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CITIZEN SECURITY AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA: IMPLICATIONS  
OF LAW ENFORCEMENT REFORMS AND DEMILITARIZATION.

A Thesis

presented in partial fulfillment of requirements

for the degree of Master of Arts

in the Department of Political Science

The University of Mississippi

by

FERNANDA A. GUTIÉRREZ-MERINO

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## ABSTRACT

Latin American region has transitioned to democracy in the last forty-three years and along with many policy reforms, citizen security has not been left behind. As these changes evolve, the relationship between internal security and the development of a stable democracy has acquired a great importance in terms of the factors that contribute to a free world.

The purpose of this research is to look at how security policy and policing in Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, and Mexico have contributed to the democratization process in regards to how the recent reforms in law enforcement in the region have created favorable conditions towards democracy. First, this paper focuses on establishing the relationship between internal security and democratization, moving forward to the role of law enforcement in the demilitarization trend in the region and the world on the transition to democracy. After briefly covering some socio economic indicators of Latin America, this inquiry applies an original demilitarization scale of law enforcement to the citizen security institutions in the countries mentioned above. This is the first empirical measurement of law enforcement demilitarization for countries in Latin America. The empirical design tests whether demilitarization of internal security affects individuals' diffusive democracy support and police institutions' specific democratization or, on the contrary, there is no effect what so ever. The findings show support for the main hypothesis that individuals from countries with more demilitarized police support in greater scale democratic regimes; individuals from countries perceived as less corrupted were shown to trust police institutions greater than those from countries more corrupted; finally,

individuals that have had any crime interaction, whether themselves or through a relative, showed less trust rates in police institutions.

## DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to God for carrying me in His arms during the toughest parts of this process. I also dedicate this work to everyone who helped me and guided me through my own times of stress and anxiety. In particular, I thank my American friends that helped me to push through to conquer this degree, Kaye Cates, Angie Malone, Sharon Wrobel, Diana Chacon, Jeff Borland, Niamh Wallace, Will Graves, and many others. Lastly, I dedicate this last effort to my family that waited patiently for me to complete my education as long as it took me, without their support and love none of this would have been possible.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I express my deepest appreciate to my advisor, Dr. Gregory Love and my committee members, Drs. Alice H. Cooper and Gang Guo. I could not have financed my studies without the assistantship provided by the Department of Political Science.

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .....	ii
DEDICATION.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	v
LIST OF CONTENTS.....	vi
LIST OF TABLES.....	vii
LIST OF FIGURES.....	viii
INTRODUCTION.....	1
BACKGROUND.....	4
HYPOTHESES.....	18
METHODOLOGY.....	20
RESULTS.....	34
CONCLUSIONS.....	38
REFERENCES.....	42
VITA.....	48

## LIST OF TABLES

1. Cost of crime and violence as a percentage of GDP.....	15
2. Table 1.....	34
3. Table 2. Trust in Police.....	36

## LIST OF FIGURES

1. Common and different features of LA police.....	13
2. Freedom House Ranking .....	15
3. Corruption Perception Index .....	16
4. Police personnel rate .....	17
5. Demilitarization.....	29

## INTRODUCTION

Latin American region has transitioned to democracy in the last forty to thirty years and along with many policy reforms, citizen security has not been left behind. As well as the structural differences in internal security institutions, we can also find variation in the levels of democracy in the region. This thesis looks to answer questions such as how does performance and development of citizen security reforms in Latin America contribute to the democratization process in the region? Do the new reforms in Latin America and the transition to demilitarization of law enforcement in the region really contribute to citizens' positive sentiment towards democratization of their country? Does demilitarization of citizen security lead to higher democracy levels in Latin America?

This issue is quite relevant for leaders in Latin American countries considering the transition to democracy that the region has been through for the last forty years. The main argument of this thesis is that demilitarization contributes to a greater individual approval of democratic values. Hence, the objective is to determine whether demilitarization contributes to democratization of public institutions or not. The argument established in this inquiry is that political institutions are positively affected by law enforcement demilitarization in a smaller scale than individuals' sentiments towards democratization.

The role that the police play in the democratization process is fundamental as new regimes need at least minimal levels of security and order, all these within the context of protecting human rights (Marenin 1996; Cruz 2011). Security and justice institutions are

fundamental in the development of democratic governance (Karstedt and LaFree 2006). As Latin American countries belong to what the literature calls third-wave democracies (Huntington, 1991), the lack of stable and modern institutions is evident. Moreover, the social context of the region has made the World Bank label Latin America as the region with the highest levels of income inequality in the world (Hinton, 2006), creating a positive environment for criminal activities and high levels of insecurity. Income inequality provokes individuals' discontent motivating or unconstraining them to participate in violent acts (Patterson, 1991) since crime could work as a balance tool to those who lack of means to accomplish success (Merton, 1938).

This research looks to understand how security policy and policing in Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, and Mexico have contributed to the democratization process in regards to how the recent reforms in law enforcement in the region have created favorable conditions towards democracy. This paper focuses first on establishing the relationship between internal security and democratization to move forward to the role of law enforcement in the demilitarization trend in the region and the world on the transition to democracy. This is the first empirical measurement of law enforcement demilitarization for countries in Latin America. After briefly covering some socio economic indicators of Latin America, this inquiry applies a militarization of law enforcement scale to the citizen security institutions in the countries mentioned above. The empirical design tests whether demilitarization of internal security affects individuals' diffusive democracy support and police institutions' specific democratization or, on the contrary, there is no effect what so ever. The findings show support for the main hypothesis that individuals from countries with more demilitarized police support in greater scale democratic regimes; individuals from countries perceived as less corrupted were shown to trust police institutions greater than

those from countries more corrupted; finally, individuals that have had any crime interaction, whether themselves or through a relative, showed less trust rates in police institutions.

## BACKGROUND

### *The issue and why it matters*

Analyzing the relationship of citizen security and democratization has great importance for many reasons. First, the region has been in constant reformulation of policing institutions since its return to democracy. Second, and as mentioned, the high levels of inequality have placed Latin America among the most violent regions of the world raising the crime rates in the region higher than other great areas of the world, due to issues linked to drug trafficking, human trafficking, kidnapping, etc. Lastly, the great connection between democracy and citizen security, the rule of law guarantees the observation of human rights, and due process, as an integral part of the emergence and institutionalization of democracy (Karstedt and LaFree, 2006).

Due to the long military authoritarian regimes that have governed great part of the region of this research's interest, many of the countries inherited militarized police institutions. Among the population, there is a common sentiment of approval for the military to take control of internal security when exceptional chaos states take place in Latin American countries. Hence, as Neild (2003) describes, public confidence in the police and judicial system is constantly weakened by the failure to deepen democracy, of the rule of law, and to extend citizenship rights across all social sectors, which undermines support for democracy.

Many countries in Latin America have implemented Iron-fist policies, where increasing penalties and construction of prisons have been the most popular actions. However, these actions

have not been as efficient in fighting crime as they were expected to. Part of the literature has determined that saturation policing offers a psychological displacement effect of reassurance to the population, because of the “10-for-1 rule”, which means that it actually takes ten officers to increase the visible presence of the police in a given area (Hinton, 2006). Therefore, the outcomes of iron-fist policies have evidenced the need of a closer relationship between the police and the community (Arias, Rosada-Granados & Saín, 2012).

### *Citizen Security and Democratization Relationship*

The relationship between internal security and democracy carries great importance when analyzing factors that would improve the levels of democratization in a region relatively and recently free. As Karstedt and LaFree (2006) explain, public perception of democracy is highly affected by the behavior of the police and other criminal justice agents; these actors are seen as the key for the development of strong democracies.

Neild (2003) describes that the instrumentalist theory of policing assumes that police reflect regimes, and their behavior will come to reflect the new values of democracy once the legal framework has been reformed to incorporate those values. The police, as agents of internal security, possess coercive capabilities to enforce rule of law. However these capabilities highlight the divisive force of the structural tensions in the society. Regardless of the differentiation, to the public perception, police is the state on the streets in regards to law and order (Hinton, 2006). Furthermore, police performance will directly affect the perception of the legal system and ultimately the legitimacy of the state itself. If people have a reasonable degree of trust in the state’s institutions, they are more likely to believe that compliance, cooperation, and loyalty will best serve their long-term personal interest. The presence of police force on the

streets provides the public reassurance of state protection against crime and a sense of safety (Hinton, 2006). Hence, with police misconduct, public respect for legality and the legitimacy of the state are diminished.

The roles of the police in democracy have been long established by the literature. As it has been argued so far, police performance will directly affect the public perception of state legitimacy, from the symbolic point of view. Therefore, the functions of the police in democracy are assistance and reassurance, deterrence capacity, and investigative capacity (Hinton, 2006). *Assistance and reassurance* provide citizens the affirmation that a state of law and a climate of justice exist when they can perceive a constant police presence with capacity to intervene in insecure states. *Deterrence capacity* is directly affected by how the criminal element perceives the likelihood and severity of punishment for violations of the law. Finally, *investigative capacity* place the police institution as an effective and efficient auxiliary to the judiciary system by making arrests and carrying out criminal investigations within legal boundaries (Hinton, 2006).

As features required of the police institutions, accountability and transparency have great importance. It is in that spirit that all citizens should be governed by the same set of institutions and legal rules; the police should be ruled in advance to performing their service in the streets. This would provide a balance between powers of coercion and the legality of their procedures, preventing any potential abuse against citizens.

The democratization process that took place in Latin America is part of what the literature has called Third-wave. As the conditions of the context of the democracy that took place in the region were completely different from the first ages of democratization, Latin

America has developed what Rose and Shin (1999) call incomplete democracies. As third-wave democracies have not been able to reach the complete democracies status yet, and there is no evidence that they will be able to do so either, the critics to these countries focus on daily violations of the rule of law, corruption and unaccountable government. O'Donnel (2004) states that transitioning to democracy entails the construction of institutions intended to ensure transparent electoral processes and the construction of institutions intended to promote the rule of law and citizens' basic rights. In addition, as Rose and Shin (1999) have stated, third-wave democracies miss basic institutions of the modern states in order to completely develop to full democracies; third-wave democracies have started democratization backwards, introducing free elections *before* establishing such basic institutions as the rule of law and civil society. The implementation of inadequate internal security policies in Latin America is a perfect example of how backwards democratization took place in the region. Great part of the countries focused on transitioning to a democratic government without setting the rules and institutions needed to protect the new status quo, setting and reforming the new institution as things started to go, managing at the same time the public critiques reflected in the new free elections. According to Cruz (2011), the transitions can be framed around three types of events: authoritarian breakdown through military coups and popular uprisings; the electoral process following the breakdowns; and institutional reform aimed to transform the security apparatus. Latin America presents cases on each type of those transitions.

### *Citizen Security and Dimensions of Democratic Support*

While determining the implications of citizen security on individuals' democratic support, it is important to determine what dimension of regime support is the object of this inquiry. As Belchior, Teixeira & Tsatsanis (2014) describe the two dimensions of regime support

as diffuse support and specific support. The first one, as the authors explain, is related to elemental features of the political system, therefore it last long in time since it originates from deep-embedded political values and attachments; while specific support is directed to performance and outputs of authorities, thus this support is constrained to perceptions and evaluations of performance and policy outputs causing swings as citizens perceptions varies.

As the testable argument of this research is whether demilitarization of police increases individuals' approval for democracy, it is important to understanding the concept of diffuse support for democracy. Belchior, Teixeira & Tsatsanis (2014) describe how diffuse support is strongly related to regime capacity as understood by Lipset, which defines it as “the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate and proper ones for the society” (Lipset, 1983, as cited by Belchior, Teixeira & Tsatsanis, 2014).

Part of the literature has stated that domestic political or economic performance seems to have little influence in regards to democracy legitimacy since support for such regime seems to be widespread in international community (Easton, 1975). However, Magalhães (2014) suggests instead that performance and outputs could greatly affect preferences about regime types for individuals. According to Magalhães (2014) government effectiveness is an important factor that determines individuals' diffusive democracy support. He defines effectiveness of government as “the *quality of policy formulation and implementation*”. As Easton (1967) and Lipset (1981) established that specific and diffuse support are naturally tied. Carlin, Love and Zechmeister (2013) describe that “reservoirs of good will” for diffuse support are built as result of institutions and political actors' sustained high performance, which generates specific support. These

reservoirs, according to Carlin, Love and Zechmeister (2013), are utilized by the political system when specific support drops temporarily.

Since law enforcement is strongly associated as the state in the streets and individuals base their democracy approval on their perception of government performance, using law enforcement reforms in Latin America should show a strong correlation with diffuse democracy support. As Magalhães (2014) states, contentment with the way democracy develops has been related with numerous significant characteristics of political performance, including the actual or alleged quality of government institutions.

Specific support has great importance for this inquiry as well. Individuals' levels of corruption experience from police members and/or levels of victimization could affect specific support of the police institution. Individuals' dissatisfaction with police performance is directly related to their perception of the institution which could cause lower rates of specific support in regards of the institution.

Rates of victimization fluctuate according to peoples' experience and people's information related to victimization around them. Some countries in Latin America score higher level of victimization experience rather than higher level of victimization perception. This indirect relationship is also seen in regards of corruption. For instance, Chile has the second highest score in the region according to Corruption Index in 2016, while the level of corruption experience according to LAPOP is one of the lowest of the region.

#### *Militarized police as factor of Citizen Security*

Keeping in mind that the object of this analysis is Latin America in the context of citizen security, this analysis must spend some effort understanding the military factor in internal

security. Latin American history, in general, has many gloomy days of military authoritarian governance. Although almost all the region is now categorized as free or partially free according to the Freedom House, a great part of the police institutions of Latin-American countries carry quiet amount of military foundation. Militarization of police institutions is not a problem itself, as Neild (2003) explains militarization can provide a sense of discipline to the institution and a hierarchical structure that organizes its administration with clear bureaucratic steps. The issue is when police, private security or paramilitaries commit abuses and they undermine democracy, creating greater violence and jeopardize human rights (Neild, 2003). Furthermore, the long history of military dictatorships in Latin America has dyed the memory of citizenship with memories of a number of disappearances and human rights abuses. As Hinton (2006) explains, in democracy it is expected that the police will use force more sparingly than in a dictatorship, where accountability is a rare commodity and impunity tends to be the rule.

For the purposes of this research is important to understand the differentiation that the literature has settled between *militarism* and *militarization*. As Kraska (2007) discusses *militarism* is the ideology focused on the best means to solve problems based on the use of force and threat of violence as the most appropriate and efficacious means to solve problems; while *militarization*, is the implementation of the ideology through the process of arming, organizing, planning, training for, threatening, and sometimes implementing violent conflict.

Kraska (2007) provides dimensions of a military model that offer us tangible indicators of police militarization, such as *material*, *cultural*, *organizational*, and *operational*. The *material dimension* refers to martial weaponry, equipment, and advanced technology; *cultural dimension* relates to martial language, style (appearance), beliefs, and values; *organizational dimension* refers to martial arrangements such as ‘command and control’ centers, or elite squads of officers

patterned after military special operations patrolling high-crime areas; and *operational dimension* are the patterns of activity modeled after the military such as in the areas of intelligence, supervision, handling high-risk situations, or warmaking/restoration. Later on, these dimensions will have great importance in order to test this paper hypothesis.

### *Citizen Security in Latin America*

Moving forward to the theory of this research's hypotheses, it is important to establish the link between law enforcement militarization and citizen security in the region. The current landscape of citizen security in Latin America is deeply connected with the governance and institutional structure of government prior to the democratization process. While some countries moved forward to democratization sooner than later, all Latin American countries at some point were military dictatorships. In the 1960s the region started to walk its way to the democratization process that we can see now. In regards of citizen security, Neild (2003) describes that transitions from authoritarianism to democracy and from war to peace have removed the region's militaries from most government and internal security duties. Before the transitions, the police violated human rights with impunity. Then the violations were targeted to political issues, and now the violations are aimed at criminal issues.

Neild (2003) compares the Latin America authoritarian approach to the one implemented during the South African apartheid. He finds that these two approaches shared some common principles in regards of policing:

“the mission of the police is to support the political regime or a particular government; police do not require public legitimacy to be effective; police have few, if any, accountability mechanism; criminal detection capabilities are weak and concentrated in limited areas/constituencies (whites, wealthy neighborhoods or business elite); intelligence-gathering structures are focused on enemies of the regime rather than gathering criminal intelligence; concentration on policing for


political control means that the understanding and practice of crime prevention are poorly developed (with little tradition of visible or community policing on which to build)". (South African White Paper 1998, as cited by Neild, 2003).

After the dictatorship period, countries in the region kept many of the office personnel in their police institutions, transferring the old methods to the new institutions and the new personnel. As Cruz (2011) states, in Central America and in many countries of Latin America, the pacts made during the transition and immediately thereafter are conditioned by agents who held power. Some of these agents survived the transitions to constitute legal players in the new institutional arena, while others did not. With the transitions to democracy, all social sectors became affected with the criminal out of control situation which increased the public pressure for internal security reforms through the region. Dissatisfaction with police performance creates feelings of insecurity in public opinion promoting the support for militarization of police institutions. Hinton (2006) states how throughout Latin America, countries still resort to calling on military troops whenever the public security situation deteriorates, and occasionally, they do so to also repress restless police.

As Arias, Rosada-Granados & Saín (2012) inform, given the political impact of levels of perceived insecurity, since the 1980s many governments have attempted to carry out institutional reform processes of the police which objectives and scope have varied, but in most cases have been insufficient to address the real and the perceived security issues. In addition to the poor perception of the police performance by the public, many citizens fear that police cannot protect them against revenge attacks if they cooperate with criminal investigations (Neild, 2003), which decreases the citizenship participation in internal security. Moreover, since in most cases the police continue to enjoy impunity, the police continue to use repressive security practices, which increase the lack of trust in the institution by the citizens.

According to Arias, Rosada-Granados, and Saín (2012), there are three cases in Latin America that the military may--legitimately—participate in internal security: (1) as a last resort in critical and exceptional cases; (2) through the promotion of its incorporation to the fight of the criminality in full and permanent form; (3) and, when there is a differentiation between police functions and the armed forces, constitutional rules on states of emergency are made flexible to allow them to participate in the fight against crime, beyond its limits, as determined by political authority. In the case that these extensions of competencies are granted by the constitution, the extraordinary competences must be clearly delimited and must be temporary, with precise tasks, deadlines, and territory.

Some common and different features of the Latin American police identified by Arias, Rosada-Granados, and Saín (2012) are shown in figure 1:



The reforms that Latin American countries have attempted to implement after their transitions to democracy have been influenced by different reform visions. The most common approach that Arias, Rosada-Granados, and Saín (2012) finds is increasing the human, operational and infrastructure resources of the institution as it is, without changes in the organization and in the police work. Thus, it limits itself to improving or expanding the existing police system, its organizational structure, doctrinal bases, functional orientations, equipment and infrastructure, personnel, training and training devices and professional careers, without regard to police modalities and their impact on the crime or the type of work performed.


There are other approaches that can be implemented, visions as changing *norms*, *organizational structure*, and involving the *community*, could improve the restructuring of police institutions, training process of the personnel, decentralization of the institution, and the institution evaluation by public opinion (Arias, Rosada-Granado, and Saín, 2012). Those changes combined could greatly improve the institution efficacy and efficiency, any other way would be a naïve approach to the required reforms.

#### *Latin America context*

When analyzing the relationship of citizen security and democracy in Latin America, to better understand the context of the interaction of these variables is important to take a look at different factors such as level of democracy, public corruption perception, cost of violence, and police personnel per 1,000 habitants.

Freedom House develops a freedom rating based on political rights and civil liberties. The scale goes from 1 to 7, where 1 is most free and 7 is least free. In the following graph, we can see the 18 traditional Latin American countries object of academic research for the years

2002, 2010, and 2016. Chile and Uruguay have the lowest scores of the region, while Venezuela is the least free country. The mean score for the region during those periods of time is 2.6. In 2016, Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Paraguay are considered partly free countries. The rest of countries of the region are considered free.




The following table shows the cost of crime and violence as a percentage of GDP for Chile, Costa Rica, Honduras, Paraguay, and Uruguay for 2010. The table shows quite a difference between the values of the selected countries; they range from 3 percent in Chile and Uruguay, up to over 10 percent in Honduras.

Cost of crime and violence as a percentage of GDP, selected countries, 2010					
Type of cost	Chile	Costa Rica	Honduras	Paraguay	Uruguay
As anticipation of crime	0.71	0.34	1.50	0.72	0.49
As consequence of crime	2.11	1.47	8.01	6.26	1.22
As a response to	0.50	0.71	1.03	1.72	1.29


crime					
<b>Cost of crime and violence</b>	<b>3.32</b>	<b>2.52</b>	<b>10.54</b>	<b>8.70</b>	<b>3</b>
Source: Based on the Cost of Crime and Violence, IADB-UNDP (2013)(UNDP Regional Report, 2013-14)					

Another illustrative factor worth considering is the Perception Corruption Index from the Transparency International. This index measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption worldwide. The following graph shows the 18 traditional Latin American countries object of academic research for the years 2002, 2010, and 2016. Chile and Uruguay have the highest scores, while Venezuela is the most corrupt perceived country in the region; the mean score is 3.5.



The Organization of American States (OAS) collects data in regards to police presence in Latina American countries. The police personnel rate per 100,000 inhabitants only considers personnel in public agencies as of December 31, whose principal functions are prevention, detection and investigation of crime and apprehension of alleged offenders. Support staff as secretaries, clerks, etc. are excluded from this account.

The following graph shows 2007 and 2010 police personnel rate. As in the last descriptive factors provided above, the main objects of focus are the same eighteen countries. However, OAS does not provide data for Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela for those years. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that Uruguay has the highest police personnel in the region exceeding the 500 police officers per 100,000 inhabitants at least since 2003.



These indicators provide an overview of the situation of the countries study in this research in comparison with the rest of the region. Chile is the out layer among the countries chose for this analysis in regards of Freedom House index and Corruption Perception index. The geographic location of El Salvador and Mexico explains some of the similar social and internal issues, as drug cartels, human trafficking and proliferation of gangs.

## HYPOTHESES

The argument to be examined here is that demilitarization of law enforcement increases diffuse democratic support. Considering that transition and the history of democracies in Latin America are strongly related with the role of military forces in governmental administration, it is expected that countries that have clearly separated internal and external security functions in two different institutions have higher diffusive democracy support. Therefore, countries with less militarized law enforcement should show higher levels of diffuse democratization approval by individuals.

(H1) Countries with less militarized law enforcement show higher levels of diffuse democratization approval by individuals.

On the other hand, specific support towards police will be greatly affected by individuals' victimization perception. Whether individuals have been victims of crime and how the police procedures after the event developed could have a great effect on individuals' efficiency perception on the institution. If individuals feel unsafe on the daily basis, added to the lack of protection mechanisms their satisfaction with law enforcement and the rule of law in the country may have negative consequences for police specific support. Therefore, individuals that expressed higher level of victimization show lower levels of specific democratization approval.

(H2) Higher levels of victimization should lead to lower specific support of police institutions.

Lastly, individuals that have interacted with police officers and that have experienced bribery requests for officer to performance their job or—to the contrary—to get away with legal fines may express lower level of specific support for citizen security institutions. If individuals perceive law enforcement as a corrupt institution their trust in the institution may be affected negatively, and the belief that they may need to be ready to protect themselves may diminish their specific support for the institution. Therefore, individuals from lower corruption perception rates countries show higher levels of specific democratization approval.

(H3) Higher levels of corruption perception in the country should lead to lower specific support for police institutions.

## METHODOLOGY

### *Militarization coding*

Despite demilitarization of police enforcement is a common vision in Latin America, for the inquiry purposes, the countries object of analysis are Chile, Argentina, El Salvador and Mexico. As Kraska (1999) explains, the analysis of demilitarization of law enforcement police should center its effort on what level does civilian police fall on a continuum—culturally, organizationally, operationally, and materially—and in what direction they are currently headed.

Based on Kraska (2007) dimensions military model, *material*, *cultural*, *organizational*, and *operational* the demilitarization scale will be applied to code demilitarization. The *material dimension* refers to the extent of martial weaponry, equipment, and advanced technology; *cultural dimension* relates to the extent of martial language, style (appearance), beliefs, and values; *organizational dimension* refers to the extent of martial arrangements such as ‘command and control’ centers, or elite squads of officers patterned after military special operations patrolling high-crime areas; and *operational dimension* are the extent of operational patterns of activity modeled after the military such as in the areas of intelligence, supervision, handling high-risk situations, or warmaking/restoration. To test the above hypotheses and based on Kaska (2007) militarization coding, a scale 1-4 will be applied to Argentina, Chile, El Salvador and Mexico police institution as follows:

**Material:**

- 1 to 4 from very low weaponry military materials, as 9mm, to 4 heavy military materials, as rifles and grenades; 2 would be define on whether agents are authorized to use fire weapons during protests or marches. This category also accounts for the extent of military control vehicles capacity such as control vehicles with water or CS cannon, or in the contrary the usage of horses for riot control.

**Cultural:**

- 1 to 4 from casual attire to military-styled uniforms to police man wearing bullet proof vests and helmets on regular basis. This category also accounts for the extent of military beliefs and values in the institution's mission. The description of the institution, mission and vision provide a great weight to the coding for the countries, therefore institutions that define itself as a civil organization will rank below 2, whether institutions that describe itself as a military institution will rank above 2.

**Organizational:**

- 1 to 4 from completely civilian organization to normalized use of elite squads of officers patterned after military special operations team. This category accounts for whether police belongs to the Ministry or Department of Defense or to another institution; it also accounts if agents in service that abuse human rights or commit a crime are judge by military justice courts or by civil courts, the first will rank above 2 in the scale.

**Operational:**

- 1 to 4 from civilian oriented operations to highly operational patterns modeled after the military for intelligence gathering, supervision, handling high-risk situations, and highly

aggressive and punitive operations such as some zero-tolerance initiatives. Such institutions that conduct highly intelligence operations will rank closer to 4.

### *Country militarization analysis*

#### ***Argentina***

The Constitutional Act of the Federal Police enacted on 1958, establishes that the Federal Police performs functions of Security and Judicial Police—provides services to the judiciary and public ministry, for investigation of crimes and execution of sentences—in the territory of the Provinces and Capital of the Nation, within the jurisdiction of the Government of the Nation. The Federal Police depends on the National Executive Branch, through the Ministry of Security. This act also establishes the hierarchical scale of range, modes of classification, promotion protocol, tenure, command and succession of command. There are two levels of police forces: those of federal jurisdiction and those belonging to each of the twenty-three provinces and the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires. Police officers who report crimes during their service are tried by the Criminal Oral Courts (Smink, 2009).

The Argentinean Federal Police has the local police divisions also: Security Police (they are those that are in the street), Police Motorized (patrols streets and avenues of the city with motorcycles last generation and four wheelers), the DOUCAD (Division of Urban Operations of Containment and Activities Sports), the CGI (Infantry Guard Corps), the GOM (Motorized Operative Group) and the PM (Mounted Police), which are all units specialized in riot control. Policy implemented since 2004 that the troops do not act with firearms in the control of marches and claims (Ámbito, 2010).

The current General Regulation of the Argentinean Federal Police Number 10 about Uniforms, Uniforms and Attributes, was approved in 1996. Such bylaws establish every detail of the uniform from the lowest to the highest range. The Rules define the uniform that law enforcement officers must wear for parades, social events, daily basis, on duty and training. The bylaws also specify the range distinctive.

The Constitutional Act of Federal Police established the hierarchical scale of range, modes of classification, promotion protocol, tenure, command and succession of command. The Federal Police has a special operations division, the Federal Operations Task Force (GEOF), which is charged with conducting counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics missions, as well as the rescue of hostages and protection of heads of state visiting the country.

The G.E.O.F have machine guns Minimi Saw M249, Belgian manufacture, able to load 250 caliber 5.56 bullets in a cassette charger. In addition, the troops wear SIZ assault rifles .223 caliber, with 30 ammunition loaders; and helmets with cameras and hearing protectors. The GE-1 group, meanwhile, has Remington 308 caliber rifles and British-made CG rifles. Street officers utilize 9 mm (Mendoza Post, 2017).

Argentinean Federal Police uses Focus II and Ranger units, armored and equipped with communication and image recording technology, to patrol (Autoblog, 2013); and uses water cannon in protests and marches (Ámbito, 2010).

According with the description above, Argentinean Federal Police score in Kaskra (2007) militarization coding 1-4 scale: Material **2.7**; Cultural **2**; Organizational **2.7**; and Operational **2.7**. Averaging a total score of 2.5.

## Chile

Citizen security labors are in charge of different institutions in Chile. Policía de Investigaciones is in charge of assisting the Judicial system to solve investigations in order to determine presence of crime and authorship; while Seguridad Ciudadana is charge of assisting municipal security through supporting Carabineros de Chile. Although these two institutions are highly recognized by the community, citizens' perception of national citizen security are exclusively link to Carabineros de Chile, therefore this analysis only focuses on individuals perceptions in regards of such institution.

The Constitutional Act of the Carabineros establishes that Carabineros de Chile is a military and technical police institution, which integrates the public force and exists to give effectiveness to the law; its purpose is to guarantee and maintain public order and internal public security throughout the territory of the Republic and fulfill the other functions entrusted to it by the Constitution and the law. This act also established the hierarchical scale of range, modes of calcification, promotion protocol, tenure, command and succession of command.

Since 2011 Carabineros of Chile depends directly on the Ministry of Interior and Public Security and is administratively linked with it through the Undersecretariat of the Interior. Carabineros of Chile is an armed police force is essentially obedient, non-deliberative, professional, hierarchical and disciplined and its personnel is subjected to the basic rules established in such organic law, its Statute, Military Justice Code and internal regulations (Ministerio Nacional de Defensa, Gobierno de Chile).

The Constitutional Act of Carabineros of Chile established the existence of Grupo de Operaciones Policiales Especiales (Police Special Operations Group, GOPE), which is a special force of military uniformed police that carry out high-risk police operations throughout the

country, including bomb disposal, location and tracking of bombs and explosives, rescuing people or bodies from places of difficult access, anti-crime raids and clashes.

The current Uniform Rules and Equipment for Appointment Staff Institutional of Carabineros de Chile was approved by de facto president Augusto Pinochet Hiriart in February 15, 1980. Such bylaws establish every detail of the uniform from the lowest to the highest range. The Rules define the uniform that law enforcement officers must wear for parades, social events, daily basis, on duty and training. The bylaws also specify the range distinctive.

In the case of Chile FAMA E (Fábricas y Maestranzas del Ejército) is in charge of providing weapons to Carabineros police force. FAMA E is a Chilean state-owned firearms manufacturer, which is part of the national army. Carabineros officers carry 9mm guns when in duty along with handcuffs and baton, and drive Dodge Charger Police Interceptor for regular patrol (Carvallo, 2014), while for protests and marches they use Panhard-branded Renault armored vehicles that have state-of-the-art technology and each weighs five tons as shooting tear gas and water cannons (Martínez, 2014; RT, 2015).

As a modernization process, Carabineros has increased its technological resources in the various units it owns. Carabineros has the most advanced digital radio system in Latin America, called SmartZone. The institution also has the AUPOL (police automation) system, which allows each police unit to be equipped computationally and connected nationally. Some of the technologies that Carabineros possess are stereoscopic magnifying glass, ultraviolet light, Alcotest (breathalyzers), off-road motorcycles, ambulance aircraft equipped with resuscitation and first aid instruments, Helicopter BK 117, Global Position System (GPS), mobile computers, Autovelox (speed pistol), and surveillance cameras (Icarito).

According with the description above, Carabineros de Chile Police score in militarization coding 1-4 scale: Material **2.7**; Cultural **2.3**; Organizational **3.3**; and Operational **3**. Averaging a total score of **2.8**.

### *El Salvador*

The Policia Nacional Civil (PNC) of El Salvador is an established civilian police institution which mission is to guarantee the free exercise of the Rights and Freedoms of the people, security, tranquility and order, preventing and repressing crime, with strict respect for human rights, integrating personnel commitment and the participation of the population, contributing to the Promotion of the rule of law and integral development of the country.

The Decree number 82, Regulation Of The Law Organization Of The National Civil Police of El Salvador in its Art. 4 establishes that the organizational structure of the PNC will be conformed by: The General Directorate, of whom The General Subdirectorates, the Subdirectorates, the General Inspectorate, the Technical Council, the Center for Police Intelligence, the Internal Audit Unit and the Courts. The PNC divisions are: Division of Environment Joint, Public Security Command Division, Mounted Police Division, and Rural Police Regional Division. Police officers who report crimes during their service are tried by the Criminal Oral Courts (Cáceres, 2017).

The Special Police Operations Group was created in 2013 and is composed of more than thirty elements of the different units: Rural Police, Finance Division, Intelligence Center, Police Reaction Group (GRP) and Operational Tactical Unit (UTO), among others. The surveillance, capture and follow-up of criminals are the main functions that have been delegated to the Group of Special Police Operations (GOPES) (Ortiz, 2006). The elements have been instructed in assault technique with long weapons and short weapons.

Although the PNC have made efforts to modernize its equipment, its material resources are still quite limited. During patrol activities officers use off-road vehicles, bullet-proof vests, 9mm guns, while for protests and marches police agents use tear gas and rubber bullets. Some of the highlights of technologies that PNC posses are a modern 911 emergency system, video cameras in public places, an automated fingerprint system and a laboratory for DNA analysis (Diario1, 2015; Marroquín, 2008). The institutions also possess Sig Sauer pistols and chargers.

According with the description above, Policia Nacional Civil of El Salvador scored in militarization coding 1-4 scale for 2007, 2009 and 2011: Material **1.7**; Cultural **1**; Organizational **1.7**; and Operational **1.7**. Averaging a total score of **1.5**. While for the years 2013 and 2015 the PNC of El Salvador scored: Material **2**; Cultural **1**; Organizational **2**; and Operational **2**.

### **Mexico**

The Federal Police Law in its Article 2 establishes that the Federal Police of Mexico is a decentralized administrative body of the Ministry of Public Security. The Police institution apply and operate the public security policy in the area of crime prevention and combat, in addition to investigating the commission of crimes under the leadership and command of the Public Ministry of the Federation. According to Art. 5 the divisions of the institutions are Intelligence, Research, Regional Security, Scientific, Anti-drugs, and Federal Forces (DOF, 2009). Police officers who report crimes during their service are tried by the Federal Criminal Procedure District Court (Meceda, 2012).

The Special Operations Group, also known as GEO, is a special operations unit of the Federal Police of Mexico. They perform a great variety of operations among which stand out; The rescue of hostages, the apprehension of highly dangerous criminals, counter-narcotics actions, counter-terrorism and the fight against organized crime. Its members have been trained


by the Aeromóvil Group of Special Forces of the Army and the Brigade of Parachutist Fusiliers of the Navy of Mexico, the GEO of Spain, the AFEUR of Colombia, the RAID of France and the FAMS of the United States (Merino).

Federal Police uniforms are regulated by the Manual of Uniforms and Currencies of The Federal Preventive Police which specifically prescribes that police agents must wear bullet proof vests and boots, while there material equipments show the military orientation of the institution (Manual de uniformes y divisas de la Policía Federal preventiva, 2008). Although the patrol transportation includes Chevrolet Suburban, Toyota Hilux, Nissan Tiida, Nissan Tsuru, and Dodge Charger; for special operations against organized crime and high-impact crime the police uses Ballistic Armored Tactical Transport; for transporting dogs that are experts in the detection of narcotics, explosives and human remains, and that are strategic in research the institution uses Van Express vans; and for the Directorate of Special Services for Security and Protection of Persons agents assigned to the security of officials, judges, witnesses and victims use Armored Suburban; In addition, trucks rinos and arms Galil and Colt (Riestra, 2015).

In regards to weapons use by the Federal Police of Mexico, the institution possess pistols, submachine guns, assault rifles, sniper rifles, machine guns, shotguns, and grenade launchers.

According with the description above, the Policía Federal de Mexico scores in militarization coding 1-4 scale: Material **3.7**; Cultural **3**; Organizational **3.7**; and Operational **3.7**. Averaging a total score of **3.5**.

The following graph shows Demilitarization average scores for each country.



### *Empirical Design*

In order to test the hypotheses, the unit of analysis is individual-year for the years of 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, and 2015 for surveys collected in Argentina, Chile, El Salvador and Mexico by Latinobarometro. The time frame for this analysis is to consider the last ten years in those countries where the political landscape have changed from left to right indistinctly. Argentina switched to a right wing president after decades of left wings administration during a deep economic crisis; while Chile went back and forth from left to right and back to left wing administration for the first time since its return to democracy. El Salvador started to face the largest migration crisis in the country due to public security issues in its history; while Mexico flipped back the administration coin after twelve years of PAN administration with a high rate of public insecurity and organized crime. The importance of my unit of analysis is that accounts for the variation of diverse countries of Latin America.

Testing the hypotheses required three different multivariate OLS regression models with the following variables:

### *Dependent Variable*

Hypothesis 1 tests whether or not the level of diffuse democracy support varies across individual-year when accounting for demilitarization level. To test this hypothesis, a created combined variable, *Democracy Support*, accounts from Latinobarometro questions: **(A)** *With which of the following statements do you agree most? Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government (1); Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one (-1); and, For people like me, it doesn't matter whether we have a democratic or non-democratic regime (0);* **(B)** *In general, would you say you are very satisfied, quite satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the working of the democracy in (country)? Very satisfied (4), Quite satisfied (3), Not very satisfied (2); and, Not at all satisfied (1);* and, **(C)** *Do you strongly agree (4), agree (3), disagree (2) or strongly disagree (1) with the following statement? Democracy may have problems but it is the best system of government.*

Hypothesis 2 tests whether or not the level of specific democracy support for police institutions varies across individual-year when accounting for victimization level; while hypothesis 3 tests whether or not the level of specific democracy support for police institutions varies across individual-year when accounting for corruption perception. To test these hypotheses, a variable—*Trust in Police*—from Latinobarometro question is used: *Please look at this card and tell me how much trust you have in each of the following groups/institutions. Would you say you have a lot (4), some (3), a little (2) or no trust (1)? Police.*

Coding values for Latinobarometro questions were modified in order for results to have logic understanding for dependent variables and independent variables.

### *Independent Variables*

The main hypothesis, H(1) uses *Demilitarization* as independent variable. This variable uses militarization average scores values described previously in this inquire. For logic understanding of the results the values have been inverted.

For H(2), a created combined variable, *Victimization*, accounts from Latinobarometro questions: **(A)** *How often are you concerned that you could be a victim of a violent crime? Almost all the time (4), Sometimes (3), Occasionally (2), or Never (1); and, (B) Have you (1) or a relative (2) been assaulted, attacked, or the victim of a crime in the last 12 months?* The values of the latter question were modified to dichotomous, in which if the respondent or a relative experience a crime it was assigned value one (1), if for the contrary, the respondent nor a relative experience a crime it was assigned value zero (0).

The independent variable for H(3) is *Corruption Perception Index* value. Corruption Perception Index is a score of how corrupt countries' public sectors are seen to be, it captures the informed views of analysts, businesspeople and experts in countries around the world. Score values are 1-10, 1 been most corrupt and 10 been less corrupt.

### *Control Variables*

When testing for democracy support it is inevitable to control for democracy level, to do such Freedom House index—*Freedom House*—is the most accurate score to use. The index accounts for political rights and civil liberties. Values go from 1, being the best, to 7, being the worst. For logic understanding of the results score values have been inversed.

*GDP per capita* is controlled in order to account for the economic situation of the home country of the respondents. Values were retrieved from the Inter American Development Bank data base, which does not have the value for 2015 for El Salvador. To maintain the increase value trend, an average of the difference between 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2013 was added to the 2013 value and assigned to 2015.

Considering the indigenous conflicts in Latin American countries, *indigenous* is a dichotomous variable that accounts for individuals self identify as indigenous. In addition, a *socioeconomic level* variable accounts for respondents' economic status; this variable is based on the survey interviewer assessment at the end of the interview. The last control variable is *age*.

Models look as it follows:

Model 1:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Diffuse Democracy Support} = & \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \text{ Demilitarization} + \gamma_2 \text{ CPI} + \gamma_3 \text{ Freedom House} \\ & + \gamma_4 \text{ GDP per capita} + \gamma_5 \text{ Ethnicity} + \gamma_6 \text{ Age} + \gamma_7 \text{ Socioeconomic} \\ & \text{Level} + \mathfrak{Z} \end{aligned}$$

Model 2.a:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Specific Democracy Support} = & \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \text{ Victimization} + \gamma_2 \text{ demilitariation} + \gamma_3 \text{ Freedom House} \\ & + \gamma_4 \text{ GDP per capita} + \gamma_5 \text{ Ethnicity} + \gamma_6 \text{ Age} + \gamma_7 \text{ Socioeconomic} \\ & \text{Level} + \mathfrak{Z} \end{aligned}$$

Model 2.b:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Specific Democracy Support} = & \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \text{ CPI} + \gamma_2 \text{ demilitarization} + \gamma_3 \text{ Freedom House} \\ & + \gamma_4 \text{ GDP per capita} + \gamma_5 \text{ Ethnicity} + \gamma_6 \text{ Age} \end{aligned}$$

+  $\gamma_7$  Socioeconomic Level +  $\beta_3$

Model 2.c:

Specific Democracy Support =  $\gamma_0$  +  $\gamma_1$  demilitarization +  $\gamma_2$  Freedom House  
+  $\gamma_3$  GDP per capita +  $\gamma_4$  Ethnicity +  $\gamma_5$  Age  
+  $\gamma_6$  Socioeconomic Level +  $\beta_3$

## RESULTS

Table 1 indicates the findings in regards of hypothesis 1. As it shows, the raw coefficient of diffuse democracy support is 3.155 with statistical significance of 0.01. When adding *demilitarization* and the rest of my control variables, there is a .245 effect on democracy support at p-value of 0.01 of statistical significance. Most control variables do not show statistically significant results, Corruption Perception Index showed a negative correlation of -.078, while Freedom House score showed a positive relationship of 0.243. GDP per capita is the only control variable with statistical significant results although it stays constant. These results support hypothesis 1, showing that individuals from more demilitarized countries support in greater levels democratic regimes than individual from more militarized countries.

Table 1

	Democracy Support
Demilitarization	0.245 (0.042)**
Corruption Perception Index	-0.078 (0.054)
Freedom House	0.243 (0.191)
GDP per capita	0.000 (0.000)*
Indigenous	-0.164 (0.071)
Age	0.002 (0.001)
Socioeconomic Level	0.115 (0.054)
Constant	3.155 (0.204)**
$R^2$	0.10
$N$	16,820

\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table 2 indicates the findings in regards to hypotheses 2 and 3. Model 2.a shows the relationship between individuals' trust in police and victimization; Model 2.b shows the relationship between individuals' trust in police and Corruption Perception Index; while Model 2.c, shows the relationship between individuals' trust in police and demilitarization without accounting for neither victimization nor Corruption Perception Index.

As Model 2.a shows, the raw coefficient of specific democracy support for police institutions is 1.923 with statistical significance of 0.01. When adding *victimization* and the rest of the control variables, there is a -.186 effect on trust in police at p-value of 0.01 of statistical significance. The control variable that obtained a statistical significance of 0.01 is Freedom House index, which shows a positive relation of .525. Although the rest of the variables do not show statistical significance, GDP per capita remains constant, while indigenous status shows a negative relation in regards of trust in police.

Model 2.b shows a raw coefficient of specific democracy support for police institutions of 1.3667 with statistical significance of 0.01. When adding *Corruption Perception index* and the rest of the control variables, there is a 0.093 effect on trust in police with not statistical significant p-value. Control variables did not show statistical significant results, however their trend remains the same that in model 1.

Model 2.c shows a very similar result in regards of demilitarization effect on trust in police that in Model 1, again without statistical significance. The raw coefficient of specific democracy support for police institutions is 1.629 with statistical significance of 0.01. When adding *demilitarization* and the rest of the control variables, there is a -.051 effect on trust in police. The control variable that obtained a statistical significance of 0.01 is Freedom House

index, which shows a positive relation of .541. Although the rest of the variables do not show statistical significance, GDP per capita remains constant, while indigenous status shows a negative relation in regards of trust in police.

These results do not support hypothesis 2, showing that individuals that either experience crime or fear of been victims of crime trust less police institutions than those with no victimization relation. However, these results support hypothesis 3, showing that countries that are perceived as less corrupted also show a positive effect on individuals trust towards police institutions. In regards of the main independent variable of this inquire, demilitarization, although the results are not statistically significant the results show that higher level of demilitarization affect negatively individuals' trust in police.

Table 2. Trust in Police

	Model 2.a	Model 2.b	Model 2.c
Victimization	-0.186 (0.040)*		
Corruption Perception Index		0.093 (0.031)	
Demilitarization	-0.050 (0.023)	-0.003 (0.029)	-0.051 (0.021)
Freedom House	0.525 (0.058)**	0.258 (0.120)	0.541 (0.050)**
GDP per capita	-0.000 (0.000)*	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Indigenous	-0.030 (0.042)	-0.048 (0.028)	-0.036 (0.039)
Age	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)
Socioeconomic Level	0.041 (0.026)	0.045 (0.025)	0.038 (0.027)
Constant	1.923 (0.160)**	1.367 (0.172)**	1.629 (0.123)**
$R^2$	0.11	0.11	0.10
$N$	16,820	16,820	16,820

\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$

Correlation and Principal Components/Correlation test were performed. Democracy support variables added to create the combined variable diffuse democracy support for model 1 showed they were not highly correlated. Principal Components/Correlation test showed good scale of reliability.

In addition to the test described above, is important to note that control for year is omitted from the report.

## CONCLUSIONS

The citizen security reforms implemented in the Latin American region since its return to democracy have contributed to the stability of the regime. However, security issues are all over the region. Indigenous conflicts in Chile and Argentina keep increasing the intensity of clashes among citizens and police personnel, getting to the point of boosting the international community concern in regards the conflict. In addition, organized crime and drug cartels in Central America do not give law enforcement a break jeopardizing internal security to extremes where civilians are forced to request asylum in other countries in order to live in peace.

The relationship between democratization and citizen security has long been established by the literature. As Neild (2003) and (Hinton, 2006) describe, law enforcement directly affect people's perceptions of the regime and the State perception. As individuals interact with police agents on a regular basis, their communication and satisfaction with police institutions will have a natural effect in people's support for the regime. As this inquiry looked to answer questions such as how does performance and development of citizen security reforms in Latin America contribute to the democratization process in the region? Do the new reforms in the Latin America and the transition to demilitarization of law enforcement in the region really contribute to citizens' positive sentiment towards democratization of their country? Does demilitarization of citizen security lead to higher democracy levels in Latin America? The development of the empirical showed great insights to be considered.

The main argument examined here is that demilitarization of law enforcement increases diffuse democratic support. As mentioned before, the role of military forces in governmental administration in Latin America are strongly related with transition and history of democracies in the region, therefore countries that have divided internal and external security functions in two different institutions have higher diffusive democracy support from individuals. The empirical results showed that individuals from more demilitarized countries support in greater levels democratic regimes than individual from more militarized countries.

In regards to specific support towards police, the results found that is affected by individuals' victimization perception in the opposite direction that the hypothesis anticipated. The fear/ worry of becoming crime victim or the experience of having been a victim has a great effect on individuals' trust on the institution in a negative way. Individuals that feel unsafe on a daily basis and perceive lack of protection mechanisms see their satisfaction with law enforcement and the rule of law agents in the country affected negatively for police specific support. The results from the model shows that individuals that either experience crime or fear of being victims of crime trust less police institutions than those with no victimization relation. These results imply that further analysis need to be done; however, interaction with police in drug trafficking areas where corruption could take place in higher scales could decrease effective performance of police, decreasing at the same time trust in the institution.

Finally, police interaction and media coverage affect corruption perception of individuals in regards of public institutions. As the third hypothesis speculated, better rates of corruption perception would affect positively specific support for democratization of police institutions, the empirical results supported the theory. Individuals from countries with lower rates of corruption

perception showed higher trust rates on police institutions, showing higher specific support rates for law enforcement institutions.

In addition, it is important to highlight that demilitarization rates showed a negative effect on individuals' trust on police. Although those results are not statistically significant, the possibility of individuals trusting police enforcement greatly when the institutions are more militarized suggest that further analysis is needed to understand the relationship between demilitarization and specific support for law enforcement institutions. Understanding this relationship would provide fundamental information to law making agents that seek to endure diffusive support for democracy.

This research provides great insights to understand how democratization is affected by police role in internal security. As Marenin (1996), Cruz (2011), and (Karstedt and LaFree 2006) established, new regimes need at least minimal levels of security and order, all these within the context of protecting human rights; due to security and justice institutions are fundamental in the development of democratic governance. As this is the first empirical measurement of law enforcement demilitarization for countries in Latin America, the new spectrum of analysis invites researchers interested in the region to expand the analysis to other countries and see if the results are a generalizable trend throughout the total region.

Modernization of technologies in police institutions is necessary to address internal security issues; as GDP increases throughout the region the resources implemented in police institutions rise as well. Rather than limiting the material resources of law enforcement, the institutions and governors must pay great attention to cultural and operational factors that rule police performance in order to promote a positive trend to democratization stability. Otherwise

international institutions such as International Amnesty, Freedom House and Transparency International will continue to express their concern in regards of human rights protection and regime violations.

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1

## VITA

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#### **FORMAL EDUCATION**

**The University of Mississippi *University, MS***

*Master's of Political Science* expected graduation date August 2017.

**The University of Memphis *Memphis, TN***

*Master's of Public and Nonprofit Administration* December 2014, GPA: 3.55

**Supreme Court from the Republic of Chile *Santiago Chile***

*Juris Doctor Degree* December 2013

**Universidad Andrés Bello *Santiago Chile***

*Bachelor in Legal Studies* November 2011

#### **SUMMARY OF QUALIFICATIONS**

- Completed research in Latin American and Caribbean issues/challenges toward democratization.
- Provided practical and realistic approaches for research problem solving and improvement suggestions.
- Ability to change direction when/if research dictates so.
- Designed strategic plans from research projects.
- Proficient in reading and writing Spanish (native), English (bilingual), and Portuguese (elementary).
- Top 5 strengths from StrengthsFinder 2.0 (Rath, 2007) are Competition, Harmony, Context, Activator, and Futuristic.

#### **PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE**

**University of Mississippi, Oxford, Mississippi**

*Graduate assistant, August 2015 to May 2017*

- Assistant translator and researcher (including data) on Colombia's peace agreement and the indigenous conflict in Chile.
- Support for classes of Comparative Democratic Institutions, Politics of Mexico and Central America, and Latin American Politics.

- **Crime Victim Center, Community Services Division, Shelby County Government, Memphis, Tennessee**

*Bilingual Victim Advocate, February 2015 to August 2015*

- Advocated for Spanish speaking victims of crime in Shelby County, assisting this underrepresented population in regards of CVC services and applicable compensations.
- Advised CVC staff interpreting and translating when serving Spanish speaking clients.
- Community Outreach and liaison with other agencies that served Hispanic victims in Memphis Metropolitan area.

**Shelby County Government, Community Services Division, Memphis, Tennessee**

*Intern, May 2014 to August 2014*

- Developed logic models, including one for nurse outreach in the Early Success Coalition Project Launch, based on the principles of implementation science.
- Developed a pictograph to communicate with stakeholders, about social issues that ESC aimed to tackle, including influence/impact.
- Collaborated host agency with execution of Teen University event, a continuing education opportunity for pregnant and parenting teens focusing on social and emotional learning, child sexual abuse prevention, and resource connections.

**The University of Memphis, Memphis, Tennessee**

*Graduate Assistant, September 2013 to December 2014*

- Conducted research on current transitional government in Cuba and civil society situations within the country.
- Designed and set up of promotional pieces for events, and representing the university division at the events.

**Corporación De Asistencia Judicial La Reina. Gobierno De Chile, Santiago, Chile**

*Legal Internship, April 2012 to October 2012*

- Interned at a pro-bono government office. Handled 52 civil cases within the required 6 months internship by the Chilean Supreme Court to grant a Juris Doctor degree.

**PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS**

- Latin American Studies Association.

**GRADUATE COURSEWORK**

- Research Methods I, II, III.
- Social and Development Policy in the United States and Cuba.
- Independent Study: Modes of Participation in Cuba.
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### **TECHNICAL SKILLS**

- Data Analysis (STATA, R).
- Software (Microsoft Office Suite, Adobe Acrobat).

### **PRESENTATIONS**

- *Modes of Participation: Public Participation in Cuba's 2011 Economic and Social Updates.* SECoPA 2015, Charleston, South Carolina.
- *Eyes, Ears...and Voices: The evolution of Comités de Defensa de la Revolución.* Coauthor with Dr. Sharon Wrobel. Midwest Political Science Association Conference 2017, Chicago, Illinois.

### **COMMUNITY SERVICE**

- Vice President of MPA Student Association, Division of Public & Nonprofit Administration, The University of Memphis, 2014.
- Volunteer interpreter and translator of documentation for legal cases for the Community Legal Center, Memphis, Tennessee, March 2013- August 2015.
- Volunteer staff member for boys scouts for Grupo Guías Y Scout De La Salle, Santiago, Chile, 2003-2006.
- Wrote and designed the Volunteer Handbook for Latino Memphis, Memphis, Tennessee, May 2014.