The Neighbor Before the House: Jordan's Internal and External Drivers Regarding the Refugee Crisis

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THE NEIGHBOR BEFORE THE HOUSE: JORDAN’S INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DRIVERS REGARDING THE REFUGEE CRISIS

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By Katherine G. Levingston

A thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for completion Of the Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies
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Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College
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University, Mississippi
May 2019

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank my parents Jon and Jennifer Levingston, my sisters, and my friends, for their unwavering support during this past year of researching and writing this thesis. I am forever grateful for their constant love and support, as well as their enthusiasm for reading multiple drafts and offering constructive feedback.

Ashleen Williams, my thesis advisor, provided me incredible guidance during this process. I thank my second and third readers, Dr. Joshua Howard and Dr. Tim Russell, for their many considerable contributions. This committee of outstanding scholars helped me to produce this work. I am indebted to each of them for sharing their invaluable skills and knowledge with me.

Finally, I want to express my gratitude to the Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College and the Croft Institute for International Studies. Both of these outstanding institutions have provided me the ability to expand my education and appreciation for the rest of the world around me through enriching classes and the opportunity to travel to Jordan. My time in Jordan peaked my interest in the topic of this thesis, enabling me to begin the work refined by my committee.
Abstract

Jordan has the second highest number of refugees in the world per capita next to Lebanon and relies very heavily on aid from the global community, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the European Union (EU). Furthermore, they lack a legal framework regarding the high amount of refugees that inhabit the country. This raises the question: What are the drivers of Jordanian refugee policy? I argue that the drivers of Jordan’s current refugee policies are their internal pressures, which are Jordan’s ongoing water crisis, unemployment, and education, as well as external funding that comes from their reliance on the UNHCR and allies, such as the United States and the United Kingdom. Using a qualitative approach, I explored Jordan’s main points of concern, regarding their security and the wellbeing of its inhabitants. My data consists of global policies created by the UNHCR and other entities in collaboration with Jordan; the United States and the United Kingdom government websites; and the UNHCR and EU websites. Through my research, I discover that external pressures, border security and international aid (monetary and humanitarian) are directly related to these internal pressures, as they directly affect Jordan’s national security and foreign relations. Furthermore, by not having a national refugee policy, Jordan is internationalizing the crisis, providing a gateway for assistance from the rest of the world.
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Chapter One: Introduction

In March of 2011 the Syrian Civil War broke out, and over 620,000 Syrians sought refuge in Jordan.\textsuperscript{1} With 6.6 million internally displaced Syrians and over 5.6 million externally displaced,\textsuperscript{2} the Middle East became the largest producer and host of displaced people in the world.\textsuperscript{3} Jordan has a population of 9,983,014,\textsuperscript{4} and for every 1,000 people, there are 89 refugees from Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, and other countries, in Jordan, which is the second highest number refugees in the world per capita\textsuperscript{5} second to its regional neighbor, Lebanon.\textsuperscript{6} As of February 2018, 740,160 refugees are living in Jordan, and 89 percent of those are Syrians registered with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).\textsuperscript{7}

The UNHCR plays an extensive role in Jordanian refugee policy. Jordan relies very heavily on the UNHCR for assistance with its high concentration of refugees. Because of the high number of refugees, it raises the question: What are the drivers of Jordanian refugee policy? Jordan does not have a legal framework regarding its refugees, which contributes to policies that do not explicitly define who is considered a refugee or their role in Jordanian society, increasing tensions between the country and the refugees.

\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Jordan Fact Sheet}. PDF. UNHCR.
\textsuperscript{5} \textit{Jordan Fact Sheet}. PDF. UNHCR.
\textsuperscript{7} \textit{Jordan Fact Sheet}. PDF. UNHCR.
The closest policy Jordan has to addressing refugees is the Residence and Foreigners’ Affairs Law no. 24 of 1973, which simply equates refugees to foreigners.\(^8\)

Thirty three years later, in 2016, the Jordan Compact was created and signed at the London Conference in 2016 by collaboration with United Nations, the United Kingdom, Germany, Kuwait, and Norway. The Jordan Compact highlighted the integration of Syrian refugees into the business sector and the education system.\(^9\) Ultimately, the policy was not satisfactory, and, in 2018, the Jordan Response Plan (JRP) was formed. Jordanian government officials, development partners, UN agencies, and International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGO) wrote the JRP, and it covers various aspects of Jordanian life, including education, livelihoods, and WASH (water, sanitation, and hygiene).\(^10\) The two latter policies are targeted towards refugees registered with the UNHCR and were created alongside other members of the global community. Jordan does not officially recognize refugees. Rather, the Jordanian government refers to them as ‘visitors’, ‘irregular guests’, ‘Arab brothers’ or just ‘guests.’ None of these terms are legally recognized under domestic laws.\(^11\) Because of this lack of recognition and the fact that these policies are not laws of Jordan, they are treated as global policies.

My topic is relevant in today’s society, because, on a domestic level, this refugee crisis is a pressing issue that Jordanians deal with on a daily basis in relation to


\(^10\) Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 2018-2020. static1.squarespace.com/static/522c2552e4b0d3c39cdec1e00/t/5ab356be8a922d5e4a011975/1521702598495/JRP+Final+Copy+21-3.pdf.

unemployment, education, and the depletion of Jordan’s water resources. From an international standpoint, the UNHCR and other global entities are making efforts to improve the situation. Jordan’s role in the Syrian refugee crisis affects a large portion of the world’s population and Jordanian inhabitants’ quality of life. Therefore, it is important to explore the steps Jordan has both taken and not taken to improve the refugee situation.

Section 1.1: Background

Crown Prince Talal of Jordan assumed the throne September 6, 1951, the same year as the 1951 Geneva Conference. Less than a year later, he had to step down due to health issues. During his reign, King Talal began developing a “new, liberalized”\(^\text{12}\) constitution, which prevented his son, Hussein, from becoming the next king until he turned eighteen. The Regency Council took care of Hussein's kingly duties until May 2, 1953, when Hussein was crowned king of Jordan.\(^\text{13}\)

During the following decade, Jordan’s economy grew at a high rate due to its successful construction industry. Educated Jordanians continued to make improvements to the country, which, in turn, strengthened Jordan’s economic and political stability; however, Jordan regressed after the 1967 War, involving Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan.\(^\text{14}\) While Jordan was not directly involved in the war itself, it still faced repercussions from it, as over 300,000 Palestinians sought refuge in Jordan.\(^\text{15}\) Most of these Palestinians were able to gain full Jordanian citizenship.\(^\text{16}\)


\(^{13}\) Ibid.


Following the war, between 1970 and 1971, the Jordanian government began to create domestic policies that focused on “promoting national unity among the Jordanian population.”\(^{17}\) The policies also centered around national security. Slowly throughout the seventies, Jordan’s economy and political stability began to improve,\(^ {18}\) and in 1986, King Hussein cut ties with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).\(^ {19}\) At this time, however, Jordan was referring to the Iraqi refugees as ‘visitors’, ‘irregular guests’, ‘Arab brothers’ or ‘guests.’\(^ {20}\)

On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. Due to Jordan’s proximity, they received about 300,000 refugees from the Gulf who remained in Jordan. This dramatic increase in Jordan’s population resulted in a threat to Jordan’s water, infrastructure and led to a rise in poverty. Jordan’s unemployment rate reached thirty percent.\(^ {21}\)

**Section 1.2: Jordan’s Relationship with the UNHCR**

Jordan has provided asylum and structure for refugees while partnering with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). While helping others, Jordan has experienced some considerable pressure on their resources, economy, and security due to the high concentration of refugees. The UNHCR began its partnership with Jordan in the early 1990s as a result of the first Gulf War. Subsequently, between 2003 and 2011, thousands of refugees fled to Jordan,\(^ {22}\) due to the United States occupation and invasion of

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\(^ {17}\) Ibid.
\(^ {18}\) Ibid.
Iraq. President Obama called for the removal of the last 39,000 U.S. troops from Iraq in 2011, and, as a result of this removal, the UNHCR devoted most of their resources to assisting these refugees.

The UNHCR has three operating offices in Jordan. Located in Amman, Irbid, and Mafraq, they partner with several different agencies to aid refugees. These agencies include other UN agencies, international and national NGOs, and community-based organizations. The UNHCR also co-chairs many groups regarding refugees and assists the Syrian Refugee Affairs Directorate (SRAD) which organizes the Zaatari and Azraq camps and makes sure they meet “international human standards and protection principles.” Figure 1 displays the location of refugees registered with the UNHCR Jordan as of 2015.

25 Ibid.
26 Jordan Fact Sheet. PDF. UNHCR
Note: These groups include Basic Needs Working Group, the Protection Working Group, and the Shelter Working Group with NRC; the associated Child Protection Working Group with UNICEF; the Sexual and Gender Based Violence Working Group with UNFPA; and the Livelihoods Working Group with DRC.
27 Ibid.
The Jordanian government does not distinguish between refugees and non refugees in their Law No. 24 of 1973 concerning Residency and Foreigners' Affairs. It is likely that Jordan relies heavily on the UNHCR to help them handle their refugee crisis, but this alliance discourages the Jordanian Government from creating an official policy to resolve the refugee crisis, because they are dependent on external aid.


1951 Convention hosted by the UNHCR in Geneva, Switzerland. The act defined a refugee as:

“...owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”

It continues to explain important issues, such as employment, housing, and documentation. The Act says that treatment in the workforce must be lawful, and one can be exempt from a country’s refugee employment laws if his or her spouse or child has residency in the country in which they live. Housing is up to the discretion of the respective country but must make the living conditions “as favourable as possible.” Finally, the act discusses refugees’ paperwork. The country of a lawful refugee’s residency should provide proper documentation if he or she wished to travel outside the country. Illegal immigrants would not receive punishment if they could provide a valid reason as to why they were not registered. Countries were also supposed to make the naturalization process as efficient as they could and could not expel a lawful refugee for reasons based on national security or public order. Jordan was not among the twenty eight countries that were represented at the 1951 Geneva Convention. As a result, Jordan sacrificed more aid from the global community.

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31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
Section 1.3: Methodology

I will use a qualitative approach to measure the drivers of Jordan’s refugee policy. I argue that the drivers of Jordan’s current refugee policies are Jordan’s ongoing water crisis, unemployment, and education, as well as external funding that comes from the heavy reliance on the UNHCR and allies, such as the United States and the United Kingdom. I classify drivers as the factors that contribute to Jordan’s attempts in creating policies for refugees due to hardships that both Jordanians and refugees face. Sub-questions will guide the research. For example, what are the benefits they receive once registering, and what is the Jordanian agency responsible for the refugee issue? How has Jordan’s approach to refugees evolved since the beginning of the Syrian conflict? I will also look at the pressures, both internal and external, that Jordan faces due to Syrian refugees to create a larger context.

As I searched for my data, common themes included the water crisis, unemployment, and education. I researched policies from the Jordanian government and organizations, such as the UNHCR, that Jordan has utilized since the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, which is where I found these common themes. Following this, I explored the struggles that inhabitants of Jordan face due to these struggles. Finally, I looked at the global community’s role in the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan to see how their aid influenced the Jordanian government’s decision on where to allocate their resources and whether or not to develop an appropriate policy.

Section 1.4: Review of the Literature

The review of the literature illustrates common themes throughout the sources, including Jordan’s lack of refugee policy and their need to be a part of an international
refugee agreement, such as the 1951 Geneva Convention. I argue that Jordan does not want to create a cohesive policy regarding the refugees they are hosting, because, Jordan does not want to officially declare these displaced persons as refugees, because of the tensions and responsibilities that pair with this title. Furthermore, Jordan does not want this to be a national issue, rather one of the global community.

“Migrants, Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Jordan, 2017” by Jussi Jauhiainen and Ekaterina Vorobeva conducted a study about the lives of Syrian refugees in Jordan. In the article, the authors discuss addresses the fact that the closest Jordan has to a legal refugee framework is the 1998 Memorandum of Understanding with the UNHCR. This MOU aligns with “major principles of international protection, including the definition of a refugee and the principle of non-refoulement.” It then proceeds to explain that the future of refugees is uncertain; therefore, this MOU can only cover what is known. Many asylum seekers go to a bordering country and wait until it is safe to return home. This, however, could turn into months or years. Others may stop in several countries along the way to their destination, but circumstances, such as encounters with authorities or criminals, may prevent these asylum seeker from getting to their safe haven. In the European Union, a migrant application can only be processed in one country. This creates issues for those trying to move to multiple countries before reaching their destination, because these asylum seekers could risk getting deported if caught traveling illegally. In Jordan, all refugee matters are handled nationally, because Jordan was not a signatory to the 1951 Geneva

This article is about a study that explores the difficulties of internationally displaced persons (IDPs) migrating from their homes. The authors write about how “irregular immigration involves interactions and clashes among globalization forces, political strategies, internal interests, humanitarian values, border nostalgia as well as the aspirations, interests and needs of the people involved,” and that the IDPs seeking asylum make the situation much more complex.
Convention.\textsuperscript{34} While the EU’s model is flawed due to asylum seekers’ troubles, Jordan could benefit from a type of framework regarding refugees that could help regulate the refugee conditions in Jordan. This article highlights the fact that Jordan does not create their own national policies and rather leans on the aid of international bodies, such as the UNHCR and the EU. This leads me to believe that Jordan wants to make this issue international, instead of just Jordan’s own problem.

Bruce Collet wrote an article about Jordanian policies related to Iraqi refugees called “Refugee Policy in Jordan and Iraqi Refugee Access to Jordanian Schools.” Collet argues that due to the Jordanian policy, revolving around the education of Iraqi refugee children, they would be less likely to benefit from their limited schooling opportunities. This policy allowed all Iraqi children to attend public school. This did not help much, though, as no child was allowed to return to school if he or she had not attended within the past three years. In 2007, the UNHCR and UNICEF created a Joint Appeal to Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan.\textsuperscript{35} As the previous article states, Jordan has no formal refugee policy and they tend to rely on foreign aid. This article continues to support my argument of Jordan’s push to make this a global crisis.

In 2013, Jordan attempted furthering their assistance to Iraqi refugees. Irene Gibson wrote “An analysis of Jordan’s 2013 policy regarding Iraqi refugees” to focus on these policies. At the time, Jordan was paying about one billion USD per year for Iraqi refugees. Gibson notes that the Jordanian government was concerned with the fact that there were

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{35} Collet, Bruce. “Refugee Policy in Jordan and Iraqi Refugee Access to Jordanian Schools.” World Studies in Education, vol. 11, no. 1, 2010, pp. 21–36., doi:10.7459/wse/11.1.04. This Joint Appeal was supposed to give aid to the Ministry of Education in order to expand education so as many Iraqi refugees as possible could join.
already Palestinian refugees who would not be returning to their home anytime soon, as this issue is similar to Jordan’s Syrian refugees. Jordan had also begun housing Syrian refugees just two years prior. Iraqi refugees were living in poverty, many were working illegally, and only 29 percent of Iraqi refugee children registered with the UNHCR were enrolled in school.36 Gibson makes it apparent the Iraqis struggled in Jordanian society but fails to give an explanation as to why Jordan could not have been more prepared for their third major wave of refugees. Because of both Palestinian and Iraqi refugees living in Jordan for an extended period of time, one might think that the Jordanian government refuses to officially declare the Iraqis as refugees in their country, along with the Syrian refugees.

In “The Global Refugee Crisis: Regional Destabilization and Humanitarian Protection,” Sarah Kenyon Lischer writes about the risks refugees pose to the stabilization of the host country’s government. She uses Palestinian refugees and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as an example. She explains that the Palestinian displacement has created problems for over sixty years.37 It could be expected that the government would be more proactive in ensuring refugees would not be able to destabilize the government. The rest of the world sees this need for help that Jordan has and provides as much aid as possible. If Jordan had a way of ensuring the security of the country due to refugees, then the global community may not give as much assistance to Jordan and the refugees living there.

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When the PLO emerged, it was primarily located in Jordan. There were 5,000 full-time fighters and 25,000 part-time fighters. They nearly overthrew King Hussein’s government, so the PLO was forced to move to Lebanon.
In an article by Scott Harding and Kathryn Libal called “Iraqi refugees and the humanitarian costs of the Iraq war: What role for social work?” the two authors explore social work provided by the host countries to the displaced Iraqis, Jordan and Syria. They explain that there is not much research on social policy and that there are two main problems regarding social work. As the lack of refugee policy in Jordan is the basis of my study, this article furthers my point. It also mentions that Jordan has teamed up with NGOs and other organizations to create formal and nonformal education for Iraqi refugee children. If Jordan has faced this problem before, then why do they currently struggle with the education of Syrian refugee children? Why do they not have a policy in place due to past experiences? This is important to address, because Jordan has faced similar issues without a cohesive policy and furthers my argument of Jordan being discouraged to do so.

Another article that is congruent with the one above is “The Need for Political Competence Social Work Practice: Lessons Learned from a Collaborative Project on Iraqi Refugees— the Case of Jordan” by Sahar Al-Makhamreh, Stefanos Spaneas, and Gregory Neocleous. These three authors conducted a study to analyze the conditions of social work with Iraqi refugees, and they discuss the need of public awareness in order to create more policies to improve the social work environment. The article also mentions some educational issues Iraqi refugee children faced initially. These children were not allowed to attend public Jordanian schools until the fall of 2007. While this article does not

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First, there is a lack of policies that involve refugees and forced migrants. Second, the Global North does not provide an adequate amount of social work to these people with policies or direct services.
39 Ibid.
directly explain the drivers I study, as it focuses mainly on social work, it raises similar questions as Harding’s and Libal’s article, regarding Jordan’s lack of preparation upon refugees’ arrival. Perhaps if Jordan had taken more action involving children and their futures, the current education policies for Syrian refugees would be significantly more effective.

“Once Resolved, Stay Resolved? The Refuge Policy of Jordan toward Palestinian Refugees” by Changrok Soh, Yoonjeong You, and Youngsoo Yu analyzes Jordanian policies surrounding Palestinian refugees and how these policies have affected their ability to adapt to Jordanian society.41 If the Jordanian government knew that the Palestinian refugees would be staying for an extended period of time, this raises questions as to why the government did not create policies to help them integrate into Jordanian society more easily. This further my argument of Jordan’s need to ensure the refugee crises remain internationalized; however, if policies involving accessible work permits had been introduced, then maybe the Palestinian refugees could have contributed more to Jordan’s economy by reducing the unemployment rate.

Brittan J. Bush proposed a framework for environmental refugees in 2013 at the Environmental Refugee Convention. Bush says that the priority is ensuring refugees have protection. Therefore, countries should provide full citizenship with complete political

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The authors claim that it is debatable whether or not Jordan has an assimilative policy and write that the four stages of adaptation are assimilating, integration, separation, then marginalization. Because Jordan was not a part of the 1951 Geneva Convention, Jordan has no legal obligation to protect these refugees; however, its constitution prohibits discrimination.
rights and civil liberties. If for some reason a country can only offer temporary citizenship, environmental refugees should still have civil liberties. Bush also argues that these refugees need more humanitarian aid. Host countries should provide social initiatives to help integrate society and gainful employment. While these are important steps in reducing the risk of conflict between refugees and their hosts, this framework seems to be too idealistic. Bush should suggest some initiatives to instigate this integration of refugees into society. He also suggests that a host country should meet the educational needs of refugee children but fails to explain how. While this framework is good in theory, it cannot work without being more specific about the initiatives that need to be taken.42

Another framework worth noting is the European refugee crisis legal framework called the Common European Asylum System in 1999. For this to be successfully implemented, it had to align with the European Union’s laws regarding refugees and remain consistent with the Hague Programme’s uniform status system. Various EU acts were also adopted, including ones to speed up the asylum application process and inform refugees about health care. In 2007, this became the Policy Plan on Asylum, which stood on three platforms. First, the Policy Plan had to align with EU members’ legislations. Second, there needed to be cooperation among the involved parties. Finally, a sense of moral responsibility to refugees between EU and non EU members was important. Potential issues with this model, however, include the different interpretations of this legislation among EU countries. Also, like the previous framework mentioned, this does not discuss the ways to accomplish the three pillars upon which this plan is built.43

42 Brittan J. Bush, "Redefining Environmental Refugees," Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 27, no. 3 (Spring 2013): 553-578
Section 1.5: Conclusion

Jordan serves an important role vis-à-vis refugees in surrounding nations. These refugees in Jordan have directly affected their resources, such as water, education and its economy through the labor market. Refugees have also shaped Jordan’s relationship with nearby countries. Jordan is heavily influenced both domestically and internationally through the refugees that enter the state. Therefore, it is crucial to examine other legal frameworks and theories involving humanitarian aid to develop an efficient plan when dealing with Syrian refugees and explore why measure have not been taken since 1973 to create a legal framework for refugees.

In my next chapter, I will analyze the refugee registration process and the evolution of Jordan’s refugee policies since 1973, since that is when the most recent law regarding migration was created. Chapter three will explore the internal pressures due to refugees, including issues revolving around education, the water crisis, and unemployment. In my fourth chapter, I will examine external pressures, such as those revolving around the Jordanian-Syrian border. I argue that the internal pressures are the main drivers of Syrian refugee policy, but that external pressures exacerbate internal pressures.
Chapter Two: Jordan’s Refugee Policies

In this chapter, I explain the evolution of Jordan’s refugee policies from their Residence and Foreigners’ Affairs Law no. 24 of 1973 to the Jordan Compact of 2016 and the Jordan Response Plan of 2018. These three documents are significant, because the first one, Law No. 24, is the original outline of Jordan’s regulations with foreigners. The law makes only a few references to refugees; nonetheless, it is important for comparison and analysis with the subsequent documents. Law No. 24 mentions the Directorate throughout, referring to the Public Security Directorate, which manages the law and order of those living in Jordan.44

The Jordan Compact is notable, because it was the London Conference’s first attempt to create an effective policy for refugees. While has not been very successful in relation to the work sector, it is crucial to read alongside the most recent attempt at creating a structure for refugees in Jordan, the Jordan Response Plan (JRP) to understand what went wrong and how the JRP can be more effective. The JRP is supposed to last from 2018 to 2020 with long-term goals.45 Therefore, we cannot know its outcome yet. Nevertheless, it is crucial that I explore the differences between the two documents and why the Jordan Response Plan may be more effective than the original Jordan Compact. By gaining an understanding of these documents, it then makes it possible to see what aspects of Jordanian life are most affected by refugees and where Jordan seeks the most improvement.

45 Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 2018-2020. static1.squarespace.com/static/522c2552e4b0d3c9c39ced1e00/t/5ab356be8a922d5e4a011975/1521702598495/JRP+Final+Copy+21-3.pdf.
With this knowledge, I am able to decipher the internal pressures of Jordan’s refugee policy. A definitive timeline of these policies is located in the appendix.

**Section 2.1: Residence and Foreigners’ Affairs Law No. 24 of 1973**

Jordan’s migrant laws and registration process are defined in their Residence and Foreigners’ Affairs Law No. 24 of 1973. Articles 4 through 10 discuss foreigners’ entry into Jordan with Article 4 discussing proper travel documentation and exemptions. According to this article, any foreigner may enter or leave Jordan with either a valid passport or a travel document issued by his country. These travel documents include laissez-passers, which can be issued by the United Nations to its officials or by States to Stateless persons or refugees living in said State.46

Article 5 says that a foreigner may enter or leave by land, air, or water, at any Jordanian checkpoint. If unable to move through a checkpoint, for such reasons including the occurrence of a forced landing, Article 6 explains that a foreigner must then register at the nearest branch office of the Directorate or at a security post within 48 hours of entering Jordan.47

Following the law’s discussion of entry, it spells out the registration process in Chapter 2, Articles 11 through 17. Article 11 says that foreigners must report in person to the Directorate or the local police station within three days of his arrival to declare his personal status and reasons for being in the country, providing appropriate documentation unless he has a transit visa, pilgrimage visa, or tourist visa. If a foreigner moves to another area in the country, Article 12 explains that he must give prior notice with his new address

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47 Ibid.
to the Directorate then notify the new directorate branch within forty eight hours of moving. This does not apply to foreigners with a tourist or transit visa.\textsuperscript{48}

Article 15 explains that a foreigner has to submit his passport or the equivalent documents to the Ministry upon his arrival, and if something happens to his documents, such as loss or damage, he must report to the Directorate or a police station. Article 16 talks about the employment of foreigners. One cannot employ a foreigner unless the foreigner has a permit of residency. This does not apply to experts hired for a certain purpose if their stay does not last more than three months. If one does employ a foreigner, the Directorate must be notified within forty eight hours of hiring and firing said foreigner. Finally, Article 17 says that other Jordanian departments must notify the Directorate of anything regarding foreigners in Jordan.\textsuperscript{49} I argue that border security affects Jordan’s economy and its issue of unemployment. The amount of security upon entering the country serves the purpose of explaining why so many refugees entered Jordan and why the border was eventually closed.

\textbf{Section 2.2: The Jordan Compact: A Work in Progress}

While documents to improve working conditions for foreigners had been developed in Jordan,\textsuperscript{50} the next document to be created regarding education for refugees in Jordan, the Jordan Compact, followed thirty three years later,\textsuperscript{51} which exemplifies Jordan’s long-term participation in providing refuge to those who seek it. The Jordan Compact was signed

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.
at the London Conference in 2016 by the United Nations, the United Kingdom, Germany, Kuwait, and Norway. The purpose of the Compact was to combine international humanitarian funding with development funding through grants and loans. Jordan was to initiate reforms in order to improve the business sector for Syrian refugees. It pledges jobs to refugees in Special Economic Zones (SEZs) along with the right to work in specific sectors. The Compact also required Jordan to provide schooling for all Syrian children and vocational training opportunities. This was to happen by the 2016-2017 school year, and 102 double-shift schools would be opened.\textsuperscript{52}

Two years into the Jordan Compact, not much improvement to sectors, such as employment and healthcare, have been made. The NGO Refugees International (RI) conducted a study revealing that 106,000 work permits had been issued by June 2018. Notably, only four percent of those went to females, who consist of half of Jordan’s refugee population. Furthermore, many UN agencies, including the UNHCR, have been pulling back, because they lack adequate funding to support the compact. This has resulted in worse conditions for Syrian refugees living in Jordan. The cost of rent is high, there is a lack of public transportation, and health care subsidies have been cut.\textsuperscript{53}

These expenses are exacerbated through foreigners’ low pay. The monthly minimum wage for a foreigner is 150 Jordanian dinars (JOD), and for a Jordanian it is 220 JOD. Rent for the average refugee is between 100 JOD and 250 JOD a month. In an interview with RI, Manal, a Syrian refugee living in Jerash said that they often “prioritize paying rent over food.”\textsuperscript{54} Another family discussed their financial issues due to a lack of

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
public transportation. The mother, Miriam, said that her son who makes 300 JOD a month, spends 100 JOD on transportation weekly. She makes 250 JOD a month and spends 70 JOD a week on transportation. In February 2018, the Jordanian government cut Syrian refugee health subsidies from 80 percent to 20 percent of their costs. Before the cut, it cost refugees the same as an uninsured Jordanian to go to the doctor. Now, the price is exorbitant. As a result, many refugees avoid going to the doctor altogether. These three issues addressed in this study by RI have put many Syrian refugees in serious financial binds.\(^{55}\)

Though the Jordan Compact addresses more refugees joining the formal working sector, those interviewed by RI says otherwise. The legal framework that allows refugees to work is very restrictive. Non-citizens cannot be doctors, engineers, teachers, accountants, hairdressers, and decorators, electricians, or car mechanics, among other professions; however, a non-Jordanian can become one of these if there is no Jordanian qualified or willing to fulfill the position.\(^{56}\) Due to these restrictions on job opportunities for non-citizens, it is very difficult for Syrians to find employment in the private sector. While the Jordan Compact pledged to provide 200,000 job opportunities to Syrian refugees, in January 2018, more than half of the 104,000 work permits issued were to work in construction. A quarter of those were issued to sectors of agriculture, fishing, and forestry. These 104,000 issued work permits also include the renewals of existing permits, meaning that many of these permits are not those of refugees. According to the UNHCR, as of June 2018, less than 50,000 refugees had work permits. A UN official said to RI, “the

\(^{55}\) Ibid.
\(^{56}\) Ibid.
number of work permits don’t [sic] say much. The number of documents being issued, they’re supporting mobility and protection, they don’t support work opportunities.”

The Jordan Compact said that the SEZs would employ at least fifteen percent of Syrian refugees to work in factories, but only five percent of these refugees have work permits to do so. These SEZs are typically located far away from urban areas where the Syrian refugees live. The commute is long and generally expensive. Conversely, Jordan issued flexible work permits in agriculture and construction that were transferable among employers in the same sector. While these flexible work permits provided assistance with Syrian refugees obtaining jobs in the formal work sector, the other areas need to improve in order for successful change.

The majority of refugees work in the informal sector. These jobs are mainly manual labor with low pay. Refugees typically suffer through the conditions of these jobs, because they are desperate for work to pay bills and sustain life. Many refuse to work in the informal sector, however, in fear of being caught and being sent to live in a refugee camp and having to pay a fine between 200 JOD and 500 JOD, which many could not afford.

Many Syrian refugees, especially women, wish to work in Home Based Businesses (HBBs), such as making clothes, but cannot do so, due to restrictions put in place by the Jordanian government. As of early 2018, HBB employment is only possible with a Jordanian business partner. This makes having a HBB very difficult, as there are reservations on both sides. In an interview with Refugees International, one woman said that the Jordanian partner would likely have more power in the partnership and make the

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57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
final decisions. Jordanians are also hesitant, because they fear their counterpart will have to leave for various reasons. One Syrian refugee women interviewed, Lara Shaheen, experienced her Jordanian business partner take all of their assets and leave Amman. “I had no documents. Nothing was in my name,” she said.\(^{60}\)

While the Jordan Compact made strides to improve life for Syrian refugees living in Jordan, it missed the mark in several areas. The policy’s approach to obtaining a working permit was flawed, as refugees continued to struggle getting one. Even when having a permit, refugees had difficulty in finding a job that paid enough to provide for his or her family. The Jordan Compact does, however, continue to assist with refugees.

A report by the Global Center for Development was released in March of 2019 acknowledging its progress over the past three years while offering critiques. Many host countries modeled their compacts after the Jordan Compact. While the Compact is flawed, adjustments have been made. Initially, the Jordanian government was attempting to hand out as many work permits possible, neglecting to address the necessities of Jordan’s inhabitants and the various work sectors. Now, the developers of the Compact along with the Jordanian government are expanding work sub-sectors for Syrian refugees and have created a committee to “consider opening other sectors to Syrians.”\(^{61}\) Also, the EU and the Jordanian government recently decided to allow Syrian refugees to work outside of SEZs once Jordan has granted over 600,000 work permits. While this has not yet occurred, this could open new opportunities for Syrian refugees to gain employment.\(^{62}\)

\(^{60}\) Ibid.


\(^{62}\) Ibid.
Section 2.3: The Jordan Response Plan: Why it could be more successful than the Jordan Compact

Following the Jordan Compact, the Jordan Response Plan (JRP) was created. The JRP is a three-year plan that focuses on the livelihood and education of Syrian refugees. It looks at the refugees’ future in Jordan and their long-term goals. In order for this to be possible, the JRP is to be revised annually. Jordanian government officials, development partners, UN agencies, and International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGO) contributed to the document. Twelve sectors are included: education, energy, environment, food, security, shelter, social protection, health, justice, livelihoods, municipal services, transportation, and wash. For the sake of this study, I will primarily focus on the education, livelihoods, and WASH (water, sanitation, and hygiene) sectors, because they involve the main drivers of Jordanian refugee policy, education, unemployment, and the water crisis.

Some of the JRP’s objectives include improving Jordan’s infrastructure, the education of Syrian refugee children, the working environment for both Syrian refugees and Jordanians, the economy due to results of the Syrian refugees, and Jordan’s environment. In the education sector, the JRP’s main goal is “to ensure sustained quality educational services for children and youth impacted by the Syria crisis.” Other priorities include providing support for the expenses of transportation and learning materials, making attempts to engage and integrate Syrian refugee and Jordanian youth, making tutoring available, providing more access to Early Childhood Education (EDE), creating

63 Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 2018-2020. static1.squarespace.com/static/522c2552e4b0d3c39cccde1e00/t/5ab356be8a922d5e4a011975/1521702598495/JRP+Final+Copy+21-3.pdf.

64 Ibid.
opportunities for children with disabilities, building new schools and renovating old ones, improving the quality of teachers, providing higher education, and improving the Ministry of Education, National Technical Vocational Education and Training (TVET), and higher education institutions to integrate Syrian refugees with Jordanians.\textsuperscript{65}

The livelihood sector’s overall objective is “to ensure dignified, sustainable livelihoods, gender equity, and the creation of economic opportunities for Jordanians in host communities and Syrian refugees, as well as strengthened institutional capacity.”\textsuperscript{66} Specifically, their goals are to increase employment opportunities to those who live in refugee camps and to help with the transition of short-term income to more sustainable employment. It also looks to create more access to formal employment with decent work and protection standards. This sector aims to improve the regulatory environment for small enterprises and have inclusive programs that promote their creation. They also wish to design interventions congruent with the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda with an emphasis on Sustainable Development Goals Five and Eight,\textsuperscript{67} a plan involving all UN members to promote peace and prosperity in developing countries.\textsuperscript{68} Finally, the livelihood sector will attempt to increase the engagement of Syrian refugee and Jordanian actors in the private sector.\textsuperscript{69}

Lastly, the WASH sector primary focus is “to ensure the safe mobility of people and goods in the areas affected by the Syria crisis through upgraded and efficient public

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{69} Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 2018-2020. static1.squarespace.com/static/522c2552e4b0d3c39c33c1d1e00/t/5ab356be8a922d5e4a011975/1521702598495/JRP+Final+Copy+21-3.pdf.
transportation services and road network.”

More specifically, through this sector, the JRP wishes to improve and increase sanitation services and provide safe water for refugee camps and host communities. They also aim to establish gender appropriate sanitation, especially in Za’atari, Azraq, and King Abdullah Park refugee camps. Furthermore, the WASH sector wishes to improve overall environmental health as a result of the goals listed above.

Section 2.4: Analysis and Discussion

As I mentioned in my methodology section, my central research question is: What are the drivers of Jordanian refugee policy? I then ask the following sub-questions to guide my research, “Is it different at the border as opposed to in the airport?” and “Can a Syrian register as a refugee in Jordan without registering as a refugee with the UNHCR?” in order to assess the on-the-ground practical registration of refugees versus the stated laws and documented policies. Regarding the first sub question, the answer is no. Article 5 of Law No. 24 of 1973 concerning Refugees and Foreign Affairs states:

“A Foreigner may lawfully enter or leave the Kingdom by land, by sea or by air, provided that he does so via the Jordanian border checkpoints or ports or airports designated for this purpose and that a border official stamps his passport or equivalent document.”

Therefore, Jordan does have security checkpoints at all the places where refugees could potentially enter the country. This informs us that the issue in its refugee policy does not lie here, which is important to discern in order to eliminate what is insignificant and focus on the possibilities that could potentially contribute to the internal pressures.

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70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
Addressing my second question, Law No. 24 of 1973 does not mention the UNHCR or any other foreign entity and their help with refugees in Jordan. It articulates in Article 10 simply:

“The Minister shall, on a proposal by the Director, specify by decree the forms and particulars of travel documents granted to certain categories of foreigners, refugees and emigrants, and the conditions and procedures for granting them.”

Unlike my first sub question, the lack of referral to outside aid for refugees in Jordan raises doubts in their policy. If there is so much assistance from the UNHCR and other organizations, why has this policy not been updated to address how they help Jordan deal with foreigners and, specifically, refugees? The government must be hesitant to define such a large multitude of people as refugees, since Jordan would then have certain responsibilities that they did not have before. Jordan would be required to provide benefits, such as healthcare, that they could possibly be unable to afford.

Furthermore, this hesitation to declare people as refugees is implied in Article 10, Section 4: “However, the validity of the latter documents shall be recognized only if they bear a visa entitling the holder to return to the issuing country.” By requiring one to have the ability to return to his native country before entering Jordan reveals that they might have known they did not have the capacity to house large numbers of refugees. Jordan would be required to sacrifice more of their resources if they had a clear policy that established refugee status. Perhaps the government suspected the possibility of people in surrounding nations seeking refuge in Jordan at the time of its writing.

All foreigners are subject to Law No. 24 of 1973, which does not distinguish refugees from non refugees. Article 2 simply equates people without Jordanian nationality

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73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
to be foreigners. Article 4 briefly mentions refugees, just saying that travel permits are considered valid documentation when entering Jordan. This article seems to leave the process of crossing the border into Jordan as very haphazard, especially when referring to refugees. Without stringent regulations, virtually anyone can simply go to Jordan; however Article 10 quickly addresses refugees entering the country. The Ministry of Interior can manage travel documentation given to refugees in Jordan, but there is a lack of regulation concerning the conditions under which refugees can enter. With refugees come responsibilities from the government. Without proper regulations and everything left to the discretion of the Ministry of Interior, the movement of refugees into Jordan is left very unorganized; therefore the Jordanian government does not have those obligations.

The Jordan Compact had some fundamental issues, as well. The compact was created hastily which led to problems that later proved to be inexcusable. Many of the parties involved were through “personal relationships, friendship and trust between the main participants”75 that may not have necessarily been the best options, such as including the UN. They had the advantage of getting officials to approve of the document, because of personal ties, though it may not have been in the best interest of the Jordan Compact to have the finished product done quickly. Furthermore, many parties were not included that could have been crucial to making the Jordan Compact successful. Refugee representatives, civil society, the private sector, and trade unions were not consulted. The UNHCR was not included until the end. Other than the UNHCR’s modest participation, the UN was not involved in the creation of the Jordan Compact. The UN’s inclusion in the creation of the

Jordan Compact could have prolonged its publication, making it a more thorough document. Had the UN participated, perhaps the Jordan Compact would have been more successful.

It is also worth noting that King Abdullah of Jordan was approached about the compact, rather than the king seeking for assistance. This raises numerous questions as to why the king was not actively seeking a drastic policy change to address the refugee crisis and questions as of why the status of refugees or the registration process was not at all mentioned. As I suggested when discussing Law No. 24, this could be congruent with the fact that Jordan does not wish to declare such a large number of people as refugees. If Jordan were to do so, then they would have formal obligations to the refugees, while Jordan does not at the moment.

The Refugees International study stated: “The World Bank has identified facilitating home based-businesses as a central avenue for providing Jordanian and Syrian women with livelihood opportunities.”76 If this is being observed by other global entities, why were issues regarding HBBs not addressed in the Jordan Compact? Had it not been so quickly developed, maybe the document could have been more efficient and beneficial to the livelihoods of Syrian refugees.

Conversely, the issue of strict regulations on small enterprises is a focal point in the JRP. Unlike the Jordan Compact, the JRP appears to be very methodical and strategic in the ways it is planned to be carried out. As opposed to the Jordan Compact’s lack of a clear budget, the JRP’s budget is cast at 7.3 billion USD over a period of three years from various

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countries and global entities. Furthermore, each year has its own budget with a specific plan. To hold Jordan accountable, their government plans to post regular financial updates.

As thorough as the JRP is, like the Jordan Compact, it, too, does not address refugee status or the registration process. My analysis above applies here, as the refugee crisis is vast and unprecedented, perhaps Jordan must prioritize issues on which they focus. The crisis is unprecedented due to the constant flow of refugees into the country with no one leaving. This document also calls for the creation of initiatives to integrate Syrian refugees and Jordanians in order to create a more holistic society. While this is ideal, the JRP does not articulate how it wishes to carry out this plan. Because the JRP is still in its first year of implementation, we will not yet know its outcome or the aspect that are directly affecting the Syrian refugee population of Jordan.
Chapter Three: Jordan’s Internal Pressures

Jordan is burdened with a great amount of pressure due to the high concentration of Syrian refugees in their small but densely populated country. Three important internal domestic issues addressed in the documents regarding Syrian refugees articulated in the previous chapter are their ongoing water crisis, unemployment, and education. When examining the areas of focus of these documents discussed in Chapter 2, one can determine Jordan’s internal pressures. These are prominent policies have shaped the way Jordan has handled refugees. This chapter analyzes the internal pressures in Jordan received due to the Syrian refugees. I argue that the issues discussed in chapter three revolving around the internal pressures are the primary drivers of Jordanian refugee policy, because of their direct impact of Jordan’s stability and society.

At the UN General Assembly in 2013, King Abdullah said, “My friends, the Syrian people must also have a future.”77 The king addressed the fact that the number of Syrian refugees in Jordan is rapidly increasing, and that the inhabitants of Jordan are in need of food, water, shelter, sanitation, electricity, healthcare, and more. He proceeded to explain that Jordan has a small economy and is the fourth poorest water country in the world.78

Queen Rania of Jordan furthers King Abdullah’s point by explaining the need for better education in Jordan. The Queen said, “Education is not a luxury; it is a lifeline. It is not a privilege; it is a priority. And it is our best chance at peace, especially in times of conflicts and crises. That’s why education cannot wait, why it shouldn’t wait.”79 Double-

78 Ibid.
shift schools have been created, which allow Jordanian students to attend during the morning shift from 8:00am to 12:00pm and Syrian refugee children to attend the evening shift from 12:30pm to 4:00pm.\footnote{Ibid.}

These issues the King and Queen of Jordan address are why that water, unemployment, and education, are Jordan’s main drivers of Jordanian refugee policy. In Section 3.2, I refer to the Labour Directorate which oversees all labor affairs that take place in Jordan.\footnote{“Ministry of Labor.” jordan.gov.jo/wps/portal/Home/GovernmentEntities/Ministries/Ministry/Ministry%20of%20Labor?nameE nntity=Ministry%20of%20Labor&entityType=ministry&lang=en&isFromLangChange=yes.} In this section, I also briefly mention the Social Security Corporation, “an independent administrative and financial organization.”\footnote{Royal Patronage and Support. Social Security Corporation , 2014, www.ssc.gov.jo/English/P}

Section 3.1: The Ongoing Water Crisis and Syrian Refugees’ Effect on it

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{annual_precipitation.png}
\caption{Annual Precipitation (IN MM)}
\end{figure}
Jordan is the fourth most water scarce country in the world, and refugees have put a great deal of pressure on their ongoing water crisis. This stress in Jordan is important to address, because the reactions to keep the country stable from Jordan’s inhabitants have an effect on its refugees. Many Syrian refugees live in urban areas, which directly affects infrastructure, services, and the economy. Figure 2 displays the amount of rainfall in Israel and Jordan. As the map depicts, most of the rainfall is not located in Jordan. This lack of rainfall is significant, because it shows that Jordan already struggles with accessible water. In an article about Jordan’s current water crises, the author Anne Marie Baylouny discusses how Syrian refugees have exacerbated this issue. In 2013, Mafraq, a Jordanian city with a very high concentration of Syrian refugees, ran out of water. King Abdullah II traveled there and promised the city additional water pipes.

The difference between these current refugees as opposed to refugees that came before is that eighty five percent of these Syrians have settled outside of refugee camps. In the camps, water is regulated, where as it is more difficult to do so in a space that is not controlled. Before Syrians arrived in Jordan, water was expected to last until 2060. Now, the water supply probably will not last until 2030. Jordanian citizens have grown unhappy with the refugees and blame them for worsening the water shortage. Baylouny argues that the discontent between the two groups increases the risk of conflict.

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87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
Additionally, the demand for water has increased by 22 percent, and the total budget for water is 360 million JOD per year as a result of Jordan's high concentration of Syrian refugees.\textsuperscript{89} While previous years of budget information would assist in contextualizing this, the data was unavailable. On average, daily consumption per person is eighty liters of water. Now, those living in Jordan are receiving less than thirty liters a day. Many Syrian refugee families sent their male children to nearby mosques with empty buckets to beg for water.\textsuperscript{90} Syrians have had to learn to conserve their water, because their previous home did not have a shortage of water the way Jordan does. Jordanians have been rationing their water since the 1980s and have learned how to reuse their water multiple times: wash clothes then use the same water to wash the floors and, finally, use it to water the plants.\textsuperscript{91} Water is crucial to sustain life; therefore, it must be a priority to have it regulated in order for it to last as long as possible.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the Jordan Response Plan addresses combating Jordan’s water crisis in regards to Syrian refugees. Because Jordan knows the weight of the crisis and its effect on the population of Jordan, it is likely that their understanding of the devastating statistics of water availability in Jordan served as a catalyst for the JRP. The Jordan Compact, however, failed to undertake this crucial issue in Jordan. Perhaps this is because the Jordan Compact focuses more on the employment of refugees.

\textsuperscript{90} Ibid.
Section 3.2: Unemployment and its Role with the Jordanian Economy

Syrian refugees are not taking jobs from Jordanians. Rather, they are given the opportunity to work in certain fields only if there is no Jordanian who wishes to occupy the position. Only Jordanian citizens can work in many positions in the formal sector.92

In order for a Syrian refugee to acquire a permit, workers and their employers are required to provide a series of documents to the Labour Directorate: an application form, two copies of the work contract, a valid vocational license of the place of employment, a valid copy of the worker’s passport, proof of the worker’s subscription from the Social Security Corporation, and the Ministry of Interior’s identity card. If it is the worker’s first time applying for a work permit, his application is referred to a committee at the ministry for approval. The employer must pay for his worker’s permit, which typically costs between 170 and 370 JOD; however, in certain circumstances, they can reach up to 700 JOD. These work permits are valid for one year.93

In a case study conducted by the International Labour Organization (ILO), they interviewed a series of Syrian refugee workers. One, under the pseudonym “Ahmad,” said he experienced many difficulties obtaining a work permit. Ahmad traveled legally to Jordan with his wife and three kids in 2011. He worked in construction upon his arrival, but it took nearly five years to get his work permit. He explained: “After months of begging my employer to apply for my work permit, he finally agreed. When we first arrived at the

92 “Medical professions; engineering professions; administrative and accounting professions; clerical work including typing and secretarial work; switchboards, telephones and connections works; warehouses works; sales works, including all groups; haircutting works (coiffeur); decoration works; teaching professions, including all specialties except for the rare ones when there is no Jordanian available; fuel selling in main cities; electricity professions; mechanical and car repair professions; drivers; guards and servants; and buildings servants”
labour directorate, everyone was surprised to see a Syrian applying for a work permit. It was almost unheard of.”94 Even when he was able to get the permit, he experienced difficulties with the government:

“It took us six months of going back and forth to the labour directorate office to finally get the work permit. The process was complicated and there were no clear guidelines as to what was needed. But I have my work permit now and I hope this will help improve my situation.”95

This is one of the many examples of Syrian refugees having problems obtaining work permits to work legally. These issues affect both Syrian refugees and Jordanian citizens, which perpetuate Jordan’s high unemployment rate, influencing their economy as a whole. In turn, this causes tensions between the Jordanian government and Jordan’s inhabitants.

The University of Jordan conducted a survey in 2017 about Jordanians’ view of the current government. There were two samples: popular Jordan and opinion leaders. The popular Jordan sample consisted of 1944 people over the age of eighteen with an equal number of men and women. The sample size of the opinion leaders was 700. The poll inquired about issues including those of economic growth and unemployment. Of the popular Jordan sample, twenty six percent believed high prices to be Jordan’s most pressing issue. Twenty two percent said it is unemployment, nineteen percent voted poverty, and thirteen think it is the overall economy. In contrast, the opinion leaders believed that the overall economy was the key issue, followed by the unemployment at 16 percent, then poverty at 8 percent. Additionally, 57 percent said that their economic situations deteriorated in the past year, and forty three percent believe it will continue to worsen the following year. Fifty three percent believe that Jordan’s overall economic

94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
situation will decline in the coming year, as well. Jordanians’ perception of the economy can lead to negative sentiments towards its own government, leading to uncertainty and instability.

Another statistic included in the article that is worth noting is that sixty five percent of the participants in the study said that they believe the government should try to get Syrians refugees to return to their native country. This is poignant, because this survey is focused on issues of the economy; therefore, there could be a connection between these two points, though it this is not clearly stated in the article. This connection suggests that tensions between Jordanian citizens and Syrian refugees are present, which is exactly what the Jordanian government could be trying to avoid by not declaring the refugees.

Despite the negative opinions of Jordanian citizens and the employment of Syrian refugees, strides towards employing Syrian refugees has been made by the UNHCR. In 2017, they established the first employment center in Zaatari. Zaatari is the world’s largest refugee camp holding 780,000 people. The center planned to host job fairs. When the UNHCR set up a tent to promote these jobs fairs they would hold, 800 refugees expressed interest. This article says that the job center has potential to positively impact Jordan’s economy.

Unemployment has shown to be an enormous problem in Jordan. Jordan’s concerns about this driver, unemployment, led the government to create the Jordan Compact. While

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97 Ibid.
the Jordan Compact set ambitious goals to decrease the unemployment rate, it continued to increase. In the survey conducted by the University of Jordan mentioned in Section 3.2,

“...the main reasons [popular Jordan] cited to support their view were the repeated increase in prices and the rise of unemployment rate (29 percent) followed by the lack of noticeable achievements and reforms (18 percent) and the government’s inability to fight corruption (16 percent),”

Furthermore, the opinion leaders had other observations:

“[Opinion leaders] believe the government to have been inefficient, he said, pointing out that the lack of tangible reforms ranked first (29 percent), followed by the ‘poor’ performance of the premier and ministerial team (29 percent) and failure to address the economic challenges (17 percent).”

It is clear that Jordanians are fully aware of the unemployment issue in their country and understand the government’s efforts to create policies to improve the situation, yet the government’s struggle to actually implement the policies themselves. This affects the refugee population’s ability to immerse in Jordanian life and sustain livelihoods for themselves. The Jordan Compact proved to be insufficient, and Jordanians all seem to have a general idea as to why that is. Therefore, the JRP’s concise step by step plan is very clear and appears to leave less room for error, so perhaps it will be more successful than its predecessor, the Jordan Compact.

It is also worth noting that the title of the article addressed about the University of Jordan’s study is titled “Many Jordanians Blame Syrian Refugees for Jordan's Faltering Economy,” though it hardly mentions Syrian refugees. A connection between Syrian refugees and the Jordanian economy is not articulated in the article. The photo attached with the article is also not very relevant to the content: Two Jordanian police officers are

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100 Ibid.
holding Syrian children with the caption “In a new poll, 65 percent of Jordanian respondents believe that the government should encourage Syrian refugees to go back to their country.”\textsuperscript{101} The newspaper in which the article was published, \textit{Al-Bawaba}, could be attempting to make a statement on how they feel about the Syrian refugees in Jordan in order to receive a response from the government. By soliciting a reply, the government would be obligated to address the magnitude of refugees in Jordan; therefore, it is likely the government will remain silent and focus on implementing the policy already set in place.

Furthermore, in an article from \textit{The Jordan Times}, discussed a study conducted by the Centre for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan where they measured Jordanians’ and Syrian refugees’ perceptions of each other. According to the study, 49 percent of Jordanians felt as if refugees living outside of camps "highly threatens the security and stability of Jordan".\textsuperscript{102} 90 percent of those who reported opposite sentiments knew those Syrians before the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War. Before the war, 51 percent of Jordanians felt positively towards Syrians, but this number has now dropped to 27 percent. Finally, 77 percent of Jordanians said that “the refugee influx is increasing pressure on the economy and services provided by the government.”\textsuperscript{103}

These two surveys published in \textit{Al-Bawaba} and \textit{The Jordan Times} make it clear that many Jordanian have reservations about the high number of Syrian refugees living in Jordan. Jordanian citizens perceive that Syrian refugees play a role in their likelihood of

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}

Levingston38
being hired. Because of this threat that Jordanians feel towards Syrian refugees due to employment, tensions rise between the two groups of people.

Section 3.3: Education

Another source of tension in Jordan relating to refugees is education. The arrival of Syrian refugees in Jordan caused educational setbacks for all children living in Jordan. This was particularly frustrating for the Jordanian government due to the strides they were previously making in this sector. Over half of Jordan’s Syrian refugee population is under the age of eighteen, so education plays a significant role in their lives and has greatly impacted the Jordanian lives of those involved in the education sphere. The amount of students attending double-shift schools has increased from 7.6 percent in 2009 to 13.4 percent in 2014, and the Ministry of Education’s goal is to reduce this number.\(^\text{104}\) Double-shift schools divide their days into two class sessions in order to maximize the amount of students able to attend.\(^\text{105}\) Over half of the schools in Amman and Irbid have reached maximum capacity or are overpopulated. Furthermore, 61 percent of Jordanians reported that education is the culprit of much of the tension among communities.\(^\text{106}\)

The fact remains that many Syrian refugees struggle to have the opportunity to even attend school due to financial reasons. As discussed, these refugees have difficulties obtaining work permits, so families have trouble obtaining the funds for school related costs. Although most of these schools are public, the cost of transportation and books can


be very expensive. Therefore, many refugees prefer to homeschool their children, or they work to help support their families.\textsuperscript{107}

Even if they can attend school, Syrian refugee children tend to struggle academically for several reasons. First, the adjustment from Syrian to Jordanian schools is difficult for students. Students struggle with different academic requirements and have trouble catching up when they have been absent for a year or longer.\textsuperscript{108} By having different requirements at previous schools or not understanding the material being taught like one’s peers can cause a student to fall behind and possibly fail.

Education in Jordan is a very important issue to address, because there lies the future of Jordan. If the Jordanian children do not receive an education, they will be unable to provide for their country and their families. Similarly, once Syrian refugee children can obtain a decent education, they can qualify for higher paying jobs, when there is no Jordanian to fill the position, and can give back to the country that provided them a home when their own was inhabitable. Furthermore, providing Syrian refugee children education without reform puts more of a burden on Jordan’s infrastructure, which the state cannot handle. Education reform provides these children opportunities to excel in the future and Jordan the ability to successfully host such a large number of refugees.

These reasons are motivation for the government to work with those involved in the school system to ensure kids have the ability to receive an education. Jordan recognizes


this education issue as another driver of Jordanian refugee policy, as education was a large part of both the Jordan Compact and the JRP.

Water security, unemployment, and education, are the internal drivers of Jordan’s refugee policy. They are prominent issues in Jordan that can potentially cause unrest in the country and lead to instability. As a result, policies needed to be created in order to establish order. The next chapter focuses on international aid and where these entities give their resources.
Chapter Four: Jordan’s External Pressures

As the previous chapter discusses the internal pressures that have resulted in Jordan’s main elements of their refugee policy, this chapter furthers that discussion by explaining the safety around the border and where international entities allocate their money and resources. Border security is important to discuss, because it directly affects Jordan’s inhabitants depending on who or what enters and exits the country.

Along with border security, aid from the global community is notable. The United States, the United Kingdom, and organizations such as the UNHCR and the European Union give much of their resources to aid Jordan. Aid goes towards the facets of Jordanian life impacted by the high number of refugees, such as water security, unemployment, and education. While I wrote about why these are the drivers of Jordanian refugee policy from an internal standpoint, I also argue that the international community contributes to shaping refugee policy. When writing about the United States’s contributions, I refer to bilateral foreign assistance, which refers to money given directly from the United States government to the Jordanian government, where the recipient has full discretion as to where the funds are allocated. While the United States may not be giving their money specifically to any of the areas mentioned above, the distribution of the money is transparent, so the government knows where the money goes.\footnote{Kilmister, Megan. “Bilateral versus Multilateral Aid.” Development in Action, 29 Nov. 2016, www.developmentinaction.org/bilateral-vs-multilateral-aid/}.

Section 4.1: Border Security

In March of 1999, Col. Mazen Qojas published an article about Jordan’s border security titled “Cooperative Border Security for Assessment and Options.” It includes the dynamics of the relationship Jordan has with each bordering country along with plans of
how Jordan wished to strengthen their borders due to illegal entry. This article is important to my study, because it gives important background information that sets up my discussion of security along the Jordanian-Syrian border.

The Syrian border is 377 km long, with 339 km of that on land and the other 39 km along the Yarmuk River. In 1999, other than Nomadic Bedouins crossing the border from either side to allow their animals to graze and drink water under the supervision of security, around the border was unpopulated. There were only two points of entry, both located along the western side of the border. Jordanian and Syrian military commanders met weekly to discuss the high amounts of illegal crossings from Syria. As a result, Jordan created ditches on the eastern and western sides to help prevent this. To increase the strength of Jordan’s borders, they planned to set up sensors, observation posts, cameras, platoons, and other means of security.

As this was written and published before the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, Jordan did not expect to increase security along the Syrian border as much as they would have to in the future. Jordan began unofficially restricting border crossing in late 2013 along the northwestern side, which let Syrian refugees to informally cross through the eastern border, along the Sweida Province. Occasionally, Jordan would unofficially close the entire border. While the government insisted on keeping the border open, statistics reveal otherwise. In early 2013, approximately 1,800 Syrians crossed the border into Jordan daily. That number decreased to less than 200 a day in late 2014. Between July and September of 2014, the UNHCR registered almost 15,000 new refugees. In comparison,

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111 Ibid.
they only registered 2,900 between the months of October and December of the same year.\textsuperscript{112}

June 21, 2016, Jordan officially closed its last land border entry point for refugees at Rubkan, Jordan. At 5:30 am, that morning, a suicide bomber exploded a car bomb that resulted in the death of four Jordanian soldiers, a police officer, and a civil defense officer. The car came from a refugee camp and the bomb exploded along the border in no-man’s land. Immediately following this, the Jordanian Armed Forces closed the area and declared it a military zone. This is one of the many security issues Jordan has faced that led to the complete closing of the border.\textsuperscript{113}

The border remained closed until 2018. On June 16, 2018, the Syrian-Russian military alliance opened an offensive front in Daraa, one of Syria’s last government areas left held by the opposition. Ten days later, Jordan’s Prime Minister, Omar Razzaz, confirmed that they would not accept any more refugees. On June 28, the Jordanian Foreign Affairs minister, Ayman al-Safadi, told the United Nations Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, that Jordan would aid Syria “on their own soil.”\textsuperscript{114} The deputy Middle East director at Human Rights Watch, Lama Fakih, expressed her discontent with Jordan’s decision:

“The abject refusal by Jordanian authorities to allow asylum seekers to seek protection not only goes against their international legal obligations, but against basic human decency. Jordanians themselves are appealing to their government’s basic decency and calling for those in need to be let in.”\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.
Fakih is not the only one who was unhappy with the closing of the border. Many Jordanian citizens and people from around the world have spoken out against this decision on social media. On Twitter, people have created posts along with the hashtag “#OpenTheBorders”. Lina Sergie Attar, a Syrian-American writer and co-founder and CEO of the Karam Foundation, called for Jordan to open its borders on Twitter:

“I know there’s a lot going on in the world. But just so you know, tens of thousands of Syrians are being exiled from their homes in #Daraa. Yet another city emptied of its people by the Assad regime. The images are devastating yet so familiar. #Syria #OpenTheBorders #Jordan“

Another man, Julian Röpcke, an editor for the German magazine BILD also spoke of his dissatisfaction on Twitter by posting: “The situation at the Jordanian border right now. Where is humanity? #OPENTHEBORDERS,” along with pictures of refugees crowded at the borders with members Jordanian Army preventing them from crossing.

On October 15, 2018, at eight o’clock in the morning, Jordan and Syria reopened the Nassib border crossing, which had been closed for the past three years. The purpose of this was to resume the use of this lucrative trade route that officials anticipate to, in turn, improve the economies of both Jordan and Syria. Before it closed in 2015, hundreds of trucks passed through the Nassib border crossing everyday between Turkey and the Gulf and Lebanon and the Gulf in multi-billion dollar annual trade. Syrians must obtain a security clearance by Jordanian authorities before entering Jordan. It is notable, however, that the movement of refugees from Syria to Jordan was not specified. Because

116 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
this event is so recent, we do not yet know how this will affect the mobility of refugees across the border.

Border security affects many countries and their relationships with Jordan. In this next section, I will explain the assistance and allocation of economic aid given to Jordan for the purpose of alleviating Jordan’s pressure of hosting such a high capacity of refugees.

Section 4.2: International Aid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donors</th>
<th>Donor Package</th>
<th>Donation Amount</th>
<th>Placement of Funds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>“Operational Plan 2011-2016 Jordan”; Vision 2025</td>
<td>37,000 euros (41.8 thousand USD); 110 million pounds (approx. 142 million USD)</td>
<td>Humanitarian, education, and government and security; Jordanian schools and the work sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2015 MOU; 2018 MOU</td>
<td>275 million USD per year; 1.275 billion USD per year</td>
<td>Regional instability and rising energy costs; the ESF and the FMF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Expansion of the Jordanian NAF</td>
<td>Over 200,000 JODs (approx. 282,090 USD)</td>
<td>NAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
<td>1.08 billion euros (1.22 billion U.S. dollars)</td>
<td>Food aid, health, water, sanitation and hygiene, shelter, and protection</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Jordan receives international aid from across the globe to assist them with the repercussions they have faced due to the number of refugees they are hosting. When discussing this section, I explore the help of two of Jordan’s prominent allies, the United States and the United Kingdom. Following will be an exploration of the UNHCR’s and the
European Union’s help to Jordan and their role in the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan. Jordan’s most recent aid is summarized above in Figure 3.

In 2014, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DIFD) published “Operational Plan 2011-2016 Jordan” in which DIFD spells out the ways they propose to aid Jordan. The plan consists of three main areas of assistance. The first is humanitarian aid which targets refugees and host communities and aims to provide support to agencies that give shelter, water and sanitation, and food security to them. Second is supporting the Jordanian government through public service. The UK’s plan was to aid refugees and hosts communities in a way that promoted the integration of the different communities. Much of this integration would be through education under No Lost Generation, an initiative to ensure the education of Syrian refugee children in certain Middle Eastern countries, including Jordan. The final area of help is to attempt to reduce the risk of conflict by addressing local grievances. While the Operational Plan ended in 2016, the UK was proactive in continuing their aid to Jordan.

The United States strives to have a strong relationship with Jordan. The former US Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, signed a five year Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) February 14, 2018, on behalf of the United States government. This MOU states that the United States will give 1.275 billion dollars of bilateral foreign assistance per year from the 2018 fiscal year to the end of the 2022 fiscal year. This money was given to the

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Economic Support Funds (ESF) and the Foreign Military Financing (FMF). Along with the MOU, the United States also has provided developmental assistance regarding health, infrastructure, education, and agriculture for areas in Jordan hosting refugees. Currently, the United States is focusing on Jordan’s education, water, refugee host community resilience, and workforce development.

While this is the first MOU the United States has signed to Jordan, this is not their first time providing Jordan with aid. After King Abdullah visited The United States, former President Obama announces the signature of a two year MOU, pledging to provide between 660 million and 1 billion dollars per year in bilateral foreign assistance; however, the MOU only gave 275 million dollars. The purpose of this MOU was to “address Jordan’s short-term, extraordinary needs, including those related to regional instability and rising energy costs.”

The UK is also providing a substantial amount of assistance to the areas of Jordan that are lacking, such as education. Although the 2016 Jordan Compact sought to ensure every child had access to education and sought to create 200,000 new jobs, in April of 2018, the UK pledged to give another 110 million pounds (approximately 142 million

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USD) towards improvements in Jordan’s economy as per Vision 2025, a partnership between the British Prime Minister Theresa May and King Abdullah.\textsuperscript{128}

In January 2019, the UNHCR published a service guide for Jordan thoroughly explaining the many way it aids refugees in Jordan. This document also specifies differences in support given to Syrian refugees versus all other refugees. It begins by spelling out the registration and resettlement processes, as both are articulated in Chapter Two. The guide also discusses its helpline for various services, such as those relating to education, disabilities, and sexual violence. Following this is an explanation of healthcare with a section dedicated specifically to Syrian refugees.\textsuperscript{129} While this aid is strictly humanitarian, not monetary, the acts through this service guide can be beneficial to these refugees living in Jordan.

Furthermore, the UNHCR has been supporting the Jordanian National Aid Fund Expansion since 2017. The UNHCR has provided over 200,000 JODs in IT equipment, including 300 tablets and printers to the National Aid Fund (NAF), to assist it registering refugees. Furthermore, the UNHCR plans to fund a technical consultant to help employees learn how to use the system.\textsuperscript{130}

The UNHCR Service Guide plays a large role in the education of refugee children. The UNHCR encourages all children to apply to the nearest public school. To accommodate the large number of students, the UNHCR has created 207 double-shift schools. They also assist the Jordanian Ministry of Education with a catch-up program.

This program is for kids between the ages of nine and twelve who cannot read or write or for those who have not had a formal education in the past three years. These students attend an accelerated learning program that teaches the material for grades first through sixth in one year with the intention that the kids can reintegrate with their peers. There are about 110 centers for these catch-up programs in Jordan. Regarding higher education, the UNHCR provides scholarships for refugees. They offer the DAFI scholarship, which is through The Albert Einstein German Academic Refugee Initiative and funded by the German government and private donors. This scholarship is for one seeking his or her bachelors degree. The UNHCR also funds a masters scholarship given by HOPES (Higher and Further Education Opportunities and Perspectives for Syrians).\textsuperscript{131}

Finally, the UNHCR Service Guide explains the process of obtaining a work permit, as explained in Chapter Two. The UNHCR also provides a free hotline to call to ask questions or talk about labor law issues. The last thing mentioned in the document is that all of the UNHCR’s services are free to refugees, so they should be wary of people committing fraud and stealing their money.

The European Union also gives large contributions to the Syrian refugee crisis. They allot 583.7 million euros (660.2 million U.S. dollars) to assist the refugees in Jordan. Through the European Neighbourhood policy, member countries give money in assistance to these refugees through the EU with a total of 500 million euros (565.6 million U.S. dollars). This brings the EU’s total contribution to 1.08 billion euros (1.22 billion U.S.

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.
dollars). This money goes towards “life-threatening needs in the areas of food aid, health, water, sanitation and hygiene as well as shelter and protection.”

Section 4.3: Analysis and Discussion

As discussed in Chapter One, Jordan has the second highest number of refugees in the world per capita second to Lebanon. While Jordan shares a border with Syria, making it more accessible to displaced Syrians, perhaps so many sought refuge in Jordan, because it was easy to enter. Until the border was completely closed in 2015, Law No. 24 did not make it difficult to enter Jordan, especially since the law hardly distinguishes refugees from non-refugees. Therefore, people could disguise themselves as refugees. This security threat was a factor in the complete closing of the border.

While closing the border was an effort to protect the inhabitants of Jordan, it posed a threat to their economy. Jordan is cutting itself off to important economic opportunities and relationships, as explained in the previous section. Their economy is fragile because of the high capacity of refugees, so it needs to do what it can to strengthen its economy. While the issue of security may make this difficult, maybe the government could intensify the entry process of everybody to ensure they know who is entering the country.

Through this evidence in the previous section, it is clear that Jordan has a substantial amount of support from the global community. The United States gives 1.275 billion dollars of bilateral foreign assistance to Jordan per year for five years. While Jordan has

133 Jordan Fact Sheet. PDF. UNHCR.
the authority to allocate the money, the US will know the money’s movement, as well. Therefore, even though the US does not have a say to where the money goes, Jordan will likely not take advantage of the donations, because the US would not give them money otherwise.

The UK also provides a substantial amount of aid to Jordan. They have a specific plan as to how they plan to help Syrian refugees can integrate into Jordanian society. This also directly affects Jordanian, because they can benefit from this aid. With this plan of integration, it strengthens Jordan’s argument to the rest of the world about how they need more assistance with refugees. On October 9, 2018, the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation tweeted a quotation from Mary Kawar, their minister, during an interview with The Jordan Times:

“‘We don’t expect refugees to go back in the near future... We need the international community’s support to continue to be resilient as Jordan is going through exceptional difficult circumstances,’ said Kawar during the interview.”

The Jordanian government is constantly seeking help from the global community. If more Syrian refugees will be living in Jordan outside of refugee camps, then they can possibly receive more aid.

As I argue that one of the main drivers of Jordan’s refugee policies is education, the UNHCR plays a large role in this. In the UNHCR Service Guide, it says, “Education is a right for all children,” and they have clearly put in a substantial amount of effort to ensure that Syrian refugee children can obtain an education. The guide also explains work

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136 MoPIC(Jordan) "We Don't Expect Refugees to Go Back in the near Future... We Need the International Community's Support to Continue to Be Resilient as Jordan Is Going through Exceptional Difficult Circumstances," Said Kawar during the Interview.” Twitter, Twitter, 9 Oct. 2018, twitter.com/MoPIC_Jordan/status/1049588306147758080.

permits, further promoting the integration of Syrian refugee society. This continues to make Jordan’s argument to have more help even stronger. The document acknowledges all of the UNHCR donors to Jordan, but Jordan has made it clear that they need even more assistance.

The EU gives aid to Jordan and its refugee community through funding towards areas focusing on water. Jordan’s ongoing water crisis affects multiple areas of life, including hydration, sanitation and hygiene, among other daily necessities. The EU’s assistance supports my argument that their water crisis is one of their drivers of Jordanian refugee policy.

The global community aids Jordan by giving their support, specifically to two areas that I argue are their main drivers: unemployment and education. Closing the border affected the economy, and the UNHCR provides assistance in obtaining a working permit and access to schools and scholarships. The United States and the United Kingdom also provide a substantial amount of aid to Jordan, which contributes to this, as well.

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138 UNHCR donors to Jordan: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, ECHO, Estonia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, Qatar, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States of America, Private Donors
Chapter Five: Conclusion

Jordan has the highest number of refugees per capita, next to Lebanon,\(^{139}\) which has posed a threat to many aspects of Jordanian life. I argue that the areas most affected by the high influx of Syrian refugees are Jordan’s unemployment rate, their ongoing water crisis, and education. Subsequently, these internal pressures become the drivers of Jordan’s refugee policy.

I determined these drivers by first analyzing the policies set in place regarding refugees. I then looked at what King Abdullah and Queen Rania of Jordan were saying about their struggles due to refugees and further explored the three areas mentioned in the paragraph above. To strengthen my argument, I examined the aid given by the outside entities, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the UNHCR.

Unemployment, education, and the water crisis, serve as important factors, because they directly affect the Jordanian population. The pressure that Syrian refugees have put upon Jordanians in this respect poses a threat to the stability of the country. That is why they are specifically addressed in policies, such as the Jordan Compact and the Jordan Response Plan, which make it very clear that Jordan needs help in these areas.

The external pressures of Jordan’s refugee policies are directly related to its internal pressures. As mentioned in Chapter Four, border security has been an issue for Jordan’s safety, resulting in the closing of the border. In turn, Jordan has not been able to participate in lucrative trades with surrounding countries. This affects Jordan’s economy, because those employed to work at the border lose those jobs. Countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom give billions of dollars to Jordan each year, many of which goes

to the three areas mentioned above. Moreover, the UNHCR provides humanitarian aid, combating issues revolving education and unemployment. All of this help from outside entities providing assistance to the internal pressures serves as external pressure for Jordan to make their own contributions through carrying out effective policies to ensure Syrian refugees’ well beings.

Conversely, by creating a definitive policy that people would be able to follow, the dynamic of Jordan and its relationship with Syrian refugees would change. Declaring the displaced Syrians would require Jordan to have certain responsibilities that would increase the internal pressure in the country. The ambiguity of Syrians’ refugee status prevents Jordan from the responsibility of providing them benefits, such as health insurance or medical care.

While there is a substantial amount of information regarding the stress that the great number of Syrian refugees has put upon Jordan, there are some limitations to my research. First, there is a lack of cohesive research regarding this crisis, which made some of the information difficult to find. Had there been more readily available documents regarding this crisis, I could have more evidence to support my argument.

Second, I did not look at prior refugee crises due to the scope of this study. Examining the evolution of all the displaced persons that have sought refuge in Jordan could broaden the exploration of my question. As a result, I could have gained a deeper understanding of the difficulties Jordanians have faced in the past and compared their hardships to how they are now with the Syrian refugees.

Lastly, this refugee crisis is ongoing, so we do not know what the long term results of this will be. The JRP was just implemented a year ago, so we will not know whether
it is successful or not for a several years. Perhaps new critical problems will arise that will take control of how Jordan and the rest of the world handles Syrian refugees in Jordan. Maybe new policies will be proposed or the situation will improve due to one reason or another. Because I am not looking at history and rather current events, nothing is guaranteed to turn out the way officials may be trying to plan, so we can predict what might happen but cannot know for sure.

As this crisis is ongoing, there are and will be opportunities for more research. Policies already set in place such as the JRP will begin to reveal whether or not they are successful and even more policies may be created. Jordan’s relationships with other countries may change, or there could be a reason for refugees to enter or exit Jordan. Whatever it may be, any change in this crisis brings the opportunity for an expanse in research.

New research regarding the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan is constantly being published. A report by the Global Center for Development was recently released in March of 2019 acknowledging the Jordan Compact’s progress over the past three years while offering critiques. Many host countries modeled their compacts after the Jordan Compact. While the it is flawed, adjustments have been made. Initially, the Jordanian government was attempting to hand out as many work permits possible, neglecting to address the necessities of Jordan’s inhabitants and the various work sectors. Now, the developers of the Compact along with the Jordanian government are expanding work sub-sectors for Syrian refugees and have created a committee to “consider opening other sectors to Syrians.”

Also, the EU and the Jordanian government recently decided to allow Syrian

refugees to work outside of SEZs once Jordan has granted over 600,000 work permits. While this has not yet occurred, this could open new opportunities for Syrian refugees to gain employment.141 The Compact also addresses education, but there has been no assessment of its implementation.

Furthermore, the World Bank recently pledges 1.9 billion USD to Jordan over the course of two years. The World Bank will be taking a 1 billion USD loan from the United States, a 200 million USD loan from Saudi Arabia, and a 250 million USD loan from the United Kingdom. They intend for this money to be used for “targeting social protection for the most vulnerable segments of the population.”142

It is important that a policy be developed to ensure that future refugee policies are regulated so citizens’ interests are maintained and balanced with the means of guest communities. I believe the water crisis, unemployment, and education, will continue to be a prominent aspects of any policies regarding refugees moving forward. In the years to come, I hope that this research can be extended as matters regarding Jordan and its inhabitants evolve.

141 Ibid.
Appendix

**TIMELINE**

Major Jordanian historical events and policies regarding refugees between 1974 and 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Law No. 24</td>
<td>Articles 4 through 10 discuss foreigners’ entry into Jordan, while Articles 11 through 17 spell out the registration process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>The Syrian Civil War begins</td>
<td>6.6 million internally displaced Syrians and over 5.6 million externally displaced.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2018 | Jordan Response Plan | Objectives relative to my research include improving:  
  - Jordan’s infrastructure  
  - the education of Syrian refugee children  
  - the working environment for both Syrian refugees and Jordanians  
  - the economy due to results of the Syrian refugees, and Jordan’s environment. |
| 1990 | Iraq invaded Kuwait | Jordan received about 300,000 refugees from the Gulf who remained in Jordan. Resulted in a threat to Jordan’s water, infrastructure, a rise in poverty. Jordan’s unemployment rate reached thirty percent. |
| 2016 | Jordan Compact | Signed at the London Conference in 2016 by the United Nations, the United Kingdom, Germany, Kuwait, and Norway.  
  - Purpose was to combine international humanitarian funding with development funding through grants and loans.  
  - Initiate reforms in order to improve the business sector for Syrian refugees. It pledges jobs to refugees in Special Economic Zones (SEZs) along with the right to work in specific sectors.  
  - Required Jordan to provide schooling for all Syrian children and vocational training opportunities.  
  - 102 double shift schools would be opened. |

*Figure 4*
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Ministry of Labor.

MoPIC(Jordan) ءلاوـه نوـاـعتلاو طـيـطـخـتلا ةرازو " نإ. "We Don't Expect Refugees to Go Back in the near Future... We Need the International Community's Support to Continue to Be Resilient as Jordan Is Going through Exceptional Difficult Circumstances," Said Kawar during the Interview." 

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Cooperative Monitoring Center, Mar. 1999,


“Syrian Refugees // Jordanian Schools – a Multimedia Documentary | Chapter 3.”


