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Comparative Analysis of Hong Kong and Taiwan's Independence Movements:

a case study of identity and politics using social movement theory

By Sarah A. Hasselle

A thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for completion

Of the Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies

Croft Institute for International Studies

Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College

The University of Mississippi

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Abstract

This thesis is a comparative study on the Taiwanese and Hong Kongese independence movements. Structured by social movement theory, this study focuses on how each movement evolved after a central cause and focuses on the different components of the social movements. This paper also includes an analysis on “national pride” in Taiwan and Hong Kong, tested by using SPSS and data from Asian Barometer.

The two independence movements can both be understood through its supporters’ concerns, and in both cases, identity is described as something culturally distinct from the mainland. As for determining “national pride,” my analysis indicates that, in 2010, Taiwanese people with higher social class and people over 50 were more proud to be Taiwanese. As for Hong Kongese people in 2012, males, people over 50 and people with lower social status were more proud to be Chinese.

In regards to political opportunity, the Taiwanese independence movement’s opportunity for collective action has contracted on an international scale, but has expanded locally. In Hong Kong, the “failure” of the Umbrella Movement, as well as mainland China’s reaction to the movement, led to the creation of many new pro-independence or pro-localist political parties. By seeking positions in the legislative body, Hong Kong’s independence supporters have attempted to create political opportunity for themselves.

In conclusion, this thesis can add to the conversation about sovereignty and democracy in East Asia. This thesis can further shed light to how the Chinese government should conduct relations with both Taiwan and Hong Kong. If gaining Taiwan is still important to the People’s Republic of China, then I suggest that they must first win Hong Kong people’s hearts.

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I. Introduction

“Taiwan is not a part of China. Taiwan is Taiwan”; “Hong Kong is Hong Kong.” In recent years, cries of protest like those above could be heard from pro-independence and pro-democracy supporters in Taiwan and Hong Kong. These protests remain relevant today. Recently, some Hong Kongers protested the election of Beijing-backed Carrie Lam as the Chief Executive-designate of Hong Kong on March 26th, 2017. Using images such as umbrellas that allude to the 2014 Umbrella Movement, protestors shouted, “We want real universal suffrage!”¹ In Hong Kong, one in six people now support independence from mainland China,² while around 90 percent of the population in Taiwan would identify themselves as “Taiwanese” rather than “Chinese.”³ Since the outbursts of the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong and the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan, news of these independence protests have caught international observers’ attention. Because the People’s Republic of China wants to use Hong Kong as an example of the “one country, two systems” model it hopes to one day implement in Taiwan, the mainland may try harder to enforce their control over the Hong Kongese protests. Understanding both of these independence movements is important for mainland government to resolve its issues with both Hong Kong and Taiwan.

Taiwan and Hong Kong are two small territories located in close proximity to mainland China, who claims sovereignty over them both. In the People’s Republic of China, Taiwanese and Hong Kongese identity are sensitive topics. For example, journalist David Volodzko discusses his experience when asking mainlanders about the three sensitive topics—Taiwan, Tibet and Tiananmen: “I...soon grew used to

¹ Wu, Venus, and James Pomfret. "Hong Kong Protest Leaders Charged Day after New Leader Chosen." *Reuters*, 27 Mar. 2017. Web. 29 Mar. 2017.

² Baldwin, Claire, Sharon Shi, and Ben Blanchard. "One in Six Support Hong Kong Independence from China: Poll." *Reuters*, 25 July 2016. Web. 28 Mar. 2017.

³ Nylander, Johan. "Strong Support For Independence In Taiwan." *Forbes Magazine*, 15 Feb. 2015. Web. 28 Mar. 2017.

hearing the same replies. Tibet belongs to China. Taiwan belongs to China.”⁴ The sensitivity of the topic of Taiwan, in particular, can be reflected recently in the response of the Chinese government to President Donald Trump receiving President Tsai Ing-wen’s call; the Chinese government called on the U.S. government to deny the Taiwanese president’s entry to the United States.⁵

Taiwan and Hong Kong’s political history reveals many similarities that make the two places interesting to study; besides the fact that mainland China claims both places, Taiwan and Hong Kong both experienced a colonial past that promoted a sense of identity different from their common ethnic Chinese identity. While supporters of independence in both places state that reasons for their protests include social and political rights, they mainly protest for the right to rule themselves.

A comparative analysis reveals how identity can be reflected in both independence movements and the politics of independence movements. Additionally, it will focus on how each movement frames its identity and utilizes politics for its goals. Structured by social movement theory, this study focuses on how each movement evolved after a central cause. For example, while the Taiwanese independence movement developed because of the KMT’s oppressive regime, the Hong Kongese independence movement is based on social and economic problems that occurred after the 1997 handover.

Independence movements, such as the ones in Hong Kong and Taiwan, can be described as social movements. Scholars have varying definitions for social movements. However, scholar Mario Diani states that most definitions include “a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity.”⁶ Scholars believe that social movements can be split into four categories: alternative, redemptive, reformative and revolutionary. In the case of Taiwan and Hong Kong’s independence movements, these

⁴ Volodzko, David. "China's Biggest Taboos: The Three Ts." *The Diplomat*, 23 June 2015. Web. 2 Mar. 2017.

⁵ Phillips, Tom. "China Asks US to Block Taiwan President Trip after Talk of Donald Trump Meeting." *The Guardian*, 6 Dec. 2016. Web. 2 Mar. 2017.

⁶ Diani, Mario (1992). "The concept of social movement". *The Sociological Review*. 40 (1): p.13. Print.

movements can be described as “reformative,” because both have been split into political parties, meaning that independence supporters have agreed to work with their opposition.⁷ For example, in the 1990s, Taiwanese independence supporters “traded its original strategy of violent protests for a strategy of electoral competition.”⁸

Scholars have devised several theories to explain the emergence of independence movements. For Taiwan, mass society theory and status inconsistency can be used to explain the rise of discontent against KMT rulers and the creation of the independence movement after 1949. Mass society theory refers to “the absence of an extensive structure of intermediate groups through which people can be integrated into political and social life.”⁹ As for status inconsistency theory, this means that unequal status “promotes dissonance.”¹⁰ The KMT’s strict government and social control contributed to feelings of alienation. When the KMT government came to power in the late 1940s, KMT leaders not only had to protect Taiwan from threats across the strait, but they also had to keep make sure that Taiwanese subjects did not criticize their government. As a result, the regime restricted civil and political activities and censored newspapers.¹¹ The KMT government also carried out land reform that forced local landlords to hand over property so that new government property could be built, and television hosts were forced to speak “clumsy” Mandarin.¹² Before long, the Taiwanese realized the people from the mainland were actually

⁷ “Types of Social Movements.” *Boundless Sociology*, 20 Sep. 2016. Web. 28 Mar. 2017.

⁸ Yeh, Chieh-Ting. “‘Taiwan Independence’ Doesn’t Mean What You Think.” *Foreign Policy*, 11 Apr. 2016. Web. 27 Mar. 2017.

⁹ McAdam, Doug. *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago, 1982, p.7. Print.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, p.8.

¹¹ Harrison, Mark. *Legitimacy, Meaning and Knowledge in the Making of Taiwanese Identity*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p.39. Print.

¹² *Ibid*.

new colonizers.¹³ Authors Cheng-Feng Shih and Mumin Chen state that “by wielding military suppression, political domination and cultural hegemony, the KMT helped crystallize the native identity, which led to anti-mainlander ethnic nationalism.”¹⁴

In Hong Kong, social discontent and the emergence of the independence movement can be perhaps explained as a reaction to social and economic change after the handover of Hong Kong to the mainland, or as collective behavior theory. Collective behavior theory explains that “any severe social strain can provide the necessary structural antecedent for movement emergence.”¹⁵ Movements can be caused from a “disruption in the normal functioning society,” examples are industrialization, urbanization, or a rapid rise in unemployment.¹⁶ Author Shiu Hing Lo states that the “reliance on the economic strategy of closer integration with Mainland China under the Tsang administration sowed the seeds of social and economic discontent in the young generation,” and that the influx of visitors from 2003 to 2013 caused Hong Kong people to dislike mainlanders, who have been “daily smuggling goods and products across the border, leading to increases in the prices of local products, ranging from tooth paste to milk powder.” This also resulted in some Hong Kong people even arguing that the number of tourists should be controlled.¹⁷

This analysis fills a lacuna in scholarship on the comparison of the two independence movements. So far, no in-depth comparison of Taiwan’s and Hong Kong’s independence movements exists with the employment of social movement theory. Social movement theory attempts to explain how and why social movements form and identify the possible success of social movements, and can be divided into several

¹³ Shih, Cheng-Feng, and Mumin Chen. "Taiwanese Identity and the Memories of 2-28: a case for Political Reconciliation," *Asian Perspective* 34.4, Special Issue on Seeking Political Reconciliation: Case Studies in Asia (2010): p.95. Print.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, p.98.

¹⁵ McAdam, *Political Process and the Development*, p.8.

¹⁶ *Ibid*.

¹⁷ Lo, Shiu Hing. *Hong Kong's Indigenous Democracy: Origins, Evolution and Contentions*, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p.89. Print.

parts: identity and framing, political opportunity, and success, as examples. This theory helps frame this study by providing analytical categories for interpreting evidence. It can be used to identify and explain the various components of the independence movements' development.

This paper will be divided into two main chapters: one focused on identity and framing, the other on political opportunity and strategies. The first chapter is divided into two parts. The first part will focus on identity and framing, while the second part concerns "citizenship," or national pride, in Hong Kong and Taiwan. I use *SPSS* and survey data from AsianBarometer to answer the question: "How proud are you to be a citizen of Taiwan/China [Hong Kong]?" The second chapter will discuss political opportunity, as well as the strategies for independence supporters. This paper will answer questions such as "What does it mean to be called 'Taiwanese' or 'Hong Kongese'?" This paper also addresses questions such as, "Where have these concerns about China come from?" This paper has found that both Taiwanese people and Hong Kongese people feel a disconnect towards their ancestors on the mainland. Both movements also attempt to frame their goals in a way that advocates for local people ruling themselves. Political opportunity is already available in Taiwan by their government under DPP power, while in Hong Kong, people have attempted to create political opportunity for themselves, with the creation of political parties. In both places, identity and cultural productions have been used as protest strategy.

The first body chapter will analyze identity and framing in social movements. Social movements must create a collective identity. This identity is described as "an individual's cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or institution."¹⁸ Collective identity is a part of movement 'frame,' "the interpretive packages that activists develop to mobilize potential adherents and constituents."¹⁹ These 'frames' "make a compelling case for the 'injustice' of the condition

¹⁸ Polletta, Francesca and James M. Jasper, "Collective Identity and Social Movements," *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 27 (2001), p.285. Print.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, p.291.

and the likely effectiveness of collective ‘agency’ in changing that condition.”²⁰ Social movements also “make clear the ‘identities’ of the contenders, distinguishing ‘us’ from ‘them’ and depicting antagonists as human decision makers.”²¹ Additionally, collective identity may be “first constructed by outsiders.” The group may then choose whether to accept this identity.²² This reflects, in part, Prasenjit Duara’s research, when he concludes that “identity is a form of meaning that only becomes possible with the differentiation between two possible identities.”²³

The next part of the thesis will discuss the “politics” and “political opportunity” of the independence movements. This chapter will address the political opportunity structures and collective behavior in both Taiwan and Hong Kong. This section will examine the capacity to act collectively and the political opportunity available to protestors in regards to Taiwan and Hong Kong’s independence movements. Political opportunity is described by Peter Eisinger as “the degree to which groups are likely to be able to gain access to power and manipulate the political system,”²⁴ while political opportunity structure has been described as the “importance of the broader political system in structuring the opportunities for collective action,”²⁵ or the “safe space” available for political mobilization. Examples of opportunity structures include “the nature of political cleavages, institutional structures, alliance structures, and prevailing strategies of social movements.”²⁶ Social movements also largely develop in democracies.²⁷

²⁰ Polletta et al., “Collective Identity and...,” p.291.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid, p.285.

²³ Harrison, *Making of Taiwanese Identity*, p.29.

²⁴ Eisinger, P.K. “The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities,” *American Political Science Review*, 67(1) (1973), p.33. Print.

²⁵ Liu, Michel, Kim Geron, and Tracy Lai. *The Snake Dance of Asian American Activism: Community, Vision, and Power*, Lanham: Lexington, 2008, p.8. Print.

²⁶ Meyer, David S. "Protest and Political Opportunities." *Annual Review of Sociology* 30 (2004): p.131. Print.

²⁷ Tily, Charles. *Social Movements 1768-2004*, Boulder: Paradigm Press, 2004, p.33. Print.

Governments can affect the political opportunity structure available to the movement. Gary Marx discusses possible repressive actions governments may take. He mentions “the creation of an unfavorable public image, disinformation, restricting a movement’s resources and limiting its facilities, de-recruitment of activists, destroying leaders, fueling international conflicts, encouraging conflicts between groups, and sabotaging particular actions.”²⁸ One way in which a government might also restrict social movements is through policing protests. Researcher Donatella della Porta argues that “the legitimacy of the state, that is, the citizens’ moral approval of the state’s authority, is an important dimension of opportunity.”²⁹ She adds, the “loss of legitimacy puts a regime at a disadvantage in the contest for framing issues in a crisis, leads to a rapid erosion of the regime’s authority, and weakens the loyalty of social control agents.”³⁰ Similar actions like those mentioned above can be reflected in the mainland government’s reaction to the Hong Kongese protest. For example, political activists critical of the mainland government have reported feeling as if they are being watched. Additionally, under the pressure of the central government, mainland-biased Hong Kongese media characterized the 2014 Umbrella Movement protests as “violent,” forcing independence supporters to rely on “alternative media,” such as Facebook and Twitter, to voice their concerns.³¹

As previous research suggests, social movement organizations will sustain abeyance structures during periods of “limited political opportunities,” which means that identities, “nurtured within” social

²⁸ Marx, Garl. “External Efforts to Damage or Facilitate Social Movements: Some Patterns, Explanations, Outcomes, and Complications” in *The Dynamics of Social Movements*, Winthrop Publishers, 1979, p.41. Print.

²⁹ Porta, Donatella della. “Social movements and the state: Thoughts on the policing of protest,” in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*. Cambridge, UK: 2008, p.43. Print.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Kwong, Ying-Ho. "Dynamics of Mainstream and Internet Alternative Media in Hong Kong." *Department of Government and Public Administration at the Chinese University of Hong Kong*, December 2015, p. 274. Print.

movement networks, “contribute to the spillover effect from one movement to another.”³² As a result of this, the continuation of a social movement can be produced when supporters join different organizations, that advocate for different, but relevant goals. An example of this can be seen in Taiwan, when the localist movement of the 1970s became a part of the independence movement.³³

The next section discusses the strategies and organization of the two independence movements. There are multiple strategies for protest, one example being “disruptive,” in which groups use violence to reach their means.³⁴ Authors Zald and McCarthy mention “radical flank effects,” the way in which groups may benefit from the presence of a “radical wing.” This presence of extremists “encourage funding of the moderates as a way of undercutting [the extremists] influence.”³⁵ In Hong Kong and Taiwan, there are many “radical,” localist organizations supporting independence. This has perhaps allowed for the successful election of “moderates.”

Strategies must be developed to frame issues with the purpose of influencing or making changes to the social or political environment. However, organizers can also make strategic efforts to reframe the movement’s own identity. Kretschmer suggests, “through framing their identities and beliefs... organizations attempt to balance insider and outsider status with claims specifically designed to appeal to both the broader public and the narrow identity of institutional members.”³⁶ The author also explains that these organizers “deliberately construct identities that conflict with institutionalized ideas about what those identities should be.”³⁷ Framing can also play an important role in sustaining member

³² Polletta et al., “Collective Identity and...,” p.297.

³³ Tischer, Jacob. "Orphan of Asia – Taiwan and the Impossibility of the Taiwanese." *Powision*, Web. 3 Mar. 2017.

³⁴ Gurr, Ted Robert. *Violence in America*, Newbury Park: Sage, 1989, p.339. Print.

³⁵ McAdam, Doug, John David McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald. *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*. Cambridge, UK: 2008, p.14. Print.

³⁶ Kretschmer, Kelsy. "Contested Loyalties: Dissident Identity Organizations, Institutions, and Social Movements," *Sociological Perspectives* 52.4 (2009): p.434. Print.

³⁷ Ibid.

participation.³⁸ Organizers can concentrate on “recasting constituents’ identities to include participation as one of the responsibilities or benefits of group membership.”³⁹

Other important strategies for success includes the relationship of social movements to other groups, the dependence of movements upon external support, such as political influence, and the response to tactics used by authorities to control movements.⁴⁰ Organizers may also make “efforts to shape the broader political environment,” which can “influence the overall pace and outcome of the struggle.”⁴¹ Additionally, media can be used as a strategy to create social attention. Media can be used as a way to evoke emotional response and can be used to attract people to participate in their cause.⁴² This paper will attempt to broadly explain the strategic and organizational aspects of the movements, by first discussing how these movements are organized, how these movements utilize identity and resources and how these organizers use media or cultural production to promote their cause.

The final section of this paper will attempt to determine the success of Taiwan and Hong Kong’s independence movements, and it will identify the components of movement survival, as indicated by the change in politics and political opportunity in Hong Kong and Taiwan. The organizational goal of a social movement is continuation, so social movement organizers will often produce materials that “operate to bind individuals to social movement organizations and hence, serve to provide continuous involvement.”⁴³ Social movements can “survive” in the way that they impact society. The way in which the political opportunity structures have changed in Hong Kong and Taiwan reflect their success.

³⁸ Polletta et al., “Collective Identity and...,” p.30.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ McCarthy, John D. and Zald, Mayer N. “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory.” *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 82, No. 6. May 1977, p.1213. Print.

⁴¹ McAdam et al., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, p.13.

⁴² Hayes, Darrel C., Jerry A. Hendrix, and Pallavi D. Kumar. *Public Relations Cases*, Australia: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2013, p.99. Print.

⁴³ Zald, Mayer N., and John D. McCarthy. "Social Movement Industries: Competition and Cooperation Among Movement Organizations," Aug. 1973, p.1227. Print.

In social movements, changing identities can also be considered a primary movement goal.⁴⁴ Social movements “need to be integrated with injustice and agency frames so as to clearly distinguish ‘us’ from opponents and bystanders,”⁴⁵ and these frames developed within movements “may have lasting impact on institutional political arenas and organizational forms.”⁴⁶ Social movements may then “demonstrate to elites that society must change to accommodate the movement.”⁴⁷ Polletta and Jasper state that, social movements, in the way that they demand recognition of a new identity, can both “secure concessions and permanently change the terrain of political conflict.”⁴⁸ A change in the identity of a society or a change in the political terrain can be an indicator of movement success.

Societal or political impact indicates the success of movements, however, social movements can also fail. Many factors can lead to the failure of a social movement. One of the biggest reasons for social movement failure is a break in collective identity, which must be preserved, so that supporters of a social movement will continue to donate their time and resources to the cause of the movement. Social movements can also fail in the strategies that they may pursue. ‘Challenging groups,’ groups “whose goals required the ‘displacement’ of their opponents,” can also fail.⁴⁹ Additionally, groups with multiple goals will be more likely to survive or be successful, because they can continue to advocate for change after their first goal is achieved.⁵⁰

In conclusion, this analysis reveals the differences between each independence movement. Both independence movements carry themes of self-governance, or of local people ruling themselves. However,

⁴⁴ Polletta et al., “Collective Identity and...,” p.296.

⁴⁵ Ibid, p.292.

⁴⁶ Ibid, p.297.

⁴⁷ Zald, Mayer N., and John D. McCarthy. *Social Movements in an Organizational Society: Collected Essays* New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publ., 2003, p.340. Print.

⁴⁸ Polletta et al., “Collective Identity and...,” p.297.

⁴⁹ McAdam et al., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, p.15.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

while both movements are inherently against mainland China, the Taiwanese independence movement is often misunderstood by U.S. policy makers, international media and China, itself—the Taiwanese independence organizers’ original intention was to form a government separate from the the KMT. While the Taiwanese believe that they are already “de facto” independent, the Hong Kongese do not hold this kind of belief. Understanding these independence movements is crucial for mainland China, because in order for it to solve its problem with Taiwan, it must first solve their problem with Hong Kong.

II. Identity and Framing

A. Framing of the independence movements

Social movements must create an identity for its supporters. This identity is a part of movement ‘frame,’ or the way in which movements advertise themselves and their cause. As movements evolve, organizers can later develop frames that appeal to the broader public. This identity may be reflected in the movement’s cultural productions.

In both Hong Kong and Taiwan, people feel a cultural disconnect towards mainlanders. While Hong Kong identity can be expressed as a cultural mix of East and West, the Taiwanese have called themselves the “Orphan of Asia,” a term describing foreign countries’ abandonment of Taiwan in recent history and Taiwan’s “dissociation from the larger global community, in general.”⁵¹ Both movements also attempt to frame their goals through democratic values. However, they ultimately advocate for local people ruling themselves.

Taiwanese identity and the Taiwanese independence movement

Local identity in Taiwan has existed long before KMT’s arrival on Taiwan. In his book, *Legitimacy, Meaning and Knowledge in the Making of Taiwanese Identity*, author Mark Harrison makes the argument that Taiwanese identity “has existed for as long as Taiwan has had a name.”⁵² Because of historical controversy, however, Taiwanese identity, as being different from Chinese identity, is seen as illegitimate on the mainland.

Recently, with Taiwan’s election of DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen, the mainland has become more worried about the future of the mainland’s relationship with Taiwan. During Tsai’s presidential term, it is likely that Taiwan will pursue the course of “identity politics,” or politics with the “aim to secure the political freedom of a specific constituency marginalized within its larger context.”⁵³ Chu argues that

⁵¹ Ching, Leo T. S. *Becoming Japanese: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation*. Berkeley: U of California, 2001, p.180. Print.

⁵² Harrison, *Making of Taiwanese Identity*, p.60.

⁵³ "Identity Politics". *Stanford Encyclopedia of Psychology*. 23 April 2015. Web.

when those seeking political legitimacy invoke national identity, but their efforts are insufficient, then this can lead to the creation of identity politics.⁵⁴ Chu states that identity ambiguity, “complicated by [the] KMT’s failure to define a new national identity” after their arrival in Taiwan, gave rise to the use of Taiwanese identity politics.⁵⁵ Chu personally believes that Taiwan’s national identity is a “reflection of the lack of national self confidence” from “cultural uncertainty in the face of Chinese nationalism.”⁵⁶ With the DPP in power, the mainland should expect politicians to “emphasize Taiwanese nationalism and the notion of a Taiwan that is politically and culturally distinct from mainland China,”⁵⁷ or to enact identity politics.

The colonization of Taiwan has led to the development of cultural identities that differ from the mainland. The Dutch, the Japanese and the Chinese, the Spanish are all examples of Taiwan’s previous colonizers. Many Taiwanese people believe Japan has made significant contributions to Taiwan’s development,⁵⁸ but the ideas relevant to the establishment of an independent Taiwan developed during Japanese occupation. Joshua Liao, one inventor of Taiwan’s independent theory, describes Formosa as “a small and weak Taiwan overwhelmed by the power of the Japanese empire, and though experiencing industrial development, doing so for the benefit of the Japanese rather than the Taiwanese.”⁵⁹ With the defeat of the first Sino-Japanese War and the 1895 “Treaty of Shimonoseki,” authority over Taiwan was transferred from the Qing Empire to Japan. In 1945, after Japan’s defeat in WWII, the Allies made a deal with Chiang Kai-shek to transfer the authority of Taiwan from Japan to Chinese nationalists, or the

⁵⁴ Chu, Jou-Juo. "Nationalism and Self-determination: The Identity Politics in Taiwan," *African and Asian Studies* 35.3 (2000): p.305.Print.

⁵⁵ Ibid, p.304.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Casey, Michael. "Time to Start Worrying about Taiwan." *The National Interest*, 12 June 2016. Web. 23 Apr. 2017.

⁵⁸ Harrison, *Making of Taiwanese Identity*, p.88.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

KuoMinTang (KMT), who retreated to Taiwan in 1945, during the Chinese Civil War. Researcher Jacob Tischer makes this statement about the origin of a separate-Taiwanese-identity in Taiwan: “Although made possible by political liberalization since 1987, full-scale Taiwanization has its socio-political forbears in the literary indigenization movement of the 1970s, with roots as far back as the collective experience of Japanese colonization.”⁶⁰ Before the transfer of Taiwan from Japan to the KMT government, the Taiwanese independence movement was already brewing.

For the past half century, Taiwanese identity can be explained by one piece of literature—the *Orphan of Asia*.⁶¹ Author Ching describes the importance of this novel, in relation to the development of Taiwanese identity: “The notion of an orphan, of being abandoned, of not belonging, has become a powerful metaphor in thinking about and defining the modern history of Taiwan.”⁶² Ching adds, “It is this conflicted sense of anger and lament that constitutes Taiwan’s collective psychic formation and enables the Taiwanese to eulogize their ‘national’ history as one of betrayal and abandonment.”⁶³ He believes that the analogy of Taiwan and the orphan became more prominent after President Nixon pursued a closer relationship with Communist China and Taiwan was consequently forced out of the United Nations.

In the *Orphan of Asia*, author Wu attempts to explain the case of Taiwanese identity through the novel’s main character, Hu Taiming. Hu originally holds a strong desire to visit mainland China to discover his Chinese roots, but after traveling to China, he grasps that he has been disillusioned with not only the Japanese, but also the mainland. In the end, he realizes he “does not belong anywhere.” Hu, after facing an identity crisis, goes crazy. As he becomes consumed by suffering, he composes two poems. One is written on the wall of his family’s ceremonial hall:

⁶⁰ Tischer, "Taiwan and the Impossibility..."

⁶¹ Ibid, p.75.

⁶² Ching, *Becoming Japanese: Colonial Taiwan*, p.179.

⁶³ Ibid, p.180.

I aspired to be a scholar
But bowed to thugs—
Where is the hammer to beat violence?
As the hero ever dreams,
The Chinese spirit lives—
I will lose this life of mine.
But how could this be?
The slave life drips with resentment,
O but how do we suffer brutes?
Comrades, reclaim old hills and streams,
Rise, ye six million, rise ye together—
Your blood simmering die for duty.

Later, in his crazed state, he starts chanting: “The head of the family is the big brother/The big brother is the head of the thieves/People are skinned/Trees are skinned/Mountains are skinned.” The first two lines of the first poem refers to his earlier decision to not only study in Japan, but work with Japanese occupiers in Taiwan. “Thugs” refers to the Japanese occupiers, and “the slave” is himself. For the second part, he refers to his brother, a government official for the Japanese. When Hu states the people, trees and mountains are “skinned,” he is referring to Japan’s use of Taiwan’s people, money and resources.⁶⁴ This book not only illustrates Taiwanese suffering under Japanese occupation, it also shows the people’s struggle to identify with those on the mainland.

When Taiwanese people first heard about the transfer of power, they were first “happy” with the idea of being ruled again by the Chinese.⁶⁵ However, after the Chinese authorities arrived in Taiwan,

⁶⁴ Wu, Zhuoliu. *Orphan of Asia*. New York: Columbia UP, 2008. p.244-245. Print.

⁶⁵ Qi, Dongtao. *The Taiwan Independence Movement: In and Out of Power*, SG: World Scientific, 2016. p. 31, Print.

some Taiwanese people expressed their concern over the Kuomintang (KMT) officers' "lack of legitimacy" to rule over Taiwan. Chinese officials also believed that Taiwan's political elites were too Japanese.⁶⁶ Harrison offers readers a first-hand account made by an Taiwanese official watching the disorganized mainland soldiers step off the ship arriving in Taiwan for the first time: "A great crowd of curious and excited citizens had come to support by father's welcoming committee and to see the show... The first man to appear was a bedraggled fellow who looked and behaved more like a coolie than a soldier, walking off with a carrying pole across his shoulder, from which suspended his umbrella, sleeping mat, cooking pot, and cup." The General gives descriptions of a few more soldiers before making the statement, "My father wondered what the Japanese could possibly think. He never felt so ashamed in his life."⁶⁷ He claims that in this moment, the moment when Chinese soldiers stepped off their ship, Taiwan's legitimacy crisis started. They "had welcomed an imagined China, a classical culture, and a 'victor,' but was instead confronted by the reality of Republican China."⁶⁸ However, as claimed by Harrison and other researchers, the event that inscribed Taiwanese identity "most forcefully" was the 2-28 Incident.⁶⁹

The KMT's rule over Taiwan was generally accepted until in 1947, when in the '2-28 Incident' a KMT officer assaulted an elderly woman and a shot was fired, killing an onlooker. After this incident, massive demonstrations exploded on the issue of the Chinese Nationalists' legitimacy to rule Taiwan.⁷⁰ Consequently, innocent people were round up and killed by KMT officers, resulting in at least twenty thousand people's deaths. Today, many Taiwanese people still regard this event as the most important event that has happened in recent history.⁷¹ Harrison argues that along with this incident's violence,

⁶⁶ Harrison, *Making of Taiwanese Identity*, p.44.

⁶⁷ Ibid, p.77.

⁶⁸ Ibid, p.78.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid, p.82.

⁷¹ Shih et al., "Taiwanese Identity and...", p. 92.

Taiwan was described as “something distinct from China [or the KMT government] in the most extreme form possible.”⁷² Shih and Chen state the event “strengthened the native consciousness and became a rallying point for the Taiwanese struggle for liberation from alien rulers (i.e. the KMT government).”⁷³ Taiwanese people were originally willing to be ruled by their Chinese “brethren,” but after experience living under KMT rule, many Taiwanese people believed they could no longer identify themselves with the mainland Chinese. Harrison states, “Taiwan was not China, but it had no Taiwanese state education system, no national literature, or nationalist identity to legitimize the name and differentiate it from China.”⁷⁴ Taiwan was not China, but they had no way to prove themselves.

After Taiwan’s economic success as one of the “Four Asian Tigers,” or one of the countries in Asia that became highly industrialized between the early 1960s and 1990s, the Taiwanese felt much different from the people on the mainland. Harrison, using examples of articles from Chinese mainlanders who visited Taiwan and vice-versa, claimed that when these people travel to the other side of the Strait, they often “reconfirm their sense of Taiwan’s distinctness rather than its essential ‘Chineseness.’” In one example, Harrison mentions a 1990s story of one Taiwanese man who returned to the mainland to visit his family’s ancestral hall. When he arrived there, he stated, “Mainland cities seemed to be like the cities in Taiwan back in time.” Another man states, “It was difficult for me to remember what was my own hometown; just like the feelings of my identity, [my ancestors] moved on long ago in another direction.”⁷⁵ These examples reflect the disconnect felt by many Taiwanese people with their mainland neighbors. The writer of the story suggests “for people living in Taiwan, traveling to the mainland reinforced their sense of Taiwan’s own identity.”⁷⁶

⁷² Harrison, *Making of Taiwanese Identity*, p.80.

⁷³ Shih et al., "Taiwanese Identity and..." p.92.

⁷⁴ Harrison, *Making of Taiwanese Identity*, p.83.

⁷⁵ Ibid, p.54-56.

⁷⁶ Ibid, p.56.

The way in which the Taiwanese framed their movement can be reflected not only on their cultural and identity differences, but also in their concerns about a closer relationship with mainland China. Author Qi states that people supporting independence in Taiwan's 2014 Sunflower Movement feared that a closer economic relationship will "'empty' Taiwan's own economic resources and add to unemployment."⁷⁷ Reporter John Nylander shares the story of Febie, a "small cafe owner in Taipei," who has become "concerned about what will happen to the island's de facto independence when more and more Mainlanders keep flooding in" and when "the economy becomes increasingly dependent on Mainland China's business interests." She states, "I'm not very happy about all these Mainland Chinese tourists coming here. Many people in Taiwan want independence."⁷⁸ She also regards herself as "Taiwanese," not "Chinese." In conclusion, Taiwanese identity can be described as one that belongs to itself, meaning that because of historical circumstances, the Taiwanese were able to develop a local identity separate from the mainland Chinese. This identity became further perpetuated by different governments and economic circumstances. As the 1990s story illustrates, visiting the mainland "reconfirmed" Taiwanese people's own sense of identity. While this was twenty years ago, I believe that this sense of superiority is still apparent in Taiwanese society. On *Quora*, an anonymous Taiwanese person answers the question "Why do Taiwanese think they are better than mainland Chinese?": "China and its citizens are still experiencing cultural lag. I've literally seen Chinese tourist poop on the streets of Taiwan. Or not wait in line. Or speak bizarrely loudly in private space. Or plant Chinese flags on Taiwanese soil. The list goes on. Taiwanese tourists generally do not pee or poop in the public in the view of all to see, and are generally respectful on foreign land. So we develop disdain, contempt, derision. That, coupled with China's not-so-friendly stance and medley missiles, grows the ill feelings."⁷⁹ Because of Chinese tourists behavior in Taiwan, the Taiwanese feel even more alienated from the mainland. While the

⁷⁷ Qi, *The Taiwan Independence Movement*, p.55.

⁷⁸ Nylander, "Strong Support For Independence In Taiwan."

⁷⁹ "Why Do Taiwanese Think They Are Better than Mainland Chinese?" *Quora*, 25 Dec. 2015. Web. 1 Apr. 2017. <<https://www.quora.com/Why-do-Taiwanese-think-they-are-better-than-mainland-Chinese>>.

Taiwanese do seem to hold a sense of superiority over the mainland Chinese, Taiwanese people mainly worry about their sovereignty.

Hong Kongese identity and the Hong Kongese independence movement

Hong Kong's identity is often expressed in a way that shows its contrast to the mainland. Author Brian Hooper explains common ideas in the literature of Hong Kong that are helpful for understanding its identity: transit, "vortex" and contrast. Transit expresses Hong Kong's geographic location as a "point of passage," while "vortex," alludes to Hong Kong's population density and "the individual's perceived inability to evacuate his or her environment." The last one, "sense of contrast," refers to the differences between "rich and poor, East and West, Occidental and Oriental, and communist and capitalist." Hooper's overarching claim is that from the time British culture met Chinese culture in Hong Kong, culture, language, traditions, and values "have been combined with or superimposed to form what has become Hong Kong culture."⁸⁰ Hooper believes that a theme exists that of how "the individual's quest becomes a collective one," Hooper gives readers an example through Joan Rogers' poem "Hong Kong Belonger":

And on this crowded island
Where cultural rivers meet
I join the progeny of time
Who throng each busy street
And calling through the rush hour,
Whispering in the night,
Echoing down the flight of years
The voices all unite
Who am I? Where am I

⁸⁰ Hooper, Brian. *Voices in the Heart: Postcolonialism and Identity in Hong Kong Literature*, New York, NY: Peter Lang, 2003, p.130-131. Print.

going?

To what do I belong?

This cry in the blood of East and West

Is the heartbeat of Hong Kong.

Hooper states that Hong Kong is a melting pot and its identity is “rooted in this process of fusion.”⁸¹ Hong Kongese radio personality Gary Ngan Luen-mo further explains this “fusion”: “We are the best example of what a multicultural society should be. We not only incorporate ideas from all over the world, we let them flourish.”⁸² In Hong Kong, identity is based around a “melting pot,” open to new ideas and new technologies. As mentioned in the poem, “To what do I belong?” refers to Hong Kong’s quest for a solid identity. Much like how the Taiwanese felt after their handover to the KMT, after 150 years of British occupation, the Hong Kongese felt an obvious cultural drift between the local people and the mainland Chinese.

Understanding Hong Kongese people’s concerns about their future is also a way to understand the independence movement’s supporters in Hong Kong. Author Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo states that although Hong Kong citizens enjoy a relatively large amount of democratic freedom, socio-economic hardship since the early 2000s have given rise to Hong Kong citizen’s feeling of contempt towards Hong Kong’s government and mainland visitors. After the transfer of Hong Kong from the British to the Chinese, a disagreement on how the concept of ‘one country, two systems’ followed. After an influx of mainland visitors and price inflation, “the accusation of mainland visitors as ‘locusts’ who extract benefits from Hong Kong and that of the ‘government-business collusion emerged.’”⁸³ Economic problems and unemployment among youth in Hong Kong eventually lead to the development of the pro-democracy movement, or the ‘Umbrella Revolution,’ in 2014, which started when student democrats Joshua Wong,

⁸¹ Hooper, *Voices in the Heart*, p.133.

⁸² Blundy, Rachel. "What Identity Crisis? Hongkongers Confront Questions of Belonging after Legco Oath Saga." *South China Morning Post*, 29 Nov. 2016. Web. 02 Apr. 2017.

⁸³ Lo, *Hong Kong's Indigenous Democracy*, p.111.

Chi-fung, Alex Chou and Lester Shum were arrested and detained for plunging into government's headquarters in the Admiralty on the night of September 26th. The protests ended in December, after a counter-effort to change public opinion succeeded in naming the protests "violent."⁸⁴

Although Hong Kong's 2014 mass protest was dubbed the "Umbrella Revolution" by foreign media, student democrats described it as "a movement propelling the pace and scope of democratization in the Hong Kong Special Administration Region."⁸⁵ Hong Kong's pro-independence movement has only formed through a series of protests, especially in recent years, with the 'Umbrella Revolution' in response to concerns over China's rule over Hong Kong. Democrats and Hong Kong citizens born after the 1990s, have expressed concern that Beijing's interference with Hong Kong's affairs not only "jeopardizes 'one country, two systems,' but also endangers the concept of 'Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong.'"⁸⁶

In Hong Kong, "localism" has also become a social reaction to mainland China's growing influence. Supporters of both Hong Kong independence and Hong Kong democracy believe that the two systems in the "one country, two systems" model must be politically separate and different so that Hong Kong can avoid having a 'mainland-type' political system, which is characterized by "political paternalism, relative government intolerance of political dissent and the frequent intervention of the central government in the affairs of local regions."⁸⁷ Additionally, before the start of the Umbrella Revolution, "difficulty in finding housing and climbing the social ladder" caused social unrest, and many nativists began "to develop a hatred for both the mainland visitors and the capitalist system in the HKSAR."⁸⁸ However, John Carroll, a professor of history at Hong Kong University, believes that Hong Kongese people are now less angry with mainland Chinese and more angry with Hong Kong's

⁸⁴ Lo, *Hong Kong's Indigenous Democracy*, p.40.

⁸⁵ Ibid, p.104.

⁸⁶ Ibid, p.18.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid, p.111.

government.⁸⁹ Nan M. Sussman believes that Hong Kong's sense of "local belonging" can be traced back to the 1970s. The author states "people in Hong Kong began to see it as their home rather than a temporary shelter, as it was perceived in the early post-war period." She adds, "That was the time when control of cross-border population flow tightened and when the distinction between Hong Kong and mainland China—in socio-economic terms and in political terms—became more palpably felt. To identify oneself as belonging to Hong Kong is, increasingly, to identify oneself as different and distinct from mainland China."⁹⁰

One recent pro-independence/localist group that has developed in Hong Kong is Hong Kong Indigenous, a group named by media as one that prefers aggression to the peaceful demonstrations that were tried, and failed, during the Umbrella Revolution in 2014. The group's central goal is that it wants Hong Kong citizens to be given a vote on the city's future, including the possibility of independence after 2047, when Beijing's promise to the British expires.⁹¹ The group believes Dr. King's statement that "a riot is the language of the unheard," and according to young, democratic supporters, the Democratic Party and the Civic Party, which are pro-democracy political parties, have not accomplished enough for Hong Kong.⁹²

In Hong Kong, many people also see themselves as different from mainland Chinese. Some scholars believe that the Hong Kongese people feel that they are culturally superior to the mainland Chinese. Longtime Hong Kong journalist David Schlesinger believes that is how people in Hong Kong felt when Hong Kong was given back to Communist China 20 years ago. Schlesinger states, "They looked down on the mainlanders that came here with bad manners, bad language skills, bad clothes, and who

⁸⁹ Blundy, "What Identity Crisis?"

⁹⁰ Sussman, Nan M. *Return Migration and Identity: A Global Phenomenon, a Hong Kong Case*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong UP, 2011. Print.

⁹¹ Wong, Alan. "China Labels Protesters 'Radical Separatists,' and They Agree." *The New York Times*. The New York Times, 20 Feb. 2016. Web. 19 Aug. 2016.

⁹² Ibid.

didn't really understand business.” He adds, "Now mainlanders come and often times they're better educated. They have better English, they have better business skills, they have multiple degrees from prestigious institutions, and they get the best slots in law firms and banks, and it's the Hong Kongers who lose out.”⁹³ Hong Kong legislator Fernando Cheung Chiu-hung also believes some people see themselves as culturally superior to the mainland Chinese. He states, “What it means to be a Hong Konger has changed since China began taking control of the city nearly two decades ago..the older generation has family members back in China, and they identify themselves as Chinese. The younger generation doesn't see the mainland that way. Everything they see about China is negative. [They see] mainlanders as dirty, impolite, and people who take away our resources.”⁹⁴ Chueng believes that some young Hong Kongers have even begun to see themselves as a different ethnicity from mainland Chinese.⁹⁵ About this, Chueng explains, “To them, it makes a lot of sense, because we have a different history, a different civilization, culture, and even language. There’s hatred. There's anger.”⁹⁶ Like Taiwan, a sense of cultural superiority still exists in parts of Hong Kong’s society.

In conclusion, Hong Kong people see themselves as a cultural mix of East and West. While Hong Kongese people have expressed economic concerns, supporters of democracy and independence also wish for a politically separate government that practices political tolerance. Hong Kong’s independence supporters frame their movement as a “movement propelling the pace and scope of democratization in the Hong Kong Special Administration Region,” while Taiwanese people mainly frame themselves as being “de facto independent.” Taiwanese people aim to protect their way of life, while some in Hong Kong hope for a vote on independence in the future. Hong Kongese people, as well as Taiwanese people,

⁹³ Schmitz, Rob. "Hong Kong Wrestles With An Identity Crisis." *NPR*, 12 Oct. 2016. Web. 29 Mar. 2017.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

have felt a disconnect towards their mainland ancestors. In both cases, identity is framed as being something distinct from mainland China's.

B. National Pride in Hong Kong and Taiwan

Group identity, as well as national identity, is something that can be imagined. When discussing identity, Benedict Anderson makes the case that identity does not necessarily have to be concrete, but can be “imagined,” meaning that although the “members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”⁹⁷

Identity can be related to citizenship. Some scholars believe that citizenship “entails status, loyalty, duties and rights ‘not primarily in relation to another human being, but in relation to an abstract concept, the state’ and thus derives its power from ‘identity and virtue.’” By this, citizenship can be a form of identity “based on social reciprocity and common interests, which may themselves be based on a sense of tradition, ethnicity or lifestyle.” Citizenship also has a potential “to moderate the divisiveness of other identities—gender, religion, race, class and nation.”⁹⁸ This section involves using SPSS to test “National Pride in Taiwan and Hong Kong.” In this part, I analyze data regarding citizenship-related questions for both places, such as “How proud are you to be a citizen of [your country],” from *AsianBarometer*'s 2010 and 2012 datasets. This section will attempt to test what Hong Kongese and Taiwanese people think about their citizenship to either the Republic of China or the People's Republic of China.

National Pride in Taiwan and Hong Kong

a) Theory and Previous Research:

⁹⁷ Anderson Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, 1991, p.49. Print.

⁹⁸ Isin, Engin Fahri, and Patricia K. Wood. *Citizenship and Identity*, London: Sage Publications, 2011: 4. Print.

In order to see who would be likely to support Taiwanese and Hong Kongese independence, I will attempt to evaluate national pride in Hong Kong and Taiwan by using SPSS to test the value “citizenship.”

Certain factors, such as parent’s political views, gender, religion, region and race, can influence a person’s political attitude and cultural identity.⁹⁹ In the United States, for example, many children inherit their parents’ views on political matters. People whose parents vote for the Democratic Party may also vote for the Democratic Party, and people whose parents vote for the Republican Party may also vote for the Republican Party. At least in the United States, gender tends to play a role in politics, as most women vote democratic.¹⁰⁰

Other factors such as age, education level, social status and income may also play a part in how a citizen views its country. Age can affect national pride in that people over 50 may have views that differ from their younger counterparts. Perhaps people with more education will vote differently from those with less years of schooling. Those with higher income may reap the benefits of society, and therefore, be more proud to be a citizen of their country.

Age should have a sizable effect on Taiwan and Hong Kong’s analyses. Journalist John Xenakis states that older generations, “especially those with some memory of the 1949 flight from Mao Zedong’s army to Hong Kong and then to Formosa, have clung to the hope that one day Taiwan and Beijing would reunite into a single China governed by Taiwan’s Nationalist government.” He adds, “people in younger generations understand that this scenario is not even remotely possible, and that reunification would mean being governed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Beijing, the same CCP that massacred thousands of college students in Tiananmen Square in 1989, and who have become increasingly authoritarian in Hong Kong, breaking their explicit public promise, when Britain returned Hong Kong to

⁹⁹ "What Factors Shape Political Attitudes?" Ushistory.org. *Independence Hall Association*, n.d. Web. 5 Dec. 2016.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

China in 1997, that they could have fully free and fair elections.”¹⁰¹ Age should have an impact on the results. Youth also took a role in the 2014 protests, where age and support for the movement have been reported to have strong correlations.¹⁰² For Taiwan, Chen Chao, in his article, claims that the youth were able to organize well for the Sunflower Movement, and afterwards, were the ones who put Tsai Ing-Wen in office.¹⁰³ However, Dongtao Qi’s research has shown that older, less-educated people living in rural Taiwan consider themselves Taiwanese nationalists, and therefore supportive of Taiwanese independence.¹⁰⁴ In Hong Kong, democrats and Hong Kong citizens born after the 1990s, have expressed concern concerns about Beijing rule in Hong Kong.¹⁰⁵

As for education-level, many protestors in both Hong Kong and Taiwan seem to be college students or professors, with much of the “Umbrella Movement” organized by by college unions. Alan Cheng, a 25-year-old Hong Konger gives his own opinion, however: “It is not necessarily about education any more, it is about who you surround yourself with.” He felt that education is no longer “a barrier to identifying oneself as a Hongkonger.”¹⁰⁶ The effect of education-level can change, if variables such as social status and income level are taken into account. People with high social status and income are likely to have high education-levels, as well. Joseph Wang states online that “If you are a rich Mainland immigrant, then you end up with rich Hong Kong friends, and you are seen as part of the social elite,”

¹⁰¹ Xenakis, John J., "Taiwan Poll Shows Support for Independence from China." *Breitbart*, 2 June 2016. Web. 28 Mar. 2017.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Chao, Chen. "Indifferent Enthusiasts: Young Taiwanese Voters Do Politics Differently." *Sixth Tone*, 21 Oct. 2016. Web. 5 Dec. 2016.

¹⁰⁴ Qi, *The Taiwan Independence Movement*, p. 115.

¹⁰⁵ Lo, *Hong Kong's Indigenous Democracy*, p.43.

¹⁰⁶ Blundy, "What Identity Crisis?"

and that Hong Kong's social structure is "class-based...not location based."¹⁰⁷ Cheng adds, "The only ones who want to identify themselves as hardcore Chinese are those with political or business interests in China."¹⁰⁸

Those with high social status are probably much prouder to be Chinese than those with low social status. Because a good economic relationship with China is in the best interest of wealthy businessman, those with higher income, and therefore, social status in Taiwan might have favorably views of China, so they perhaps will not be as proud to be Taiwanese.

Protesters in both Taiwan and Hong Kong emphasize local languages. In McLean's article about language and identity in Hong Kong and Taiwan, she states that through "using Cantonese, the [Umbrella Movement] protesters show how they identify first as a 'Hong Konger' and not as 'Chinese.'"¹⁰⁹ Those speaking local languages or dialects in Taiwan and Hong Kong are likely to be more supportive of independence. In relation to this study, Hong Kongese people who speak local languages might be less proud to be a citizen of China. While for Taiwan, local languages also give rise to a sense of "strong local identity."¹¹⁰ So those speaking local languages in Taiwan are probably more proud to be a citizen of Taiwan.

b) Data and Hypotheses:

The data used in this paper was collected by Asian Barometer, a database run by the Program for East Asia Democratic Studies at National Taiwan University. This paper specifically analyzes data for Wave 3, or the program's third survey testing. In Taiwan, the Wave 3 survey was conducted from January to February 2010, while in Hong Kong, data was collected from September to November 2012. While

¹⁰⁷ Wang, Joshua. "How Do Hong Kong People Treat Wealthy Mainland Chinese Immigrants?" Quora. N.p., 7 Nov. 2014. Web. 1 Apr. 2017. <<https://www.quora.com/How-do-Hong-Kong-people-treat-wealthy-Mainland-Chinese-immigrants>>.

¹⁰⁸ Blundy, "What Identity Crisis?"

¹⁰⁹ McLean-Dreyfus, Marie-Alice. "Say It Loud: Language and Identity in Taiwan and Hong Kong." *Thinking Taiwan*, 6 Nov. 2014. Web. 1 Dec. 2016.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

Wave 4 data is now available for Taiwan, at the time of the request for data, Wave 4 data for Hong Kong was not yet available. The Wave 4 survey for Taiwan was completed in 2014. Data for Asian Barometer was collected by conducting face-to-face interviews and by conducting national probability samples.

The dependent variable for this paper is labelled “citizenship” and measures how proud a person is to be a citizen of their country. For this paper, question 154, “How proud are you to be a citizen of Taiwan?” or “How proud are you to be a citizen of the People’s Republic of China?” is used. For Wave 3, the question specifically refers to Hong Kongese people’s citizenship to the People’s Republic of China, rather than their citizenship to Hong Kong. The dependent variable is recoded so that it is ranked from 1 to 4: 1 means that not proud at all, 2 means not very proud, 3 means somewhat proud, and 4 means very proud.

For the first independent variable tested, this paper uses a “female” dummy variable, meaning that the interviewees labelled 1 are female, while the interviewees labelled 0 are male.

The second dummy variable is used from question SE3, actual age, and relabelled and recoded as “Age over 50,” so interviewees with ages from 0 to 50 are marked 0, while interviewees with ages from 51 to 100 are marked 1.

The next independent variable is education level, listed as SE5. “Education” is ranked so that 1 means “no formal education,” 2 means “incomplete primary/elementary,” 3 means “complete primary/elementary,” 4 means “incomplete secondary/high school; technical school/vocational type,” 5 means “complete secondary/high school; technical school/vocational type,” 6 means “incomplete secondary/high school,” 7 means “complete secondary/high school,” 8 means “some university education,” 9 means “university education completed,” and 10 “means post-graduate degree.”

The fourth variable is “social status,” as provided by question SE12. The question asks interviewees to rank their perceived social status. The ranking is from 1 to 10, from lowest status to highest status.

As for the fifth variable, it is provided by SE11, or language. This variable is ranked from 1 to 5: 1 means the person speaks “only local language,” 2 means the person speaks “mostly local language,” 3 means the person speaks “a mixture of local and official language,” 4 means the person speaks “mostly official language,” and 5 means the person speaks “only official language.” When testing this variable, “official language” also seems to include Cantonese for Hong Kong, so it seems that this variable is more relevant to Taiwan than Hong Kong.

The next variable, from question SE13a, relates to income. This variable is recoded so that 1 means income “does not cover the needs, there are great difficulties,” 2 means income “does not cover the needs, there are difficulties,” 3 means income “income covers the needs all right, without much difficulty,” 4 means “Our income covers the needs well, we can save.”

The last variable is from question IR13, which asks for the interviewee’s place of residence. The ranked from 1 to 4, from capital to village. 1 is labelled “Capital or Megacity (1 million population plus),” 2 is “Regional Center or Other major cities (100,000 plus),” 3 is “Small city or town (less than 100,000 people),” and 4 is “Village or countryside.” Owing to Hong Kong’s status as a megacity, in this paper, the “location” variable is only applied to Taiwan.

Hypotheses for Taiwan:

Hypothesis I: All else being equal, more males than females will be *more proud* to be citizens of Taiwan.

- Previous research shows that men tend to be more patriotic than women.¹¹¹

Hypothesis II: All else being equal, people over 50 will be *more proud* to be citizen of Taiwan, while people under 50 will be *less proud* to be a citizen of Taiwan.

- People under 50 play a big part in Taiwanese protests, so they might be less proud of the Taiwanese government. In 2010, at the time of the survey, the leader of Taiwan was Ma Ying-jeou, who was Chairman of the KMT and advocated for closer ties with China. Perhaps people

¹¹¹ "What Factors Shape Political Attitudes?"

- under 50 were less satisfied of their government at that time, and therefore, less proud to be a citizen of Taiwan.

Hypothesis III: All else being equal, people with lower education levels will be *more proud* to be a citizen of Taiwan, while people with higher education levels will be *less proud* to be a citizen of Taiwan.

- Dongtao Qi's research shows that the less educated tend to be more nationalistic in Taiwan.¹¹²

Hypothesis IV: All else being equal, people with a lower social status will be *more proud* to be Taiwanese, while people with a higher social status will be *less proud* to be Taiwanese.

- Dongtao Qi's research shows that many of Taiwanese farmers and those with lower social status are more nationalistic than others.¹¹³

Hypothesis V: All else being equal, people who speak less local language will be *less proud* to be Taiwanese, while people who speak more local language will be *more proud* to be a citizen of Taiwan.

- As stated before, people used local languages in Hong Kong and Taiwan to emphasize their local identities.¹¹⁴

Hypothesis VI: All else being equal, people with lower income will be *more proud* to be Taiwanese, while people with higher income will be *less proud* to be Taiwanese.

- Previous research conducted shows that poor farmers are the most nationalistic group in Taiwan. Those with higher income may want closer economic ties with China.¹¹⁵

Hypothesis VII: All else being equal, people living in cities in Taiwan will be *less proud* to be a citizen of Taiwan, while people living in villages will be *more proud* to be Taiwanese.

- Research indicates that those living in rural Taiwan are more nationalistic than others.¹¹⁶

¹¹² Qi, *The Taiwan Independence Movement*, p. 115.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ McLean-Dreyfus, "Say It Loud: Language and..."

¹¹⁵ Qi, *The Taiwan Independence Movement*, p. 115-116.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

Hypotheses for Hong Kong:

Hypothesis I: All else being equal, more males than females will be *more proud* to be citizens of China.

- Previous research shows that men tend to be more patriotic than women.¹¹⁷

Hypothesis II: All else being equal, older people will be *more proud* to be a citizen of China, while younger people will be *less proud* to be a citizen of China.

- People under 50 were affected by economic changes brought by closer economic ties with the mainland. People under 50 were the ones mostly involved in the 2014 Umbrella Revolution.¹¹⁸

Hypothesis III: All else being equal, people with lower education levels will be *more proud* to be a citizen of China, while people with higher education levels will be *less proud* to be a citizen of China.

- Many of the protestors were college-educated or recent graduates, who have had trouble finding jobs.¹¹⁹

Hypothesis IV: All else being equal, people with a lower social status will be *less proud* to be a citizen of China, while people with a higher social status will be *more proud* to be a citizen of China.

- People with higher social status are likely to have more business and social connections with people from the mainland.¹²⁰

Hypothesis V: All else being equal, people speaking less local languages will be *more proud* to be Chinese, while those speaking more local languages will be *less proud* to be Chinese.

- Local languages were used by protesters to emphasize a strong local identity.¹²¹

¹¹⁷ "What Factors Shape Political Attitudes?"

¹¹⁸ Lo, *Hong Kong's Indigenous Democracy*, p.43.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Wang, "How Do Hong Kong People...?"

¹²¹ McLean-Dreyfus, "Say It Loud: Language and..."

Hypothesis VI: All else being equal, people with less income will be *less proud* to be a citizen of China, while people with higher income will be *more proud* to be a citizen of China.

- People with higher income are likely to have more business connections with people from mainland China.¹²²

c) Analysis:

| Variables | min | mean | median | max | standard deviation | % missing |
|---------------|-----|--------|--------|-----|--------------------|-----------|
| "citizenship" | 1 | 3.2208 | 3.00 | 4 | 0.65731 | 3.3 |
| female | 0 | 0.4755 | 0.00 | 1 | 0.49956 | 0 |
| Age over 50 | 0 | 0.3838 | 0 | 1 | 0.48646 | 0 |
| education | 1 | 6.73 | 7.00 | 10 | 2.241 | 0.2 |
| social status | 1 | 5.49 | 5.00 | 10 | 1.850 | 4.8 |
| income | 2 | 3.0930 | 3.00 | 4 | 0.72703 | 2.1 |
| language | 1 | 2.61 | 2.00 | 5 | 1.385 | 0.1 |
| location | 1 | 2.35 | 2.00 | 4 | 0.975 | 0 |

Taiwan descriptive statistics

My first step in the analysis, after taking care of missing values, was to view the descriptive statistics for each place. Here are the descriptive statistics of each variable in my analysis for the research conducted in Taiwan in 2010:

As indicated by the median and mean, most

Taiwanese people interviewed in 2010 considered themselves "somewhat proud" to be a citizen of Taiwan.

As for the dummy variable "female," there were less females than males interviewed. The mean for the dummy variable "Age over 50" is less than .5, so most people interviewed were younger than 50 years old. Most people interviewed had higher education levels. The people interviewed considered themselves to have a pretty low social status; the mean is 5.49 of 10. When testing for income no one indicated that they felt that their income "does not cover the needs, there are great difficulties," so the minimum for that variable is 2. For the most part, people believed their income "covers the needs all right, without much difficulty." As for language, the people interviewed spoke more local language than the official language. Most of the people interviewed also lived in cities or regional centers.

As for Hong Kong, most people interviewed in 2012 considered themselves "somewhat proud" to be a citizen of China. Most of the people interviewed were female and over the age of 50. Most of the

¹²² Wang, "How Do Hong Kong People...?"

| Variables | min | mean | median | max | standard deviation | % missing |
|---------------|-----|--------|--------|------|--------------------|-----------|
| “citizenship” | 1 | 2.9097 | 3.00 | 4 | 0.79972 | 11 |
| female | 0 | 0.5418 | 1.00 | 1 | 0.49845 | 0 |
| Age over 50 | 0 | 0.5162 | 1.00 | 1 | 0.49995 | 0 |
| education | 1 | 5.36 | 6.00 | 10 | 2.556 | 1.3 |
| social status | 1 | 4.50 | 5.00 | 10 | 1.664 | 4.4 |
| income | 1 | 3.0223 | 3.00 | 4 | 0.64444 | 3.5 |
| language | 1 | 4.90 | 5.00 | 5.00 | 0.636 | 0.9 |

Hong Kong descriptive statistics

people interviewed had completed the vocational type of high school. The people interviewed also viewed their social status to be pretty low, while the people generally said their income “covers the needs all right, without much difficulty.” As for language,

most people spoke the “official language.”

The next part of my analysis was finding the regression results for Taiwan and Hong Kong. The variables in the chart marked with one of more (*) indicates that the value is significant. If the p-value is less than 0.1, the value is marked with (*). If the p-value is less than 0.05, the value is marked with (**). If the p-value is less than 0.01, the value is marked with (***). All of these indicate the values range of significance.

For my analysis of Taiwan, I used the regression model: [citizenship] = $\beta_0 + \beta_1$ *[female] + β_2 *[age over 50] + β_3 *[education] + β_4 *[social status] + β_5 *[income] + β_6 *[language] + β_7 *[location]. The final regression equation for Taiwan is: [citizenship]= 3.173 + (.051*female) + (.071*age over 50) - (.014*education) + (.017*social status) +(.017*income) + (.003*language) - (.027*location).

As for Hong Kong, my regression model is as follows: [citizenship] = $\beta_0 + \beta_1$ *[female] + β_2 *[age over 50] + β_3 *[education] + β_4 *[social status] + β_5 *[income] + β_6 *[language].

The final regression equation for Hong Kong is:[citizenship]=3.368 - (.161*female) + (.222*age over 50) - (.018*education) - (.038*social status) + (.025*income) - (.056*language). From this regression equation, we know that a one-unit increase in “citizenship” is associated with numbers in the regression

| Taiwan-variables | Coefficient estimate | Standard error |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------|----------------|
| (Constant) | 3.173*** | 0.123 |
| female | 0.051 | 0.035 |
| Age over 50 | 0.071* | 0.042 |
| education | -0.014 | 0.10 |
| social status | 0.017* | 0.010 |
| income | 0.017 | 0.026 |
| language | 0.003 | 0.012 |
| location | -0.027 | 0.018 |
| Adjusted R-square | 0.006 | |
| N | 1457 | |
| *: p<0.1; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01 | | |

equation. For example, a one-unit increase in “citizenship” is associated with a (.025) increase in income, (.222) increase in age, and so on.

| Hong Kong—variables | Coefficient estimate | Standard error |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------|----------------|
| (Constant) | 3.368*** | 0.243 |
| female | -0.161*** | 0.051 |
| Age over 50 | 0.222*** | 0.058 |
| education | -0.018 | 0.012 |
| social status | -0.038** | 0.017 |
| income | 0.025 | 0.043 |
| language | -0.056 | 0.041 |
| Adjusted R-square | 0.056 | |
| N | 993 | |
| *: p<0.1; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01 | | |

We can use the regression equation in this way: when evaluating different people of society, we can determine their measure of “citizenship,” or how proud they are to be a citizen of their country. For example, for a Taiwanese woman over 50, with no formal education, with a mid-level social status, income that “covers the needs all right, without much difficulty,” who speaks only the local language and who lives in a village, her regression model would look something like this: $3.173 + (.051*1) + (.071*1) - (.014*1) + (.017*5) + (.017*3) + (.003*1) - (.027*4)$. Her estimated “citizenship” level would be 3.312. When

analyzing at a woman with the same characteristics in Hong Kong, her estimated regression model would be $3.368 - (.161*1) + (.222*1) - (.018*1) - (.038*5) + (.025*3) - (.056*4)$. The resulting number would be 3.072. These equations can be used in this way to find how proud a Hong Kongese or Taiwanese person might have been to be a citizen of Taiwan or Hong Kong, based on certain characteristics. As stated before, the value “citizenship” is ranked from 1 to 4, with 1 meaning that the person is “not proud at all” of their citizenship, and with 4 meaning that the person is “very proud” of their citizenship. This shows that these women are “somewhat proud” of their citizenship.

| variables | Taiwan | Hong Kong |
|---------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| female | not significant | significant |
| Age over 50 | significant | significant |
| education | not significant | not significant |
| social status | significant | significant |
| income | not significant | not significant |
| language | not significant | not significant |
| location | not significant | n/a |

In the next part, I analyzed which values were significant for each country. I additionally made one table so that the two countries could be compared. For Taiwan, only “Age over 50” and “social status” are significant. Both “Age over 50” and “social status” are positive values and are significant at the 10 percent level. For Hong Kong, “female,” “Age over 50,” and “social status” are significant. “Age over 50” is significant at the 1 percent level, while “social status” is significant at the 5 percent level. “Female” and “social status”

are negative values, while “Age over 50” is a positive value.

d) Project Conclusions:

As for my hypotheses for Taiwan, my hypothesis that “more males than females in Taiwan would be proud to be a citizen of Taiwan” was *not supported* by the data. My hypothesis that “people with lower education levels will be more proud to be a citizen of Taiwan” was also *not supported*. The hypothesis that “people speaking less local language will be less proud to be Taiwanese” was *not supported*. Another set of hypotheses *not supported nor significant* were “people with lower income will be more proud to be Taiwanese,” as well as the hypothesis that “people living in cities will be less proud to be Taiwanese.”

While “social status” was *proven significant* for Taiwan, my hypothesis that “people with higher social status will be less proud to be Taiwanese” was *not supported*. In the regression results, “social status” has a positive value. The likely cause of this is that people with a higher social status in Taiwan have more prominent positions in society and live a comfortable life. They then, may be proud to be a citizen of Taiwan.

Another value that was significant for Taiwan is “Age over 50.” This *supports* my hypothesis that “people over 50 will be more proud to be a citizen of Taiwan.” A possible cause of these feelings could be Taiwan’s democratization. Taiwan has become a more free and open society since martial law was dropped in 1987 and the DPP was established in 1986.

As for my hypotheses for Hong Kong, my hypothesis that “people with higher education levels would be less proud to be a citizen of China” was *not supported* by the analysis. While, my hypothesis “those speaking more local language will be less proud to be Chinese” was also *not supported*. The last hypothesis with an insignificant regression outcome is the hypothesis that “people with higher income will be more proud to be a citizen of China.”

However, other hypotheses were supported. For example, the hypothesis that “males more than females will be proud to be a citizen of China” *was supported* by the data. The hypothesis that “people over

50 will be more proud to be a citizen of China” *was also supported*. As proved by the regression results, people with higher social status were more proud to be a citizen of China.

From what I have discovered from my research, in 2010, people over 50 and people with higher social status in Taiwan were *more proud* to be Taiwanese, and in 2012, Hong Kongese people over 50, males and people with lower social status were more proud to be a citizen of the People’s Republic of China. For Taiwan, this project has supported previous research conducted by author Dongtao Qi that suggests older people are more proud to be Taiwanese. As for Hong Kong, I was not expecting people with lower social status to be more proud to be Chinese and for people with higher social status to be less proud to be Chinese.

Perhaps one reason why people over 50 were more proud to be Taiwanese is that, at the time of the survey the KMT government was in power. In 2014, young people generally participated in the Sunflower Movement. People over 50, with relatives who remember the Chinese Civil War, may have wanted Taiwan to have closer relations with the mainland, and so, they may have been proud of the government (under KMT rule) at that time. People with a higher social status perhaps reap the benefit of economic relations with the mainland.

In Hong Kong, perhaps people over 50 face less socio-economic problems than people born after the 1990s. I think because the older generation did not face as much problems as the younger generation, they were generally more proud to be a citizen of China. Additionally, in Hong Kong, males and people with lower social status were more proud to be Chinese. In the descriptive statistics for Hong Kong, people generally perceived themselves to have a lower social status. For this, additional research must be conducted to further evaluate these results.

III. Political Opportunity & Strategies

A. Politics & Political Opportunity

Political opportunity, as mentioned before, is the “degree to which groups are likely to be able to gain access to power and manipulate the political system,”¹²³ while political opportunity structures form when society or the political system changes, allowing for collective action.¹²⁴

This section will analyze the “politics” and “political opportunity” of Taiwan and Hong Kong’s independence movements. This paper finds that while the political opportunity structure for the Taiwanese independence movement has decreased on an international scale, its political opportunity structure has expanded in Taiwan. Additionally, in Hong Kong, by seeking positions in the legislative body, independence supporters have attempted to create political opportunity for themselves.

Political Opportunity of Taiwan’s Independence Movement

When discussing the political opportunity structure of the Taiwanese independence movement, most researchers would look to the past. Because the Taiwanese independence movement developed soon after the KMT came to Taiwan, many scholars analyze its emergence from this point. In Mark Harrison’s book *Legitimacy, Meaning and Knowledge in the Making of Taiwanese Identity*, he mentions that owing to the KMT’s authoritarian regime, Taiwan’s independence movement was not a mass movement in Taiwan until the 1980s. In 1986, the Democratic People’s Progressive Party (DPP) was established, and in 1987, martial law was lifted. After this, the DPP became the first political party to challenge the Chinese National Party’s (KMT) authoritarian regime. At this point in time, the political opportunity structure changed and expanded the independence movement’s opportunity for collective action.

Before the establishment of the DPP, the independence movement mainly existed outside Taiwan, when a few people, in the aftermath of the 2-28 Incident, left Taiwan to create a nationalist movement. Although there was no political opportunity structure within Taiwan, supporters of the independence

¹²³ Eisinger, “The Conditions of Protest Behavior...,” p.33.

¹²⁴ Liu et al., *Asian American Activism: Community, Vision, and Power*, p.8.

movement first tried to create one outside of it. Supporters first went to Japan, then the United States to establish their headquarters.

Over time, the political opportunity structure for the independence movement, however, has generally decreased at an international scale. For example, facing pressure from the KMT government, the Japanese government felt obliged to send some supporters of Taiwanese independence back to Taiwan to be put on trial. After the establishment of their headquarters in the United States, the status of Taiwan as independent from mainland China became threatened when the United Nations decided to only recognize the People's Republic of China as the official representative of China. It was not until after martial law was lifted that the Taiwanese independence movement had the political opportunity to develop on Taiwanese soil.

As for the general treatment of protestors by authorities in Taiwan, people supporting Taiwanese independence are generally treated with tolerance and only face issues with KMT government officials or supporters. An example of the most violent protest policing in Taiwan can be described in the aftermath of the "2-28 Incident."¹²⁵ While policing under KMT's authoritarian regime was a problem before, supporters no longer face this kind of problem. Right now, Taiwan's president is from the DPP. Qi describes Taiwan's government under DPP leadership as a "movement government," or a government that "tends to emphasize movement principles and goals at the expense of government performance and mobilize the movement base to help secure power."¹²⁶ This means that opportunity is very much available for collective action for independence in Taiwan. More about the organization of Taiwan's independence movement will be described more in the next section.

Politics & Political Opportunity of Hong Kong's Independence Movement

As for Hong Kong's independence movement, the emergence of the Umbrella Movement came with the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress' proposed electoral reform, in which

¹²⁵ Shih et al., "Taiwanese Identity and..." p.92.

¹²⁶ Qi, *The Taiwan Independence Movement*, p.vi.

nomination for a political candidate would require Beijing's approval. Li Fei, the secretary general of the committee at that time stated, that candidates would be required to "love the country, and love Hong Kong" and would have to "protect the broad stability of Hong Kong now and in the future."¹²⁷ This "opportunity for protest" fluctuated with protest policing and secret attempts by the Chinese government to stop protestors. However, the 'failure' of this protest caused other opportunities to develop. As supporters for independence disagreed with the way in which the government reacted to their demands, many supporters tried to find political opportunities through the 2016 elections.

Before Hong Kong's control was transferred from London to Beijing, secret negotiations between the two polarized the political landscape. According to Lo and Bettinger, Hong Kong democrats emphasized ideals of freedom, equality and autonomy, while pro-Beijing constituents valued stability, harmony and prosperity.¹²⁸ Brian Denny believes the rapid emergence of the democratic left signifies the "radicalization and polarization of Hong Kong's democracy movement."¹²⁹

The students and supporters of the pro-democracy group Occupy Central have expressed before that the government in Hong Kong "make(s) it impossible for anyone not trusted by the Chinese government to stand for election." The protestors in the Umbrella Movement accuse Beijing of breaking vows to give Hong Kong people genuine democracy.¹³⁰ Because many Hong Kong people felt that their rights were being violated by Beijing, many want to participate in opposition, i.e. the independence movement, which later evolved into political organizations.

Protestors wanted to open up the political positions to genuine contest. Protestor Nathan Law states in an article, "If I had the chance to express my political opinion with dignity, I don't think it would

¹²⁷ Buckley, Chris and Michael Forsythe. "China Restricts Voting Reforms for Hong Kong." *The New York Times*, 31 Aug. 2014. Web. 16 Feb. 2017.

¹²⁸ Lo, Ming-Cheng Miriam, and Christopher P. Bettinger. "Civic Solidarity in Hong Kong and Taiwan." *The China Quarterly* 197 (2009): 183. Print.

¹²⁹ Lo, *Hong Kong's Indigenous Democracy*, p.56.

¹³⁰ "China Issues Warning over Hong Kong 'illegal' Protests." *BBC News*, 2 Oct. 2014. Web. 21 Aug. 2016.

be necessary to plan such things,” referring to an attempt to intercept a visiting senior Chinese official’s motorcade in May.¹³¹ Only a small minority of people support separatism,¹³² but the way the Chinese government responded to this opposition could have been a determining factor for how the movement was able to win further supporters. The opinion given by Law reflects lack of political dialogue between movement organizers and the government.

As for the Chinese government’s suppression of the movement, many original supporters of the movement feel threatened while at home. For example, in an article published last February, Mr. Chan Kin-man, one of the professors who helped to found the movement, has reported feeling unsafe at home, checking his apartment for bugs.¹³³ Also related to this is the disappearance of Hong Kong booksellers. Abducted for selling books critical of the Communist government, sixty-one year old Lam Wing-kee, was forced to sit in confinement for five months straight in mainland China. To cover up the abduction, Lam was forced to participate in a state-run broadcast, stating that he was there “to face justice for his role in a fatal 2003 hit-and-run car accident in the Chinese coastal city of Ningbo.” He later told reporters, “It was a show, and I accepted it. I had to follow the script. If I did not follow it strictly, they would ask for a retake.”¹³⁴ Journalist Dominique Rowe reported in her article that the Hong Kong government has “tried unsuccessfully to rein in the rapidly growing movement, threatening teachers with dismissal if they raise the subject in classrooms and disqualifying independence activists from standing in elections.”¹³⁵ These

¹³¹ Wong, Alan. “Chinese Official Condemns Calls for Greater Autonomy in Hong Kong.” *The New York Times*, 19 May 2016. Web. 21 Aug. 2016.

¹³² Ramzy, Austin. “Hong Kong Says Legislative Candidates Must Endorse Chinese Rule.” *The New York Times*, 15 July 2016. Web. 19 Aug. 2016.

¹³³ Yu, Verna. “Hong Kong’s ‘Occupy’ Leaders Now Face Quiet but Persistent Harassment.” *The Christian Science Monitor*, 18 Feb. 2015. Web. 16 Feb. 2017.

¹³⁴ Alan Wong, Michael Forsythe and Andrew Jacobs. “Defying China, Hong Kong Bookseller Describes Detention.” *The New York Times*, 16 June 2016. Web. 3 Mar. 2017.

¹³⁵ Rowe, Domonique. “Hong Kong’s Election Results Slammed in Chinese Media.” *Time*, 6 Sept. 2016. Web. 3 Mar. 2017.

examples indicate the mainland government's fierce opposition to the movement in Hong Kong, and its attempts to stop it from growing.

However, the mainland government's strategies for suppression may only be causing more people in Hong Kong to turn to the movement. For example, Hong Kong Baptist University's Jean-Pierre Cabestan stated that the 2016 legislative election results "is a strong signal to Beijing that its heavy-handed policy is just alienating more Hongkongers and is actually the real reason of the growing pro-independence sentiment."¹³⁶ The mainland government may only be hurting its chance to resolve this problem.

In conclusion, as Meyer quotes Kriesi: "the state can invite action by facilitating access, but it can also provoke action by producing unwanted policies and political threats."¹³⁷ In the case of Hong Kong, unwanted policies and reactions by the Chinese government has caused Hong Kong supporters to find other ways to express their concerns. By seeking positions in the legislative body, Hong Kongers have attempted to create political opportunity for themselves.

B. Strategies & Organization

Framing the collective identity of a movement is a strategy, itself. Jill Kiecolt mentions the creation of collective identity as the "central task" of a social movement. She states that a social movement must "ensure that its members incorporate the movement's collective identity into their own self-definitions."¹³⁸ With the creation of collective identity, social movement organizers make "conscious strategic efforts...to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action."¹³⁹ These strategic efforts, along with other strategies, will be discussed below.

¹³⁶ Connor, Neil. "Young Anti-China Activists Victorious in Hong Kong Vote." *The Telegraph*, 5 Sept. 2016. Web. 3 Mar. 2017.

¹³⁷ Meyer, "Protest and Political Opportunities," p.131.

¹³⁸ Kiecolt, Jill, "Self-Change in Social Movements," in Owens, Timothy J., Sheldon Stryker, and Robert W. White. *Self, Identity, and Social Movements*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2003, p.9. Print.

¹³⁹ McAdam. *Political Process and...*, p.xxi.

Organization & Strategies of the Taiwanese Independence Movement

For Taiwan, the idea of independence has largely become ingrained in its culture and politics. In Taiwan's political environment, a common opinion between the green party and blue party is that Taiwan is a "de facto independent country, and deserves the official UN membership."¹⁴⁰ The Taiwanese already believe that they are culturally and politically separate from China, and they also disagree with the Republic of China's Constitution that advocates Taiwan to retake the mainland. The Taiwanese believe that they "should be a country independent of both PRC and ROC."¹⁴¹

Taiwan's independence movement, overtime, has had its foundations morphed into political organizations; the first organization backing it being the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Qi describes the Taiwanese government when the DPP is in power as a "movement government," however, he also claims that although the Democratic Progressive Party supports the Taiwan Independence Movement, the independence movement is still "very much a social movement and stays relatively independent of the government."¹⁴² Although the party supports Taiwanese independence, the movement will not influence governmental decisions. But many green-party supporters are proponents of Taiwanese independence, so the Party can still utilize this to gain votes.¹⁴³

There are other Pan-Green organizations with more extreme stances when it comes to Taiwanese independence. For example, the Taiwan Solidarity Union (Táiwān Tuánjié Liánméng) specifically supports Taiwanese localism and independence. Whereas the DPP website does not have a section specifically related to Taiwanese independence, the Taiwan Solidarity Union's website states "Since the direct election of the DPP president in 1996, the position of Taiwan as an independent sovereign state has been established," and "all the people must jointly safeguard the freedom, democracy and security of the

¹⁴⁰ Qi, *The Taiwan Independence Movement*, p.54.

¹⁴¹ Ibid, p.55.

¹⁴² Ibid, p.37.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

Taiwanese nation from being violated.”¹⁴⁴ Another Pan-Green party is the New Power Party, recently formed after the 2014 Sunflower Movement. As of 2016 elections, the party has won five legislative seats. Perhaps the case can be made, that because the Democratic Progressive Party, has of late, implied that it wants to continue the status quo, many people are willing to vote for it. Because people are afraid of a possible attack from mainland China, as a response to possible extreme policies, many people want to maintain the status quo. This can follow the case of “radical flank effects,” which as mentioned before, happens when the presence of extremists “encourage funding of the moderates as a way of undercutting (the extremists) influence.”¹⁴⁵

Some Chinese people have argued that in Taiwan’s efforts to be seen as independent, the Taiwanese have tried to seem as culturally different from mainland as they possibly can. This can also be seen as a strategy. An example of Taiwanese people In Zhang’s blog, he contributes Taiwanese people’s unwillingness to rejoin the mainland to Taiwan’s enjoyment of its democratic way of life. He states that, “instead of saying that the people of Taiwan do not agree that they are Chinese, it is better to say that the people of Taiwan do not agree with China's life. They have become accustomed to the way of life in Taiwan and are deeply in love with such a life [for] Taiwanese reasons.”¹⁴⁶

Calling oneself Taiwanese has become in itself a strategy of protest. Qi mentions in his book, “gradually, ‘pro-China’ activities became politically incorrect and none of the politicians would like to receive such condemnation from their political rivals.”¹⁴⁷ Calling oneself Taiwanese has begun to mean that one cares about freedom of speech and other fundamental rights, while calling oneself Chinese in Taiwan has begun to have negative implications.

¹⁴⁴ "台灣團結聯盟---政策綱領." 台灣團結聯盟—政策綱領. Taiwan Solidarity Union, n.d. Web. 3 Mar. 2017.

¹⁴⁵ McAdam, et al., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, p.718-719.

¹⁴⁶ Zhang, Geng-wei. “张耕维：为什么台湾人不认同中国呢？” N.p., 4 Jan. 2017. Web. 03 Mar. 2017.

¹⁴⁷ Qi, *The Taiwan Independence Movement*, p.42.

As mentioned before, in his book *Legitimacy, Meaning and Knowledge in the Making of Taiwanese Identity*, Harrison gives some examples of people who decided to travel from the mainland to Taiwan or from Taiwan to the mainland in the 1990s to find that, culturally, their way of life is different from each other. One person states, “of course I can imagine people from the mainland having the same kind of desire for the benefits of modern life.”¹⁴⁸ During the 1980s, as one of Asia’s “Little Tigers,” Taiwan was seen as “ahead” of the mainland, and the mainland was seen as socially and economically poor.¹⁴⁹ These differences can be not only be attributed to long separation from mainland China, but can be attributed to different economic systems and the divergence of different cultural values, as well.

Identity is a strategy not only for the social movement and political organizations, but also for the Taiwanese people as it is used as a defense of their democratic government and way of life. In the paper titled “Nationalism and Self Determination: identity politics in Taiwan,” author Jou-Juo Chu argues “that lying behind all the obsessions for a new Taiwan-centered identity is primarily the impulse to fight for a sovereignty that can guarantee an unconstrained international space, rather than a nationalist motive to cut off all the cultural and racial identification with China.”¹⁵⁰

The Taiwanese independence movement has legitimacy through its political party institutions. Regarding money, facilities and labor, the independence movement gains these resources through the political organizations it has morphed into. The independence movement also receives support from localists, whose objectives are similar to those advocating for Taiwanese independence. Qi mentions that other social movements have also had a long relationship with the Taiwanese independence movement and offers the opposition movement and the pro-democracy movement, as examples.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁸ Harrison, *Making of Taiwanese Identity*, p.55-56.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Chu, "The Identity Politics in Taiwan." *African and Asian Studies* 35.3 (2000): 305. Print.

¹⁵¹ Qi, *The Taiwan Independence Movement: In and Out of Power*, p.45.

The independence movement's ideas can be seen in Taiwanese film and media. Doctor Robert Hyland of Queens University in Canada, has researched how Taiwanese film reflects localist values. In his introduction to his article on "Global Politics and a Cinema of Localism: Contemporary Taiwanese Film," he uses Wei Te-sheng's 2008 *Cape No. 7* film as an example, in which the main character, a singer, smashes his guitar and says "Fuck Taipei," in regards to "fake" Taiwanese politics—those with a close relationship to Beijing—before heading on a journey to the South coast.¹⁵²

Organization & Strategies of the Hong Kongese Independence Movement

As for Hong Kong's independence movement, the idea of independence from the People's Republic of China is still seen to be very radical to many people living inside and outside Hong Kong. As described in one *Economist* article, supporters are "commonly dismissed by mainstream commentators as belonging to a radical fringe."¹⁵³ However, like Taiwan in the past, Hong Kong has been experiencing a rise in localist groups; for example, the localist group called Civic Passion. Civic Passion is a localist group that supports a militant approach for gaining independence. As of late, however, the group is making more efforts to appear "moderate."¹⁵⁴

The first organization that ignited the Umbrella Movement and published the idea of possible independence from the People's Republic of China is the Hong Kong University Students' Union. Articles published by the organization in 2014 includes "The Hong Kong nation deciding its own fate" and "Democracy and Independence for Hong Kong." Another article was published again in March 2016 called "Hong Kong Youth's Declaration." This declaration states, "even though Hong Kong doesn't have

¹⁵² Hyland, Robert. "Global Politics and a Cinema of Localism: Contemporary Taiwanese Film." *The Iqfor Journal Of Asian Studies* I.I (2014), p.

¹⁵³ Bekemans, Sam. "Determined: Local Passion Is Flaring, but China's Fears of Secessionism Are Overblown." *Economist*, 30 May 2015. Web. 14 Feb. 2017.

¹⁵⁴ Ng, Kang-Chung. "Radical Hong Kong Group Civic Passion to Become 'moderate' Political Party." *South China Morning Post*. South China Morning Post, 05 Jan. 2017. Web. 14 Feb. 2017.

the conditions to become independent yet ... whether independence is viable or not is not our main concern. The main point is whether Hong Kong should become independent.”¹⁵⁵

Leading up to Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement, many political organizations were formed, calling for support for a more democratic Hong Kong. Groups include Youngspiration and Hong Kong Nationalist Party, the first political organization to advocate for Hong Kong’s independence, and the party rejects the Basic Law stating “Hong Kong is an inalienable part of” China.¹⁵⁶ Political organizations supporting Hong Kong independence also include a group called Hong Kong Indigenous, formed in 2015. The group believes in Dr. King’s statement that “a riot is the language of the unheard,” while Mr. Leung, the leader of Hong Kong Indigenous states in an article that Hong Kong must “develop and reinforce a local identity” and “draw a line between us and them.”¹⁵⁷

As mentioned by Mr. Leung, Hong Kongese must “draw a line between us and them.” This underlines identity as a protest strategy. An example of this is on the Facebook page called “英屬香港 British Hong Kong,” a page perhaps romanticizing Hong Kong’s past colonizers. Page administrators shared a photograph from a page called “Hong Kong & China [are] NOT the SAME 中港大不同.” The words across the top of the 2013 photo are “we are not British, but don’t call us Chinese. We are Hong Kongers.” The paragraph below these words encourages overseas Hong Kongese to call themselves “Hong Kongers, not Chinese.” They also encourage overseas Hong Kongers to educate themselves on the issues facing Hong Kong.¹⁵⁸ A photo from February 5, 2014, after the end of the Umbrella Movement, shows the words “Hong Kong is not a part of China” placed over a scene of Hong Kong. The caption

¹⁵⁵ Fung, Owen. "HKU Student Magazine Says Hong Kong Should Become Independent from China after 2047." *South China Morning Post*, 15 Mar. 2016. Web. 14 Feb. 2017.

¹⁵⁶ Fung, Owen, and Kang-chung Ng. "Hong Kong National Party Is Born: Will Push for Independence, Will Not Recognise the Basic Law." *South China Morning Post*, 28 Mar. 2016. Web. 14 Feb. 2017.

¹⁵⁷ Wong, "China Labels Protesters ‘Radical Separatists,’ and They Agree."

¹⁵⁸ Hong Kong & China [are] NOT the SAME 中港大不同. Digital image. *Facebook*. N.p., 5 Feb. 2014. Web. 14 Feb. 2017. <<https://www.facebook.com/hknotch/>>.

below the picture states, “Part of china? Why [do] we need a passport or permit (for) entry there? Why don’t (we) have the residency (there)? The so-call(ed) one country two systems is just a name to fool those who believe Hong Kong is in China, while we are outside China, but being controlled. Just like Tibet. And we are not Chinese. We are Hongkongers.”¹⁵⁹


Identity can also be a protest strategy also in the way that identity was portrayed in the images created by *Local Studio HK* in 2015. This studio portrays how they think Hong Kongers are different from mainland Chinese. A few examples are on the next page. The images presented above relate to what Hong Kong people think of as problems that may plague mainland China’s society. For example, as indicated with the first photo on the top left, Hong Kong people may take pride in having a government that can be considered more free and democratic than the mainland. As the second photograph on the top right indicates, Chinese society may be considered to be more closed off from the rest of the world, because of the fact that certain websites are banned by the government in mainland China. It is important to note, however, that in reality, Chinese youth are able to download VPNs (virtual private networks) to access government-blocked websites such as *Facebook* and *Twitter*. The photograph on the bottom left expresses concerns about food safety in mainland China, while the last photo shows Hong Kongers’ possible distaste of the Communist Party and of their own government.¹⁶⁰

During the Umbrella Revolution, protestors started using “alternative media,” meaning social media websites rather than traditional newspapers, to state their opinions regarding the pro-democracy movement. According to researcher Kwong Ying-Ho, most mainstream media organizations “took an anti-movement stance and practice(d) self-censorship so as not to offend the Chinese government.” Kwong states, mainstream media “avoid(ed) sensitive topics or use(d) alternative means (employing foreign

¹⁵⁹ Hong Kong & China [are] NOT the SAME 中港大不同

¹⁶⁰ Merelli, Annalisa. "These Illustrations Show How Different Hong Kong Thinks It Is from Mainland China." *Quartz*, 1 July 2015. Web. 14 Feb. 2017

media reports) to handle these issues in order not to provoke Chinese leaders.”¹⁶¹ As a result of this, protestors and those wanting to complain about the government took to the internet to vent their complaints.¹⁶² In Kwong’s 2014 survey, 49.1% of Hong Kongers believed media practiced self-censorship, while 56.7% believed that the media had reservations about criticizing the Chinese government. As for the



protestors’ perceptions, main stream media remained conservative due to “business connections with China.”¹⁶³ During this time, the credibility of online media was “boosted.”¹⁶⁴ Another strategy during

¹⁶¹ Kwong, "Dynamics of Mainstream and Internet Alternative Media in Hong Kong," p.274.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid, p. 287.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid, p.289.

protest was local language. McLean states, “using Cantonese, the [Umbrella Movement] protesters show how they identify first as a ‘Hong Konger’ and not as ‘Chinese.’”¹⁶⁵

Other strategies, besides online media, include video production, such as the *Ten Years* film. *Ten Years* won Best Picture at the Hong Kong Film Awards in March 2016, and the film, which started its production in 2014, is “popular because it shows the hopes and fears of Hong Kong citizens living under Chinese rule.”¹⁶⁶ In the film, considered to be a “thought virus” by a mainland editorial, the question that the directors were pursuing with this film is: “If nothing changes in Hong Kong, what will the city be like in 10 years?”¹⁶⁷ The film is composed of five different parts. The film opens up with a scene depicting a secret meeting between political advisors. These advisors suggest that a political leader should be shot at a political meeting held later that day. The reason for this? The mainland government wants to have a reason to pass a stricter security law. The next part goes into almost an apocalyptic scene—two people seem to be the last people on Earth.

For the second part of the film, a taxi driver’s problems are described as more and more restrictions are placed on taxi drivers who do not fulfill the proper standard language (*putonghua*) requirements. As the story goes on, a focus is placed on the frustrations felt by the taxi driver as he discovers he cannot communicate with most of his customers. The next part deals specifically with the fight for Hong Kong independence. This part starts with a television news report about an unknown person burning themselves outside the British embassy and ends when it is found out that an elderly woman participating in the protests sacrificed herself for the people of Hong Kong after witnessing police brutality against protestors for independence.

The final part of the movie deals with an egg seller and a book store owner. A Hong Kongese man is sitting in his store when he receives a phone call from his egg supplier. Apparently, because of new

¹⁶⁵ McLean-Dreyfus, Marie-Alice. "Say It Loud: Language and Identity in Taiwan and Hong Kong."

¹⁶⁶ Yu, Alan. "In 'Ten Years,' A Dystopian Vision Of Hong Kong's Future Under China." *NPR*, 7 July 2016. Web. 12 Feb. 2017.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

restrictions, his supplier decided to move to Taiwan to work on a farm there. Later, a group of “Youth Guard” students come by, dressed as if they are students from the decade of China’s Cultural Revolution. The leader of the group of students takes a photo of the sign that says “local eggs.” When the man asks why the student is taking a photograph, the student replies that “local” is on the list of restricted words, which students should report. The group of students, along with the egg supplier’s son, come by later when the store is closed to throw eggs at it, depicting a scene that reflects something reminiscent to what happened in China’s Cultural Revolution, when children opposed their parents for the sake of politics—something that was completely unheard of before in a Confucian society. The ending scene is at the bookseller’s secret room, where he keeps all of his banned books. The father asks his child, “How do they think they can ban things from existence?” The ending sentence comes from the boy: “Right, even *Doraemon* is banned, idiots.”

This film’s importance is that it reflects the fears of Hong Kong’s people. It reflects fears about an increasingly non-open government, fears about the demise of the Cantonese language, fears about book restrictions and fears about a more fiercely “educated” youth under an increasingly oppressive system. Some scenes have been said to be exaggerated, however, executive producer of the film, Andrew Choi, mentioned in an article, “A lot of people are saying, 'You don't have to wait 10 years, it's already happening now.’”¹⁶⁸ Former Umbrella Movement leader Joshua Wong also gave his opinion on the film’s exaggeration: “If something as absurd as the bookseller case can happen in Hong Kong, can we really rule out anything in the future?”¹⁶⁹ In regards to the ending scene, author Alan Yu mentions that the word “local” has “become politically charged since a ‘localist’ political movement began fighting the growing influence of mainland China and advocating a ‘Hong Kong-first’ approach.”¹⁷⁰ Additionally, another film will be coming out this year on *Netflix* about the actual Umbrella Movement. The film is called *Joshua*:

¹⁶⁸ Yu, "In 'Ten Years,' A Dystopian Vision Of Hong Kong's Future Under China."

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

Teenager vs. Superpower, after the young independence leader, Joshua Wong. Wong has expressed that “the most important thing is to reach the people who are interested in the democracy movement in Hong Kong,” and that he hopes the film will spread awareness of Hong Kong’s politics. Cheung Chor-yung, a political scientist at City University believes that people will be interested in this film, “because there are all sorts of elements – a giant authoritarian state being confronted by a young and fragile-looking student.”¹⁷¹

In conclusion, strategies for Hong Kong’s independence movement can be seen in how the protestors organized themselves for the election of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council, as well as in film and media production. During the September 2016 elections in Hong Kong, the ‘localists’ groups won six seats in the seventy-member legislative council, while twenty three pan-democrats and one centrist were also elected.¹⁷² This election is significant in that the turnout rate was 58.28 percent, the highest turnout rate after the British handover in 1997.¹⁷³ Also significant is that some ‘localists’ won in different geographic locations, “breaking the traditional dominance of the pro-Beijing and pro-democracy parties” that those areas had before. Candidates were also very young, “with little resources or networks to support them.”¹⁷⁴ Before these elections, however, on July 14, 2016, the Electoral Affairs Commission sent out a notice that candidates would have to sign a form that stated candidates would have to agree that they believe in “one country, two systems.” This resulted in six people’s nominations being disqualified.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷¹ Carvalho, Raquel. "Joshua Wong Hopes Netflix Airing of Film Will Raise Awareness." *South China Morning Post*, 25 Jan. 2017. Web. 3 Apr. 2017.

¹⁷² Tsui, Tom, and Heather Timmons. "Hong Kong’s Historic 2016 Legislative Council Election, in Five Charts." *Quartz*, 5 Sept. 2016. Web. 14 Feb. 2017.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Li, Hak Yin. "Hong Kong's 2016 LegCo Election: A Tectonic Shift in HK Politics?" *IPP Review*, 6 Sept. 2016. Web. 14 Feb. 2017.

¹⁷⁵ Ng, Joyce, Tony Chueng, and Owen Fung. "Protests Shut down Electoral Commission Briefing as Hong Kong Indigenous' Edward Leung Disqualified from Legco Elections." *South China Morning Post*, 3 Aug. 2016. Web. 14 Feb. 2017.

V. Conclusions

In conclusion, the two independence movements have many similarities that make a comparative analysis constructive for understanding the mainland government's problems in relation to Hong Kong and Taiwan. Chinese scholar Zhu Jie, after completing a similar study, believes that both governments want to become a democracy, and they both want to use democracy as an "excuse" to become independent.¹⁷⁶ While both supporters argue for democratic values, they mostly express that they want a government free from "oppressive forces."

Hong Kongese and Taiwanese independence supporters hold different ideas about what independence means. In Hong Kong, independence means having a government that is politically separate from the mainland's government. As for Taiwan, there are two definitions of independence for Taiwan. One is ROC independence (*huadu*), and the other is Taiwan independence (*taidu*). ROC independence "holds that Taiwan is already an independent state," but the Taiwan independence definition claims that Taiwan "is not an independent state unless the Republic of China regime is overthrown and replaced by the Republic of Taiwan,"¹⁷⁷ or a government not influenced by the KMT. Regardless of either definition, supporters' main goal is creating a government for the Taiwanese people, and in this sense, Taiwanese people already regard themselves as independent from the mainland. Political scientist Chieh-Ting Yeh describes Taiwan's independence movement's strategy as "nation-building," which later developed to "Taiwanize" the ROC. This means instead of "overthrowing the ROC outright," the movement created a political party that attempted to represent both political values and the people of Taiwan. He explains that this strategy emerged because "Taiwanese independence, the revolutionary kind anyway [i.e. undoing ROC's political system], did not enjoy support from the majority of Taiwan's population." The main goal of the independence movement now is "to bring the people of Taiwan to

¹⁷⁶ 祝捷, "民主独立"的台湾故事与香港前路," 港澳研究, 2015年第二期.

¹⁷⁷ Yeh, "'Taiwan Independence' Doesn't Mean What You Think."

identify themselves as a separate, self-ruling political community, while steadily but slowly reforming ROC institutions.”¹⁷⁸

The two independence movements can both be understood through its supporters’ concerns. While economic fears are one cause of the Sunflower Movement in 2014, Taiwanese people mainly worry about their sovereignty. While Hong Kongese people have also expressed similar concerns, supporters of democracy and independence also wish for a politically separate government that practices political tolerance. Hong Kong’s independence supporters frame their movement as a “movement propelling the pace and scope of democratization in the Hong Kong Special Administration Region,” while Taiwanese people mainly frame themselves as being “de facto independent.” Taiwanese people aim to protect their way of life, but people in Hong Kong hope for a vote on independence in the future. Hong Kongese people, as well as Taiwanese people, have felt a disconnect towards their mainland ancestors. In both cases, identity is described as something culturally distinct from mainland China’s. Hong Kongese and Taiwanese have both shown a sense of disconnect or superiority when it comes to thinking about mainland Chinese.

As for levels of “citizenship,” in Taiwan, my analysis indicates that, in 2010, Taiwanese people with higher social class are more proud to be Taiwanese. The cause of this might be that those with higher social status may live a more comfortable life and therefore have a higher value of “citizenship.” Another significant value is “Age over 50,” which supports my hypothesis that people over 50 will be more proud to be a citizen of Taiwan. Qi also came to this conclusion in his research. The reason for this might be related to Taiwanese development, as Taiwan has become a more free and open society since the 1980s.

As for Hong Kongese people in 2012, my hypothesis that “males more than females will be proud to be a citizen of China” is supported by the data, along with the hypothesis that “people over 50 will be more proud to be a citizen of China.” Perhaps the reason why people over 50 are more proud to be a

¹⁷⁸ Yeh, “Taiwan Independence’ Doesn’t Mean What You Think.”

citizen is the fact that younger people have faced more economic problems after the British handover. The regression results prove that people with higher social status were more proud to be a citizen of China. These people might benefit more from economic conditions caused by collaboration between Hong Kong and the mainland's governments.

Politics in Taiwan can be described as “movement-orientated.” The Taiwanese independence movement has succeeded in its establishment of the DPP, by the party's support of the independence movement. Because of the DPP and the support it provides to the movement, the idea of Taiwanese independence has become widely familiarized and accepted in Taiwanese society. An example can be seen in the election data for Taiwan's DPP. From 1986 to 1999 party membership increased by 180 percent, and from 1999 to 2000, membership increased by over 170,000 people.¹⁷⁹ Additionally, after the recent Sunflower Movement, new political parties formed in a wave called “3rd force politics,” as a reaction to closer economic ties with the People's Republic of China, advocated under the KMT government in 2014. An example of a new political party is the New Power Party, which advocates for total Taiwanese independence.

In regards to political opportunity, the Taiwanese independence movement's opportunity for collective action has contracted on an international scale, but has expanded in Taiwan. For example, the Taiwanese independence movement was established in Taiwan after the Democratic Progressive Party was set up in 1986 as the opposing political party to the KMT and martial law was abolished in 1987. Political opportunity is already available in Taiwan by their government under DPP power; the government is part of the movement, and the DPP is able to utilize support for Taiwanese independence for votes. However, outside of Taiwan, political opportunity structure for Taiwanese independence has declined. The most distressing blow to the Taiwanese independence movement was in 1971, when the Republic of China lost

¹⁷⁹ Qi, *The Taiwan Independence Movement*, p.48.

its seat in the U.N. As of 2016, only twenty-three countries maintain official diplomatic relations with the ROC.¹⁸⁰

Politics have changed in response to mainland China's reaction to the Umbrella Movement. Jean-Pierre Cabestan, an expert on Chinese politics at Hong Kong Baptist University, observed that Beijing's "heavy-handed policy is just alienating more Hong Kongers and is actually the real reason of the growing pro-independence sentiment."¹⁸¹ The "failure" of the Umbrella Movement to produce results, as well as mainland China's reaction to the movement, led to the creation of many new pro-independence or pro-localist political parties. Martin Lee, a veteran activist and founder of Hong Kong's democratic party, reflected that the Umbrella Movement had created a new wave of campaigners to take over from his generation. Lee stated this new wave shows that the Umbrella Movement "was successful because a lot of young people have participated in politics."¹⁸² The change in Hong Kongese politics can be an indicator of the movement's success.

As for political opportunity in Hong Kong, opportunity for protest formed after the Standing Committee of National People's Congress' proposed electoral reform. Unwanted policies or reactions by the Chinese government has caused Hong Kong supporters to find other ways to express their concerns. Political opportunity fluctuated with protest policing and secret attempts by the Chinese government to stop protestors. As supporters for independence disagreed with the way in which the government reacted to their demands, the movement gain many supporters through the 2016 elections. By seeking positions in the legislative body, Hong Kongers have attempted to create political opportunity for themselves.

Both of the independence movements have now established some foundation in political parties. In Taiwan, the government with the DPP in power has been called a "movement government."¹⁸³ In

¹⁸⁰ Qi, *The Taiwan Independence Movement*, p.51.

¹⁸¹ Connor, "Young Anti-China Activists Victorious in Hong Kong Vote."

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Qi, *The Taiwan Independence Movement*, p.v.

Hong Kong, some view supporters of independence as radical, but they have been making efforts to form political institutions. Strategies for independence can be seen in how the protestors organized themselves to get elected to Hong Kong's Legislative Council.

In both places, identity and cultural productions have been used as protest strategy. Tactics in both places include film and social media. Han Chinese composes 92 percent of Hong Kong's population¹⁸⁴ and 95 percent of Taiwan's population.¹⁸⁵ While Hong Kongese and Taiwanese people both share a common ancestry with people on the mainland, the way in which Hong Kongese people and Taiwanese people identify themselves has changed. When it comes to framing their movements, the Taiwanese and the Hong Kongese's movement strategies can be described as purposely framed to contrast with mainland China. Independence supporters purposely address how they differ from the mainland Chinese. Especially in Hong, supporters of independence have used social media to advocate their cause. In addition, media and film in Hong Kong, reflect the people's desire for a more open government, as well as their concerns for the future. Supporters may also use local language as a protest element.

The success of the Taiwanese independence movement can be seen in the changes of Taiwanese society in identity. An example can be seen in the legitimization of the name Taiwan. Harrison discusses how the name Taiwan has become "legitimized by social groups through politics, literature and history."¹⁸⁶ Politicians started to avoid having close relations with mainland Chinese. As mentioned before, over time, 'pro-China' activities "became politically incorrect and none of the politicians would like to receive such condemnation from their political rivals."¹⁸⁷ On *Blogspot*, a post from Monday, March 9th, 2009 states, "Taiwan is Not [a] Part of China. Period!!" The blogger states "the People's Republic of

¹⁸⁴ "2016 Population By-census – Summary Results (Report)." *HK Census and Statistics Department*. February 2016. p. 37. Retrieved 14 March 2017.

¹⁸⁵ *The Republic of China Yearbook (2014)*. Executive Yuan, R.O.C. 2014. Print.

¹⁸⁶ Harrison, *Making of Taiwanese Identity*, p. 70.

¹⁸⁷ Qi, *The Taiwan Independence Movement*, p.42.

China has never ruled Taiwan.”¹⁸⁸ This type of information seems ingrained in Taiwanese society. In Taiwan, calling oneself Taiwanese has become in itself a strategy of protest. Calling oneself Chinese in Taiwan may have begun to have negative implications. Taiwanese people have attempted to distinguish themselves from the KMT party and mainland Chinese.

As for the success of not only the independence movement, but the localist movement in Hong Kong, this can be seen specifically in the way that politics have changed. It can also be seen in the way that localists insist on an existing identity different from that of mainland China’s. Politics in Hong Kong have also changed with the creation of pro-independence political parties following the Umbrella Movement. Although the original movement failed, it became successful “because a lot of young people have participated in politics.”¹⁸⁹

In conclusion, this thesis can add to the conversation about sovereignty and democracy in East Asia. When comparing both Taiwan and Hong Kong, reporters Forsythe and Ramzy state that “a fear of democracy and heavy-handed control of the news are at odds with the increasingly well-educated” Hong Kong people, a “former British colony where civil liberties like freedom of speech and freedom of assembly are guaranteed,” and Taiwan, “a democracy for the past two decades.”¹⁹⁰ Fernando Cheung, a Hong Kongese lawmaker also makes the statement, “If Beijing doesn't change their tactics toward Hong Kong, there's a high chance that China will lose the hearts and minds of Hong Kong people forever.” He adds, “And does that matter to Beijing? I think so. It would show to the world that China and its Communist Party cannot rule a highly developed economy and a cosmopolitan society like Hong Kong’s.”¹⁹¹ This thesis can further shed light to how the Chinese government should conduct relations with both Taiwan and Hong Kong.

¹⁸⁸ “Taiwan Is Not Part of China. Period!!!” *Blogspot*, N.p., 9 Mar. 2009. Web. 22 Feb. 2017.

¹⁸⁹ Connor, “Young Anti-China Activists Victories in Hong Kong Vote.”

¹⁹⁰ Forsythe et al, “China Finds Its Global Ambitions Humbled in Its Own Backyard.”

¹⁹¹ Schmitz, “Hong Kong Wrestles With An Identity Crisis.”

Also interesting, however, is the recent travel ban on Taiwanese activists to Hong Kong.¹⁹² During the 2014 protests, Hong Kongers supported Taiwan's Sunflower Movement, while Taiwanese people supported Hong Kong's Umbrella Movement. 2014 photographs show Taiwanese people holding up signs such as “香港，加油 [Go Hong Kong]!” and “Support Hong Kong Civil Disobedience Movement.” In Hong Kong, a sign of support says, “I'm Hong Kongese. Taiwan, please step on our dead body and find your own path.” Meng-Lin Wu, a blogger in Taipei, comments, “China wants to annex Taiwan...If anything happens to Hong Kong due to China, then it will be considered a consequence for Taiwan too, should it become another SAR.”¹⁹³ If the mainland government increases its suppression of the Hong Kongese movement through police protesting, or so on, it is likely that the mainland government will not only lose Hong Kong people's support, but also will lose any possibility of reconciliation with Taiwan.

Authors of *Self, Identity and Social Movements* state that “If the generalized beliefs on which the movement is based represent an inaccurate assessment of the political realities confronting the movement, it is only because they function on a psychological rather than political level.”¹⁹⁴ Based on numerous articles describing Hong Kong and Taiwan's independence movements as “unrealistic,” this statement can perhaps reflect the impossibilities of Taiwanese and Hong Kongese independence.

A suggestion for the Chinese government would be that it must listen to Hong Kong people's concerns so that the People's Republic of China can have a better relationship with both Hong Kong and Taiwan, in the future. If gaining Taiwan is still important to the People's Republic of China, then they must first win Hong Kong people's hearts.

¹⁹² "Taiwanese Independence Activists 'Not Welcome' in Hong Kong." *Time*, 18 Aug. 2016. Web. 29 Mar. 2017.

¹⁹³ Wu, Meng-Lin. "What Do the Taiwanese People Think of the Hong Kong Protests?" *Quora*, 3 Oct. 2014. Web. 01 Apr. 2017. <<https://www.quora.com/What-do-the-Taiwanese-people-think-of-the-Hong-Kong-protests>>.

¹⁹⁴ McAdam, *Political Process and...*, p.10

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