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A Teleosemantic Theory Of The Deep- Unconscious: A Response To John R. Searle's Account Of The Unconscious

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A TELEOSEMANTIC THEORY OF THE DEEP-UNCONSCIOUS:

A RESPONSE TO JOHN R. SEARLE'S ACCOUNT OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

A Thesis
presented in partial fulfillment of requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts
in the Department of Philosophy and Religion
The University of Mississippi

by

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ABSTRACT

In *Mind*, John R. Searle dismisses the deep-unconscious on the grounds that it neither satisfies the Connection Principle nor does it exhibit intentionality. I argue against Searle's account of the unconscious. My initial reason for rejecting Searle's account is that he sacrifices the theoretical virtue of explanatory power for the sake of ontological simplicity. The reason the unconscious mind gained theoretical sustenance in the first place was to understand and explain various aspects of human behavior that consciousness cannot account for, so any good theory of the unconscious ought to fill this explanatory gap. By oversimplifying the unconscious, Searle's account cannot explain such aspects of human behavior, e.g., the causes of our sexual preferences, the tendency to mirror body language of others, or how our environments can shape our judgements. As an alternative, I defend a teleosemantic theory of the unconscious as a causal explanation for consciously unintended human behaviors.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Before the 1800s, the notion of ‘unconscious mental states’ was perceived as a contradiction in terms. This notion would have been read as ‘unconscious consciousness’, for ‘conscious’ and ‘mental’ were used as synonymous expressions. This perceived contradiction was due to the Cartesian intuition that consciousness and mental content are essentially related, for Rene Descartes believed that conscious thought is the only kind of thing that exhibits intentionality. The incentive to understand and explain human behavior, however, gave theoretical sustenance to the unconscious. Most prominently described by Sigmund Freud, there are consciously unintended aspects of human behavior whose best explanations require that there are unconscious states with intentional content, e.g., implicit beliefs and desires.

In “The Unconscious and the Explanation of Behavior”, John R. Searle discusses four types of unconscious mental states/processes: (1) preconscious, (2) repressed, (3) deep-unconscious, and (4) nonconscious. In his discussion, Searle argues that the deep-unconscious is superfluous and its proposal is attempting to fill a gap that does not exist. According to Searle, because deep-unconscious mental processes have neither the ability to become conscious states nor function in mental causation, they are nothing more than neurobiological processes of the nonconscious. I will argue that this is false. Searle individuates unconscious mental states from purely nonconscious phenomena by asserting what is known as the *Connection Principle*: “Unconscious mental state[s]

must be the kind of thing that could be a conscious mental state[s].”¹ From this assertion, he further claims that unconscious states are defined by their *ability to cause* conscious states and behaviors appropriate to those states. I agree with this latter claim, and contrary to Searle I believe the deep-unconscious meets this criterion; however, I disagree with the Connection Principle. Searle’s account of the unconscious fails to consider certain consciously unintended behaviors thereby making it easy to reduce the deep-unconscious to nonconscious phenomena. In essence, he has ‘defined away’ something that still needs to be explained.

In the following section, I sketch a general structure of consciousness. In section three, I thoroughly explain each of the four unconscious mental states/processes from Searle’s account. In section four, I reconstruct Searle’s argument for the nonexistence of the deep-unconscious, then I evaluate its central premise using Robbert van Baaren’s “A Critical Evaluation of Searle’s Connection Principle.” In section five, I discuss Searle’s account of intentionality to reveal that even by his own lights deep-unconscious states can be said to possess intentionality. In section six, I discuss Searle’s understanding of aspectual shape and argue that it is not essentially phenomenal. In section seven, I use examples of consciously unintended behaviors from social psychology and evolutionary biology as evidence to (1) support the need for positing the existence of the deep-unconscious and to (2) demonstrate the deep-unconscious as having the ability to cause conscious states and behaviors appropriate to those states. As an alternative to Searle’s account, in section eight, I will defend a view of the deep-unconscious informed by teleosemantic theory. In section nine, I address a famous objection to the etiological aspect of teleosemantic theory from Donald Davidson’s ‘Swampman’ thought experiment. Finally, I reach the conclusion that the restated teleosemantic account of the deep-unconscious demonstrates it as distinct and irreducible by

¹ John R. Searle, *Mind: A Brief Introduction*, pp. 171.

having shown that (1) it involves processes distinct from nonconscious phenomena, (2) intentionality is not necessarily phenomenal, and (3) deep-unconscious states have the ability to cause conscious states and behaviors appropriate to those states.

CHAPTER 2

A STRUCTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The term ‘consciousness’ is vague in that it encompasses various qualities and processes. In order to clarify this notion, consider the following account provided by philosopher and cognitive scientist David Chalmers: A mental state is said to be conscious if and only if it exhibits (1) awakeness, (2) reportability, (3) intentionality, and (4) qualitateness.² First, depending on how ‘awakeness’ is defined, it is debatable whether dream states are considered conscious. If ‘awakeness’ is defined as the state of being aware of one’s own consciousness, then dreams could be said to be conscious. Consider the psychological phenomenon of lucid dreams. In a lucid dream, one is consciously aware that he is dreaming. If ‘awakeness’ is defined as the state of being awake as opposed to being asleep, then dreams are not conscious. For our purposes, ‘awakeness’ will be understood by the latter definition. Second, a thought is said to be conscious if it is, at least in principle, verbally reportable. In the case of a mute individual, although he cannot *verbally* report his thoughts, his thoughts are reportable in principle. For instance, if the mute individual acquires the ability to speak, then he could verbally report his thoughts. The verbal report of his thoughts reflects no relevant change in the structure of his mental states, but rather, it only reflects an unrelated physiological change in his anatomy. Third, conscious mental states exhibit

² David Chalmers, “The Hard Problem of Consciousness,” pp. 225.

intentionality. A mental state possesses intentionality if it is *about* something - that is, it purports to represent something other than itself. To further clarify, “[intentional states] include perceptions, beliefs, desires, memories, decision, judgements, reasoning, schemas, imaginings, ideas, concepts, and perhaps sensations, as well as any representational aspects of emotions and feelings.”³ Fourth and lastly, qualitiveness is the “*something it’s like*” feature of consciousness.⁴ In other words, subjective experience is the qualitative feature of consciousness. When a person sees the color red, for example, he has the visual *experience* of seeing red - that is, there is *something it’s like* to see the color red. Although these properties undoubtedly overlap, the contention of this proposal will focus on intentionality.

I am focusing on intentionality in this paper because, according to Searle, it is necessarily and sufficiently linked to something’s being a genuine unconscious state. Searle believes that in order for a mental state to be called ‘unconscious’ it must have the ability to become a conscious state in virtue of its intentionality. Searle humorously contends that “an unconscious mental state is exactly like a conscious mental state only minus the consciousness.”⁵ Searle asserts that this definition is less than sufficient yet agrees that some notion of the unconscious is necessary in order to explain certain aspects of human behavior. Searle discusses four areas of the unconscious mind: (1) Preconscious, (2) repressed, (3) deep-unconscious, and (4) nonconscious. He argues, however, that there are only two true areas of the unconscious: Preconscious and nonconscious. His main reason for assimilating the repressed to the preconscious is because both involve intentional states that have the potential to become conscious phenomenal states, and his main reason for assimilating the deep-conscious to the nonconscious is because neither involve

³ Karen Neander, “Mental Content,” pp. 145.

⁴ Chalmers, pp. 225.

⁵ Searle, pp. 166.

intentional states that have the potential to become conscious phenomenal states. Searle's account of the unconscious mind, as it will be demonstrated, carries a conscious-centric bias and does not offer an explanation for many unintended aspects of human behavior. By approaching the unconscious merely from a cognitive psychological perspective, Searle is able to present an account that escapes the problem of explaining consciously unintended behavior. In doing so, he presents a valid argument; however, his argument will be revealed as unsatisfactory.

CHAPTER 3

THE FOUR TYPES OF UNCONSCIOUS STATES

The first type of unconscious state, Searle notes, is the *preconscious*. Preconscious mental states are intentional states that are not currently being experienced but can easily enter into the conscious field when prompted.⁶ It is important to note that these sorts of states do not play a causal role in behavior, but instead, they are best understood as propositional content not currently being experienced. To illustrate, before being prompted to think of the Eiffel Tower, the idea of it was not present to the mind. The idea, however, was readily available to the mind. The preconscious can be further understood by metaphorically conceptualizing it as a supply closet of infinite material. For instance, suppose some art student *X* has the intent to build a sculpture. Student *X* does not know what he is going to build; however, any material he is prompted to use for the sculpture is readily available to him in the supply closet. Likewise, the preconscious is a supply closet for the conscious field from which particular and abstract ideas may be drawn. It is important to note that preconscious states do not function causally in behavior.

The second type of unconscious state is the *repressed* unconscious. Repressed mental states are intentional states that are not being experienced but function causally in present behavior and thought processes of an individual.⁷ These mental states are individuated from the repressed in two

⁶ Searle, pp. 167.

⁷ Ibid.

ways. First, they are distinct from the preconscious in virtue of the causal role they play in behavior and thought. Second, they are distinct from the preconscious by the fact that they are not readily available to the individual and often require psychoanalysis to be realized. Consider again art student *X*. Suppose *X* has been prompted to build a sculpture, but rather than being instructed on what materials to use, the art professor allows *X* to have creative freedom. Not to the surprise of the professor, *X* builds a sculpture that resembles that of his past artworks. *X*, however, fails to realize that there is a similarity shared by all of his sculptures, for the subject-matter of his work always varies. Although the subject-matter differs, *X* always uses barbed wire on the outer surface of his sculptures. When this is brought to his attention, *X* is astonished and wonders why he always chose barbed wire. An art therapist walks in and enlightens *X* about his repressed desire for security, for *X* was raised across various foster homes throughout his life. Although this thought was not present to *X* during his sculpting, *X* is now in full realization of his repressed state and gains understanding about certain aspects of his behavior.

The third type of unconscious state is the *deep-unconscious*. Deep-unconscious processes are not intentional states and can be understood as the mental processes responsible for forming perceptions as well as other computational processes.⁸ Searle asserts that the deep-unconscious refers to the type of mental states that cannot be brought to awareness, not even in principle, because “[they are] not the sort of thing that can form the content of a conscious intentional state.”⁹ Searle illustrates deep-unconscious processes with the example of a child learning a language.¹⁰ He proclaims that “both in the acquisition of language and the forming of perceptions, the

⁸ Searle, pp. 168.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Searle, pp. 168.

computational rules are not the kinds of things that could ever be consciously thought.”¹¹ Searle does not go into detail about the deep-unconscious, but by equating the deep-unconscious with mere computational processes, he offers a vague cognitive psychological approach to the unconscious. His account of the deep-unconscious denies that there are complex unconscious reasoning processes affecting behaviors that are representational. One might say that Searle is touching on speech behavior; however, the perceptions and computational rules contributing to the early acquisition of a language are not the same as the complicated consciously unintended behaviors I have in mind, e.g., the causes of our sexual preferences, the tendency to mirror body language of others, or how our environments can shape our judgements. By offering an account that does not account for these cases of human behavior, Searle is able to easily dismiss the deep-unconscious; however, I argue that Searle is committing a straw man fallacy¹² in doing so.

Lastly, the *nonconscious* includes neurophysiological phenomena such as the production and reuptake of neurochemicals in the brain.¹³ Although the secretion of serotonin undoubtedly plays a causal role in human behavior, there is no mental reality to it nor could there ever be.¹⁴ Searle gives the example of the medulla controlling breathing in order to illustrate nonconscious processes. He states that “the medulla [functions] in a nonmental fashion, in the same way that the stomach functions in a nonmental fashion when...digesting food.”¹⁵ In conclusion, the nonconscious seems agreeably unproblematic.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² The straw man fallacy is an error in reasoning characterized by misrepresenting an opponent’s position or an idea such that the misrepresentation makes it easy to argue against or dismiss the competing position/idea.

¹³ Searle, pp. 168.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Searle, pp. 168.

CHAPTER 4

SEARLE'S REJECTION OF THE DEEP-UNCONSCIOUS

Searle considers both the preconscious and the nonconscious to be unproblematic; however, he asserts that the repressed and the deep-unconscious are superfluous. First, he argues that the repressed unconscious can be understood as a subtype of the preconscious.¹⁶ Secondly, Searle argues that the deep-unconscious is nothing more than nonconscious neurobiological processes.¹⁷ Searle rests his assertions on what he calls the *Connection Principle*. The Connection Principle states that “an unconscious mental state must be the kind of thing that could be a conscious mental state” at least in principle.¹⁸ In more detail, Searle’s argument can be reconstructed as follows:

- (1) There are nonconscious neurobiological processes, and there are neurobiological processes capable of producing states in the conscious form.
- (2) Unconscious mental mechanisms are defined, not in terms of their neurobiological properties, but rather, in terms of their ability to cause conscious states and behavior appropriate to those mental states (derivation of the Connection Principle).
- (3) In order to function in mental causation, an unconscious state must have intentionality.

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 169.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 171.

- (4) Both preconscious and repressed mental states are able to cause conscious states and behaviors appropriate to those states since they exhibit intentionality; therefore, in virtue of satisfying the Connection Principle, these mental states are understood as unconscious.
- (5) Deep-unconscious processes do not exhibit intentionality and thus cannot cause conscious states or behaviors.
- (6) If the deep-unconscious lacks the essential feature of intentionalistic phenomena, then it can be assimilated to the nonconscious.
- (7) If the deep-unconscious is the nonconscious, then its notion can be eliminated entirely.
- (8) Therefore, the deep-unconscious does not exist.¹⁹

At first glance Searle's Connection Principle seems unproblematic; however, closer examination will reveal that it begs the question.²⁰ The Connection Principle, henceforth called CP, states that "an unconscious mental state must be the kind of thing that could be a conscious mental state."²¹ Searle's argument for CP comes from his understanding of intentionality, and thus, his understanding of aspectual shape.²² He claims that "intentional states always have aspectual shapes, because all representation is under aspects."²³ Searle posits that "this aspectual feature must matter to the agent. It must exist from his/her point of view."²⁴ If aspectual shape must exist from one's point of view, then this presupposes phenomenal properties - or the *something it's like* features - which are essentially conscious in nature. If aspectual shape presupposes the phenomenal properties of conscious states, then CP denies the possibility of occurrent unconscious intentional

¹⁹ Searle, pp. 171.

²⁰ The fallacy of begging the question occurs when an argument's premises assume the truth of the conclusion, instead of supporting it.

²¹ Searle, pp. 171.

²² Aspectual shape refers to the mode of presentation of the representational content of an intentional state.

²³ Searle, pp. 117.

²⁴ Robbert van Baaren, "A Critical Evaluation of Searle's Connection Principle," pp. 77.

states. Robbert van Baaren draws a distinction between *occurrent* and *dispositional* unconscious intentional states in “A Critical Evaluation of Searle’s Connection Principle.” Baaren states that “dispositional unconscious intentional states are possible conscious intentional states or dispositions to cause conscious intentional states” whereas occurrent unconscious intentional states do not have the possibility of becoming conscious states but nonetheless use intentionality to function in mental causation and behavior.²⁵ Dispositional unconscious intentional states are unproblematic for Searle, as these are the sorts of unconscious states that satisfy CP; however, if CP is true, then the notion of an occurrent unconscious intentional state is a contradiction in terms.²⁶ To show that CP is false, Baaren argues that “one should object...against the claim that aspectual shape requires existence or even possible existence from the point of view of the subject, so called subjective ontology.” In other words, we should deny that aspectual shape is necessarily phenomenal.

My overall objection to Searle’s argument is the rejection of premise (5): *Deep-unconscious processes do not exhibit intentionality and thus cannot cause conscious states or behaviors*. To reject premise (5), I will argue that CP is false by showing that there are unconscious mechanisms capable of causing conscious states and behaviors appropriate to those states without exhibiting or potentially exhibiting *phenomenal* intentionality, i.e., occurrent unconscious intentional states. In agreement with Baaren, I will deny that aspectual shape is necessarily phenomenal which will further demonstrate how an unconscious state can be intentional as well as function in mental causation without being the kind of thing that could itself become a conscious mental state.

²⁵ Baaren, pp. 79.

²⁶ Baaren, pp. 79.

CHAPTER 5

INTENTIONALITY AS REPRESENTATION OF CONDITIONS OF SATISFACTION

Intentionality is the ability the mind has to refer to objects and states of affairs in the world beyond itself.²⁷ Since mental states do not always reflect actualities in the world, Searle further clarifies that “intentionality is [best understood as] representation of conditions of satisfaction.”²⁸ Intentional states are related to the world in different ways. In the case of propositional content, intentional states are “responsible for fitting the world” whereas in other cases, such as desires, it is “the responsibility of the world to fit the content of the desire.”²⁹ These two cases of intentional states have different directions of fit, and thus they have different conditions of satisfaction. In the case of beliefs, the intentional state has the responsibility to represent how things actually are in the world - that is, a belief is either true or false.³⁰ In the case of desires, the intentional content represents how things in the world would be preferred - that is, a desire is either fulfilled or dissatisfied. If person *X* has the belief that it is raining outside, then his belief will be true if and only if it is raining outside. Beliefs have *mind-to-world* direction of fit - that is, the conditions of satisfaction require mental states to coincide with how things really are in the world.³¹ In contrast,

²⁷ Searle, pp. 117.

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 122.

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 118.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

if person *X* has the desire for it to rain, then his desire will be fulfilled if and only if it rains. Desires have *world-to-mind* direction of fit; therefore, the conditions of satisfaction require that things in the world match the content of the desire.³² Under these circumstances endorsed by Searle, the deep-unconscious will be demonstrated as having intentionality.

³² Searle, pp. 119.

CHAPTER 6

ASPECTUAL SHAPE

When discussing intentionality, Searle also notes that “intentional states always have aspectual shapes, because all representation is under aspects.”³³ One major objection Searle notes for theories of the unconscious is the inability to account for the presence of aspectual shape when an intentional state is unconscious.³⁴ Since one purpose of this proposal is to show that unconscious states exhibit intentionality, it is necessary to address this criterion. Intentional states exhibit referential content and cognitive content. The referential content is the object of representation whereas the cognitive content is the mode of presentation - or aspectual shape. This distinction accounts for how two concepts can have the same referent but different meanings.³⁵ Consider the Morning Star and the Evening Star. Both concepts refer to the same celestial body but differ in their aspectual shape. Before advancements in astronomy, however, they were perceived as two distinct celestial bodies. To further illustrate the significance of aspectual shape, consider water and H₂O. Person *X* asks for water and then observes the server write “H₂O” on his notepad. Since person *X* has never learned the chemical formula for water, he assumes the server misunderstood his drink order. The server returns to the table with a glass of colorless, odorless liquid. Person *X*

³³ Ibid., pp. 117.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Karen Neander, “Teleological Theories of Mental Content,” pp. 389.

is unsure if it is water or H₂O. The server clears the confusion by offering a brief chemistry lesson to person X. Water and H₂O share the same referent, however, the concepts differ in aspectual shape.

Searle claims that aspectual shape cannot be characterized in purely behavioral terms because identical behavior can be motivated by different aspectual shapes.³⁶ For example, person X could exhibit liquid-seeking behavior motivated by either a want for water or a want for H₂O. Even if we were to ask person X under which aspect he desired his beverage, the properties making the difference could still not be communicated because they are phenomenal.³⁷ Phenomenal properties - the *something it's like* features - of mental states are not the sorts of things that can be understood by anyone other than the subject who is having them. From this line of reasoning, Searle concludes that intentional states are necessarily phenomenal since they involve aspectual shapes. If aspectual shapes are necessarily phenomenal and intentional states always have aspectual shapes, then unconscious intentional states must be the sort of thing that can become conscious intentional states. This conclusion is the foundation of CP. Searle invites others to refute CP by providing a counterexample of an unconscious intentional state that is neither accessible to consciousness nor a disposition to cause a conscious intentional state, for no such evidence seems to be providable.³⁸ Baaren points out that “being mental states, they are inaccessible to third persons, and being unconscious states, they are inaccessible to the first person. Therefore, the best [he] or anyone can do is to provide a clear sense of and indirect evidence for the claim that there are such states.”³⁹

³⁶ Baaren, pp. 76.

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 78.

³⁸ Baaren, pp. 80.

³⁹ Ibid.

To segue into counterexamples to CP, one immediate question to ask Searle is what *caused* the conscious desire for water in person *X*? My intuitive response is that there is a physiological need for water in the body recognized by the brain that then causes a subject to feel the phenomenal state of thirst accompanied with the intentional desire for water as well as the belief that water will satisfy this physiological need. This would not be a merely nonconscious neurobiological process since there is referential content involved, i.e., the representation of liquid. If there is referential content, it must be the case that it is represented to the subject under some aspect. If this is true, then aspectual shape is not necessarily phenomenal. I will not go into further detail about the specific unconscious mechanisms responsible for causing conscious desires for water, but I only bring this to attention to show that there is an explanatory gap in Searle's account of the unconscious as it relates to the causes of certain conscious states and behaviors. Bringing this explanatory gap to attention segues into the proceeding counterexamples to CP. Baaren, for instance, concentrates his counterexample on the case of blindsight patients.

Blindsight patients are subjects who, due to damage to their visual cortex, have lost most if not all of their vision but nonetheless have the ability to respond to visual stimuli that they do not consciously see.⁴⁰ Baaren cites a study in which a blindsight patient is presented with a cup of water in his blind field. The blindsight patient is not consciously aware that the cup is there; however, "when motivated to grab the object in his blind field, he will make a movement with his arm and hand appropriate to grab the cup, even though he claims to have no knowledge or awareness of what is in front of him."⁴¹ Cases of blindsight challenge the common intuition that perceptions must enter consciousness to affect our behavior. Baaren explains that "the subject is

⁴⁰ Baaren, pp. 81.

⁴¹ Ibid.

grabbing the object in front of him in the way in which he would grab the cup were it in his visual field and within reach,” so “there is therefore reason to suppose that the object in front of him is represented in a way similar to the way the cup would be represented if he did see it.”⁴² Since all representations are under aspects, Baaren concludes that this seems to demonstrate a case of unconscious aspectual shape without any phenomenal quality. In what follows, I will provide more counterexamples to CP to show that there are such things as occurrent unconscious intentional states and mechanisms that play causal roles in conscious thought and behavior.

⁴² Baaren, pp. 82.

CHAPTER 7
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY,
AND THE EXPLANATION OF BEHAVIOR

As previously noted, Searle inadequately represents the deep-unconscious as a means to easily dismiss it as nonconscious phenomena. His representation is not satisfactory, as it leaves us without causal explanations for various conscious states and behavioral phenomena. Searle's approach to the unconscious can be understood as similar to the standard approach from cognitive psychology. Cognitive psychology fails to account for the unintentional aspects of human behavior, as it equates the unconscious solely with subliminal information processing.⁴³ Equating the unconscious with subliminal information processing ultimately leads to the conclusion that "the powers of the unconscious mind are limited and that the unconscious is rather 'dumb'."⁴⁴ Recall that Searle uses the example of a child learning a language to illustrate the mechanisms of the deep-unconscious. In doing so, Searle only acknowledges that "concept activation and primitive associative learning [can] occur unconsciously, [but] anything complex requiring flexible responding, integration of stimuli, or higher mental processes [cannot]." Contemporary research in social psychology, however, reveals the powerful role of the unconscious mind in

⁴³ John A. Bargh and Ezequiel Morsella, "The Unconscious Mind," pp. 73.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

several behavioral guidance systems.⁴⁵ The latter approach to the unconscious is consistent with teleofunctionalism in that it stresses both phylogenetic⁴⁶ and ontogenetic⁴⁷ functions of mental states. The revised account of the deep-unconscious will rest on this latter approach. Before presenting a revised definition of the deep-unconscious, however, unintentional aspects of human behavior need to be explored in order to stress the need for the revised account of the deep-unconscious.

As briefly mentioned in the beginning of this essay, there are aspects of human behavior that are not consciously intended or motivated - that is, the agent is largely unaware of the cause or nature of his behavior. In addition to consciously unintended behaviors, there are also aspects of human desire that stem from processes much deeper than those that are conscious. Since humans carry a conscious-centric bias “due in part to the operational definition within cognitive psychology that equates unconscious with subliminal,” they often overlook the *cause* of their behaviors/desires.⁴⁸ Within the theoretical framework of teleofunctionalism, however, these “sophisticated unconscious behavior guidance systems not only make sense, [but] they turn out to have been predicted on *a priori* grounds.”⁴⁹ Briefly put, teleofunctionalism defines the nature of mental states/processes in terms of normative functions in relation to their etiological background - both ontogenetic and phylogenetic.⁵⁰ In layman terms, teleofunctionalism is a perspective derived

⁴⁵ Bargh and Morsella, pp. 73.

⁴⁶ In biology, the term “phylogenetic” refers to the evolutionary history of an organism. A phylogenetic function is one that has developed over time by having served adaptive ends for past ancestors, e.g., the mental mechanisms responsible for learning.

⁴⁷ In contrast to phylogenetic, the term “ontogenetic” refers to the developmental history of an individual organism within its own lifespan. An ontogenetic function is one that has developed by having served adaptive ends within the organism’s lifespan, and it is dependent of phylogenetic functions. For example, the effects of classical conditioning would be understood as ontogenetic whereas the mental mechanisms that allow for classical conditioning to be possible would be understood as phylogenetic.

⁴⁸ Bargh and Morsella, pp. 73.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 75.

⁵⁰ Neander, “Teleological Theories of Mental Content,” pp. 386.

from evolutionary biology that looks at mental functions as products of natural selection and adaptation.

Contemporary research in social cognition reveals “surprising findings regarding complex judgmental and behavioral phenomena that operate outside of awareness.”⁵¹ For instance, in the first few seconds of meeting a stranger, an individual has already made implicit judgements concerning his competence, trustworthiness, and likeableness.⁵² Across all psychological domains, these sorts of behavioral phenomena are known as instances of *automaticity*. In general, automaticity refers to complex judgements and behaviors whose influences operate outside of conscious awareness.⁵³ Automaticity is generally understood by its role in skill acquisition “in which a process always begins as a conscious and deliberate one, becoming capable of automatic operations only with frequent use.”⁵⁴ However, there is evidence to suggest that “there are evolved substrates and early childhood learning mechanisms involved as well.”⁵⁵ In ordinary cases, people sometimes claim that they do not trust a certain person while at the same time not knowing why, but rather, they accept it as a ‘gut feeling’. These feelings, intuitions, and gut-reactions do not spontaneously arise, but instead, research shows that they, among other automatic behavioral phenomena either originate from evolved mechanisms or are derived from processes of skill acquisition.⁵⁶ Although these intuitions might not always accurately represent reality, the unconscious mechanisms from which they originate or are derived aim at fulfilling certain implicit goals - social and biological.

⁵¹ Bargh and Morsella, pp. 75.

⁵² Documentary: “The Magic of the Unconscious Mind: Automatic Brain.”

⁵³ John A. Bargh, “Automaticity in Social-Cognitive Processes,” pp 593.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

Aside from evolved mechanisms, research in social cognition reveals that a large sum of automatic phenomena are the effect of *contextual priming*.⁵⁷ Contextual priming refers to the unconscious ‘downloading’ of cultural norms and values as well as the behaviors and values of persons in close proximity to an individual.⁵⁸ Priming typically occurs in the early years proceeding birth; however, the phenotypic plasticity of the human mind allows for a life-long capacity of fine-tuning.⁵⁹ It is for this latter reason that humans are able to adapt to new environments and learn new skills across the lifespan. These “priming effects, in which what one perceives directly influences what one does, depend on the existence of a close, automatic connection between perception and behavior.”⁶⁰ This automatic perception-behavior link explains the unconscious tendency humans have to mirror body language as well as adopt mannerisms of those in their social vicinity.⁶¹ This unconscious mechanism functions to increase liking and bonding between individuals; however, most people are largely unaware as it occurs.⁶²

For evidence of this automatic perception-behavior link, consider the following research findings: A study exploring the unconscious mechanism responsible for social mimicry reveals that participants exposed to implicit elderly-stereotype primes adopt a slower pace of walking.⁶³ “Not only does priming with elderly related stimuli cause a participant to walk more slowly (behavioral effect), but it also affects the participants’ perceptions of the environment in stereotype-consistent ways: estimating a hill to be steeper and the distance across a grassy field to be longer compared to the estimates made by a control group. It is as if the active self concepts of

⁵⁷ Bargh and Morsella, pp. 76.

⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 75.

⁵⁹ Bargh and Morsella, pp. 76.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Bargh, “Automaticity,” pp 594.

the experimental group participants took on the role or persona of an elderly person.”⁶⁴ A further study on the effects of contextual priming reveals how polling locations affect the way people vote.⁶⁵ The Arizona 2000 general election included a ballot initiative to raise state sales tax to increase education spending.⁶⁶ In the first phase of the study, participants were sent to vote in either a school or a non-school location.⁶⁷ The participants exposed to school voting environments showed more likely to vote in favor of education spending than participants exposed to control voting environments.⁶⁸ In the second phase of the study, participants were exposed to school-related images and control images.⁶⁹ The participants exposed to school-related images showed more likely to vote in favor of education spending than the participants exposed to the control images.⁷⁰ These research findings illustrate that behaviors and consequential real world decisions can be influenced by subtle environmental features even outside of conscious awareness.

Not only does the unconscious play a role in social behavior, but it also influences human desires. From an evolutionary perspective, “genes primarily drive [human] behavior through motivations.”⁷¹ Biologically speaking, humans have the underlying motivation to survive and reproduce. These unconscious motivations manifest into various human behaviors and thoughts in the attempt to achieve a certain goal.⁷² In sexual selection, for instance, some person *X* unconsciously evaluates the genes of a potential mate *Y* whereby he will judge *Y* as either attractive or unattractive. Certain female characteristics, such as a wide hip-to-waist ratio, are perceived as

⁶⁴ Ibid., pp 595.

⁶⁵ Jonah Berger, “Contextual Priming: Where People Vote Affects How They Vote,” pp. 8846-8849.

⁶⁶ Ibid., pp. 8846.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid., pp. 8848.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Berger, “Contextual Priming,” pp. 8848.

⁷¹ Bargh and Morsella, pp. 75.

⁷² Ibid.

desirable as they reflect signs of fertility; however, signs of fertility are not the conscious concern of the male, but rather, they are unconscious concerns manifested into conscious desire, i.e., phylogenetic development of mental mechanisms.⁷³ Human desires are also influenced unconsciously through culture and early learning, i.e., ontogenetic development of mental mechanisms. With regard to contextual priming, person *X* might be psychologically conditioned by his culture to perceive a petite female frame as more desirable than a voluptuous one. This latter case reflects the adaptive nature of the unconscious mind with regard to sexual selection. The ideal mate might not always be the one with the most prominent signs of fertility, as social status and intelligence also function as determining factors. In either case, however, the unconscious is guiding conscious behavior and thought towards a goal. Although unconscious and conscious goal pursuit function in agreement most of the time, the underlying motivations differ. In the case of sexual selection, the conscious explanation of preference is simply what is attractive whereas the unconscious explanation of preference reveals a more complex evaluation of the mate. As Bargh and Morsella note, “Given the late evolutionary arrival of conscious modes of thought and behavior, it is likely that conscious goal pursuit exapted, or made use of, already existing unconscious motivational structures.”⁷⁴

Searle invited us to provide *at least* one counterexample to CP. I have provided several, as these cases demonstrate how deep-unconscious states are intentional and play causal explanatory roles with conscious states and behaviors appropriate to those states. To summarize, cases of contextual priming reveal how behaviors and consequential real world decisions can be influenced by subtle environmental features even outside of conscious awareness. With the case of sexual

⁷³ Documentary: “The Magic of the Unconscious Mind: Automatic Brain.”

⁷⁴ Bargh and Morsella, pp. 75.

selection, the deep-unconscious evaluates certain social and biological features of a mate and causes certain conscious desires appropriate to achieving the goal of reproductive success. In conclusion, the cases presented serve as counterexamples to Searle's CP by demonstrating ways in which unconscious mechanisms utilize representational content to carry out functions and cause conscious states and behaviors appropriate to those states. Recall that CP states that "an unconscious mental state must be the kind of thing that could be a conscious mental state."⁷⁵ The cases presented show that CP is false, yet they satisfy Searle's condition that unconscious mechanisms are defined in terms of their ability to cause conscious states and behaviors appropriate to those states. Furthermore, these cases also give indirect evidence that unconscious states can be intentional and thus have aspectual shape without being phenomenal.

I have been demonstrating how deep-unconscious mechanisms use representational content to carry out their functions; however, there seems to be occurrences where deep-unconscious mechanisms *misrepresent* content in which case their conditions of satisfaction are not met. In "The Biology of Facial Beauty," B. Fink and N. Neave note, "Evolutionary psychologists consider...the shape and [color] of the lips as an indicator of youth and fertility. Full lips in women are developed under the influence of oestrogens, and several features of the face and body that indicate fertility develop under the influence of sex-steroids."⁷⁶ Deep-unconscious mechanisms evaluate these indications of health and fertility to cause conscious states of sexual attraction; however, these indications of health and fertility are often misrepresented to the deep-unconscious due to the use of cosmetics and/or enhancement of plastic surgery. The reason why women wearing makeup are perceived as more attractive than women who do not is because the

⁷⁵ Searle, pp. 171.

⁷⁶ B. Fink and N. Neave. "The Biology of Facial Beauty," pp. 323.

deep-unconscious mechanisms naturally selected to detect indicating signs of health and fertility misrepresent the cosmetically enhanced faces as being natural. The traits are being perceived correctly, but they are inaccurately represented in the sense that what is being seen is not a correct evaluation of what the unconscious mechanism is naturally selected for. Suppose some man *X*'s deep-unconscious evaluates the facial features of some woman *Y* who has cosmetically enhanced lips. *X*'s deep-unconscious evaluates the lips of *Y* as an indication of fertility; however, the conditions of satisfaction are not met in virtue of *Y*'s lips falsey signaling the indication of fertility. This example demonstrates why we cannot simply have a theory of mental content that individuates mental states in terms of function. A theory that indicates mental states purely in terms of a function cannot explain why misrepresentations have the ability to illicit identical responses to accurate representations. In order to account for why misrepresentations have the ability to illicit identical responses to accurate representations, we must take into account the selection history of mental mechanisms and distinguish between function and proper function. In the next section, I will discuss a theory of mental content derived from evolutionary biology that looks at mental functions as products of natural selection and adaptation.

CHAPTER 8

A TELEOSEMANTIC THEORY OF THE DEEP-UNCONSCIOUS

Searle admits that there are aspects of human behavior that only make sense by appealing to the unconscious; however, his presentation of the unconscious fails to offer such an explanation. In light of the research findings from social cognition and evolutionary biology, there is evidence to support that unconscious processes play an influential role in human behavior in ways not accounted for by Searle. These mechanisms seem to be more than nonconscious neurobiological processes, for they utilize representational content, e.g., the pitch of a hill, walking speeds of elderly persons, and waist-to-hip ratios. Again, nonconscious neurobiological processes can be understood, for example, as the brain processes responsible for the nonconscious regulation of circulation or digestion. These processes are not understood as representational, for they do not involve any informational functions.⁷⁷ In other words, nonconscious neurobiological processes have no mental reality attached to them. Since mechanisms of the unconscious use representational content to carry out their functions, they can be understood to possess intentionality.

Teleofunctionalism defines the nature of mental states/processes in terms of normative functions in relation to their etiological background - both ontogenetic and phylogenetic.⁷⁸ In layman terms, teleofunctionalism is a perspective derived from evolutionary biology that looks at

⁷⁷ Neander, "Teleological Theories of Mental Content," pp. 392.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 386.

mental functions as products of natural selection and adaptation. The teleofunction of mental content - or *intentionality* - is to accurately represent the world to humans. This contrasts with ordinary functionalism. Functionalist theories of mental content are problematic because they have no way of accounting for error or malfunction, for they define intentional states merely by the function they happen to perform at a given time.⁷⁹ The notion of *normative* functions is what distinguishes functionalism from teleofunctionalism. Rather than defining intentional states by the function they happen to perform at a given time, teleofunctionalism defines intentional states by the function they are *supposed* to perform. Teleosemanticist Karen Neander notes, “Ordinary functionalism...uses a nonnormative notion of a function, such that if an item, *x*, has a function to do *Z* in circumstances *C*, then *x* is disposed to *Z* in *C*. In contrast, teleofunctionalism uses a notion of function that allows that an item, *x*, could have a function to do *Z* in circumstances *C* even if *x* is not disposed to do *Z* in *C*.”⁸⁰ Although the representational content of mental states might not always be accurate, the mechanisms that produce or use the representations operate under normative functioning - that is, these mechanisms have been naturally selected by their environments as the most fit and most adaptive.⁸¹

Unconscious mental processes, such as those used in social interactions and sexual selection, operate in terms of normative information-processing functions. Neander explains that “the functions supply the normativity and the fact that they are *informational* functions makes them representational, as opposed to, for example, circulatory or digestive.”⁸² Searle argues that unconscious mental states are defined in terms of their *ability to cause* conscious states and

⁷⁹ Ibid., pp. 384.

⁸⁰ Neander, “Teleological Theories of Mental Content,” pp. 385.

⁸¹ Ibid., pp. 387.

⁸² Ibid., pp. 392.

behaviors. This ‘ability to cause’ feature of unconscious mental states reflects a functional role. Deep-unconscious mechanisms function to produce certain human desires and behaviors in order to reach certain biological ends which are normative in this sense. As demonstrated from social cognition research, the unconscious provides humans with quick intuitive reasoning for judging the trustworthiness of other individuals. From a teleofunctional perspective, this unconscious mechanism is ontogenetically adaptive in that it draws information from an individual’s past to create cautious behaviors for present circumstances. These cautious behaviors are a survival mechanism to keep an individual safe. In this example, the teleofunction of the unconscious mechanism is to cause thoughts and behaviors that will help to ensure the survival of the individual. The fact that these mechanisms rely on representational content to function individuates them from nonconscious mechanisms. Recall that the unconscious mechanisms that play a role in sexual selection also rely on representational content to function. When a man sees a woman he finds attractive, he may be able to say which attributes of the woman he finds attractive; however, his conscious state does not go so far as to explain *why* he finds these certain attributes attractive. The ‘why’ is located in the deep-unconscious, for this is where the genes, fertility, and other social factors of the woman are being evaluated. The teleofunction of this unconscious mechanism is to cause desires and behaviors in an individual to motivate reproductive success.

Reconsider the following premises from Searle’s argument: (2) *Unconscious mental states are defined, not in terms of their neurobiological properties, but rather, in terms of their ability to cause conscious states and behavior appropriate to those mental states* and (3) *In order to function in mental causation, an unconscious state must have intentionality*. The unconscious processes mentioned from social cognition research and sexual selection are distinct from those of the preconscious and the repressed, and they have also been shown as distinct and irreducible from

the nonconscious; therefore, these unconscious mechanisms give theoretical sustenance to the *deep-unconscious*. Contrary to Searle's assertions, the deep-unconscious can be said to exhibit intentionality on the basis that its mechanisms use representational content to carry out their functions. Again, Searle asserts that "intentionality is [best understood as] representation of conditions of satisfaction."⁸³ Deep-unconscious desires, such as the ones that function in sexual selection, possess conditions of satisfaction and thus are intentional in nature. Some of these functions are the result of ontogenetic development while others are the result of phylogenetic development. The phylogenetic functions of unconscious sexual selection mechanisms are those that use representations characteristic of fertility and health such as hip-to-waist ratios. Ontogenetic functions of unconscious sexual selection mechanisms are those that use representations characteristic of social status, wealth, and/or intelligence.

⁸³ Searle, pp. 122.

CHAPTER 9

THE SWAMPMAN ARGUMENT

According to teleosemantic theory, mental content is understood in terms of its biological function in relation to a selection history. One of the major objections to this account comes from Donald Davidson's so-called 'Swampman argument' and pertains to the theory's commitment to selection history. Davidson's thought experiment goes as follows:

“Suppose Davidson is talking a walk in a swamp when he is suddenly struck by lightning. Suppose further that as soon as the lightning bolt has evaporated him, by random fluke, a perfect molecule-for-molecule replica of him reassembles itself out of the materials available in the swamp. Suppose finally that the replica of Davidson, call him ‘Swampman’, is behaviorally identical to Davidson; he walks and talks like him, greets his friends, writes philosophy papers, etc. By assumption Swampman will lack any state with a history of natural selection. Since that is so, according to teleosemantics, Swampman won't have any states with representational content...[no] beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. even though he is behaviorally entirely indistinguishable from a normal human being.”⁸⁴

The issue for teleosemantic theory is that it seems to offer an inadequate account of mental representation, for Davidson's Swampman seems to present a counterexample for how something could have mental representation without selection history. If Swampman does have mental representation, then, in light of the theory's commitment to selection history, teleosemantics is false. One way to respond to this counterexample is to deny that Swampman has mental representation. Denying that Swampman has mental representation goes against our common

⁸⁴ Uwe Peters, “Teleosemantics, Swampman, and Strong Representationalism,” pp. 275.

intuitions; therefore, teleosemantics carries the burden of proof for explaining how a being's physical states can operate and function exactly like our own and not be genuine mental representations.

In what follows, I take the former approach in denying that Swampman initially has intentional states. I will begin by claiming that mental representation is essentially a biological phenomenon where biology presupposes teleology with natural selection based history. Next, I will discuss what is known as the *fiction response* - the claim that Swampman is not problematic for teleosemantics because he is imaginary. Uwe Peters counters the fiction response with a real world scenario of some creature having mental representation without a selection history. I will respond to Peters' counterexample by highlighting his misrepresentation of evolutionary theory. My response to Peters will demonstrate how, even though Swampman cannot initially be said to have intentionality, teleosemantics can account for his developing intentional mental states in virtue of an ontogenetic selection history.

The standard response to the Swampman objection is to assert that Swampman's lack of mental representation does not suffice to falsify teleosemantics.⁸⁵ I agree with the standard response, and I argue that the Swampman objection is undermining the essence of biological systems. The teleofunction of a heart is what makes it a heart. Recall that some X possesses a teleofunction F if and only if X does F and exists because it does F . Just because something performs the same function as a heart without having the teleofunctional disposition to do so does not make it equal to an authentic heart. Granting Swampman mental representation seems to stem from a functionalist account of intentionality. A functionalist account of intentionality will regard

⁸⁵ Ibid., pp. 276.

anything that functions as mental representation as genuine mental representation. I argue that consciousness and mental representation are biologically intrinsic, and their teleology is what makes them what they are. This line of reasoning may seem circular because the conclusion depends on a definition of mental representation that asserts it as being intrinsically teleological; however, this is the same move that is being made in the Swampman objection - that is, it assumes a definition of mental representation that is purely functionalist. I find that a definition of mental representation that assumes teleofunctionalism is a less problematic one since it can account for error, misrepresentation, and malfunction.

Furthermore, the chance of a perfect molecule-for-molecule replica of someone spontaneously arising by random fluke without any causal connection after he has been vaporized by a lightning bolt seems virtually impossible. Swampman would be a special case for teleosemantics *if* he were actualized. Disregarding the Swampman objection based on its near impossibility is often referred to as the *fiction response*.⁸⁶ In “Teleosemantics, Swampman, and Strong Representationalism,” Uwe Peters counters this response by offering what he takes to be an actual case of a creature who lacks representation but is behaviorally identical to members of its species that do possess representational states. Consider the following case proposed by Peters:

“Suppose...at some point in the past when organisms in this world haven’t yet evolved representational states, there is a population of primitive creature. One of them, call her ‘*CI*’, acquires by random genetic mutation for the first time in evolutionary history a particular inner state *R*. As it happens, *R* is activated by and systematically co-varies with the presence of some object or state of affairs *X* in *CI*’s immediate environment and leads *CI* to exhibit behavior in response to *X* that has survival-promoting effects. As a result, *CI*’s life expectancy increases allowing her to transmit *R* to numerous offspring.”⁸⁷

⁸⁶ Peters, pp. 276.

⁸⁷ Peters, pp. 277.

Peters is highlighting the fact that at some point in evolutionary history, representation must have emerged in the actual world. The selection history of any mechanism responsible for mental representation undoubtedly has a beginning. In this case, *CI* is the first of its species to acquire internal state *R* by random genetic mutation; therefore, *CI* provides an actual instance of a creature with mental representation without a phylogenetic selection history.

Although Peters presents an instance of mental representation without selection history, the case of *CI* does not pose a threat to teleosemantics. Recall that teleosemantics is a theory derived from evolutionary biology. Natural selection is but one mechanism of evolution, for there is migration, mutation, and genetic drift as well. Furthermore, there are two processes of natural selection - phylogenetic and ontogenetic. Peters seems to be overemphasizing phylogenetic selection history. Teleosemantics emphasizes natural selection for the purpose of attributing a *telos*⁸⁸ to mental states to represent intentionality as conditions of satisfaction. If some first mental representation *R* arose out of genetic mutation, teleosemantics is simply asserting that *R* or the mechanism responsible for *R* will persist through time if *R* performs an advantageous functional role which will cause it to have an ontogenetic selection history. In the case of *CI*, “*R* is activated by and systematically co-varies with the presence of some object or state of affairs *X* in *CI*’s immediate environment and leads *CI* to exhibit behavior in response to *X* that has survival-promoting effects. As a result, *CI*’s life expectancy increases allowing her to transmit *R* to numerous offspring.”⁸⁹ If *R* is inherited to offspring, then *R* attains a phylogenetic selection history. Teleosemantics accounts for states having phylogenetic selection histories as well as their developing ontogenetic selection histories. Furthermore, consider the circumstance in which *R* did

⁸⁸ A *telos* is an end or purpose.

⁸⁹ Peters, pp. 277.

not lead to survival promoting effects and was therefore not transmitted to any offspring. Teleofunctionalism accounts for things that do not perform a function just as it accounts for things in error. Just because *R* is not potentially selected in virtue of fulfilling some advantageous role does not mean it lacks intentionality. Teleofunctionalism just stresses that *R*'s persistence depends on its performing some biological function beneficial to its possessor. *R*'s persistence - or selection history - is a consequence of its having performed some former biological function aiding in the survival or reproduction of its possessor.

In conclusion, Peters' objection is unsuccessful because he mischaracterizes the relation between biological function and selection history as it relates to teleosemantics. On Peters' account, some internal state *R* is an intentional state if and only if it or the mechanism producing it has a selection history; however, this is not what teleosemantics asserts. Teleosemantics asserts that *R* is an intentional state in virtue of its disposition to perform a biological function, and its persistence depends on its performing said biological function successfully where success in this case is determined by its fulfilling some advantageous role. The ways in which these fulfillments are met, especially in terms of desires rather than beliefs, might create a more specific teleofunction for *R* over time, i.e., ontogenetic selection history. The relation between biological function and selection history is one of supervenience, where change in biological function creates change in natural selection. Peters' account of teleosemantics overemphasizes the significance of selection history - specifically, phylogenetic selection history - which in turn overshadows this supervenience relation. Selection history is not the sole determinant of something's being a genuine mental representation, but is merely the consequence of mental representations' conditions of satisfaction being met in ways that are beneficial to the possessor. This distinction between phylogenetic and ontogenetic selection history can further explain how Swampman might

develop genuine intentional states over time. Although Swampman undoubtedly lacks a phylogenetic history, he has the potential to develop an ontogenetic selection history since he has mechanisms that function in a way. As these mechanisms interact with the environment, certain states might be selected to perform normative functions in virtue of which his mental representations can become genuinely intentional over time.

CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSION

Searle dismisses the deep-unconscious on the grounds that it neither satisfies the Connection Principle nor does it exhibit intentionality. Since mental content does not always accurately represent the world, Searle further clarifies intentionality as representation of conditions of satisfaction. Contrary to Searle, I have demonstrated how mechanisms of the deep-unconscious causes conscious states and behaviors appropriate to those states in order to achieve certain biological and/or social ends. Desires exhibit intentionality - specifically, they have world-to-mind direction of fit where the conditions of satisfaction, if met, result in the desire being fulfilled. Mechanisms of the deep-unconscious also use representational content to carry out their functions, and it is for this reason that the deep-unconscious is distinct from nonconscious neurobiological processes. Even by his own lights, I have shown how the deep-unconscious satisfies Searle's criteria for unconscious mental states. By approaching the deep-unconscious from cognitive psychology, Searle is able to easily dismiss it as nonconscious, i.e., a strawman fallacy. His account of the unconscious, however, is unsatisfactory as it does not offer a causal explanation for certain consciously unintended behaviors. In response to Searle, I have offered a teleofunctional account of the deep-unconscious which not only demonstrates its intentionality, but it also offers explanations for consciously unintended behaviors by appealing to considerations from evolutionary biology and social cognition. The objection from the Swampman argument does not

pose a threat to teleosemantics because (1) it assumes a merely functionalist account of mental states, (2) it is an imaginary scenario, and (3) Uwe Peters' 'real-world' Swampman case misrepresents teleosemantics. In conclusion, the restated teleosemantic account of the deep-unconscious meets his requirement of intentionality and ability to cause conscious states and behaviors appropriate to those states; therefore, the deep-unconscious exists according to Searle's criteria for unconscious states.

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VITA

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