives the individual toward further inquiry.

Elliott feels that an educational approach that stresses this process of engagement, reflection, reward, fulfillment, and self-discovery creates a circular sense of self-esteem that thrusts the student toward a desire to engage learning and practice more purposefully and optimistically. “One of the main reasons that flow is beneficial is that one’s overall quality of life depends on it . . . . Human beings seek self-esteem and happiness more than anything else . . . Self-esteem is intimately related to involving one’s self more and more deeply in the challenges and complexities of an established domain of effort, or ‘in a system of meanings that

72 Ibid., 119.

73 Ibid., 118.
gives purpose to one’s being.”\textsuperscript{74} This is important, Elliott believes, to the advocacy of music education because personal enrichment and fulfillment are essential to universal education.

Whereas Elliott’s philosophy is an emphasis upon praxis, driven enthusiastically by the resulting experiences of flow, Reimer presents music education as the education of feeling. Reimer sees music as a process of engaging meanings. In this, the philosophies of Elliott and Reimer are similar. Reimer sees music as an educated perception of feeling. But, since feelings are dependent upon individual experiences and contexts, individuals must be educated to interpret, assess, and engage productively the meanings within music.

Although there are points within Elliott’s ideals of education that cross paths with the philosophies of Reimer, Elliott ultimately rejects the idea of aesthetic education. “This praxial philosophy is fundamentally different from and incompatible with music education’s official aesthetic philosophy.”\textsuperscript{75} In this, Elliott does not provide a convincing reason as to why the driving experience of flow should not be interpreted as a manifestation of feeling—which Reimer would identify as essential in aesthetic education. Still, Elliott’s primary emphasis is upon the concept of praxis—the systematic progression from beginner to professional that is fueled by flow. In one sense, Elliott and Reimer stand in stark contrast. Still, it is possible to glimpse a complementary approach that interprets flow via a synergistic lens—understanding Reimer’s aesthetic approach as effective in approaching appreciation, and seeing the systematic approach of Elliott’s praxial concept as vital in the development of skillful musicianship.

In so far as a general music education course has the means and the time to implement a synergetic approach that encourages both aesthetic contemplation and praxial productivity, this

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 119.

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 14.
may prove successful. Such an ideal situation will not be pursued in this research, however.
Concerning the average appreciation course for the non-musician the praxial approach has little
to offer—especially within limited classroom contexts. Such an assertion will likely raise a
justified question: Does listening constitute “doing?” The nature of doing, however, is an issue
of how (observation), not why (justification)—and the issue of flow might explain why praxis is
so enjoyable, but it says nothing of why ‘doing’ is valuable to the non-musician in the first place.
(It is problematic to justify education according to what feels good). As stated in chapter one,
aesthetics is necessarily an issue of value. Therefore, it would seem that aesthetic education
(robustly stated) is the more qualified candidate for an educational paradigm that is able to
justify music education across the curriculum.
CHAPTER III:
LITERATURE RELATING TO PHILOSOPHICAL NATURALISM

PHILOSOPHICAL NATURALISM AND THE FACT-VALUE SPLIT

A central focus of this study is the impact of philosophical naturalism on the MEAE understanding of aesthetic value. This chapter will first explain philosophical naturalism and the fact-value split. Then, the relationship between the rise of philosophical naturalism and a coincidental shift in mainstream aesthetic theory will be situated historically. Finally, the potential impact of philosophical naturalism upon one’s presuppositions of aesthetic value will be addressed and related to the justification of aesthetic education. Philosophical naturalism is a complicated term involving many concepts, but will here be defined as a philosophical presupposition, or worldview, which holds that all of reality ultimately reduces to natural explanation. Philosophical naturalism is difficult to address comprehensively because, although it always involves some form of naturalist reduction (reducing truth or value to behavior, privatized feelings, or human construction) such can be approached in a plethora of ways. The main problem with naturalism is that a particles-in-motion-and-nothing-beyond view of reality can speak only of physical regularity—what is, or at least seems to be—and is therefore unable

to speak of normativity—what ought to be. In short, naturalism leaves no room for objective values, since these are not about what is, but about what ought to be.

Strong forms of philosophical naturalism include two prominent schools of thought. Scientism reduces all meaning to empirical fact. Logical positivism reduces meaning to logically definable statements or scientific truths. Weak forms of philosophical naturalism may allow for immaterial states—e.g. that a mind is not the same as the brain—but they ultimately hold that non-natural phenomena will reduce to scientific explanation. Strong naturalists will claim that mind is nothing but matter—and that while we are currently unable to reduce and explain qualia (felt experience), we will be able to do so with time. Weak naturalists will hold that mind is not identical to matter, but will insist nonetheless that mind comes from matter. Both forms of naturalism have impacted the study of aesthetics, by imposing (whether explicitly or implicitly) a fact/value dichotomy.

The fact/value split is a doctrine that emerged circa the rise of Modernity and presumed that values are not derived from facts. Nancy Pearcey expounds:

The direction in intellectual history since the Enlightenment has been to grant to science the authority to pronounce what is real, true, objective, and rational, while relegating ethics and religion to the realm of subjective opinion and nonrational experience. Once this definition of knowledge is conceded, then any position that appears to be backed by science will ultimately triumph in the public square.78


This has also been called the dichotomy between beliefs and knowledge; truth refers only to facts derived from experiment and observation and value is understood as only culturally embedded, with no objective reference beyond language.\(^79\)

The debate is essentially one over the truth of universal, objective value, and therefore between the two camps of realists and anti-realists. Any philosophical study of aesthetics must consider the difference between cognitivism and noncognitivism. Noncognitivists deny the truth of—or the ability to know—objective values; they are therefore called antirealists, and they represent strong naturalism. Cognitivists do not deny truth, and so they are considered realists. If influenced by naturalism, however, one might still reduce cognitive knowledge to relative belief, constructed experience, or some form of empirical evidence or physical process.\(^80\) So, value language has truth content, but it is relative, and cannot therefore be true in a universally objective sense. This compromises any commitment to moral/value realism. Such a cognitivist, though a realist about knowledge, therefore becomes an antirealist concerning universally objective value. This is called weak naturalism. Non-naturalists, e.g. moral intuitionists, insist that goodness is reflective of a universal, objective and immutable truth.

Concerning education, if moral/value realism is false, then education cannot matter in any full-bodied and universally meaningful sense—i.e. beyond the whims of individual choice, social arrangement, or government imposition—because meaning cannot exist in a meaningless world.

---


We often stand back and ask whether our existing beliefs are true according to science, but why
not ask whether they cohere with ethical or aesthetic standards? Who crowned science king over
concerns of value norms and meaning? As Thomas Nagel has argued, we are in fact “viewers of
the world from nowhere within it.”81 That is, we often speak meaningfully about the world and
about value from a perspective that lies beyond strict subjectivity, and assumes a standard that
lay beyond context.82

The impositions of philosophical naturalism found within modernism set the stage well
for postmodernism because postmodernism inherited and assumed a position of antirealism
concerning value language. R. Scott Smith explicates the cognitive dissonance within the
postmodern culture. How does one engage in any meaningful way, if there is no objective,
external standard to ground meaning? Meaning therefore reduces to mere emotion. Explaining
the fact-value split, he insists that westerners today typically embrace the notion that moral/value
language has no grounding in knowledge and is therefore reduced to mere taste/preference.
Science, on the other hand, is considered the primary authority on what one can know.83 This
reduction of objective meaning directly coincides with individual and cultural/contextual
relativism.

The exaltation of empirical science at the expense of value has been called “the last

81 Thomas Nagel, “Value: The View from Nowhere,” in Ethical Theory: Classical and
141.

82 C. S. Lewis cleverly pointed out that, one cannot recognize a crooked line without having
some prior notion of straightness. See: C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (San Francisco: Harper,
2001), 38.

83 R. Scott Smith, In Search of Moral Knowledge.
dogma of positivism.” This is because in the twentieth century a group of philosophers known as the logical positivists carried the fact/value split to its extreme conclusions. In 1921, Ludwig Wittgenstein declared that ethics could find no place in a logically dogmatic language. Though he would later change his philosophical stance, the early Wittgenstein famously articulated a position to which many at the time staunchly held; “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.” Of course, it is certainly plausible that perhaps whereof one cannot speak thereof the language is insufficient. Still, the fact that something cannot be defined or adequately described does not necessarily mean that it cannot exist objectively. The logical positivists, however, did not see it this way. Alas, logical positivism has been exposed as self-refuting.

Stephen Schwartz identifies a major tenet of logical positivism to be the notion that utterances of value, such as ethical statements, “have no cognitive content but are expressive of attitudes and emotions.” Largely associated with A. J. Ayer (who first offered an analytic concerning the term ‘good’), this view became known as emotivism. Ayer explained; “We may define the meaning of the various ethical words in terms both of the different feelings they are ordinarily taken to express and also the different responses which they are calculated to

---


88 Schwartz, 67.
Ayer hoped to convince the reader that metaphysical theories, lying beyond empirical verifiability—whether statements of ethics, religion, or aesthetics—are utterly, literally, meaningless. In order to render metaphysical statements meaningless, he established a criterion of verifiability, or the verification principle—which became central to positivism:

A sentence is factually significant to any given person, if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express—that is if he knows what observations would lead him, under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being false. If, on the other hand, the putative proposition is of such a character that the assumption of its truth, or falsehood, is consistent with any assumption whatsoever concerning the nature of his future experience, then as far as he is concerned, it is, if not a tautology, a mere pseudo-proposition. The sentence expressing it may be emotionally significant to him; but it is not literally significant.  

In the second addition of his *Language, Truth, Logic*, Ayer contended, “For a statement of fact to be genuine, some possible observation must be relevant to the determination of its truth or falsehood.” Bertrand Russell similarly critiqued the notion of values; “Questions as to ‘values’ lie wholly outside the domain of knowledge. That is to say when we say that this or that has ‘value,’ we are giving expression to our own emotions, not to a fact which would still be true if our feelings were different.”

Many critics see the conflict arising from the issue of emotivism as the result of a dogmatic presuppositional bias—namely, the verifiability principle. As Steven Cowan and James Spiegel explain, the principle is self-defeating because it cannot even verify itself.

---


90 Ayer, 35.

91 Ibid., 27.

Alister McGrath, philosopher of science and religion, has also challenged, “In its rigorous sense, ‘proof’ applies only to logic and mathematics. We can prove $2 + 2 = 4$, just as we can prove the whole is greater than the part. Nevertheless, it is important to avoid confusing ‘provability’ with ‘truth.’” As C.S. Lewis once quipped, “Most dogs cannot understand pointing. You point to a bit of food on the floor: the dog instead of looking at the floor sniffs your finger. A finger is a finger to him, and that is all. His world is all fact and no meaning.” Such an analogy exposes well the flaw of positivist presumption, which asserted staunchly the fact/value split.

The rise of staunch empiricism has been attributed to the impact of Hume’s skepticism and Kant’s noumenal-phenomenal distinction. Historically, this resulted in a shift away from the notion of universal value as objectively knowable, and eventually toward a complete and problematic abandonment of universal, objective value, as philosophical naturalism’s proclivity toward reduction had a central role in the formation and imposition of the fact/value dichotomy. G. E. Moore attacked the view that value judgments are merely a subset of empirical judgments. He called the equating of natural properties, e.g. pleasure, with a non-natural property, e.g. goodness, the naturalistic fallacy. Lewis also took issue with this reduction. If value is not objective beyond the empirical world—i.e., beyond the epistemic

---


96 R. Scott Smith, Amazon Kindle edition, Loc. 72-197.

97 Zammito, 305.

norms that guide scientific observation—then it can only be subjective. Who then gets to assume authority concerning those empirical judgments, as to what should be called good? The judge cannot be a party judged or else the decision is arbitrary and there is no grounding reason to value, e.g., preservation of the species above self-preservation. Nonetheless, the logical positivists staunchly held that values have little to do with rationality.

Although positivism eventually died out due to self-referential absurdity, the fact/value doctrine unfortunately remained. There is an immense philosophical tension between the two prominent schools of twentieth century thought—i.e., modernism and postmodernism. Paradoxically, however, they seem to share a common reduction of value in language. Both views reject a worldview that holds beauty or goodness to be an objectively true referent to something beyond the subject, culture, and physical world; and they both assert instead a worldview that precludes the possibility of such robust objectivity.

Despite popular acceptance of naturalism’s fact/value split, many have challenged that it simply does not comport with the real world. Recognizing that it is difficult to verify scientific statements scientifically, it was W. V. O. Quine who first famously identified habitual reductionism as a dogma of empiricism. He identifies such reductionism as “the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to


immediate experience”. Quine exposed the dogmatic impositions of empiricism as unempirical assertions in themselves.

Thomas Nagel has also astutely assessed the issue of reductionism and natural order—ultimately exposing naturalism as borrowing from a system of cognition of which it cannot speak because such is immaterial. He insisted that language concerning physical states and/or behavior can speak only of that which is objectively observable, while mental states are experienced apart from observation. Language pertaining to mental states therefore becomes referential, and not directly observational. Nagel has identified value intuition as a strong case for rejecting philosophical naturalism.

Alvin Plantinga has exposed philosophical naturalism as a major source of contemporary tension between science and religion, because it allows for no possible conclusions beyond the realms of what it presupposes as reality. And yet, he observes, philosophical naturalism curiously borrows much language from religious worldviews. It speaks of a meaningful universe—one in which knowledge is valuable and life, significant. But why suppose this? Naturalism provides no reason to conclude anything substantial concerning one’s cognitive abilities. He concludes that philosophical naturalism is actually in deep conflict with science.

It is problematic to judge a body of belief as false—e.g. value realism—when borrowing premises from the belief that one is rejecting—e.g., that judgments matter. The value realist


105 See Plantinga, (Kindle Edition), Loc. 168, and Loc. 4813.

acknowledges the material world, but also that pragmatic experience testifies to meaning that lay beyond the world. Philosophical naturalism, however, predetermines what can and must be true about the world, while smuggling in pieces of value realism—e.g. that it should be “good” or “right” to hold to philosophical naturalism. At this point, it is important not to confuse the worldview presupposition of philosophical naturalism with methodological naturalism—i.e., the mindset that is necessary for employing the scientific method of observation. Similarly, scientism should not be confused with scientific method.

Methodological naturalism is concerned with methods of investigating reality, and holds the scientific method to be a general authority. This involves a general presumption about how one can acquire knowledge about the world. Philosophical naturalism, on the other hand, is concerned with what is reality, and precludes non-natural explanations. The presumption of philosophical naturalism can be seen in the efforts of early-twentieth-century American philosophers who, according to David Papineau, “urged that reality is exhausted by nature, containing nothing ‘supernatural,’ and that the scientific method should be used to investigate all areas of reality, including the ‘human spirit.’” In short, philosophical naturalism asserts a worldview; no immutable truths can exist beyond explainable material processes.

Hilary Putnam pointed out that the reduction of value to subjectivity becomes a thought and discussion stopper. Errors resulting from the fact/value split include: that values play no role in the realm of facts (i.e., in science), in the determination of what is a fact, or in the description of a fact; that values are reduced to personal taste and therefore find no place in the

107 Papineau, "Naturalism."

role of reason; and that values are entirely subjective and without objective qualities. Moreover, the enterprise fails both practically and philosophically because postmodernism, followed to its logical conclusion, ends in nihilism and the absence of all facts and all values. This is antithetical to intuitions of value judgments as objective and rational.\footnote{Robert A. Harris, “A Summary Critique of The Fact/Value Dichotomy.” (2005). Retrieved on November 15, 2014 from: http://www.virtualsalt.com/int/factvalue.pdf} Why “ought” I think it “good” to value the “rights” of another? For the value realist, a world of value reductionism is a “thin world,” which yields several significant consequences: (1) there is no reason to rise above custom; and (2) there is no difference between good or bad, right or wrong. On the other hand, a “thick world” is one pregnant with true value.\footnote{J. P. Moreland, \textit{Kingdom Triangle} (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2007), 34.}

THE HISTORICAL REDUCTION OF BEAUTY

For a term essential to arts education, “aesthetics” often falls victim to ambiguity. Many use the term simply to distinguish relative pleasures—individual or cultural preference. Others associate it exclusively with either form or feelings. The heart of aesthetic inquiry, however, involves the questions of what is good, beautiful, or meaningful, and why. For some, value is psychological, for others physiological. For some it is determined, for others it is a response to an experience. Still others see value as necessarily referential to an objective standard lying beyond both subjective experience and physical/behavioral stimuli. As observed by philosopher, Douglas Groothuis, “Just as my experience of roundness when I see an orange is not in itself round, my experience of aesthetic excellence has an objective reference beyond the experience
In other words, there is a sense of referential awareness, inherent within the experience of aesthetic beauty, which points to a universal, objective standard of value.

Originating in the 1700s, the term, ‘aesthetic,’ generally designates an object, judgment, attitude, experience, or sort of value. Alexander Baumgarten coined the term in 1750, focusing on a science of sense perception, felt qualities, and responses. This modern emphasis, however, still begs the question as to what is good. The classical dialogue of beauty involved a cognitive awareness of and inquiry into the very nature of reality itself. Contrary to the classical exploration of what such awareness means as it relates to universal objectivity and reality; the modern notion of aesthetics tended to stress a science of perception or of feeling. From such an empirical approach developed the notion of the aesthetic attitude. If beauty lay in the senses, one can learn to sense correctly or to manipulate more accurately the senses of others. By the time of the twentieth-century Music Education as Aesthetic Education (MEAE) movement in the United States, aesthetic beauty had become seemingly defined as a special experience wherein the value of said experience was said to lie in the ineffable experience itself.

The classical approach to education as an exploration of aesthetic value was more holistic. Grace of the body was the emphasis of physical education; academics were taught via


112 Shelley, "The Concept of the Aesthetic."

113 Arnstine, 9-11.

114 Townsend, 3.

115 Reimer seems to speak of aesthetic beauty as intrinsic to experience—as if it justifies itself. Understanding exactly what he means by aesthetic experience is one of the primary concerns of the current study.
drama, myth, poetry, and song; and the contemplation of music was seen as a sort of introduction to philosophy.\textsuperscript{116} Following the Enlightenment, the aesthetic seems to have become primarily an issue of the senses or of individual will. With the push toward Postmodernism, and its rejection of objective and universal values, aesthetics could mean little more than private experiences of personal emoting. R. Scott Smith, James Sire, and a several other authors have observed that modern and postmodern trajectories are significantly intertwined with the rise of philosophical naturalism.\textsuperscript{117} Philosophical naturalism is a worldview presupposition that arose following the rise of the Enlightenment, and asserts that all of reality reduces to natural explanation. This results in what has been called the fact/value split—the presumption that values are not derived from facts; that truth refers to empirical observation, and value has no objective reference outside of language construction. This, of course, would bring into question the entire arts education enterprise.

Surveying the historical dialogue concerning the justification of music education, Estelle Jorgensen has observed how modern philosophers have tended to fall on one side or the other of a classical Platonic-Aristotelian dialogue.\textsuperscript{118} T. Ray Wheeler has insisted that contemporary

\textsuperscript{116} Arnstine, 10.


\textsuperscript{118} Jorgensen, “Justifying Music in General Education,” 229.
aesthetic philosophies represent this dialogue, as well.¹¹⁹ But given the presuppositions of a naturalistic bias following the Enlightenment, and Postmodernism’s predetermined rejection of objective, universal value, it becomes questionable whether the classical dialogue—i.e., the pre-modern conviction in beauty as a referential quality of an ultimate, universal truth—has indeed been able to vie for mainstream consideration in the twentieth century.

If the value of music refers only to what is scientifically observable, or if it is only relative to the individual, culture, or context, then it is doubtful whether music education can ever really be justified convincingly as a valuable or necessary part of one’s education. To be clear, it may seem justified to the majority, but students often ask why they should have to learn a given subject. This is a fair question, and deserves something more substantial than a circular, “because it is good for you,” because the goodness of the experience is precisely what they were questioning. Moreover, if music is good for the student, and most students are already exposed to music beyond the classroom, then again the question lingers, why the need for the classroom? To consider the inquiry of this research satisfactorily, it is worth contemplating how the fact/value split, stemming from the rise of philosophical naturalism, has coincided with the rise of aestheticism; and to suggest how this has set the stage for the predominant twentieth-century definition of aesthetic education in the U.S.

Aesthetic Inquiry and the Pre-Modern Dialogue

The heart of aesthetic inquiry—the question of value—represents one of the deepest questions in all of philosophical inquiry. Meaning and reality are significantly intertwined with

questions of goodness and beauty—e.g., whether goodness is objective or subjective, particular or universal. While modern art has offered cultural objects to be valued for their own sakes, or to excite a desire for a sense of escapism, beauty in a classical sense was not simply the portrayal of emotion. Rather, it was, as Dabney Townsend contends, “a value closely linked with truth and the good.”

In classical thought, beauty was associated with harmonic order and often entwined within discussions of religion, knowledge, morality and politics. Socrates stressed philosophy as the quest for wisdom; and the question of value was indeed the question of philosophy. In Plato’s presentation of the Euthyphro dialogue, Socrates famously set his student on the horns of a worldview dilemma in order to ponder goodness more deeply.

Classical theories of art were essentially theories of imitation. For Plato the artistic imitation is in its reference; the imitation is a shadow of a shadow of a true universal ideal. Beauty is the good. For Aristotle, the craft of imposing design on matter is the artistic imitation—an imitation of the universal that is the artistry of an orderly design discoverable throughout the particulars. Form represents design imposed upon matter by some outside agent. Therefore, to understand more completely the universal things, one focuses more upon the

\[\text{120 Townsend, 1-2.}\]

\[\text{121 The connection between aesthetics, ethics, and cosmology is not simply a western construction. It can be seen in ancient cultures around the world. See, e.g., Curt Sachs, } \text{The Rise of Music in the Ancient World: East and West} (\text{New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 1943}).\]

\[\text{122 Townsend, 6; and 16-17.}\]

particular causes and effects. From these theories emerged the concept of a dialectic—i.e., knowing something in relation to something else.\textsuperscript{124} Plato was somewhat mistrusting of the arts because of the art’s ability to influence emotion. Because reason and feelings are often conflicting, he feared that those who rely on feeling ignore reason.\textsuperscript{125} Nevertheless, he did not condemn art entirely. Rather than value art as autonomous, he valued the potential ethical education that could be fostered by considering its potential effect on character and conduct.\textsuperscript{126} His primary interest in the arts was the development of the royal artist, whom he called the philosopher-king—the one who devotes his days to learning what goods are true goods, and pondering the values by which one measures all of the arts. Activities that end only in pleasure are not good activities. Pleasure is often at war with reason and self-control, and should never measure worth because, good or bad, man inevitably becomes like that which he enjoys. With age, Plato began to consider that, if resulting in good ends, pleasure and pain could actually become ally to reason.\textsuperscript{127}

For Aristotle, nature was the order of all things; and mankind her noble son. Stressing a lens of beauty via nature, he saw art as the imitation of divine creation. Katherine Gilbert and Helmut Kuhn expound; “Art imitates the process of nature, and God is the prime mover of nature.”\textsuperscript{128} This helps to explain why tragedy was an art so highly valued. Order is present

\textsuperscript{124} Townsend, 7; and 20-21.

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid., 9.

\textsuperscript{126} Ralph Smith, “The Philosophical Literature of Aesthetic Education,” 141.

within all forms of imitation, yet tragedy goes beyond mere order, and deals with the ‘why’ of human destiny. The virtue of tragedy is: “the exhibition of misery or happiness as necessary, as something that under the circumstances had to be . . . illustrative of law . . . . The logic of the necessary rules over all.”¹²⁹ Aristotle agreed with Plato concerning ethical aims of imitation. The endeavor of classical education, then, was the ethical development of the will. While Plato distinguished the philosopher as concerned with the universals, and the artist with particular things, Aristotle saw both to be concerned with the question of universals.¹³⁰

The Medieval Christian Church stressed a universal grounding for goodness and beauty, and a unity between objective knowledge and subjective experience—although the classical tension between the importance of the universals and the particulars continued. With the rise of Humanism, however, aesthetic philosophies began to stress the autonomy of nature and the individual. Following the Renaissance, mainstream aesthetic emphases began to shift from a concern for divine harmony and the pondering of universal objective values, toward that of felt experience, formal control, and pleasurable effect. Still, a noteworthy tension can be seen within Renaissance thought. Leonardo da Vinci, for example, wrestled with the fact that a world determined by mathematics, but devoid of universals such as intrinsic value, leaves the human being as only a machine that is denied freedom of will—for freedom is a universal ideal.¹³¹

¹²８ Gilbert and Kuhn, 61-63.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 70-1.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 79-86.

Many Reformers and Counter-reformers saw a deep unity between the universals and the particulars, and acknowledged the power of the arts to express such unity. Martin Luther, for example, championed music as a necessary part of education, and the handmaiden to theology, because only music and theology can still troubled souls. Counter-Reformation art similarly emphasized figures of substance and weight in order to depict an incarnation of God’s glory revealed within the material world. With modernity, however, dualism became dichotomy.

Whereas the Enlightenment tradition began to stress the sovereignty of the senses, the Romantic tradition emphasized the autonomy of the mind. Reacting against romanticism, many began to stress materialism, determinism, and naturalism. It was in this context, that Charles Darwin offered a naturalistic account of history—stressing matter over mind. But from such a theory of knowledge, value and truth claims find little room for justification. As Kierkegaard pointed out, such an abyss can only be overcome by a leap of faith. Aesthetics may find freedom, but only at the expense of absolutes. And so, turning inward, art became a state of mind. Value became a thing of the imaginative mind—the subjective and privatized inner life—while facts became an issue of naturalistic methodologies.

133 Paul Nettle, Luther and Music (Philadelphia, Muhlenberg Press, 1948), 12.
134 Pearcey, 88.
135 Ibid., 147. Still, the aesthetic enjoyment of music was perplexing for Darwin; See Andy Hamilton, Aesthetics and Music (London: Continuum International, 2007), 84.
The Fact-Value Split and Aesthetic Theory

Several philosophers have drawn attention to observable links between the dualistic nature of the Platonic-Aristotelian dialogue—the world of facts vs. the world of values—and historical trends in philosophical thought. Some have focused on ancient trajectories of pre-Socratic uncertainty,138 while others have explored relationships between classical dualism and a new dualism within Renaissance Humanism.139 An increasing number of philosophers and theologians have given particular attention to the dichotomy of sense/mind following the rise of humanism.140 Finally, some have more recently studied the impact of the Enlightenment-Romantic dualistic traditions upon Modernism, Postmodernism, and the linguistic turn that reduced all objective knowledge to mere language games—wherein knowledge refers not to an


understanding of objective, universal truths, but to a familiarity with culturally-determined meanings, values, norms, and narratives.\textsuperscript{141}

Since the postmodern reduction of meaning to mere interpretation undermines the very need for an aesthetic theory, arguably little can be said from such a perspective. The history of aesthetic theory, therefore, is perhaps best understood in light of the dualistic material/immaterial lens that has dominated the history of philosophical thought and resulted in what Quine identified as the dogma of empiricist reductionism. Francis Schaeffer, a twentieth century theologian offered valuable insight into historical trends and trajectories via this lens, which he called the two-story view.\textsuperscript{142} Robert Bowman Jr. summarizes Schaeffer’s case:

The modern dualism eventually broke down and resulted in modern man crossing what he calls the line of despair. This line represents the transition from a culture in which people lived ‘with their romantic notion of absolutes (though with no sufficient logical basis)’ to one in which many people have abandoned belief in absolutes and so have despaired of finding any rational basis for meaning or purpose in life . . . . Modern man, having crossed the line of despair, takes a leap of faith to affirm that life has meaning and purpose because human beings cannot live without such meaning . . . . This ‘leap’ results in a two-storied view of the world. The ‘downstairs’ is the world of rationality, logic, and order; it is the realm of fact, in which statements have content. The ‘upstairs’ is the world of meaning, value, and hope; it is the realm of faith, in which statements express a blind, contentless optimism about life . . . . ‘The downstairs has no relationship to meaning: the upstairs has no relationship to reason’ [emphasis in original].\textsuperscript{143}

---


\textsuperscript{142} See Schaeffer, \textit{The Francis A. Schaeffer Trilogy}.

This shift happens socially and across the disciplines—shifting from philosophy to the arts, and permeating popular culture.\textsuperscript{144} Richard Ramsey calls this the line of uncertainty. “Beginning with certainty, philosophers experience doubt and end in a low of despair and uncertainty. However, it is too painful to live without meaning, so they struggle to escape; they seek a way to be sure of something. Finally, they seem to accept uncertainty and lose interest in the deeper questions of philosophy, while, curiously, beginning to concentrate on ethics.”\textsuperscript{145}

This lens is helpful in understanding the struggle underlying the eventual fact-value split. In the material world, the lower story, there is allegedly only fact and matter; in the value realm, the upper story, one finds private ideals and notions of universals such as objective truth meaning. Pearcey has also identified the fact/value split as underlying sacred/secular tensions.\textsuperscript{146} Sociologist Peter Berger has similarly observed a “dichotomization of social life”\textsuperscript{147}—with scientific (empirically objective) knowledge in the public square, and value reduced to privatized (subjective) preferences. A theory of reality that is not able to ground both sides of the dichotomy ultimately rejects one and dogmatically embraces the other. This lens therefore serves as a unique perspective for understanding and appreciating the history of aesthetics.

For Plato, the arts were an act that engaged the senses for the purpose of directing them into a contemplation of perfection. Aristotle was still concerned with universals, though his emphasis was on the particular experiences—e.g., his ethical theory, while ultimately concerned

\textsuperscript{144} See Schaeffer, \textit{The Francis A. Schaeffer Trilogy}.

\textsuperscript{145} Ramsay, 19.

\textsuperscript{146} Pearcey, \textit{Total Truth}, Amazon Kindle edition, Loc. 542.

with virtue, emphasized an acquisition of such virtue via a habitual conditioning of
temperance. The arts, then, were similarly the practice of imitating the universal of an order
imposed upon the cosmos, and found throughout nature, by emphasizing an order upon the
material via the ability of the mind. Nancy Pearcey summarizes Greek aesthetic philosophy:

No living human body is as perfectly proportioned as a Greek statue. That’s because these
statues do not represent particular individuals but universal ideals or types. Philosophers of
the classical age gave priority to the ideal over the real, the universal over the individual.
They did not assign any dignity or value to the features that make each person unique.
What mattered were the shared features that made up universal human nature.
Individuality was regarded as nothing more than an aberration, an irregularity, a departure
from the ideal. Consciously or not, classical art was reflecting classical philosophy.\textsuperscript{149}

The classical dualism lay in the contemplation of goodness. Was the sensuous nature of matter
only shadow (Platonism), or an evil to be escaped (Neo-Platonism), or could goodness be found
within the natural order of the material world (an Aristotelian approach)? One side emphasized
ideals; the other stressed the material. But both assumed universal, objective values.

Augustine understood the material as valuable; but also, mankind is torn between two
cities. There is value within experience, but ultimate value is grounded within the universal—
God. This was a holistic theory. Following Augustine, many within the Church struggled with a
Neo-Platonic dualism, which advanced asceticism—the flesh was an evil to be escaped. Aquinas
reintroduced an Aristotelian understanding within the unity of a Christian theology. Nature is
valuable because God made it, and in imitating nature, one is able to learn more about God. In
light of this, mankind had seemingly escaped a dualism that depicted the natural world as
inherently evil or insignificant. The holistic unity of mind and body, of universal and particular,
coupled with the humanistic pleasure in expression found perhaps its fullest expression within

\textsuperscript{148} R. Scott Smith, \textit{In Search of Moral Knowledge}, Loc. 665-806.
\textsuperscript{149} Pearcey, \textit{Saving Leonardo}, 79.
the art of the Baroque—though therein abounded many theories concerning form and expression. However, the celebration of such a holistic unity was short lived. For growing out of the Enlightenment, a new dualism was fervently embraced—objective/subjective knowledge.

Concurrent with the push toward much scientific progress, the spirit of the Enlightenment slowly began to encourage the philosophical presumption known as philosophical naturalism. Following the rise of philosophical naturalism, reality was declared to be fundamentally material—the world is all facts; values cannot really be known. Cherishing value, however, the Romantic tradition responded with an assertion of idealism—the notion that reality is fundamentally mental (a realm of ideas).\(^{150}\)

It was Immanuel Kant whose philosophy influenced both Enlightenment and Romantic traditions. For although he stressed that reason “proves” things by grounding them in nature—therefore, universals cannot be proven—this also meant that universals could not be disproved. Kant refused to give up moral value, and so he attributed it to an immaterial practical reason, beyond experience, which legislates a moral law over all individuals. This, however, inevitably led to the rise of existentialism—which asserted that the moral law is not the same for all people; it is, rather, individual—and positivism—which asserted that there is no logical reason to believe in Kant’s *noumenal* realm (the immaterial realm in which said moral law is located).

Seeking unity between the contradicting sides of this fact and value, Kant suggested that nature was fundamentally a perceptual ordering imposed by the human mind.\(^{151}\) The emphasis

\[^{150}\text{Ibid., 90-1; See Immanuel Kant, }The \text{ Critique of Pure Reason, Translated by Kemp Smith (New York: MacMillan, 1929).}\]

upon such an autonomous mind gave way to the rise of existentialism. As Kant had suggested, the alienated self, trapped within a hostile world would simply have to live as if life has meaning and morals matter. While some artists accepted science as the only path to truth—approaching art as an imitation of science and imposition of methodically determined order—Romantics sought spiritual freedom within art as religious experience. This tension was heightened in the twentieth century, as is observable within the extremes of expressionism vs. formalism. Thus continued a longstanding dichotomy—meaning as found within objective form vs. subjective feeling.

The philosophical counterpart to musical aestheticism is striking. Philosophically, the early twentieth century gave way to two revolutionary strands—namely, existentialism and positivism. Both avoided universal reference and past traditions. This period of rejecting past traditions became known as modernism. Stephen Schwartz describes this movement as:

[A] rejection of past traditions, experimentation with new methods and forms; fascination with and anxiety about technology and use of new technical methods; focusing on method, surface, expression, and language . . . . Early analytic philosophers rejected virtually all past philosophy and would only rely on science to provide knowledge . . . . The evolution of analytic philosophy exhibits the conflict between formalism and expressionism that we see in modern art . . . . Modernism is reflected in both an extreme formalism and an ardent expressionism.

---

152 While existentialism is a complex term, for the purpose of understanding the current study it will here be understood succinctly as concerned primarily with affirming the individual’s authenticity of will and value of experience. One’s primary concern, then, does not involve some objective, universal sense of values, but the immediate struggles of individual existence.

153 Pearcey, Saving Leonardo, 99-100.

154 Whereas existentialism stressed individualism, free will, and the subjectivity of value, positivism stressed a staunch materialist empirical methodology.

155 Schwartz, 5.
Following what philosophers call the linguistic turn—the mid-twentieth-century conclusion that truth/meaning is merely the product of individual preference or socio-cultural factors\(^{156}\)—postmodernism embraced wholly a dichotomy of contradiction asserted by the very tradition it despised—i.e., the Enlightenment dichotomy of fact vs. freedom. Existentially, people live as if value language is meaningful. Alas, at the end of the day, postmoderns are accused of having embraced a dehumanizing cultural dichotomy that sees value as defined, and notions of an objective truth as oppressive.\(^{157}\)

In this context, it is no surprise that art was privatized—reduced to an experience of feelings, rather than a subject able to provoke meaningful objective dialogue. Pearcey expounds:

The Enlightenment put the arts and humanities on the defensive. Rationalist critics began to insist that art should be stripped of anything that does not exist in the ordinary, everyday world. They attacked the use of poetic elements, such as the Greek myths with their gods and goddesses. They debunked fantasy and fairytales with their giants, witches, winged horses, enchanted forests, and magic swords. They even criticized figurative language—the use of symbols and metaphor. Why? Because it is not the factual, literal language of science . . . .

All this added up to a staggering assault on the arts. Until this time, the goal of art had been to express truth of some kind . . . .

But now, in a startling turnaround, Enlightenment thinkers began to deny that art had anything to do with truth . . . . Atoms belonged to the realm of objective facts. Beauty was relegated to the realm of subjective values.\(^{158}\)

\(^{156}\) Whereas the postmodern turn, more broadly speaking, involved a socio-cultural skepticism of anything that smacked of absolutes—and therefore a distrust of religious, scientific, and political powers—the philosophical turn within postmodernism refers, more specifically, to the emphasis on knowledge as mind-constructed rather than mind-independent; See R. Scott Smith, Chapters 8-9; See also: Sire, *Naming the Elephant*, Chapter 2.


\(^{158}\) Pearcey, *Saving Leonardo*, 98.
The Two Dogmas of Musical Modernism

Rudolf Radocy and J. David Boyle recapitulate the mainstream historical aesthetic dialogue. Whereas Plato saw the arts as an imitation of the ideal, and Aristotle, more as a revelation of a deeper reality, Rousseau stressed art as expression. French classicists stressed the mathematical formalism, as German romanticism emphasized metaphysical theories of individual creative genius.\(^{159}\) Many thinkers—e.g. Leo Tolstoy—continued to stress the extra-musical values of music.\(^{160}\) Following Romanticism, however, there arose an emphasis on absolute music—music for its own sake.\(^{161}\)

According to Andy Hamilton, “Kant is in some sense a precursor to the aesthetics of form, Hegel of the aesthetics of expression . . . . Both the aesthetics of form and the aesthetics of expression contributed to the ideal of absolute music.”\(^{162}\) Additionally, with the dawn of the public concert scene, there was less need for music to be tied specifically to social function. Although the idea of music as an absolute language can first be seen within the aesthetic theories of Schopenhauer and Wagner, it was Nietzsche’s distaste with external references (e.g. Christian symbolism) that helped solidify music’s status as an absolute end in itself.\(^{163}\) This aesthetic separatism—a romantic notion of music as its own language—led to the doctrine of formalism. Nietzsche’s banner of referential rejection was carried with fervor by the formalists. But if music

\(^{159}\) Radocy and Boyle, 204.

\(^{160}\) Townsend, 204-212.

\(^{161}\) Hamilton, 66-94.

\(^{162}\) Ibid., 70.

\(^{163}\) Radocy and Boyle, 205; and Hamilton, 60-70.
is valuable for its own sake, then its value lies either in its form or in an emotional experience of its expression. Thus began a dichotomy between formalism and expressionism.

Eduard Hanslick (1825-1904) is considered the first staunch advocate of formalism. Attacking Wagner and rejecting program music, Hanslick elevated Brahms as the epitome of true music, and asserted that instrumental music has the only true musical value. The value of music therefore lay in the particulars, as the meaning of music is the dynamic conveying of sound in motion. There is no real musical reference, and feeling is simply an effect of experiencing music’s own special language of sense and logic. Says Hamilton, “Hanslick’s standpoint was widely influential. Twentieth-century musicologists treated formal analysis as essential to the understanding of music, while his treatment of emotion and experience has been widely influential in analytical aesthetics.” Concerning the latter, “Because no cognitive content can be assigned, the temptation has been to regard music as a language of feeling.”

Between the Twentieth-century spirit of anti-traditionalism and strong assertions of philosophical naturalism, supernaturalism began to receive less tolerance. Aesthetic experience came to be seen as a new alternative to the outdated religious belief—which was increasingly dismissed as an outdated, ignorant explanation of aesthetic experience. Formalism increased in popularity, given its ability to address the objective details of art without the difficulties of treading into the issue of personal experience. Clive Bell stressed formalism, but in a way that allowed for this quasi-religious language. Everyday events evoke emotions—these are the


165 Hamilton, 82-3.

166 Townsend, 216-19.
representational experiences—but the emotions evoked via nonrepresentational form constitute an aesthetic experience. The product of art, therefore, is not beauty, but aesthetic emotion. For Bell, this is an end in itself, able to replace religion as the ultimate grounding of value and significance in experience.  

In short, the two dogmas of musical modernism were the assertion of aestheticism—which created a false dichotomy between music as absolute and music as referential—and the presumption of formalism—creating a false dichotomy between form and expression. This shift in emphasis, from a dialogue of music as philosophical insight concerning objective, universal truth, toward a science of beauty, or a cult of non-referential religious-like experiences, curiously coincides with the rise of philosophical naturalism. Following the rise of empirical dogma, aesthetic beauty was reinterpreted as autonomous will and separated from natural properties. The first shift refocused the aesthetic dialogue, from non-natural objectivity to sensory response and perception. The second shift attempted to reject the naturalist reduction of beauty to object or natural process and instead asserted individual subjectivity. Following the 1848 Romantic revolutions, a third shift emphasized aestheticism and a separation of art from pragmatic life—an art-for-art’s-sake perspective that stressed formal elements over representational meaning and separated aesthetic value from other values.

167 Ibid., 255-58.

168 Townsend, 83-6; Radocy and Boyle, 204. A similar coincidental shift occurs in the philosophy of ethical value. See R. Scott Smith, Amazon Kindle edition, Loc., 2575.

169 Townsend, 145-7; Pearcey, Saving Leonardo, 90-100.

170 Hamilton, 85-6. It is significant that art-for-art’s-sake is sometimes called separatism, or separation thesis (p.86).
This set the stage for the North American emphasis upon Aesthetic Education, which was largely influenced by Susanne Langer and John Dewey. As Leonard B. Meyer revealed, Langer and Dewey’s philosophies aligned well within the position of absolute expressionism—a position that Meyer presented as a synthesis of the two sides of the formalist/expressionist dichotomy. Still, reference—in so far as it was understood to relate to any sense of objective, universal truth—was largely avoided. It was Bennett Reimer who predominantly defined the twentieth century music education as aesthetic education enterprise (MEAE). As observed by John Richmond, Bennett Reimer’s *A Philosophy of Music Education* builds largely from his dissertation, which stressed similarities between aesthetic experience and religious experience. Reimer’s dissertation attempts to articulate an Absolute Expressionist position by combining the philosophies of Langer, Dewey, and Meyer with the liberal theology of Paul Tillich, reinforced by Carl Jung’s theories of religious psychology. In his *A Philosophy of Music Education*, Reimer then asserts these theories in the name of Absolute Expressionism, in an effort to avoid

---

171 The MEAE movement began largely as a reaction to musical instrumentalism, which stressed musical value as primarily an educational means to a non-musical/extra-musical end. The push of MEAE, however, toward a universal education, predominantly in absolute music, for the sake of an aesthetic experience for every child becomes questionable concerning justification. Concerning the issue of aesthetic education as a reaction to instrumentalism, see: Charles Leonhard and Robert W. House, “Foundations and Principles of Music Education: Philosophical Foundations of Music Education,” in *Source Readings in Music Education History*, Edited by Michael L. Mark (NY: Schirmer Books, 1982), 228.


the dichotomy between formalism and expressionism, and to justify music education on the sole basis of value within the aesthetic experience itself.\textsuperscript{174}

PHILOSOPHICAL NATURALISM, AESTHETIC THEORY, AND EDUCATION

The rise of philosophical naturalism curiously coincides with a shift in the history of value theory. Concerning aesthetics, the eventual result was the emergent prominence of aestheticism—or an art-for-art’s-sake perspective that (1) separated aesthetic value from moral or other values, and (2) encouraged an emphasis upon formal elements over the consideration of representational meaning.\textsuperscript{175} While many now reject formalism, it is still questionable whether they continue to embrace modernism’s extreme separation of cognitive value from the arts.

Such a reduction of what may be considered objectively true, and the resulting the fact/value split resulted, has directly impacted education as it concerns aesthetics. Is aesthetic meaning only to be understood as relating to the form of the object or the feelings of the subject? Does this not trivialize the aesthetics enterprise? Has music nothing to say of value in the world in a more robust sense than to reduce it to object or experience? Who gets to determine the answer and remove the question from the dialogue? And what if one holds otherwise? Are they removed from the dialogue? And if so, are they still expected to appreciate the dialogue?

With the rise of philosophical naturalism, there was a decrease of interest in beauty as relating to the world in a robustly objective (universal) sense. One distinct mark of modernity was the shift away from cosmological theories of beauty, and beauty as grounded beyond the physical world, and a refocusing upon observation within the natural world, thereby justifying

\textsuperscript{174} Reimer, \textit{A Philosophy of Music Education} (1970).

\textsuperscript{175} Hamilton, 85-6. It is significant that art-for-art’s-sake is sometimes called separatism, separation thesis (p.86).
the arts solely in terms of humanistic desire, aspiration, and rational domination over the natural world.176 This shift continued, with romanticism, onward toward emphasis on the individual.177

Following the emergence of a dual aesthetic within seventeenth and eighteenth century thought—a perceptual division between the intellectual and the sensual,178 there arose three general approaches to the philosophy of aesthetics—expressionism, referentialism, and formalism. While several aesthetic theories existed,179 scholars (including Meyer and Reimer) categorized them into these general viewpoints for the purpose of clarifying basic assumptions concerning the psychological-aesthetic phenomenon.180 These three paradigms have been identified as the primary considerations as to why people listen to music.181 For the absolutist, also called an isolationist, musical value is the result of musical sounds. Absolutists may be formalist or expressionist. For formalism, musical meaning is the result of intellectual perception of formalized structures. Expressionism holds that musical meaning is the result of structural relationships exciting feelings in the listener. In either case, absolutists reduce


177 Abrams, 29-36.


179 Abraham Schwadron observed several philosophical paradigms including: desire and the unconscious (Freud); reason (Santayana); symbolic transformation (Langer); feeling response (Garvin); speculative volition (Stravinsky); logical clarity (Schoenberg); logical imagination (Leichtentritt); and Hindemith’s symbolic craftsmanship. See Schwadron, 33.

180 Radocy and Boyle, 204-205; and Abeles, Hoffer, and Klotman, 73.

181 Abeles, Hoffer, and Klotman, 68.
meaning to something derivative of musical structure. For referentialists, musical meaning goes beyond the sounds themselves—e.g. stories, concepts, actions, etc.\textsuperscript{182}

Influenced by Meyer, Langer, and Dewey, the majority of aesthetic education in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century largely embraced expressionism, with much of the dialogue centered on a dichotomy between pragmatism and absolute expressionism (a synthesis of formalism and expressionism). Sophisticated theories of music expression came from Langer and Dewey. Expressionism is closely tied to John Dewey’s pragmatic views of experience—wherein the flux of life calls forth feelings generated at some time in a person’s past experience.\textsuperscript{183} For Dewey, the artist brings before the conscious mind an experience in which the nature of meaning is in flux and the listener’s feelings are aroused.\textsuperscript{184} Stressing that feelings convey what words cannot say, Langer defined art as a creation of forms that symbolize human feelings; and music, more specifically, the “tonal analogue of emotive life.”\textsuperscript{185}

Many theories of art became primarily built around personal and emotional experience. Art communicates a conception of inward reality—of import, not meaning—and music expresses dynamic forms of feeling—an apparent movement across felt time. Expressionist theories were raised in contrast to formalist theories, which focused solely upon internal relations within the work thereby reducing aesthetic response to a reaction evoked via formal contemplation.\textsuperscript{186}

\textsuperscript{182} Radocy and Boyle, 204-206. The authors identify an additional position called musical relativism, wherein musical meaning is the product of psychological expectation, which is the result of experiencing prolonged familiarity with one’s own cultural orientation.

\textsuperscript{183} Abeles, Hoffer, and Klotman, 70-71.

\textsuperscript{184} Dewey, 15. For more on Dewey’s philosophical influence, see Appendix B.

\textsuperscript{185} Langer, \textit{Feeling and Form}; 40, 27. For more on Langer, see Appendix B.
Leonard B. Meyer held referentialism to be a subset of expressionism. Distinguishing between absolute expressionism and referential expressionism, he described the former as emotive response to the music, and the latter an emotive response to the referential content of music. While he acknowledges extra-musical reference, he ultimately argues for absolute expressionism—which he sees as a successful synthesis of formalism and expressionism.\textsuperscript{187}

Embracing the absolute expressionist view, Bennett Reimer championed an aesthetic education of feeling, while David Elliott rejected this notion, insisting that music education is instead a pragmatic experience of knowing gained via doing. The Reimer/Elliott dichotomy, however, lies within only one position—namely, expressionism. The contemporary emphasis of music education in the U.S. seems to have been primarily on formalism or expressionism, while theories of reference and classical theories of \textit{mimesis}\textsuperscript{188} seem to have been deemed problematic. Reimer was skeptical of reference. But why is this?

Said Reimer, “The major function of art is to make objective and therefore accessible the subjective realm of human responsiveness. Art does this by capturing and presenting in its intrinsic qualities the patterns and form of human feeling . . . . Education in the arts, then, can be regarded as the education of feeling.”\textsuperscript{189} Feeling is certainly an aspect of experience, and therefore of knowing. However, the reduction of aesthetic experience to feeling is questionable. Whether this can stand as a comprehensive theory for education will depend largely upon what


\textsuperscript{187} Meyer, \textit{Emotion and Meaning in Music}. It seems to have been presumed, however, that referential value is only emotive and not substantive. For more on Meyer, see Appendix B.


such feelings mean, what an aesthetic experience means, and whether such is an end in itself or an experience wherein one is able to sense true universal value beyond the experience. Why is this important? If one’s theory is unable to ground the truth of value beyond the experience as an end in itself, then one will find difficulty justifying a universal education convincingly. To be clear, there are many ways to justify an approach to education within a localized context; but to justify education as universally valuable requires reference to a standard beyond the experience.

Elliot Eisner has offered considerable insight concerning the relationship between objective knowing and subjective experience, between higher-order thinking and visual imagination. He describes the link between theoretical cognition and imagination as imaginative extrapolation—“using what one sees to generate theoretical interpretations that give the particular situation a fresh significance.”190 Also, “Language, severed from semantics, is without meaning, and while images do not accompany every thought carried by language, our language refers to referents we are able to experience, recall, or imagine . . . . Our cognitive life depends upon experience.”191

In Eisner’s assessment, experience is understood as pivotal to knowledge, and yet it is not robbed of its extra-experiential reference.192 Aesthetic knowledge involves both knowledge of the world and knowledge of the aesthetic experience; and it is our knowledge of meaning in the world that drives us to seek meaning within the experience. Musical beauty is too complex to be reduced to a common observation (e.g. formalism) and similarly more meaningful than simply


191 Ibid., 106.

192 Ibid., 37.
writing it off as determined by the subjective experience. Feelings and motivations are complex, and people listen to a given work for different reasons and in different ways, given different contexts. Still, if anything is truly beautiful, such requires awareness of an external standard.

As the field of aesthetics is closely related to ethics, the following presuppositional distinctions will help to consider more carefully what is meant, or presumed, when speaking of value. Value theories can be divided into cognitive and noncognitive presuppositions. Strong philosophical naturalism embraces a non-cognitive stance wherein value claims—statements concerning beauty or goodness—have no truth-value. Meaning is therefore emotive or expressive, but not factual. Cognitivism holds that value claims—statements of beauty or goodness—do have truth-value, and it is possible to know what the truth is. There are still helpful distinctive presuppositions, however. Cognitive naturalism represents a form of weak philosophical naturalism, wherein value claims are describable in factual terms. These, however, refer to—they are reducible to—natural properties or empirically observable relationships. Cognitive naturalism includes subjectivism (value is determined by the subjective individual), conventionalism/social constructivism (value is determined by the constructs of the social context), and objective naturalism (value is determined by external physical realities or relationships), and various mixes of these positions.

In addition to cognitive naturalism, however, there is also cognitive non-naturalism. In this case, value claims (e.g. ‘X is beautiful’) are understood to have truth content because beauty and goodness are understood to be a reflection of some immutable truth or standard. Amidst pragmatic experience, one is exposed to such reflections and therefore able to know that such a thing as beauty and/or goodness does in fact exist. Cognitive non-naturalism includes views
such as intuitionism (i.e., justified knowledge via value intuition), supernaturalism (knowledge via revelations acquired through spiritual experiences) and theism—a combination of the two.¹⁹³

The aesthetic dialogue tends to fall victim to a sort of scholarly double-speak: the arts are on the one hand referenced as a truly valuable humanistic endeavor (which implies an objective standard of value); and on the other hand reduced to a sort of experience, wherein the notion of any reference to objective truth beyond the art object bespeaks a category error. A cognitive theory of art—the view that the arts somehow reveal truth about the world—therefore requires sound justification. Attempts to justify cognitive aesthetics tend to fall into three categories. Some argue that art gives us philosophical knowledge via a prompting of critical discourse on aesthetic perspectives. Others insist that art provides an experiential knowledge—broadening one’s awareness of the human experience (the ways in which one knows the world), and thereby increasing one’s potential sources of insight. Still others have embraced a more promising position, called neocognitivism. Rather than insisting that the art object offers new knowledge,

¹⁹³ For more on the distinctions between cognitive naturalism and cognitive non-naturalism, see Pojman, 155. The current study has labored to include sources that are able to speak to each of these presuppositions. Strong naturalism is represented well by Ayer and Russell. Nietzsche, Putnam, and others represent weak naturalism. Renowned theologians (e.g. Francis Schaeffer) and philosophers of religion (e.g. Groothuis and Moreland) will represent the theistic position. A theistic case for aesthetics represents a view of reality that holds goodness, truth, value, and aesthetic beauty to be intricately linked with religious belief in God or gods, known via natural revelation (e.g., value intuitionism) and/or special revelation (e.g., knowledge via spiritual experiences). Value intuition needs qualification; while many value intuitionists are also theists (e.g. C. S. Lewis), there are cases in which one is convinced that value intuition trumps philosophical naturalism, but one is not yet ready to commit to a position of theism (e.g. Nagel, *Mind and Cosmos*). Still, since theism is able to represent both intuitionism and supernaturalism, it will serve well as the default representative for non-naturalism—though both theists and non-theists will be cited in reference to value intuitionism.
the neocognitivist holds that art engages and transforms what knowledge one already has, thereby offering an occasion to deepen an understanding of what one already feels and knows.¹⁹⁴

At this point, some questions arise in prefacing our investigation of Reimer. Non-cognitivism reduces value to emotional utterance, and a course in music appreciation would therefore find no grounds for justification. Cognitive naturalism allows for value language, but arguably trivializes aesthetic education, as the justification for appreciation becomes questionable if beauty and value hold no larger significance. First, does Reimer defend cognitivism and, if so, how? If he is a cognitivist, a second concern follows: to what extent does Reimer’s philosophy allow for a cognitive non-naturalist perspective as opposed to cognitive naturalism? To what extent is Reimer’s philosophy justifiable to the value intuitionist?

As a robust philosophy for MEAE would need to be able to consider all perspectives, if Reimer is unable to offer a philosophy that speaks satisfactorily to the issue of value intuition, then his philosophy as the leading example of aesthetic education will need revisiting. This is because it is important to advocates of aesthetics—and especially value intuitionists—to know whether opponents of the MEAE movement are in fact attacking a comprehensive philosophy for music education as aesthetic education, or instead, the artifact bearing Reimer’s name that has come to be labeled as the definitive view of what MEAE must look like.

Where does Reimer fall? Is he absolute expressionist all the way down? Or does his philosophy attempt to articulate a theory in which music offers cognitive meaning beyond felt musical experience as an end in and of itself? Does Reimer’s aesthetic philosophy allow for the broad coverage of the neocognitive perspective? Does he at least encourage aesthetics as philosophical discourse, or does he reduce it entirely to the felt experience of given objects?

Returning to the initial question, is it necessarily the case that music education must stress either formalism or expressionism? The emphasis on subjective feeling would seem to undermine any justification for a universal education, while formalism appears elitist. Moreover, both positions seem to be circular in justification. Neither is able to ground value beyond the object itself or the subjective self. Formalism reduces value to the object, while expressionism reduces value to the subjective experience. On the other hand, meaningful reference to, or imitation of, a meaningful world appears to be, for education, undeniably essential. Even when memory dominates pedagogy, meaning is essential to memory. Reference, however, seems to receive little consideration—especially, reference to any sense of universal truth. But why is this so? Might this be the result of a fact-value bias?

Rather than embrace the deconstruction of a robust reference (to beauty and value) to a referent only of subjective experience or objective form, Morris Abrams has observed that art theory actually seems to pivot from a sense of reference in four ways: reference to work; artist; audience; and universe. He contends that a more holistic approach to aesthetics—to the question of beauty and value—would involve all of these. Abrams’s work provokes consideration of the notion that, perhaps the prominence of a more robust heritage of value theory preceding the Enlightenment is not a merely antiquated detail, but a significant one.

Reimer’s absolute expressionist language appears, at face value, to have fallen subject to a philosophical naturalistic reduction—reducing beauty and goodness to the product of an experience, with no rich reference beyond. But it would be premature to draw such a conclusion definitively without closer assessment. The need for such an evaluation is therefore warranted.


196 Abrams, 3-6.
The remaining chapters will evaluate Reimer’s philosophical language in light of philosophical naturalism and the fact/value split, in order to assess whether his aesthetic theory allows for a robust understanding of value language, or whether it restricts aesthetic education to a reductionist\(^{197}\) understanding of value.

\(^{197}\) Whereas a non-naturalist may believe in beauty or value as reflecting universal, immutable truths, philosophical naturalists reduce value to behavior, emotion, or human construction.
CHAPTER IV:
REIMER’S AESTHETIC PHILOSOPHY

Bennett Reimer’s *A Philosophy of Music Education* has shaped a great deal of music education philosophy in the United States. It has been translated into several languages and sold around the world, and the impact of his philosophy is indeed no insignificant matter. The question, however, remains: Has Reimer successfully justified the assertion that music education should be a part of the general education curricula?

There is no questioning the fact that Reimer was both productive and influential concerning music education methodology, and there is no doubt that he has contributed greatly to MENC (now NAfME) as well as to numerous professional publications. This research, however, involves neither his success nor his approach to methodology. This study involves the question of whether Reimer’s philosophical position is able to justify convincingly the aesthetic value of music as it is applicable to all students, and therefore worthy of their academic attention. This research does not question that music is valuable. A satisfactory grounding for musical value, however, will suggest many things concerning whether and why such education is warranted in the first place. What is it about the experience of music that warrants the need for that child’s academic attention? If people already value music, why ought they study an academic approach to music? In short, a universal education implies a universal value. Is Reimer able to ground such a universal value?
As aesthetic education claims to answer this question, and Reimer has become the predominant representative of Music Education as Aesthetic Education, our questions for Reimer are as follows: What is music’s aesthetic value? Why is it valuable? What does it mean for an experience to be an aesthetic experience? Why is such an experience necessary or valuable? Additionally, concerning the interests of this research, we must also ask: Is Reimer a cognitivist or non-cognitivist—i.e., does he hold that the arts yield real knowledge, or only behavioral stimuli? Is Reimer a naturalist or non-naturalist—i.e., does he see the world as only matter, with no real objective truth beyond, or does he hold that there are universal, objective truths beyond the material world? This chapter will seek to represent Reimer’s position, concerning these questions. Reimer’s primary work, *A Philosophy of Music Education*, went through three editions, spanning approximately three decades. This chapter will therefore present Reimer’s position from within each of these editions.

A 1970 PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC EDUCATION

Reimer prefaces his first edition (1970) by positing that human beings long for a depth of experience, and the arts are able to contribute uniquely to human self-understanding. Music educators therefore need an understanding of aesthetic value, so that they can share that value with others. At this point it is still unclear what said value is and how it is shared. According to Reimer, the value of music education is determined by the value of music.\(^\text{198}\)

Reimer champions a unified philosophy because philosophical presuppositions unavoidably influence one’s educational philosophy. Concerning the question of why a universal education in music is warranted, Reimer holds that this is because music is a

fundamental way of being conscious about reality. He observes that the Progressive movement successfully expanded the role of education to include the social, and not solely the formal education. But this unfortunately “also led to a decline in emphasis on teaching subjects for their inherent value.” The point of music education, he thinks, rather than stressing extra-musical values, should be to help children understand the nature of music. Why is this? So that they can share with others the insights into reality, found within the musical experience.

Appealing to the theories of Leonard B. Meyer, he posits three possible views for addressing aesthetic education in the current context: absolute formalism; absolute expressionism; and referentialism. Reimer first concedes that there are no immutable truths in aesthetic experience. He points out that Marxist aesthetics is irrelevant to American education. Seeing such socialist realism as the clearest example of referentialism, he faults it for plummeting art to a socio-political servitude.

Reimer also accuses modernist referentialism of reducing value to identifiable emotional messages. Here he attacks Tolstoy’s theory of emotional reference. For Tolstoy, good art is that which transmits specific emotions, and good emotions are those that foster a sense of love for God and neighbor. Reimer rejects such a position because, therein, art must be evaluated based upon non-artistic subject matter. Additionally, Reimer rejects Deryck Cooke’s theory of symbolic conventional referents—e.g., major intervals as representing joy, and minor intervals as

199 Ibid., 7.

200 Ibid., 12-15.

representing misfortune. Ultimately, Reimer rejects referentialism because, he says, it reduces musical value to non-artistic values.

He also rejects formalism, because there can be no meaning beyond the sounds themselves. The musical experience therein is principally an intellectual engagement. He sees the very idea of a “discipline” and the study of “fundamentals” as being, at base, formalist, and so he acknowledges an aspect of value within the position. However, he concludes, “It is not possible to regard art, with the Formalist, as an intellectual exercise. Surely art is intimately connected to life rather than totally distinct from it.”

Reimer therefore spends the rest of his work presenting a third theory—absolute expressionism, which, he insists, includes elements of both referentialism and formalism. Providing a helpful overview, he explains:

First, and most basic, is the clear distinction between Absolutism and Referentialism. The Absolute Expressionist agrees with the Absolute Formalist that the meaning and value of art are to be found in the aesthetic qualities of art works. In this there is an irreconcilable conflict with the Referentialist view of art’s meaning as a function of subject matter. But while the Expressionist cannot accept the non-artistic meaning as central to art, it also cannot accept the Formalist notion of the intellectual, removed-from-life nature of aesthetic experience. How can it be maintained that the experience of art is aesthetic experience, that art’s meaning is aesthetic meaning, that art’s value is aesthetic value, and at the same time claim that art can exert a strong effect on the quality of human life? . . . First, the nature of art as art must be affirmed. Second, the relation of art to life must be recognized.

Reimer’s entire philosophy is built upon a significance that is gained via the sharing of musical meaning; aesthetic quality is likened to a quality inherent within all of human experience. Sharing in this experience is therefore sharing in the experience of humanness. The relationship between felt artistic qualities and that of human experience is therefore perceived as


203 Ibid., 25.
“significance.” The sharing of significant qualities of human experience provides a deeper sense of humanness. He reiterates several times that aesthetic experience is an experience of life at the deepest level significance, and he clarifies that such is found primarily within the artwork.

But what exactly is the value of such an experience? To this question, Reimer replies; “The arts may be conceived as a means to self-understanding, a way by which a human’s sense of nature can be explored, clarified, grasped.”204 The point, then, of an aesthetic experience is to “signify the humanizing value of self-knowledge.”205 He insists that few values are deeper than this, and that the arts are among the most successful means of realizing this value. But Reimer stresses that while self-knowledge is gained, music is not a language. He finds it necessary to distinguish between feeling and emotion. His intent is to focus on the felt experiences of subjective reality. Reimer is certain that feeling is ineffable; it cannot be named.

The purpose of art is to objectify “the subjective realm of human responsiveness.”206 The value of aesthetic education, then, is the enrichment of one’s quality of life via deeper insight into the nature of feeling. Education involves the sharing of meanings about humanity. But this does not necessarily mean, Reimer believes, that meanings are external. Expressive forms cannot provide knowledge about the factual world, he insists. “The expressiveness of an art-symbol is contained in its aesthetic qualities rather than being pointed to in something outside itself . . . . Art-symbol meanings are available only through an immediate apprehension of quality, and such apprehension is essentially a private adventure.”207 He describes the all-at-

204 Ibid.
205 Ibid., 26.
206 Ibid., 28.
once quality of art symbols, experienced in felt time, as a presentational form rather than
discursive intellectualization.

Expressive form presents meanings in the form of a deeper knowledge of the human
experience. Artworks should therefore always be approached as such. The purpose of aesthetic
education, then, is to help others share the meanings acquired via expressive forms. “Music as
expressive form is the be-all and end-all of music education,” he says, “for such an experience is
the only way of sharing music’s aesthetic meaning.” At this point, the meaning of “sharing”
needs clarification. But Reimer offers little clarity; aesthetic sharing is a quality of experience
that is unidentifiable, but allows one to know and share one’s humanity more fully.

Reimer’s theory of experience is built upon the observation that living things all share the
variable of an interaction with one’s environment. Secondly, Humans are capable of perceiving
movement as significant, and transforming a sense of significance into expressive forms. He
finally acknowledges his position as a biological foundation for aesthetic experience based on
the theories of Dewey and, especially, Langer. This is helpful in explaining why Reimer’s
notion of external reference seems to be limited primarily to the socio-cultural contexts within a
material world. Value cannot therefore lie beyond the context or formal object. Reimer’s only
other option, then, is the experience itself. He says:

One important characteristic of aesthetic experience is intrinsicality . . . . The value of
the experience comes from its own, intrinsic, self-sufficient nature. Aesthetic experience
is not a means toward non-aesthetic experience and serves no utilitarian purpose. It is

---

207 Ibid., 63.
208 Ibid., 69.
209 Ibid., 73-5.
experience for the sake of the experience in and of itself, unlike practical experience, the value of which is that it produces something other than itself.\footnote{210}

He asserts that it can only be intrinsic if removed from instrumental\footnote{211} concerns, and enjoyed for itself. And the aesthetic experience always involves the qualities of a perceptible object.

Reimer insists that aesthetic education must influence students’ ability to have aesthetic experiences, and this can be accomplished by teaching aesthetic perception amidst contexts that promote aesthetic reactions. He calls this enhanced skill, aesthetic sensitivity. Aesthetic experience is not about making judgments, he says. Art is not for mere liking, but for the sharing of its insight into self-knowledge. One shares art’s power by experiencing it. Experienced aesthetically, an artwork provides a unique delight with which few human experiences can compare. Says Reimer, “To share that delight, which is the delight of understanding more fully that nature of human reality, is the important job of aesthetic education.”\footnote{212}

It is undeniable that the experience of music itself is of the utmost value to Reimer’s position. He once again attacks referential values as being non-music or anti-music education. He insists, “Teach children non-aesthetically, and they will learn to be non-aesthetic. Teach them aesthetically, and they will learn . . . to be more aesthetically sensitive.”\footnote{213} At this point, there is some confusion, however. If aesthetic experience is essential to human experience, then

\footnote{210}{Ibid., 75.}
\footnote{211}{This refers to the use of music education as a means to a non-musical end, rather than as an end to be valued in and of itself.}
\footnote{212}{Ibid., 85.}
\footnote{213}{Ibid., 95.}
(1) why must aesthetic experience be taught; and (2) why should one believe Reimer’s assertion that a lack of aesthetic education will result in becoming non-aesthetic?

Reimer continues to build his case for value within the experience as an end in itself, by appealing to Meyer’s psychological theory of anticipation, frustration, and fulfillment as the most convincing explanation of the process of experiencing organized sound. Reimer Says, “When a system of sound-relationships—a piece of music—is experienced aesthetically, the tonal matrix of tensions and resolutions produce tensions and resolutions within the experiencer, and these are ‘significant’ because they are analogous to the modes of feeling.”214 This, he contends, produces “a sense of oneness with the music.”215

Concerning the question of why students must be taught to perceive, Reimer holds that many people find many types of music to be meaningless because they are ignorant of stylistic details, and cannot therefore perceive aural coherence. The universality of music, for Reimer, seems to be the fact that it can be shared, because it is a common means by which humans seek to express an embodied form of felt experience. This raises a fair question. If aesthetic experience is a universal feature of humanity, why then the need for music listening instruction—i.e., why cannot the popular music of any given cultural context offer the same experience? Reimer’s response is that pop music exists not to serve aesthetic purposes primarily, but the psychological and social needs of teen-agers.216

214 Ibid., 100.
215 Ibid., 99.
216 Ibid., 102-3.
By the second edition of his book (1989), Reimer’s philosophy may not have gone unchallenged, but no other philosophical position had made its way into the limelight. So Reimer largely reiterated his former position, this time attempting to qualify and expound upon previously ambiguous language—as the meaning of ‘aesthetic’ had been one of the main issues raised—in order to defend more thoroughly his position. His position remained essentially as it had been. While music has many important nonartistic functions, its value lies within the musical experience; “when music, with its universal appeal to the human mind and heart, is bypassed or weakened in favor of nonmusical emphases . . . we have betrayed the art we exist to share.” ²¹⁷ He clarifies that he equates “aesthetic” with “artistic,” “intrinsic,” and “musical,” but he does not explain why he equates the “nature” of music with the “value” of music.

He articulates his belief that the values of music education are fundamental to social order and visions of the good life. The contribution of music education is therefore an attempt to reach to the core of human valuing—i.e., meaning as it is found within self-knowledge and satisfaction. His guiding thesis remained that “the essential nature and value of music education are determined by the nature and value of the art of music.” ²¹⁸

Reimer begins his work, as he had in 1970, with an emphasis on the importance of a unified philosophy. He believes that the profession is desperate for a sense of meaning for their professional lives, and that a philosophy can provide such meaning. His primary concern, then, seems to be an educational philosophy that is able to ground one’s sense of purpose in one’s own profession. Two things are needed then: a convincing base for valuing music education, and the


²¹⁸ Ibid., xvi-1.
need for undergraduate education to stress the study of philosophy. In short, if the experience of music is deeply meaningful to the human experience, then sharing that experience is a deeply meaningful purpose of the teaching profession. The purpose, he says, of a professional philosophy is to explain why one’s work really matters. Such a philosophy should be considered before entering into one’s profession. Reimer’s task is therefore to ground the experience of music as deeply meaningful to the human experience.

Herein lies the core question: what is the value of music education? Secondary values, he insists, are not the point of music education, because all subjects can yield secondary values. Rather, “music and the arts are unique in the values they offer, and these values are so fundamental to any notion of the good life as to be unquestionable in their necessity.”\(^{219}\) Reimer holds a position of music as having a special cognitive status. “That which humans know from art that is knowable only from art.”\(^{220}\) The majority of this edition presents the same explanation as his first edition, but with added commentary and further clarification.

Reimer once more depicts a dichotomy between the formalists and the referentialists, insisting that; Absolute expressionism seems to be the most attractive position. He contends that arts education is essential for children, but that referentialism is unable to speak to the arts’ uniqueness. He concedes that the appeal of referential meaning as educational is convincing, but he takes issue nonetheless with the fact that one no longer needs art in order to share referential meanings. Reimer concludes:

> Absolute Expressionists disagree with Referentialists on two fundamental issues: (1) where you go to get what art gives and (2) what you get when you go there. While Referentialism insists that you must go outside the work, Absolute Expressionism insists that meaning and value are internal; they are functions of the artistic qualities themselves

\(^{219}\) Ibid., 9.

\(^{220}\) Ibid., 12.
and how they are organized . . . References are always transformed and transcended by the internal artistic form. The artistic meaning and value is always and essentially above and beyond whatever referents happen to exist in a work.

. . . Reference, while influential, is never the point, according to Absolute Expressionism. References are only part of the larger internal whole, and the experience of the work is always both larger than and different from any of its parts. 221

Formalists, on the other hand, separate art from the values shared by all people, thereby reducing it to an elitist matter of taste:

Absolute Expressionists agree with the Absolute Formalists about where you go . . . But Expressionists include nonartistic influences and references as one part of the interior while Formalists exclude them. As to the matter of what you get . . . Expressionists do not agree with the Formalists that the experience is an intellectual one—an experience only or primarily linked to the special emotion given by pure form. The Expressionist part of the position connects the experience of art with feeling. 222

The absolute expressionist sees the arts as a special sort of cognitivism—yielding cognitive experiences that are meaningful in ways limited solely to such experiences. Such experiences are therefore necessary for all people, he says, “If their essential humanness is to be realized.” 223 Reimer posits that inner thought is too fluid to control by thinking inwardly. There is therefore a need for a sort of symbolic transformation—i.e., the transformation of an internal experience into an external symbolic system, in order to objectify felt experience and fix one’s attention upon a symbolic form. Reimer sees this capacity for symbolic transformation as one of the most important characteristics of human beings. 224

221 Ibid., 27-8.

222 Ibid., 28.

223 Ibid., 28-9.

224 Ibid., 30.
Reimer attempts to establish music’s value within the special felt experience, upon the descriptive observation that all cultures acknowledge a special relation between feeling and the arts. Just as writing, and reading the writings of others, broadens and deepens one’s reasoning, creating and experiencing art broaden and deepen one’s feeling. He reasons that, since human beings continuously feel, and the subjectivity of feeling is not logically organized, but, rather, in a state of dynamic flux, that feeling therefore cannot be reasoned out. The value, then, lies in the felt experience of embodied feeling. One becomes enabled “to feel reflectively about the feeling itself.”

Reimer here takes care to address more thoroughly the distinction of emotion from feeling. Emotions, he contends, are word categories meant to vaguely represent subjective experiences. Our felt experiences are too complex as to become effable. Sharing in the experience of an artwork’s expressive qualities is therefore, says Reimer, taking part in the very qualities that constitute human experience. This, he says, is perceived as significance. Reimer’s position becomes an existential twist on Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am;” suggesting, instead, “I feel, therefore I am.”

The significance of felt experience seems to be the sense that life is meaningful. Reimer insists that art is linked to the depth of life’s significance. Sharing the special qualities of artistic experiences creates “a deeper sense of the nature of human life as sentient.” He is convinced that this represents all of the justification that music needs; it is self-justifying:

If any experience in human life can be valued intrinsically—for the sheer, sweet sake of the experience itself and our capacity to be aware that we can experience our aliveness—then surely artistic experience is of this sort . . . . To ask what the value of such experience might be is like asking what the value of the experience of love might be. To

---

225 Ibid., 31-34.

226 Ibid., 52.
experience love is to be profoundly what we as humans are capable of being. That is a value requiring no other to justify or explain it. It is the same with artistic experiencing, which raises to the highest possible levels our capacity to experience for the sheer sake of being experiencing creatures. To require other justification is, in a way, to demean the very nature of the human condition.  

Reimer appeals to humanity’s self-knowledge as one of the most significant values available.  

Reimer appears to think that self-knowledge is the phenomenon that imbues humanity with value, and anything that engages one’s sense of self-awareness is therefore valuable. He likens such an experience to spiritual experience. A spiritual experience “is ‘vertical’ in its affect: it is rich with knowing as a singular presence rather than as a horizontal commonality with similar things . . . . Experiences of art also yield this verticality of the ‘now’ felt as significance. But this comes from a structural presentation embodied in materials.”  

Reimer calls the mind’s ability to process complex structures within art “intuition,” and he insists that it can be developed via arts education. Perhaps building on his concept of experience as spiritual, he distinguishes between knowledge about and knowledge of. Concepts represent knowledge about something, and, he asserts, never any knowledge of an experience. To the contrary, says Reimer, artworks present knowledge of an experience, but are never “about” anything. Because we continuously engage perceptual meaning within lived experiences, Reimer sees the arts as human beings’ highest developed mode for cognitive structuring. At this point, it begins to sound as if Reimer is bent toward a naturalistic presumption. Since many people differ on the definition of an aesthetic experience, Reimer clarifies what he means by the term. He defines it as the special experience “that the arts exist to

__________________________

227 Ibid., 52-3.

228 Ibid., 82.
provide,” and the product of aesthetic perception coupled with aesthetic reaction. He reiterates that the experience of music’s expressive form is “the be-all and end-all” of aesthetic meaning, and therefore of music education.

At this point, Reimer perhaps realizes that his position seems more favorable to the formalist than to the referentialist, given its emphasis on attention to symbolic form. He attempts to clarify his concern, and then draw in some connections for those whose interests lie in ethical references. First, he clarifies his foremost concern; one’s attention should be focused so as to arouse a reaction that fosters an aesthetic experience.”

Music is only referential in the broad sense that references function as nonmusical experiences. He acknowledges that the visual or literary imagination may be stirred by music, but he stresses that these intrasubjective experiences are only remotely related to the music itself.

Reimer attempts to appease those concerned with references by drawing a connection between aesthetic experience and ethics. He says, “Morality in art, like meaning in art, has little if anything to do with the nonaesthetic content of art . . . . What then is morality? Simply put, it is the genuineness of the artist’s interaction with his materials. The moral dimension of art, says Reimer, is not morality in an objective sense; it is a subjective sense of choice within freedom. It is not about extramusical reference, but authenticity. Music educators therefore do not teach morality. This is done by the music experience itself. That is, music fosters a deeper sense of authenticity.
In the third edition of his philosophical opus (2003)—printed after David Elliott’s *Music Matters*—Reimer presents the same position as before, but attempts to offer a more exhaustive explanation. He makes it clear that his philosophy is founded, “as it has always been, on [his] belief in the power of musical experience, in its many manifestations, to deepen, broaden, and enhance human life.” He offers the same grounding for philosophical unity as before; the value that one holds for one’s profession will ultimately effect one’s perception of self-worth.

Reimer now claims that when he uses the term, “aesthetics,” he is using it “in the broadest possible sense, encompassing all past and present philosophical discourse on the entire range of issues related to aesthetics and philosophy of art.” Still, he distinguishes between music-making roles, as “artistic,” and listening, responding, and critiquing roles as “aesthetic.” He still holds that aesthetic education presents ineffable meanings acquired only within aesthetic experiences. Although this experience involves mind, body, and feeling, and incorporates a variety of universal and individual meanings, these are derived only via the experience of sound. The acquisition of music’s special meanings is only available via direct experience, and education helps to cultivate the sensitivities necessary for such special experiences.

There are a few noticeable differences in Reimer’s third edition. First, Reimer devotes a significant portion of his preliminary introduction to an assessment of Postmodernism. This edition is perhaps best known for its synergistic proposal of reconciliation. Also, Reimer treats the formal/referential distinction somewhat differently this time. Further, he devotes more

---


234 Ibid., 7.
explanation to the separation of reason from emotion, to which he had previously alluded only briefly. Also in this edition, he expands the efforts of his second edition, in speaking to the relationship between ethics and morality. He moreover expands his detail of explanation concerning the issue of musical knowing. Finally, he attempts to reconcile the dichotomy between value relativism and absolutism, by positing what he calls a synergistic theory of the universal value of music. Each of these points will be addressed in turn.

Postmodernism and Synergism

Reimer this time understands that it is unavoidable to speak into a postmodern context about the supposed value of a largely modernist enterprise without addressing the tensions, and possible common ground, between these two schools of thought. This, he insists, is one example of why it is important for educators to familiarize themselves with philosophy—and the philosophical issues of the day. This, he fears, means that education can become caught up in the spirit of the times—in this case, postmodernism.

Although he had posited philosophical positions as little more than contextual in his second edition, he seems to believe, by his third, that there is certainly an extent to which an educational philosophy cannot solely rest upon the spirit of the context. He finds it necessary to distinguish between modernism and postmodernism, and to present his philosophy in a way that attempts to appease complementary concerns between them. He admits his intolerance for postmodernism’s rejection of music’s universal essence. He paints the dichotomy between modernism and postmodernism as being the difference between seeing truth as absolute (modern) vs. asserting truth to be relative (postmodern). Postmodernists suspect reason as gendered, and insist that there are no universal principles. Postmodernists therefore propose no
solutions since knowledge is uncertain. Reimer rightfully suspects that postmodernism is not an issue of the new tradition vs. the old tradition; it is rather a new assertion stemming from an old dispute; and each tradition need not therefore define the other.

But Reimer then asserts that there is no real objective universal truth; there is only the universal of shared humanness.\textsuperscript{235} In holding to this fact, he observed that he is in agreement with postmodernists. Favoring modernism’s certainty that knowledge is possible, however, Reimer also holds that many postmodern ideas about the arts are found within modernism, as well. He therefore feels that reconciliation is possible.

His main point of contention is a postmodern reduction of artistic value, wherein it is merely determined by its service to political agendas. This is largely because there is no standard for goodness, given postmodernism. Another postmodern position with which Reimer takes issue is the notion that the consumers of the arts create just as much as the artists (so that there is no real interpretation), and that those artists are merely the mediators of cultural meanings. What then, asks Reimer, would allow us to distinguish between good and bad artworks, and what would it mean to make a performance better?

Acknowledging the possibility of traditionalist elitism, he labors to find a point of reconciliation. He claims that we can appreciate the postmodernist’s skepticism, because, “We can agree that universal, ultimate truths are human inventions while also recognizing the need for and possibility of reaching better clarity in matters that concern human well-being . . . . In many fundamental respects humans share characteristics, such as being musical, that are innate,

\textsuperscript{235} Ibid., 27.
transcultural, and transhistorical.”

Reimer claims that an imperfect theory of truth is more productive than aggressive skepticism. Therefore, he suggests a middle ground between authoritarianism and skepticism, wherein a unity might be found. He terms this middle ground, “synergy.” He considers Estelle Jorgensen’s emphasis upon a dialectical view that seeks to, in her words, “recognize tensions in need of resolution, and hope that through dialogue these tensions can be worked through and either reconciled or tolerated.” This allows teachers and students to explore alternatives and search for common ground between them prior to excluding either option. Reimer thinks that this might be something like what he calls synergism, but he says that he is not entirely certain. The remainder of the work attempts to reiterate his same position, but via this synergistic lens.

Form, Reference, and Context

Returning to an old debate, it is interesting to note that Reimer has omitted the term referentialism in his third edition. He instead paints a tension between formalism and contextualism. But, given his language, it seems as though he has equated referentialism with contextualism. Reference, however, does not necessarily have to be contextual—e.g. ancient mimetic theories attempted to imitate the perfection of cosmic order. He acknowledges Kant as having had some influence upon formal emphases, and admits that sounds must constitute a part of musical meaning. Concerning attacks against the formalist position of music for music’s sake

236 Ibid., 27.
237 Jorgensen, In Search of Music Education, 34.
as elitist, Reimer calls this a misunderstanding that is both extreme and erroneous because many people actually do enjoy music for the simple pleasure that music offers. Restricting this experience solely to western music, however, is elitist, he admits. He nevertheless believes that the core of music is the power of sounds to embody human experience. Musical form is the root of musical experience, and gives a sense of tangibility to feeling.

By the time of his third edition, the aesthetic/praxial debate had arisen, and Reimer had now had several years to consider the charges of his former student, David Elliott. Reimer claims that he had rejected formalism in prior editions, but that he had also acknowledged a contribution that it makes in identifying form as an important part of the musical experience. Reimer claims, therefore, that Elliott misrepresented this view as formalist, and was therefore easily able to posit an antidote—that one must choose an emphasis either on form or praxis. So, Reimer attempts to present his position, once again.

Still limiting reference to the practical context, Reimer attempts to posit his philosophy as a synergistic position between the extremes of formalism and the various pragmatic concerns of music education—praxis (music as a process) and social agency, or contextualism. Concerning formalism and praxialism, he concludes, “Process (praxis) and product (form), each dependent on the other, are necessary components of the experience-based philosophy I will propose.”

Reimer spends some time addressing the issue of social agency. The points with which he takes issue are basically the same as those given in prior editions for his rejection of referentialism. Seeking synergism between formalism and his newly termed contextualism, he claims; “Contextualists, in their focus on social and political significance, make an invaluable

---

contribution, balancing the overly internal concentration of formalism.” Still, he continues, formalist and contextualist theories are incomplete without considering their complimentarity.

Reimer presents two potential views complementary to his approach. One insists that music is its own unique experience—as nothing else, he claims, is able to create its own special world via sounds. In the second view, since human experience is understood to transcend singular disciplines, the unique experience of music, which heightens human awareness, therefore contributes to the human experiences that carry over into other disciplines. In the first view, music is its own unique discipline; in the second view, musical experience permeates life and history, and is necessarily interdisciplinary. Reimer once more paints his philosophy as a synergetic complementary of either of these views.

He continues to propose that the value of music lay foremost within an aspect of its felt experience, although he allows for marginal values. For example, Reimer acknowledges utilitarian values of music—e.g., improving test scores or spatial-temporal reasoning, etc.—as useful in efforts of advocacy. Still, he insists that music’s ultimate value, rather than any means by which music contributes to other values, is ultimately an end—that special experience, which only music affords. It is the emotional dimension—i.e., music’s power to present a special form of knowing, through feeling—that constitutes the most important characteristic of music. He still holds that the purpose of music education is to make these musical experiences as widely available as possible. He states, “If any single value of music underlies the commitment and passion of music educators it is likely the capacity of music to enhance human feelings, and the desire to make this gift of music as richly available to people as possible.”

239 Ibid., 58.

240 Ibid., 75.
The Reason/Feeling Split

Reimer distinguishes between reasoning and feeling, as he had in his former edition. This time, however, he prefaces with a useful observation that allows a bit more insight into the reason for his distinction. He acknowledges an emotional dichotomy within western history:

There has been a strong tendency to regard emotion as different from, and of lesser value than, intellect . . . [implying] that reason, or rationality, is the epitome of human functioning, and that the emotions or feelings have little or nothing to do with reason. In fact, emotions are often believed to get in the way of reason’s proper workings. This belief has largely accounted for the arts being regarded as less important in education than those subjects clearly based on reasoning.¹⁴¹

It is worth noting here that Reimer has implicitly identified a tension within the fact/value split—although he has not identified the split itself.²⁴² What now? The historical struggle involving the split is not an inability to recognize a dichotomy, but in an inability to reconcile the measurable material world with immeasurable, universal values. Recall Reimer’s aforementioned synergistic concession; “We can agree that universal, ultimate truths are human inventions.”²⁴³

Reimer astutely points to Descartes’ error of attempting to separate mind from body, when feelings actually play an important role in cognition. “Our awareness of ourselves as we relate to our inner and outer worlds is based on feelings . . . . This perception, or realization, or awareness of what is happening to us, caused by feeling, is consciousness.”²⁴⁴ He then reiterates

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Although Reimer never addresses a split between fact and value, he frequently points out a tension between behaviorism and cognition. While such tension does in fact result from the fact/value split, recognition of this tension, and rejection of behaviorism, does not necessarily mean that one rejects philosophical naturalism. So, Reimer has not acknowledged the fact/value split, although he has become aware of tensions within the assertion that the world is all fact (matter), and mental states do not therefore exist; the brain is simply reacting to material stimuli.

²⁴³ Ibid., 17.
his distinction between emotion and feeling, as presented in prior editions. In short, Reimer inadvertently acknowledges a fact/value split, and he rejects the dogmatic assertions of hardcore naturalists (positivists or behaviorists). The question, then, is how he justifies value.

Reimer holds that consciousness is what most makes human life ‘human.’ This consists of a given emotion, the felt experience of that emotion, and a cognitive awareness that one is having a felt experience of the given emotion. Whereas, in his second edition, he presented emotions as vague categories of felt experiences, and the felt experiences themselves as directly acquiring knowledge of the ineffable, he now more carefully defines feeling as specific awareness, and emotions as broad levels of awareness. Still, his attempts at clarity are ambiguous, since he identifies philosophy as ‘language-think’ and music as ‘sound-think.’

Even if we concede that the cognition of one’s directly experienced felt qualities are gained via sound-think, how is one to transition to the idea of emotion without engaging in language-think? As Reimer defines it, emotion is a broad conceptual awareness based upon familiarity with a recurrence of specifically felt experiences. But the recurrence of feeling in itself says nothing of how to categorize feeling; it is only a recognized recurrence—like Déjà vu. To do anything beyond this is to engage a referential quality of experience. But Reimer has insisted that the sounds themselves—not the references—constitute the most meaningful aspect of the experience. How then, within the experience of sounds themselves, and with no referential engagement of language-think, can one know anything of broad concepts such as emotions? Reimer does not really say. He later returns to address knowing within experience. At this point, his clarification seems unhelpful.

\[244\] Ibid., 78.
Reimer’s emphasis on consciousness is key to his third edition. He appeals to a depth of significance acquired via direct experience, which he calls by a number of names including: core-consciousness; self-awareness of the feeling of knowing; the autobiographical self; and felt history. Even amidst his case for cognitivism, Reimer exposes his naturalistic proclivity more in this edition than in any prior. He specifies in detail how Langer’s theories were so powerful in influencing his position and his understanding of cognition via self-awareness. He sees music as something that humans devised in order to widen their ability for felt knowledge—a mode of extending the instances of felt experiences, which, he holds to be the core for human cognition.

At this point, one begins to suspect that Reimer does hold to a position of philosophical naturalism. Reimer implicitly clarifies this naturalistic bent when he champions the theory of his philosophical inspiration, Langer. “Over and over, in detailed language, she explains how feeling arises from bodily awareness and, at a certain point in evolution, enters a new phase: consciousness arises.”245 This position explains his earlier dismissal of universal truths. He also appeals to Dewey’s theory of complex experiences, and to Meyer’s theories of listener expectation, as reinforcing his position.

Reimer begins to point his excursion into an assessment of cognition toward the purpose of aesthetic education. He observes that all musical engagements activate the listening mind, and that our self-awareness of what we are when experiencing music “is the sum total of all we have experienced in our lives.”246 This again begs the question of how sound-think, exclusively (i.e., having no reference beyond the experience), is able to suggest referential concepts. Reimer does not speak to this, but instead continues, insisting that we sometimes may become so immersed in

245 Ibid., 81.

246 Ibid., 87.
the experience that we seemingly become the music. As in the second edition, he reiterates that this self-justification is all that is needed to ground the value of music. Thus, he believes that he has justified his educational philosophy: “The enhancement of the extent and depth of what we feel . . . can be called an ‘education of feelings’ . . . . Music is a unique way of extending . . . our emotional lives.”

Reimer insists that engaging music does exactly for feeling what writing and reading do for reasoning. Key to expressionism, he contends that the value lies within the experience itself; the value of self-awareness acquired via feeling more deeply within is the end, and not a means. This is where his philosophy becomes complementary to formalism, but questionable as far as referentialism is concerned. Says Reimer, to go beyond the fluctuation of subjectivity, and hold onto the meaningful experience, the experience must be symbolically materialized. Since the aim of aesthetic education is to broaden our felt experience and discipline our subjectivities, and since listening is the most common way that people engage musical meaning-making, students should therefore be taught to hear within—i.e., disciplining their attentiveness to the formal aspects of the work—thereby deepening their understanding of artistic traditions.

On Music and Morality

Reimer’s explanation of the listening process seems to leave referentialism unaccounted for. He therefore attempts, as in his second edition, to draw connections between music and morality, in a manner complementary to absolute expressionism. He presents two common

\[\text{247 Ibid., 88-9.}\]

\[\text{248 Ibid., 99-100; and 119.}\]
views in approaching morality. In one view, there are ultimate principles, and being moral involves following the rules. In another view, morality is completely arbitrary, and determined by the individual. So, one must choose either absolutism or subjective relativism. Although Reimer seems to have equated “objective truth” with “absolutism,” he nonetheless observes correctly that the choice, which he has described, is a false dichotomy.

Unsatisfied with either angle, Reimer believes his philosophy to represent the synergistic view, in which “morality, and ethical behaviors, are, at base, products of human imagination,” because, “issues concerning how we can be better people draw on a combination of reason and imagination (both based on bodily experience), guiding our choices in the world of others in which all of us must live.” Reimer does not explain why this escapes the snares of relativism. But he presents Mark Johnson’s ethical view as pointing the profession in the right direction of achieving a synergistic philosophical unity. Johnson’s view likens morality to aesthetic discrimination and artistic creation, in that both share four common characteristics: discernment, expression, investigation, and creativity. Reimer asserts that both aesthetic activities and moral concepts are the products of imagination and feeling. In the same way that we construct things creatively in art, we similarly do this in morality, as well. “We portray situations, delineate characters, formulate problems, and mold events.”

249 Ibid., 120.

250 Ibid.


252 Ibid., 121.
Reimer accepts the premise that morals are imaginative constructs, and agrees with Johnson that there is a link between morality and aesthetic creativity. Reimer, however, details this relationship differently. He insists that moral value is more likened to artistic value when it comes to normative conduct and issues of authenticity. Whenever one’s experience requires the making of choices, values become a determinant of conduct. Reimer seems to be implying that these are imaginative values. Choices are at the center of musical creativity. Ethical (normative) considerations are therefore in play. He lists 1) trust, 2) competence, 3) cooperation (utility), 4) respect, and 5) courage as representative aspects of music’s moral dimension.253

Reimer contends that being creative and ethical in musical ways influences one to become creative and ethical in additional ways. This fosters creative insight into the good life, concerning both utility and individuality. What is the good life? Says Reimer:

We can conceive of the good life as an accumulation of particular goods . . . the sum total of a life worth living. In that sense music offers ethical and life-enhancing values just as numberless other endeavors do, but in the distinct way characteristic of music . . . . The goal, or value, or rationale for music, then, is not its contribution to what every other endeavor equally contributes to . . . but the contribution it makes that nothing else makes . . . . the unique meaning it adds to human experience.254

So then, attempting to assemble this philosophical view; it seems to be that, for Reimer, music’s unique contribution to ethics is a special encounter with a self-authenticating awareness—both of oneself as sentient, and of the fact that such sentience is shared with others—that encourages imaginative ways of envisioning and seeking the good life, both individually and collectively.

253 Ibid. 122-5.

254 Ibid.
On Musical Knowing

Returning to expound upon the question of knowing within music, Reimer claims that musical experiences educate one’s inner life, therein deepening one’s feelings. He painstakingly clarifies that music is not a language and does not follow the communication process. “In fact,” he avers, “to the extent that a musician follows the communication process rather than the creation process his work will turn out to be nonartistic.” Reimer dismisses the notion of receiving a gift from the sender, because it implies a specific message when sometimes we listen not for the messages, but for the music itself.

He points to the fact that there are many modes of knowing, and that music must therefore serve as its own special sort of knowledge. Citing Philip Phenix’s mention of the aesthetic as a distinct mode of cognition, and appealing to Howard Gardner’s identification of music as one of seven distinct frames of intelligence, Reimer attempts to defend the notion of musical experience as its own dimension of meaning. The purpose of music is to create and share lingually ineffable meanings. Elaborating, he confidently declares; whereas “concepts yield knowledge about,” music “yields knowledge within.”

Here, he finally reaches the core of his definition of music: musical meanings “achieve universally . . . meaning beyond those available from conceptual reasoning, communication,

255 Ibid., 137-8.


258 Reimer, A Philosophy of Music Education (2003), 146.
conventional symbols, designations, ‘knowing about,’ and so forth . . . Sounds, organized in culturally influenced ways, are ‘music’ when they bring meanings into existence that are available in no other way.”\(^{259}\) Reimer then summarizes his overall position; “Music can be described as sounds organized to be inherently meaningful . . . . The arts can be described as all the ways and means people have contrived to organize materials to produce meanings inherent within the materials and their organization.”\(^{260}\) This inherent meaningfulness is a special experiential encounter that must be experienced in order to be understood.

Reimer has not yet convincingly explained why education is really necessary. He acknowledges that there would be questionable need for music education if it provided merely the same experiences available beyond the classroom. He therefore seems to justify the value of music education within the fact that it exposes students to unfamiliar music—and therefore to unfamiliar, inherently meaningful, special experiences, each of which fosters new opportunities to deepen one’s sense of knowing within.

But this, Reimer acknowledges, introduces a paradox. Given his previous separation between philosophical knowing and musical knowing, one must now concede that teaching requires the need for language-think, whereas the musical experience is primarily sound-think. In order for music in the educational setting to offer something more than music in one’s natural, everyday socio-cultural settings, educators must move beyond the sound-think, using language-think to consider how to approach sound-think more meaningfully.

Still, Reimer ultimately sees music as a super-propositional knowledge. He allows that music can enhance a message, but insists that it must always involve a sense of ineffable

\(^{259}\) Ibid., 151.

\(^{260}\) Ibid., 152.
meaning beyond the message. While pre-modern theorists of beauty would certainly agree with him on this point, Reimer’s position should not be confused with pre-modern theories—for Reimer rejects notions of immutable truth, a concept to which most theorists of antiquity were committed. For Reimer, music is an outward evidence of an inner essence. Music education therefore exists to develop one’s potential for acquiring deeper significance amidst one’s felt experience. 261 Thus, there is a need for philosophical unity concerning a common methodology.

On the Universal Value of Music

Finally, Reimer deals with the issue of the universal and the contextual. He holds that human experience involves individual, contextual, and universal aspects. His definition of universal, however, suggests a post-Enlightenment influence and therefore does not speak to interests of the classicist (i.e., pre-modern) aesthetician. He presents the universal as the descriptive fact that various contexts and individuals seem to share an expressive commonality. This offers nothing to the discussion of whether beauty/goodness is truly and objectively universal—i.e. meaningful beyond the individual experience, even if that experience happens to be shared with other individuals. Reimer sees cultural context as a variable in the formation of human consciousness. 262 “Music education exists to make experiences of musical meaning, as various cultures create then, more deeply and widely accessible, thereby contributing an essential

261 Ibid., 161-5.
262 Ibid., 168.
value to each culture’s and to each individual’s identity and viability.”\textsuperscript{263} Reminiscent of his ethical theory, he equates cultural imperatives to the grounding of beliefs or values.\textsuperscript{264}

Opposing a colonialist attitude, he suggests that music cultures define what people must know in order to create, perform, and understand the music of that culture; and so all cultures cannot be expected to engage all music in exactly the same way. This, however, shouldn’t mean that there is no commonality between them. Says Reimer, “All music, in all cultures, in all periods of history, serves the same underlying function—to be experienced as arranged, meaningful sound, which heightens and gives spiritual meaning to human experience, whatever other use it may happen to fulfill.”\textsuperscript{265}

Within this last statement lies a potentially insightful clue into Reimer’s theory of the inherent meaningfulness that lies at the heart of the “nature and value” of music. That is, Reimer often depicts music as a sort of spiritual experience. Music, he says, exists foremost for the purpose of serving the soul—which he defines as one’s deepest sense of self. Concerning education, he specifies, we are “to help our students understand that the creation of music meaning is a universal need of human beings.”\textsuperscript{266} So, it appears as though Reimer may see the special, ineffable experiences of self-awareness and a deepened cognition of shared humanness, which is acquired solely through the unique experience of music, as a kind of spiritual experience—though having no real and objective reference beyond itself. If Reimer’s position

\textsuperscript{263} Ibid., 173.

\textsuperscript{264} Ibid., 176.

\textsuperscript{265} Ibid., 186.

\textsuperscript{266} Ibid., 191.
on the value of aesthetic experience is to be comprehensively understood, then his understanding of aesthetic experience as related to spiritual experience will need further articulation.

PIECING TOGETHER SOME PUZZLING POSITIONS

Conclusions could easily be drawn at this point. Reimer seems to be both a cognitivist and a weak naturalist. It appears as though there is some cognitive dissonance, however, in philosophically reconciling his materialism with his value assertions. What is even more confusing is his recurrent appeal to spiritual experience. If there is no real objective truth, how then is Reimer grounding such an assertion? He seems to be a philosophical naturalist—which, by definition, accepts a sort of value reductionism—by outright rejecting notions of immutable, universal truths concerning value. And yet, he also speaks of aesthetic value as if it is somehow able to transcend the material experience, and provide universal meaning. It is therefore worth consulting some of his additional writings in order to clarify: 1) his position on naturalism, 2) his understanding of cognitive meaning within the arts, and 3) his meaning of aesthetic experience as in and of itself the deepest source of musical value.

Reimer understood scientific observation and the aid of psychology as potentially both fruitful and dangerous to the field of music education.\(^\text{267}\) He advocated the arts as an opportunity to capitalize on the study of cognition,\(^\text{268}\) and yet he also held that, “the ineffable insights available through aesthetic experience will always seem more ‘true’ and more ‘real’ than the


objective data offered by science.\textsuperscript{269} This position was reinforced in a symposium presentation, wherein Reimer warned against an overdependence on learning theory and research.

So, Reimer’s position is certainly not one of strong naturalism, but this does not mean that he was not a naturalist. In a 2008 article, he proclaimed;

\begin{quote}
As I observed twenty-three years ago . . . ‘The myth of objectivity, of verifiability, of truth as something existing out there awaiting our discovery and of science as a value-free and objective description of that truth, is now a myth in tatters.’ This assertion was reinforced more recently by John Lehrer in his stunningly insightful book, \textit{Proust was a Neuroscientist}. ‘Reality,’ he said, ‘is not out there waiting to be witnessed; reality is made by the mind.’\textsuperscript{270}
\end{quote}

Consider also his appeal to evolutionary psychology and analytical philosophy as having explained, “that, just as humans have inherited from evolutionary developments the same physical structures (heart, liver, lungs, etc.), we have also inherited the same underlying mental structures held in common by all members of our species.”\textsuperscript{271} Although Reimer has rejected strong forms of naturalism, his rejection of objective truth suggests that he nonetheless views reality as limited to the physical world, and truth as relative to human construct.

While it remains unclear how Reimer reconciles his emphasis upon the truth of music’s value with his rejection of truth, it has become clear that he can be labeled a weak naturalist. Reimer’s naturalism reveals itself perhaps most clearly in his attention to ethical issues. For example, he holds that “equity and justice are human constructs; the inventions of human


\textsuperscript{271} Ibid., 169.
imagination,"²⁷² and yet he curiously asserts that music educators share an obligation to promote these ideals. It remains unclear, if value is constructed, why it should be shared.

Reimer is clearly a philosophical naturalist, though not a strong naturalist. He has asserted that value is a product of evolutionary process. Such a conclusion will necessarily limit the aesthetic dialogue, as it allows little room for pre-modern theories of beauty and goodness. What remains unclear is how, on Reimer’s view, anything can really be known, if there are no ultimate truths and moral and aesthetic values are nothing but the product of human imagination. The question, then, is how Reimer justifies the value of the aesthetic experience as meaning anything more than simply what some human beings have claimed it to be, according to the constructs of their evolutionary processes. Here, more attention to the experience in itself is needed. Reimer’s philosophy has everything to do with a deep significance acquired via the experience itself. What exactly he understands such an experience to entail therefore needs further exploration. According to Reimer, “Music is a remarkably vivid and concentrated instance of the self-within-the-world human condition.”²⁷³ So, what is known—or cognitively engaged—is the self as a sentient being.

Reimer describes the profound experience of the aesthetic as “being moved deeply in response to music.”²⁷⁴ In response, one experiences “being;” one is moved; and one is moved deeply. Being, he explains, “refers to an engagement of the self as a sentient organism with


²⁷³ Ibid., 43.

²⁷⁴ Ibid., 53.
sounds understood to be musical."\textsuperscript{275} To be moved refers to a capacity to feel, and to know that what one feels is significant and self-determining. Herein lie some insightful applications to Reimer’s position on external reference; while an experience might involve secondary references, the value itself is found within the profundity of the experience itself because, therein, one is able to know oneself more deeply. Aesthetic experience, then, constitutes a sort of transcendence wherein one is able to find a meaningful sense of wholeness unavailable in the cold facts of the material world. This meaning is like that lying at the heart of humanism—the sense of humankind asserting itself, asserting value, and willing itself toward individual identity and social utopia. Reimer declares, “Our susceptibility to profundity in music may be the very paradigm of the human capacity for significant experience.”\textsuperscript{276} But what does this mean?

\textbf{ON THE VALUE OF AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AS RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE}

Perhaps the greatest variable discovered amidst this research—a missing puzzle piece—came from John Richmond’s contribution to \textit{The Journal of Aesthetic Education}’s 1999 special issue, in honor of Bennett Reimer. Richmond observes two significant details. First, he points out that Reimer’s dissertation was on the similarities between aesthetic and religious experience. Second, Richmond notes that this dissertation shaped many of the ideas foundational to Reimer’s writing career. Richmond declares, “One need not have read all of Reimer’s published works to see the imprint of this dissertation throughout his later writings.”\textsuperscript{277}

\textsuperscript{275} Ibid., 54.

\textsuperscript{276} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{277} Richmond, 29.
Richmond describes Reimer’s evaluative perspective as that of Moderate Religious Liberalism; “a position often equated with humanism, naturalism, and atheism. It affirms the central importance of religious experience for humankind, but sets aside the notion of a Divine Other or Supreme Being or First Cause as obsolete for our modern, scientific age.” Still, it is unclear how religious experience can be asserted as important, on this worldview. Richmond’s most significant observation involves the impact of Paul Tillich. According to Richmond:

Tillich influenced Reimer in countless ways, to be sure, but there are at least three pivotal ideas in Reimer’s dissertation that trace directly to Tillich. First, Tillich redefined the word ‘God’ . . . . God is not a Supreme Being that can be said to exist . . . . [quoting Tillich] ‘If “existence” refers to something which can be found in the whole of reality, no divine being exists.’ Religious faith . . . is not relationship with, or belief in, a Divine Being, but instead is ‘the state of being ultimately concerned.’

Second, Tillich spoke extensively of humankind’s sense of ‘estrangement.’ This concept is a ‘bookend,’ if you will, for Dewey’s (and Reimer’s) call for unity, in that this sense of estrangement makes humankind’s need for uniting or re-uniting so crucial and meaningfully felt . . . . For Tillich, the crucial point to understand is that humans are capable of being aware of Being, and that this capacity allows us to sense our own finitude in the face of an infinite. Acts of faith thereby can be understood as acts ‘of a finite being who is grasped by and turned to the infinite.’

Thirdly, Tillich provides an important connection for Reimer between these ideas of ultimate concern, estrangement and the aesthetic, for art is the expression of the experience of Being-itself [emphasis in original]. Art fulfills its fullest potential . . . when it holds for our contemplation what it means to be finite in the midst of the infinite . . . . Such profound experience is available to humankind in only three ways, two of which are what Reimer calls ‘indirect’ means . . . only one of which is ‘direct.’ The two indirect means are art and philosophy and the direct means is religion. Yet even in religion, the experience is ultimate reality, or Being-itself . . . . The term ‘symbols’ is used here in a quasi-Langerian sense as expressive forms of the otherwise unknowable.

In his 1963 dissertation, Reimer championed Tillich’s approach to reconceptualizing Christian theology for the modern mind. He is particularly interested in Tillich’s concept of “ultimate concern,” in which religious experience is always an encounter not with a real being,

---

278 Ibid., 30.

279 Ibid., 35-6.
but “with that which concerns man ultimately.” Our ultimate concern is our being or non-being “the totality of what is real to the human creature—the very meaning and purpose of existence.” Weaving together the strands of his philosophical influence, Reimer claims:

The infinity to which man belongs and from which he is separated—this is precisely the human condition to which Dewey refers when he talks of the world beyond the world of ordinary existence, to which we are introduced by aesthetic and religious experience. This is what Langer points to when she says that the art symbol is the ‘absolute image—the image of what would otherwise be irrational,’ and that religious insight is the apprehension of the ‘essential pattern of human life.’ For Meyer, the ‘ultimate realities’—the ‘mystery of existence’—of which the experience of great music makes us aware points to the very same . . . ultimate concern as described by Tillich.

An important aspect of Tillich’s theology, which seems to have impacted Reimer’s thinking significantly, is the idea of estrangement. Reimer speaks often of the human condition, but what this means, beyond orthodox connotations, is unclear. But, for Tillich, the human condition is estrangement; and it seems to be so for Reimer as well. As one experiences one’s finiteness, anxiety increases due to the potential threat of non-being—i.e., of the cessation of one’s existence. Questions concerning the whole of human existence thus arise. This is a question of God; God therefore correlates, says Reimer, “to human anxiety and contingency.” As a metaphor, and nothing more—a symbol of courage—“God’ takes on existential significance.” Significance (or ‘ultimate concern’) therefore seems to be established allegedly in the fact that human beings are unique in their ability to take part in the cognitive awareness of

---


281 Ibid.

282 Ibid., 194.

283 Ibid., 199.

284 Ibid.
being. “Man is conscious of himself as having a world to which he belongs. Because of this ‘consciousness of self’—this ability to see oneself as separate from everything else—man can transcend every particular situation . . . . He can experience himself as belonging.”

Implementing another metaphor, Reimer builds off of Tillich’s definition of “communion,” which refers to an awareness of others that one finds amidst the deepening of one’s awareness of self. Paradoxically, “communion is necessary if the person is to become an individual. The entire notion of individualization and participation makes possible the concept of the unity of a disrupted world, and undergirds any attempts to speak of a universal system of relations.” Reimer observes that, for Tillich, God does not exist, but is being-itself, and that “Dewey’s conception of God as ‘the unity of all ideal ends arousing us to desire and actions’ contrasts sharply with any doctrine of God as a being with prior, or non-ideal existence.” The views of Tillich and Dewey are therefore complementary, on this point.

Extending the metaphor of ‘God’ for the purpose of drawing analogy to aesthetic experience, Reimer writes, “The concept of God as being-itself points to the power inherent in all things—the power of resisting non-being—of not being nothing [in original].” To this, he adds; “When man experiences ultimate concern he experiences holiness, and this experience is the deepest possible in the religious and in the aesthetic realms.” So, the point of meaningful experiences, it seems, is to reveal to the human being a sense of authentic identity and

---

286 Ibid., 203.
287 Ibid., 211.
288 Ibid., 214.
289 Ibid., 216.
ontological relatedness; the individual and shared ability to assert meaning, to attribute values to the evolutionary achievement of the human being, and to celebrate this achievement of shared sentience. Says Reimer, “It will be remembered that Dewey’s concept of ‘self-unification,’ Langer’s term ‘personal identity,’ and Meyer’s notion of ‘individualization’ all pointed to the idea that the highest potential of aesthetic experience is to make man aware of the ultimate reality of existence—of his essential condition as a ‘self who has a world.’”

The crucial principle of Tillich’s philosophy, with which Reimer is concerned is the position that “art is the expression of the experience of ultimate reality—of being itself.”

Reimer holds to Tillich’s theory that all great art is religious because of its ability to manifest a sense of ultimate reality. He attempts to explain this more thoroughly:

The sense of fulfillment we get from the experience of the depth of reality is one of life’s few genuine joys. At such times we feel that we truly know ourselves and our world, and that the ugliness, the pain, the meaninglessness of life, somehow dissolves . . . . In aesthetic and religious experience, more than in any other way, we can achieve self-unification, or personal identity, or individualization . . . which comes from knowing a ‘new reality’ of wholeness, which displaces the ‘old reality’ of estrangement.

Recounting the observations of his dissertation, Reimer draws together several of these points:

First, we found that both aesthetic and religious experience arise from the fact of man’s nature as a conscious, reacting organism in a world of which he is a part but from which he perceives that he is separated. Second, it is possible for man to experience, aesthetically and religiously, a sense of unity with his world. Such experiences bring about what has been variously called ‘self-unification,’ ‘personal identity,’ ‘self-individualization,’ and ‘the integration of personality.’ Finally, aesthetic and religious experiences inform man in the deepest, most powerful way possible of the human condition of estrangement and the possibility of reunification . . . . Underlying our theory

290 Ibid., 231.

291 Ibid., 252.

292 Ibid., 262.
. . . has been the notion that the highest good in the life of man is the development of his consciousness of himself and his world—the cultivation of his power of perceiving.\textsuperscript{293}

In drawing his comments to a close, Reimer incorporates the theories of Carl Jung—who devoted much attention to religious experience as psychological phenomenon. For Jung, to consider something religiously is to hold it as significant, or valuable, or of ultimate concern; but this is always a psychological attitude. Reimer explains, “For Jung, as for Tillich, religion is not a question of faith but of experience. It makes no difference what one might think of religion—the fact is that those who have had these experiences possess a great store of something that can be a source of life, meaning and beauty for them.”\textsuperscript{294}

In the closing, Reimer declares what would come to represent a foundational premise in his philosophy of music education; “We have suggested in this study that aesthetic experience can reach to the very roots of our understanding of the human condition, and that such experience is then religious in nature.”\textsuperscript{295} He concludes; “The quality of life as a whole is determined by the quality of the individual experiences of which life is made.”\textsuperscript{296}

Reimer’s dissertation offers many insights into his understanding of meaningful experience. Clearly, his understanding is deeply intertwined with theological symbolism. Still, more could be said about the specific connection between Reimer’s definition of religious experience and his understanding of aesthetic experience in the arts. Luckily, Reimer published an article shortly after his dissertation attempting to address this very thing.

\textsuperscript{293} Ibid., 265-6.
\textsuperscript{294} Ibid., 268.
\textsuperscript{295} Ibid., 275.
\textsuperscript{296} Ibid., 284.
In 1965, two years after completing his dissertation, Reimer published an article in *Religious Education*, entitled, “The Religious in the Arts.”²⁹⁷ Therein, he further developed the ideas explored in his dissertation. Pivoting from an assertion of Tillich, Reimer states, “The conception I want to develop . . . put simply, is that . . . every great work of art, by its nature as a *work of art* [emphasis in original] is religious art.”²⁹⁸ According to Reimer, the value of any art object is its ability to transcend its subject, and achieve a sort of symbolization for life in its entirety, rather than merely in part. Great art, “if it is perceived sensitively,” grants insight “into the human condition and into the nature of reality which go as deep as the human mind seems capable of going.”²⁹⁹ Such an experience is, for Reimer, religious in the fullest sense of the term. Aesthetic experience contains a ‘religious’ feature, in that it represents an embodied insight into sentience of the human organism, and a sense of ‘oneness’ within the universe.³⁰⁰

Reimer sees this sense of achieving oneness with the universe, as “one of man’s most basic, most powerful, and most all-pervading needs.”³⁰¹ The aesthetic experience, then, constitutes the depth at which such significance is conceived. For Reimer, any experience that is able to foster such a sense of deep significance—and sense of oneness with the universe—is called religious experience. Aesthetic experience, it seems, offers a sense of significance for a life with no objective truths beyond the material world. Within the aesthetic experience, one feels a sense of belonging rather than estrangement. Reimer declares, “It is no exaggeration to


²⁹⁸ Ibid., 310.

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

³⁰⁰ Ibid., 312.

³⁰¹ Ibid.
say that for some people aesthetic experience is the chief buffer between a life which is reasonably meaningful and one which is essentially meaningless. And there would be little danger in asserting that for all people aesthetic experience can serve an important function in making life . . . at least more beautiful.”

Drawing his thoughts to a close concerning this existential connection, Reimer offers one of his last reiterations on the matter. In concluding this 1965 article, he avers:

It is possible to glimpse the dimension of what seems to us to be the true and the beautiful. The sense of fulfillment we get from the experience of the depth of reality, as we can experience it through great art, is one of life’s few genuine joys. At such times we feel that we truly know ourselves and our world, and that the ugliness of life, somehow dissolves, and, at least for the moment, disappears . . . . It seems to me that a person who cultivates that religious quality of experience in all that he does, who thinks and feels deeply, who is sensitive to the beauty in art and in life, is a religious person . . . . A life which is lived in consonance with the religious insight it experiences, itself takes on a quality which makes it intrinsically meaningful and inherently beautiful. This, it seems to me, is what constitutes religious life.”

After this publication, Reimer seems to have offered little attention to articulating his position on this connection between religious and aesthetic experience. The views expressed herein seem to have been nevertheless assumed in all three editions of his aesthetic philosophy.

This chapter has meticulously surveyed Reimer’s view on aesthetic value. In summary, Reimer seems to represent a position of weak naturalism; i.e. he is a cognitivist concerning value language; but a naturalist concerning the impossibility of ultimate truths, and value as a product of human imagination. Locating aesthetic value in an experience for the sake of itself, he likens it to a sense of spirituality—a value construction of metaphors meant to comfort the human being with a sense of significance in the understanding of shared sentience as a profoundly deep

302 Ibid., 312-13.
303 Ibid., 313.
awareness of oneself, one’s world, and oneself as one within the world. Aesthetic experience is a spiritual experience of oneness with the universe. If indeed everyone has such an experience when engaging the arts, this such would seem to warrant aesthetic education. In short, Reimer is certain that one can be taught to become sensitive enough to engage one’s experiences so as to discover therein an undeniable sense of transcendence—a sort of inner peace and purpose.
CHAPTER V:
RESPONDING TO REIMER

To recapitulate, it is possible that Reimer has cultivated a successful theory for developing one’s attentiveness to form. But if his theory is unable to justify music as universally valuable, it will be questionable as to why Reimer’s method should dominate most classrooms. This chapter will be divided as follows: First, I will offer critical commentary concerning Reimer’s *A Philo* *sophy of Music Education*. A few additional thoughts will be offered concerning some of the literature that has helped the researcher to understand Reimer’s position more comprehensively. I will conclude with an overall summary.

AN ASSESSMENT OF REIMER’S *A PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC EDUCATION*

In his first edition, Reimer holds that the value of music lies in the ineffable meanings found solely within the experience of formalized sound. He rejects the position that the purpose of music is formal intellectualization. Still, he insists that it is nonetheless an experiential attentiveness to the formal structuring wherein the ineffable value of musical meanings is found. Attentiveness to the formal elements is, in other words, an essential variable, but the value of musical meaning is the special nature of the musical experience itself—the result, rather than the process, of attentiveness. It is due to this insistence upon the importance of symbolic form that he is wary of attributing value to reference.
Reimer insists that the nature and value of music education will be determined by the nature and value of music. Even so, need this necessarily marginalize referential value? Is it impossible for the inherent value of music to turn out to be an external reference to meaningful order within the universe? Reimer is certain that the value of music is intrinsic and ineffable. But does this assertion not beg a question concerning musical meaning? How can the special meanings found within aesthetic experiences be shared, if they are entirely ineffable—i.e., they can only be known within the musical experience in itself? And why ought they be shared? What objective truth exists beyond the experience to ground such oughtness? Reimer insists that there are no immutable truths within the aesthetic experience.\(^{304}\) But this is a controversial claim.

Reimer clearly articulates the aesthetic tensions of modernism, but his conception of reference appears to have been biased by at least two naturalistic assumptions—namely that: 1) there are no immutable truths; and 2) values are human constructs. Given the former assumption, it is easy for him to see reference as, at best, reflecting the latter. Reimer holds that music’s ultimate value is a sort of self-understanding found solely within the aesthetic experience. But, he has not convinced the reader as to why this is so. Reimer says that the aesthetic experience is not about liking or making judgments, but about sharing insights into self-knowledge. This raises two concerns. First, is evaluating art not what we do naturally? Second, on what basis can Reimer assert that aesthetic experience is about sharing insights?

In his second edition, Reimer is a bit more open to “nonartistic functions,” but he still holds that musical value is ultimately a special sort of ineffable enlightenment found entirely

---

from within the experience itself. Intuition is not referential, but a cognitive ability to process complex structures. He continues to claim that the arts give “meaningful cognitive experiences unavailable in any other way,” and that these are “necessary for all people if their essential humanness is to be realized.” The second point seems to be a leap. If cognitive experiences found solely within the arts are necessary for revealing one’s essential humanness, would this mean that a child who is blind or deaf is unable to realize their humanness?

Another problem involves the education of feelings. There is a difference between educating one’s feelings and increasing one’s awareness of one’s own feelingfulness. It would seem more accurate to describe Reimer’s position as an education of attentiveness to feelings, rather than an education of feelings. But even this would seem odd, given his methodological emphasis on form rather than feeling; he emphasizes attentiveness to musical form, as if such will naturally result in the awareness of ineffable meanings. His philosophy, therefore, would be better described as ‘an education of attentiveness to symbolic form with the hope of experiencing an ineffable feeling intrinsic to musical form.’

Some of Reimer’s assertions concerning the value of musical experience seem to be in conflict. It is entirely ineffable; it can be shared. It is the result of attentiveness to form; it is the result of an awareness of one’s humanness. Reference is only a secondary value; yet the ultimate value of the experience is a special reference to self and humanity, and the sense that life is meaningful. Another problem is the fact that Reimer holds aesthetic experience to be self-justifying. But this too is controversial. How is one to determine which felt experiences should


306 Ibid., 28-9.
be valued? Why value one over another? Is an experience good just because it feels good? Reimer may be onto something in his likening of aesthetic and spiritual experience—as it could be posited easily that both aesthetic and religious experience represent an intuition of meaning beyond the experience. It is unclear, however, what this means if there are, as he claims, no immutable truths within the aesthetic experience.

Reimer claims that references are only remotely related to the music itself. But music seems to be naturally referential for many people. How is Reimer’s testimony to stand against a plethora of common experiences? And what about beauty? As Groothuis observed, “Just as my experience of roundness when I see an orange is not in itself round, my experience of aesthetic excellence has an objective reference beyond the experience itself.”307 So, when one says that musical object \( X \) is beautiful, it seems that musical object \( X \) necessarily involves a reference beyond the musical experience itself—namely, beauty. Whether or not, and how, objective beauty is rightly or falsely attributed to musical object \( X \) is a different matter. The point is that Person \( A \), in describing musical object \( X \) as ‘beautiful,’ is pointing to an objective sense of beauty—an objective attribute of reality that is reflected in musical object \( X \). Reimer is willing to acknowledge music as an intuitive awareness of animate order. But order can be recognized in a number of ways, and is by nature a referential concept. Reimer’s reduction of musical meaning primarily to felt subjectivities seems shallow. Not only does his position limit extra-musical cognition of referential order, it also limits the value of untrained evaluation. Why assume that there is little value or purpose in an uneducated evaluation.

At some points, Reimer’s position begins to sound like a sort of spiritual elitism. Music must be understood in the proper way in order to experience its special delights. The need for

---

music education is the sharing of that delight—i.e., “the delight of experiencing more fully the potentials of human subjectivity.” But Reimer cannot have it both ways. Either aesthetic value is ineffably intrinsic (and so the uneducated student should be able to experience aesthetic significance naturally), or it is locked within a proper attentiveness to symbolic form (and so the student must be taught to tap into this special experience). It is unclear as to why music education as primarily a development of formal attentiveness is necessary.

Reimer attempts to strengthen his position, in the second edition, by allowing for a rather narrow connection between music and morality. But in Reimer’s view, morality has no external grounding. If moral goodness cannot be established beyond human construct, then there is little reason to hold that aesthetic beauty or goodness can be objectively justified. Additionally, how could Reimer have such an objective, external insight into an exclusively subjective, indeed ineffable, experience? How can one share the ineffable, if feelings are completely locked within individual experiences? Furthermore, if one accepts that value lies within individual, ineffable experiences, how can we ever really know that we share the same experiences?

Reimer attempts to present a more synergistic view in his third edition, but he still touts the same ultimate position; that musical value, at bottom, is found solely within the special experience that only music affords. His proposal of synergy is an attempt at reconciliation between modernism and postmodernism—but is not inclusive of many pre-modern convictions. He accepts postmodernism’s claim that there are no objective, immutable, universal truths, while he clings to modernism’s conviction that knowledge is possible and does not reduce to the mere whims of the individual. He claims, “We can agree [with the postmodernist] that universal, ultimate truths are human inventions while also recognizing the need for and possibility of

---

reaching better clarity in matters that concern human well-being.” But what if we do not agree? Moreover, this is a self-defeating statement. If there are no universal truths, then Reimer’s statement cannot be true.

Reimer rejects subjectivism—i.e., the reduction of value to individual whim—but he apparently accepts cultural relativism (as it is commonly called), or what might more accurately be called conventionalism—value as determined by culture/context. In actuality, if value is determined by culture, then it is determined by a collection of individuals. It makes little difference to call it subjective or cultural. The majority may impose a normative practice on the given context, but there can be no value beyond the context if value is human construct. At the end of the day, it is the individual who gets to decide what to value, and, if there is no transcendent standard of goodness, then no one can tell the individual that they are wrong.

One particular point with which the researcher takes issue is Reimer’s claim to speak of ‘aesthetics’ in the broadest sense possible—specifically, in a manner that is inclusive of all historical discourse. If this were so, however, then he would include the pre-modern approach to beauty. But, as he has ruled out the possibility of objective universal truths, he is really only able to speak to a post-Enlightenment discourse. For many philosophers and theologians have spoken of beauty and goodness with an objective reference to an immutable truth in mind. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, for example, all held to ideas of truth beyond the material world and immediate experience. Reimer denies such notions of truth. So how is it that he is able to speak of aesthetic concepts in a way that is as inclusive as he believes? It seems, rather, he is using the term in a manner specifically inclusive of post-Enlightenment discourse. But even

---


310 Ibid., 7.
here, it cannot be claimed that he is speaking inclusively of all discourse, because there were philosophers/theologians, even amidst a modernist context, who still appealed to the immutable truth of objective aesthetic beauty—even as a means of refuting philosophical naturalism.\footnote{See, for example: Arthur James Balfour, \textit{Foundations of Belief} (New York, NY: Longman’s, Green, & Co., 1895), 33-66.}

Reimer denies this. He defines music, narrowly, as “sounds organized to be inherently meaningful.”\footnote{Reimer, \textit{A Philosophy of Music Education} (2003), 152.} But what if organized sound can imply something meaningful about the world?

While Reimer rejects both scientism and postmodern skepticism as embracing contradiction, in his denial of universal objectivity he seems to be confused on the matter of absolutes. In addressing morality, he rejects absolutism with minimal attention to the loaded nature of such a term. He exposes the dichotomy between absolutism and relativism as false, but then his ‘synergistic’ solution is to understand morality as the product of human imagination. This, however, would seem to simply destroy a false dichotomy in order to raise a false trichotomy. For example, Reimer’s theory has no room for one who holds to the truth of graded absolutism.\footnote{Graded absolutism refers to a belief in absolute standards of truth concerning value, coupled with an understanding that situational ethics may include a conflict between two moral truths—in which case one’s obligation is to the greater absolute; the greater good. For example, while lying and murder may both be wrong, one is morally obligated to lie if one understands that doing so will save an innocent life.} In short, for Reimer to reject objective universal truths because he equates immutable objectivity with rigid absolutism is a problem. He rejects all forms of absolute truth concerning value beyond human construct. Value intuitionists,\footnote{Intuitionists insist universal truths can be known via the convictions of pragmatic experience.} however, hold that there are in fact absolute truths concerning goodness etc.—e.g. moral law—but that, while truth is not

\begin{flushright}
\footnote{See, for example: Arthur James Balfour, \textit{Foundations of Belief} (New York, NY: Longman’s, Green, & Co., 1895), 33-66.}
\end{flushright}
constructed by the context, the context often includes complex variables that must be considered when making judgments. So, one does not have to buy into absolutism, as Reimer believes, in order to hold to absolute truths of objective beauty or goodness. Non-naturalist philosophers have challenged this assumption as representing a major misunderstanding of postmodernism.\footnote{See, e.g., J. P. Moreland, “Postmodernism and Truth,” in \textit{Reasonable Faith} (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2007), 117.}

Let us turn to the issue of meaningful experience. As Reimer defines it, emotion is a broad conceptual awareness based upon familiarity with a recurrence of specifically felt experiences. But the recurrence of feeling in itself says nothing of how to categorize feeling; it is only a recognized recurrence—like Déjà vu. To do anything beyond this is to engage a referential quality of experience. But Reimer has insisted that the sounds themselves—not the references—constitute the most meaningful aspect of the experience. Alas, what is “meaningful” without a referent? The fact of cognition says nothing about the meaning of an experience.

Reimer seems to use “meaning” and “significance” interchangeably—if the experience is meaningful, then the significance must lie in the experience itself. But this begs a question. Must something be ‘significant’ in order to be meaningful? One could easily contest Reimer’s position on form vs. reference by contending that attentiveness to form may in fact be meaningful, but that the significance of music lay in its external reference. Reimer’s position allows reference to be only secondary, and then, primarily social.

Reimer holds that significance is ineffably located within the experience itself, as one’s attentiveness is given to a contemplation of music’s symbolic form. The purpose of music education is to make these significant musical experiences as widely available as possible by
educating one’s formal attentiveness. But what if I value the arts or the beautiful in nature, because I intuit goodness via pragmatic experience? Wouldn’t this suggest that, while the experience is an important aspect of cognition goodness, or significance, lies elsewhere?

Reimer’s obsession with experience at the expense of reducing all other meaning to secondary value is a difficult assertion to accept without a convincing argument. But, given the explicit assertions and implicit assumptions that Reimer gives, let us attempt to construct his argument. Let \( A \) represent the fact that music is something that must be experienced in felt time. Let \( B \) represent the fact that music is clearly valuable. (This in itself is not a sort of question begging; rather, it is a descriptive observation that if people across cultures and across human history have valued musical practices, then music cannot be concluded to be worthless). Now, these two premises are strong; there is little reason to dispute them.

Reimer, however, then makes a questionable move. His implicit argument seems to be something like the following: If \( A \) is true, and \( B \) is true, then \( C \) (the value of music lies within the experience). The logical form of the argument would look like this: \((A \cdot B) \rightarrow C\). Actually, had Reimer stopped here, his position might not be in question, and his philosophy would likely be more inclusive. This conclusion seems obvious, as it only states that one cannot experience the value of music without finding oneself within the experience of music. Reimer does not actually imply merely \((A \cdot B) \rightarrow C\), however. Instead, he asserts something like: \((A \cdot B) \rightarrow C'\) (where \( C' \) asserts that ‘the value of music lies in the experience of music in and of itself’). To state that the value of music lies within the lived experience of music need not be problematic. To assert, however, that the ultimate value is the experience itself—for the sake of itself—and so

---

referential meaning and formal rationalization are therefore secondary variables, simply does not follow from the facts that music is valuable, and must be experienced.

For all of Reimer’s appeals to the multifaceted nature of cognition, and the problematic limitations and oversimplification of a systematic overemphasis upon learning theory and behavior, one would think that he would have been hesitant to hold so staunchly to his absolute expressionism. Why not recognize that (1) while it is true that A and B are obvious, and attention to the experience itself should not be neglected by an overemphasis upon form or reference; it is also true that (2) some people obviously value formalistic emphases; and (3) others clearly value a referential emphasis? Further, (4) some people value an emphasis not simply upon the emotional experience that a referent stimulates, but upon meaningful reference beyond the experience, in symbol or metaphor, to something that is true about the world, or a possible world. Finally, it may also be true that (5) some see a deep value in music’s instrumental uses—e.g., work songs; music as mnemonic aid for teaching one’s cultural history or theological tradition; etc. It seems problematic to assert that points two through five mean little to nothing compared to the experience itself. But Reimer insists that the music experience justifies itself—the value of music is the experience itself because the experience of music is valuable. This is where Reimer might be accused of question begging.

One can agree with Reimer that musical experience is valuable. He assumes, however, that this necessarily justifies his expressionist theory; and so he moves on to theorize about music’s special ineffable, intrinsic value as an enhanced knowing within music. But does music in the immediate experience itself offer nothing for reason beyond ineffable feeling? Value implies meaning, and meanings are necessarily referential. There is something amiss in trying to align Reimer’s emphasis on symbolic form, at the expense of reference, with his assertion that
deep within the experience lies a sense of self-awareness and shared humanity. His philosophy of aesthetic significance curiously begins to sound very referential indeed.

Concerning the issue of meaning within the experience, Reimer points to the value of ineffable experiences, and yet naturalism prevents any notion of universally objective value from being meaningfully communicated. Whence come these ineffable meanings? Reimer denies immutable truths. But why could this seemingly ineffable experience not be defined as the sensing of greatness within or beyond the world? Why the predetermined need to lock it into the experience-in-itself-and-not-beyond?

Reimer sees music as something that humans devised in order to widen their ability for felt knowledge—a mode of extending instances of felt experiences, as is the basis for human cognition. This is speculative, however. Such an assertion seems to pivot from his theory of mind as the product of evolutionary progress. But this is a controversial assumption. Moreover, it is uncertain what role aesthetic experience really plays on this view, and so it therefore remains unclear as to why there is a need for aesthetic education. It seems that Reimer may have committed the genetic fallacy (fallacy of origins) in attempting to argue that if humans evolved then any notion of objective values must also be a product of evolution. In fact, there are both theistic evolutionists and non-theistic value realists who would take issue with this presumption.

Although Reimer believes in value cognition, and rejects behaviorism, the ability of mental states to know anything for certain, and to convey that meaning reliably, given that they are, as he claims, simply the chance products of evolutionary processes is a controversial claim. It is a leap—a science-of-the-gaps argument, if you will—to assert matter-of-factly that, while

317 Ibid., 81.
we do not really know how mental states arrived from brain states, it must necessarily be the case that this is what happened, since immutable truths cannot exist. This is the sort of dogmatic bias that provokes a fact/value split. Naturalists have little ground to stand on when they begin to speak of value and justification. In such a case, they often take an existential leap to the value realm of the dichotomy, in order to live as if value is real, even though their theory cannot justify this conclusion. It seems that Reimer has done precisely this.

Significance, Morality, Religious Experience and the Human Condition

Recall Reimer’s important concessions. First, in the final edition of his philosophical opus, he stated, “We can agree that universal, ultimate truths are human inventions.”318 There is, then, no real objective universal truth; there is only the universal of shared humanness. Additionally, in a 2009 publication of compiled essays, he wrote concerning the evolutionary development of cognition; “Just as humans have inherited from evolutionary developments the same physical structures (heart, liver, lungs, etc.), we have also inherited the same underlying mental structures held in common by all members of our species.”319 So, cognition is the product of evolutionary development, and, since there is no such thing as universal, objective truth, humans have constructed social truths, and ascribed value to various objects, actions, and experiences. Why humanness is so valuable then, on this view, remains unclear. I will begin this section with the issue of ethics, the good life, and the human condition. I will conclude with commentary concerning Reimer’s fascination with aesthetic experience as religious experience.


319 Reimer, “Roots of Inequity and Injustice,” 169.
First of all, Reimer draws a connection between music and morality. He is not the first to do this, and I think that it is insightful to do so. Having rejected the notion of immutable truths, however, Reimer limits ethical meaning in music to authenticity and the good life. His approach to ethics therefore seems to be both confused and shortsighted. If there is no real value, then ethical education is pointless. What does morality even mean? Reimer’s view does not allow for such objectivity, for he admits that equity and justice are human constructs. Human constructs, however, can never be truly obligatory; but only asserted and imposed.

For Reimer, morality is not about objective standards of right and wrong. Rather, the imaginative norms—the sense of “ought”—that guides the individual seems to rest upon a deeper awareness of what constitutes “the good life.” It seems to be a given assumption for Reimer, that, because human beings share a common desire for a sense of the good life, they are therefore acting in ways authentic to their humanness whenever they make decisions that encourage a pursuit of the good life. One is therefore moral whenever one’s decisions embody an act of authenticity—an affirmation of self-awareness that is able to sense a greater connection to others. But what reason is there to think that the universe functions, on a macro-level, in such a way as to foster agreement concerning the good life, when there exists no standard for oughtness or goodness, given philosophical naturalism?

In the same peculiar way that Reimer denies immutable universal truths, and then appeals to the good life as if it is a universal truth, and to humanness as if it is a universal good, he also appeals curiously to another universal truth—namely, the human condition of estrangement. The aesthetic experience then serves as an assertion of meaning within one’s existence as a sentient being. Says Reimer; “It is no exaggeration to say that for some people aesthetic experience is the chief buffer between a life which is reasonably meaningful and one which is essentially
meaningless. He is correct that, if his presumption of philosophical naturalism is true, then one is free to assert whatever makes the futility more bearable. But, given the implications of philosophical naturalism, such value language is ultimately meaningless.

So, how is any given value of music, or education for that matter, ever to be asserted as ‘good?’ At best, it can be instrumentally useful for those who desire such ends. But, even then, it cannot be imposed as truly ‘good’ for all students. A striking problem here is what might be called Reimer’s Archimedean perch. I am here borrowing terminology from Ronald Dworkin, who referenced people who “purport to stand outside a whole body of belief, and to judge it as a whole from premises or attitudes that owe nothing to it.” Dworkin calls such people Archimedans. Additionally, Reimer insists that aesthetic educators must be acquainted with the deepest values of music, as scholars understand (construct?) them. But would it not be better for educators to be familiar with the tensions within the dialogue of value itself—i.e., familiar with views on both sides of the subjective/objective and universal/particular debates—rather than simply the assertions of mainstream scholars?

A final issue is that of religious experience. Reimer has attempted to establish aesthetic significance within a sort of religious comfort. The discovery that tied many points together for the current researcher—the puzzle piece missing throughout all three editions of Reimer’s magnum opus—was the connection between the influence of Paul Tillich’s aesthetic theology and Reimer’s aesthetic philosophy. Reimer’s reference to concepts such as the significance of

---


321 Dworkin, 88.

being, estrangement, and the human condition can be easily tied to Tillich. Understanding Tillich’s use of this terminology helps to explicate many of Reimer’s ideas.

Succinctly, Tillich redefines God as ‘being’ itself, and then asserts that being is itself and nothing beyond. He posits that all ultimate meaning is a self-discovery and communal unity within the oneness of ‘being’ (i.e., ‘being itself’ and not a real external being). Aesthetic and religious experience is therefore grounded in (the oneness with, and enhanced awareness within) being. It not surprising, then, that Tillich’s ground of being sounds strikingly similar to Reimer’s appeal to aesthetic experience. Reimer’s philosophical foundation faces great difficulty. He has taken Tillich’s view of aesthetic and religious experience as grounded within a shared cognitive oneness of being—i.e., the sense of an estranged humanity seeking meaningful oneness within the impersonal ground of the universe itself—and he has merged it with philosophical naturalism (which may have permeated Tillich’s thinking, as well). Both positions face problems.

SUMMARY

The concern here has been to question whether Reimer’s justification for aesthetic value is sound; and whether his emphasis upon form over reference or pragmatic and instrumental value is appropriate. The questions to be answered concerning Reimer’s work are: (1) what is the value of music? (2) Is aesthetic education, as he defines it, able to speak robustly of meaning? Finally, (3) how does Reimer’s philosophy fit into the issue of philosophical naturalism and the fact/value split?

Musical Meaning

Reimer’s view of form, reference, and expression is somewhat paradoxical. He sees referential value as only secondary—non-artistic value that one ascribes to the meanings derived
from encountering the artistic qualities of the experience. Form captivates one’s attentiveness, fixing it upon the experience in and for the sake of itself, which deepens the sense of awareness acquired within the experience—therein deepening the significant impact of the experience. To Reimer, the experience is the vital element. If removed, form and reference mean nothing because there is no experience to be described formally; and no experience to which one could attach, secondarily, referential value. The paradox is that for all of Reimer’s wariness concerning reference, the ultimate significance to which he ascribes aesthetic meaning, though acquired only within the experience itself, turns out to be referential—i.e., reference to the sentient self, the shared sentience of humanness, the human condition, and a special sense of unity therein.

Reimer is well read in the aesthetic philosophies of many modernists and postmodernists, but he is unable to justify an aesthetic philosophy in way that is inclusive of the concerns of those who reject hard claims of philosophical naturalism—such as Reimer’s claim that universal truths are the product of human construction. Additionally, he speaks to issues in theology and philosophy of religion, as they relate to aesthetics. His approach, however, is not an inclusive one—i.e., he speaks of religion in a manner exclusive to naturalism.

Also, Reimer appears confused when it comes to an articulation of exactly what it is that he believes. He touts weak naturalism one minute—which necessarily rules out supernaturalism—but then he embraces a sort of cognitive spiritualism. He insists upon the ultimate value of the aesthetic experience, but aesthetic value, given philosophical naturalism, cannot mean anything beyond the whims of human construction.

While the researcher has several issues with Reimer’s philosophical position overall, his approach is not without merit. Any cognitivist can appreciate his rejection of behaviorism.
Additionally, if one is an absolute expressionist, then Reimer’s approach articulates the view well. If one is a formalist, perhaps they will ignore some of Reimer’s commentary concerning the experience in and for the sake of itself, but they will likely find much usefulness in his methodology. Referentialists, mimetics, and pragmatists, however, will most likely take issue with Reimer’s approach, as it seems to belittle their primary concerns. All positions can nevertheless agree that Reimer’s passion for acknowledging the importance of the musical experience itself is admirable. Alas, in the same way that Reimer does not want the referentialist to neglect the importance of the experience itself, so too the referentialist does not wish for Reimer to neglect the importance of reference at the expense of emphasizing form and the experience in and of itself. Still, there are several positive features in Reimer’s theory.

First, Reimer is passionate about refusing to separate body from mind. This is why he rejects strong naturalism. While weak naturalism does not escape the snare of the fact/value split, it is nonetheless a first step in the sort of openness that is necessary for reconciliation. Second, he stresses the importance of refusing to remove value from the experience as it is lived.323 He understands that emphasis upon body alone leads to behaviorism; emphasis solely upon the rational mind can promote gratuitous formalism, an emphasis upon social function at the expense of enjoying the lived experience may, at times, be a detrimental effect of referentialism; and an overemphasis on instrumentalism may threaten concern for an aspiration of artistic excellence. This, however, does not mean that experience itself is the most important variable. The various aspects of musical value may in fact turn out to be more closely related than they are antithetical. A comprehensive and inclusive philosophy will bear this in mind.

Aesthetic Value and Aesthetic Education

While it is not the intent of the researcher to present a comprehensive counterpoint between the philosophies of David Elliott and Bennett Reimer, perhaps it is here appropriate to begin with Elliott’s criticisms. Elliott voices concern with the contention that “the chief characteristic of aesthetic experience is that its value is intrinsic.” Deeming the theory of aesthetic experience to be problematic, Elliott notes several points—two of which are especially noteworthy. “First, it rests on logical contradiction . . . . On the one hand, these writers insist that aesthetic experience is self-sufficient, disinterested, and impractical. On the other hand, they claim that the primary value of aesthetic experience (and aesthetic education) is knowledge of human feeling—an extrinsic benefit.” Another problem that Elliott observes is a presumption, based on the theories of Langer, concerning musical value. It may be true, says Elliott, “that some listeners may hear some musical patterns as expressive of tension and release (or conflict and resolution). But this does not begin to explain the nature and value of musical works.”

A hole in Reimer’s view is the striking exclusivity that seems contrary to the way in which that many people report experiencing the aesthetic value of music—whether in reference, pragmatic use, etc. Here, it seems appropriate to recall the words of M. H. Abrams. Abrams has observed that art theory historically pivots from a sense of reference in four ways: to the work; to the artist; to the audience; and to the universe. He insisted that a robust and inclusive approach

---

324 Elliott, 36.
325 Ibid.
326 Ibid, 37.
to aesthetics must involve all of these. Moreover, he observed that it is likely no insignificant
detail that such an approach was prominent prior to the Enlightenment.\footnote{327}

Appealing to Reimer’s own concern for the complex nature of cognition, and expounding
upon the concern of Abrams, consider this hypothetical scenario: Within any given musical
experience, there is a self-awareness (a reference to self), and a meta-cognition of one’s
immediate felt experience (reference to the experience itself); there is also an awareness of order
and meaning (a reference to form), and an awareness of artistry (a reference to creator);
additionally, there is also a stimulation of higher-order referential cognition as one becomes
aware of one’s awareness of order and meaning (this is a reference to order and meaning on a
level beyond the work itself). In short, reference cannot be removed from experience.

In Reimer’s own words, “Every teacher imposes upon his/her students within the
classroom a series of choices that reflect the beliefs—the philosophical presuppositions—of the
teacher.”\footnote{328} Indeed, it seems to be so beyond the classroom, as well. Reimer’s own philosophy
may have limited the dialogue concerning musical value to his own presuppositions. In fairness,
let the reader be reminded that his work is entitled, \textit{a philosophy}—as opposed to “the
philosophy.” Still, there is a danger of misrepresentation, whether by skeptic or advocate, as to
what aesthetic education must look like. That is, one may identify Reimer’s philosophy as
representative of the mainstream position within the twentieth century MEAE movement. But
this need not preclude what aesthetic education must be.

\footnote{327}{Abrams, 3-6.}

\footnote{328}{Reimer, \textit{A Philosophy of Music Education} (1970), 4-7.}
This represents another point raised by David Elliott, when he says, “Generations of music teachers have been reared on [Reimer’s] beliefs, countless research publications have assumed or repeated its aesthetic claims, and numerous music curricula have incorporated its recommendations.”

He sees this as problematic; “To suppose that all thinking that falls under the heading ‘music education philosophy’ is equally valid is probably to assume too much.”

He further observes a bias associated with the advocacy of aesthetic education. He says, “Coincident with the aesthetic concept of art was the social transformation of European society. . . . The assumptions anchoring aesthetics, both then and now, are inseparable from the Romantic ideology.” Indeed, perhaps it is not the aesthetic education enterprise that is problematic but the narrow definition as deemed appropriate by the Romantics. In fact, Reimer represents only “a philosophy” of aesthetic education—namely, that of absolute expressionism.

The term “aesthetic education” taken at face value suggests an education of aesthetics; and aesthetics involves at least the three different positions that Reimer works through in order to stress his preference—namely, referentialism, formalism, and expressionism; but also mimesis, and other theories. The point is that Reimer has not actually provided a philosophy of music education as aesthetic education; he has, rather, posited a philosophy of music education as absolute expressionist education. Aesthetic education, on face value, suggests a dialogical approach in which students become familiar with, and wrestle through the various paradigms of aesthetic theory—the various positions concerning the truth of goodness and beauty.

---

329 Elliott, 29.
330 Ibid., 5.
331 Ibid., 23.
Music education as aesthetic education, then, would suggest using the music appreciation classroom as a means of introducing students to this dialogue, and helping them to think critically through the concerns of each position. Recall Estelle Jorgensen’s dialectical philosophy. Reimer is intrigued with this approach, and questions whether he is suggesting something similar with his synergistic view. However, it should be pointed out that there is a notable difference. Jorgensen is concerned with a dialogue between teacher and students within the classroom, whereas Reimer is trying to reconcile philosophical positions between educators—in Reimer’s classroom, education is concerned primarily with the experience, not the dialogue. But what if the value of aesthetic education lies in its ability to prompt critical thinking about value itself? Perhaps this is a more robust approach to aesthetic education.

Bennett Reimer and the Fact/Value Split

We can now draw conclusions concerning the relationship of Reimer’s philosophy to the historical tensions of philosophical naturalism, and the resulting fact/value split. Reimer clearly rejected strong naturalism. Alas, he also rejected the notion of universal objective truths concerning value beyond human construction and imagination. His view therefore seems to align most consistently with a position of weak naturalism; and we can see within his position a habit common to most naturalists—whether strong or weak. Strong naturalists assert that there can be no real meaning beyond the material world and chemical processes. Weak naturalists also accept the fact of a materialistic world with no universal truths beyond—while also holding that they are able to know something about themselves, their experiences, and their world (i.e., cognition is not simply the result of behavioral stimuli), and that value statements do carry a
truth content; but only a constructed truth. In both views, ultimately, the world is all fact; universal, objective values are either meaningless or the constructs of human imagination.

Curiously, however, some naturalists begin to assert claims that seem rather peculiar, given their claim to naturalism—e.g., stealing is wrong; humans are valuable; that something is indeed ‘good’, or beautiful, etc. Such universals, of course, cannot truly exist on the naturalistic worldview; and so a decision must be made. One may dismiss talk of value as meaningless; one may assert one’s own meaning; one may revisit one’s worldview; or one may attempt to live as if notions of beauty and goodness exist, when in fact they do not. In the case of the latter, the naturalist often longs so deeply for the truth of these ideals that they take what Francis Schaeffer called the existential leap into the ‘upper story,’ or the realm of values.

In short, they assert the world of fact as being true of reality, and values as reducing simply to human constructs; but then they attempt nonetheless to live within a world of value. Wherever one finds such assertions, one will find a sense of cognitive dissonance. Reimer may not have been a strong naturalist in his theory of mind, but he certainly seems to have been a cognitive naturalist about value. He asserts that there are no universal truths; that these are human constructs. The problem is that he also asserts a claim to objective knowledge concerning universal truth and value: musical experience as truly valuable; education as truly valuable.

332 For more detail concerning the value reduction of both strong and weak forms of naturalism scientism, see chapter six of R. Scott Smith, In Search of Moral Knowledge.

333 Schaeffer, The Francis A. Schaeffer Trilogy, 237 -51; Says Schaeffer, “There is a complete dichotomy between the upper and lower stories . . . . Below the line there is rationality and logic. The upper story becomes the nonlogical and the nonrational. There is no relationship between them. In other words, in the lower story . . . . You simply have mathematics, particulars, mechanics. Man has no meaning, no purpose, no significance . . . . But up above, on the basis of a nonrational, nonreasonable leap, there is a nonreasonable faith which gives optimism. This is modern man’s total dichotomy.” (Ibid., 237-8).
(beyond strict instrumental purposes); the human condition of estrangement as not ‘good;’ the ‘goodness’ of self-awareness; the notion of shared sentience—i.e., the awareness of a collective humanness—as a ‘good’ thing; and he speaks of the ‘good’ life as a truly ‘good’ thing.

It seems, then, that Reimer has taken an existential leap and asserted—as was common amidst the Romantic era—that music is a religious experience of transcendence. But to where is one able to transcend in a strictly material world? Reimer asserts that one finds a sort of spiritual oneness with being itself—a deep knowledge of humanness. Alas, this assertion cannot ground any sense of true value in a material world—much less, the aesthetic value of music. Not only has Reimer embraced and asserted the naturalistic fact/value split, but he also falls within the Romantic tradition of attempting to assert the value side as if it has any meaning in a world made solely of fact. This would seem to fit well with Elliott’s observation that “the assumptions anchoring aesthetics . . . are inseparable from the Romantic ideology.”

The worldview to which one holds will bear impact upon the possible conclusions concerning one’s justification of value. Naturalism and Non-naturalism—including theism, broadly, and more narrowly, intuitionism or supernatural revelation via spiritual experience—claim contrary things about the truth of value, and they imply different possible conclusions concerning the importance of form, reference, etc. The fact that Reimer asserts both (the naturalistic reduction of universal, objective truth concerning value and the non-naturalistic significance of a universally valuable spiritual experience), when they are actually mutually exclusive views concerning value, only confuses his case for the justification of music education and his explication concerning musical value. In summary, he seems to have accepted the post-Enlightenment bias of philosophical naturalism, and with it the fact/value split; and yet,

---

following the tradition of many Romantics, he desires to liken aesthetic experience as a sort of religious experience. His philosophy therefore reveals the weight of internal conflict, desiring to assert true and meaningful value in a world made solely of facts—a world wherein value, if not literally meaningless, is at best imaginative and individually or socio-culturally constructed.
CHAPTER VI:
EXPANDING THE CONTEMPORARY MAINSTREAM DIALOGUE

Reimer seems to assert two mutually exclusive views—the factual reality of naturalism, and the spiritual significance of supernaturalism. In this chapter, I will address this problem more thoroughly. I will posit two possible conclusions, and articulate what each would mean for the justification of musical value, and the establishment of a philosophy of music education. I will conclude that one is more plausible than the other, and I will expound upon how that option might especially compliment what is lacking in Reimer’s position. Then, having drawn two possible though contrary conclusions, I will suggest an approach to collegiate or advanced secondary general music/music appreciation methodology that is inclusive of both views. I will offer some final thoughts and transition to the official conclusion of this research.

WORLDVIEW COMMITMENTS AND VALUE CONCLUSIONS

This section will compare the two foundational worldview claims of naturalism and non-naturalism. Each will preclude—i.e., determine or disqualify—possibilities concerning aesthetic value. While philosophers may hold to one or the other, the base claims of these views, concerning the nature of truth and value, are mutually exclusive; and so one cannot assert both

---

335 Naturalism (including non-cognitivism and cognitive naturalism) and non-naturalism (including theism, value intuitionism, and the potential significance of spiritual experience) represent the two foundational positions from which value cognitivism must ultimately pivot.
and hold a coherent view. I will present the logical aesthetic conclusions for each view, and consider what each would mean for the advocate of Reimer’s philosophy. I will make a case for non-naturalism as being able to speak more inclusively and comprehensively than naturalism, concerning aesthetic variables in general and Reimer’s concerns in particular. Finally, I will suggest a dialogical methodology—i.e. teaching via dialogue—that is inclusive of each position.

Friedrich Nietzsche determined that, if philosophical naturalism is true, then value is a purely subjective matter, and truth is but an assertion of individual will. A. J. Ayer, however, contended that, if philosophical naturalism is true, then any talk of aesthetics, ethics, or religion reduces simply to emotive utterance—i.e., it is literally meaningless. These conclusions seem to be more consistent with philosophical naturalism than the position to which Reimer holds.

If the world is as Nietzsche described, then truth and value, these can only be asserted; they cannot refer to anything truly meaningful. Additionally, given such a world as this, Karl Marx was correct when he declared that religion is simply an opium of the people—what more could it be? This point is similar to Reimer’s contention that, “it is no exaggeration to say that for some people aesthetic experience is the chief buffer between a life which is reasonably meaningful and one which is essentially meaningless.” If philosophical naturalism is true, then one is free to assert whatever makes the futility more bearable. Still, given the implications

336 Nietzsche, The Will to Power.
337 Ayer Language, Truth, Logic.
of philosophical naturalism, value language is ultimately meaningless. Alas, Reimer was not ready to live in the world of hard fact; and so he took a value leap.

This relates to Reimer’s cognitive dissonance in the following ways. First, if he is going to assert a naturalistic worldview—which he does—then his options are as follows. He cannot speak of the aesthetic experience as truly or universally meaningful—for that would be simply an emotive utterance. He cannot stress that form is truly valuable, but only that the experience of form is pleasurable. He cannot assert that the experience is deeply significant; only that it is pleasurable. (This, of course, is beginning to sound like behaviorism, which Reimer rejects). He can appeal to the value of religious experience in so far as he means: (1) that this is simply a pleasurable escape from the real world (as Marx suggested); (2) that he is referring solely to his own personal assertions of meaning (as Nietzsche suggested); and (3) that such a statement cannot refer to any real sense of value, but rather to his personal emoting (as Ayer observed). It seems, then, that the naturalistic view does not cohere with what Reimer is attempting to assert.

Aesthetic Value in a World of Hard Facts

What would be the most consistent conclusions, concerning aesthetic value, given a philosophical naturalist worldview? First, aesthetic value is individually constructed, so there can be no appeal to objective beauty, and no ultimate truth concerning universal value. When individuals come together and agree upon certain values, they can form value communities. Therein, aesthetic value would naturally assume a social purpose—socio-political reference, pragmatic preference, instrumental use, etc. According to communal agreement upon particularly pleasurable aspects of musical experience, they might stress form, reference, or the pleasurable experience in and of itself (i.e., for hedonistic reasons). Reference could not depict
anything truly ‘beautiful’ (for this requires an objective founding); rather, it could only depict the (instrumentally) useful object, the specific details of formal construction, successful achievement or praxial excellence in performance, the pleasurable experience, or given socio-political purposes. Some individuals or communities may value the pleasurable stimulation via attentiveness to formal details, but there could be no real beauty in form. Ultimately, the musical experience could only be valuable in so far as it is determined to be pleasurable, or pragmatically useful, according to the whims of individual or community.

What would this mean for music education? There could be no asserted imposition of a given philosophy of music. Nor could there be any mandate for general music education as truly and universally valuable. Music education could only serve the needs of the individual or community, and could then only be determined according to the preferences and purposes of the majority—these would likely be pragmatic or instrumental purposes. What clearly does not fit in this worldview is Reimer’s appeal to spiritual experience (if this is supposed to mean anything more than emotive assertions to lessen the discomfort of futility); at best, individual meanings are subjectively projected onto any given experience. But this is clearly not what Reimer wants. It seems, then, that the world of naturalism is not where Reimer really wants to make his case. If so, he has to accept the reality that individual meanings, pragmatic constructions, instrumental functions, or social purposes are all that music and the arts can really be valued for. If not, then he must relinquish his bias against the possibility of immutable, universal truths—so that he may explore the philosophical implications of aesthetic value within the various paradigms of a non-naturalistic worldview, in order to see if his philosophy is able to find a stronger foundation.

In summary, should the advocate of Reimer’s view determine to hold to a naturalistic view, with no room for immutable, universal truths beyond material process and human
construct, they can assert that the value lies in the experience—for that is the only place that it could be. What could not follow, however, is that value means any sense of universally deep significance that is intrinsic to the experience. Further, since the pleasure within any given experience would ultimately be determined on an individual basis, there could be no ultimate truth to which the absolute expressionist could appeal in asserting that value should not be reduced to subjectivism. This means that there could be no room, on this view, for the assertion that any given experience—whether the subjectively determined experience, the communal experience, or the experience in and for the sake of (pleasure) itself—is more valuable than any other (e.g., formalism, referentialism, expressionism, instrumentalism, praxialism, etc.). In short, in a world with no immutable truths, no philosophy of aesthetics can be true, because there is no Truth to which one may appeal; but subjective and pragmatic theories would be most productive.

A World without Dichotomy: Facts and the Fact of Values

The spirit of humanism, in its origins, championed an intellectual inquiry and aspiration for understanding. The post-Enlightenment habit of mediating scholarly debate in favor of naturalism seems, then, a dishonest move. A philosophy of music education that truly represents the spirit of humanistic inquiry must encourage a dialogue between both sides. I will here provide a case for aesthetic value on the view of non-naturalism. While value intuitionists commonly hold to a theistic position, there are exceptions wherein one is convinced that philosophical naturalism fails, but chooses to remain agnostic concerning theism. For the sake of brevity, however, I will appeal primarily to theism, as it is able to speak of both value
intuitionism and supernaturalism.\textsuperscript{340} The point is to show that some people have well-thought reasons for committing to universally referential value.

To some, it will seem presumptuous to assert philosophical naturalism and especially inconsistent to tout aesthetic value therein as referencing anything truly meaningful. Value intuitionists\textsuperscript{341} have great difficulty accepting naturalistic assertions of value, because these seem counter-intuitive to the convictions of pragmatic experience. Non-theistic philosopher Thomas Nagel, for example, sees value intuition as a strong case for rejecting philosophical naturalism.\textsuperscript{342} Still, one of the most significant points of naturalistic tension with which many theists will take issue is the problem of mind. Whereas on theism, the entire world testifies to truth of a mind beyond the material world the existence of mind cannot be explained satisfactorily on a philosophical naturalist worldview; it is only speculated to be eventually, inevitably, explainable by scientific study.

Mental states cannot be derived from studying brain states, and so it is deeply problematic to suppose the latter to speak conclusively or even prescriptively of the former. Language concerning physical states and/or behavior can speak only of that which is objectively observable, while mental states are experienced apart from observation. There is no reason, in other words, to accept the notion that consciousness is the product of brain states. As Groothuis observes, if philosophical naturalism is true, “we have no basis to trust our reasoning. Our

\textsuperscript{340} A theistic case for aesthetics represents a view of reality that holds goodness, truth, value, and aesthetic beauty to be intricately linked with religious belief in God or gods, and known through natural revelation (e.g., value intuitionism) and/or special revelation via spiritual experiences.

\textsuperscript{341} Value intuitionists hold that the immutable truth of goodness is known, with conviction, via pragmatic experience; one’s intuition of beauty/goodness/evil is not mere emoting or illusion; and goodness or beauty is not ultimately the product of human construction.

\textsuperscript{342} Nagel, \textit{Mind and Cosmos}, 121.
beliefs might be true (that is, by a cosmic fluke whereby nonrational forces cause us to hold true beliefs), but we would have no reasons to hold these beliefs, and so they could not count as knowledge.” In short, there is no reason to expect to even be able to know that something is valuable in a philosophical naturalist world.

Compare naturalism to theism, which holds an objective truth of goodness and beauty to be knowable via both pragmatic experience and reason. Not only do reasonable arguments for theism abound, theism is also able to speak of aesthetic value more comprehensively than naturalism. The theist can effectively appeal to arguments from objective value, for example, because absolute standards of goodness are possible on a theistic view. Appealing to the fact of pragmatic experience, common amongst all of humanity—wherein there is unanimous conviction that goodness, rightness, and truth exist—the theist is able to present a strong case for the objectivity of true beauty and goodness; this is because talk of goodness/badness, beauty/evil, and rightness/wrongness carries with it a ring of truth (i.e., it corresponds to reality) as it aligns (coheres) with our own pragmatic experiences.

This need not mean that the fullness of beauty is located within the immediate object of experience; only that the truth of beauty is reflected within and throughout the world—and especially so within an experience of artistic creation. As Immanuel Kant once stated, “two

---

343 Groothuis, Christian Apologetics, Loc. 4390. Or as Paul Copan has succinctly stated, “Our beliefs may help us survive, but there’s no reason to think they’re true.” Paul Copan, “A Moral Argument,” in Passionate Connection: Contemporary Discourses on Christian Apologetics, Edited by William Lane Craig and Paul Copan (Nashville, TN: B&H, 2007), 89.

344 Arguments include, but are not limited to: cosmological arguments; ontological arguments; teleological arguments; axiological arguments; evidential arguments, historical arguments, anthropological arguments, and archaeological arguments, and arguments from experience.

things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe . . . the starry heavens above and the moral law within.”

Notions of good/bad, right/wrong, beauty/evil, etc. are non-material ideals that cannot be grounded in a solely material world. And yet, such notions are clearly part of reality. Even Einstein recognized that “science can only ascertain what is, but not what should be.”

Intuition, then, is not superstition; it represents an argument from objectivity. As C. S. Lewis observed; “A man does not call a line crooked unless he has some idea of a straight line. What was I comparing this universe with when I called it unjust?”

While one may not have a “proof” of goodness or beauty (in the deconstructed sense), one is nonetheless left with a series of clues that weave into a convincing pattern of meaning—and one can only find meaning in a meaningful world. It therefore cannot be asserted that non-naturalism is without reason and argument. Non-naturalistic positions, then, deserve a voice in the mainstream dialogues of aesthetics and education.

BRIDGING THE CHASM

Despite his naturalistic assertions, it seems that Reimer ultimately desires to articulate the aesthetic experience as (1) an encounter with deep significance, and (2) a universal sense of value. His emphasis upon experience appears to be a plea for recognition that there is, at face value, true beauty within the aesthetic experience—i.e., the experience of artworks. Since these are confusing assertions on a naturalist view, it is therefore the opinion of the current researcher


348 C.S. Lewis, *Mere Christianity*, 38.
that Reimer’s position would make more sense pivoting from a non-naturalistic view—e.g., theism. This is not to imply that all of Reimer’s concerns will find footing on theism—e.g., that music is ultimately an end in and of itself—but only that his concern for musical value as universally and spiritually significant will find better footing if it pivots from a concession of immutable truth.

Let us then attempt to reconcile Reimer’s position with theism, in an effort to articulate his concerns in as coherent a position as possible. Of course, to avoid contradiction, the aesthetic advocate will first have to relinquish the claim that immutable truths and true value are the product of human construction. Having first made this necessary move, we can consider the spiritual significance of the aesthetic experience. On a theistic view, beauty is an objective reference to a standard of goodness beyond the material world. This one point will greatly impact one’s understanding of aesthetic experience. We will now consider the variables of form, reference, etc., as well as Reimer’s concern for ‘humanness,’ from a theistic lens.

First, there is plenty of freedom for value within social reference. If there is an objective awareness of goodness, then ‘the good’ or ‘the good life’ will certainly be an experience sought and an issue engaged via social contexts. There is no reason why beauty reflected within the art of human creation cannot be socially engaged, celebrated, and contemplated as part of the greater dialogue of beauty, truth, and goodness. Further, as Leland Ryken has observed, “The arts are perhaps the chief means by which a society focuses attention on its own values.” This need not imply that all value reduces to construction; rather, aware of true beauty reflected in the world, and wanting more of it, individuals express themselves as lovers of beauty; some artifacts express one’s identity, community, or serve socio-cultural needs more effectively than others.

Moreover, the arts often engage the question of truth within the world. If human beings were created to know and share goodness, as the theist holds, and to express themselves powerfully via the coupling of emotion and reason, then it is easily plausible—as the ancients believed—that the arts can have a powerful emotive force. Any politician understands that emotive force is often more persuasive than reason, even if one gives a fallacious argument. Why would the arts not be at least as powerful when used for socio-political purposes? Whether the power of experiencing truth, beauty, or the disarming sincerity of raw emotion is actually used for good is a matter of ethical theory.

Concerning aesthetic theory, the fact that the arts can be wielded in such a way is testimony to the fact that there is something objectively true about the arts that in fact moves people deeply. It seems, then, that Reimer has little room on either a naturalist or theistic view to downplay the pragmatic. Does this mean, then, that form has little value on a theistic view? Indeed not. If the world is truly designed and imbued with meaning, then the beauty of such meaning will be reflected throughout the world, and one’s pragmatic experiences of the world will be replete with a sense of intuitive awareness of such order and objective, universal meaning.

Add to this the fact that humans seem to seek purpose and order throughout their experiences, and it is easily plausible to conclude that humans continually seek an experiential encounter with a sense of aesthetic beauty observable in the greatness of nature and art objects as referential insight into the nature, or order, and the meaning, or purpose, of the act of creation itself. It is easily plausible, as the theist claims, that we are wired both to recognize goodness and to want more of it—to align oneself with the good, so to speak. Form itself can therefore be ‘beautiful,’ in appealing to one’s sense of desire for a well-established order or meaning—one’s
desire to engage the relationship between universal value and material order—and by engaging notions of universal excellence within imitative craftsmanship of the functioning nature of the particulars.

If we were created to be musical creatures, then psychological theories of listener perception or expectation when engaging musical form (e.g., that of Meyer) would make sense. Moreover, if we are designed to seek community—as some theists hold—it makes sense that the biological development of listener expectations is reportedly related to listening regularities within the social rhythms of one’s immediate context. For one so concerned, this would represent just one way of reconciling universals with particulars. Since rhythm is critical in language acquisition, and most social interactions involve a sense of rhythm, it is easily plausible that a well-ordered universe would include individuals with a finely tuned ability for discerning rhythm. This is complementary to Reimer’s position on listener attentiveness and expectation.

What are we then to make of experience? Is Reimer’s concern for the importance of experience even warranted? Is it, as he insists, the end in and for the sake of itself? Many theists will hold that while the arts offer much more than just the experience in and of itself, there is nevertheless a pragmatic enjoyment within the experience of the creative process, or attentiveness to a skillful excellence in the construction of craft or the mechanics of performance. As Ryken insists, “Artistic technique is a type of beauty and skill that calls attention to itself . . . . [All artists] flaunt their mastery of form and expect us to admire what they have created.” Still, it does not follow that just because musical experiences are often pleasurable, that musical


351 Ryken, 37.
value is therefore limited to the experience in and of itself. It may, at times, be a pleasurable end; but often, music is also a means to an end, which is a quest for meaning; a passion for order.

On the theistic view, experience is important and indeed relates to cognition, and perhaps to spiritual experience as well. For it is in the lived experience that one engages one’s world—i.e., one cognitively ponders the variables of lived experience: Who am I? What do I feel? What is the meaning of this feeling; of this experience? How is it that I am aware of meaning; and what does this mean? With a theistic view, one is able to acknowledge a foundation for truth, goodness, and beauty beyond the world. From this position, there is little difficulty in holding that, upon an experience of greatness, we are exposed to a deeper spiritual truth about our world—an undeniable experience that corroborates prior experiences and confirms our deep convictions that there is an ultimate source of beauty, truth, and goodness. One can truly experience greatness within the world if that experience testifies to the truth of significance beyond the world. Reimer’s position has room to fit here, as well.

On a theistic view, reference to beauty can never be completely removed from experience—for the truly objective referent is the very source of all reflected and acknowledged beauty or goodness within the world. Form involves reference to meaning and order within the object that then refers to a greater sense (meta-cognition) of meaning and order within the universe. This is why the ancients were insightful in their pondering of music within the spheres. That reference cannot be removed from experience is not only true given theism; it is also true given the fact of cognition: as one ponders feelings, one also engages cognitive reference to subjective experience; as one ponders form or animate order, one engages cognitive reference to object, or objective experience; and as one ponders one’s own cognition, or even the meaning of
universal cognition, one is also referentially engaging higher-order references. In short, experience engages cognition; and the cognition of meaning is necessarily referential.\(^{352}\)

Another of Reimer’s concerns involves the significance of humanness. Unlike philosophical naturalism, some theistic views are able to justify convincingly a special dignity instilled within the human being. As Steve Cowan and James Spiegel explain, the human being then has great creative and imitative potential for ordering his or her world in meaningful ways.\(^{353}\) Here too is a point that is not allowed given naturalism—wherein the human being may have advanced more so than other species, but cannot be anything really ‘special’—but is allowed given theism; and in fact compliments Reimer’s view. Most of Reimer’s concerns therefore seem far more plausible, if a non-naturalistic position, e.g. theism, is an option.

Not only is theism/non-naturalism more complementary to Reimer’s concerns than naturalism, a theistic/non-naturalistic position of aesthetics is also generally able to speak more comprehensively and more inclusively of aesthetic experience. After surveying common aesthetic views—namely, mimesis, expressionism, formalism, and Marxism—Cowan and Spiegel go on to present Nicholas Wolterstorff’s theory of the arts as world projection,\(^{354}\) wherein “the artist mimics God’s original creative act, by fashioning a world for public

\(^{352}\) To conceptualize one’s experience is immediately to evoke a sense of referential expectations. R. Scott Smith articulates how a thing \(X\), in itself (e.g. a musical experience), contains only intensional properties (non-mental properties; e.g., particular sounds). The actual object (e.g., a musical object) makes up the extension of a concept. The concept is an intentional property of a thought/belief (a mental property), and is therefore referential/representational. See: R. Scott Smith, Chapter 12.

\(^{353}\) Cowan and Spiegel, 428.

\(^{354}\) Nicholas Wolterstorff, Art in Action (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1980).
appreciation.“ World projection serves many purposes, including the evoking of emotion and engaging truths within one’s experiences, or about one’s world. The authors note that Wolterstorff’s aesthetic theology is able to speak broadly of theological themes and most inclusively of all other aesthetic paradigms; “The mimetic function appears in the artist’s imitation of God’s original creative act. The Marxist emphasis on ideology and social change is affirmed in the concept of modeling and the recognition of art’s power of persuasion. And Wolterstorff explicitly notes the expressive function of art.” The authors conclude that each theory is correct to some extent, but that they can only be successfully intertwined from within certain views of supernaturalism.

Theism/non-naturalism is not only more inclusive of the various aesthetic paradigms of form, reference, and experience; but also understands them as being significantly more intricately connected. It seems problematic for the reductionist to separate these variables, when they are so interdependent. For example, aesthetic experience cannot be a purely emotional experience lacking objective reference. As Groothuis eloquently states:

Aesthetic evaluation should involve the emotions of the perceiver, but the emotions ought to be calibrated to the nature of the object apprehended. It makes no sense to translate the statement ‘The waterfall is sublime’ to mean ‘I have sublime feelings’. Just as my experience of roundness when I see an orange is not in itself round, my experience of aesthetic excellence has an objective reference beyond the experience itself. Beauty is in the eye (or ear or imagination) of the beholder in that one identifies it and (ideally) responds to it in a particular way that is fitting. Beauty is not only in the eye of the beholder [emphasis in original]. The act of aesthetic judgment is a judgment of something outside myself, which I take to possess certain qualities, whether is be a painting, a sculpture or a musical performance.

355 Cowan and Spiegel, 428.

356 Mimesis involves reference to the real world, to possible worlds, or to truth beyond the world.

357 Ibid., 429.
Also, while the experience involves reference, the referent involves a sense of meaningful order—namely, meaningful form. Says Ryken, Art “rearranges the materials of life in order to give us a heightened perception of its qualities. Art is life at the remove of imaginative form.”

C.S. Lewis summarized the referential element well, when he said that the poet is “someone who says look at that and points.” Similarly, the musical work may draw attention (point) to a given created form, or to specifically referential meaning within or beyond the form; the subjective cognition, upon experience, may point inwardly to one’s own feelings or imaginative references; all the while, all parties involved—creator, performer, listener, etc.—engage in higher-order cognitive references to the existence of meaningful order—of intent, of purpose, of expectation, of rightness (e.g., performance), of goodness and of beauty. The arts may give shape and articulation to our feelings, but they also engage referential cognition of both order and desire.

Ryken articulates this cognition of referential meaning well:

By looking at anything closely, we come to understand it better... The wisdom that the arts convey is often a bringing to consciousness what people already know. In short, the meaning of contact with the arts is heightened awareness—awareness of ourselves, of people, of the world of God... Artists often do this by ‘defamiliarizing’ experiences—by portraying it in a new way so we will take note of it. A rich confusion of awareness lies below the level of our consciousness. Artists reach into that confusion and give it an order... We suddenly sense our experiences and insights projected onto the details of the work before us. Artists turn pain inward so we can bear it. They turn our joys into art so we can prolong them... Artists give shape to the affirmations and denials of the human race... The arts help us to understand and process life.

---


359 Ryken, 26.


361 Ryken, 31-2.
The arts seem indeed more complicated that any narrow paradigm (formalism, expressionism, etc.) allows. The aesthetician pivoting from a foundational assumption of theism/non-naturalism seems able to justify meta-cognition of truly meaningful experiences in a far more comprehensive way than the naturalist—moreover, in a way that resonates with the truth of our pragmatic experiences. Gadamer was insightful to note that aesthetic experience somehow “takes the person experiencing it out of the context of his life, by the power of the work of art, and yet relates him back to the whole of his existence.”\textsuperscript{362} Ultimately, says Ryken, “art is not about things as they are, but about things as they matter,” as human experience, including aesthetic experience, is replete with “meanings that take hold of us both consciously and unconsciously.”\textsuperscript{363} This is exactly what the theist, for example, would expect.

There seems to be a unique relationship between experience and reference, and reference as expectant of a meaningful experience. Also, an experience of formalized meaning seems to evoke conceptual higher-order references to an expectation of orderliness, meaningfulness—i.e., a purposeful world, one that was created and imbued with value. It would follow that such a world would be one to which the human being—if created to be a valuable part of it—would deeply yearn. This is why C. S. Lewis understood aesthetic experiences as those moments when “we want to be more than ourselves . . . . We want to see with other eyes, to imagine with other imaginations, to feel with other hearts, as well as our own . . . We demand windows.”\textsuperscript{364}


\textsuperscript{363} Ryken, 26.

Theism compliments aesthetic awareness more comprehensively, and is more generous to Reimer’s concerns than philosophical naturalism. Experience, however, should not be removed from either form or reference. There is a deep sense of goodness inherent within order, and undeniably so amidst pragmatic experience; but it does not follow that a rigid methodological emphasis upon order is necessarily good. Similarly, there is a sense of inherent worth in the expressiveness of the individual; but this does not mean that all personal expression without concern for order is good. Perhaps goodness is a reflection of the fact that both form and expression are meant to be—that there is inherent worth within the individual, and an overarching sense of order to guide individual expression; but both involve reference. This is why Valentine has suggested that; “instead of emphasizing the ‘uniqueness’ of music, educators should introduce it as an aesthetic embodiment of the human passion for order.”[365]

Approaching music education as an engagement of passion, order, and referential meaning, collectively, seems a more open-minded option than formalism, referentialism, or expressionism alone allows. Consider, for example, the ethical symbolism of form vs. expression. The notion of using music appreciation as a means to critical thinking about order, desire, and the question of ‘goodness’ is reminiscent of the pre-modern concern for studying ethos and music as insight into the philosophy of value.

Referential Education: Truth, Desire, and the Human Condition

One variable needs to be addressed carefully before proceeding—for it is, on some views of theism, an essential variable of referential cognition; but, if philosophical naturalism is true, it

---

[365] Valentine, 8.
can only reduce to behaviorism. This is the issue of desire. I will keep this succinct by appealing primarily to C. S. Lewis’ concept of sehnsucht, and James Smith’s theology of culture.

Lewis spoke of a deep and meaningful referential longing—“an unsatisfied desire which is itself more desirable than any other satisfaction”\(^\text{366}\)—associated with one’s objective sense of true goodness and beauty; one’s awareness that the human being is instilled with a value that points elsewhere. Expounding upon this longing, he wrote:

\begin{quote}
I call it Joy, which is here a technical term and must be sharply distinguished both from Happiness and from Pleasure. Joy (in my sense) has indeed one characteristic, and one only, in common with them; the fact that any one who has experienced it will want it again. Apart from that, and considered only in its quality, it might almost equally well be called a particular kind of unhappiness or grief. But then it is the kind we want. I doubt whether anyone who has tasted it would ever, if both were in his power, exchange it for all the pleasures in the world. But then Joy is never in our power and pleasure often is.\(^\text{367}\)
\end{quote}

So then, applying this sehnsucht to aesthetic theory, part of the reason why human beings seek beauty and meaning via aesthetic experiences—by which I mean experiences wherein one engages meaningful order or animate expression via nature or the arts—involves the expression of and searching for a deeper referential longing—i.e., for spiritual fulfillment.

Lewis describes desire in the sense of a robust religious experience.\(^\text{368}\) This would seem to compliment Reimer’s insightful observation that the value of aesthetic experience may in fact be linked to religious experience. As Lewis contended, “Creatures are not born with desires unless satisfaction for these desires exists . . . . If I find in myself a desire which no experience in this world can satisfy, the most probable explanation is that I was made for another world.”\(^\text{369}\)


\(^{367}\) Ibid., 18.

\(^{368}\) Ibid., 166.
sounds, then, as if this too represents yet another concern of Bennett Reimer—arguably his deepest concern. Again, such is justifiable on supernaturalism, but nonsensical given naturalism.

Such an understanding of desire sets the stage well to introduce a thought-provoking philosophy of cultural aesthetics. James Smith posits an aesthetic theology\(^{370}\) that sees the individual as primarily desire-oriented, and cultural influence as desire shaping. He questions whether education is in fact the absorption of ideas or, more accurately, the formation of hearts and desires—the shaping of hopes, passions, and visions of the good life. The latter would mean that education is happening everywhere—in homes, at sporting events, and even at the mall.

Smith artistically describes what he calls the “mall liturgy,” in order to point out the spiritual-experience-seeking nature of cultural institutions that we inhabit. Each cultural institution contains its own subtle pedagogies. Since the “mall pedagogy” aims for the heart rather than the head (e.g., consumerism), Smith insists that cultural values shape students’ attentiveness and desires more so than the academic institution. He states, “Because our hearts are oriented primarily by desire, by what we love, and because those desires are shaped and molded by the habit-forming practices in which we participate, it is the rituals and practices of the mall—the liturgies of the mall and market—that shape our imaginations and how we orient ourselves to the world.”\(^{371}\) In an interview addressing the story behind her *Saving Leonardo*, Nancy Pearcey echoes this idea, but stresses more specifically the subtle pedagogies of the cultural artifacts within those malls and markets. Says Pearcey, “The arts are how most people


\(^{371}\) Ibid., 24.
get their ideas about life. They don’t say, ‘I need a philosophy of life,’ and then sign up for a course at the local university. Instead they pick up their ideas through the books they read, the movies they watch, the images from advertising.” Pearcey’s point is well taken. Is it unreasonable to suppose that students take many of their ideas concerning truth, beauty, and goodness from the music that they listen to, or from mainstream philosophies of music pervasive throughout their cultural institutions?

Smith’s theology of culture sees human nature as essentially desiring and imaginative, and considers how practices shape the aim of one’s desire and understanding of the good life. This has fascinating implications for approaching aesthetic education. Why must ‘aesthetic education’ be defined as ‘absolute expressionism’? Can it not mean something more comprehensive, like, ‘an education, via contemplation of the arts, that promotes critical inquiry into cultural aesthetic pedagogies, and dialogue concerning the nature of goodness and beauty’?

**OF DIFFERENCE AND DICHOTOMY**

It is problematic to misrepresent what the aesthetic education enterprise can look like simply because many have previously defined it narrowly. In actuality, the term, taken at face value, implies education in which one engages the various paradigms of aesthetics. So, it would be more accurate to define aesthetic education as a critical thinking approach to arts education in which one compares and contrasts the different philosophical emphases. But even this carries with it a potential for a biased misrepresentation.

It would seem to be both anti-intellectual and contra the true spirit of humanist inquiry to remove an option from the dialogue due to a predetermined bias. The defining values of a given

---

society will likely never be unanimous, but often involve lower levels of conflict; the question is not whether the majority will control the microphone, but whether all views will be allowed to vie in the classroom. I have shown that non-naturalistic views such as theism include many well-pondered theories. Moreover, many points mentioned compliment philosophical positions within pre-modern aesthetic theories—e.g., *ethos*, music of the spheres, etc. I have also shown why it is problematic to assert naturalism as the only option in determining aesthetic meaning.

Still, while their ultimate conclusions concerning value are mutually exclusive, there is nonetheless some common agreement between the aesthetics of naturalists and non-naturalists. Both agree that they mean something—whether emotive or literal, culturally constructed or universally referential—when speaking of goodness, value, beauty, and meaning itself. Though they begin with contrasting assumptions and end with exclusive conclusions, both sides are nonetheless concerned with understanding value and advocating their view. Why not therefore pivot from the harmony in order to dialogue about the differences? What if the classroom—while still teaching elements of listening, historical, cultural, and stylistic detail—became a sort of open forum where students struggled with questions of beauty and goodness?

It seems that a truly inclusive aesthetic education will encourage students to wrestle with questions of aesthetic value, desire, and goodness both on a normative and meta-aesthetic level. A normative aesthetic approach might encourage students to ponder form, reference, social commentary, instrumental use, performance expectation vs. individual freedom, and experiential value. A meta-aesthetic approach would press students against the horns of seeming dilemmas between universal and particular, fact and value, form and freedom, order and chaos, [373]

---

[373] Whereas normative aesthetics involves descriptive variables of what individuals or cultures value, meta-aesthetics involves the higher-order questions of what is good or beautiful and why.
good and evil; or encourage students to ponder cosmological theories. Students could even ponder the origin of musical beauty itself, by considering, in open-forum dialogue, both the naturalist case and the theistic case for beauty.

In such a classroom, the student would engage specific works, and learn specific details about those works. And yet they would also think critically beyond those works—engaging in an artistic process of critical evaluation. Consider, for example, Strauss’ *Also Sprat Zarathustra*, *Op. 30* not only as an opportunity to discuss dynamics, but also to dig into the issue of Nietzsche’s conclusion that a death of god means utter freedom. Perhaps alluding to Nietzsche’s aesthetic theory of formal order vs. freedom of expression, students could wrestle with the question of which is better—a world of rigid order or one of utter freedom. Also, students might select a work, critique it, and then dialogue about their assessment. This is valuable because, while students may be unqualified as professional critics for a given music culture, they remain active critics nonetheless amidst the mainstream culture—assessing the artifacts therein that continually vie for the attentiveness of their desires.

Given the more inclusive nature of an aesthetic education defined in this manner, there is much more freedom in approach on behalf of the educator, while remaining focused nonetheless upon rigorous content. Such a challenging approach to music appreciation further offers a powerful case for general music as interdisciplinary. The most important aspects of education, in so far as they relate to social success, have long been critical thinking and the ability to dialogue publicly. Should aesthetic education take such an approach as the dialogical classroom, it will not only be to the advantage of skill development in public speaking and critical thinking, but it can engage students to think critically about an issue that permeates every other area of life—the question of what is good. Is something good because I desire it or do I desire it because it is
good? How do I justify my claims to value if the world is all fact? Does music relate to ethics? Does music relate to religion, beyond the fact of pragmatic use? Do the arts communicate truth or only opinion? This list of applicable interdisciplinary questions is by no means exhaustive.

Consider the last question, for exemplary application. Ryken insists upon the ability of the arts to reflect truth in detail. Still, he describes five common fallacies concerning this matter: (1) that the arts must, by definition, tell truth; (2) that all artworks must tell truth; (3) that arts’ usefulness must be determined according to its abstract ideas; and (4) that arts’ usefulness depends on the truthfulness of the philosophical viewpoint of the artist; but this does not mean (5) that works of art make no truth claims. Expounding upon how truth can be found within the arts, even when nothing is explicitly asserted, he says:

Artists do more than simply present human experience. They interpret it. They see reality from their own perspective and mold their vision around their own opinions . . . . Except for nonrepresentational art and music, virtually every work of art, music, or literature makes an implied interpretation of reality . . . [But] even nonrepresentational art conveys a sense of life . . . . Artistic perspective consists of such attitudes as order or lack of it, hope or despair, the presence or the absence of a supernatural reality, meaning or futility.

Ryken suggests that works of art often press upon three fundamental worldview categories: Reality (What really exists?); Morality; (What makes something good or bad?); and Values (What is worth experiencing?) Why cannot aesthetic education engage such questions?

This is an opportune time to consider how music can serve as a doorway to a dialogue of ethical value. Recalling Lewis’ theory of desire, and Smith’s theology of culture, we share a

374 Ryken, 125-30.
375 Ibid., 141-2.
376 Ibid., 143.
proclivity toward desire and seeking more of that which most captures our desires. Three significant questions, then, are whether something is good because it feels good; whether one thing is better than another; and whether some things can in fact be bad. Appealing to the eloquent insight of Lewis, Ryken states, “There is a sense in which everyone, regardless of his or her worldview, shares an identical task—that of coming to an understanding of the truth of reality in an intelligent awareness of alternatives. C. S. Lewis has written that ‘to judge between one ethos and another, it is necessary to have got inside both.’” This brings the researcher full circle to the point that what is being suggested here is a dialectical approach as encouraged by Jorgensen, but specifically as a method for engaging critical questions of aesthetic value.

In example of application, the student might be asked to select a musical work with references, e.g., a programmatic tone poem, or an art song, and then write a paper choosing an aesthetic paradigm (form, reference, or expression), and then arguing for that paradigm as representing the more valuable aspect of their music experience. They can apply musical terminology acquired in class to describe specific details within the song that relate to the case that they are making. Let me also provide an example of higher-order evaluation. Old British folk ballads often include narratives of injustice and revenge. The student might write a paper engaging the song critically—therein detailing the nature of the ethical subject matter—and then, while describing the song appropriately when necessary (e.g., a “strophic,” “homophonic,” etc.)

---

377 Some philosophers of music education have championed normative, pragmatic, or socio-political theories of ethics. But a metaethical dialogue seems more powerful in that students are forced to ponder what is good, why, and what one should think when desires collide.

378 Ryken, 146-7.

379 Recall once more Jorgensen’s vision of a dialectical approach in which students “recognize tensions in need of resolution, and hope that through dialogue these tensions can be worked through and either reconciled or tolerated.” Jorgensen, In Search of Music Education, xii-xiii.
the student might decide whether the act of revenge was right or wrong; importantly, the student will need to defend this position in their paper. Students can present the song and their case to their classmates, and then the class can engage in open-forum dialogue.

While this approach might seem too philosophical for some educators, there is another approach in extant literature that compliments Jorgensen’s dialectical approach, as well as the current researcher’s interest in a referential dialogue of aesthetic values, but might be more appealing to the reader who prefers psychological archetypes rather than philosophical dilemmas. Laurence Berman has presented an archetypal model of musical dialogue. He builds from viewing the human condition as including three paradigms: man-as-himself; man-and-society; and man-with-cosmos. The universal concerns of human beings involve an awareness of: life-death; harmony-conflict; unity-duality; body-spirit; change-eternity; fear-desire; joy-sorrow; love-hate; reason-will; and order-chaos.

From these concerns, he introduces an overarching dichotomy of Eros/Thanatos (life/death), and five subsequent dichotomies: comic/tragic (“apprehension of the world, subjectively as pleasure and pain, objectively as good and evil”); romantic/ironic (“sympathy and antipathy—our impulse to be drawn toward an object or to draw away from it”); mythic/humanistic (the need for absolutes—the need to question); hieratic/demotic (cultivation of the extraordinary—significance in the ordinary); and Apollonian/Dionysian (“a number of interrelated perceptions, ranging from the more ontological—finite-infinite, form-feeling—to the more personal and temperamental—sober-intoxicated, control-abandon”).


\[381\] Ibid., 7-19.
Without necessarily neglecting attentiveness to formal detail, listening experience, or concerns in style/genre, students can also be asked to think critically concerning archetypal categories into which a given piece might fall. Perhaps they could choose a musical work, categorize it into an archetype or two, and then write a paper explaining and defending their position. Therein, they might be encouraged to describe in detail—using appropriate musical terminology learned within the classroom—what the music is doing at various points within the work, and why they think this relates to the archetype they have chosen. While some of these archetypes will work best to describe programmatic works or music with lyrics, the Apollo/Dionysus model of formal control vs. unbridled expression, or the Eros/Thanatos model of willful assertion vs. restful cessation can be applied easily to purely instrumental works.

The points to be made in all of this are as follows. First, it is problematic for an educational philosophy to prevent non-naturalistic aesthetic positions from vying for consideration just because mainstream representative scholarship may have embraced philosophical naturalism. Second, it is misleading to define something as broadly implicative as “aesthetic education” to mean something as narrowly explicit as absolute expressionism. Finally, a dialogical approach to aesthetic education is at least worth considering, as it has the potential of being both comprehensively interdisciplinary and broadly inclusive of differing, even irreconcilable views. Reimer stated in 1970, “There is an almost desperate need for a better understanding of the value of music.” Indeed. There is a desperate need to understand aesthetic value in general. Let us then open the forum and encourage students to talk about it.

---

CHAPTER VII:  
CONCLUSION

It would be problematic to impose an academic bias in the name of free inquiry. While there has been a longstanding philosophical dichotomy in music education between David Elliott’s Praxial philosophy and Bennett Reimer’s absolute expressionist philosophy—which has come to be known as a leading representative of aesthetic education—there is yet a more pressing dichotomy embedded deep within contemporary aesthetics dialogue. The current research has taken up the task of evaluating Reimer’s philosophy of aesthetic education. Reimer’s philosophy involves several complex layers of both positive observations and problematic assertions. Still several prominent themes have been discovered.

On the surface level, many have taken issue with the claim that musical value ultimately lies in the experience itself. Pentti Määnttänen, for example, has urged reconciliation between the aesthetic approach and the praxial and pragmatic paradigms, insisting that, “Because meanings are necessarily tied to the social and cultural context, the aesthetic experience . . . cannot be completely private and isolated.”

On a deeper layer of Reimer’s value philosophy, it was discovered that he rejects the notion of universal, ultimate truths, insisting that these are the imaginative product of human

construction. This reduces value to context—with no possibility of reference beyond. It is helpful, however, to distinguish between the fact that all inquiry occurs within a given context, and the assertion that contexts necessarily determine the truth of goodness, beauty, or value. It is a serious flaw for Reimer to reject presumptuously the possibility of universal objective truth concerning value, because there then exists no standard of truth to which his advocacy can appeal, and by which his view may be assessed.

Concerning yet another deeply embedded assumption, it was discovered that Reimer’s understanding of aesthetic experience is significantly intertwined with his philosophy of spiritual experience. But it was also discovered that his philosophy of spiritual experience—foundational to his theory of aesthetic experience—conflicts with his philosophical naturalism. While much has been written in evaluation of his absolute expressionist claims, research is limited in assessing the aesthetic presumptions and pre-determined conclusions relating to his worldview claims. The current study therefore evaluated his aesthetic philosophy from within the worldview foundations of both philosophical naturalism and non-naturalism. While Reimer’s appeal to the value of ineffable experience in and of itself seems ill-defensible on either view, it was nonetheless determined that non-naturalism—and theism, in particular—is far more conducive than naturalism, to his concern for significance within the experience, and to his suggested link between aesthetic value and religious experience.384

Ultimately, it was discerned that the greatest obstacle for Reimer is his inability to appeal to true value, goodness, significance, or beauty because of his outright rejection of immutable

truth. Understanding this as the naturalistic bias that encourages a fact/value split, the advocate of aesthetic education will have to relinquish the claim to know that there is no immutable truth. Conceding an awareness of objectively true beauty and goodness reflected within and throughout the world, there is much room for a more comprehensive and inclusive understanding of aesthetic education.

Expressing concern for the abandonment of universals complicated by the demands of globalization for ironic attention to localization, Martin Stokes posits that the totalities within world music “remind us of the impossibility of localism.”\footnote{Martin Stokes, “Afterword,” in The New (Ethno)musicologies ed. Henry Stobart (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press 2008), 214.} Andy Nercessian contributes, “Music and its context and perception might always exist together, yet this is like saying that we need not differentiate trees from the soil in which they grow since they always grow together.”\footnote{Andy H. Nercessian, Postmodernism and Globalization in Ethnomusicology: An Epistemological Problem (Scarecrow Press, 2002), 19.} As noted by J. H. Kwabena Nketia, aspects of form and structure reveal themselves even in traditions that lack a written body of theory.\footnote{J. H. Kwabena Nketia, “Contextual Strategies of Inquiry and Systemization,” Ethnomusicology 34:1 1990: 82.} Citing Charles Seeger, Nketia concludes that “The goal of musicology must be ‘the study of the total music of man both in itself and in relation to what is not itself.’”\footnote{Ibid., 78} Nercessian suggests that perhaps the new aim of music education should be “the study of culture-transcendent appropriation;” we must ask why music is able to convey such a variety of meanings, how such a variety of meanings can exist, and what that means.\footnote{Ibid., 78}
It is no mistake that the dialogue of aesthetics and ethics has a significantly intertwined history of inquiry. As Alister McGrath has observed, “One of the greatest themes of classical philosophy is what is sometimes called the ‘Platonic triad’—truth, beauty, and goodness.”\textsuperscript{390} If one were so eager to challenge assertions of absolutes, it would be academically dishonest not to apply the same scrutiny to the assertions of nihilism and existentialism. McGrath contends, “Beauty reveals truth by pointing to a realm beyond the visible world of particulars.”\textsuperscript{391}

Both Plato and Augustine pondered whether beauty is the result of pleasure, or pleasure a testimony to beauty,\textsuperscript{392} and many writers of antiquity even pondered the existence of evil in relation to an awareness of beauty/goodness. Such is a question of objective meaning; and it is a universal dialogue. Crispin Sartwell reports, “The nature of beauty is one of the most enduring and controversial themes in Western philosophy, and is—with the nature of art—one of the two fundamental issues in philosophical aesthetics.”\textsuperscript{393} Rather than imposing a dichotomy, and asserting one side of the dialogue—this runs the risk of imposing the wrong perspective—perhaps education should champion the dialogue itself, as Jorgensen suggests.

Meaning is a universal pursuit, and people throughout time (many of them, musicians) have dealt with the issues of beauty and evil and drawn from their conclusions applications for living and ethical interaction. C. S. Lewis stated, “If anyone will take the trouble to compare the

\textsuperscript{389} Nercessian, 132.

\textsuperscript{390} McGrath, 103.

\textsuperscript{391} Ibid., 115.

\textsuperscript{392} Monroe C. Beardsley, \textit{Aesthetics From Classical Greece to the Present: A Short History} (University of Alabama Press, 1975), 95.

moral teaching of, say, the ancient Egyptians, Babylonians, Hindus, Chinese, Greeks, and Romans, what will really strike him will be how very like they are to each other and to our own.” The question of values is deeply connected to that of universal objective meaning.

While many of Nietzsche’s conclusions were quite problematic, he at least began with the productive questioning of meaning, and he contributes some valuable insight to music concerning an ethical dialogue via the conflict of the Apollonian-Dionysian dichotomy. Marja Heimonen posits that the central tenets of education are entwined with virtue, moral philosophy, and development of the whole human being; “The ‘scales of justice’ have to be balanced between complete freedom and complete engagement with the law. Legal [objective] rules . . . cannot be abandoned but have to be adapted to practical life.” She asks whether the music teacher should approach the curricula in a similar manner. Gaudelli and Hewitt support such an approach because “problem solving is the condition of organic life.”

This research has therefore suggested a reformation in understanding what aesthetic education can mean. It seems to have been primarily defined, in the United States, as absolute


395 The Apollonian and Dionysian concept represents a philosophical dichotomy, wherein Apollo (god of form, order, and reason) and Dionysus (god of freedom, chaos, and expression) struggle for dominance. The resulting dramatic tension of this struggle is said to represent the heart of all great tragedy. See: Freiderich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music*, Translated by Ian Johnston (2009), Retrieved March 10, 2013 from: http://www.richerresourcespublications.com/EBooks/philosophic_titles/Nietzsche/Birth_of_Tragedy_e-book-2.htm

396 Heimonen, 124.

397 Gaudelli and Hewitt, 90; The authors elaborate upon the curricular implications of this point; “Ideally, schools would become incubators of social change rather than institutional-like organizations aimed at supplying workers for their productivity and efficiency. Teachers and students, in such a conception, would be intellectually engaged in the problems of the day and engage in action to address these problems.” (Ibid., 93).
expressionism. The current researcher—willing to concede the possibility of immutable truths concerning truth, goodness, beauty, and meaning—has suggested understanding aesthetic education, instead, as a dialogical education, via attention to the arts, wherein students are encouraged to think critically about the various aesthetic paradigms, and to dialogue about meaningful questions of value—e.g., Is $X$ good because we desire it, or do we desire it because it is good? There are a number of promising dialectical tensions that can be worked through, including: the classical dialectics of truth—universal/particular; and objective/subjective; ethical dialectics (the passion for order and the fight for freedom)—form/freedom; etc.

MUSICAL VALUE, AESTHETIC EDUCATION, AND THE PHILOSOPHER KING

Roger Scruton has claimed that, “beauty is vanishing from our world because we live as though it did not matter.”\(^{398}\) He points to Arthur Danto as one who holds to the notion of beauty as deceptive.\(^{399}\) This seems perhaps an astute observation. The classical (pre-modern) dialogue encouraged the study of beauty and the arts as inquiry into the issue of universal meaning, and understood music as robustly interdisciplinary. Following the Enlightenment, however, after the term “aesthetic” was coined, beauty was slowly but surely reduced more exclusively to the empirical senses, and inevitably to little more than emotive projection or private construction. The rise of philosophical naturalism into the limelight of mainstream thought resulted in a bias toward reductionism, thus imposing dogmatically a schism between fact and value—the presumption that values cannot be universal, objective facts, as they can neither be empirically


\(^{399}\) Ibid., 140.
measured nor observed. Coinciding with this shift toward a habitual philosophical reductionism, there arose two dogmatic impositions of music modernism: aestheticism (removing musical meaning from reference to immutable truths of extra-musical values); and a dichotomy between formalism/expressionism. Many post-Enlightenment traditions therefore inherited a heavy burden of having to assert value groundlessly in a world of hard facts.

This set the stage well for the North American emphasis upon Aesthetic Education, influenced by Langer and Dewey. Meyer combined the philosophies of Langer and Dewey within the paradigm of absolute expressionism. Any reference to an immutable truth concerning beauty and value remained avoided. It was Bennett Reimer who largely defined twentieth century music education as aesthetic education. Combining the philosophies of Langer, Dewey, and Meyer with the theology of Paul Tillich, he attempted to justify music education within aesthetic experience as a sort of religious experience, to be valued as an end in and for the sake of itself—with no universal, objective truth beyond. Unfortunately, however, his philosophical position smacks of both naturalism and aestheticism. It is formalism with an existential leap into the realm of values, in order to assert the experience as valuable, when in actuality, he seems to have so rigidly removed the possibility for true referential significance that all that remains is a world of experiential fact, but no real value—as value is necessarily referential; always begging questions of objective beauty, truth, and goodness.\textsuperscript{400}

The academic institution cannot completely embrace Postmodernism, because such would undermine need for the academy. So it seems to cling to the modernist assertion that the

\textsuperscript{400} To be clear, the author is not suggesting that one cannot experience true value. What is here being contended is that such a notion of truly meaningful experience does not fit within the worldview that grounds the value of experience, circularly, within the experience of valuable experiences. Value must, therefore, be a concept smuggled in from another worldview.
arts are valuable for their own sake. But what does this mean if value is an empty, and not a robust, concept? From the convictions of the leading Greek philosophers until the rise of Renaissance Humanism, universal truth was a common part of the dialogue. The dualism therein—a dualism, but not necessarily a dichotomy—involves the nature of goodness, and the extent to which the material realm was inherently evil or could be manipulated toward (universally) valuable ends. However, a growing emphasis on autonomy within nature quickly led to reality disconnected from the realm of values—and eventually skepticism that anything can be truly known at all. The modern history of aesthetic theory seems to have teetered on either side of a fact/value dichotomy. Alas, neither side alone is able to ground meaning.

The Enlightenment saw nature as a great machine to be dominated by the autonomous individual. As foreseen by Leonardo, however, the implication therein is that all is determined. There is, therefore, no freedom. The Romantics replaced the machine with a metaphor of an organic spirit of freedom and individualism. This quickly led to a sort of aesthetic spiritualism wherein the universal is an experiential connectedness; so, nature became a religious experience. The historical tension between the Enlightenment and Romantic traditions portrays well the struggle to ground the cognition of objective value from within a worldview that presupposes philosophical naturalism. The fact/value split, whether asserted dogmatically or embraced presumptuously, followed the rise of ‘enlightened’ naturalism and fostered a struggle that has led to a culture of skepticism concerning value.

This has impacted twenty-first-century music education in the U.S., in that music is taught with primary emphasis on form and little consideration for reference beyond the programmatic, while the ultimate justification given for music education as aesthetic education

401 Pearcey, Saving Leonardo, 89.
has been largely built upon the notion of a spiritual experience in and for the sake of itself. This establishes the value of experience, circularly, within the experience of valuable experiences. If only for the sake of the experience, why? What then? If, on the other hand, the experience of the particulars is valuable in prompting dialogue and critical inquiry concerning the issues of objectivity and subjectivity, of universals and particulars, then aesthetic education as a promising approach to interdisciplinary inquiry may indeed be justifiable. Problems may remain, but perhaps the main problem lies not with the whole MEAE enterprise; perhaps it is simply the definition of aesthetics education that needs revisiting. Reimer’s observation is intuitive if it can be justified beyond the experience in and of itself—but that of course suggests referential value.

Broadly speaking, education today seems to stress, concurrently, empirically objective details and standardized expectation amidst a cultural backdrop of relative truths—given that immutable truths are said to be merely human constructs. The arts are seen as contributing to personal, private feelings or expressions, and not really to any sense of universal objective value. And so, arts education becomes trivialized. This educational juxtaposition of a long-unresolved tension in Western thought is both conflicting and crippling for students—teaching them an empty and contradicting dualism of formalism and relativism. But students often seek deep answers to profound questions. What is good? What should I value? And Why?

Questions concerning objective/subjective truth and the practical applications of decision-making are significantly intertwined with the issue of universal, objective value. Ramsay’s line of uncertainty reveals that it is ethical meaning for which one grasps as one becomes desperate for any sense of meaning at all;\(^{402}\) and is thus tied up significantly with the question of beauty and goodness. Perhaps, then, this reveals the need for educational curricula to

\(^{402}\) Ramsay, 19.
be centered upon a dialogue of value. This would suggest a warrant for aesthetic education if understood not as an experience in and of itself, but as a doorway to philosophical dialogue. This, however, is nothing new. It is very similar to what Plato envisioned in the student of goodness as a philosopher-king.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS REVISITED

This research has surveyed historical aesthetic philosophies of music, and determined that there is a noteworthy historical shift following the Enlightenment. It was further determined that philosophical naturalism has indeed influenced Bennett Reimer’s view of aesthetic value, and therefore his philosophy of music education as aesthetic education. Some contemporary alternatives were suggested concerning the possibilities of what a more holistic approach to aesthetic education in the United States might look like. The most robust philosophy of aesthetic education applicable to a music appreciation course for the general student will be one that is comprehensive of various aesthetic paradigms and inclusive of differing views concerning the truth of value. It seems to the researcher that the most comprehensive and inclusive approach will be a dialogical approach that uses the arts to encourage students to think critically and engage one another dialectically concerning questions at the heart of inquiry into the nature of goodness and meaning of beauty.

A few points of clarification seem appropriate. First, it is essential to understand the distinction between methodology and justification. Although a few suggestions for approaching methodology may have been offered, the primary concern of this research has been that of justification, not methodology. Second, music education has not herein been approached narrowly as “performance education,” but more broadly as general music appreciation.
Finally, it is important to understand that the author has not here attempted to present an imposition of referentialism—wherein the *ism* attached suggests that all other aesthetic paradigms are to be understood as less important than referential qualities when evaluating art objects as aesthetically pleasing. Rather, the author has attempted to open the aesthetic dialogue much wider than it seems contemporary philosophies of music education as aesthetic education have allowed, and to show that the issue of value cannot really be removed from the question of reference; the issue of justification concerning the universal value of music and music education cannot really be removed from the question of universal objective values. There indeed seem to be true experiences of beauty found within and throughout the world; but this must reflect a standard of beauty beyond the world.

Moreover, it has been contended that referential value is significantly intertwined with pragmatic experience and formal attentiveness. While there is often an ineffable quality to beauty, the fact of its true, universal objectivity can be nevertheless experienced pragmatically, and expressed both formally and referentially within and through the arts—whether it be an emotionally or intellectually engaging experience; and whether it be an engaging of explicit imitations of order and goodness, or of implicit negations, whereby one is brought to experience/ponder a projected world seemingly devoid of beauty, order, or consonance.

**SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH**

There are numerous possibilities for further research. First, a few ideas come to mind for the philosopher. One can, e.g., take Jorgensen’s emphasis on a dialectical method, coupled with the current researcher’s suggestion of applying it to aesthetic education, and compare it with
dialogical/dialectical approaches from beyond the field of aesthetics—in order to suggest further, and more detailed, approaches to curricular design.

Another approach would be to revisit a prior philosophical study. T. Ray Wheeler has contended that Reimer’s philosophy of feelings resembles Plato’s concept of forms and the systematic approach of Elliott’s praxis is Aristotelian—rejecting immeasurable claims of the aesthetic and emphasizing measurable, procedural progression.\textsuperscript{403} However, it was Plotinus who emphasized a sort of spiritual escapism. Perhaps it is worth revisiting Wheeler’s position, and seeing whether Reimer’s view might better align with that of Neo-Platonism.

Additionally, we have seen that Reimer rejected immutable truth, whereas Plato was certain of the forms as immutably true. Are they, then, as similar as Wheeler suggests? It is also worth questioning the extent to which Elliott might be compared to Aristotle. Elizabeth Schellekens has pointed out that, for Aristotle, art is “the realization of a universal: unlike history, which is limited to past events and is thus constrained to particulars, art seeks to capture and portray the universal in each individual phenomenon.”\textsuperscript{404}

One other study comes to mind for the student of classical Greek philosophy. It would be an interesting endeavor to compare Aristotle’s case for music education in Book VIII of \textit{Politics} with Reimer’s Philosophy. The researcher interested in studying further the impact of philosophical naturalism might analyze John Cage’s case that “everything we do is music” in light of the problem of reducing value to mere construction.\textsuperscript{405}

\textsuperscript{403} Wheeler, “Rationalism and Empiricism.”

\textsuperscript{404} Elizabeth Shellekens, \textit{Aesthetics and Morality} (New York, NY: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2007), 46.
For the student of psychology, two ideas come to mind—one more philosophical; the other more quantitative. First, it is clear that Carl Jung’s psychology impacted Reimer’s philosophy. The current study, however, focused on Reimer’s philosophical and theological influences. It would be interesting to know whether Jung was influenced by naturalism, and whether the aspects of Jung’s theory that most impacted Reimer’s educational concerns are complementary to or compatible with Berman’s archetypal approach to music, suggested by the current researcher in chapter seven. For the quantitative researcher, it would be interesting to know whether, and if so how, personality types—using a measure, such as Myers-Briggs\textsuperscript{406}—correspond to listener preferences for attentiveness to form or reference; and lyrics or sounds.

For the historian, it would be interesting to spend more time on the lesser studied advocates of music education as aesthetic education—not solely for the purpose of recounting their contributions, but rather to see whether the definition of aesthetic education as they advocated it aligns with the mainstream definition in a truly representative way. For example, Harry Broudy may not have published as much on aesthetics as did Reimer. Still, Broudy nevertheless said many things about it.\textsuperscript{407} To what extent was his definition in agreement with Reimer’s, and more importantly, to what extent was it contrary?

Finally, it is always worth remembering that other countries that emphasize education may have already worked through some of the struggles that we face—or they may have yet to do so. What this means is that the educational researcher so interested, should consider just how

\textsuperscript{405} John Cage, “Everything We Do is Music,” YouTube, Flash Video File, Retrieved on April 4, 2015 from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWowppCYTZ0.

\textsuperscript{406} The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) is a psychological assessment, based on Carl Jung’s theories of personality types, that suggests a subject’s predominant personality traits by measuring perceptual and decision-making preferences.

\textsuperscript{407} For more here, see: Broudy, \textit{Building a Philosophy of Education}.
ambiguous the term “aesthetics” can be. It is therefore worth asking, how have other countries defined it. Are there approaches to education out there that are considered by their advocates to be a form of aesthetic education, and yet they allow for, or emphasize, something other than form of expressive experience? What other attempts have been made to define “aesthetic education” in as comprehensive a manner as possible, rather than simply rejecting the straw man that is really absolute expressionism—“a philosophy”—and not in fact “aesthetic education.”

FINAL REMARKS

Francis Schaeffer once wrote, “Today we have a weakness in our educational process in failing to understand the natural associations between disciplines. We tend to study all our disciplines in unrelated parallel lines . . . . Without understanding that these are the things of man, & the things of man are never unrelated parallel lines.” Approaching music aesthetic education as a dialogue of value seems a promising way to present an educational option that is able to resonate with high school and college students of all interests—for we have, all of us, a desire to know beauty or goodness and to experience meaning; and it will be demanded of each one of us, whether explicitly or implicitly, an answer to the question “What is good?” As Peter Kreeft has stated, “No one wants only some beauty, but all beauty—beauty itself without limit. When we see our twenty-thousandth beautiful thing, we wonder where the next one will be.” Indeed, there is something about our experiences of beauty and goodness in the world that strikes us as being full of meaning—reflective of something more than just our immediately pleasurable experiences. But what does this mean? Let us begin to encourage dialogue over dogma.

408 Schaeffer, Francis A. Schaeffer Trilogy, 211.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


LIST OF APPENDICES
APPENDIX A:
DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
DEFINITIONS

Essential Philosophical Concepts

*Axiology* – The study of value; this includes the subset fields of ethics and aesthetics.

*Aesthetics* – This can refer to (1) the study of beauty or goodness in general; (2) general theories of art; (3) specific theories of sense perception or perceptual cognition; or (4) mainstream cultural stylistic preferences.

*Universals* – Properties that are objectively true, good, right, valuable, or meaningful regardless of internal or external variables.

*Particulars* – Those things that are not universals; but simply a smaller part of one’s subjective or empirical experience.

*Philosophical Realism* – The belief that reality includes objective meaning and universals, which lay beyond empirical observation, individual perceptions/conceptions, and socio-lingual constructions.

*Philosophical Naturalism* – The belief that there exists no meaning or reality beyond the material world. From this perspective, beauty or goodness cannot be universal.

*Fact-Value Split* – A reductionist dichotomy of meaning in which fact refers only to empirically verifiable or rationally reducible observations, while value is reduced either to emotive response or to privatized feeling/opinion or social construction.

*Strong Naturalism* – This view holds that there exist no truths beyond that which can be observed scientifically or proved logically. Talk of immaterial states or immaterial notions of value such as ‘beauty’ or ‘goodness’ are meaningless.

*Weak Naturalism* – This view holds to the naturalistic rejection of notions of ultimate truth, while also holding that value language is not meaningless. Rather, values (concepts of beauty, rightness, goodness, etc.) reflect individually or culturally constructed ideals.

*Non-cognitivism* – This theory of value language is a form of strong naturalism; this view holds that statements of value do not contain truth content; they are mere emotive utterances, and do not literally refer to anything meaningful.

*Cognitivism* – This view holds that statements concerning value do have truth content. Whether the truth of such value is immutable or constructed will depend upon one’s view concerning philosophical naturalism.
Cognitive Naturalism – Value statements do contain truth content, but such truth cannot refer to any sense of universally objective value; such notions are the product of human imagination. Rather, value statements reflect the truth of value beliefs, which are the product of cultural, contextual, or individual construction. (I.e., the statement ‘X is good’ is “true” for the individual/culture; but not objectively true). This theory of value language is a form of weak naturalism.

Cognitive Non-naturalism – Value statements contain universal objective truth content—i.e., statements of value ultimately refer to some sense of objective awareness of a universal standard of value reflected throughout pragmatic experience. This theory of value language rejects philosophical naturalism, and includes views such as theism, value intuitionism, and supernaturalism.

Value Intuitionism – This view holds that there do exist immutable truths concerning value—i.e. external standards of beauty, goodness, etc. reflected within localized experience. The truth of such value is confirmed via pragmatic awareness.

Supernaturalism – This term can carry a variety of meanings, but for the sake of this study will be understood as the belief that one can acquire knowledge concerning the truth of values through special revelation acquired via spiritual experiences.

Theism – This too is a loaded term, but is generally understood (and will be understood for the sake of this study) as the belief in a God (or gods) who created and ordered the world to function in a certain way, and who both transcends the world and is immanent within the world. As it concerns the knowledge of universal, objective values, theism includes both natural revelation—revelation via pragmatic awareness within the natural world, e.g. value intuitionism—and special revelation—e.g. supernaturalism. Because theism is able to represent more broadly both of the narrower non-naturalist views (i.e., intuitionism and supernaturalism), it will serve, in this dissertation, as the default position when comparing naturalism with non-naturalism.

Terminology Relating to Aesthetic Theory

Formalism – The Philosophical position that musical meaning lies in the object.

Expressionism – Musical meaning lay in subjective feeling.

Absolute Expressionism – Meaning lies in the emotive response to formal elements.

Referentialism – Music can refer to meaning beyond the object or subject.

Referential Expressionism – Meaning lies in the emotive response to referential elements.
**Pragmatism** – Meaning is relative to practical (subjectively experienced) contexts.

**Mimesis** – Imitation or representation of the real world, or a projected world.

**Instrumentalism** – Music’s value lay in its usefulness as a means to a non-musical end.

**Social Realism** – Musical value lay in its ability to represent society, and to convey hidden transcripts that criticize social structures or rally political change. This includes Marxism-Leninism, which seeks to use the arts as a tool for encouraging socio-political change.

**ABBREVIATIONS**

MEAE – Music Education as Aesthetic Education
APPENDIX B:

BENNETT REIMER: PHILOSOPHICAL INFLUENCES AND BIOGRAPHY
John Dewey (1859-1952)

John Dewey was a significant force of influence on early Twentieth Century education. He was a pragmatist and a leading proponent of the progressive education movement. His impact on education includes the development of ideas concerning: learning by doing; a child-centered approach to education; the teacher’s role not as instructor, but as facilitator; interest in multicultural issues; and viewing the process of education as occurring within individualized experiences that are localized within specific socio-biological contexts.

Philosophically, Dewey rejected mind/body dualism, and was heavily influenced by naturalism. For Dewey, value is instrumental, and truth determined by pragmatic usefulness. Value therefore is not measured by an external reality (universals), but via experience. Rejecting a correspondence theory of truth—the notion that truth refers to that which corresponds to reality—he emphasized instead a pragmatic theory of truth, wherein truth is determined according to what works and best serves one’s needs.

He called the western tendency to speak of (impose) external reality (universals) a philosophic fallacy, and instead posited a theory of mind as having emerged from natural processes. Values therefore become the instruments or inhibitors of society. While a naturalist, his theory of art is said to teeter on the line of idealism. Dewey combined notions of expression and representation in art; to be expressive is to be in a sense representational. As art

---


412 Field, “John Dewey (1859-1952).”
Presents a new experience, one recalls meanings from prior experiences.\textsuperscript{413} Said Dewey, “Sense, as meaning so directly embodied in experience as to be its own illuminated meaning, is the only signification that expresses the function of sense organs when they are carried to full realization.”\textsuperscript{414} Expressive meaning, then, lies within the lived interaction with one’s world.

For Dewey, the aesthetic experience is not necessarily one associated with a work of art, but one tied to meaningful experience. Sensitive both to social aspects of education and to the need to consider multicultural perspectives, Dewey saw art as a product of culture, an expression of hope and significance. His \textit{Art as Experience} is considered one of the most important contributions to early Twentieth century aesthetics.\textsuperscript{415} His philosophy especially influenced Abstract Expressionism.

To understand refined aesthetics, one must first consider “the raw” that is found within the interest of the common folk. Aesthetic experience begins as fascination with a pleasurable experience. Because it is the nature of the fine arts to aim for a refined taste, the commoner seeks pleasure in what is to the refined considered vulgar. In addition to artistic refinement, the nature of capitalism reinforces the distinguishing of more and less valuable taste. But for Dewey, aesthetic experience is found on the behavioral (animal) level. Art then is the result of an evolved sense of self- and other- identification. But meaning is organic and experiential, not real—i.e. not external or universal.

\textsuperscript{413} Dewey, 83-98.

\textsuperscript{414} Ibid., 22.

Criticism allows one to deepen, or reconsider, one’s perceptions as one is exposed to the process of artistic production. Judgments serve to 1) discriminate between the parts (analysis) and 2) encourage a unified sense of understanding the whole (synthesis). For Dewey, embodied meaning seems to combine expression and representation, but allows no substantial reference. Aside from Dewey’s impact on education in general, his ideas concerning the nature of experience influenced both Reimer’s dissertation research and his general aesthetic philosophy.

Susanne K. Langer (1895-1985)

Susanne Langer was an absolute expressionist, best known for her aesthetic theory of semiotics. In short, she offered a rationalization of the aesthetic process—i.e., musical form is logically similar to the form of feeling. For Langer, works of art are expressive forms, and art conveys emotion whereas words convey thoughts. Her leading works, in order, were: *Philosophy in a New Key, Feeling and Form*, and *Philosophical Sketches*.

For Langer, mankind is an animal, and symbolization the key to human consciousness. Langer held that symbols evolved over time, giving expression to the mental complexities of the inner life. For her, music articulates what cannot be spoken. To be clear, specific emotions are not communicated. Rather, music—an aural experience existing in felt time and space—communicates the notion of felt experience. Symbolic relationships are grasped via study of the formalized structure. Words refer to things, but fail to capture and convey the impact of our emotions. Thus, art became the emotive articulation of ineffable felt experiences. Moreover, the added dimension of music’s being in time deepens the experience of understanding. For example, whereas time can be represented but not felt in one’s experience with a clock, music actually allows one to experience felt time.
Langer was suspicious of the notion that music is a language, meaning that it is able to convey messages. Rather, it is an objectification of feeling. Because feelings are shared, art becomes a formalized experience. The arts are able to articulate one’s own lived experience of feelings "so that we become conscious of its elements and its intricate and subtle fabric,” and reveal that “the basic forms of feelings are common to most people at least within a culture."416 One’s “inner life” is enriched via the deepening of sensitivity to one’s own perceptions and “the fabric of tensions” within experiences.417 The cognitive action that is art produces a created symbol that gives an aesthetic impression.

Langer believed that Hanslick's error was a presumption that symbolic representation is discursive, which necessarily excludes symbolic meaning. She stressed music as the language of feeling—not the cause of feelings, but the logical expressions. Music "is not usually derived from affects nor intended for them; but we may say, with certain reservations, that it is about them."418 In her attempts to develop a symbolic theory of aesthetics—a “new key”—Langer seems to have been reacting to a dogma of positivism—wherein aesthetics is non-cognitive. "In the fundamental notion of symbolization . . . we have the keynote of all humanistic problems. In it lies a new conception of 'mentality,' that may illumine questions of life and consciousness, instead of obscuring them as traditional 'scientific methods' have done."419 Like Dewey, Langer’s influence upon Reimer can be seen both in the attention that her ideas received within


417 Ibid., 103.

418 Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, 218-21.

419 Ibid., 25.
Reimer’s dissertation, and in the extent to which her theories of symbolization influenced his absolute expressionist philosophical position. In Reimer’s own words, “Philosophy in a New Key widened my eyes. Feeling and Form knocked me out. Problems of Art deepened my respect. Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling . . . was flat-out awesome.”

Paul Tillich (1886-1965)

Paul Tillich was a twentieth-century neoorthodox theologian. As explained by Paul Enns in a handbook overview of theology and theological movements, “Neoorthodoxy is also known as ‘dialectical theology’ . . . or ‘crisis theology’ to indicate that a person comes to experience God through a crisis situation.” A significant point is that neoorthodoxy was influenced by Kierkegaard’s emphasis on a subjective encounter as self-justifying, without having to appeal to external fact—e.g. historical reliability.

Tillich was the son of a Lutheran pastor. While his father stressed tradition, his mother nurtured a sense of openness. He was influenced by the existentialism of Martin Heidegger, while teaching theology at Marburg in Germany. He was fired from the University of Frankfurt in 1933 for having opposed Adolph Hitler earlier in the 1930s. So he moved to the United Stated and taught theology at Harvard, and eventually the University of Chicago.

In his Systematic Theology, he posited a view of God not as personal, but as Being itself. Sin referred not to some real and historical thing, but to an estrangement from one’s real

---


self. Aware of one’s finiteness, mankind experiences anxiety. Christ is not a real, historical person, but as Enns explains, “a symbol of the ‘New Being’ in which every force of estrangement trying to dissolve [one’s] unity with God has been dissolved. Thus, Tillich emphasized religious experience as a rational allegory for personal transcendence—which implies a connection not to a person, but to being itself; a feeling of having grounding within one’s lived experience.\textsuperscript{423} In his mammoth work on Christian theology, Milliard Erickson observed that Tillich’s view is most accurately understood as a sort of panentheism—i.e., that God is in everything.\textsuperscript{424} Still, Tillich defines ‘God’ in metaphorical, not literal, sense. Tillich’s influence can be seen within Reimer’s definition of aesthetic experience as religious experience.

Leonard B. Meyer (1918-2007)

Leonard B. Meyer received his Ph.D. in History of Culture from the University of Chicago in 1954. He held an interest both in western tradition and Gestalt psychology. Meyer taught music and humanities courses at the University of Chicago in the 1960s, and the University of Pennsylvania beginning in the mid 70s. His most celebrated work is \textit{Emotion and Meaning in Music}.

Meyer recognized a problematic divide in philosophy, and sought to advocate music education as both cognitive and emotive. He identified this tension as an absolutist-referentialist debate, which he recognized as “a tendency toward philosophical monism rather than a product

\textsuperscript{423} Enns, 604-607.

\textsuperscript{424} Milliard J. Erickson, \textit{Christian Theology}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} edition (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 1998), 330.
of any logical opposition between types of meaning."\textsuperscript{425} Meyer rejected as false dichotomy, the notion that intellectual experience is so easily separable from emotional experience. He similarly recognized a problematic dichotomy between the notion that musical meaning is either inherent or extra-musical.

Meyer additionally observed problematic psychological theories. Hedonism reduces aesthetic experience to sheer pleasure. Atomism reduces music to merely a complexity of sounds. Universalism attempts to impose a musical object as necessarily and universally good for all times and contexts, when in actuality, music is a product of culture and experience.

He acknowledged the possibility of referential meaning. Still, he primarily emphasized music “as a closed system” with “no signs or symbols referring to the non-musical world of objects, concepts, and human desires.”\textsuperscript{426} So while a meaningful musical experience may indeed involve emotional reactions to meanings beyond the musical work—that is to say, absolute meanings and referential meanings “are not mutually exclusive”—the core value of musical meanings ultimately “lie within the closed context of the musical work itself.”\textsuperscript{427} Meyer thinks that formalists and absolute expressionists are actually looking at the musical experience from alternate sides of the same coin.

He distinguished between mood and emotion. The former is a temporary experience while the latter represents a more stable impression. The focus on mood explains prior psychologists’ fascination with associational features. Meyer therefore encourages a shift of focus to the pondering of emotion. Influenced by Dewey’s Conflict Theory of Emotions, Meyer

\textsuperscript{425} Meyer, Emotion and Meaning in Music, 1.

\textsuperscript{426} Ibid., vii.

\textsuperscript{427} Ibid., 1-2.
is ultimately concerned with emotional responses to perceptual affects. "The listener brings to the act of perception definite beliefs in the affective power of music. Even before the first sound is heard, these beliefs activate dispositions to respond in an emotional way."\(^{428}\) The musical experience is a cognitive engagement of appraisals that, in turn, prompt pleasant or unpleasant emotional experiences.

These pleasurable or unpleasant emotional experiences are cognitive reactions to one’s perceptions engaging experience. As one experiences music, one develops a sense of order and expectation. When one’s expectations are arrested, one is affected with intense emotion. This he calls the law of affect; “Emotion is evoked when a tendency to respond is inhibited.”\(^{429}\) These emotions and psychological expectations are learned via enculturation. Musical style provides musical norms. Divergence from said norms creates uncertainty. Uncertainty evokes anxiety.

When one experiences unexpected stimuli, the listener attempts to account psychologically for the deviation within the stylistic features of the work. This causes the mind to withhold judgment, supposing that the meaning may be found in what follows; to become frustrated; or to dismiss such deviation as error.

This process yields various aspects of cognition. Hypothetical meanings are experienced via the process of engaging in expectation. Evident meaning refers to the active attempt to explain antecedent gestures within experience once the consequent is perceived. Determinant meaning involves the contemplation of relationships between hypothetical meanings and evident meanings. All of this, Meyer calls embodied meanings. “Embodied musical meaning is, in

\(^{428}\) Ibid., 11.

\(^{429}\) Ibid., 22.
short, a product of expectation.” Meyer’s influence can be seen in many ways throughout Reimer’s writing. Most notably, however, it can be seen in that Reimer assumes a philosophical position of absolute expressionism—a position that Meyer helped to clarify and articulate.

Charles Leonhard (1915-2002)

Charles Leonhard was an important figure in the field of music education—especially as it relates to philosophy and aesthetic education. While attending Teachers College at Columbia University in the 1930s, Leonhard studied under several pragmatists and progressive educators. He was first influenced by the ideas of Dewey in an educational foundations course. As a doctoral student, in 1946, Leonhard was a student of Susanne Langer—and was deeply impressed by her emphasis on aesthetic education. Leonhard began teaching at the University of Illinois in 1951. There, he taught many graduate students, including Bennett Reimer in 1963.

Leonhard wrote on the topic of aesthetics for the *Journal of Research in Music Education* in 1955. This article—based on a 1954 MENC presentation—helped to define philosophy and aesthetics for the field of music education, and championed the need for philosophical research. Therein, he suggested the ideas of Langer. In 1959, Leonhard and Robert House co-authored *Foundations and Principles of Music Education*, published by McGraw-Hill. This work was heavily built around Dewey’s concept of experience, and aesthetics as defined by Langer,

Ibid., 35.


Ibid., 50-51, and 78.

Dewey, and Carl Seashore. After stressing James Mursell’s emphasis upon musical meaning as fundamental to music education, they turned to Meyer’s analysis of meaning.

In a context that stressed instrumentalism—i.e., music valued in education solely for its extra-musical developments—Leonhard championed both the realism of Harry Broudy, and the pragmatism of Foster McMurray, in appealing to aesthetic education. The emphasis on music as the development of social life, work habits, etc., he charged, had led to “appallingly scanty musical achievement, minimal musical learning, and shockingly low musical standards.”

Aesthetic education, he argued, provides insight into life values.

Leonhard and House summarized their position as follows: 1) art represents one’s need to transform one’s experience symbolically; 2) aesthetic experience is tied to ordinary experience, representing one’s highest source of satisfaction in living one’s experience; 3) human experience is necessarily tied to feeling; 4) music is expressive of feeling; 5) the forms of music can be filled with a plethora of meanings; 6) since music’s appeal is felt experience, all music involves feelingful experience; 7) music’s significance is its expressive appeal; 8) everyone has a need for symbolic experience, and therefore a capacity for such with music; 9) the development of such responsiveness that is common to all human beings is the only grounding for music education; 10) music education should therefore necessarily be aesthetic education; 11) the ability to develop one’s aesthetic potential should be given to every child; 12) music education should involve recognition of the value in all forms of music; 13) major attention should be given to an educative experience that fosters an aesthetic response to great music; 14) instruction should

434 Ibid., 86-7, and 96-9.
435 Leonhard and House, 228.
therefore use music of the highest quality; and 15) through extensive experience with music via aesthetic education, “instrumental values will inevitably accrue.”

Leonhard stood at the forefront of the push toward an aesthetic education. Alas, there is a risk of ambiguity and miscommunication when attempting to speak across disciplines such as music education and the philosophy of aesthetics. It was for this reason that Leonhard stressed the need for developing graduate and undergraduate coursework in aesthetics, as well as symposia on the philosophy of music education.

In 1970, Leonhard took on the task of editing the Prentice-Hall series called Contemporary Perspective in Music Education. This six-volume series included three books on process (instruction, evaluation, etc.) and three texts on knowledge (philosophy, research, and psychology). The first three texts, printed in 1970, included Clifford Madsen’s *Experimental Research in Music Education*, Richard Colwell’s *The Evaluation of Music Teaching and Learning*, and Bennett Reimer’s *A Philosophy of Music Education*. As Reimer’s own graduate advisor, Leonhard’s influence can neither be succinctly summarized nor understated. According to Reimer, it was Leonhard’s guidance that prompted Reimer’s study in the intersections of music education, philosophy, and aesthetic experience in the first place.

---

436 Ibid.
437 Heller, 114-16.
438 Ibid., 125-26.
Bennett Reimer represents a significant force of influence on American music education. An advocate of music education for every child, Reimer authored or edited several books and over 100 articles, chapters and reviews. He was born on June 19, 1932 in New York City and educated in the Brooklyn public school system. Reimer received a Bachelor of Science degree in Music Education from the State University of New York College at Fredonia, in 1954, and a Master of Science degree in Music Education in 1955, from the University of Illinois. His mother had enrolled him in Julliard, to receive clarinet lessons as a child, and so he began his musical career as a clarinetist. As an undergraduate student, Reimer studied woodwinds and eventually focused his attention on performance as an oboist. Due to a medical problem involving his lungs and relating to his performing, Reimer eventually had to give up his emphasis upon performing and committed primarily to teaching, research, and writing.

From 1955 to 1957, he taught band and music theory at the College of William and Mary's Richmond Professional Institute in Virginia. From 1958 to 1960, he taught music theory, woodwinds, and conducting in Harrisonburg, Va., at what eventually became James Madison University. After receiving his doctorate from the University of IL, he became a professor there. He later served as Chair of the music department at Case Western Reserve University, and then the John W. Beattie Endowed Chair of the Northwestern University Music Education Department, in Evanston, IL—where he remained as Professor Emeritus for 19 years.

After retiring in 1997, he remained highly productive as author and researcher. He was bestowed several honors and awards, including an honorary doctorate from Chicago’s DePaul University. Additionally, He received an MENC Senior Researcher Award, and he was inducted
into the Music Educators Hall of Fame. Reimer presented lectures and research around the world. He died from cancer, on November 18, 2013, at the age of 81.

Reimer passionately argued for arts education, and insisted that an aesthetic education should be part of the core curriculum for every education program. He has written on a broad range of topics including music research, curricula, philosophy, cognitive psychology, multicultural and international issues, multiple musical intelligences, and interdisciplinary aspects of arts education. His most famous work, *A Philosophy of Music Education*, became a sort of literary staple for teacher training—evolving noticeably over three editions.

In his later years, he began to advance a new vision of music education. He charged that music education had largely focused on performance education. To this he responded with a vision of music education as multifaceted. “I developed a theory of intelligence which is unusual in that it takes Howard Gardner’s Theory of Multiple Intelligences to whole new levels in that it is a role-based theory of intelligence—i.e., intelligences are based on the roles that we play.” In other words, thinking of music education as just one sort of thing is problematic in that it neglects the important contributions of differing roles. Said Reimer, “We have deprived kids in schools of the opportunities to learn what’s right for them in music.”

We advocate as if performing is all that matters, he insisted, when in actuality there are many students who are engaged in music making outside of school—but in ways that have little relation to what music is studied in school. Reimer saw that a music culture involves music that serves various functions. He therefore became an advocate for a general music program that introduces students to the different roles that music plays in culture.

---

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

Jeremy Edwin Scarbrough was born in Meridian, Mississippi on March 9, 1982. He earned a B.A. in Music (Vocal Performance) from Mississippi State University in 2006. In 2011, he received an M.M.E. (Music Education) from the University of Southern Mississippi. In 2012, he completed an M.A. in Theological Studies from Liberty Baptist Theological Seminary, and he earned an M.A. in Christian Apologetics (philosophy of religion and the foundations of Christian thought) in 2014, from New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary. His Ph.D. in Music Education, from the University of Mississippi, has included a coursework emphasis in the philosophy of value (ethics and aesthetics). His research interests span each of these areas and seek common dialogue between them. He is husband to Abigail, and father to Piper Rosalie.

Mr. Scarbrough taught three years of general music at the public high school level, prior to earning his Ph.D. Additionally, he has served three years at the collegiate level as a graduate instructor of music appreciation, while pursuing his doctoral studies at the University of Mississippi. He founded the Ole Miss chapter of Ratio Christi in 2013, and served there as Chapter Director from 2013-2015. Ratio Christi is a student-led apologetics organization that meets regularly to discuss issues in theology, ethics, philosophy of religion, and popular culture, and seeks to organize annual teaching seminars in these areas. Mr. Scarbrough has presented research regionally, nationally, and internationally—addressing interdisciplinary connections between philosophy, theology, worldview studies, culture, and the arts.