Religious Politics: An Individual Level-Examination Of The Political Implications Of Faith In Brazil

Thatianne A. Moreira

University of Mississippi

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd

Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Moreira, Thatianne A., "Religious Politics: An Individual Level-Examination Of The Political Implications Of Faith In Brazil" (2013). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 785.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd/785

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.
RELIGIOUS POLITICS: AN INDIVIDUAL LEVEL-EXAMINATION OF THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF FAITH IN BRAZIL

A Dissertation
presented in partial fulfillment of requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Department of Political Science
The University of Mississippi

by

THATIANNE MOREIRA

August 2013
ABSTRACT

Although Brazil is, historically, a catholic country, the Catholic Church is losing its members to the Protestant churches, mainly Pentecostal ones. Between 1940-2010, the number of Protestants increased from 2.6% to 20.2%. On the other hand, between the same period, the number of Catholics decreased from 95% to 68.5%. One of the consequences of this shift in the religious marketplace has been its impact in the political realm; more specifically, in the number of political candidates that have identified themselves as evangélicos. The presence of evangélicos in power seems to be the most studied facet of the growth of Pentecostalism in Brazil. However, the literature would also benefit from the investigation of the consequences of this shift occurring in the religious marketplace at the individual-level. Here, I use data from the LAPOP (2010) to investigate the effects of religiosity, paying special attention to Pentecostalism, on political behavior and attitudes. This dissertation is divided in three parts. First, I draw demographic patterns between members of the major religious groups (Catholics, Pentecostal and mainline Protestants). Second, I test how religious variables (religious affiliation, church attendance, and devoutness) affect different measures of political participation. And lastly, I analyze how religiosity affects individuals’ perceptions of democracy. My findings suggest that religion is mostly not correlated to political outcomes although devoutness shows to be a strong factor determining attitudes toward democracy. In the case of Brazil, socioeconomic variables are the strongest predictors of political outcomes.
DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to the One who made this impossible task possible. To Him, I dedicate all.

Philippians 3:8
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First, I would like to express my gratitude to the people that brought me to this world to be part of such a loving and fun family. Thank you mom and dad for being the best parents I know. Second, I want to thank the people that made these past four years at the University of Mississippi so enjoyable. To my best friend Kristi Boxx, thank you for all that you do for me; from putting up with my mood shifts to all the great meals that you cook. To my fiancé Will Dewey, thanks for all the love and kindness that you pour into my life. I promise your turn will come soon. To my American parents, Joann and Johnny Flynt, thank you for letting me be part of your family and loving me like your own daughter. Third, I would like to thank Dr. Robert Albritton, Dr. Alice Cooper, and Dr. Gregory Love for agreeing to be in my committee. Thank you for sacrificing your time to make this project possible. On a more personal note, I will miss those appointments with Dr. Albritton where we talked about Brazilian culture more than the dissertation issues themselves. Thank you Dr. Albritton for your friendship. I also want to thank our department secretary, Regina Jordan, for always taking care of me.

Lastly, I would like to show my appreciation for the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). Without their dataset, this dissertation would not have been possible.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ......................................................................................................................... ii
DEDICATION ....................................................................................................................... iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................................................................ iv
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................. vi
LIST OF FIGURES .............................................................................................................. vii
INTRODUCTION: PENTECOSTALISM IN BRAZIL .............................................................. 1
PENTECOSTAL PROTESTANT IDENTITY: WHO ARE THE PENTECOSTALS ..........17
PENTECOSTALISM AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR .......................................................... 41
PENTECOSTALISM AND SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY ............................................... 64
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 91
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................. 99
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1: Distribution of Income by Religious Affiliation (ESEB 2002) ..................28
Figure 1.2: Distribution of Income Between Mainline and Pentecostal Protestants ....... 30
Figure 1.3: Levels of Education by Religious Affiliation ........................................31
Figure 1.4: Levels of Education Between Mainline and Pentecostal Protestants ....... 31
Figure 1.5: Distribution of Income by Religious Affiliation (LAPOP 2010) ............... 36
Figure 1.6: Years of Education by Religious Affiliation (LAPOP 2010) ................. 36
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Number of evangelico officials represented in the legislature .................................5
Table 1.1: Socioeconomic Background by Religious Affiliation (2010).................................34
Table 1.2: Socioeconomic Background by Religious Affiliation (2008).................................34
Table 1.3: Socioeconomic Impact on Pentecostal Affiliation...............................................37
Table 1.4: ANOVA Analysis..................................................................................................40
Table 2.1: Predictors of Political Activities.................................................................................58
Table 2.2: Predictors of Interest in Politics and Political Persuasion.......................................60
Table 2.3: Political Persuasion by Religious Affiliation.........................................................61
Table 2.4: Political Activity by Religious Affiliation.................................................................61
Table 2.5: Devoutness by Religious Affiliation.............................................................................62
Table 3: Church Attendance by Religious Affiliation..............................................................75
Table 3.1: Raw Percentages on Opinions About Homosexuals’ Right to Run for Office........81
Table 3.2: Opinions on Homosexuals’ Right to Run for Office by Religious Affiliation.........82
Table 3.3: Difference in Levels of Political Tolerance Between Mainline and Pentecostal

Protestant ..................................................................................................................................83
Table 3.4: Political Tolerance Scale by Religious Affiliation.....................................................84
Table 3.5: Democratic Support by Religious Affiliation.............................................................85
CHAPTER 1
PENTECOSTALISM IN BRAZIL
INTRODUCTION

While advocates of secularization and modernization theories argued for most of the 20th century that the importance of religion as a political and social factor (i.e. religious authority) would decrease, and perhaps even fade away, in the modern world, it is clear that religion remains a relevant aspect of many societies.

Although empirical evidence shows that the traditional forms of religious participation (e.g. church attendance) are no longer as common as they once were among believers in many societies, many scholars have argued that this trend does not indicate that religion has become less important; instead, they note that religion has gone through a transformation process (Norris and Inglehart 2004; Fox 2008; Fox 2007; Steigenga 2001). As Fox writes “religion is, among other things, a complicated multifaceted social phenomena that is constantly changing, evolving, and adapting to an ever-changing environment. Thus some aspects of religion in some places are secularizing but other aspects of religion in other places are becoming more powerful and influential” (2008:30). While in some societies, secularization and modernization forces have challenged religion’s relevance as a social factor, in others, they have contributed to a “resurgence” or “revitalization” of religion.\(^1\)

\(^1\) For more read Fox’s second chapter on A World Survey of Religion and the State titled “The Question of Religion’s Role in Politics and Society.”
One of the cases that attest to Fox’s argument on the importance of religion is the current scenario in Latin America. As Gill (2002) comments, the political efforts of religious-affiliated candidates and movements in South America have been met with surprising success. In Peru, *evangélicos*\(^2\) were the key ingredient to President Alberto Fujimori’s 1990 successful presidential campaign. In Brazil, many religious-affiliated candidates have found their way not only into the local but also into the national elections as it is the case of previous presidential candidate Garotinho in 2002. In Guatemala, religious-affiliated candidates have not only participated in presidential election but have also won presidential elections twice (General Efrain Rios in 1982 and Jorge Serrano Elias in 1990) in the last two decades (Hallum 2002).

At the individual level, we can also see the clear impact of the rapid growth of Pentecostalism pointing to what Steigenga and Cleary termed “the conversion of a continent” (2007). In 1991, the number of Protestants in Brazil represented approximately 9 percent of its population. By 2010, this number had increased to 22.2 percent. Conversely, the number of Catholics in 1991 represented 83 percent of Brazil’s population. In 2010, this number had dropped to 64.6 percent. In Chile, the percentage of *evangélicos* grew from 5.5 percent in 1960 to 12.4 percent in 1992 (Oro and Seman 2000). In El Salvador, the percentage of *evangélicos* has grown from 16 percent in 1988 to 38 percent in 2010.\(^3\)

This wave of conversion, specifically to Protestantism, in Latin America has drawn the attention of political scientists due to its political and social implications. However, a deficiency of this body of empirical research is its lack of attention to individual-level analysis. Most of this

---

\(^2\) The term *evangélico* (evangelicals) is often used, in the Latin American context, to describe members of a wide range of Protestant groups, with diverging origins. The term includes classic Pentecostals, neo-Pentecostals, historical or mainstream Protestants, non-denominational Protestants and, at times, it also includes members of the Seventh-Day church (Steigenga and Cleary 2007; Freston 2006).  

\(^3\) According to data compiled from different sources available through the Religion-In-The Americas (RITA) database ([http://prolades.com/](http://prolades.com/))
body of work focuses on the aggregate dimensions of the political system – mainly the political party system and electoral outcomes (Bohn 2006; Borges 2009; Freston 2004; Machado and Mariz 2004; Oro 2001, 2003). The lack of attention to the individual-level of analysis is problematic for at least three reasons. First, multiple levels of analysis are the most effective way to achieve scientific understanding of political phenomena (McAdam et al. 1997); after all, the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable is not fixed or constant across time. Variations in outcome are more likely to be a function of both individual-level and macro-level factors. Second, as many scholars have argued and demonstrated (Robinson 1950), strong aggregate level relationships are not always reproduced at the individual level – problem known as ecological fallacy or bridging the gap between micro and macro level analysis. The question I ask here is the following: although empirical research shows that the Pentecostal movement has impacted politics at the aggregate level, what are the effects of this phenomenon at the individual level? And third, although it is a challenge to make the link between micro and macro patterns, seminal works by Almond and Verba (1963), Inglehart (1990), and Putnam (1993) have demonstrated that individual attitudes are crucial to the national context. For instance, attitudes such as interpersonal trust, life satisfaction, and support for the regime have been linked to the quality of democracy (Inglehart 1990, 1997; Putnam 1993; Lipset 1993). Therefore, uncovering the effects of the wave of Pentecostalism on individual attitudes will help us understand the present national context more fully. Only so, one will be able to draw the link between the impact of Pentecostalism at the macro and micro levels.

THE BRAZILIAN SCENARIO: GROWTH OF EVANGÉLICO
Just like the third wave of democratization washed the Latin America shores between the 1970s-80s, a wave of Pentecostalism has also swept across Latin America, and to a lesser extent, the globe. According to the Anderson et al. (2010), there has been an estimated 700 percent increase in the number of Pentecostalism believers around the globe within the past thirty years. Korea had an estimate 5 percent of Protestant just after the Korean War. In 2006, Korea had over 35 percent of its population claiming to be Protestant (Kim 2006). In China, despite persecution during the Cultural Revolution, the number of Protestants are said to be between 30-40 million (Oblau 2011). Pentecostalism has also achieve success in Africa where countries like Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Malawi have about 20 percent of its population professing to be belong to the Protestant movement.

In Latin America, Brazil has been one of the leading countries in religious transformation. Although Brazil is historically a catholic country, the Catholic church is losing its members to the Protestant churches. According to the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, IBGE), between 1940-2000, the number of evangelicos increased from 2.6% to 15.4%. On the other hand, between the same period, the number of Catholics decreased from 95% to 73.6%. Because of the nature of this religious transformation that has occurred in the past decades, it is more adequate to say that Brazil is going through a Protestant revival than a pure Pentecostal one. One of the consequences of this shift in the religious marketplace has been noticed more clearly in the political realm; more specifically, in the number of political candidates that have identified themselves as evangelicos.

Many authors have pointed out to the importance of differentiating between the term “evangelico” and “Pentecostal.” As Anderson et al. (2010:14) show, the term “pentecostalism” has been used by scholars of religion to refer to a wide range of churches with diverging doctrines, including catholic and protestant denominations. However, in the Brazilian context, the Pentecostal movement is made up mainly by Protestant believers and churches (Sinner 2007: 173; Oro and Samen 2000; Sanchis 1994).
Previous research shows that the number of evangélico members in the legislature has grown steadily since the 1980s (Fonseca 2002, Oro 2006). Figure 1 shows the number of evangélico officials in the lower chamber of the legislature, or Chamber of Deputies, between the periods of 1983-2010.

**Figure 1: Number of self-identified evangélico officials represented in the legislature**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislature (period)</th>
<th>Number of Evangélico Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983-1986</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-1990</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-1994</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-1998</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2002</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-2006</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2010</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The presence of evangélicos in power seems to be the most studied facet of the growth of Pentecostalism in Brazil, as it is evident in the many studies published not only by Brazilian authors but also by scholars from other countries (Freston 2006; Maia 2006; Oro 2006; Borges 2009; Smith 2009). Scholars have been mainly interested in how these evangélico officials have impacted the party system; more specifically, the possibility of the formation of an evangélico party (Borges 2009), the evangelical representation in the legislature (Oro 2003; Smilde 2003; Machado and Matriz 2004; Machado 2006; Goncalves 2011), and the impact of evangelical voters on electoral outcomes (Patterson 2005; Bohn 2006).

Although the impact of this movement on the party system may be the most evident, the literature would also benefit from the investigation of this shift occurring in the religious marketplace and its consequences at the individual-level.

---

As the classic works of Almond and Verba (1963) and Putnam (1993) have suggested, democratic government does not rely on formal institutions only; the democratic political culture of a country, or the endorsement of democratic values by citizens, is a strong determinant of the quality of democracy. The significant link between religion and politics emerges when religion is the primary, though not necessarily exclusive, foundation for moral values and political orientations (Leege and Welch 1989; Laymann 1997; Smidt 2008; Putnam and Campbell 2010). Religion, overtly or covertly, influences politics by encouraging and enforcing some attitudes and behaviors and by discouraging and disparaging others (Guth et al. 1997; Green 2003).

Considering a two-dimensional conception of ideology (liberal versus conservative), the religious citizen is more likely to be ideologically conservative than the non-religious citizen (Hunsberger 1995; Schwartz and Huismans 1995, Saroglou et al. 2003). By ideology, I refer to what Huntington defined as a “system of ideas concerned with the distribution of political and social values” (1957:454). Religious people, across a variety of contexts, tend to place high importance on conservative values such as tradition and conformity and low importance on hedonistic and openness to change (Saroglou et al. 2004). In a nutshell, a conservative favors limited governmental action in economic matters and opposes the expansion of personal freedoms; a liberal opposes both (Maddox and Lillie 1984; Swedlow 2008). As evidence of this expectation, that religious voters are more ideologically conservative than the non-religious voter, many scholars have found empirical support for this relationship between evangelicals and
political ideology, especially in the American context (Kellstedt and Smidt 1993; Leege and Kellstedt 1993; Wolfe 2000; Green 2007).

Also, the religious citizen is more likely to be a member and vote for a candidate of a conservative party than the non-religious voter. Previous studies investigating the link between religious beliefs and partisanship in the American context have found support to the strong correlation between conservative voters, and more specifically the evangelicals, to the Republican Party (Kellstedt and Smidt 1993; Calfano et al. 2005). One often cited example is that of the electoral outcome of the 2004 presidential election when the second largest voter gap was between Protestant (voting for Bush) and other religious groups (voting for Kerry) (Green 2007).  

As to the relationship between religious beliefs and democracy, most research focuses on the aggregate dimension of this relationship; more specifically, the link between the religious culture of a country and the type of regime. The works that do focus specifically on the relationship between individual religious beliefs and democratic values are not numerous and most focus on the American context. But some important attempts have been made. Greenawalt’s (1988) Religious Conviction and Political Choice is one of the earliest works in the analysis of the relationship between faith and individual political choices. Greenawalt’s main goal is to address whether people properly rely on their religious convictions in deciding what public policies to support. The important contribution of this piece to this literature is that it points to the almost inevitable conflicts between religious convictions and the rationale of political choices.

---

6 This finding is based on data from the 2004 National Election Pool (NEP)
7 Some examples are: Diamond et al. (2005) and Jelen and Wilcox (2002). And more recently, because of world events, there has been a greater focus on the link between Islam and the democracy.
All these previous findings paint the picture of the religious voter as ideologically more conservative and more likely to identify themselves with, and vote for, a conservative party than other voters. But are religious voters more active in politics than others? One of the most recent large N analyses presents inconclusive results. Norris and Inglehart (2004) study the impact of secularization on a variety of indicators, one of the being religiosity, and draw their findings from data including 191 nations including periods from 1981-2001. Norris and Inglehart (2004) conclude that “different ways of measuring religious participation generate contrasting results” (192). For example, the authors find that church attendance is correlated to significant lower than average levels of political discussion and interest, to lower levels of social trust, and to less participation in some of the more radical forms of political protest. That is, religiosity, measured in terms of church attendance, is negatively related to higher levels of political participation. On the other hand, when religiosity is measured in terms of membership in religious organizations, the relationship between religiosity and all these indicators changes. That is, individuals that belong to religious organizations display relatively high levels of civic behavior and attitudes. The authors suggest that the contrasting results are plausible. In their interpretation, simply attending religious services does not seem to make one politically active; however, the more demanding activity of joining a religious organization seems to be conducive to political activism.

THE FOCUS OF THE DISSERTATION

Given this important role that religion can exercise in the political realm, the overarching question I seek to answer here is what are the individual-level political implications of the
explosive growth of Pentecostalism in Brazil? How do Pentecostals differ from other religious groups? Does the unique growth of Pentecostals, and consequently the movement’s political power, also translate into a unique pattern of political engagement at the individual level? Ultimately, I am interested in knowing whether different religious affiliations translate into different political orientations and behavior. Therefore here, Pentecostal will be compared to believers belonging to the other major religious groups: Catholicism, mainline Protestantism, and Spiritism.\(^8\) Catholics, mainline Protestants, and Spiritists account for 61.4, 13.7, and 2.3 percent of the population respectively. Below I briefly describe the religious groups examined here.

**PENTECOSTALS**

Pentecostalism emerged in the twentieth century as a movement within Protestantism which gave emphasis to the Christian way of life resembling that of the New Testament. The new version of Protestantism brought back to the core of their faith phenomena such as speaking in tongues, divine healing, expulsion of demons, and prophecy. According to Paul Freston (2004; 2001), the prominent scholar in the field of religion in Latin America, Pentecostalism has only been adopted by a minority of Protestants in the developed West; however, he estimates that Pentecostalism represents the dominant form of Protestantism in Latin America.

In Brazil, Pentecostals account for 60 percent of the 42.3 million Protestants. Pentecostals churches in Brazil are characterized by its emphasis on speaking in tongues, literal interpretation of the bible, divine healing, prosperity gospel, and spiritual warfare. The three largest

---

\(^8\) Non-religious are also included in order to determine if there are underlying differences between religious and non-religious voters. Non-religious account for approximately 8 percent of the Brazilian population.
Pentecostals churches are the Assembléia de Deus, Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus and Congregação Cristã no Brasil.

Assembléia de Deus

Founded in 1910 by two Swedish missionaries in the city of Belém, Para was the first Pentecostal church in Brazil. The two Swedish missionaries, Gunnar Vingren and Daniel Berg, had arrived in Belém to help a local Baptist church. However, after performing healing miracles and encouraging members to speak in tongues, the two missionaries were expelled from the church. Other members followed them to start an independent church which they named “Assembly of God.” What distinguishes the Assembly of God denomination from the other Pentecostal denominations is its emphasis on the Holy Spirit. Although, they believe in the baptism of the Holy Spirit, this belief is not the most important doctrine taught in these churches. Today, it is estimated that the Assembly of God churches have approximately 12.3 million members which makes this denomination the largest protestant church in Brazil.

Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus (IURD)

The IURD was founded in July of 1977 by pastor Edir Macedo in Rio de Janeiro. The IURD church is well-known for its focus on prosperity gospel, exorcism, and healing ministries (Freston 2005). Interestingly, although the social composition of this denomination is lower than that of most of other Pentecostal churches (i.e. for instance, members from the IURD often have lower income and schooling levels than other Protestant members belonging to different Pentecostal churches), the IURD is a wealthy church owning Brazil’s third largest television network and raising over 1.4 billion annually. In terms of missionaries, the IURD is the leader in numbers of missionaries sent to world with approximately 2,500 individuals sent to all
continents. Today, it is estimated that IURD has over five thousand temples with membership of approximately 1.3 million.

**Congregação Cristã no Brasil**

The Congregação Cristã no Brasil was established in 1910 in São Paulo by Luigi Francescon, an Italian missionary. Francescon was born in Udine, Italy in 1866. After completing his military duties, he migrated to the United States in 1890. In March of that year, Francescon was introduced to Christianity and in that same year founded the Italian Presbyterian church. In 1907, Francescon joined the Pentecostal movement and was mentored by William H. Durham, the key leader of the Pentecostal movement in Chicago. In March of 1909, Francescon arrived in Brazil and in 1910 established the first Congregação Cristã no Brasil. Today, the membership of the Congregação Cristã no Brasil is of approximately 2.3 million.

**MAINLINE PROTESTANTS**

Most mainline protestant denominations arrived in Brazil in the second half of the 19th century through Presbyterian, Methodist and Baptist missionaries coming from the United States. Since its arrival, these traditional denominations appealed more to those belonging to the social and cultural elite of the country. Many scholars believe that this focus on converting members of the elite is the reason why the traditional denominations never blossomed in Brazil (Mendonça 1989). Amongst the three, Baptists are the biggest group with approximately 3.7 million members. The Presbyterian church comes second with approximately 920,000 members.
Methodists are the smallest group within the mainline Protestant tradition with approximately 250,000 members.

CATHOLICS

Up to the 1970s Catholicism was not only the religion of the majority but also had virtual monopoly in the religious marketplace. Catholicism was brought to Brazil in the 1500s by Portuguese colonizers. Therefore, it was never an indigenous faith since before Portuguese explorers arrived in South America, the natives had their own folk beliefs. And although Catholicism was then the religion endorsed by the state, some adopted, some rejected and many creolized the faith. The creolization of Catholicism meant that the Catholic faith was divided in how it was practiced; there was the formal Catholicism of the upper classes and clergy, and the folk or popular Catholicism practiced by the masses in which traditional Catholic practices were mixed with indigenous practices and beliefs (Smith and Prokopy 1999). As a result, members of the popular Catholic Church tended to “ignore the three persons of the trinity in favor of the Virgin Mary and a myriad of saints” (Chesnut 2003:23). To Chesnut (2003) what distinguishes (popular) Catholicism in Brazil from the traditional Catholicism (practiced in Europe for instance) is its polytheistic aspect. Chesnut (2003) observes that for the “great majority of popular Catholics, God is a remote figure who rarely receives the kind of intimate prayers and petitions that are directed to the saints and virgins” (105). Another distinctive characteristic of Brazilian Catholicism is the contractual relationship known as promessa (or promise). In this relationship, believers promise to “pay” for a miracle performed by the Virgin
or saints by performing sacrificial rituals (most often this sacrificial ritual would take the form of a procession or pilgrimage).

One of the most important developments that have taken place within the Catholic Church in the couple decades is a movement known as Charismatic Renewal which, some would argue, is a direct response to the Protestant growth in Brazil. Like the Pentecostal movement, the Charismatic Renewal movement is also centered on the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, many Charismatic Catholics also believe in the baptism in the Spirit and speaking in tongues. This new emphasis can be seen very clearly in the way Masses are conduct. Cleary (2007) says of the Masses:

The unexpected innovation of the Brazilian Charismatic Renewal has been priest performers. None exceed Padre Marcelo Rossi. He looks like the incarnation of an evangelical televangelist, only better. He has drawn two and half million persons to a Charismatic celebration, needing a race track because a soccer stadium was not large enough… In Rossi’s case, he incorporated singing and movement into both stadium and daily Mass. He became a singing star. His CDs have risen to the top charts. He also dances, in the sense of moving to the music. (165-66)

Not only the way Masses are conduct have changed but also, more importantly, the message of the churches that have subscribed to the movement have focused on encouraging the public to live their lives according to guidance of the Holy Spirit, to be committed to God, and live righteously (Cleary 2007). Although Charismatic Catholic churches resemble much the Protestant Pentecostal churches, the dividing line that separates these two groups is the centrality of the Virgin Mary (Chesnut 2003). To Charismatic Catholics, the Virgin is the center, more than any other element, of the Catholic faith. In 2003, the number of Charismatic Catholics was estimated to be between 8-10 million (Chesnut 2003).
SPIRITISTS

Spiritism (sometimes referred to as Kardecism) emerged from the writings of Allan Kardec\(^9\), a French philosopher and teacher, in the 19\(^{th}\) century. Kardec taught chemistry, physics, anatomy, and astronomy in Paris before he got interested in spirits. In 1848, in Hydesville, New York, a Methodist family claimed that they could communicate with spirits through “table-tapping;” basically, people sat around the table and asked questions which, in turn, were answered by the spirits using the table as an instrument. The story of this phenomenon reached the ears of Kardec, and although he was skeptical at first, in 1855 he witnessed “table-tapping” for the first time. This event marks Kardec’s investigation of spirits. With the help of mediums, Kardec started examining the spirits’ answers to questions regarding the problems and purpose of human life.\(^{10}\)

In 1857, Kardec published “The Spirits Book,” work that gave birth to Spiritism.\(^{11}\) In *The Spirits Book*, Kardec addresses questions regarding God, the universe, spirits (and how they interact with men), laws that guide human life, and the present and future life (Kardec 1944). The book is a codification of answers (a little over 1,000) that the author received from many different spirits.

One of the most distinguishing features of spiritualism is the belief in reincarnation as a means for spiritual progress. Spiritists believe that spirits are immortal and the goal of life on earth is to enhance one’s spirit – in knowledge and capacity. Therefore, death is just the detachment of the spirit from the body; not the death of the spirit. After death, the spirit keeps on living until it reincarnates in another physical body.

\(^{9}\) Allan Kardec’s real name was Hippolyte Leon Denizard Rivail.
\(^{10}\) According to Allan Kardec (1861), a medium is someone who feels the presence of spirits.
\(^{11}\) And these later works, by Allan Kardec, also contributed to the Spiritualist doctrine: The Mediums Book (1861), The Gospel According to Spiritism (1864), Heanven and Hell (1865), and The Genesis According to Spiritism (1868).
It is important to mention that Spiritism has its foundations on Christianity. Spirits accept many of the doctrines presented in the bible. As to their most distinguishing claim, Spiritists believe that eight bible passages justify their belief in reincarnation. And like Christians, Spiritists also believe in the person of Jesus. However, contrary to Christian thought, Spiritists believe that Jesus was not God, nor a god, but was the only perfect spirit to walk on earth.

In summary, Spiritism’s goal is to understand the nature, origin and destiny of spirits (Kardec 1944). Many Spiritists would not consider Spiritism a religion, but a doctrine. Others would say it is a religion without rituals. In Brazil, most Spiritists also associate themselves with one of the traditional religions; in most cases, Catholicism. According to Monteiro (2001), 95.4 percent of Spirits were once Catholic or still associate with Catholicism. There approximately 3.8 million Spiritists in Brazil.

THE PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION

This dissertation is organized as the following. Chapter 2 investigates the socioeconomic identity of the Protestant Pentecostal voter. The goal is to find out whether the Pentecostal believer is unique. Using data from the 2002 Brazilian Electoral Study (ESEB) and the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008-2010, I draw comparisons between the socioeconomic background patterns of believers belonging to the main religious groups. Chapter 3 investigates the link between religion and political behavior. The main question address in this chapter is how religion affects one’s likelihood of engaging in politics. I want to know whether the evangélico presence in the legislature translates into a unique pattern of political behavior by

---

12 Such as the existence of God (and one God only), divine justice, the emphasis on good works, and etc.
13 Used in Bohn (2004)
Pentecostal Protestants. In other words, are Pentecostals more politically engaged than the other members of belonging to other religious groups? Chapter 4 aims to explain the impact of religion on individuals’ perspective of democracy. More specifically, I will be examining differences in levels of political tolerance and support for democratic practices among members of the main religious groups. Lastly, Chapter 5 provides a review of the findings and implications of this study to this literature.
CHAPTER 2

PENTECOSTAL PROTESTANT IDENTITY: WHO ARE THE PENTECOSTALS?

According to the recent numbers released by the Fundacao Getulio Vargas (Getulio Vargas Foundation, FGV), the number of Protestants in Brazil represents over 20 percent of the population. If the projections are accurate, by 2020 this percentage will increase to approximately 50 percent. To a historically catholic country, where Catholics used to represent 95 percent of the population up to the 1940s, the numbers are unprecedented. Who are these individuals? What are the commonalities between them? The purpose of this chapter is to address these questions by drawing comparisons between the main three religious groups: Catholics, mainline Protestants and Pentecostal Protestants.

DECLINE IN CATHOLICISM

In order to understand the rapid and unforeseen growth of Protestants in Brazil, a good point of departure is the decline in Catholicism and consequently conversion to Protestantism. Since the 1940s, the Catholic Church has been losing members; many of those left the Catholic faith to join the Protestant movement. According to the IBGE, between the years of 1940-2010, the number of Catholics decreased from 95 percent to 64.4 percent while the number of Protestants increased from 2.6 percent to 22.2 percent. The simultaneous decrease in the number of Catholics and increase in the number of Protestants in Brazil represent the tip of the iceberg of

---

14 Numbers referring to the year of 2009.
the grand religious transformation occurring in Latin America; phenomenon referred to by some scholars as “conversion of a continent.”

Theories explaining this religious change not only in Brazil but also in Latin America have been organized in terms of supply-side and demand-side explanations. Supply-side explanations focus on the opportunities and restrictions religious organizations and its leaders face in the religious marketplace. (Finke and Iannaccone 1993; Warner 1993). These explanations, originated from economic models, view religion as a product, leaders and religious organizations as suppliers, and believers as consumers. The words of Finke and Iannaccone illustrate the main assumption of supply-side explanations.

The market model views churches and their clergy as religious producers who choose the characteristics of their product and the mains of marketing it. Consumers in turn choose what religion, if any, they will accept and how extensively they will participate in it. In a competitive environment, a particular religious firm will flourish only if it provides a product as least as attractive as its competitors.

(Finke and Iannaccone 1993:28)

According to supply-side explanations then, factors such as denominational competition and state regulation of religious activity and institutions are major determinants of levels of the public’s participation in religious activities. On the other hand, demand-side explanations focus on the needs, perceptions, and tastes of religious consumers. The processes of modernization, industrialization, and secularization are often cited phenomena in explaining how social and structural change affect the demand for religion – or the needs and perceptions of individuals toward religion. For instance, many authors have emphasized how the changes brought by these processes, secularization and industrialization, have caused a decrease in demand for religion and religious authority (Chaves 1994; Norris and Inglehart 2004). The assumption is that rising levels

---

15 For more discussion on the topic, see Timothy J. Steigenga and Edward L. Cleary, Conversion of a Continent: Contemporary Religious Change in Latin America (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2007).
of urbanization, education, and wealth all contribute to the decreasing influence of religious authority in society.

Supply-side and Demand-side Explanations and the Case of Brazil

Both set of explanations work together to explain the Latino scenario. While supply-side explanations point to the Catholic Church’s contentment with the status quo and the growing religious pluralism in the region as causes of the decline of Catholicism, demand-side explanations emphasize the challenges and ideas brought up by modernization as causes of the growth of Protestantism.

Gill (1998) writes that the Catholic Church was the only supplier of religious services for nearly five centuries (up to the mid-1800s), position that provided the Catholic Church with virtual monopoly over religion in Latin America. However, as many scholars point out, the Catholic Church was a lazy monopolist (Finke and Stark 1992; Smith and Prokopy 1999; Levine 2009). In the words of Gill (1999:73), “it is difficult to think of Catholicism as being a proselytizing religion [in Latin America]; with a virtual monopoly over the religious market, its mission to gain adherents was more or less complete.”

The problem with monopoly is that the church stops supplying its flock with their needs. Meaning, religious monopoly breeds lazy leadership (Finke and Stark 1992). When religious monopoly exists, the monopolist leadership becomes complacent even to the point of taking their members or congregations for granted. In the case of the Catholic Church, since no other religious movement presented itself as a threat to the status quo, the leadership had no incentive to be active or innovative. Evangelization is an ongoing process; a lack of evangelism, or the continuous preaching of the faith, discourages members to continue to be committed to the faith.
The monopoly of the Brazilian Catholic Church did just that. Perhaps the lack of commitment to evangelization can be seen through the extreme lack of clergy. According to Barrett (1982), the number of priests in Latin America is approximately 1.9 priests per 10,000 Catholics while in the U.S and Great Britain the numbers are 9.8 and 10.5 respectively.

Another related cause to the decline of Catholicism, from the supply-side explanation, is the multiplication of religious choices, or religious pluralism. According to the religious market model, whereas monopoly leads to complacent monopolies, a free religious marketplace leads to an “energetic competition between churches [and] expands the supply of religious ‘products,’ thereby mobilizing religious activism among the public” (Norris and Inglehart 2004:95). In the Brazilian case, the monopoly of the Catholic Church was most threatened in the 1980s due to democratic transition, and consequently, the political reforms that empowered other religious groups. The new found political freedom accentuated religious pluralism and competition by providing new and old churches a variety of ways to make their message heard and also to gain access to the state (Serbin 1999).

In the midst of this new religious competition, two different movements emerged challenging the Catholic monopoly: Protestantism and Afro-Brazilian religions (Patterson 2005). In the case of the Afro-Brazilian religions, umbanda and candomble were acquiring more attention of the public although less than 1 percent of the population identified themselves as belonging to those three religious groups combined. As to the Protestant movement, Pentecostal denominations quickly gained prominence in the public sphere. A prime example is the establishment of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus, IURD). The IURD was established in 1977 by evangelist Edir Macedo and by the mid-
1990s it had purchased the third largest Brazilian TV network (TV Record) and an average of $1 billion in tithes per year.

As Catholicism faces the challenge imposed by the political reforms and, consequently, the increasing religious pluralism, another set of factors, linked to demand-side explanations, also shook the scope of influence of the Catholic Church: people’s diversifying and fluctuating needs (Doogers 2001; Willems 2006). Broadly, the source of change in needs can be organized as coming from either structural changes – known as “anomie” thesis – or an individual’s personal choice for a different set of values. The anomie thesis suggests that changes brought by modernization (the loss of traditional community, urbanization, economic growth, and etc.) cause a sense of uncertainty or a disruption of traditional patterns that makes individuals more likely to see religion as an attractive option, or an adaptive mechanism. In the case of Brazil, Protestantism was the more attractive option for many affected by these structural changes. Another possible cause of conversion to Protestantism is the individual’s personal choice for a new set of norms. The need for a new set of norms can originate from a big pool of reasons varying from people’s needs to find answers to transcendental questions to affinities with individualism and capitalist values associated with the Protestant faith (Heirich 1977; Seman 2000).

Andrew Chesnut’s (1997) investigation of the enormous success of Protestant Pentecostalism in Brazil illustrates the argument put forth by the anomie thesis. Conducting ninety life history interviews with believers belonging to three different Pentecostal churches in the Amazonian city of Belém, between the years of 1993 and 1994, Chesnut finds that conversion to Protestantism is linked to the promise of faith healing many Protestant churches promote. Many individuals turned to Protestantism after they, or a family member, experienced
some type of illness or life-threatening condition. Chesnut concludes that the message of healing power echoes with the masses’ needs.\textsuperscript{16} Emilio Willems’ investigation of conversion in Brazil and Chile point to the other set of explanations – to the individual’s personal choice for a new set of norms. As a result of his field work, Willems finds that many of the life stories he collected linked conversion to Protestantism to a feeling of dissatisfaction with life or search for better a spiritual life.

Other authors’ investigation of conversion to Protestantism in Latin America also point to this same pattern in conversion. Rebecca Bomann (1999) studies the conversion experiences of believers in Bogota, Columbia. Bomann spends a year travelling and interviewing individuals that were raised Catholic but at some point in their lives turned to Protestantism. After extensive field work, Bomann concludes that there are basically three explanations for conversion: structural change, and social and spiritual needs. As to structural changes, the author points to experiences of massive urbanization and rapid modernization which disrupts traditional family structures and ways of life where the poor are the most affected. In terms of social needs, the Protestant Church provides ways to supply for the members’ needs for material needs, social networking, and emotional support. Lastly, the need for spiritual fulfillment also draws people to the Protestant faith. Bomann describes Latin America as defined by a passionate and spiritual culture where the practice of divination, superstition, folk religion, and saint worship are all common practice. Therefore, it is no surprise that the Protestant church, specially the Pentecostal one, has captivated many with its many supernatural experiences and manifestations.

Explanations stemming from both, supply-side and demand-side theory, offer valuable insights to our understanding of the decline of Catholicism. While endogenous developments

\textsuperscript{16} For more works on the relationship between Pentecostalism’s healing experiences and conversion to Protestantism in the Brazilian context see Marcelo Natividade (2006), Victor Valla (2002) and Francisco Cartaxo Rolim (1985).
hurt the Catholic Church’s scope of influence, other exogenous factors such as political reforms and people’s diversifying needs also contributed to the decline in membership in the Catholic Church and perhaps, inversely, contributed to the growth of Protestantism. Next, I will turn to a brief discussion of the history of the Protestant Pentecostal movement in Brazil.

THE PROTESTANT PENTECOSTAL MOVEMENT: THE WAVES OF PROTESTANTISM

In a better effort to understand how the Protestant movement sprung up in Latin America, scholars often explain the phenomenon as successive waves of evangelism. The Protestant roots in Latin America date back to the early 1800s. In 1810, Brazil and Britain signed a commercial treaty that opened up the doors for foreign trade and, consequently, allow for cultural exchange. More importantly, the agreement guaranteed religious freedom for new immigrants. Many of those that migrated to Brazil were members of the Anglican Church. This period marks the first successful introduction of the faith in the region – or the first wave. However, it is important to note that these Protestants immigrants practiced their faith as means for preserving their cultural identity instead of a means for spreading the faith to non-believers. Therefore, the impact of these first Protestants in the Brazilian religious’ landscape was very limited.

The second wave of Protestantism began in the early 1900s as the result of an evangelical movement originated in the United States. This earlier revival evangelical movement was also the beginning of Pentecostalism, first seen in Topeka, Kansas, in 1901, and most famously in Azusa Street, Los Angeles, five years later. The movement was transported to Brazil mainly through the initiative of two Swedish missionaries that had been living the United States: Gunnar Vingren and Daniel Berg. After a revelation in a church in Chicago, where Vingren and
Berg received the word they should spread the faith to an unknown place, the two missionaries packed up and arrived in Para, Brazil in November of 1910 to establish one of the first Brazilian Pentecostal churches, the Assembly of God. Around the 1920s, Vingren and Berg started ordaining local pastors and in the early 1930s, they transferred the leadership of the church to Brazilian leaders. Almost simultaneously, the arrival of Luis Francescon in Sao Paulo also majorly contributed to the spread of Protestantism in Brazil. Francescon founded the first Pentecostal church in Brazil – Congregacao Crista – in Sao Paulo in 1910 after he was expelled from the Presbyterian Church of Bras. The significance of this second wave of Protestantism is not only that it marks the beginning of the Pentecostal movement in Brazil but also lays the foundation for the formation of independent and local churches (Vasquez 1998). As Read (1965) shows, by the 1950s, the membership of the Assembly of God and the Congregacao Crista had jumped over to 120,000 and 132,000 respectively.

The third wave of Protestantism occurred between 1950s and mid-1970s. During this period, many Pentecostal churches were formed including the Igreja do Evangelho Quadrangular, Brasil para Cristo, and Deus e Amor. The founder of Brasil para Cristo (Brazil for Christ), Manoel de Mello, was a leader trained in the Assembly of God tradition and used the mass media and religious rallies to proselytize the faith. As result, Brasil para Cristo became the first large Pentecostal church in Brazil. This strategy was also adopted by other Pentecostal churches and, since then, Pentecostalism has experienced spectacular growth. Today, the largest Pentecostal church in Brazil is the IURD, founded in 1977, with over five million members and 13,000 churches.17

---

17 Many authors would not classify the IURD as a Pentecostal church but as a Neo-pentecostal one. Some of the innovations of Neo-Pentecostalism are: (1) the belief that the best of life is not only reserved for the afterlife, but to life on earth as well; (2) the belief that men are not responsible for the evil in the world. The devil is the one to be
What distinguishes the mainline Protestant church from the Pentecostal Protestant church? The purpose of the Pentecostal movement was to reorganize the faith so that the modern church could resemble more what the “first” church looked like – as described in the bible (in the book of Acts). Due to this reshaping of doctrine, the most common traits of the Pentecostal church are speaking in tongues, emphasis on baptism of the spirit, divine healing, expulsion of demons, and prophecy. These traits make the Pentecostal Protestant church distinct from the mainline Protestant church.

The main goal of this chapter is to describe the socioeconomic identity of those that make up the membership of the Pentecostal church. Who are these individuals? Are they unique? Or are they very similar to the rest of the population?

Background

It has been argued that Pentecostal Protestantism often makes its greatest wins among the most disenfranchised sects of the population (Freston 2001; Montero and Almeida 2000; Chesnut 1997; Steward-Gambino and Wilson 1997; Pierucci and Prandi 1995; Mariz 1994; Fernandes 1992). The argument makes sense when one analyzes the way Pentecostalism was introduced in Brazil. As mentioned before, Pentecostalism was brought to Brazil through international
missionaries; mainly the two Swedish and Italian missionaries. Vingren and Berg arrived in the state of Para with the purpose of proselytizing the Protestant faith. Upon their arrival in the rural Para, the two missionaries were sheltered by a Baptist minister who spoke English. Berg and Vingren spent months participating in the activities of a small Baptist church until they were excommunicated due to their message of baptism in the Holy Spirit and faith healing. After their expulsion, Berg and Vingren organized their own church in 1911 (the Assembly of God), made up by locals that were so economically disprivileged they could not afford to rent a worship place on their own (Chesnut 1997). Berg then drew from his own funds—accumulated through bible selling and a job as a smelter at the Port Company of Para—to keep the ministry alive.

By 1914, the number of members of the newly formed Pentecostal church was approximately 190. By the mid-1920s, the number in membership had increased beyond the temple’s physical capacity of twelve hundred seats. By the 1930s, the Assembly of God had founded two other churches and registered over a thousand of believers. Seeing that the movement had been consolidated in the north of Brazil, the headquarters of the Assembly of God was transferred to Rio de Janeiro. Meanwhile, Luis Francescon was having the same effect on the Paulista Presbyterians that Vingren and Berg had on the northern Baptists (Chesnut 1997). While we lack data and information to know what the congregation founded by Francescon looked like, it is clear that the members of the first Assembly of God came from the poor areas of Belem, Para. In Chesnut’s (1997) account of Berg and Vingren’s efforts to win converts in Para, the author writes:

To win converts to their Pentecostal faith, Berg and Vingren spent much of their time making house calls on the sick. Berg reports receiving calls at their basement room after midnight from distraught relatives of the infirm. Even if the afflicted eventually succumbed to malaria, yellow fever, or another tropical malady, the therapeutic value of prayer, anointment with oil, laying on of hands proved real. With little access to the city’s
... precarious health care facilities and neglected by the Catholic church, many ill Belenenses and their families came to the Assembly of God as a last resort.

(Chesnut 1997:28)

The success of Pentecostalism among the poor and less educated can be better understood when one contrasts the evangelization approach of mainline Protestant missionaries to that of the Pentecostal Protestant missionaries. First, it is important to emphasize the fact that most of the early Brazilian Pentecostal churches were formed by individuals that had left their Baptist congregations. After Berg and Vingren were expelled from the Baptist church they used to serve, the two missionaries and seventeen others pursued a clear and intentional strategy of poaching members of the Baptist churches in their region. Second, Baptist missionaries were highly involved with the Brazilian upper class due to their similarities in socioeconomic class, racial bias and perhaps even political views (Premark 2011). Third, Pentecostalism gave Brazilians the opportunity to be in charge. While the leadership of the Catholic Church and mainline Protestant churches was in the hands of mostly foreign priests and foreign missionaries respectively, the leadership of Pentecostal churches could be held by anyone. In other words, the requirements to be a pastor for a Pentecostal church were much less extensive than those to be a pastor for a mainline Protestant church. All of these factors contributed to the success of Pentecostalism among the masses. As Premark (2011:15) writes, the masses “embraced Pentecostalism because [Pentecostalism] embraced them.”

As story tells, Pentecostalism did spread out first amongst those with lower socioeconomic status. However, is Pentecostalism still a movement of the most disfranchised? According to data belonging to the year of 2002, the short answer to this question is “yes”, although a deeper comparison of the socioeconomic status among members of different religious groups reveals that members of the three main religious groups and those not affiliated to a religion are very similar in their socioeconomic background. Using data from the 2002 Brazilian
Electoral Study (ESEB), Bohn (2004) describes the socioeconomic characteristics of the Brazilian Protestant. Figure 1.1 shows the distribution of income by religious affiliation.

As data from the ESEB 2002 show, the monthly income of most members of Protestant churches (48.4 percent) was equal to minimum wage. Approximately 67 percent of Protestants received a maximum of twice the minimum wage monthly. Only about 8.9 percent of Protestants came from the group that earned six or more times the minimum wage.

**Figure 1.1: Distribution of Income by Religious Affiliation (ESEB 2002)**

![Distribution of Income by Religious Affiliation](image)


A closer look at Figure 1.1 points to interesting similarities between Catholics and Protestants. The monthly income of most members of the Catholic Church (51.8 percent) was equal to minimum wage. Approximately 77.3 percent of Catholics received a maximum of twice the minimum wage monthly. The percentage of Catholics that earned six or more times minimum wage was of 8.8. Also, the distribution of income between Catholics and Protestants is very similar to that of members of the Afro-religion group. Most members of the Afro-religion
group (54.5 percent) also earned a monthly income of minimum wage and only 9.9 percent earned six or more times the minimum wage.

As it is clear, most members of the three largest religious groups (Catholics, Protestant, and Afro) earned a monthly income equal to minimum wage in 2002. One is tempted then, to think that religion, in general, is an option of the poor. However, that would be an incorrect assessment since approximately 46 percent of those that did not associate themselves with a religious group also earned a monthly income equal to minimum wage.

What stands out from data shown in Figure 1.1 is the distribution of income between members of Spiritism. While most members of three largest religious groups earned a monthly income equal to minimum wage, only 30 percent of the practitioners of Spiritism earned that same wage. Also, 36.8 percent of Spiritists earned six or more the minimum wage; number significantly higher than those for Catholics, Protestants and Afro.

Data from ESEB 2002 also allow us to analyze differences in income between mainline Protestants and Pentecostal Protestants. As Figure 1.2 shows, there were significant differences between the distribution of income between mainline and Pentecostal Protestants. In 2002, 70.3 percent of Pentecostal Protestants earned a monthly income up to two times the minimum wage while the percentage for mainline Protestants was 58.3. However, the sharpest difference between these two groups relied on the percentage of members that earned six or more times the minimum wage. While 6.8 percent of Pentecostal Protestants earned six or more times the minimum wage, the percentage for mainline Protestants was 16.7. These numbers show that mainline Protestants were wealthier than Pentecostal Protestants. These findings suggest that following hypothesis:
H1: There is a positive relationship between low levels of income and Protestantism
H1.1: Mainline Protestants are slightly wealthier than Pentecostal Protestants
H2: There are no significant differences in income between Catholics and Protestants

Figure 1.2: Distribution of Income Between Mainline and Pentecostal Protestants

![Bar chart showing income distribution](chart.png)


Next, we turn to the analysis between religious affiliation and education. Given the
history of Brazilian Pentecostalism, one is tempted to make the conclusion that, just like income,
lower levels of education is positively linked to Protestantism. Data from the 2002 ESEB
confirms that suspicion. Figure 1.3 presents the relationship between levels of education and
religious affiliation.

In terms of education, Catholics and Protestants have a very similar profile. The percent
of Catholics that did not complete primary school is 58.1 while for Protestants is 54. The
percentage of individuals that have some or a college degree is 6.3 and 5.6 for Catholics and
Protestants respectively. Once again, we see the significant contrast between the members of the
three largest religions and Spiritists. While the majority of members of the three largest religious groups had not completed primary education, the greatest percentage of Spiritists (36.5) had
some degree of secondary education; only 27 percent of Spiritists had not completed primary school. Also, when it comes to higher education, there was a significant contrast between Spiritism and the other religions. Approximately 24 percent of Spiritists had some degree or college experience while the percentage for Catholics, Protestants, and members of the Afro-religions were 6.3, 5.5, and 4.5 respectively.

Another important contrast to make is between mainline Protestants and Pentecostal Protestants. Once again, we see Pentecostal Protestants scoring lower than mainline Protestants on the variable analyzed. According to figure 1.4, the number of Pentecostals Protestant (60.8 percent) that did not finish primary education is almost double the number of mainline Protestants (33.7 percent) that did not finish primary education. Most mainline Protestants (44.6 percent) had some degree of secondary education. Also, the difference in college experience between these two groups was significant. While only 2.2 percent of Pentecostal Protestants had some degree of college experience, approximately 16 percent of mainline Protestants had the same experience. From these findings, we can generate the following relationships:

H3: There is a positive relationship between low levels of education and Protestantism
H3.1: Mainline Protestants are more likely to display higher levels of education than Pentecostal Protestants.
H4: There are no significant differences in levels of education between Catholics and Protestants.

Data from 2002 show Pentecostalism as movement embraced mostly by those of lower socioeconomic status, is the present scenario the same? Using one of the most recent surveys done in Brazil, the LAPOP (for the years of 2008 and 2010), I will analyze the socioeconomic characteristics of the current Pentecostal Protestant.
The Current Scenario

In order to test the independent effects of socioeconomic variables on religious affiliation, I first use a means comparison analysis (ANOVA) for the periods of 2008 and 2010. Next I also present the results of a logit model predicting Pentecostal affiliation based on socioeconomic variables. The socioeconomic variables included in the analysis were income, urban, education, and age. Income is measured by asking respondents their monthly income based on minimum wage. Urban is a dummy variable to indicate the location of the respondent’s resident where urban is coded as 1 and rural is coded as 0. Education is measure by the amount of years of education respondents have completed. And finally, age is reported as the respondent’s actual age.

The ANOVA analysis of socioeconomic variables on religious affiliation shows that the only significant coefficient is urban for the year of 2008 and age for the year of 2010. Up to 2008, the likelihood of an individual identifying himself with Pentecostalism was greater if he lived in an urban area versus a rural area. In 2010, the relationship between urban versus rural area and identification to Pentecostalism becomes insignificant. Age is statistically insignificant for the year of 2008 and becomes significant in 2010. Although the coefficient shows significance at the .05 level, the difference in average age between Pentecostals and the rest of the population is only two years.

All other variables were not statistically significant. Findings of the ANOVA analysis suggest then that there are no significant differences between Pentecostal Protestants and the rest of the population in terms socioeconomic status. It seems that the relationships that existed in 2002 still remain.

\[^{18}\text{In 2010, minimum wage was equal to R$ 510.00 (approximately$280.00).}\]
Table 1.1: Socioeconomic Background by Religious Affiliation (2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pentecostal</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean/Std. Deviation</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>2.63 (1.58)</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>.88 (.322)</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>8.06 (3.72)</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>37.30 (15.0)</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 1.2: Socioeconomic Background by Religious Affiliation (2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pentecostal</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean/Std. Deviation</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>3.55 (1.59)</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>1.10 (.301)</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>6.91 (4.02)</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>39.41 (15.75)</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In order to illustrate better the comparison between Pentecostals and the rest of the population, figures 1.5 and 1.6 present data on income and education variations between the different religious groups. As Figure 1.5 shows, most Pentecostals (56.5 percent) earn a monthly income of up to twice the minimum wage. Most mainline Protestants (55.1 percent) also earn an income of up to twice the minimum wage. The data also show that Catholics remain very similar to mainline and Pentecostal Protestants in terms of income. As Figure 1.5 shows, most Catholics (57.9 percent) earn a monthly income of up to twice the minimum wage. Once again, the interesting finding here is the monthly income of the Spiritists. The income category that has the highest number (30 percent) of Spiritists represented is monthly income of “five to fifteen times” the minimum wage. Also, approximately 8 percent of Spiritists earn a monthly income of fifteen
times or more the minimum wage; this number is greater than the percentage on the same
category for Catholics, mainline Protestants, Pentecostal Protestants, and no religion combined.\textsuperscript{19}

In terms of education, Catholics, mainline Protestants, Pentecostals, and those with no
affiliation to religion are very similar. For instance, the percentage of individuals that have some
degree of high school experience is 40.5, 43.5, 46, 43.1 for Catholics, mainline Protestants,

\textbf{Figure 1.5: Distribution of Income by Religious Affiliation (LAPOP 2010)}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure1.5.png}
\caption{Distribution of Income by Religious Affiliation (LAPOP 2010)}
\end{figure}


\textsuperscript{19} The percentage of Catholics, mainline Protestants, Pentecostal Protestants, and no religion that make fifteen or
more times the minimum wage combined is 6.1.
Pentecostal Protestants, and no religion respectively. For college experience, the percentages are 8.6, 12.6, 71.1, and 10.4 for Catholics, mainline Protestants, Pentecostal Protestants, and no religion respectively. Spiritists, once again, present a puzzle. Spiritists turn out to be the most educated between the three largest religious groups and those with no religious affiliation. Approximately 26 percent of Spiritists have had some degree of college experience. This percentage is double the percentage (12.6) of the second group (mainline Protestants) with the highest number of members that have had some college experience.

In order to provide a further test on the socioeconomic identity of the Pentecostal Protestant, I also use a logit model to predict what variables have the greater likelihood of impacting Pentecostal affiliation. The results of the logit regression, presented on Table 1.3, show that income, urban, and education are not statistically significant variables predicting Pentecostal affiliation. Although age appears as statistically significant, the negative coefficient points to a
small difference in age between Pentecostals and non-Pentecostals, where the former tends to be younger than the latter.

**Table 1.3: Socioeconomic Impact on Pentecostal Affiliation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient (Std. Err)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.02 (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>.37 (.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.02 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.01 (.00)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.37 (.29)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant at .05 level  
** Significant at .01 level  
*** Significant at .001 level

All the previous analyses point to the following conclusion: based on socioeconomic variables, Pentecostal Protestants are not unique citizens. When one compares the socioeconomic background of the Pentecostal Protestant to that of the other main religious groups, the Pentecostal Protestant does not stand out. The Pentecostal Protestant is more likely to be economically disprivileged, have low levels of education, live in urban settings, and young. Such characteristics do not make Pentecostals Protestants unique. Catholics, mainline Protestants, adherents of Afro-religions, and those with no religious affiliation all seem to share the socioeconomic identity of the Pentecostal Protestant.

Although evidence points to the conclusion that individuals belonging to the main religious groups and those with no religious affiliation are similar, one religious group stands out: the Spiritists. Spiritists are significantly wealthier and more educated than the rest of the religious population. What makes the Spiritist unique? While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to investigate Spiritism, I, for the purpose of satisfying one’s curiosity, briefly discuss the possible reasons that make Spiritists a unique religious group.
My explanation for the uniqueness of members belonging to Spiritism comes from the nature of Spiritism itself. Unlike Catholicism and Protestantism, Spiritism gives individuals room to be spiritual but not religious. In some aspects, being religious and spiritual are synonyms. Both connote the belief in a supernatural power of some kind and also a desire to develop a relationship with that supernatural power. Also, both connote the desire to be part of rituals or practices that promote the connection between the individual and supernatural power. However, there are also important differences between these two terms. Religious studies scholar Robert Fuller, writes that modernism and cultural forces have reshaped how individuals see the “private” and “public” spheres of life (Fuller 2001). Many now associate faith with the private realm of life rather than the public realm of institutions and rituals. Therefore nowadays, the word *spiritual* is more likely associated to personal thought and experience while the word *religious* is more likely associated with membership in religious institutions, participation in formal rituals, and adherence to official doctrines (Fuller 2001). Basically, the “spiritual, but not religious” individual rejects the idea of a traditionally organized religion as a means for spiritual growth. Instead, these individuals have embraced an individualized spirituality where they are able to pick and choose from a set of different religious philosophies.

Seeing Spiritists as spiritual but not religious perhaps explains their uniqueness. The freedom of thought and from traditional religion Spiritism offers its adherents matches the postmaterialistic attitude of the wealthy and more educated individual towards life. According to
Inglehart (1990), individuals that hold postmaterialistic values are less likely to be religious.\(^\text{20}\) Also, postmaterialistic values are linked to higher levels of income. As Inglehart (1990) proposes, economic development may cause the shift away from materialistic to postmaterialistic values. Although the causal arrow cannot be drawn with precision, we can look at the uniqueness of Spiritists as originating from the higher levels of income and education these individuals have. In other words, from all the alternative religions, Spiritism offers the wealthier and more educated citizen the best option for their fulfillment of spiritual needs. As mentioned before, Spiritism teaches that there is a supernatural being, God; however, Spiritism does not require any practice or ritual from its adherents such as membership to an institution or a body of laws or doctrines. For these reasons, the wealthier and more educated spiritual Brazilian may be attracted to Spiritism more than the other alternatives.

In order to test the hypothesis that Spiritists are more likely to hold Postmaterialistic values than others belonging to the other major religious traditions, I build an index based on Inglehart’s postmaterialism index.\(^\text{21}\) The results of the ANOVA regression (see Table 1.4) show that the difference in mean score between Spiritists and others is statistically significant (.000 level). Spiritists are more likely to hold Postmaterialistic values than members of the other major religious groups.

\(^{20}\) Also see Inglehart 1995, 1997 and 2005.

\(^{21}\) My index was based on the answer to the following two questions. First, do you approve or disapprove the right of homosexual union? Respondents indicated their approval by rating their response on a scale of 0-10 (where 0 is highly disapprove and 10 is highly approve). Second, do you agree or disagree with the following statement: I would approve of my daughter/son’s union to a black person. Respondents indicated how much they agreed to the statement by rating their response on a scale of 0-7 (where 0 is completely disagree and 7 is completely agree). These two questions try to capture the freedom of speech dimension related Inglehart’s postmaterialism index. The other dimension of postmaterialism regards the importance of say in political matters. Due to data constraints, and more specifically, the lack of appropriate questions, I do not measure the second dimension of postmaterialism.
Table 1.4: ANOVA Analysis

Descriptives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>Lower Bound</th>
<th>Upper Bound</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>1411</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>.099</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>17.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainline Protestant</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>.225</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>17.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pentecostal</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>.197</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>17.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiritist</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>.405</td>
<td>14.05</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>17.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2109</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>.082</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>17.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ANOVA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>450.780</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>150.260</td>
<td>10.849</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>29154.733</td>
<td>2105</td>
<td>13.850</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>29605.514</td>
<td>2108</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this chapter was to investigate the socioeconomic characteristics of the Pentecostal Protestant. As evidence shows, the individuals representing this religious group are not unique. As expected, the Pentecostal Protestant is poor, young, has between low and average levels of school education, and lives, mostly, in urban areas. These characteristics do not make the Pentecostal Protestant unique since these characteristics are also representative of Catholics, mainline Protestant, members of Afro-religions and those with no religious affiliation.

If the Pentecostal Protestant resembles the members of the other major religious groups and nonreligious in terms of socioeconomic background, does that similarity carry over to political behavior? How does Pentecostalism affect political behavior? These are the main questions I seek to answer in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 3
PENTECOSTALISM AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

How does Pentecostalism affect political behavior? Overall, the relationship between Christianity and politics is complex. The Christian doctrine carries the seeds for both, political quiescence and activism. While on one hand, it teaches that one should respect those in power and the authority they possess, on the other, it also encourages one to be a spokesperson for certain issues (behavior that may translate to political action). The main focus of this chapter is to understand how Pentecostalism affects the political behavior of citizens. Is the Pentecostal more engaged in politics than others? Or, is he quiescent towards the political system?

RELIGIOSITY AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

The relationship between religiosity and political engagement is a complex one. While some scholars suggest that religiosity boosts political participation, others make the argument that it suppresses. The explanations linking the influence of religiosity to political behavior often revolve around the church, religious doctrine and affiliation, and the individual level of commitment aspects of religion.

Churches, specifically the Catholic and Protestant ones, have traditionally been important political and social actors in society. For instance, in the United States the church played a key role in many important historical junctures such as the civil war and Civil Rights movement (Calhoun-Brown 2000; Sweet 1912). In Europe, the church contributed to the end of communism (Ediger 2005; Mucha and Zaba 1992). In Latin America, the church was a strong opposing force to many of the authoritarian regimes imposed between 1950-70s (Fleet and Smith 1997; Sabia 1997; Bruneau and Hewitt 1989; Bruneau 1985). Since Emperor Constantine’s
conversion and consequently use of religion as justification for political authority to today’s context, the church has been an institution that has exerted great influence in society. According to Campbell and Yonish (2003:89), “churches are by far the most prevalent form of voluntary associations.” Churches are important organizations in society because they provide a place for people to meet, opportunities for the development of leadership skills, information about public affairs, delivery of welfare services, opportunities for socialization across social and ethnic backgrounds, and encouragement for participation in other voluntary associations (Norris and Inglehart 2004). Due to the role of the church in society, *church attendance* and *membership* are two of the most popular religion variables in the literature. The argument is that the individual that attends or is a member of church is provided with the resources and opportunities to develop civic skills necessary to engage effectively in politics (Brown and Brown 2003; Brady et al. 1995).

Another important religion variable relates to the religious doctrine or affiliation one associates. The argument is that different religious traditions result in different social perspectives, and consequently, different political behaviors (Brewer 2003; Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2011; Patterson 2004). When individuals accept membership in a particular group or organization, in this case the church, the individual also accepts, to a certain degree, the norms and values of the group. Therefore, a member of the Protestant church that abides to the Protestantism may have a different worldview from an individual affiliated to a different religion or religious doctrine.

Finally, explanations linking the influence of religiosity to political behavior also consider the level of commitment of the individual to his or her religion, measured often by the intensity of religious beliefs. Although one may be a member of a church and be exposed to the
doctrines of that organization, the level of commitment of the individual to the doctrine he is exposed is also important. In other words, how committed an individual is to his faith beliefs may have important implications for political behavior (Patterson 2005; 2004). In studying the relationship between religion and politics in Guatemala and Costa Rica, Steigenga (2001) finds that religious beliefs are a significant factor affecting political variables. In the Guatemalan and Costa Rican cases, higher scores on a scale of religious conservatism were positively related to political quiescence towards conflictual policies and willingness to vote. Religious conservative individuals were willing to participate in politics through voting but were unwilling to engage in potentially conflictual behavior that could challenge political authority. Steigenga’s scale of religious conservatism was based on differences in responses to questions regarding millennialism, doctrinal orthodoxy, and images of God among respondents. Higher scores on the scale of religious conservatism meant that the respondent tended to agree with statements like the following: “Christ will return soon,” “the Bible should be interpreted literally,” and “God judges wrong-doers.” In Steigenga’s analysis, among Catholics, mainline Protestants, Pentecostals, and non-religious, Pentecostals scored the highest in all indicators.

Another study supplements the importance of the intensity of religious beliefs to political participation. McKenzie (2001) investigates the claim that church attendance has a positive effect in some types of political participation (i.e. voting) but a negative effect on others (i.e. nonelectoral activities). McKenzie argues that this differing effect is due to self-selection biases and that once self-selection is considered, church attendance plays no role in a respondent’s participation in politics; in other words, church attendance is not the best measure to predict political behavior since “congregants’ decisions to attend church frequently or infrequently

---

22 McKenzie measures self-selection as the respondents’ degree of fundamentalism based on their beliefs about the Bible.
partially reflect their underlying beliefs about fundamentalism. Present political behavior scholarship fails to account for the confounding influences of these types of personal motivations for church attendance.” (2001:486).

The literature briefly presented here illustrates the multidimensionality of religiosity. What comparativists have seen is that different aspects of religiosity affect political participation differently (Patterson 2005;2004). Next I will describe how religion has been said to boost and suppress political participation.

**Religiosity as a Boost to Political Participation**

The argument that religion boosts political participation often deals more with the role of churches in communities than with religious doctrines and individual commitment aspects of religiosity. The church can influence political behavior in multiple ways. Churches provide individuals with the appropriate environment to learn and improve those civic skills necessary for political participation (Alex-Assensoh and Assensoh 2001; Putnam 2000; Verba et al. 1995; Peterson 1992; Morris 1984) – these skills are, but not limited to, writing letters, speaking in front of groups, taking part in meetings, and voting; they are the source of theological and moral perspectives that guide how individuals make decisions about public policy (Tetlock 2000; Calhoun-Brown 1996; Wald et al. 1993; Wald et al. 1988, 1990); they reinforce and facilitate the transmission of group norms through its frequent patterns of social interaction (i.e. worship services) (Wald et al. 1988); and finally, they serve as sites for direct mobilization (Fitgerald and Spohn 2005; Wielhouwer 2000; Harris 1999; Calhoun-Brown 1996).
As to religious doctrines, the link between religious teachings and political participation is a complex one. As mentioned before, individuals that subscribe to different religions, and consequently different religious doctrines, are exposed to different teachings. These different teachings may impact how individuals perceive the world. Therefore, the logic is that different religions may result in different political behavior (Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2011; Patterson 2004; Brewer 2003). One of the most popular works that demonstrates this argument is found in Max Weber’s (1992) *The Protestant Ethnic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Weber (1992) argued that Protestantism provided a more favorable environment for capitalism, and ultimately democracy, than Catholicism. His argument was based on the different doctrines between these two religious institutions. To Weber, while Protestantism emphasizes individuality, egalitarianism, asceticism and an active spiritual life, Catholicism emphasizes passive obedience to authority, collective values, and fatalism. These differences made Protestantism fertile ground for capitalism.

The level of commitment of the individual to religious beliefs can also boost political participation. In *Latin America’s Neo-Reformation: Religion’s Influence on Contemporary Politics*, Eric Patterson examines the hypothesis that Protestants are more likely than Catholics to hold democratic values. Patterson’s analysis points to the importance of commitment to the faith. Patterson says:

The primary cleavage in political attitudes was not between Catholics and Protestants but between the devout and not devout. Analysis of regression results confirmed a pattern of political differences based on religious intensity, not religious affiliation. (2005:149)

Looking at the Brazilian and Chilean cases, Patterson found that devout believers were more likely to express confidence in the government, to perceive others as law-abiding citizens, and to stand up for their rights than not devout believers. Also, in both cases religious intensity
had a positive effect on satisfaction with democracy – where devout believers are more likely to be satisfied with democracy than not devout believers.

*Religiosity as a Suppressor of Political Participation*

While the argument that religion boosts political participation often deals with the role of the church in communities, the argument that religion functions as a suppressor of political participation often deals with religious doctrines. Most of these arguments are based on Karl Marx’s idea that religion acts as an opiate on mass political consciousness. In describing the influence of the Pentecostal movement on Chilean politics, Lalive D’Epinay argued that Pentecostals were not looking for social or economic change but they were passive and apolitical. Lalive D’Epinay says of Chilean Pentecostal movement:

Pentecostalism teaches its initiates withdrawal and passivity in political matters, limited only by the commandment of submissive to authority. In its social forms, it appears as specialized (since it is purely religious) reincarnation of a moribund society, and as their heir of the past rather than the precursor of emerging society. The components create a force for order rather than an element of progress; a defender of the status quo rather than a promoter of change (1967, 145).

To Lalive D’Epinay, Pentecostalism was a refuge to those poor migrants and others whose lives had been transformed by rapid socioeconomic forces. Pentecostalism served to remedy a sense of anomie many felt. The concept of anomie was first introduced by French sociologist Emile Durkheim in the late 1800s in his analysis of the transition from simple agrarian to highly complex urban societies. Durkheim argued that the increasing division of labor in society created a sense of normlessness in which individuals become uncertain of what models of life they should follow. A state of anomie may imply feelings of social isolation, loneliness, frustration, and hopelessness. According to Lalive D’Epinay, Pentecostalism was

---

23 See Emile Durkheim (1893), *The Division of Labor in Society.*
more than the remedy to anomie. Pentecostalism was also the key to adaption of poor migrants to the new urban world. This latter use of Pentecostalism is also the reason why Lalive D’Epinay saw the faith as encouraging passivity in political matters. According to the author, what Pentecostalism did for the poor was to “reconstitute the rural hierarchal patron-client order in an urban setting.” (Peterson and Vasquez 2008:162). The continuation of hierarchical patron-client relationships, being reflect in the relationship between believers and pastors, only reinforced the sense of withdrawal from worldly things – including politics. In this manner, Pentecostalism, as a religious doctrine, served as a suppressor of political participation in Chile.

The role of the church in the community has also been hypothesized to function as a suppressor of political participation. This argument focus on the time commitment believers have to their congregations. The logic is that churches may require too much from their members’ time and energy, which in turn may take time away from engaging in political activities. Campbell (2004) investigates the claim that Protestant churches foster political participation and one of his conclusions is that membership in evangelical Protestant denominations has a negative effect on political participation. Campbell (2004) concludes that the “time members of evangelical Protestant denominations spend in their service to their church comes at the expense of participation in the wider community, contrary to the way mainline Protestant and Catholic churches foster civic activity among their members” (155). The argument that some denominations may require more from members than others is based on Innaccone (1992,1994,1995) and Finke and Stark (1992) idea that some churches tend to be stricter than others, therefore, requiring more from their members. On one hand, strict churches are less likely than less strict churches to face collective action problems. Strict churches often have a high cost of membership – regulations of sexual behavior and social conduct – which screens out free
riders. On the other, strict churches require significant investments of time and commitment into the activities of their congregation which may cause members to hold fewer memberships in outside groups or organizations. Another argument emphasizing the role of the church as a suppressor of political participation lies at the role of clergy, or more importantly, their message. Previous research has shown that being a member of a political church enhances engagement in political activities (McClernking and McDaniel 2005; Harris 1999; Calhoun-Brown 1996; Tate 1993). A political church is one that “holds political awareness and activity as salient pieces of its identity” (McDaniel 2002). In such a church, members may discuss political matters with one another regularly, hear announcements or discussion on political campaigns, and even hear politicians or candidates as guest speakers. Therefore, members of political churches are more likely to engage in political than members of non-political churches.

PENTECOSTAL POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

Steward-Gambino and Wilson (1997) argue that the view that Pentecostals are always and inherently apolitical, or they “render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s,” is a stereotype. The traditional view is often this: Pentecostals are only concerned with matters of private morality, participation in church-related activities, and intra-group identity/solidarity. However, Steward-Gambino and Wilson point to evidence showing otherwise. As evidence, the authors point to the growth of protestant political parties in the region; one example being that of El Salvador where the growing widespread distrust of politics among protestant believers led to the establishment of two evangelical-inspired political parties in the 1990s.
The important question is not whether the Pentecostal Protestant is apolitical or not; rather, it is how politically engaged Pentecostal Protestants are, especially as compared to the other major religious groups – such as Catholics in the case of Brazil. Previous research shows that historically, Protestants and Catholics have stood on opposite sides of politics (Valenzuela et al. 2007). Starting in the nineteenth century, Protestants tended to support anticlerical, or leftist, parties and candidates for these allowed them to establish their own churches and schools and to practice their religion freely. On the other hand, Catholics tended to support parties and candidates that are more centrist or rightist for those have been historically linked to the church. This historical background may lead us to believe we will find differences in the political behavior of Protestants and Catholics. As to differences in political behavior between Pentecostal Protestants and mainline Protestants, the literature is not clear. From this perspective, we can suggest the following hypothesis:

H1: Protestants and Catholics display different patterns of political behavior

Another matter concerning the differences in political behavior between Protestants and Catholics voters is the frequency in which they engage in political matters. As discussed earlier, most of the literature describing the positive link between religiosity and political participation focus on the role of the church in the community. Patterson (2005) looks specifically at the importance of the Catholic and Protestant churches in Brazil in building civil skills and suggests that the Protestant church provides more opportunities than the Catholic Church for the development of those skills that are essential to political participation and democracy. More specifically, the Protestant church provides a place where individuals learn organizational skills, improve their analytical skills through programs emphasizing individual interpretation of the Bible, and are encouraged to be involved in their communities (Martin 1990; Cleary and
Steward-Gambino 1997). Two indicators might help us understand why Patterson (2005) claims that the Protestant church provides more opportunities than the Catholic church for the development of civic skills; one lies at the role of the church itself and the other at the behavior of the attendees. On a study examining the role of the Protestant churches in communities of Rio de Janeiro, Conrado (2006) finds that out of the 843 churches included in the analysis, 57 percent of them have some type of social work project in place. The social work projects varied from the distribution of food to workshops for adults. One the other indicator, according to data from the ESEB 2002 Protestants are the most devout amongst all other believers. Respondents were asked how often they attended religious services. The answers ranged from “at least once a week”, “once a week”, “once or twice a month”, “a few times a year”, and “rarely.” Approximately 82 percent of Protestants said they attended church at least once a week; for the same category, the percentage for Catholics, Spiritists and Afro religion was 36, 49, and 50 percent respectively. According to these numbers, it is clear that the Protestant spends more time at church than the Catholic believer. Also, Landim (2001) shows that the greater the frequency of attendance to religious services, the greater the likelihood of contributing financially to a social project. Therefore, if the Protestant believer spends more time in church than the Catholic believer, and therefore, has more opportunities to learn civic skills and might be more willing to support a social cause, the following hypotheses are proposed:

H2: Protestants are more likely to be engaged in politics than Catholics.
H2.1: Protestants are more likely to be interested in politics than Catholics.

Although the Protestant church may provide the basis for greater opportunities than the Catholic church for members to learn civic skills, is there a difference between mainline and Pentecostal Protestant churches in how they encourage civic participation? No research to date
has examined this question specifically. However, Conrado (2006) provides some statistics on social projects directed by Protestant churches that shed some light into this question. According to Conrado, out of the 218 organizations that promote some type of social work with focus on children and teenagers in Rio de Janeiro, 72 percent are affiliated to the mainline Protestant church while 22 percent are affiliated to the Pentecostal church. To the author, the discrepancy in levels of social involvement between the two church groups is due to the experience and legacy of mainline Protestantism in Brazil. Since mainline congregations were established earlier than Pentecostal ones, they have been working with communities for longer periods of time; therefore, have also been able to create and develop more institutions that promote community development. From this brief review, the following hypothesis is suggested:

H3: Mainline Protestants are more likely to display higher levels of political participation than Pentecostal Protestants.

Finally, as to how religiosity affects political behavior one should also ask whether religiosity have a different effect in the likelihood of unconventional political participation among Protestants and Catholics. Some scholars have shown that biblical literalism and religious participation have a strong impact on the likelihood of participating in protest (Sherkat 1998; Quinley 1974). Using data from the 1996 Religious Identity and Influence (RII) Survey, McVeigh and Sikkink (2001) show that there are four factors that increase the likelihood of Protestants participating in unconventional political activity: volunteering for church organizations, a perception that religious values are being threatened, a belief that individuals should not have a right to deviate from Christian moral standards, and a belief that humans are
inherently sinful. It seems then that Protestants will engage in unconventional political behavior only under special circumstances.

Additionally, as Steigenga (2001) shows, Pentecostals appear to be less likely to challenge the status than other religious groups, including mainstream Protestants. According to the author, Pentecostals’ unwillingness to mount potential challenges to political authority is a consequence of millennialist beliefs coupled with literal interpretation of the bible. From this discussion, the following hypotheses are suggested:

H4: The Protestant voter is less likely to engage in unconventional politics than the Catholic voter.
H4.1: The Pentecostal Protestant voter is less likely to engage in unconventional politics than the mainline Protestant voter.

THE BRAZILIAN PENTECOSTAL PROTESTANT: DATA AND MEASURES

In order to test the suggested hypotheses on the political behavior of Pentecostal Protestants, I use the Latin American Public Opinion Project, the Americas Barometer (LAPOP) (2010). This survey was administered between March and April of 2010 based on face-to-face interviews conducted in Portuguese. The total N of the project is 2,482 respondents.

In this next section, a series of political activities are analyzed in the light of religiosity. When political scientists talk about political participation, one of the most often analyzed variables is voting turnout. In the Brazilian case, voting turnout does not seem to be a good indicator of engagement in politics since voting is mandatory. Voting became mandatory in 1932 in an effort to maximize the number of voters and therefore, voices represented through the

\[24\] Such as the passage on respecting and submitting to local authorities described in Romans 13:1-2 saying: “Let every person be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God. Therefore whoever resists the authorities resists what God has appointed, and those who resist will incur judgment.”
process. If an eligible voter does not cast his ballot on election day, he is at risk of losing his eligibility as a voter. In order to prevent a loss of voting rights, the individual must report to the Superior Electoral Court the reason why he did not vote. Also, individuals that fail to comply have to pay a fine of approximately $35. Because the incentives to vote are so high, voting is not an appropriate measure of voluntary engagement in political activities. Therefore, in the following section, other standard measures of political participation such as contacting a public official and working in a political campaign are analyzed. The key dependent and independent variables are the following:

**Dependent variables**

*Contacting Elected Officials.* This variable asks respondents the following question: In order to find a solution for your problems, or problems faced by the community, have you contacted the local authorities such as the mayor or governor? The variable was coded as 1 for “yes” and 0 for “no”.

*Community Work.* This variable asks respondents whether they have contributed to the solution of a problem in their community in the last twelve months. The answers ranged from “once a week”, “once or twice a month”, “once or twice a year”, or “never.” I recoded this variable into a dummy variable where any answer indicating participation was coded as 1 and non-participation was coded as 0.27

---

25 Voting is mandatory for all individuals between the ages of 18 – 70 years old. Voting is option for all individuals between the ages of 16 and 18, for those older than 70, and to the illiterate.

26 Also, the revoked ability to vote, or the loss of voting eligibility, may have further consequences. A citizen that loses his voting rights may also not be able to apply for a passport; apply for loans through public banks; receive his month salary (if he works for any governmental institution); and, take any exam for governmental job position.

27 The answers “once a week”, “once or twice a month”, and “once or twice a year” or coded as 1; “never” was coded as 0.
**Political Work.** This variable asks respondents whether they worked for a political party or candidate during the presidential elections of 2006. The variable was coded as 1 for “yes, I worked” and 0 for “I didn’t work.”

**Political Persuasion.** This variable asks respondents the following question: during political campaigns, some people try to convince others to vote for a specific candidate or political party. How often have you tried to convince other people to vote for a candidate or a political party? The available answers were “frequently”, “sometimes”, “rarely”, and “never.”

**Interest in Politics.** This variable asks respondents how interested they are in politics. The answers range from “very much interested”, “somewhat interested”, “little interest”, “no interest.”

**Protest.** This variable asks the following question: in the last twelve months, have you participated in a public protest? “Yes” was coded as 1 and “no” was coded as 0.

**Independent variables**

**Religious Affiliation.** Since the goal of this chapter is to investigate whether religiosity has an independent impact on political activities, a dummy variable is included to indicate each of the three main religious groups: mainline Protestants, Pentecostal Protestants, Spiritists. A dummy variable to indicate nonreligious is also added to the models. This variable is based on the following survey question: what is your religion, if you have one? Respondents had the following options: “Catholic”, “traditional Protestant”, “non-Christian”, “no religion, but spiritual”, “Pentecostal Protestant,” “Mormon”, “native religions (candomble, umbanda, etc.)”, “Spiritist”, “Jewish”, “Atheist”, and “Jehovah Witness.”
As Patteron (2004, 2005) and Steigenga (2001) have shown, religious intensity, measured in terms of how devout one is to his or her faith, matters. This variable asks respondents the following question: how important is religion in your life? The answers were coded as the following: “very important”, “somewhat important”, “not very important”, and “not important.”

Control Variables

The standard control variables were included:

Income. This variable is a measure of the income of the household. This variable was coded on a scale from 0 to 10 where (0) was “no income”; (1) 0-R$510.00; (2) R$510.01-1,020.00; (3) R$1,020.01-1,530.00; (4) R$1,530.01-2,550.00; (5) R$ 2,550.01-3,570.00; (6) R$ 3,570.01 – 4,080.00; (7) R$ 4,080.01- 6,120.00; (8) R$ 6,120.01-7,650.00; (9) R$ 7,650.01-R$10,200.00; (10) more than R$10,200.00.

Age. This variable represents the age of the respondent

Education. This variable captures the respondents’ total years of education.

Gender. Males were coded as 1 and females as 0.

Urban. This is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that the respondent lived in an urban area and 0 indicates the respondent lived in a rural area.

Important Methodological Note
Since Catholics comprise the majority of the population, Catholics will be use here and in chapter 4 as the out-group. Or the Catholics will be the reference group to the other religious affiliation dummies. Also, those religious groups not examined here, Mormon, native traditions, Jewish, and Jehovah Witnesses, were excluded from the dataset.

Results

The impact of religiosity on several different types of political activities is summarized on Table 2.1 and Table 2.2. Overall, the effect of religiosity on the prospects of engaging in political activities is weak. Religiosity is only statistically significant on three of the six different measures of political activities examined. Religiosity, or religious affiliation, has a significant effect on political work, community work, and political persuasion. Generally speaking, the mainline Protestant voter seems to be more politically active than Pentecostals and Catholic voters. According to the logit and regression analyses, being a mainline Protestant increases the likelihood of political participation in three different aspects. The three are: working for a political candidate or a political party during a campaign, engaging in activities to help the community to address pressing problems, and engaging in conversations aiming to persuade others regarding political matters. Being a Catholic is not statistically significant in any of the measures of political activity; therefore, unveiling Catholics as the least engaged in politics. Being Pentecostal Protestant is only statistically correlated to political work, or working for a political candidate or a political party during a campaign. A closer look at the data show clearer differences between the three religious groups examined here.

As to political work, Pentecostal Protestants have the highest percentage of individuals saying they have worked either for a candidate or political party during a campaign. Catholics
are the least involved in this type of activity. While approximately 12 percent of Catholics have worked for a candidate or a political party during a campaign, the percentages for Pentecostal Protestants and mainline Protestants are 18.2 and 16.4 respectively.

As to community work, mainline Protestants have the highest level of participation in helping their communities to address pressing needs. Catholics have the lowest percentage on this measure, slightly behind Pentecostal Protestants. While 32.3 percent of mainline Protestants have done something to help the improvement of their communities, the percentages for Pentecostal Protestants and Catholics are 26.8 and 25 respectively.

As to political persuasion, once again, mainline Protestants are the most active in this category. Mainline Protestants are more likely to engage in conversations with the aim of influencing others in political matters than Pentecostal Protestants and Catholics. While approximately 33 percent of mainline Protestants said they practice political persuasion “frequently” or “sometimes”, the percentages for Pentecostal Protestants and Catholics are 28 and 21.4 respectively.

The findings regarding not only the relationship between religiosity and political activities but also, most importantly, the differences in engagement in various political activities confirm the expectation presented in the beginning of this chapter. Overall, Protestants were expected to be more politically engaged than Catholics. The logit and multiple regression analyses confirm those expectations. Additionally, regarding differences between the mainline and Pentecostal Protestant, mainline Protestants are more politically active than Pentecostal Protestants.
Table 2.1: Predictors of Political Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political Work</th>
<th>Contacting Officials</th>
<th>Community Work</th>
<th>Protest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pentecostal Protestant</td>
<td>.359 (.19)*</td>
<td>- .466 (.32)</td>
<td>.076 (.15)</td>
<td>-.196 (.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainline Protestant</td>
<td>.225 (.20)</td>
<td>.157 (.27)</td>
<td>.255 (15)</td>
<td>-.199 (.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiritist</td>
<td>-.168 (1.01)</td>
<td>-1.20 (1.02)</td>
<td>.200 (.34)</td>
<td>-.640 (.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonreligious</td>
<td>-.032 (.32)</td>
<td>.284 (.43)</td>
<td>.121 (.25)</td>
<td>.033 (.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church Attendance</td>
<td>.028 (.06)</td>
<td>.134 (.09)</td>
<td>.138 (.04)**</td>
<td>.075 (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devoutness</td>
<td>.185 (.11)</td>
<td>.106 (.16)</td>
<td>.080 (.08)</td>
<td>.023 (.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.100 (.05)*</td>
<td>.069 (.05)</td>
<td>.109 (.03)**</td>
<td>.063 (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.020 (.02)</td>
<td>.029 (.03)</td>
<td>.057 (.01)***</td>
<td>.122 (.030)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.013 (.005)**</td>
<td>.006 (.006)</td>
<td>.020 (.003)***</td>
<td>-.002 (.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>.886 (.24)***</td>
<td>.315 (.32)</td>
<td>-.596 (.14)***</td>
<td>.361 (.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.02 (.47)***</td>
<td>-4.63 (.73)***</td>
<td>-2.93 (.37)***</td>
<td>-4.62 (.70)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2068</td>
<td>2206</td>
<td>2187</td>
<td>2202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LAPOP (2010)

* significance at .05 level; ** significance at .01 level; *** significance at .001 level.

As Table 2.5 will show the differences in responses to the question “how important is religion in your life.” Pentecostal Protestants show the highest degree of devoutness while

---

28 These models were estimated using logit analysis.
Catholics show the least. Whereas 89.2 percent of Pentecostal Protestants say religion is very important in their lives, the percentages for mainline Protestants and Catholics are 85.3 and 67.9 respectively. Although there are significant differences between Protestants and Catholics in how devout there are to their faith, devoutness is not, unexpectedly, statistically correlated to any of the measures of political activities. Although these findings regarding devoutness can be seen as contrary to what Patterson (2004,2005) and Steigenga (2001) have found, we should be careful to draw conclusions since both authors do not analyze the link of devoutness per se to strictly political activities. Instead, Patterson and Steigenga’s argument is that religious intensity, or devoutness, matters to political attitudes and church related events respectively.

Although devoutness is not a predictor of political activities, church attendance is statistically significant in predicting community work and interest in politics. The coefficients show that the more one attends religious services, the more likely he is to engage in community work and to be interested in politics.

As expected, socioeconomic measures are strong indicators of some political activities. Income is a statistically significant indicator of political work, community work, and interest in politics. As to political work, higher income increases the likelihood of working for a candidate or political party during a campaign. As to community work, higher income increases the likelihood of one helping his community with a solution for a pressing need. And as to interest in politics, higher income decreases the likelihood of one not being interested in politics. Education is a statistically significant indicator of community work, protest, and interest in politics. Higher levels of education increase the likelihood of engaging in community projects, protest activities, and being interested in politics. It is not surprising that those with higher socioeconomic levels engage more in political activities than those with lower socioeconomic levels. This link between
socioeconomic status and political participation – that is, the more educated and wealthier individuals tend to be more engaged in politics than those that are less educated and with lower income – has been found by several authors like Verba and Nie (1972), Milbrath and Goel (1977), Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980), and Verba, Brady, and Scholzman (1995).

Table 2.2: Predictors of Interest in Politics and Political Persuasion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Interest in Politics</th>
<th>Political Persuasion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pentecostal Protestant</td>
<td>-.162 (.06)**</td>
<td>.169 (.06)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainline Protestant</td>
<td>-.057 (.06)</td>
<td>.213 (.06)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiritists</td>
<td>-.231 (.13)</td>
<td>.123 (.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonreligious</td>
<td>.007 (.08)</td>
<td>-.051 (.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church Attendance</td>
<td>.047 (.02)**</td>
<td>.027 (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devoutness</td>
<td>-.015 (.03)</td>
<td>-.013 (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.054 (.01)***</td>
<td>.016 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.029 (.005)***</td>
<td>.008 (.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.0007 (.001)</td>
<td>-.003 (.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>-.229 (.05)***</td>
<td>-.303 (.06)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.75 (.13)***</td>
<td>1.77 (.14)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2196</td>
<td>2178</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LAPOP (2010)

* significance at .05 level; ** significance at .01 level; *** significance at .001 level.

29 These models were estimated using regression analysis.
Table 2.3: Political Persuasion by Religious Affiliation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequently</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Rarely</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>60.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainline Protestant</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>51.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pentecostal Protestant</td>
<td>6.44%</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>53.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiritist</td>
<td>5.45%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>54.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonreligious</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>63.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LAPOP (2010)

Table 2.4: Political Activity by Religious Affiliation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political Work</th>
<th>Community Work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>88.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainline Protestant</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>83.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pentecostal Protestant</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>81.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiritist</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>98.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonreligious</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>90.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LAPOP (2010)

Age is a statistically significant predictor of political work and community work. The older one is, the more likely he is to work for a candidate or a political party during a campaign and to engage in community projects. Urban is a statistically significant predictor of five out of the six political activities. While living at an urban setting increases the likelihood of one working for a political candidate or political party, contacting officials about public issues, engaging in community work, being interested in politics, and engaging in political persuasion, it does not affect the likelihood of being part of a public protest. Findings on the relationship between the urban/rural divide and political participation are somewhat ambiguous. Although

30 Based on the question: how often do you engage in political persuasion?
most would agree that living in urban areas produces the overall highest levels of political participation, others point to the evidence depicting citizens from rural areas as more politically active than citizens from urban ones. The argument for higher levels of political participation in urban settings comes from the view that there is more psychological involvement or stimuli to participate in politics in urban versus rural areas. In urban settings, the citizen is expected to be more exposed to mass media and different types of cultures and perspectives; as a consequence, these experiences function as a boost to political involvement. However, some authors have point out to evidence supporting a different view. Urban areas can display lower levels of political participation than rural areas due to (1) the existence of a culture of political alienation that might emerge in urban settings and (2) the reinforcement of patron-client relationships through voting patterns in rural settings.\endnote{31}

**Table 2.5: Devoutness by Religious Affiliation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Somewhat important</th>
<th>Of little importance</th>
<th>Not important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>67.9%</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainline Protestant</td>
<td>85.3%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pentecostal Protestant</td>
<td>89.2%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiritist</td>
<td>65.4%</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LAPOP (2010)

**CONCLUSION**

The goal was this chapter was to analyze the effects of Pentecostalism on patterns of political participation. The results of the various models point to the conclusion that not only Pentecostalism, but also the other set of religious beliefs have little influence on political participation. Although mainline Protestantism was positively correlated to the most number of political activities (3 out of 6), the P-value for all those relationships was never smaller than

\endnote{31}{For country studies analyzing the gap between urban-rural, see Wickham (2002) and Fahmy (2002) on Egypt; Albritton and Thawilwadee (2002) and Laothamatas (1996) on Thailand.}
Pentecostalism was only positively correlated to one type of political activity – political work – but like mainline Protestantism, its P-value was significant at the .05 level. Catholicism was not correlated to any of the political activity measures. These findings confirm the overall expectation of this chapter – that Protestants are more politically engaged than Catholics. Protestants, mainline and Pentecostals, are more likely to engage in political persuasion, community work, and work for a political party or candidate than Catholics. Catholics were the least engaged in politics. Socioeconomic variables were the strongest predictors of political activity. Higher levels of income, more years of education, and living in urban settings all significantly increase the likelihood of political participation. As Brady et al. (1995) show, socioeconomic variables are powerful predictors of political participation because variables such as income and education can have a direct link to political activities. For instance, money enables people to donate money to specific candidates or political organizations. Higher levels of education also mean a greater likelihood of having better vocabulary skills and more opportunities to practice civil skills.

In the analysis of the socioeconomic background of religious affiliation in chapter 2, Spiritists turned out to be the most unique religious group. Spiritists were significantly more educated and wealthier than Protestants and Catholics. Therefore one could expect Spiritists to also show higher levels of political participation. However, according to the data used here, Spiritists did not show a unique pattern of political participation. Spiritism was not significantly correlated to any of the measures of political participation.

The analysis of this chapter points to the conclusion that religion is not a strong predictor of political engagement. However, does the same pattern hold when one analyzes levels of support for democracy? This will be the main topic of the next chapter.
CHAPTER 4

PENTECOSTALISM AND SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY

What are the determinants of democratic support? Attempts to answer this question have been popular amongst comparativists since the third wave of democracy washed the shores of many countries around the globe starting in the late 1970s. While the explanations for the causes of the phenomena are varied, ranging from cultural to systemic ones, one school of thought has focused on the impact of values on democracy. The central goal of this chapter is to examine the effects of religion, as a variable pertaining to individuals’ value systems, on support for democracy; more specifically, to understand whether Pentecostalism has impacted citizens’ support for democratic institutions in a unique way.

THE DETERMINANTS OF DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL CULTURE

Starting in the 1980s, some key authors have focused on the role of a country’s political culture to explain the emergence, persistence, and lack of democracy (Huntington 1984; Almond and Verba 1989; Inglehart 1990, 1997; Diamond 1993; Lipset 1994). One of the seminal essays within this literature is Almond and Verba’s (1989) *Civic Culture* where the authors explain patterns of political behavior based on the political culture of the country. The term political culture referred to political orientations toward the political system and the role of self in that system. One of the main arguments set forth by the authors was that the viability of democratic institutions is strongly influenced by the political culture predominant amongst the population. In other words, a political culture marked by high levels of political efficacy, trust and support for the political system is more likely to be congruent with a democratic rather than other types of political structures. Since Almond and Verba’s piece, political culture explanations have become
popular in the field. Later, Putnam’s *Making Democracy Work*, adds to the political culture approach by suggesting that social capital, a more structuralist perspective, is a key ingredient of effective institutional performance. Putnam defined social capital as “features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (1993:167). In his analysis of Italian regions, Putnam found that the northern political institutions were more effective than the southern institutions due to sharp contrasts in rates of endowed social capital between the two regions. Northern political intuitions were more effective in building trust and connections amongst its citizens than the northern institutions due to the higher number of sports clubs and cultural associations that promoted social cooperation. Other works such as Inglehart and Flanagan (1987), Inglehart (1990), and Inglehart and Norris (2005) have found support for the link between orientations and values and regime type.

These previous works suggest that there is strong link between political culture and the political structure of a country where not only values and orientations (as emphasized by Almond and Verba) but also patterns of behavior (emphasized by Putnam) are important factors in determining what type of political institutions countries adopt.

Although the political culture approach has received a lot of praise from some, it has not gone unchallenged. One of the common challenges, and perhaps more serious one, comes from studies emphasizing the importance of institutions to political outcomes. Muller and Seligson (1994) challenge the assumption that individuals’ beliefs have a causal effect on regime type. In contrast, they make the argument that civic culture, or at least some of its indicators, can be an effect rather than a cause of democracy. The authors believe that attitudes such as political trust,

---

32 Other challenges can be found on the basis of the experience of post-communist countries, the effect of education, life cycles, and methodological problems (Dutch and Taylor 1993; Lane 1992).
support for the system, and political competence are learned through the experience of living in a stable democratic regime. Although the data used by the authors do not completely discredit the basic premises of the link between political culture and democracy, evidence showed that interpersonal trust – one of the measures of civic culture – is an effect rather than a cause of democracy. Another similar challenge comes from Rohrschneider’s (1999) analysis of ideological values in unified Germany. Looking at the political elites of East and West Germany, Rochrschneider found that eastern German political values reflected their exposure to a socialist regime whereas western German values reflected their exposure to democratic institutions. According to Rochrschneider, the difference in acquisition of democratic values between eastern and western political elites stems from the different institutional designs politicians were socialized into. While eastern German elites were socialized into a political structure where openness and freedom to criticize the government were subject to punishment, western German elites were socialized into a system where political participation and competition were encouraged. The central argument then is that learning democratic values requires individuals to be exposed to those institutions that provide opportunities for the development of democratic citizenship-qualities. If a country’s political framework does not provide citizens the opportunities to learn and practice democratic citizenship-qualities, mass support for democratic ideals may be weak. In the case of unified Germany, the politicians’ ideologies reflected the ideological premises of the political systems to which they were exposed. Therefore, Rochrschneider asserts that “democratic values presumably follow, but do not have to precede, the establishment of democratic institutions which function well because – once established – they shape mass and elite ideological values” (1999:9).

33 The strongest indicator on the determinants of democratization in the authors’ analysis was not an attitude of the general public but a macroeconomic variable – income inequality.
Even in the face of these challenges, the political culture approach has been very much useful to understand the sustainability or quality of democracy. As mentioned before, since Almond and Verba’s introduction of the concept of political culture, many other authors have examined and shown empirical evidence supporting the view that values and orientations do have an impact on democracy.\textsuperscript{34} One of the most recent and throughout examples can be found on Inglehart and Welzel’s (2005) \textit{Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy}. In this piece, the authors analyze the consequences brought by modernization and its political implications. The central argument is that modernization, or economic development, causes a shift in individual values which in turn has political consequences. This shift in values represents a move away from values emphasizing physical and economic security towards those emphasizing self-expression. Once individuals’ values start reflecting the latter, they will also demand those intuitions that will best suit their newly acquired preference for civil and political liberties – in this case, democracy. The argument is best summarized by the authors’ words:

\begin{quote}
Economic development leads to growing emphasis on self-expression values—a syndrome of trust, tolerance, political activism, support for gender equality, and emphasis on freedom of expression, all of which are conducive to democracy. This implies that rising emphasis on self-expression values should be closely correlated with economic development as well as civil society, citizen participation and democracy. (2003:557)
\end{quote}

What Inglehart and Welzel’s research communicates is that democracy is not a “machine that, once set up, functions by itself” but that democracy relies on deep-rooted orientations among citizens (2005:2).

From this previous discussion, one thing is clear: values matter. And they matter much. However the idea of values is very much abstract. After all, what type of values matter most? Obviously, the answer to this question is “it depends.” To some people, some sets of values will

\textsuperscript{34} For more see: Lee (2008) on Asia; Inglehart (2003) and Tessler (2002) on Arabic countries; Gibson et al. (1992) on post-communist countries.
exercise more influence in their political orientations, and consequently political behavior, than others. There are innumerable factors that influence the formation of our values; and religion is just one of those possible factors. Religion becomes an important variable to political scientists when it becomes the foundation for political orientations. For the religious individual, religion, overtly or covertly, influences political behavior by enforcing some attitudes while discouraging others (Guth et al. 1997; Green 2003).

For a while, religion was a missing or forgotten variable in political science. Many thought religion would disappear due to the rising levels of secularization observed in different societies around the globe; however, as Chavez (1994) puts it “religion’s stubborn refusal to disappear has prompted major reevaluation of inherited models of secularization” (749). An empirical test to Chavez’s words can be found on Inglehart and Norris’ Sacred and Secular where the authors use evidence from the World Values Surveys and European Values Survey, including 191 countries worldwide, to show how secularization has impacted politics and social patterns in the world. One of the findings in their research is that “religious legacies leave a distinct and lasting imprint on contemporary values” (134); or in other words, religion still influences patterns of political behavior that varies across countries and individuals. Because of this important role of religion in shaping our values, this section focuses on determining how religion affects individuals’ perspectives on democracy.

RELIGION AND SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY

35 The evidence presented by the authors point to a decline in religiosity and the role of religion in politics only in industrial and postindustrial countries. And even in these countries, the pace of change differs from one country to another.
When it comes to the link between religion and democracy, it has been widely seen that there is no simple causal relationship between the two. Historically, religious beliefs and liberal-democratic politics have been seen as incompatible. This incompatibility rests on the idea that to express one’s religious beliefs is to be intolerant of other individual different religious ideas. Therefore, many scholars have argued that religion and politics are at odds since religion is about absolutes and liberal-democratic politics is about tolerance and compromise. Also, another source of complexity comes from the idea that that some religious principles are better for democracy than others. As mentioned on the previous chapter, the multidimensionality of religion allows for differing effects on political behavior; the same is also expected for political attitudes and orientations. In an analysis of the link between religious beliefs and civic attitudes in the United States, Putnam and Campbell (2010) say this:

Religious Americans are, in fact, more generous neighbors and more conscientious citizens than their secular counterparts. On the other hand, they are also less tolerant of dissent than secular Americans, an important civic deficiency. (358)

What are those beliefs or practices that are good and bad for democracy? According to Griffith et al. (1956) some of these beliefs are love for and belief in freedom, active and constructive participation in the community life, integrity in discussion, and cooperation. These beliefs and practices may help religious individuals to give meaning to concepts closely linked to democratic practices such as fairness and justice.

On the other hand, many scholars have shown that higher levels of religiosity are positively linked to political intolerance, especially for religious beliefs associated with fundamentalism (Beatty and Walter 1984; Wilcox and Jellen 1990; Ellison and Gay 1993; Eisenstein 2004). Much emphasis has been given to political tolerance in explaining democratic support. Political tolerance is important for democracy for enables people to respect others’
political preferences, even when they may disagree with such preferences. Gibson (1998:37) says of the importance of political tolerance to democracy: “one of the most vexing problems of attempted democratic transformations is the problem of political intolerance – the unwillingness of citizens and leaders to allow all political interests to compete openly for political power… for bitter enemies to learn how to compete peacefully and democratically for political power is one of the most formidable problems for the consolidation of democratic transformation.” Without political tolerance, political competition cannot exist. Without political competition, the various political preferences of citizens cannot be represented in the political realm. If different perspectives are not allowed to be represented in the political realm, democratic ideals become undermined. Therefore, political tolerance is a key democratic value.

Regarding this link, between political intolerance and religiosity, Stouffer (1995) is one of the first and most interesting studies to date due to its depth and creativity. Stouffer conduct a survey where he examined the reactions of respondents to danger of a communist conspiracy and its implications to civil liberties. Although the survey focused mainly on attitudes toward communism, Stouffer also asked respondents whether they would support certain forms of freedoms – such as allowing certain individuals to teach at a college or give a speech to the members of their community – for unpopular groups such as atheists and homosexuals. The results of his research showed that only 28 percent of individuals that attended church in the month before the survey fell in the “more tolerant” category. In contrast, 36 percent of individuals that indicated they were not church goers fell into the same category. Overall, church goers were less tolerant of “unpopular” groups than those that did not attend a church.\(^{36}\) Many other scholars have found this same relationship between religion and tolerance where more

\(^{36}\) One important finding in Stouffer’s work is that church denomination and religious affiliation matters. According to Stouffer’s data, southern Protestant (Baptist specially) were more intolerant than the northern Protestant and Catholics in general. Jews were more tolerant than Protestants and Catholics.
religious individuals also tend to be less tolerant than less religious and irreligious individuals (Steensland et al. 2000; Kellstedt and Green 1993; Layman and Green 1998; Williams Jr. et al. 1976). When religious beliefs become associated with fundamentalism, the tendency for political intolerance becomes even higher. Religious fundamentalists emphasize a strict literal interpretation of their holy text, dispensational theology, and premillenial eschatology which make them even more prone to be intolerant of other views that do not match their own.

From the previous discussion, one thing seems clear: the relationship between religiosity and support for democracy is not a simple one. As pointed out by Putnam and Campbell (2010) and many others, while some aspects of religion are good for democracy, others aren’t. Bloom and Arikan (2012) refer to religion as a two-edged sword for its differential effect on attitudes toward democracy. The authors say:

> religious beliefs due to its association with conservative traditional values, engenders opposition to change, desire for order, and intolerance, which are incompatible with democratic norms and values. On the other hand, religiosity is also a social phenomenon. Involvement in social religious networks has a positive influence on civic skills, leading individuals to actively engage in politics and hold more positive attitudes towards democracy. (250)

The words of Bloom and Arikan (2012) illustrate the complexity of untangling the effects of religiosity on democracy. Therefore, in order to produce better research findings, comparativists should keep in mind the multidimensionality of religiosity since many have shown that different aspects of religion impact political behavior and attitudes differently.

**EXPECTATIONS FROM PENTECOSTALISM**
How does Pentecostalism affect attitudes toward democracy? Will this expectation conform to the negative previous pattern between religion and democratic ideals? In nutshell, I expect religion to be, overall, positively correlated to democracy. Although religious beliefs are often negatively correlated to democratic ideals, I expect the other religious variables to have a positive impact on attitudes toward democracy. What follows is my argument for the suggested overall expectation.

The wave of Pentecostalism in Brazil is marked by a lack of theological line. In other words, they do not emphasize, like the historic denominations, many of the doctrines of Christianity such as justification by faith, predestination, harmatology (the doctrine of sin), and eschatology. The Pentecostal churches, instead, tends to teach theological currents and doctrinal positions that fit the often strong charismatic profile of its leaders and the needs of the larger group. Therefore, we see churches adopting different main ministries; some churches focus more on the healing ministry, while others on the prosperity gospel; some focus on the ministry of redemption from curses, others on miracles; and the list goes on.

In the past few of decades, Brazil has experienced the amazing growth of neo-Pentecostal churches. These churches differ from the traditional Pentecostal ones by their even greater lack of theological training and systematic knowledge of the bible, their emphasis on miracles, and the collecting of money from believers (Martin 2002, 1990; Oro 2001; Oro and Samen 2000). Among these churches are the Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus (IURD), Renascer pra Cristo, Igreja Internacional da Graca de Deus, and Igreja Mundial do Poder de Deus. For neo-Pentecostals, Christians should be a prosperous people. Christians should be wealthy, healthy,
and free of problems. A lack of those achievements (money, cars, nice houses, a good health state, and etc.) can be seen as a lack of faith, the presence of sin in one’s life, or as the result of the works of the devil (Oro 1997). The neopentecostal message seems more based on the doctrines that match the needs of the group than on the systematic theology generally emphasized by mainline, and even some Pentecostal, churches.

The lack of systematic theology seen in the Pentecostal churches in general, perhaps, makes Pentecostals believers more tolerant of other views than mainline Protestants. As many have shown, often political intolerance and high levels of religiosity are negatively correlated. I expect Pentecostals to be more tolerant of diverging views than mainline Protestants because a lack of more in-depth knowledge about the doctrines of the bible avoids the formation of strong dispositions towards particular views; therefore, making Pentecostals more flexible to respecting ideas that might not match their own. Here, I am making the argument that Glock and Stark (1996), Ellison and Musick (1993) and Wilcox and Jelen (1990) made before: that high levels of theological conservatism and doctrinal orthodoxy and negatively correlated to political tolerance.

While a mainline Protestant church tends to cover multiple topics of the bible throughout the year, many Pentecostal (and specially Neopentecostal) churches will have weeks or months dedicated to one specific issue. The biggest Brazilian Neopentecostal church, the IURD, is well-known for such campanhas, or campaigns. The latest campaign of the IURD was directed towards receiving the Holy Spirit. The promise of the campanha was to receive the Holy Spirit in 7 days.

This different pattern of preaching between mainline and Pentecostal Protestant churches may cause Pentecostals to hear less on dividing topics than mainline Protestants. A good

---

39 Here, I am assuming that Pentecostals and mainline Protestants display a similar pattern on all other religiosity indicators.
40 The campaign kickoff started in February, 2012.
example is that of same-sex marriage. The same-sex marriage issue is a fairly new discussed topic in many churches (Pentecostals and mainline) in Brazil. It was not until same-sex marriage became a political issue that religious leaders started to be more vocal about the churches’ stand on topic (not that it wasn’t a clear one already). Once the question “should same-sex marriage be legalized” hit national media, religious leaders started to use the pulpit as a means to remind believers what the bible says on the topic. Although the topic (as a political one) is a fairly new one in the church, mainline Protestants are more likely to have stronger predispositions on the topic than Pentecostal Protestants because they hear more about “marriage” in church. This flexibility of the structure of Brazilian Pentecostalism may allow for greater opportunities for the development of tolerance of opposing views. Therefore here, as to differences between Pentecostals and mainline Protestants on levels of political tolerance, I hypothesize that Pentecostals are slightly more politically tolerant than mainline Protestants.

I also hypothesize that Catholics are the most tolerant when compare to mainline and Pentecostal Protestants. While identifying with Protestantism, mainline or Pentecostal, most likely entails a high degree of devoutness and church attendance, identifying with Catholicism does not translate into the same. A great percentage of Catholics are nominal Catholics; in other words, they might have been baptized and perhaps even taken the First Communion but they do not attend church frequently (Souza 2001). According to data from Pierucci and Prandi (1995), only 14 percent of Catholics were also practitioners or active in church activities in 1994.\footnote{Also, according to Antoniazzi (1989), in 1988, only about 20% of the Catholic population attended mass weekly.} Data from the LAPOP 2010 survey presented on Table 3 shows that this trend still remains amongst Catholics. Also, in terms of importance of religion in ones’ life, Catholics once again show the lowest levels of devoutness (presented in chapter 3).
Table 3: Church Attendance by Religious Affiliation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>More than once a week</th>
<th>Once a week</th>
<th>Once a month</th>
<th>Once or twice a month</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainline Protestant</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pentecostal</td>
<td>56.9%</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiritist</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>36.5%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LAPOP (2010)

Therefore, because Catholics tend to display the lowest overall levels of religiosity amongst the three main religious groups, they are also most likely to display higher levels of political tolerance. From this previous discussion the following hypotheses are suggested:

H1: Catholics are more likely to show higher levels of political tolerance than Protestants (mainline and Pentecostal).

H2: Mainline Protestants are likely to show lower levels of political tolerance than Pentecostal Protestants.

Political tolerance is just one of indicator of a broad measure of democratic support. Often in the literature, we see democratic support being measured by asking questions that tap more on the ideals (or overt support) than on the procedures (covert support) that make democracy work. When overt measures are applied, support for democracy is found not only in democratic regimes but also authoritarian ones (Gibson 1996; Fuchs and Roller 2006; Inglehart 2003). However, when different indicators measuring the willingness of citizens to extend civil liberties to others (including political opponents) are used, support for democracy is not as widely found, especially in countries that have a legacy of authoritarianism (Inglehart 2003).
Here, both aspects of support for democracy, overt and covert, are used to measure overall support for democracy.

Here I hypothesize that amongst the three main religious groups, Catholics are the most supportive of democracy. And this is due to low levels of religiosity Catholics tend to display. As to differences between mainline and Pentecostal Protestants, I hypothesize that there are no significant differences between the two groups in overall levels of support for democracy. Although a lack of systematic knowledge about biblical doctrines might make Pentecostals to be more politically tolerant than mainline Protestants, that knowledge should not affect overall levels of support for democracy since these two groups display very similar patterns of devoutness and church attendance. This similarity in overall levels of religiosity may also translate to similar levels of overall support for democracy. Therefore the following hypotheses are suggested:

H3: Catholics are more likely to be supportive of an overall indicator of democracy than Protestants (mainline and Pentecostal).

H4: There are no significant differences between mainline and Pentecostal Protestants in their support of an overall indicator of democracy.

Although the expectation is to find that there are no significant differences between mainline and Pentecostal Protestants in their overall level of support for democracy, the relationship between mainline and Pentecostal Protestantism and overall support for democracy is, I expect, a positive one. As some have shown, the churches in Latin America have played an important role in providing skill-building opportunities for its members (Sinner 2007; Patterson 204, 2005; Cleary and Steward-Gambino 1997; Camp 1997). In other words, religious affiliation and participation have been positively linked to democracy. However, as explained before, religion can also have a negative effect on democracy. Religion, thought of as religious beliefs,
often has a negative correlation with one of the pillars of democracy – political tolerance. Since this seems the only instance where the effects of religion on democracy seem consistent across cases, the effects of religion on the other measures of democracy are ambiguous and open for debate. Therefore here, I hypothesize that the combination of high levels of church attendance and devoutness of members belonging to mainline and Pentecostal Protestant churches makes these believers more prone to be supportive of many of the procedures, and perhaps even some ideals, that make democracy work.

**H5: Mainline and Pentecostal Protestantism are positively correlated to overall democratic support.**

**DATA AND MEASURES**

In order to test the suggested hypotheses on the attitudes towards support for democracy by the different religious groups, I use the Latin American Public Opinion Project, the Americas Barometer (LAPOP) (2010). The following key dependent and independent variables are described below.

**Dependent variables**

*Political Tolerance.* In order to test the hypotheses on political tolerance, it is important to choose a survey question that taps on the practical implications of what it means to be tolerant. Authors like Inglehart and Norris have emphasized that the essence of democracy is that not only the government but the people tolerate the opposition and also allows it to participate; the crucial test democracy takes place when one has to tolerate those they least sympathize or agree with. Therefore here, I use two different measures of political tolerance. The first measure, and also
the most extreme one, is based on the question dealing with expanding rights to homosexuals to participate in politics. I believe this is a good measure of political tolerance in the Brazilian context given the country’s historical background and recent developments on gay right issues. As a traditionally Catholic country with a somewhat conservative population, most Brazilians oppose same-sex marriage. However, in May of 2011, the Supreme Court passed a law that recognized same-sex unions making Brazil the 6th country in Latin America to legalize such union. According to the Brazilian Institute of Opinion and Statistics (IBOPE), 55 percent of Brazilians were against the decision of the Supreme Court. It is clear that at least half of the population opposes extending marriage rights to homosexuals. Perhaps to many, this is a matter of moral issues. However, what about extending strictly political rights to homosexuals? Given how Brazilians think of same-sex marriage, asking how they would feel about extending political rights to homosexuals can be an adequate measure of political tolerance. The question is the following: thinking of homosexuals, how much do you approve or disapprove the right of these people to run for public office? Respondents were asked to rate their approval on a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 stands for strongly disapprove and 10 for strongly approve. The second measure is based on Seligson’s (2000) work on democratic stability. A political tolerance scale was built using the four following questions:

1. There are people who only say bad things about the (country) form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people’s right to vote?
2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to conduct peaceful demonstrations in order to express their views?
3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the (country) form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office?

42 The ruling gives same-sex couples the same legal (financial and social) rights as married heterosexuals. Same-sex couples are now able to enjoy the inheritance and pension rights and health plans. The ruling falls short of the recognition of same-sex marriage.
4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television to make speeches?

Respondents were asked to rate their approval on a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 stands for strongly disapprove and 10 for strongly approve.

*Democratic Government.* This variable is based on the responses to the following question: which phrase do you agree the most? Respondents were given the following options: (1) In some circumstances, an authoritarian government is preferable than a democratic one; (2) To someone like me, it doesn’t matter if we have a democracy or not; (3) Democracy is preferable than any other type of government.

*Democratic Participation.* This variable is based on the responses to the following question: Do you think that our country needs a government with an iron fist, or that problems can be resolved with everyone's participation? The answers were the following: (0) Iron fist; (1) Everyone’s participation.

*Electoral Democracy.* This variable is based on the responses to the following question: There are people who say we need a strong leader who does not have to be elected by the vote of the people. Others say that although things may not work, electoral democracy, or the popular vote, is always best. What do you think? The answers were: (0) We need a strong leader who does not have to be elected; (1) Electoral democracy is the best.
Overall support for democracy. Using factorial analysis, the three following variables were used to create a summary index of support for democracy: democratic government, Democratic Participation, and Electoral Democracy.

**Independent variables**

All the independent variables used in chapter 3 are also used here.

**Results**

The results of all the analyses point to one common pattern: that religiosity has differential and overall negative effects on democratic support. In a nutshell, religiosity, measured as religious affiliation and church attendance, is not correlated to any of democratic support measures except for political tolerance regarding the right of homosexuals to run for office and democratic participation. When measured as devoutness, religiosity has an overall negative effect on support for democracy. Religious affiliation and church attendance were statistically significant only in the analysis of the determinants of the first measure of political tolerance and democratic participation whereas devoutness was statistically significant in all but two measures of democratic support (homosexuals’ right and electoral democracy).

The results of the analysis displayed on Table 3.2, confirm the expectation of a negative relationship between religiosity and the principle of political tolerance based on the idea that homosexuals should have the right to run for office. Religious affiliation and church attendance were statistically and negatively correlated to political tolerance. While Pentecostalism and
mainline Protestantism were negatively correlated to this measure of political tolerance, Spiritism’s coefficient pointed to the exact opposite direction. Affiliation with Spiritism makes one more likely to agree with the statement that homosexuals should have the right to run for office. Based on Table 3.1 of raw percentages, Catholics showed the highest levels of tolerance among the three. This was expected since Catholics display the lowest levels of religiosity – measured in terms of church attendance and devoutness – among the three groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
<td>57.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pentecostal</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
<td>17.38%</td>
<td>47.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainline Protestant</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiritist</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>79.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonreligious</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
<td>63.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LAPOP (2010)

Contrary to the expectation, Pentecostals showed slightly lower levels of political tolerance than mainline Protestants. However, a further test, one-way ANOVA, shows that the difference in levels of political tolerance between these two is not statistically significant. The analysis is displayed on Table 3.3. I expected Pentecostals to show slightly higher levels of political tolerance than mainline Protestants due to a lack of systematic theology prevalent in many Pentecostal churches; however, as this analysis shows, what distinguishes Pentecostal from mainline Protestant churches does not have an impact on its members’ levels of political tolerance.

Church attendance was also negatively correlated to political tolerance. The more often one attends church, the more likely he is to disagree with the statement that homosexual should have the right to run for office. Here the logic is that the more one attends church, the more likely he is to be exposed to messages that support some views and not others. Using the
previous example of same-sex marriage, the more one attends church (either Catholic, Pentecostal or mainline Protestant), the more likely he is to listen to sermons on the concept of

Table 3.2: Opinions on Homosexuals’ Right to Run for Office by Religious Affiliation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Affiliation</th>
<th>Homosexuals’ Right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pentecostal Protestant</td>
<td>-.711 (.21)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainline Protestant</td>
<td>-.644 (21)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiritist</td>
<td>1.46 (.47)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonreligious</td>
<td>.449 (.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church Attendance</td>
<td>-.206 (.06)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devoutness</td>
<td>.099 (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.066 (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.119 (.02)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.015 (.005)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>-.111 (.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>6.48 (.47)***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² 0.06

N 2144

LAPOP (2010)
* significance at .05 level;
** significance at .01 level;
*** significance at .001 level
marriage and its practical implications to daily life. By learning what marriage should look like according to the bible, anything that does not fit the depiction learned in church may be condemned by the believer; therefore, making that believer to be less supportive of marriages that are not between a man and woman.

Regarding the second measure of political tolerance (as displayed on Table 3.4), the only statistically relevant religious variable is devoutness. Being affiliated to a religion and attending religious services does not affect one’s level of political tolerance. However, the more devout one is of his faith, the more likely he is to be politically intolerant.

Table 3.5 summarizes the findings regarding the effects of religiosity on democratic support. According to the models, religiosity was found to be a weak determinant of democratic support. The only statistically significant religious affiliation variable in these models was Pentecostalism. Affiliation with Pentecostalism makes one less likely to be support of an overall measure of democratic support and to agree with the statement that democracy is preferable than any other government. Affiliation with mainline Protestantism and Spiritism did not affect the any of the measures of democratic support.

Table 3.3: Difference in Levels of Political Tolerance Between Mainline and Pentecostal Protestant

DESCRIPTIVES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>Lower Bound</th>
<th>Upper Bound</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mainline Protestant</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>5.89</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>.196</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>6.27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pentecostal</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>5.88</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>.175</td>
<td>5.53</td>
<td>6.22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>5.88</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>.131</td>
<td>5.63</td>
<td>6.14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### ANOVA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>7209.097</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>11.125</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7209.114</td>
<td>649</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LAPOP (2010)

**Table 3.4: Political Tolerance Scale by Religious Affiliation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Affiliation</th>
<th>Political Tolerance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pentecostal Protestant</td>
<td>-.010 (.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainline Protestant</td>
<td>-.180 (.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiritist</td>
<td>.599 (.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonreligious Church Attendance</td>
<td>.120 (.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devoutness</td>
<td>-.285 (.08)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.053 (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.091 (.02)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.011 (.004)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>-.563 (.17)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>7.36 (.38)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LAPOP (2010)

* * significance at .05 level;
** ** significance at .01 level;
*** *** significance at .001 level
Church attendance was not statistically insignificant either. Attending church did not affect the ones’ level of support for the different measures of support for democracy. Devoutness was statistically significant in 3 out of the 4 measures of democratic support: overall support for democracy, democratic government and democratic participation. In all these relationships, devoutness had a negative impact on democracy. The more one values his religion, or the more importance one gives to his religious beliefs, the less likely he is to support the overall idea of democracy and to agree with statements that affirm that “overall, democracy is preferable than any other type of government” and “problems are best solved with the everyone’s participation.”

**Table 3.5: Democratic Support by Religious Affiliation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Overall Support for Democracy</th>
<th>Democratic Government</th>
<th>Democratic Participation</th>
<th>Electoral Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pentecostal Protestant</td>
<td>-.143 (.07)*</td>
<td>-.145 (.14)</td>
<td>-.297 (.14)*</td>
<td>-.293 (.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainline Protestant</td>
<td>.053 (.07)</td>
<td>.178 (.16)</td>
<td>.093 (.15)</td>
<td>.345 (.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiritist</td>
<td>.245 (.15)</td>
<td>1.00 (.48)*</td>
<td>.724 (.42)</td>
<td>.075 (.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonreligious</td>
<td>-.021 (.10)</td>
<td>.064 (.23)</td>
<td>-.205 (.22)</td>
<td>.031 (.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church Attendance</td>
<td>-.009 (.02)</td>
<td>-.163 (.07)</td>
<td>.021 (.04)</td>
<td>-.040 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devoutness</td>
<td>-.088 (.03)**</td>
<td>-.163 (.08)*</td>
<td>-.218 (.07)**</td>
<td>-.053 (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.005 (.01)</td>
<td>-.015 (.03)</td>
<td>.036 (.03)</td>
<td>-.031 (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.032 (.007)***</td>
<td>.061 (.06)***</td>
<td>.042 (.01)**</td>
<td>.059 (.02)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.005 (.001)**</td>
<td>.011 (.003)**</td>
<td>-.004 (.003)</td>
<td>.009 (.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>-.040 (.07)</td>
<td>-.251 (.15)</td>
<td>-.323 (.15)*</td>
<td>.153 (.18)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The more devout one is, the more prone he is to believe that an authoritarian government is justifiable and that, at times, problems within the state are better solved by strong leaders that might not be held accountable to others.

Overall, religion has a somewhat weak effect on support for democracy. As all the analyses show, the most significant religious variable is devoutness. Being a devout believer was statistically significant and negatively correlated to 3 measures of democracy. Religious affiliation and church attendance were only statistically significant in relation to the first measure of political tolerance and democratic participation. Whereas religion has a weak impact on attitudes toward democracy, socioeconomic variables are the best predictors of individuals’ perceptions of democracy.

**Socioeconomic variables**

Socioeconomic variables turned out to be the best indicators of support for democracy; the strongest indicator being education. *Education* was not only statistically significant across all measures of democratic support but it was also positively correlated to all measures. *Income* was not statistically significant in any of the measures of support for democracy. *Age* was significant in 4 out of the 6 models. *Urban* was only statistically significant in predicting democratic participation.
In the first model, education is the only statistically significant variable that is positively correlated to political tolerance. The more years one has spent in the school system, the more likely he is to agree with the statement that homosexuals should have the right to run for public office. More years of education also makes one more likely to support the general idea of democracy, to agree with the statements that *democracy is preferable than any other type of government, problems are better solved with everyone’s participation, and a leader elected through popular vote is the best alternative*. Age was also a strong factor determining attitudes toward democracy. In the first model, age appeared as negatively correlated to political tolerance. In other words, the older one is, the more likely he is to not agree with the statement that homosexuals should have the right to run for public office. In the other models, age was positively correlated to democracy. The older one gets, the more likely he is to support the overall idea of democracy and to believe that democracy is more preferable than any other government.

The explanatory power of socioeconomic variables predicting political outcomes is not new to political scientists. Since Verba and Nie’s (1972) *Participation in America*, over and over again, socioeconomic status has been found to be an important determinant of political participation (Milbrath and Goel 1977; Winkler 1981; Verba et al. 1995; Booth and Seligson 1978). Individuals from higher socioeconomic backgrounds tend to be more politically active than individuals from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. Therefore, the finding that education was a very powerful predictor of attitudes toward democracy amongst Brazilians is not novel.

*What about the Spiritists?*
In chapter 2, we learned that Spiritists are a unique group, at least in terms of socioeconomic status. Spiritists were substantially wealthier and more educated than all other members belonging to different religious groups. Because of their uniqueness in socioeconomic status, I expected Spiritists to also display a unique pattern of political behavior. However, in Chapter 3, the data analysis did not point to the expected patterns; Spiritism was not correlated to any of the measures of political participation. In other words, being affiliated with Spiritism did not make one more or less likely to engage in politics. Here, I also wanted to analyze the impact of Spiritism on attitudes toward democracy to see if, just like in terms of socioeconomic status, Spiritists stood out. As the results of the analyses on Table 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 show, Spiritism is only statistically relevant predicting support for the first measure of political tolerance.

In the first model measuring support for homosexuals’ right to run for office, Spiritism appears as one of two variables that is statistically and positively correlated to political tolerance (the other one being education). The coefficient displayed on Table 3.2 suggests that being a Spiritist makes one more likely to approve of the right of homosexuals to run for public office; which in turn, also leads to the assumption that Spiritists are more politically tolerant than the other religious groups represented in the first model.

On Table 3.5, Spiritism is only statistically correlated to one measure of democratic support. Spiritism is positively correlated to the measure of democratic government indicating that those that identify with Spiritism are likely to think of democracy as the most preferable type of government. However, the statistical significance of this variable is at 0.5 level which translates into a weak relationship between the dependent and independent variable.

On Chapter 2, Spiritists stood out in terms of their socioeconomic status. Here, they stand out in their support for political tolerance when measured in terms of support for homosexuals’
right to run for office. Spiritism was the only statistically significant religious variable that was positively related to the first measure of political tolerance. While all other religious variables had a negative effect on the likelihood of being political tolerant of homosexuals running for office, Spiritism stands out for its positive relationship.

CONCLUSION

The goal of this chapter was to analyze the impact of religiosity on attitudes toward democracy. What has become clear is that religion has a differential effect on individuals’ perceptions of democracy. Out of the three different religion variables, only devoutness showed statistical relevance across models. As expected, the more one values his religion, or the more importance one gives to his religious beliefs, the less likely he is to hold strong democratic values. Amongst the religious affiliation variables, Pentecostalism and Spiritism were the most important ones. While all religious affiliation variables had statistical significance when predicting the first measure of political tolerance, they all lose statistical significance in the second model of political tolerance. Also, while devoutness did not have an effect on the likelihood of one being more favorable or not of homosexuals’ right to run for office, it did when predicting a broader syndrome of political tolerance. However, the effect was a negative one where the more devout one is the more likely he is to be politically intolerant. Regarding the second set of models on attitudes toward democracy, Pentecostalism and Spiritism are the only statistically significant variables measuring religious affiliation. While being affiliated with Pentecostalism makes one less likely to be supportive of an overall measure of democratic support and agreeing with the statement that problems are best solve with the participation of everyone, being affiliated with Spiritism makes one more likely to agree with the statement that
democracy is the most preferable type of government. Although one might be tempted to conclude that Pentecostalism and Spiritism are strong determinants of one’s support for democratic values, it is important to note that although these relationships were statistically significant, they were weak since they were at the .05 level.

The strongest indicators predicting support for democracy were those related to one’s socioeconomic background; more specifically here, education. Education was statistically correlated to 4 out of the 5 different measures of support for democracy. In addition, in all of those relationships, education had a positive impact on the dependent variable. In other words, the more educated were more likely to be more political tolerant and supportive of democracy than the less educated.

Religion has shown to have differential and overall negative effects on attitudes toward democracy. Devoutness stands out as the most important religious variable since it was statistically significant not only predicting political tolerance (political tolerance scale) but also two measures of democratic support. However, as it has been the case with most empirical research predicting political outcomes, here also, socioeconomic status was the most powerful factor determining individuals’ perceptions on democracy. Education was not only statistically significant across all models and measures but also, more interestingly, was positively related to all outcomes. The more educated one is, the more likely he is to, overtly and covertly, support democracy.

What we have learned from this chapter is that religion does not act as a uniform agent. As Bloom and Arikan (2012) have pointed out, religion is a double-edged sword since it can be both, a challenger and a booster of democracy. Here, in the case of Brazil, religion seems to function more as a challenger than as a force driving democracy. And as the number of
Pentecostals continues to grow, political scientists should keep their eyes focused on the possible consequences the movement brings to the political sphere.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this dissertation was to shed light on the impact that the wave of Pentecostalism has had on individuals’ political behavior and attitudes in the Brazilian context. While many authors have paid attention to what seems to be the aggregate-level consequences of the movement, such as electoral outcomes and the party system, the literature lacks an analysis of the consequences of the phenomenon at individual-level. This dissertation sought to fill this gap in the literature. In this chapter I discuss the findings of this dissertation.

PENTECOSTALS AND SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS

One of the common assumptions about Pentecostals is that they tend to be the most disenfranchised in society, or the poorest and less educated citizens. The analysis of chapter 2 confirms this expectation but also points to the finding that Pentecostals are not the most disenfranchised religious group in society; instead, Catholics are. Catholics are the poorest and least educated amongst the main religious groups in Brazil. Pentecostals rank second on the list of most disenfranchised religious group but only by a marginal advantage over Catholics. On the other side of the spectrum, Spiritists were found to be the most better off religious group. The majority of Spiritists earn double the income of the majority of Catholics, Afro, mainline Protestants, and Pentecostals. They are also highly educated. While 26 percent of Spiritists have
at least some college experience, the percentage of Catholics, mainline Protestants, and Pentecostals that have the same experience is 28.3 percent combined.

These findings suggest that although Pentecostals do conform to the expected socioeconomic patterns described in previous literature, they are not unique. Or in other words, Pentecostals are not the most disenfranchised religious group in society. Another important finding is also that being poor and less educated is not a trait belonging to religious individuals. The nonreligious are also largely poor and less educated. Over 50 percent of nonreligious individuals earn less than twice the minimum wage monthly and approximately 46 percent have a middle school diploma as their highest educational achievement. Therefore, nonreligious and religious individuals have very similar socioeconomic backgrounds. We can conclude from this that being poor and less educated is the common profile of the average Brazilian.

PENTECOSTALISM AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

Most often in the literature focusing on religion and politics, one finds that religion does impact political outcomes. Here too, the findings point to this assumption. Religion does play a role in Brazilian politics, however, not as one might have expected. The key religious variable in this dissertation, Pentecostalism, was not found to be an important predictor of political outcomes. Overall, being affiliated to the Pentecostal church did not make one more or less likely to be engaged in politics. In the analysis of how religion affects political behavior in chapter 3, Pentecostalism was statistically significant in only one of the six models. The results
of that sole model showed that affiliation with Pentecostalism increased one’s likelihood of working for a political party or candidate during presidential elections.

While Pentecostalism was correlated to one political activity only, mainline Protestantism was correlated to three of the six political activities included in the analysis also making mainline Protestants the most politically active citizens. Being part of a mainline Protestant church increased one’s likelihood of working for a political candidate or party during presidential elections, engaging in political persuasion, and helping their communities to address pressing needs. Catholicism was not statistically correlated to any of the measures of political activities.

The strongest predictors of political engagement were socioeconomic variables. Income and education were statistically correlated to the same three political activities. The higher one’s income and education levels are, the more likely he is to engage in community projects, to be part of protest demonstrations and to be interested in politics.

PENTECOSTALS AND DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT

Chapter 4 was dedicated to understanding the relationship between religion and democratic support. Previous authors have examined this link extensively and one common understanding is that religion can function as a two-edged sword. On one hand, religion may be seen as incomparable with democracy since religion is about absolutes and democracy is about tolerance and compromises. On the other, participation in religious activities is often correlated to support for democracy. The logic behind this latter argument is that involvement in religious activities teaches one appreciation for democratic values.
Using three different measures of religiosity the results of the analysis in chapter 4 confirm the overall expectation that religion has differential effects on political outcomes. Religious affiliation and church attendance were statistically significant in three of the six models. Religious affiliation and church attendance were statistically correlated to the first measure of political tolerance where being part of a church and attending religious services increases one’s likelihood of disapproving homosexuals’ right to run for public office. While religious affiliation and church attendance were not strong predictors of the measures of democratic support, devoutness, or how important one’s religion is, stood out as the most relevant religious variable. Devoutness was statistically significant in four of the six models. The more importance one gives to his religion the more likely he is to display lower levels of overall support for democracy, to disagree with the statements that democracy is preferable than any type of government and that problems are best solved with the participation of everyone.

One of the main expectations not fulfilled on chapter 4 was to find that at least one of the aspects of religion, especially church attendance, would have a positive impact on democratic support. Contrary to expectation, all statistically significant religion variables were negatively correlated to the different measures of democratic support, except for Spiritism. Spiritism was statistically significant in two of the six models. Being affiliated with Spiritism greatly increased one’s likelihood of being more politically tolerant of the idea of homosexuals’ right to run for office and also agreeing with statement that democracy is preferable to any other government.

Similar to the analysis between religion and political behavior on chapter 3, here too, the strongest predictors of democratic attitudes were related to one’s socioeconomic background. Education was statistically significant in 4 of the 5 models. In addition, in all of these models
education a positive impact on the dependent variable. Therefore, the more educated one is the more likely he is to support democratic principles.

DIFFERENT RELIGIONS, DIFFERENT POLITICS

Another expectation of this dissertation was to confirm what Patterson (2005) called “different religions, different politics” thesis. Patterson’s idea is that different religions can result in different politics. The logic is that different religions, and most specifically in his analysis Catholicism and Protestantism, differ in a number of basic doctrines and practices such as levels of church attendance, time devoted to bible reading, and role of the clergy in a way that may result in different political attitudes and behavior. The findings of this dissertation do not confirm this expectation; different religions did not result in different politics.

There were no major differences in political behavior and democratic support between believers belonging to the three main religious groups; the differences were mostly in degree, not of kind. Catholics, mainline Protestants, and Pentecostals were mostly apolitical. However, mainline Protestants are slightly more politically active than Pentecostals and Catholics. Catholics were the least politically active.

Although there were no major differences in political outcomes between the main religious groups, when Spiritism is added to the equation we do see a glimpse of the “different religions, different politics” pattern described by Patterson. Although Spiritism was not statistically correlated to any of the measures of political behavior, it was statistically significant in predicting two measures of democratic support. Unlike the other religion variables that had a
negative effect on political outcomes, Spiritism had a positive effect on democratic support. In other words, while all other religion variables are negatively correlated to support for the democracy, Spiritism is the only religion variable that has a positive effect on one’s likelihood of supporting democratic principles.

The general conclusion from this study is that although Pentecostals have been on the spotlight for its unforeseen growth, they are not special political actors. Or at least, not yet. So far they do not exhibit a unique way of participating in politics nor do they conceive democracy differently from the rest of the population.

THE FUTURE OF RELIGION IN POLITICS

In the past few decades, the rapid growth of the number of Pentecostals has been a hot topic. After all, the country had never experienced such a Protestant presence. Protestants now own TV and radio stations, newspapers, and very profitable businesses. It seems they are spreading out very quickly throughout all segments of society. In the political realm, the Protestant block (or Bancada evangélica) has attracted much attention since in terms of numbers of representatives (the total number of Protestant elected officials represents 13.2% of the total number of seats in Congress), they are, presently, only behind the PT and PMDB political parties.

Intuitively, one may explain the success of the Bancada evangélica by pointing to the evangélico voter effort to elect those candidates that identify with the Protestant faith. One is inclined to believe that the uniqueness of the presence of evangélicos in power is translated to a uniqueness of patterns of political participation by Pentecostal Protestants. However, this
dissertation has shown that Protestants, mainline and Pentecostals, are not unique political actors. Once again, there were no major differences in political engagement between members belonging to three major religious groups (Catholics included). And when there were small differences in patterns of political behavior, religion often had a negative impact on political outcomes. Therefore, although at the aggregate level Pentecostalism has shown its political strength, at the individual level, Pentecostalism has not created special political actors.

While many foresee that the number of Pentecostals will continue to grow, and perhaps even surpass the number of Catholics, others like Paul Freston, a specialist on Latin American religion and politics, believes that Brazil will not become a Protestant country. Freston believes that the number of nonreligious individuals will outpace the number of Protestants in the future. Since predicting the future is a task that many choose to not undertake, as this group continues to grow in number we, political scientists, should keep an eye on them and on the developments this movement may bring to the political realm.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Freston, Paul. 2006. La Marea Evangelica. *Foreign Policy Edicion Espanola* 14:34-42.


VITA

Thatianne A. Moreira
Department of Political Science
The University of Mississippi
University, MS 38677

Email: tamoreir@olemiss.edu
Tel: (580)6788908

Employment

8/2012 – present – Instructional Assistant Professor, University of Mississippi

Education

PhD  Political Science, University of Mississippi, 2013
Areas: Comparative Politics and International Relations
Research Interests: Comparative Political Behavior; Democracy and Democratization; Religion and Politics; Political Culture; Latin American Politics
Dissertation: Religious Politics? An Individual-Level Examination of the Political Implications of Faith in Brazil.
Committee: (Chair) Dr. Robert Albritton, Dr. Alice Cooper, Dr. Greg Love, and Dr. Oliver Dinius.

M.A  Political Science, University of Mississippi, 2011.
Areas: Comparative Politics and International Relations

B.A  Political Science, Cameron University, 2007.

Research

Conference Presentations
“Religious Politics: an Individual Level-Examination of the Political Implications of the Faith Transformation in Brazil.” Presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, January 2013, Orlando, FL and also invited to be presented at the Southwestern Social Sciences Association, March 2013, New Orleans.
Teaching Experience

July 2011 – present  University of Mississippi
POL 102 – Introduction to Comparative Politics
POL 103 – Introduction to International Relations

Research Experience

Project: Socio-Economic Resilience (SERP) and Dynamic Micro-
Economic Analysis (DyME) for Large Scale Catastrophes.
Funded by the Southeast Region Research Initiative (SERRI)
Responsibility: Help develop the community resilience survey (CRS); data
management; data collection.

Relevant Experience
Software  SPSS; Stata; LaTeX
Language  Portuguese (Brazil; native language)
           English (fluent)
           Spanish (advanced knowledge)

References
Professor  Dr. Robert B. Albritton
(Dissertation Chair)  Department of Political Science
                     University of Mississippi
                     University, MS 38677
                     ralbritt@olemiss.edu

Professor  Dr. Alice Cooper
Department of Political Science
University of Mississippi
University, MS 38677
acooper@olemiss.edu

Professor  Dr. Gregory Love
Department of Political Science
University of Mississippi
University, MS 38677
gjlove@olemiss.edu