Democratic Paradox: The Role Of Regime Type In Civil War Intervention And Success

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DEMOCRATIC PARADOX: THE ROLE OF REGIME TYPE IN CIVIL WAR INTERVENTION INITIATION AND SUCCESS.

A dissertation

presented in partial fulfillment of requirements

for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

in the Department of Political Science

The University of Mississippi

Justin Burnett

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ABSTRACT

JUSTIN M. BURNETT: Democratic paradox: The role of regime type in civil war intervention initiation and success. (Under the direction of Dr. Timothy Nordstrom)

Regime type is an important yet largely ignored factor in the likelihood of civil war intervention initiation and success. Most research related to intervention processes has analyzed these processes without questioning whether or not domestic political institutions and constraints affect the decision to intervene as well as the probability of success. Democracies have unique institutions and recognized norms that do not exist in non-democratic states. I argue that these differences matter and that domestic political audiences in democracies can more effectively drive foreign policy decisions than populations in non-democratic states. When democratic populations are exposed to media images of particularly violent conflict they have the opportunity to assess the need for intervention based on ingrained democratic norms. I believe that this leads to democratic policy makers being compelled to intervene in the most intractable conflicts in response to demands from domestic audiences. However, due to the difficulty of intervention in these conflicts I argue that the same type of political pressure that leads to intervention in these conflicts also serves to pressure policy makers to withdraw prior to successful completion of the mission. By drawing from a wide variety of literatures related to conflict I proposed two hypotheses to test the whether or not regime type influences the decision to intervene and the probable success of all intervention opportunities from 1945-2012. I found empirical evidence that supports my assertion that democracies are more likely than non-
democracies to intervene in the most intractable conflicts. With regard to my theory on success I did not find strong evidence that indicates that democracies are less likely to be successful than their non-democratic counterparts. Rather, it appears that they are simply less successful than when they engage in interstate war.
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CHAPTER 1: THE STUDY OF CIVIL WAR INTERVENTION

1.1 Introduction

Throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first there has been a significant decline in the instance of interstate warfare. However, throughout this same period, the world has witnessed a sharp rise in the number of internal conflicts. It is therefore unsurprising that scholars in the field of international relations have turned their attention to this phenomenon. Much of this research has focused on the internal characteristics of the civil war state and the reasons for and consequences of failing to resolve these conflicts. More recently scholars have devoted their attention to third party interventions in intrastate conflicts. One line of research focuses intervention processes in the pre-intervention period. Third-parties choose to intervene in intrastate wars for a variety of reasons. Protecting vital national or regional interests that could be jeopardized by particular states being in a state of civil war or a belief that intervention should be undertaken in order to provide humanitarian relief to the conflicted population are but a few examples of reasons a third-party will choose to intervene. While domestic politics has been considered in the literature on civil war processes, it has not been examined as a driver for intervention. That is, no effort to consider how domestic political pressure can affect the intervention decision calculus has yet been undertaken.

Similarly, intervention success is another area in the conflict literature that has received a great deal of attention in recent years. Reasons for success and failure of civil war intervention
have been attributed to the internal characteristics of the state in conflict, the capabilities of the intervener, and the type of conflict, among others. Again, much like the intervention decision literature, there has been no analysis of how the domestic political characteristics and institutions of the intervener can impact the likelihood of successful intervention efforts. I believe that both the decision to intervene and the probability of a successful intervention could very well be linked and better understood within the context of how domestic policy preferences can impact foreign policy decisions. If we are to believe that a realist paradigm still dominates the thought processes of policy makers with regard to foreign policy decisions, then the questions that I will address and the theories I will propose probably have no place in the literature. However, if we are inclined to believe that a realist paradigm fails at some level to explain these intervention processes then my approach to understanding these processes is not only relevant, but unique in its approach. The following example should help to clarify how domestic audience costs could be linked to both.

1.2 Domestic Politics in Intervention Processes

Following the departure of Siad Barre from Somalia in January 1991 the central government of the eastern African country collapsed and violent conflict between the countries various clans began occurring with increasing frequency. Compounding these problems was a persistent drought that rendered the state unable to provide food for its already beleaguered citizens. Although several private organizations attempted to assist the citizens by providing food to the famine stricken population, securing these stores was difficult at best. In April 1992, the United Nations authorized UNOSOM. It was intended to be a peacekeeping mission that would organize food distribution and coordinate the relief efforts in country.
However, neither these private organizations nor the UN mission could effectively coordinate this distribution as relief supplies moved further from the major population centers (Stewart 2002).

Increasingly, news coverage of the unfolding crisis began appearing on televisions throughout U.S. households. As the situation continued to deteriorate, pressure was mounting on President George H. W. Bush to make a more direct U.S. commitment to the relief operations. In August 1992 President Bush authorized Operation Provide Relief. The primary mission of the operation was to airlift supplies into Somalia’s interior regions and conduct surveillance of the situation on the ground (Allard 1995). However, because the mission did not provide for securing relief supplies once on the ground, looting of these supplies by the warring factions continued. If U.S. forces were not deployed to ensure delivery of these supplies to their appropriate destinations, it appeared that widespread famine would be imminent.

Operation RESTORE HOPE was intended to provide security for the supply chains as well as broker truces among the competing Somali clans. It established secure sectors on the ground for relief supplies to travel through and maintained a fragile peace among the clans. The mission was largely successful, and mass starvation was temporarily avoided. However, once the situation on the ground stabilized, United Nations diplomats began to press for an objective beyond the scope of the initial mission including confiscating weapons and pressing for a much needed but difficult to attain political settlement (Stewart 2002).

In response to these expanded mission goals the U.S. (in addition to other nations) reacted by increasing their military presence in Somalia under UNOSOM II. Complicating matters was the fact that while previous missions had been specifically aimed at peacekeeping,
the new mission expanded the role of the armed forces to include a peace enforcing component. While many Somalis had initially welcomed the assistance of the U.S. and others when the primary goal was that of ensuring aid distribution, military involvement in the political settlement proved to be less welcome. Resistance to the peace enforcing mission grew within the country and soon U.S. and coalition forces found themselves conducting extensive combat operations throughout Somalia. Of particular interest to the U.S. was the apprehension of General Mohamed Farrah Hassan Aidid, leader of the Somalia National Alliance.

Throughout 1993, combat operations continued at an increasing pace while searching for Aidid and assaulting key locations of strategic importance to the Somalia National Alliance. Of particular note was a deployment of Joint Special Operation Task Force Ranger. Its specific mission was to track down Aidid and his command structure and turn them over to the United Nations for prosecution. In October 1993, TF Ranger attempted to move into a sector of Mogadishu known to be a stronghold of Aidid’s. The initial raid lasted 2 days. TF Ranger saw 16 soldiers killed and 57 wounded including pilots, passengers, and exfiltration teams involved in the “Blackhawk Down” (Stewart 2002). Shortly after the raid, images of the soldiers’ bodies being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu began appearing on American television.

What had begun as a relief mission evolved into a series of bloody raids that claimed the lives of dozens of American servicemen. Americans, horrified at the brutal consequences of this intervention, began withdrawing support for continued efforts to enforce a political solution. Subsequently, President Clinton ordered the withdrawal of American forces from Somalia and by March of 1995 all U.S. forces were withdrawn from the country. Despite the best efforts of several nations, Somalia continued to exist as a failed state after intervention forces withdrew.
Popular sentiment to assist the ailing Somali state appear to be one of the driving forces that led to increasing U.S. involvement in that civil war. The war had begun in 1991 and its devastating effect on the population was compounded by severe drought onset that very same year. By 1992 the plight of the Somali people in general and the deteriorating situation in Mogadishu in particular was quickly becoming public knowledge. Images and stories of the starving, war-ravaged population began to be distributed by various media outlets. By this time volunteer aid organizations were rapidly becoming unable to provide the assistance needed by the Somali people. As public awareness of the Somali peoples’ predicament came to light, public pressure in the United States to assist the Somali people began to mount. In late 1992 nearly a third of the domestic U.S. population was following the situation in Somalia. By early 1993 estimates of domestic U.S. awareness of the situation had reached nearly 90%.

The question of why the U.S. and others failed to successfully intervene now becomes the relevant question. Much of the current literature on civil war intervention would conclude that the internal dynamics of the conflict were the reasons behind a lack of success on the part of the interveners. In the Somali example, the existence of many competing factions engaging in increasingly violent conflict could have forced policy makers to come to the conclusion that continued involvement would be futile. Certainly, the internal situation in Somalia was difficult. However, I am unconvinced that the characteristics of the conflict were the only factors leading to this unsuccessful attempt at intervention. It appears that domestic political pressure in the United States led U.S. policy makers to intervene in the conflict. Additionally, I would argue that this same domestic pressure led to a premature withdrawal of forces.

Being a superpower with unmatched military resources, the United States could have further entrenched itself in the conflict. The addition of more ground forces along with sustained
air and naval support would have, I believe, eventually resulted in the capture of Aidid, the defeat of his supporters, and ultimately a successful intervention. This type of sustained effort had the potential to help encourage and enforce a stable political settlement. It was not that the United States lacked the material resources to do so. Instead policy makers lost the support of the population for continuing intervention in what appeared to be a conflict that would increasingly become difficult to successfully intervene in.

It is possible that the internal characteristics of conflict contribute not only the reluctance of states to intervene, but the failure of intervening states’ achieving their goals as well. An alternative explanation is that the domestic political characteristics of an intervener not only affect a state’s decision to intervene, but also make it difficult for particular regime types to successfully achieve their intervention objectives. This alternative explanation is one which the current literature on civil war intervention fails to address. The lack of inquiry with regard to whether or not regime type has any bearing on the decision to intervene and the outcomes of interventions leads me to believe that our understanding of these processes is incomplete. Addressing these questions will enhance our understanding of interventions as well as the reasons for their success or failure. That is the purpose of this dissertation and, to my knowledge, the first attempt to answer whether or not domestic audiences can influence both the decision to intervene and whether those interventions are likely to be successful.

I will argue that the current intervention literature has failed to adequately examine the role of regime type as it relates to both the decision to intervene and the ultimate success or failure of those interventions. Specifically, the literature has failed to address how regime type and domestic audiences might influence the intervention process. Domestic political pressure affects the intervention process in two ways. First, domestic audiences can pressure policy
makers into intervening in conflicts in which successful intervention is difficult to realize. Additionally, once the intervention is underway, negative domestic sentiment regarding the mission will force leaders to withdraw forces prior to successful completion of the objective. The novelty of the theory is in the linkage of initiation and success via domestic audience costs. The domestic pressure placed on democratic leaders has the potential not only to influence initiation, but could lead policy makers to intervene in civil wars where the odds of success are relatively remote.

My proposal is that democratic societies force policy makers into more intractable conflicts. If this assertion can be empirically observed, it would certainly add to the literature on civil wars and intervention. In contrast to the realist paradigm that so often dominates our approach to international relations, this research has the potential to indicate that domestic politics can in fact have a significant impact on foreign policy decisions under conditions in which the intervener’s national interests are not necessarily threatened. In fact, this domestic pressure will lead to policies that have the potential to lead policy makers to make sub-optimal foreign policy decisions. That is, the policy preferences of domestic populations and policy makers may not reflect one another. While policy makers determine that a particular intervention is not in the best interests of the state, uninformed publics will, through political pressure, encourage these policy makers to undertake the intervention in spite of policy makers’ misgivings about the need for and potential success of that intervention.

I believe that while democracies undertake the decision to intervene in a fashion similar to their non-democratic counterparts, particular democratic institutions and norms complicate the intervention decision process. Democracies are also potentially limited as to how vigorously they pursue an intervention strategy once operations have begun. Domestic pressure can and do force
nations into more intractable conflicts while subsequently tying the hands of policy makers once an intervention has been initiated. I suspect that this is one of the primary reasons that democracies, while highly successful in interstate conflicts, fare far worse when intervening in another state’s civil war. I intend to develop a regime based theory of the intervention process that seeks to explain why democracies have the potential to engage in risky interventions. I will also attempt to connect regime characteristics to the failure or success of those interventions by showing that the same domestic political forces that encourage intervention also serve to expedite terminations of missions prior to success being realized.

1.3 Conclusion

In the chapters that follow I plan to address questions related to the role of a potential intervener’s regime type influencing the decision to intervene, the effect that domestic pressure has on the ability of an intervener to be successful, and how these two processes are ultimately linked through the prism of domestic politics. Chapter 2 begins by reviewing the relevant literature on civil war intervention with a focus on the motivations for intervention. This will primarily focus on the conflict characteristics and why they might induce a third party to intervene in a civil war. This chapter will also review the intervention decision literature. In this section I will pay particularly close attention to the differences between democracies and non-democracies. It is the variation in ability to resist or avoid negative public reaction to policy that I argue shapes both the intervention decision and likelihood of successful intervention. In chapter 3 I will tie research related to the intervention decision process and regime type together to form my theoretical arguments on intervention initiation. Specifically, I will argue that variations in media effects and population characteristics differentiate democracies from autocracies in the intervention decision process. Later, I will unify these theories by
demonstrating how both processes can be linked via regime type and the associated domestic audience costs. The result of this discussion should allow me to develop a decision theoretic approach to intervention initiation and success related to regime type. Chapter 4 will be dedicated to empirical examination of whether or not domestic audience costs and pressure can influence policy makers into intervening in civil wars. Moreover, I will show evidence that domestic pressure will lead policy makers to intervene in conflicts in which the likelihood of success is relatively low. Specifically I plan to provide evidence that democratic states are more likely than non-democracies to engage in risky interventions that result in higher than expected failure rates. In this chapter I will also determine if domestic audience costs lead to premature intervention termination. I intend to determine whether these difficult cases are also examples of a situation in which domestic political pressure leads to mission termination prior to achieving a successful outcome. This chapter will attempt to empirically tie intervention initiation and success together. Finally, in chapter 5, I will further discuss the implications of my findings and suggest alternative avenues of research related to the dissertation.
CHAPTER 2: INTERVENTION AND SUCCESS

2.1 Types of Intervention

Generally speaking, three major forms of intervention can be identified. The first, and least costly to the intervening state, is diplomatic intervention. This could include an offer to help the warring factions negotiate a settlement by acting as a mediator. Because the costs of diplomatic intervention could be considered nominal at best, I will not include them in my forthcoming analysis. The second is economic intervention. An example of this might include sanctions against the existing government of the target state, thus limiting the ability of that government to engage in economic exchange. This imposes a cost not only to the target country, but also to the intervener by limiting the potential revenue to the intervener from the sale of goods and services to the target country. Conversely, the intervener could decide to cease purchasing exports from the target country thereby denying the target country access to the intervener’s markets and reducing the amount of capital to which the target country has access. The intervening party might also wish to affect the situation by providing aid to one or another side engaged in the conflict in order to sway the conflict in favor of a particular side.

The third type of intervention is the military option. This could take one of several different forms at varying costs to the third party. The first might be to send arms to one of the factions. A second might be to send in military advisors to the target state to assist a particular side with the training of troops. Another variation could include sending combat troops to the
target states to help shift the balance of power. In 1969, James Rosenau attempted to formulate a working definition for intervention. He defines intervention as both “convention breaking” and “authority oriented.” By this he means that the conventional behavior of interaction between the respective states (the intervener and the target state) must be changed in some fashion. Furthermore, the intervening state must intend to affect the authority structure of the corresponding state. That is to say that the intervening state must have some intention to affect the structure of government authority either by stabilizing the existing power structure or changing it (Rosenau 1968).

For the purposes of this dissertation, I will not be considering diplomatic intervention. Diplomatic intervention entails minimal if any measurable cost being borne by the intervener. I will argue that that the potential and realized cost of intervention impact democratic public opinion and that public opinion has the potential to drive civil war processes. Because diplomatic intervention does not impose significant cost to the intervener, I feel that it does not necessarily have a place in my theory.

Interventions into internal wars in foreign countries are nearly always wars of choice. Generally, states have no obligation to intervene in civil wars. There are exceptions of course. For example, preexisting military pacts could compel to the alliance partner to intervene. Huth (1998) found that if the target state and the intervener had a preexisting military pact, then intervention in a civil war was more likely. This is not to suggest that states will intervene, but rather that they are only more likely to do so. States tend to approach the decision to intervene in another’s internal conflict much as they would when considering entering into an interstate conflict. In both cases successful realization of objectives and costs related to engagement are of paramount importance in the decision making process. If policy makers calculate that the odds
of success are low and the potential cost for failure are high, they will likely attempt to avoid becoming involved in a conflict.

Conversely, if the potential for success is high and the cost for failure is low, states should be more inclined to engage in conflict. This basic cost benefit analysis can help determine which conflicts states will choose to engage in. I believe the effect of this analysis is even more pronounced in relation to civil wars. Interstate wars are not always wars of choice. A state has the potential to be attacked by another in the international system. In these cases it may or may not make sense for a state to fight. Capitulation may be the best choice. In contrast civil war intervention, as stated earlier, nearly always allows the potential intervener to choose whether or not to intervene. To be clear, this does not suggest that states will seek out any and all opportunities to intervene or seek out wars to engage in. There should be some compelling interest beyond the mere opportunity of achieving an easy victory or successful intervention.

While civil wars are frequently considered to be internal affairs, the reality is that they have the potential to impact both neighboring states as well as the global political system. Given that the ramifications of these conflicts can extend beyond the conflicted state’s borders, it stands to reason that external states will wish to influence the outcome of another state’s civil war. States will take many factors into consideration when deciding whether or not they will intervene.

2.2 Motivations for Intervention

2.2.1 Population Dislocation, Contagion, and Ethnicity

Civil wars have been found to disrupt societies by forcing refugees across national borders (Collier et. al, 2003) and damaging social programs within the state in conflict (Lai and Thyne 2007). This movement of refugees is particularly troubling for neighboring states which
experience economic repercussions related to diversion of resources to address refugee issues (Holl 1993; Siverson and Star 1991; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). States neighboring those in conflict also typically experience a dip in their economic growth due to disrupted trade flow (Murdoch and Sandler 2002). Others theories posit that population movements are a primary reason underlying the spread of conflicts across regions due to the fact that “refugee flows may facilitate the transnational spread of arms, combatants, and ideologies conducive to conflict; they alter the ethnic composition of the state; and they can exacerbate economic competition (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006).

Additionally, refugees flowing from the civil war into bordering states could constitute a major health concern for the regional community. Civil wars tend to be breeding grounds for a variety of different health hazards (Ghoborah, Huth, and Russett 2003). Civil wars do extraordinary damage to the public health systems of a country by draining resources available to apply to healthcare systems and exposing the local populations to pathogens well as other dangers. Women and children are the most likely to be affected by a collapse of the healthcare infrastructure and they also constitute the populations most likely to become refugees (Ghoborah, Huth, and Russett 2003). Thus beyond the economic burden that comes with refugee flows, the spread of communicable diseases such as malaria HIV/AIDS represent a secondary concern of neighboring states (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005; Collier et. al 2003).

Given these potential dangers, states in the immediate bordering nations might very well be highly inclined to intervene. Civil wars have detrimental effects on neighboring countries. First, the potential for “contagion” is high (Regan 2000). That is, the fighting would not be contained within the borders of the conflicted country. Kathman (2010) observed that when the infection risk to third party neighbors increased so too did the likelihood that they would
intervene. Additionally, “ethnic affinities” in cross-border communities will generally be higher than in those environments where large distances separate ethnic groups, generating domestic constituencies that influence the decision-making process.”

2.2.2 The Geography of Conflict

Why then should a study that focuses on regime type and intervention processes consider refugee flows, contagion, and ethnic ties? One interesting feature of democracies is that they tend to cluster. Most are clustered in Western Europe and the Americas. Interestingly, most civil wars occur in the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia. In these areas, democracy is not nearly as prevalent. If a civil war erupts, it is much more likely that the neighboring states are not democracies. Yet we continue to observe democracies intervening in states within the aforementioned regions. It should be fairly evident that most democratic states are minimally at risk of experiencing these mass flows of refugees. Thus, when considering intervention, it does not necessarily appear that the refugee flows would be part of the intervention decision calculus. Other geographic considerations could certainly be taken into account when a state is deciding on whether or not to intervene. One finding was that great powers are much more likely to intervene in distant conflicts (Pearson1974).

When considering the geographic clustering of democratic regimes, democracies are less likely to experience civil wars themselves and their neighbors are more likely to be democracies. Therefore it makes sense that the opportunity to intervene would exist at some distance from their borders due to the fact that civil wars are less likely to happen in regions inhabited by democracies. However, it should be noted that distant conflicts necessarily entail higher costs related to the intervention. Planning for the logistical difficulties posed by engaging in an
intervention farther from a state’s power base is more difficult and the effort is more costly. Due to the fact that as costs for intervening increase as the intervener extends from its power base, the potential for successful intervention decreases (Regan 2000). Therefore, we should see geographically insulated states more hesitant to engage in distant conflicts. This is particularly true of democratic regimes who typically display more caution in choosing which conflicts to engage in. However, we often observe democratic regimes entering into these conflicts despite the added cost of intervening from a distance (Regan 1996). My theory is that some civil wars have particular characteristics that peak the interests of domestic political audiences in democratic states. If these audiences have the ability to influence policymakers to intervene in civil wars that have no direct bearing on the national interests of the intervening state, then this might provide at least a partial explanation as to why third parties will intervene.

2.3 Conditions for Successful Intervention

While the previous literature clearly indicates that third parties feel compelled to engage in interventions in order to stem the negative consequences of civil wars, they must also calculate the probability that their intervention will be successful. One of the basic assumptions made by policymakers when considering intervention is the probable success of the endeavor. How then should we define success? One widely accepted proposition is that intervening states will act in order to encourage the fighting to come to an end (Regan 1996). That is, the cessation of hostilities and the stabilization of the conflicted state will be the primary goal of the intervention. This is not to say that other motivations should not be considered. For example, the intervening state might wish to become engaged in the conflict for a variety of other reasons. The intervening state could have an interest in exploiting the conflict for its own benefit. By intervening the state may be able to make territorial gains for itself. Another goal may be to help
ensure regional stability by limiting the spread of the conflict to other nations. Alternatively, the intervening state could have particular ties to a country in conflict which would necessitate interventionist behavior to ensure that the status quo is not upset. For the purposes of this paper, I intend to define success as intervention which serves to cease hostilities and stabilize the conflicted region. Under this definition, it makes no difference which party in the conflict, if any, an intervener supports.

2.3.1 Conflict Characteristics

Beyond defining success, how do the characteristics of the conflict affect the likelihood of a successful intervention? Particularly intense conflicts with high casualty rates prior to an intervention are factors that affect the probability of success. Given that the internal parties to the conflict have already expended significant resources, such as blood and treasure, it is unlikely that less costly forms of intervention, such as economic incentives to end the fighting would be sufficient to bring the conflict to an end. Rather a more significant form of intervention, for example a large and costly military intervention, could be necessary to achieve the intervener’s goal. Additionally, high casualty rates will often entrench the opposing sides in their effort. They become more resolved to continue the fight to the end given that each has invested much in their campaigns already. These considerations could lead one to believe that intense and protracted conflicts are among the most difficult to successfully intervene in, and are thus less likely to experience an intervention (Regan 1996).

The nature of the conflict must also be considered. Different civil wars have different causes and the variation in these causes leads to differing degrees of intractability. Fearon (2004) examined various types of civil wars and how their typology affects the duration of the
conflict. Several categories seem to be able to be resolved relatively quickly. Coups, popular revolutions, wars of decolonization, and conflicts in post-cold war Eastern Europe tend to be short lived. In contrast, “sons of the soil” (Weiner 1978) conflicts tend to last much longer. These conflicts are characterized by an ethnic majority moving populations from their traditional territorial base into the periphery of the state. The migrants, supported by state development projects, push traditional inhabitants of these areas out of their traditional land base. This forced (or encouraged) migration often leads to the secondarily displaced populations deciding to push back against the state and those that migrated into territory that was historically controlled by the peripheral population.

Unlike the previous conflict types, these conflicts tend to have quite a bit more staying power. Additionally, intrastate conflicts that result from conflicting ideologies are particularly difficult to end. Whereas disputes over autonomy of populations may be able to be resolved in a relatively straightforward manner, ideological differences have a way of hardening the resolve of the conflicting parties. When the resolution to the conflict involves one side abandoning its ideological base, that side must also concede claims to sovereignty (Regan 1996). Because the issues at stake are less tangible in these conflicts, relative to ethnic and religious conflicts, both competing sides will be more unwilling to concede their position making outside intervention much more difficult. The point of the previous discussion is to illustrate that not only do the reasons for intervention vary, but the likelihood of a successful intervention also varies depending on conflict characteristics.
2.3.2 The Intervention Cost Calculus

Intervention options have associated costs. Regan’s expected utility model for intervention addresses these costs as well as other factors third parties consider when choosing to intervene. First, decision makers must consider whether or not the intervention, no matter the goal of that intervention, will be successful. Let us assume the following case that he puts forth. “If there were two identical interventions – in terms of human and material costs—and one succeeded and the other failed, we would expect the political costs of failure to surpass those associated with the successful policy (Regan 1998). In other words, interveners take into consideration the nature of the conflict and the potential costs-benefit outcomes when deciding whether or not to intervene. Intervention is a costly course of action for states. Large quantities of material resources are required to undertake such action. This is particularly true of military intervention. Troops must be diverted from other theaters and this movement can strain the logistic capacity of the intervening state. Thus, there is an economic cost to intervention that they would avoid bearing by avoiding involvement in another states internal conflict. Beyond economic costs, intervention can impose a human cost on states. Intervening raises that probability that these troops will become casualties of the conflict. Given the disposition of the intervening states population, the realization that their fellow citizens might be killed during a conflict can impact them negatively. Thus, the possibility of political backlash to the intervention decision is a real political danger to policy makers.

2.4 Democracies and Conflict

Are democracies more capable of avoiding conflict with a high probability of a negative outcome? Some research has appeared to support the idea that generally democracies are less
prone to go to war (Babst 1972; Rummel 1983). More recent research has helped to dispel the notion that democracies are less war prone. While democracies do not tend to fight one another, democratic states are as likely to be involved in military conflict as frequently as other regime types (Levy 1982). The decision to go to war is ultimately made by a state’s political leaders (Domke 1988) whether they be democratic or of another type. When the potential for political consequences related to entering a conflict are limited, then leaders should be more willing to do so. However, if there are negative foreseeable consequences that follow a decision to engage in a conflict, leaders should be less willing to engage in behavior that could harm them politically. Leaders in democratic states will necessarily be more loath to make hasty decisions to go to war due to the fact that they attain and maintain power through the consent of the governed, who will necessarily incur the cost of conflict, they can be held accountable for unpopular or faulty decision making politically. We should view the decision to intervene in a state’s civil war in much the same light. Both interstate and intrastate conflicts can have positive or negative political consequences for leaders in democratic states. When successful policies are enacted, policy makers are rewarded. However, if they fail to achieve a stated objective (e.g. losing a war, failing to successfully intervene) the potential for negative political consequences is heightened.

2.4.1 Institutional Constraints in Democracies

It is not that simply being a democratic regime makes a state less likely to go to war but, rather the structure of democratic regimes that allow citizens and other groups within democratic states to constrain the actions of heads of state. Other proponents of the institutional constraints argument (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Russet 1993) argue that democratic institutions allow for the organization and mobilization of opposition groups which will no doubt take
advantage of the vulnerability of elites that embark upon frivolous, expensive, or failed foreign policy (e.g. war). Because there is often competition waiting in the wings, going to war has the potential to increase dissatisfaction among the electorate which can encourage them to replace parties or leaders who engage in failed policies thereby making the current regime more risk averse. In contrast, nondemocratic leaders do not face such prospects given the authoritarian nature of their regimes.

Democratic institutions also help to decentralize decision-making power allowing groups that are more conflict averse to impede actions that may lead to conflict (Morgan and Campbell 1991). These lines of reasoning suggest that leaders in democratic societies have a less incentive to go to war given the risks associated with doing than authoritarian governments. There is also an informational component related to states and their willingness to go to war that is derived from the crisis bargaining literature. When complete information exists about the intentions of both parties in a crisis then it becomes easier for the parties to come to an agreement as to what settlement would be acceptable to both and thus avoid the need to incur the cost of engaging in armed conflict in order to resolve the dispute. However, because opposing sides of an issue maintain diverging interests, they will be inclined to hold information in order to potentially achieve a better deal than they would have under conditions of complete information. Audience costs can help explain why certain regime types can more credibly signal their intentions.

Democratic leaders face both internal and external costs when signaling intentions. Fearon (1994) develops a bargaining model to emphasize the importance of public opinion in the decision making process. Democracies, because of their political structure, face higher costs than do non-democracies and are therefore compelled to send credible signals during times of crises. Democratic leaders are particularly vulnerable to audience costs related to national honor
(Mercer 1996) in that if they reveal false intentions and retreat from their stated position they will incur audience costs both domestically and internationally. Thus, there is an international cost to backtracking resulting in loss of credibility among peers in the international community. There is also a domestic cost associated with bluffing. Democratic leaders who engage in this behavior often face skepticism about their ability to effectively govern from the domestic populations. Additionally, political opponents will likely seize the opportunity to mount a political front in opposition to leaders that sully the national honor of the state (Fearon 1994; Schultz 1998).

Non-democracies have less to fear from engaging in bluffing behavior as they are not as accountable to their populations and often encounter little viable political opposition. Therefore, when audience costs are potentially high regimes are likely to send credible signals indicating their resolve related to their stated bargaining position. Furthermore, the presence of strong political opposition can serve to provide additional confirmation of the regimes stated intentions (Schultz 1999). Another common component of democratic systems of government is the existence of a free press. A minimally restricted press corps can further confirm whether or not democratic regimes are resolute in their stated intentions and can transmit this information to external parties (Siegel 1997). These institutions can lead to greater transparency regarding a government’s intentions help to solve the problems arising from incomplete information during the bargaining process. It could be assumed that democratic populations have much greater access to government transparency. They also have the potential to know more about the world in general given the prevalence of these press corps. Once democratic populations have knowledge of external events they have the opportunity to voice their opinions as to what the appropriate course of action might be. It is the variation in audience costs related to political
decisions and the availability of information that helps explain why democracies and non-democracies choose to intervene in some conflicts while avoiding others.

### 2.4.2 Audience Costs

Democratic regimes are particularly responsive to public opinion. The potential for negative consequences stemming from a decision to intervene in another state’s civil war could dissuade democratic leaders from interventions. However, the opposite seems to be the case. Throughout the last four decades it is democratic regimes that have been the most active in civil war interventions. Apart from regime type and the audience costs influencing the decision to enter into a conflict, they can help to explain probable outcomes of particular types of wars. My theory is that initiation and success are linked by domestic politics. Public sentiment can be a powerful impetus for democratic policy makers to intervene in conflicts in which the public perceives a compelling reason for action. This decision by the initiator is considered “self selection” (Gartner and Siverson 1996, Reiter and Stam 2002). One can assume that state leaders will take into account their chances of winning any conflict that they enter. A further assumption is that once a particular likelihood of success has been subjectively established by the potential initiator they will have a better understanding of whether or not to intervene in a particular conflict. As this likelihood of success increases so too does the likelihood of initiation. However, when domestic political pressure exists, the decision calculus becomes somewhat more complicated.

Earlier research indicates that leaders who enter into conflicts and fail face negative political repercussions, most notably removal from office (Reiter and Stam 2002). The fear of this outcome is not without warrant. Unlike autocratic or anocratic governments which have the
power to repress populations and maintain their hold on power, democratic regimes are particularly sensitive to how policy decisions will affect their perception among the democratic population. While the early research indicates that war loss leads to regimes being ousted more quickly and more frequently than other types (Beuno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995), more recent analysis appears to indicate that systematic removal of democratic leaders who fail to achieve their foreign policy goals is not nearly as prevalent as once thought (Chiozza and Goemans 2004).

This might appear to undercut my argument regarding audience costs being calculated in the intervention initiation process. However, this is not necessarily the case. This more recent research only indicates that systematic removal of democratic leaders from office is not as likely following the failure of a military campaign. It does not speak to the perception that democratic leaders have regarding the potential political consequences of failure. They can still feel constrained by domestic institutions and public opinion even in the face of evidence that suggests dire political consequences are unlikely. While removal from office following a failed intervention may be rare, this failure can erode a population’s faith policy makers’ ability to make sound judgments both foreign and domestic.

2.4.3 Information and the Cost of Conflict

Autocratic regimes can, at least theoretically, be more willing to engage in risky wars. If their internal security structures are robust enough repress any negative reaction to defeat, then they can effectively negate audience costs. In contrast, democratic regimes are not often afforded this option. Thus, democratic leaders have a lower threshold for negative political consequences when their foreign policy fails. Democratic leaders are much more particular
about what types of war they choose to engage in. Research seems to indicate that democracies are much better at determining which conflicts lend themselves to success. Domestic audience costs, political opposition and veto players, and a free press are components of democratic regimes that help guide leaders through the war initiation process. Democratic institutions tend to produce higher quality information regarding the political costs related to intervention than do non-democracies (Reiter and Stam 1998a). For example, open forums for debate related to policy choices serve to uncover faulty assumptions about the level of support for war. The presence of political opposition, which can use the press as a forum for debating the quality of decisions, is also characteristic of democratic regimes (Snyder 1991; Van Evera 1994). Media coverage of a policy decision would necessarily expose that policy to public scrutiny and thus potential audience costs. If the relevant public in opposition to the policy is significant enough, then choosing and unpopular policy could lead to audience costs for the policy makers who fail to recognize and react to public opinion.

Democratic military institutions are also more likely to present quality information on the chances of winning a conflict whereas these same institutions in non-democracies are either unwilling or unable to provide clear direction to leaders regarding military affairs (Pollack 1996). Additionally, democracies tend to have more competent and less biased bureaucratic institutions that can even handedly evaluate the implications of policy decision (Reiter 1998a). In contrast, it can be observed that autocrats will often surround themselves with individuals that wish to stay in the good graces of those that they serve. Dissent and proposal of alternative courses of actions related to policy are discouraged and often punished severely. One recent example of this phenomenon is Iraq under Saddam Hussein’s regime. During his tenure as the leader of Iraq, he undertook two military campaigns that resulted in disaster for the state: the Iran Iraq war from
1980-1988 and the 1990 Gulf War against the United States. In both cases his subordinates failed to accurately predict and inform him of the duration and cost of these conflicts, possibly due to fear that disagreeing with Hussein would lead to demotion or some other form of punishment.

Democratic leaders typically do not have the ability to maintain as dominant a position regarding policy decisions that many non-democratic leaders do. Advisory boards to these leaders are typically made up, in part, of career bureaucrats who benefit from a greater degree of insulation from retribution if their views conflict with those of political leaders. All of these factors lead to democratic regimes being able to more accurately identify which conflict should be avoided. Democratic regimes also seek to identify the lowest cost wars to enter into both in financial and human capital when possible. Democracies typically fight in less bloody conflicts due to shorter wars (Bennett and Stam 1996, 1998). They also tend to engage in lower-cost wars (Siverson 1995). This is partially related to audience costs. Increased expenditures can lead to greater rent seeking behavior by the government conducting military operations. This need not be strictly monetary in nature. It is true that as the costs of a conflict increase fewer resources can be used to address needs of the state unrelated to the conflict.

However, when we consider costs we must also look at the cost in lives of those that a state commits to a conflict. We must look back to audience cost to help explain why this is the case. Democratic populations are sensitive to casualties and conflict fatigue. They are not necessarily any more sensitive to them than populations under other regime types, but they have an opportunity to express their grievances to which democratically elected officials will be unlikely to ignore. As the casualty count rises, so too does opposition to war in democratic populations. It is not necessarily a function of how many total casualties exist for any intervener
but rather a rapidly accelerating rate of casualties that accounts for a decline in public support (Gartner and Segura 1998). For these reasons we see democratic regimes initiating war under only certain conditions: short, low cost wars where the odds of victory are relatively high. This ability to correctly assess the potential costs associated with conflict is one explanation for the success of democratic regimes (Reiter and Stam 2002). The reasons behind these accurate calculations relate to the institutions inherent to democratic political systems.

Generally, initiators of conflict hold an advantage when it comes to winning conflict (Bueno de Mesquita 1981). However, there is some indication that democracies, unlike other regime types need not take advantage of striking the initial blow in order to assure victory. There have been several different hypotheses as to why this is the case. I will examine two different schools of thought related to why democracies are more able to win wars relative to other regime types. The first school (war fighting) establishes a rent seeking model to explain why democracies fare better in war. It asserts that democracies are better at waging war for three distinct reasons. First, democracies seek lower rents from their populations leading to greater economic wealth which supports superior war fighting capability. Second, democracies will form formal or informal alliances to assist each other. Finally, they can expect that their populations can more easily be rallied to provide support for the war fighting effort (Lake 1992).

While at first glance this reasoning seems to provide a logical way forward in explaining democratic dominance in conflict, the model does have some shortcomings. Fewer rents derived from the population lead to a relative decline in the available resources available for efficient war fighting. Furthermore there is no guarantee that democracy leads to greater economic wealth (Przeworski and Limongi 1997). Although overwhelming democratic coalitions are hypothesized in the model to be a determinant of democratic victory, the data to support that
conclusion is lacking (Reiter and Stam 1998a). However, there does seem to be some credibility to the claim that democracies are better able garner support for war efforts among their populations (Levi 1997).

Not only are democracies more able than non-democracies in building domestic support for war efforts, but democracies also hold an advantage on the battlefield. Most of the existing literature seems to indicate that there is little evidence that soldiers fighting for democratic regimes fight harder based on an adherence to a particular political ideology. The results of most studies are mixed at best. However, there are certain aspects of democratic culture that do lend themselves to greater war fighting effectiveness. One characteristic of democratic militaries is that they tend to field more talented military leaders. As opposed to the militaries in non-democracies, democratic military leadership is often more adept in assuring that the troops that they command adhere to a general battleplan. One possible reason for this is that the leadership structure of most democratic militaries is not dominated by individuals who belong to a particular social class or ethnic group. Rather, they are drawn from the general population. This leads to fewer instances of class or ethnic cleavages that could serve to undermine the authority of military leaders, thus increasing the likelihood that when orders are given they are executed more readily (Rosen 1991).

While the military hierarchy in democracies tends to be more stable, this does not mean that soldiers are altogether barred from exhibiting individuality on the battlefield. One characteristic of superior leadership is the recognition that, while military commanders are generally best suited to make tactical and strategic decisions, they are not always in a position to make the correct battlefield decision. Often, particularly at the tactical level, individual soldiers or small groups of soldiers are in the superior position to determine what the best course of
action is given the particulars of the operation at hand. Individualism is a characteristic emphasized by many democracies (to one degree or another). Therefore, it is unsurprising that soldiers would display this characteristic when engaging in war fighting activities and that this trait would be encouraged to some degree by military leadership (Pollack 1996).

Democratic militaries also exhibit greater organizational effectiveness. Nondemocratic leaders often have much to fear from their own military services relative to democratic leaders. Many have themselves come into power by way of military coup and recognize that the same fate could befall them if they do not take steps to prevent it. Many times, nondemocratic leaders will attempt to insulate themselves from internal challenges by promoting those who exhibit high levels of loyalty to the regime or move them from one position to another to avoid these individuals cultivating close ties to those they command (Tullock 1987). This may or may not lead to having the most talented and capable individuals at or near the top of the military hierarchy. On the other hand, democracies tend to promote individuals to leadership positions based on a system of merits and achievement. Rather than place individuals in these positions due to loyalty to the regime, democracies let those best suited to the task fill these positions based on their effectiveness as leaders (Reiter and Stam 1998b). Bestowed with more talented military planners and leaders as well as having soldiers that possess greater initiative, democratic regimes have advantages that other regime types cannot necessarily claim (Reiter and Stam 1998a, 1998b, 2002).

2.4.4 Conflict Outcomes

So what are the general findings on war outcomes based on regime type? It appears that democratic regimes are careful about what wars they choose to fight. That is, they generally
fight short wars with low numbers of casualties (Bennett and Stam 1996, 1998; Siverson 1995). Democracies also tend to win wars both when they initiate the conflict as well as when they are the initial target (Clark and Reed 2003; Reiter and Stam 1998a, 2002). However, this advantage declines across time particularly when protracted conflict leads to high levels of casualties (Bennett and Stam 1998; Reiter and Stam 2002). In sum, what should we expect from democracies prior to and during conflicts? Essentially the evidence points toward a trend of democracies to carefully choose which conflicts they engage in (assuming they are the initiator) and that when they do commit to armed conflict there a wide variety of reasons that they would succeed in their efforts. In fact, most evidence suggests that democracies are successful in war approximately 80% of the time (Reiter and Stam 2002). This success rate is much higher than that of non-democratic regimes. Why then do democratic regimes fair no better than their nondemocratic counterparts when conducting civil war interventions? By all accounts democracies are far more capable in combat than are non-democracies. They also benefit from higher standards of leadership, better battle tactics, and better logistics. They should also be more able to decide which interventions would be successful and avoid those that would be costly and most likely to fail.

Previous research into intervention initiation and success has been largely limited to an examination of the internal characteristics of the state experiencing a civil war. It is important to include both an analysis of conflict characteristics as well as examine how an intervener’s regime type influences the intervention process. I believe that both impact the intervention process. However, no attempt has been made to assess both sets of factors. This research project is an attempt to fill this gap in the literature by examining how regime types and their particular political institutions influence the decision to intervene and why these interventions succeed or
fail. To do so, several questions must be addressed. First, are democracies more prone to intervening in conflicts that are difficult to resolve? If so, do the domestic political institutions of democracy pressure policy makers to intervene in conflict in which successful intervention is unlikely? Further, based on our understanding of democratic war fighting efficiency, I would expect democracies to be more effective interveners. Is this in fact the case? If not, why do democracies, which are successful while conducting interstate wars, fail to achieve a similar success rate when intervening in intrastate conflicts?
CHAPTER 3: DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS AND CIVIL WAR INTERVENTION PROCESSES

3.1 Introduction

Much of the conflict literature referring to the effect of regime type has been limited to examinations of interstate war. In contrast, literature on intrastate conflict rarely mentions how an intervener’s regime type influences the decision to intervene. Likewise, scholars have neglected to thoroughly examine how regime type affects the likelihood of a state successfully intervening in a civil war. The literatures on interstate conflict and regime type provide a foundation for addressing questions regarding the possibility that democracies and non-democracies differ fundamentally in how they conduct foreign policy formulation. Previous research into intervention initiation and success has been limited to an examination of the internal characteristics of the state engaged in civil war. This focus fails to take into consideration the internal characteristics of potential interveners which are an important yet unexamined factor in the intervention process.

Democracies and non-democracies often function quite differently at the domestic and international level. However, with regard to intrastate war intervention, the current literature appears to set aside the possibility that the governments that adopt these disparate political systems might approach the intervention process differently. Democracies should, and I believe do, approach intervention differently than non-democracies. The consequence of this alternative understanding of democratic intervention leads me to two hypotheses. Democracies will
intervene in civil wars more often than non-democracies. According to my theory, domestic political institutions unique to democracies force democratic policy makers to intervene, often in conflicts that they (the policy makers) would often prefer to avoid. Additionally, the same domestic institutions that pressure democratic policy makers to intervene in these conflicts will undermine the ability of policy makers to successfully intervene in intrastate conflict. If we are to better understand why states decide to intervene and whether or not those interventions are successful, then it is important to move beyond a simple analysis of conflict characteristics and begin to examine how an intervener’s domestic political institutions and norms shape the initiation process as well as an intervener’s success rate. This research project is an attempt to fill this gap in the literature by examining how democratic regimes and their particular political institutions influence the decision to intervene and why these interventions succeed or fail. In the sections that follow, I will argue that democracies must, by virtue of their unique domestic political institutions, consider interventions under a different set of political considerations than their non-democratic counterparts.

3.2 The Intervention Decision Process: The Democratic Paradox

Many different factors lead to a nation intervening in another’s internal conflict. The process that policy makers go through when deciding on whether or not to become involved in internal conflicts has traditionally been viewed in a relatively straightforward manner. When considering foreign policy decision such as this, policy makers ask themselves a variety of questions. First, does this conflict have the potential to directly impact the national security interests of the potential intervener? If so, then we could assume that policy makers would be inclined to take some sort of action to mitigate the potential security threat. An example of this is a conflict occurring in a neighboring state. In this case, there is the potential for the conflict to
spill over the border. Alternatively, depending on the degree of threat present, they could choose to engage in buck-passing behavior by waiting to see if another neighbor decides to intervene. There are a wide variety of potential threats (to security or national interests in general) that policy makers could consider when deciding to intervene or not. Of course, there are other reasons that policy makers choose to intervene that are not related to security or interests.

Another consideration that leaders take into account is the intensity of the conflict. One potential characteristic of low level conflict is that it is not always readily observable to policy makers. Therefore, if conflict is not observed (at least at some significant level), intervention/non-intervention cannot be considered a matter of choice. Let us assume that most leaders of governments have enough resources at hand to at least recognize when conflict occurs. If policy makers do observe the conflict and it is characterized by relatively low levels of violence, then it is likely that they would defer to a non-interventionist policy (at least in the short term) in the hope that the situation will correct itself without the need to intervene. However, if there is intense fighting accompanied by high casualty rates in addition to widespread destruction then it is more likely that a third party will choose to intervene (Regan 1998). Regan identifies intense conflict accompanied by high casualty rates as being a sufficient condition for a state to intervene in a civil war. However, he neglects to offer insight as to why policy makers, in particular democratic policy makers, will choose to intervene. I intend to build upon his general observations by identifying the possible underlying mechanisms of domestic political processes that lead to democratic intervention being observed.

Democratic and non-democratic policy makers will both consider the likelihood of success of an intervention. At this point the question of what qualifies as success could be debated depending on what the potential goal of the intervention is. I will save that question for
later consideration. Whatever policy makers consider success to be, it should be assumed that they would prefer to enter into the conflict if a positive outcome could be expected. However, democratic leaders are not afforded the opportunity to abstain from intervention as easily as autocratic leaders. It should be assumed that the majority of any democratic population would be unwilling and/or unable to fully consider the array of variables that help determine which conflicts lend themselves to successful intervention. If these populations have no interest in the conflict then policy makers can make their own determination of likelihood of success and act accordingly. However, if public interest in intervention manifests itself among a democratic population then that population will pressure leaders to intervene even when the chances of success are low. Autocratic leaders simply do not encounter this type of public feedback nearly as often as democratic leaders. Thus, we should observe democracies intervening in intrastate conflict more often than their non-democratic counterparts.

Another factor in the intervention calculus is the expected cost of intervention. This could include the material, human, and political costs related to undertaking an intervention. It is likely that the intervening state would likely wish to calculate the minimum level of resources that they must commit to ensure the likelihood (as best they can given the fluid nature of conflict) that the mission is successful. While both democratic and non-democratic state governments should be able to calculate these costs with some degree of accuracy, most in any general population are unlikely to be able to do so. For non-democracies this calculation should allow them to determine what is needed to succeed and allocate the requisite resources to help insure a successful intervention. Democratic governments should also have the ability to estimate the cost of success. Again, constraints on the ability to implement a successful policy are subject to the whims of a democratic population. Whereas autocratic leaders incur these
costs without regard for public opinion related to the cost of success, democratic leaders are potentially subject to public scrutiny of the intervention costs. If the costs of intervention are deemed too high by a democratic public, democratic leaders are constrained from employing the resources necessary to achieve success in intervention. Thus, because of cost constraints placed on democratic leaders by their populations, we should observe democracies failing to achieve successful intervention outcomes.

These expectations present us with a potentially vexing problem that democratic leaders face. An unsophisticated democratic public can force leaders to undertake potentially high risk interventions while at the same time insisting that the cost incurred through the intervention be kept at a level that ensure a lower likelihood of success. Democracies are different. Democratic policy makers must approach the intervention process in a manner that is distinct from their non-democratic counterparts. This democratic paradox is the overarching phenomena that I seek to explain. In the following sections I will explain how democratic institutions shape intervention policy. Democratic leaders have a unique political relationship with their respective populations relative to their non-democratic counterparts. Public opinion matters to democratic leaders. Due to the nature of the political system within which these democratic leaders operate, they must take active public opinion into consideration when making political choices, intervention policy being one example. Furthermore, the freedoms and access afforded to media organizations in democracies serves to enhance the ability of populations to communicate preferences to the political leadership. The synergism of public opinion and media can have a measurable effect on democratic policy maker’s decisions to intervene in civil war. The coupling of active public opinion and a free press with post-materialistic attitudes, expressed most profoundly in democratic states, further shapes the policy preferences of democratic leaders. These factors,
when considered together, lead me to believe that democratic leaders can be forced to engage in risky interventions more often and less successfully.

3.3 **Democracies, Public Opinion and Civil War Intervention**

In an autocratic state, a more simplistic cost benefit analysis reflects the intervention process accurately. Policy makers in autocratic states tend to be more insulated from potential pressure from their populations than their democratic counterparts. This is not to say that there is no relevant audience that policy makers must appeal to in order to move forward with a decision. Rather the potential pool of audiences is much smaller and often more closely linked ideologically with those at the highest level of government. Therefore fewer constraints are placed upon autocratic policy makers when considering the decision to intervene. Conversely, in democratic states domestic political considerations both constrain and advocate particular foreign policy preferences. Much of the literature on decision-making indicates that a fundamental feature of the political context regarding policy decisions is a concern over the acceptability of that decision (Art 1973, Farnem 1990). That is to say that if policy is expected to be effective it must be acceptable to relevant groups and individuals. Who then are these “relevant” groups? In an autocracy this is often limited to a relatively small group of individuals that have influence over governmental policy. Democracies, by way of the manner in which institutions are more closely tied to the desires of those they govern, have potentially many more relevant groups.

Whether or not there is a considerable amount of policy shift observed under conditions of shifting public opinion has been debated through much of the literature. There are those who assert that policy preferences will adapt to changing public opinion regarding those policies. One theory is that policies should be expected to respond to public opinion given that under
certain circumstances elected officials will be responsive to public opinion in anticipation of
either positive or negative public response to proposed policies (Downs 1957; Davis, Hinich, and
Ordeshook 1970). They argue that electoral viability of policy makers is contingent on the
approval of certain electoral majorities. Under conditions of perfect information this relationship
appears logical. One of the more frequent disagreements among scholars studying policy
responsiveness is what the causal relationship between public opinion and public policy is.
Those that would argue that policy makers are responsive to changing public opinion see policy
being shaped by the policy opinions of engaged publics.

Conversely, there are those that will argue that this causal relationship works in reverse.
That is, rather than public opinion affecting policy responsiveness, public opinion leaders will
seek to shape public opinion in a manner that favors those policy makers’ preferences. This
could come in a variety of forms. Either policy makers will seek to inform an uneducated public
about how a particular policy or policy outcome would be beneficial to the public (Mill 1962;
Key 1961), or policy makers could choose to actively mislead the public as to the nature of the
policy or the potential consequences of that policy (Edelman 1964; Wise 1973; Miliband 1976).

While there is certainly merit in all of these arguments, it is my contention that policy is
in fact responsive (to a certain degree) to public opinion. The assertion that policy makers would
seek to educate an uninformed public first assumes that publics are largely ignorant to events.
While this is true in the short term, I would argue that any event of significant magnitude (e.g. a
major civil war) would appear on much of the public’s political radar at some point.
Additionally, while democratic publics would not necessarily have any specific reaction to an
unfamiliar event, they hold opinions about similar events and policy prescriptions that have
occurred in the past. Therefore, they often have latent opinions that simply have not had an opportunity to be expressed.

I am even more skeptical of the argument that policy makers could be engaged in deliberate deception in order to shape public opinion. While it is certainly possible, the conditions under which this approach would be successful would need to be very specific. First, the public would need to be almost wholly unaware of an event and the policy proposal directed at it. In this case the need to deceive the public would be unnecessary as policy makers could simply go private with their policy choice and the relevant publics would be none the wiser. In order for this condition of public ignorance to exist it would require an inattentive public and either an ineffective press corps, or a press corps that is complicit in and supportive of the deception. In the case of an autocratic nation, these conditions are possible. However, in democratic states I argue that it is unlikely that going private or actively seeking to obscure the policy would be possible for any significant amount of time.

Fortunately, there has been some limited research related to this causal relationship. A. D. Monroe’s (1978) examination of policy and public opinion congruence indicates that there measurable consistency between the two. This observation is most profound when considering foreign policy and what he terms “highly salient” issues. However, this does not suggest a solution to the questions surrounding the causal relationship. Again, a narrow vein of research provides us with clues as to whether or not opinion drives policy or whether the reverse is the case. Not only can we observe policy and opinion congruency but it also appears that public opinion drives this process. If shifts in public opinion on a salient issue are significant and can be sustained over an extended period of time policy will tend to conform to this public opinion (Page and Shapiro 1983). Furthermore, Page and Shapiro have observed this opinion movement
preceding changes in public policy leading me to believe that public opinion can and does affect policy decisions. It is my hope that this dissertation will provide further evidence of this causal relationship being driven in large part by public opinion.

If there is a general lack of knowledge among the public about the existence of a particular foreign policy issue, then the policy maker necessarily has greater freedom to implement policy that he or she believes is best suited to the situation. In other words, the leadership is not constrained by public opinion. There are limited (if any) negative consequences to implementing the policy due to lack of awareness on the part of the public. Holding private information about policy is, in many cases, preferred by leaders. Democratic leaders in particular wish to hold private information to avoid public scrutiny of the policy which would trigger a negative response by public. A negative view of the policy might translate into political blowback that policy makers rightly wish to avoid. However, this does not means that latent public policy will not necessarily be dismissed by policy makers. Policy makers do not consider unexpressed public opinion unimportant. These policy makers understand that there is a possibility that dormant public opinion can be activated even if they (the policy makers) are not the ones to initiate this activation. A robust media infrastructure is a likely activator of public policy outside of the policy making establishment.

Because they recognize that activation is possible, policy makers will attempt to predict public reaction to a policy in the eventuality that the policy is publicized. Furthermore, they will attempt to assess how this predicted public opinion could impact the implementation of policy makers’ preferred foreign policy proposals (Powlick 1991; Hinckley 1992). Therefore, even when a preferred foreign policy has been determined, the activation of public opinion and the potential resistance to a particular policy will induce policy makers to tailor the policy in such a
way that it falls within a perceived range of acceptability by the public. This pre-activation calculation has the potential to shape policy prior to the public being significantly aware of the event or policies related to it.

Policy makers could, if they choose to, broadcast the policy thereby activating public opinion. However, given limited public knowledge in this case, doing so would unnecessarily expose the policy to public scrutiny and potentially lead to disapproval of the policy (Baum 2004). There is some evidence that U.S. Presidents tend to “go private” with policies that do not have a direct impact on national security (Smith 1998; Schultz 2001). While there may be a political incentive in going public with a policy announcement (obtaining a positive audience benefit from successful policy), it also allows an opportunity for negative public attitudes toward the policy to be expressed.

3.4 Media’s Effect on Public Opinion and Foreign Policy

Announcing policy preferences and action is not a role limited to policy makers. Given the limited nature of the conflict I would assume that inaction would be the likely policy choice in this case. Assuming a professional and effective press corps, we could expect that at least some coverage of the policy would be presented to the public. However, limited conflicts would likely lead to limited coverage. So, even if the potential policy preference of the public is in favor of active government intervention, public opinion is not activated and the preference is not expressed to policy makers. In this scenario, the conflict occurs, policy is made, and the public has little opportunity to react (Katz and Powlick 1996).

In another scenario, there is a civil war and the level of conflict is intense. There is a growing humanitarian crisis and the violence is escalating. Again, the conflict has little or no
impact on the national security position of the potential intervener. However, in this instance I assume that media coverage of the event will be significantly more pronounced. One might questions why media outlets would choose to cover this type of event. Graber (1997) proposes that media outlets will choose to cover stories according to five criteria. First, does it directly impact the lives of potential viewers? Given the particulars of this case it is unlikely to do so. Second, does the story have elements of violence, conflict, disaster, or possibly scandal? Certainly a civil war of the type described fits within this criterion. Third, is it familiar? This is often difficult to determine. However, since this is one of the primary considerations for deciding what to cover, I would assume that it probably has not been reported extensively and therefore would be unfamiliar to the public. Fourth, audience proximity is considered. In the American context, the audience proximity would probably be distant given the geographical location of the United States. This obviously depends on how one measures proximity (regionally, continentally, ideologically, etc). Finally, is the event timely or novel? This too would vary, but I assume that a current civil war would be at the very least considered timely.

Civil wars meet at least one of the criteria Graber describes, violence and conflict. More importantly, this is one of the most important of the five when outlets choose to report events. In this case then, I would assume that coverage of the event would be significant. Let us further assume that the leaders of the potential intervener would again choose to refrain from intervening. Not only is the event not vital to the national security interests of the state, but the material cost to intervene successfully would most probably be much greater than in the minor conflict previously mentioned. I believe that the key difference between the two scenarios is the level of media coverage given to both events. In this case it is much less likely that the policy makers would be able to keep the policy private.
Rather, media coverage of the event would necessarily expose the policy to public scrutiny and thus potential audience costs. It does so through the following steps according to Powlick and Katz (1998). A policy decision is made. The public has several options: ignore the policy, accept it, mildly resist the policy, or voice strong opposition to the policy. The authors assume that the policy is presented. I would argue that this does not always happen. From that point the media decides whether or not to cover the event. If they choose not to cover the event then, as indicated earlier, there is no opportunity for public opinion to activate.

However, even with a widespread and active press corps reporting on events, there has been a vast array of empirical analysis that seems to suggest that domestic audiences have little inclination to seek out and attempt to gain a greater understanding of their nation’s foreign policy (Almond 1950; Rosenau 1961; Newman, Just, and Crigler 1992; Ericson, MacKuen, and Stimson 1994). The conclusion of much of this work appears to indict domestic audiences as being apathetic to issues and policies that exist beyond their limited, primarily domestic views of and interest in politics. These assertions should not be altogether unsurprising. The day to day activities of most individuals are more often than not unaffected directly by events beyond their nation’s borders. Given the stresses of daily life such as work, family and other potential distractions, we could conceive of the individuals as being rationally ignorant of affairs that have little or no material consequence to them.

Generally speaking, the American public was long considered to be considered quite disengaged from as well as uninformed about foreign policy issues (Converse and Markus 1979; Zaller 1992). That is, most of the time domestic audiences will have unstable opinion regarding foreign affairs, if they are aware of them at all. This indicates a lack of political sophistication on the part of the public. However, lack of political sophistication is not necessarily an indication of
a lack of opinion relative to a particular policy. Individuals have a tendency to respond to questions posed to them whether or not they have any relevant knowledge about the subject in question. They have opinions that they can express in a more or less truthful manner even though the subject matter is quite foreign to them (Mueller 1973; Zaller 1992. The end result of this general ignorance to public policy, and foreign policy in particular, is that public opinion related to these policies tends to lie dormant. Public opinion will continue to exist in this dormant state until the emergence of an event or proposal that results in an activation of latent public opinion (Key 1964; Powlick and Katz 1998).

This is particularly true of domestic populations in well established democracies. As noted earlier, these states tend to be geographically clustered and often well removed from areas experiencing conflict. As such, we should expect that policy regarding distant events and peoples would unduly distract much of a domestic population from domestic concerns closer to home. This is especially true considering the time and energy required to contemplate the policy implications of states interacting with each other on the global stage.

Most unsophisticated publics will tend to skew their attention away from hard news outlets toward more entertainment oriented programming (Chaffee and Kanihan 1997). Their desire to meaningfully dissect the intricacies of policy, specifically foreign policy, is much lower than that of what we might consider attentive or sophisticated publics. Furthermore, these unsophisticated publics, who are often considered apathetic toward policy matters, often feel as if they have no meaningful way of influencing policy even if they desired to do so (Key 1961; Rosenau 1961; Cohen 1973). Despite this apparent apathy and the tendency of unsophisticated publics to direct their attention away from sources of “hard” news, it is increasingly the case that policy information is being disseminated through non-traditional channels.
More specifically, so called “soft” news sources have to a much greater degree than in the past devoted time and resources to covering foreign affairs. Soft news sources are generally differentiated from hard news sources by two variables. Typically, subjects such as politics, economics are considered to be “hard news.” The focus of the coverage tends to be factual in nature. Sources reporting hard news are interested in covering the specifics of the events being covered. “Soft news” sources on the other hand have traditionally sought to shy away from topics that are typically the perview of hard news sources. Rather, these outlets seek to inform or advise audiences about topics of general human interest or simply entertain them. While probably not to the same degree as traditional news sources, these outlets do provide a general overview of international events. This is particularly true of dramatic events unfolding in distant countries, specifically conflict in which a human drama is a significant component. It seems as though many of these soft news outlets have seized upon the realization that while they can satisfy their audiences with compelling tales of dramatic human interest stories of domestic origin, the same desire on the part of their audiences to be informed of disaster and human drama at home translates into an interest in drama unfolding in the rest of the world. These same unsophisticated publics, who intentionally eschewed the perhaps antiseptic policy analysis of an event provided by mainstream media outlets, find themselves engrossed by world events quite regardless of whether they intended to do so. Therefore even individuals who shy away from discussion of policy, domestic or foreign, have the opportunity to be exposed to debate that has the potential to activate dormant public opinion in those who would otherwise not engage in contemplation of policy.

Once media coverage (via traditional or soft media) is provided, an opportunity for elite debate of the policy exists. If the public has access to this content of this debate then it can begin
to form an opinion with regard to the stated policy of the government. The public could approve of the policy and no costs would be incurred. However, the mere fact that public awareness could be higher leaves open the possibility that there would be portions of the population that would disagree with stated policy of the government and lobby for a change in position. This is not to say they the public becomes more sophisticated in their understanding of the issue, only more aware of it. As the level of media coverage increases then the likelihood of a relevant group in opposition to the non-interventionist policy could emerge as well. Policy makers could be perfectly happy with the policy as is. They may feel that non-intervention is the best approach. After all, interventions have at least some minimum costs associated with them. In the low level conflict the only cost would be that of material and manpower to conduct the intervention. In the high level conflict, with the addition media coverage which serves as the first step in activating public opinion, political cost are now present. If the relevant public in opposition to the policy is significant enough, then the non-interventionist policy could lead to negative public perceptions of policy makers who fail to recognize and react to activated public opinion.

This presents a problem for policy makers, particularly if they are elected officials. They could continue with the current policy and risk losing significant political support from certain segments of the population. This could be problematic if the event occurs during an election period or if it fails to terminate before the next election cycle. Still the official(s) could believe that the current policy is optimal. Thus, the policy maker has encountered a conflict between domestic and foreign policy and must determine some acceptable alternative to current policy (Farnham 1990). Ideally, he or she would like to know whether or not the opposition audience costs do not outweigh the cost of intervening. However, this can be quite difficult. The question
then becomes one of how the policy maker can seek an alternative policy that will work best on both dimensions. Policy makers will attempt to forge a compromise position that attempts to satisfy both the need to address the foreign policy issue as well as domestic policy preferences (Mintz 1993). Additionally, the policy maker will not only consider both dimensions of the policy, but will actually consider domestic politics first when reformulating the policy.

3.5 Post Materialistic Attitudes and the Push Toward Intervention

While media coverage of an event, for my purposes a civil war, is a necessary condition for the activation of latent public opinion, it is not however sufficient for activating public action. Simply being aware of an event does not lead individuals to actively take part in the policy making process. Rather, proactive populations must be both aware of an event and believe that the event is relevant enough to their lives in order for that population to proactively engage in the policy discussion. This is the second condition that I believe differentiates democratic publics from those in non-democratic states. In this section I will examine the role of post-materialistic attitudes in democratic populations and the mechanism by which these attitudes lead these populations to action.

Maslow (1943) asserts that humans will tend to satisfy particular needs according to a specified hierarchy. At the bottom of the hierarchy we find biological and physiological. These include the most basic needs required for humans to survive. When these needs are not being met it is basic human nature that individuals will seek to attain these fundamental requirements prior to engaging in any other activity. Once these have been obtained individuals will focus on safety needs. These include protection of oneself and assurance of a stable and secure environment. This includes not only physical stability, but economic stability as well. This
economic stability component will be the starting point of my argument regarding post-materialistic attitudes and public opinion regarding foreign policy attitude. Beyond these safety needs, humans begin to form meaningful relationships. I will argue that these relationships do not necessarily have to be restricted to those in close relational or geographic proximity to one another.

Finally, we come to the esteem needs. Once basic physiological, safety, and relational needs are met, individuals will pursue more personal and material goals. These could include achievement of a particular status, the acquisition of wealth, and an enhanced desire to be responsible for making decisions not only for oneself but for others within the individual’s sphere of influence. Once these “deficiency needs” (Maslow 1943) have been met, individuals can allow themselves to focus less on the what the individual must have to survive and thrive and more on the potential of the individual to more significantly affect events previously thought to be out of one’s control.

In general, the more able one is to assure himself of the basic requirements of survival and security the more likely he is to concern himself with matters less related to basic survival. This concept is expressed in Inglehart’s (1977) scarcity hypothesis. In it, Inglehart suggests that all individuals can appreciate and seek to attain freedom and autonomy. However, under conditions where the most basic needs (food, shelter, physical security, etc) of the individuals are not being met, they will prioritize their personal goals to ensure that the most fundamental needs for human survival are being met. Under these conditions materialistic attitudes will prevail. Conversely, under conditions of conditions of physical and economic security, individuals will begin to exhibit post-materialistic attitudes by pursuing goals such as knowledge acquisition, self
awareness, and a need to understand the meaning of external events and how those events and their consequences affect the individuals understanding of the world around them.

Until the period following World War II, much of the world’s population had existed in a state where materialistic values prevailed. Instability existed at both the international and national level across much of the globe. Frequent interstate war along with unstable economic conditions in many countries perpetuated these materialistic attitudes. However, in the decades following World War II there has been a marked shift in the attitudes of individuals. This is particularly true of advanced industrial societies (Inglehart 2008). The post war era ushered in economic stability and prosperity in many of these societies and there is significant evidence that younger cohorts in these societies exhibit greater and increasing levels of post-materialistic attitudes (Inglehart 1971, 1977, 2008). That is individuals in the post-war era were less likely to experience deficiencies in physical and economic requirements outlined by Maslow.

It is this shift in attitudes from materialism to post-materialism that I am most interested in as it relates to civil war intervention processes. I propose that societies with a larger proportion of individuals exhibiting post-materialistic attitudes will engage in and wish to influence discussions of policy once latent public opinion has been engaged. Post-materialistic attitudes are an important factor to consider when determining whether or not a state will choose to intervene in a civil war. In an advanced industrial society, post-materialistic attitudes are likely prevalent among many individuals that live in that country. Certainly there will be those who still have to face the prospect of not having their basic needs being met. Overall however, economic, relational, and security needs are attainable by much of the population.
This stands in stark contrast to the plight of the much of the populations of states in the underdeveloped world. Populations in these states are faced with a variety of impediments to assuring themselves of a stable and secure daily existence. Potable drinking water is often in short supply even in the more developed regions of the second and third world. Communicable diseases are not uncommon. The economic systems in many of these states are unstable. Given these conditions it would be difficult to expect post-materialistic attitudes to develop among much of the second and third world’s population. The majority will be too preoccupied with satisfying the conditions that allow for their survival. Therefore, we should expect varying levels of post-materialistic attitudes based in part on the stability of the state that an individual finds himself. Fortunately, existing research confirms this expectation. Most advanced industrial societies do exhibit higher levels of post-materialistic attitudes. The graphic below illustrates this to be the case.

Figure 3.1 Materialist/Post-Materialist Values by GNP/CAPITA

Figure referenced from Ronald F. Inglehart (2008): Changing Values among Western Publics from 1970 to 2006, West European Politics, 31:1-2, 130-146
Not only does Inglehart’s (2008) graphic indicate that states with greater economic stability and mobility tend to produce populations that hold post-materialistic values it also reveals information directly related to my argument. I have asserted that democracies and autocracies are in many cases fundamentally different. One of these conditions is that democratic populations are more likely to exhibit post-materialistic attitudes. This chart illustrates that to a large degree. When considering post materialism we can see that many of the populations exhibiting this trait tend to be in established industrial democracies. These are clustered in the upper right hand corner of the graphic. Furthermore, once a population adopts post-materialistic attitudes, subsequent generations tend to adopt this attitude as well increasing the proportion of the population that holds these views. Although this trend can be interrupted for short periods based on economic conditions in a state, this temporary lapse in attitudes does not appear to be long term or regressive. The prevalence of post-materialism among the populations of these states is critical to my argument. I propose that individuals with post materialistic attitudes will be more likely to pressure democratic policy makers to intervene in civil wars. Unlike individuals living under conditions which would suppress post-materialistic attitudes, citizens living in established democracies are often afforded the opportunity to consider the circumstances of individuals experiencing a civil war. With their material and security needs being met they have the capacity to actively contemplate the policy implications of their state intervening in a conflict.

Individuals exhibiting post-materialistic attitudes can examine the circumstances of those experiencing a civil war and have the potential to form an ideational relationship with those individuals. There may not be a physical or familial relationship between him and the individual experiencing the conflict. However, there could exist an ideational link between the two. The
school teacher in Kansas will recognize that a civil war in a far removed state may not directly impact his daily life. However, he may construct an intersubjective relationship with another individual based on his ideological norms (Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink 2001). For example, our teacher (given the fact that he lives in the United States) probably adheres to a number of ideological norms such as equal treatment under the law or the right to life except under circumstances in which the law provides that this protection has been forfeited by the individual.

According to democratic legalism theory, regime type is critical in understanding how respect for the rule of law governs the affairs of states. Democratic states adhere to norms of judicial processes, limitations placed on government action, and constitutional constraints. Not only do they observe these norms domestically, they often apply them to international relations as well (Simmons 1999). Similarly, when democratic states engage in dispute resolution they are more likely to seek peaceful methods in resolving their conflict. In short they will prefer political compromise and eschew violent conflict as a means of resolving their differences (Dixon 1993, 1994, 1996). Democracies are also more likely to accept third party involvement in the conflict resolution process. Dixon (1993) and Raymond (1994) find that democracies are both more likely to accept third party engagement and that this dramatically increases the likelihood that conflicts will be resolved peacefully. While these findings focus on democratic norms at the state level, individuals within democratic state internalize these norms, project these norms on others, and use their understanding of these norms to analyze external events.

When a citizens in democratic states become aware that other individuals are being denied these rights, as is often the case in intrastate conflict, they projects these norms upon that person creating an ideological relationship within their minds. After establishing this link, the post-materialist/legalist not only has an opportunity to influence policies that may impact the
other individual but may feel compelled to do so given his desire to affect the plight of the individual(s) in the conflict area. I believe this to be particularly true when the circumstances of the civil war and the civil war victim are most dire. That is, the more egregious the characteristics of the civil war, the more compelled the post-materialist/legalist will be to affect the event. In this particular case, that would entail pressuring policy makers to intervene in order to alleviate the suffering of individuals and populations in the afflicted country. Conversely, while there are almost certainly varying levels of post-materialistic thought among more affluent populations in autocratic states, the absence of understanding of or adherence to democratic norms and legalist thought will preclude these populations from developing any strong ideational relationships with the individuals excluded from protection according to democratic norms.

It is the existence of post-materialistic/legalist attitudes in conjunction with the presence of a free press that I believe forces democratic policy makers to undertake the decision to intervene in a manner divergent to autocratic policy makers. For me to make a positive link between a free press and post-materialism leading to unique policy making decision in democracies it is necessary to show that there is a correlation between the two conditions. The following graphic provides a cursory link between the two.
Again, much like the data on post-materialism we can see that the existence of a free press is largely concentrated among modern industrialized democracies. These states tend to cluster in Western Europe and North America.

### 3.6 Conclusion and Hypotheses Related to Intervention Initiation

According to my theory, democratic policy makers must contend with domestic political pressure when considering civil war interventions. This domestic political pressure should not be nearly as relevant to autocratic policy makers given the lack of free press and the low levels of post-materialistic attitudes. When both post-materialist attitudes and a free press exist within a state, as they do in many established democracies I should be able to observe a variance in the intervention decision calculus between democracies and non-democracies.
Because a free press exists in most of these states domestic populations are exposed to the existence of events beyond their own limited personal experiences. Autocratic states tend to have a press corps that is less interested in providing unbiased information to the population. Rather, these organizations act more like an entity of the state that disseminates information at the behest of the regime in order to suppress information or only provide news coverage of events that tend to benefit the regime. Alternatively, media resources in democratic states tend to provide a much wider range of information to the public. This may or may not be beneficial to policy makers who might prefer to make policy out of the general public’s view. Thus, a free press has a greater ability to activate public opinion in a manner that undercuts democratic policy makers’ ability to make policy based on strict cost benefit calculations. This is true even when publics are generally unsophisticated. News will filter through the media infrastructure, even through those outlets that are not necessarily designed to convey policy information. This is particularly true of events in which extreme crises and violence are presented to the public for consumption.

When democratic, and likely post-materialistic, publics become aware of a crises they have to decide whether or not to actively engage in the policy making process. In the case of a minor conflict where there are few visible casualties, they will likely be satisfied to let the internal parties to the conflict resolve the situation. However, when a conflict is characterized by a high casualty count, extended duration, and/or mass movements of refugees, democratic publics will be more likely to pressure policy makers to intervene. Furthermore, when more than one of these characteristics exists, I expect even more pressure to intervene being brought to bear on democratic leaders. Because of the pressure from democratic populations for their policy makers to act when a civil war occurs, I propose the following hypotheses.
H1: Democratic policy makers will be observed to intervene in intense civil wars more often than their non-democratic counterparts.

H2: Because of their propensity to intervene in difficult to resolve civil wars, democracies will be less successful

Democratic policy makers operate under particular constraints that limit their ability to effectively choose which civil wars they wish to intervene in. In the following chapter I intend to address the proposition that democratic states engage in intervention more often than non-democracies. My expectation is that I will find democratic states intervening in civil wars at a higher rate than non-democracies. Furthermore, I expect that, due to post-materialistic attitudes among democratic populations, democratic states will tend to engage in high risk interventions. Once engaged in a high risk intervention however, domestic sentiment impedes democracies from successfully concluding these interventions.

Of course there are alternative conclusions that could be drawn from the existing literature. Based on evidence related to interstate conflict, we may surmise that democracies are in fact better at avoiding high risk conflict than their non-democratic counterparts. Thus, by being potentially more able to identify high risk conflicts, we might observe democracies engaging in low or very low risk interventions and successfully concluding them. While these conclusions run counter to my theoretical argument I feel it important to mention them. If in fact the empirical evidence does not appear to support my hypotheses, we will have gained some, I believe, valuable knowledge regarding the effect of regime type on foreign policy decisions. Specifically, it lends us insight into the previously unasked question as to whether or not regime
type makes a difference when considering civil war intervention. The following chapter will attempt to determine which of these conclusions, if any, stand up to empirical analysis.
CHAPTER 4: DEMOCRATIC INTERVENTION ONSET

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter I will test the hypotheses that have been established based on the theoretical arguments presented in chapter 3. In the following section I will propose a research design to test my hypothesis that democratic states are more likely to engage in high risk interventions and because of this are less often successful when they intervene. In the following chapter I seek to accomplish three goals. The first will be to describe the data used in the analysis. Secondly, I will discuss the measures used to test my hypotheses. Finally, I will interpret the results as they pertain to my hypotheses.

4.2 Research Design

4.2.1 Data and Dependent Variables

In order to assess the impact that regime type has on the propensity of a state to intervene in high risk civil wars and whether or not those interveners are successful, I have constructed a dataset that includes data on interventions, the intensity of civil wars, and the success of those interventions. Fortunately, a data set compiled by Jacob Kathman (2011) contains much of the appropriate data that would need to be used for my analysis. One of the strengths of this dataset is comprehensiveness of the dates of armed conflict ranging from 1950 through 1999 thus providing a broad range of conflicts to analyze. Regan (1996) defines civil war as “armed
combat between two groups within state boundaries in which there are at least 200 fatalities.” The dataset identifies (need to count) civil wars between 1950 and 1999 with 535 annual observations of interventions being recorded during that period. The types of interventions included in the analysis are military and economic. While using the actual number of interventions as a unit of analysis is possible, doing so could be problematic. By not taking into account the actual number of potential interveners in every conflict a certain amount of selection bias is introduced into the model. Kathman (2011) has remedied this problem by expanding the existing data from Lemke and Regan’s work. Previously, the only factor that was considered whether or not a state intervened in a particular civil war. In Kathman’s data, each civil war is treated as an annual intervention opportunity for each state in the system less the state experiencing the civil war. The result of this expanded data set presents us with 182,137 cases of intervention opportunity.

4.2.2 Model

As previously stated, I believe that the regime type of any potential interveners has an impact on intervention processes. Specifically, democracies, for reasons specified in chapter 3, will intervene more often than their non-democratic counterparts in more intractable conflicts and because of this they are less likely to be successful. At the very least they will not be successful to the degree that we observe when they engage interstate conflict. Initially, using a logit or probit analysis of my dependant variables appeared to be methods suitable for testing my dependant variables. This however presents a problem in that doing so could necessarily introduce a significant level of selection bias into the models. Following
Lemke and Regan’s logic, observing major powers experiencing success simply by examining which conflicts they intervened in, we may very well be observing states selecting into interventions that they are relatively sure will be successful. Therefore, not only does being a given factor directly affect the outcome of the intervention, there is also an indirect impact on the decision to intervene in the first place. Like Lemke and Regan’s (2004) analysis I have two binary dependant variables: intervention and success. Intervention indicates whether or not a potential intervener chose to intervene in a conflict. The second being whether or not they were subsequently successful according to the aforementioned criteria. Logically it follows then that a state must choose to intervene in order for success to be an option and thus coded 1. Because of the potential for bias when testing for both dependant variables independently, the most appropriate way to test my hypotheses is by employing a censored probit model. By simultaneously estimating coefficients for both sets of control variables in this manner, direct effects on the independent variables are measured while controlling for indirect effects. Lemke and Regan (2004) term this “selecting into an opportunity.”

4.2.3 Measures of Intensity

My hypotheses state that democracies will intervene more often in high intensity conflicts and that intervention in risky and costly conflicts inevitably leads to lower rates of successful intervention. Because of this, I need to not only identify intervention, but will also need to differentiate between high and low cost interventions. The data does provide variables related to
conflict intensity. Two methods of defining the intensity of any conflict will be employed in the
analysis. First, a fatality dummy variable will be used to define the data for analysis. In any
conflict in which the conflict fatality level exceeds the mean of 83,000 the fatality dummy will
be coded as 1 and zero otherwise. I expect that higher numbers of battle deaths will indicate a
lower level of tractability in conflict. Given this lowered ability to effectively manage a
conflict I would expect intervention to be less likely according to accepted understandings of
civil war intervention. As indicated in chapter 2, low cost wars/intervention are those in
which the duration is expected to be short, the costs low, and the expectation of success high.
In contrast, certain conflict characteristics lend themselves to high risk intervention. High
total casualty counts and high yearly casualty counts (intensity) are both characteristics that
appear to predict higher cost/higher risk interventions. My theory proposes that
democracies are more likely to intervene in conflicts which appear more intractable based on
conflict intensity. Furthermore, conflicts of great intensity tend to be more difficult to
successfully intervene in.

Alternatively, another measure for intensity might also be useful. Also included in
the data set is a variable termed refugee. According to Regan’s (2000) definition, a
humanitarian crisis is triggered once 50,000 refugees have fled the conflict zone. Given my
theoretical argument, this measure of conflict intensity fits well and will be used as an
alternative to the fataldum in my analysis. Again, I will modify the data set in order to run
models with and without the refugee dummy. As with the fatality dummy, I expect
increased instances of democratic intervention when a refugee crisis exists. Using both of
these measures of intensity will allow me to identify cases in the data appropriately in order to analyze only those conflicts which I have designated as intense or not intense according to these criteria. My expectation is that we will observe democracies intervening in these hard cases more often than their non democratic counterparts.

4.2.4 Intervention Success

Successful interventions could be defined in multiple ways. Rather than assuming that all interveners seek to simply end the conflict in order for a political settlement to have the potential to take root, each intervener will have its own interests at stake on some level and states will carefully chose which side to assist to achieve their desired political outcome. Seeking to ensure some level of regional stability, ideology, protection of the intervener’s economic, military, or diplomatic goals, as well as preventing or containing humanitarian crises have all been posited as legitimate goals of intervention (Pearson 1974; Cooper and Berdal 1993). No matter what the particular goal, states may choose to intervene by assessing the conflict in terms of their own interests and choose sides according to whichever they calculate to have the highest probability of furthering the interveners interests whatever they may be. Regan’s (1996) data includes a measure of success for any given intervention. Success in Regan’s analysis is defined as the cessation of the conflict for 6 months at a minimum. Of course there are other measures of success. Licklider (1993) defines success in particularly narrow terms. In order for intervention to be considered as success, hostilities must cease for a minimum of 5 years or multiple sovereignty is no longer the political reality
in the conflict state. As Regan (1996) points out, this definition is far too bounded to be of practical use as a measure of success (footnote on Regan’s reasoning to be included). Bringing the conflict to an end within a reasonable period of peace following is therefore a satisfactory measure of success.

I agree that the five year minimum suggested by Licklider is far too narrow to define success. I have determined my own definition of success and will specify success in two ways. Take, for example, the civil war in Greece that took place from 1944–1949. The United States first intervened in the conflict in 1946 and subsequently in 1947. I believe that to attribute a successful intervention to the United States would be erroneous. Simply because a state chooses to intervene at some point in the conflict does not mean that the successful conclusion of the conflict should be considered a success. I would argue that only those states that actively intervening at or near the end of the conflict should be credited with being successful in bringing about a peaceful end to that conflict. Therefore, my first measure of success will be that a state is intervening either militarily or economically during the last recorded year of the conflict. Thus, in order for an intervention to be considered successful, the war must end within one year of the intervention. Success1 is a dichotomous variable that will be coded as 1 if a state actively intervened during the last year of the conflict and 0 otherwise. However, this standard appears too rigid. In order to relax the standard I will also run my models with a second success variable, success2. It too is
dichotomous and will be coded 1 if a state intervenes and the conflict ends within two years of the intervention.

4.2.5 Primary Independent Variable

The following analyses will be focused on the role that regime type plays in the decision to engage in high risk/high cost intrastate war interventions in addition to its effect on the success of those interventions. As noted in chapter 3, democratic and non-democratic states should have an equal opportunity to assess the particular circumstances related to any given ongoing civil war. However, due to the unique characteristics embodied in democratic regimes, the ability of policy makers within these regimes to avoid high risk interventions is much lower than their non-democratic counterparts according to my theory. The presence of a free press in addition to activated public opinion serves to pressure democratic policy makers to engage in risky interventionary behavior. I argue that non-democratic policy makers are not subject to the same pressures from the public nor the exposure of policy preferences and therefore are often able to avoid high risk interventions. Thus, democratic leader will be compelled to follow public opinion into high risk interventions that have little chance of success.

In order to measure the regime type of any potential or actual intervener, the data set uses Polity IV standards for determining regime type. When a potential intervener’s score meets or exceed 6 then that state is considered a democratic state and the democratic intervener variable will be coded as 1. When the Polity score is not available for a particular state the Freedom House “Free” designation will substitute as the indicator for an intervener being a democracy. Polity captures both democratic as well as autocratic qualities that exist within political institutions present in a state. That is, rather than simply assigning a single characterization of
democracy or autocracy to a regime, the polity data examines various levels of authority throughout different components and procedures of a government. Specifically, the system is characterized by measuring various components relative to how political leader are recruited and selected, what limitations are placed on the executive branch of government, and the openness of the political system relative as to who can participate in government. Consequently, rather than having a -1, +1 (autocratic, democratic respectively) system of classification the Polity data can provide us with a more nuanced understanding of regime type. This more comprehensive analysis of regime type illustrates a “spectrum” of various levels of governmental authority ranging from “fully institutionalized autocracies through mixed, or incoherent, authority regimes (termed "anocracies") to fully institutionalized democracies” (Marshall and Gurr 2013).

This method of coding regime types results in a 21 point regime type scale with a score range of -10 to +10. The hereditary monarchy represented by a score of -10 represents the autocratic extreme while consolidated democracies with a score of +10 represent the opposite side of the scale. Between these two extremes are a range of regime types with autocracies representing -10 to -6, anocracies being coded from -5 to +5, and democracies listed from +6 to +10. These scores are converted to a 10 point scale for use in coding whether or not a party to the conflict qualifies as a democracy. Again, a minimum score of six will be used to determine if a state qualifies as a democracy. Additionally, there are three special categories (-66, -77, -88) that need to be addressed. States coded as -66 are those in which there is foreign interruption in and treated as system missing data. A score of -77 indicates a period of interregnum and are coded in PolityIV as a neutral score of 0. A designation of -88 is used during periods of political transition. In these instances, scores are prorated on an annual basis based on the score prior to
the -88 designation and the resulting score once a regime type can be assessed after the transition. Regime type is coded for not only the interveners, but for the conflict state as well.

4.2.6 Control Variables

Following empirical work by Regan (2004), Lemke and Regan (2004), and Kathman (2011) I have chosen to use the analytical model used by Lemke and Regan and apply it to Kathman’s (2011) data. Many of the control variables used in Kathman’s analysis will be used here as well. The timeframe within which the conflict takes place should be considered relative to interventions. Given the ideological struggle present during the Cold War and the desire of both superpowers to spread and maintain influence over their client states and/or use proxy combatants to indirectly challenge one another, it is to be expected that instances of intervention should be higher between 1945 and 1989 (Regan 1998, 2000). Accordingly, a Cold War dummy variable is included by designating years between and including 1945 and 1989 to account for the ideological struggle between the United States and Soviet Union. More intractable conflicts do not lend themselves to being ripe for intervention. Those conflicts in which the annual casualty rate is particularly high deter some potential interveners from attempting to affect the conflict. The Intensity variable in the data represents this and will be included in the analysis. In three models the Refugee variable will be included. Again, I hypothesize that democracies in particular will be more apt to intervene when a refugee crisis exists. Two other conflict characteristics concern the root cause of the conflict. Ideological conflicts and ethnic conflicts both have the tendency to attract third party intervention (Lemke and Regan 2004, Kathman 2011). As such, such they too will be include in the analysis.
Another potential indicator of intervention is whether or not the potential intervener and the target state share a defense pact. It stands to reason that if the conflict countries government were threatened by either an outside or native threat, that the potential intervener would act in a similar fashion. That is, if the conflict state’s government were threatened and the pact partner had pledged to intervene on the government’s behalf, it should not matter where the threat arises. Accordingly, the data set includes an *Alliance* variable. To determine the alliance status of any dyadic pair of states, the authors refer to Correlates of War alliance data with specific attention to the EUGene compilation data and dyads with an existing alliance at the time of the conflict will be coded as 1 (Gibler and Sarkees 2004). Also of interest to potential interveners is the past relationship that they might have shared with a particular country. A colonial history variable is included to indicate that which potential interveners had previously colonized the target state. The expectation is that intervention is more likely given this history and thus the *Colonial History* variable is included in the data set to identify these dyadic relationships. The Issue Correlates of War Project (Hensel 2007) provides the information that the authors used to code this variable. If there was a colonial history then the variable will be coded as 1. Geographic proximity to the conflict state has been shown to be highly correlated to instances of intervention (Kathman 2011). His research has shown that due to the risk of conflict contagion and in the interest of regional stability, border-states are significantly more likely to intervene in neighboring states’ civil wars. The Contiguity variable is derived from data compiled by Stinnett et al. (2002).

There is also some evidence that the regime type of the conflict state produces variation in the observations of intervention. Generally speaking democracies are significantly less likely to be targets of interventions. Democracies are theorized to enjoy greater levels of security.
Recent research into this theory tends to support the hypothesis that democracies benefit from greater security and stability and are thus less likely to experience intervention (Herrman and Kegley 1996). Target states that are by the aforementioned Polity/Freedom House criteria considered democracies during the period of conflict will be coded 1. As mentioned in the above section on democratic interveners, Polity IV and Freedom House data are used to specify which dyads include democratic target of intervention. Conflicts in which the target state is a democracy (+7 or greater) should be negatively correlated with intervention. Furthermore, a joint democracy variable is included in the data set when both the target state and the intervener are coded a 1 according to the state criterion for determining regime type. In Regan and Lemke’s analysis this variable was negative but not significant. However, because of the variation in my model specification, I have decided to include it as well.

The ability of major powers to project their power and influence should weigh on the decision to intervene. Great powers have far flung interests and the ability to affect those interests both militarily and economically. Therefore it should not be surprising to see that major powers are often observed intervening disproportionally (Lemke and Regan 2004, Kathman 2011). A Major Power variable is therefore included in the intervention analysis as well as the success portion of the model. Annual categorization of any third parties ability to act as a major power is determined in the COW data (Correlates of War Project 2008). Finally, previous research appears to indicate that African nations are disproportionally reluctant to conduct interventions (Lemke 2002). There are varied explanations for this behavior. It could be the case that African nations prefer more peaceful forms of international relations. Alternatively, the ability of African nations to fund or otherwise conduct military or economic intervention is low relative to many other potential interveners, particularly industrial democracies. While this
analysis will not address which of these hypotheses is correct, I felt that because of the negative and significant finding in previous research that it was a suitable control variable. If the potential intervener state is located on the African continent or occupies land on an island adjacent to the continent, it will be coded 1.

When testing for success a number of other variables will be included. Per my argument, the regime type of the potential intervener is important and will be used as a variable in the success model in the same form that it exists in the intervention model. Additionally, the type and target of the intervention has some bearing on the likelihood of success. Included in the data set are variables used in Lemke and Regan’s (2004) analysis. I have excluded their variables related to the specific targeting of interventions as they do not pertain to my theoretical arguments. According to the authors’ analysis the type of conflict has an impact on whether or not the intervention will be successful. In both instances there is a negative coefficient. However, neither is significant. What is significant is the fact that their research seems to indicate that great powers have a much greater likelihood of success when they choose to intervene. Finally, because the primary focus of this dissertation concerns regime type, I will be including a Democratic Intervener variable, coding it exactly as it is in the intervention portion of the model. According to my expectations, because democracies should choose to intervene in intractable conflicts, I expect them to be less successful when they do decide to intervene.
### Table 4.1: Censored Probit Analysis of Intervention and Success in Civil War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Success</th>
<th>Full Model</th>
<th>Fatality Dummy = 1</th>
<th>Fatality Dummy = 0</th>
<th>Refugees = 1</th>
<th>Refugees = 0</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>5.05</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4.95</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.38</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Intervener</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>-6.98</td>
<td>-6.24</td>
<td>-7.23</td>
<td>-7.00</td>
<td>-7.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Intervention**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>-0.0000259</td>
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<td>0.57***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.53***</td>
<td>1.29***</td>
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<td>1.55***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.21*</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Intervener</td>
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<td>0.33***</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.11*</td>
<td>0.04</td>
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<td>-0.24</td>
<td>-0.63**</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>-5.17***</td>
<td>-4.26***</td>
<td>-4.39***</td>
<td>-4.53***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**

*** Significant at the .01 level  
** Significant at the .05 level  
* Significant at the .1 level
Empirical Results and Discussion

Table 1 reports the empirical results for both my independent variables as well as the control variables, the most important of which as it relates to this dissertation, is democratic intervener. Model 1 includes all independent variables and runs the censored probit model without accounting for variations in my intensity variables. Models 2 and 3 rerun the analysis on cases where the fatality intensity variable is on and off respectively. Finally, models 4 and 5 provide a comprehensive analysis by considering the full model along with separate analyses for refugees and fatality intensity variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Treatment</th>
<th>Success2</th>
<th>Fatality Dummy = 1</th>
<th>Fatality Dummy = 0</th>
<th>Refugees = 1</th>
<th>Refugees = 0</th>
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<tr>
<td>Model 1</td>
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<td>0.89*</td>
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<td>Model 3</td>
<td>Fatality Dummy = 0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Model 4</td>
<td>Refugees = 1</td>
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<td>0.48**</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>1.04***</td>
</tr>
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<td>-2.57***</td>
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**Intervention**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Coldwar</td>
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<td>Fatal</td>
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<td>Alliance</td>
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<td>0.22*</td>
<td>0.47***</td>
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<td>0.33**</td>
<td>0.64 ***</td>
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<td>1.53***</td>
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<td>1.35***</td>
<td>1.55***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Target</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note:
*** Significant at the .01 level
** Significant at the .05 level
* Significant at the .1 level

4.3 Empirical Results and Discussion

Table 1 reports the empirical results for both my independent variables as well as the control variables, the most important of which as it relates to this dissertation, is democratic intervener. Model 1 includes all independent variables and runs the censored probit model without accounting for variations in my intensity variables. Models 2 and 3 rerun the analysis on cases where the fatality intensity variable is on and off respectively. Finally, models 4 and 5
substitute the intensity variable *refugee* for the fatality variable and run the analysis both with and without the refugee variable. Of particular interest to the aims of this research, I find that democracies are more likely to intervene in particularly intense conflicts no matter which of the measures I use to determine intensity. The results for success are another matter.

While the results of the fully specified model are interesting in and of themselves, and in large part reinforce the findings of previous researchers, my hypotheses focus specifically on democratic intervention and success in high intensity civil wars. I have argued that democracies are more likely than non-democracies to intervene in conflicts that should be considered more intractable and thus higher cost endeavors. I have further asserted that because democracies select into interventions in high intensity conflict, they are less likely to be successful. As mentioned previously, I have constructed two variables to indicate higher levels of intractability in any given conflict.

When the fatality dummy is set to 1, as it appears in model 2, the democratic intervener variable is both positive and highly significant. This suggests that when fatalities are observed to be higher than normal, democratic interveners are more likely to enter these conflicts, presumably to prevent or reduce future fatalities. The African intervener is also positive and significant as it was in the full model. Additionally, the democratic state variable, while still negative, is no longer significant. When I analyze only those conflicts where the fatality dummy is zero (model 3), the coefficient for the democratic intervener variable reverses direction though it is not significant and the African intervener variable once again becomes statistically insignificant. Based on these analyses, the evidence suggests that democracies are more likely than non-democracies to be observed intervening in cases of civil war where costs are high and the conflicts seemingly more intractable.
I find similar results when I substitute the refugee dummy for the fatality dummy to determine which conflicts could be categorized as intense or intractable. In model 4, I run the censored probit model only on those intervention opportunities where the number of refugees exceeds 50,000 (refugee dummy = 1). The alliance and African intervener variables are no longer significant. Most importantly the democratic intervener stays positive and significant under these conditions. All other control variables behave in the manner in which they did when the full model was run. Alternatively, when I set the refugee variable to zero (model 5) and rerun the analysis, the democratic intervener variable is still positive but no longer statistically significant. The results of these analyses seems to indicate a greater propensity of democratic states to intervene when a humanitarian crisis is ongoing and supports my theoretical argument regarding the ability of democratic publics to pressure their governments to intervene when they witness this type of crisis. Additionally, the alliance variable is once again highly significant.

While the results of the intervention portion of the analysis match with my theoretical expectations I found less support for my second hypothesis. When defining successful intervention as being the presence of a third party in the final year of the conflict the results appear to contradict the findings of Lemke and Regan (2004). I should note that given any of the model specifications none of the control variables rose to a statistically significant level. In the Lemke and Regan model, both ethnic conflict and ideological coefficients are negative though not significant. In each of my models the coefficients are positive albeit not significant.

Previous research appears to indicate that great power interveners are significantly more likely to embark on successful interventions. Surprisingly, across all five of my models, I observe negative coefficients for the great power variable, though none is significant. Perhaps most importantly for the purposes of this dissertation, the democratic success observations do not meet
my expectations. In models 1, 2, 3, and 5 the coefficients are all positive but again not statistically significant. Model 2, in which the fatality dummy variable is activated, the democratic intervener coefficient is oriented in the expected direction (negative) but it too does not reach the standard of statistical significance.

Due to the possibility of my using too strict a standard when defining success I repeated the analysis using a slightly more relaxed standard. In these analyses, success is recognized if a third party was actively intervening during the last two years of the conflict. Unsurprisingly, the vast majority of the variables behave consistently in all ten models related to intervention. Two deviations are worth noting however. In model 4 where the refugee variable is activated, intensity stops being a significant variable. More interesting however is the observation (model 3) that democratic states that are experiencing low level conflicts tend to be avoided by interveners. Generally speaking, the democratic peace literature posits that this should be expected (Hermann and Kegley 1996; Kegley and Hermann 1995). When reporting my initial set of findings, democratic conflict states were only negatively associated with intervention when the full model was specified and when the refugees dummy was activated. In this secondary analysis, which takes into account for varying degrees of conflict intensity, it appears that only under certain conditions are democracies unlikely targets of intervention. In my analysis third parties are most hesitant when there is a refugee crisis or if the casualties are relatively low. While the results in the intervention portion of the censored probit model appear largely similar, there is significant deviation in the models as well as some significant differences from the results reported by Lemke and Regan (2004) when the more relaxed standard of success is applied to the models.
While my initial analyses indicated that none of the control variables were significantly related to success, the findings of the second set of models differ in some very important ways. While Lemke and Regan had consistently negative, though not significant, finding regarding success in ethnic and ideological conflicts I find that under certain circumstances these conflict characteristics can positively influence success. In models 1, 4, and 5, the coefficients are all positive though not significant. However, when the fatality dummy is activated I observe a positive and statistically significant correlation between ideological conflict and success. When the fatality dummy is turned off, the direction of the coefficient becomes negative and is no longer significant. Ethnic conflict is also positively related to success under the specification of the full model and when both of my intensity dummies are activated. Another variation, and one that partially supports previous findings in the literature regarding great power success, is the observation that great powers are successful though in my models this only occurs under conditions of high casualty conflicts. Concerning the variable of most interest to me, democratic interveners, the results are mixed. When the full model is specified and when the refugee dummy is activated the coefficients are positive though not significant. When the fatality dummy is activated I observe my theoretically expected negative coefficient though it is not significant. It is only when the intensity variables, refugee and fatality, are deactivated that I observe positive and significant correlation with successful intervention. While these results do not bear out my theoretical expectations regarding the success of democracies, it is interesting to note that it appears that democracies are significantly more likely to successfully intervene, again under a less strict standard of success, when the conflict tends to be less intense or intractable.

Again, I feel that the censored probit model is the most appropriate form of analysis and thus those models using censored probit analysis were reported. However, previous research has
been done using both probit and logit regression models. In the interest of being more comprehensive in my analysis I ran additional single-step probit analyses on intervention and both success variables to determine whether or not the results varied from those reported in the censored probit model. For the most part the results of the probit analysis regarding intervention onset closely mirrors the results derived from the censored probit analysis. The one exception is that the African intervener variable shows both a positive and highly significant coefficient when the refugee variable is activated. Whereas there are only minor differences between the probit and censored probit observations with regard to intervention initiation, when considering the probit analysis of the success1 variable, I do find some rather stark differences. The ideological conflict variable becomes positive and highly significant in the first 4 of the five models. The ethnic conflict variable becomes positive and significant when the fatality dummy variable is activated. The results of the probit model now show positive and significant coefficients for great powers in every case. Most importantly, the democratic intervener variable begins to behave the theoretically predicted manner to a degree. In model 2, with the fatality dummy activated, I observe democratic interveners being negatively and significantly associated with intervention success. While this analysis does not account for selection effect, it in part supports my theoretical claim that democracies will opt into intractable conflicts and are for the reasons stated in chapter 3 less likely to achieve successful outcomes.

The majority of the control variables behave in a similar fashion to the manner in which they did in both Lemke and Regan (2004) and Kathman (2011) analyses. In the case of Kathman’s analysis, only intervention onset results will be compared as he did not consider success in his analysis. When the censored probit is run on the full model, the refugee variable is both positive and significant reflecting the tendency of third parties to intervene when a refugee
crisis occurs. Conflicts occurring during the cold war are perhaps unsurprisingly, given the ideological conflict between the superpowers, more prone to interventions. This finding is consistent across all of the models run in these analyses. Conflict states which have a dyadic alliance with a third party are also more likely to experience intervention. Third parties with a past colonial history with a conflicted nation are similarly more likely to intervene in the former colonial states thus reflecting that historical ties between nations can be an impetus for current interest. Great powers are, given their greater ability to project power along with wider global interests in general, are found to be among the most likely states to engage in interventionary behavior. Like the cold war variable, great and colonial powers are found to be positively related to intervention across all models.

Like Kathman, I found that democracies had a greater propensity to intervene in civil wars in general. While Lemke and Regan’s coefficient was positive it was not significant. When considering whether or not democratic states in a condition of civil war are more or less likely to experience an intervention the results have been mixed. My full model seems to indicate that, like Hermann and Kegley (1996) and Kathman (2011), democracies are less likely that their non-democratic counterparts to experience third party intervention. This contradicts the finding by Lemke and Regan (2004) that democracies are more likely the targets of intervention. Ethnic and ideological conflicts are in every model in my analysis both positively and significantly likely to see intervention. When third parties share a border with a state experiencing conflict the likelihood of intervention also increases. This result too is consistent in all of my models. In none of the models used was a joint democratic dyad significantly related to intervention onset. Ethnic and ideologically driven conflicts were in each model run both positively and significantly related to intervention onset. Sharing a border with a state
experiencing conflict appears to be a clear impetus for contiguous states to intervene. This most probably reflects the fear of diffusion of the conflict into surrounding states or general destabilization of the region. Interestingly, my findings depart from expectations of Lemke and Regan’s (2004) previous research regarding African interveners. In two of my models, model 1 (full model) and model 2 (activated fatality dummy), I find African interveners to be positively and significantly associated with intervention. Of particular interest is the positive result when fatalities are particularly high. This finding could lend support to Lemke and Regan’s (2004) assertion that intervention may, rather than a hostile act, be a means of conflict management. In the case of civil wars with proportionally high fatalities we could see this correlation as an example of African states attempting to manage particularly disastrous conflicts.

4.4 Summary

As stated in the introduction to this chapter, the goal of this chapter is threefold. I have successfully described the data used for the subsequent analysis by identifying the various dependent and independent variable used in the various models. I have shown how these variables are specified and why I believe there inclusion is important. The second goal was to explain to the reader why I insisted on using the censored probit model. It was important to help the reader understand why I chose this analytical model over other, perhaps more conventional analytical tools. Finally, I performed not only the censored probit analysis but also performed separate probit analyses to model the analysis that Kathman performed relative to intervention onset. Generally speaking it appears that only one of my hypotheses was supported through the empirical analyses. I have hypothesized that democratic publics pressure their governments to engage in risky interventions. It seems as though democratic interveners tend to target difficult
to resolve civil wars more often than their non democratic counterparts and thus that my hypothesis regarding intervention onset appears to have some empirical support.

Conversely, there does not appear to be empirical evidence supporting my second hypothesis regarding intervention success. I have previously argued that the same domestic forces that drive intervention initiation also drive democratic states to abandon their intervention effort when public pressure to withdraw is evident. I found little empirical support for this hypothesis. It does not appear that democratic governments are less successful in their interventionary behavior even when the conflicts are more intractable and the costs borne by the intervener are presumably much higher. While this finding does comport with my theory, perhaps this is a positive result. In effect, the negative findings regarding my second hypothesis seem to indicate that once a democratic intervener commits to action, they are more likely to stay the course and commit to the peaceful resolution of civil wars even when the cost to the is potentially great. Perhaps more importantly with regard to my understanding of civil war processes, my observations of democratic success bring something new to the literature. I found that democracies are no more or less successful than their nondemocratic counterparts when intervening in civil wars. This is an important finding. The vast majority of the democratic peace literature seems to indicate that democracies are far more successful in combat operations than are non-democracies. This however only holds true when the conflict is on a interstate nature. I do not however observe this tendency when analyzing their performance relative to civil war intervention. I believe that these findings make a subtle but important contribution to the literature on civil war processes and to a greater understanding regarding successful military action based on the type of conflict being entered into.
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

5.1 Review

In the post WWII era the world has witnessed a precipitous decline in instances of conflict between nation states. While this may provide us with some sense of comfort, during the very same time span we have seen a surge in intrastate violence. As such scholars in the field of international relations have increasingly attempted to study various aspects of these conflicts. A large portion of the early research in the field focused on the internal dynamics of these conflicts. Questions such as why they occur and what the characteristics of the parties involved in the fighting obviously needed to be addressed. Early analysis of these conflicts tended to view them as strictly internal conflicts from which external states would be insulated from. It is not until somewhat recently that civil wars have been characterized as international events. More recent scholarship has provided us with an abundance of evidence that many of the negative consequences of these conflicts can rapidly move beyond the conflicted states borders and directly or indirectly impact not only neighboring states, but entire regions. Some conflicts may indeed have a system wide impact.

Recognizing this, more recent attention has been given to the study of interventionary behavior by third party states. While recognizing civil wars as international events much of the existing research has focused on the particular internal characteristics of the conflict state. That is, third parties will often analyze the forces driving the conflict in determining whether or not an
intervention is either necessary or likely to be successful. There has of course been discussion of whether or not characteristics of third party interveners leads to intervention and/or success. For example, we have observed that great power states are more likely to intervene in civil wars and are also more successful. However, in my review of the literature, I noticed a rather stark omission. A thorough discussion of whether or not an intervener’s regime type plays a role in intervention processes is notably absent. It appears much of the literature assumes that most if not all potential interveners use the same cost benefit calculus when deciding whether or not to intervene in intrastate conflict.

My argument is that democracies and autocracies have some very particular institutional characteristics that have thus far been ignored in the literature. There are specific expectations and constraints placed on public policy makers in democracies that do not occur in autocracies. Why then should we expect that states of varying regime types would use identical approaches to making foreign policy decisions? This is the question that initiated this project and the one that I have endeavored to answer throughout this dissertation. I argue that domestic political considerations are an important, yet understudied, facet of the civil war intervention literature. Because of domestic political pressure to engage in interventionary behavior, democratic governments are more likely to intervene in civil wars in general. The reasoning behind why I believe this to be the case is evident in my theoretical argument which I presented in Chapter 3. While this is in and of itself of some perhaps minor interest it is my take on which interventions these democratic policy makers choose or are compelled to intervene in that makes this research unique and thus a worthy addition to the growing body of literature in this field.

I have argued that domestic political pressure not only compels democratic policy makers to intervene in civil wars generally, but forces their hand into intervening in the most intractable
and violent conflicts. Democratic publics force leaders to engage in the most costly conflicts in terms of blood and treasure. The paradox that I spoke of earlier is that these same democratic publics that push for intervention in the most intractable of conflicts are the same ones that, once aware of the mounting costs of intervention, pressure leaders to abandon these interventions before they have a realistic chance of succeeding. Thus, the paradoxical nature of democratic public opinion serves to limit democratic policy makers’ room to maneuver politically when considering whether or not to engage in high cost/low reward interventions. Chapter 3 lays the foundation for my expectation that democratic regimes will both intervene more often than their non-democratic counterparts and ultimately less successful.

5.2 New Variables and Results of Analysis Related to Hypotheses

In chapter 4, I provide a framework for analysis of my hypotheses. This analysis incorporates many of the most commonly used variables included in previous research on both intervention onset and success. My addition to the research includes incorporating a regime type variable into the data to determine whether or not democracies do in fact intervene in civil wars more often than their autocratic counterparts. Additionally, I created two independent variables that control for conflict type. These variables trim the data in such a way that only the most intense conflict year data are used in the analysis. The first measures conflict intensity on annual casualties. The second uses refugee migration as a measure of conflict intensity.

My second contribution to the data are definitions of success that I believe to be relatively conservative in nature and best able to determine which states were able to successful intervene. The first, and most restrictive, limits success to only those states that intervened in the
final year of the conflict. I then relaxed this standard to include any state that has intervened within 2 years of a cessation in hostilities.

The results of my analysis are mixed. Many of the more common variables used in the literature tend to behave in much the same way as in previous analyses with a few notable exceptions which are discussed in the previous chapters. Looking at my variables, the results do not always meet my expectations. My analysis reveals that democratic states do engage in interventionary behavior that is distinct from non-democracies. I find compelling evidence for the notion that democratic states intervene in civil wars where the potential cost for intervention is high. That is, they gravitate to conflicts where the likelihood of success is measurably low. I argue that this is in large part due to domestic political pressure. Democratic publics compel their leaders to intervene in cases where obvious human rights abuses exist, the level of violence is great, and humanitarian crises are evident.

However, turning to my second hypotheses, the results are not as compelling. I found little evidence that democratic states are less successful than non-democracies when they do decided to intervene. Even in the most difficult cases. While not the result I was expecting, I believe that it still tells us something useful about regime type and intervention processes. The results of the analysis do not indicate that democracies fare worse than non-democracies during interventions. It simply means that compared to the level of success democracies experience in interstate wars they are less effective in successfully concluding intrastate conflict. There could be multiple reasons for this finding. My specification for which wars would be considered high intensity conflicts may need to be adjusted in some way. Alternatively, my specifications regarding how success is measured and which states could be considered successful might be too restrictive. On this point I would say however that I intentionally used relatively conservative
measures to determine what constituted success. I believe that for this project that was the prudent choice. Finally, there may be fundamental differences in the nature of interstate and intrastate war that I failed to consider when forming my theory and hypotheses. In this paper I have analyzed civil war intervention by focusing not on the internal characteristics of the conflict, but rather through a thoughtful analysis of the intervener. It appears that there are shortcomings by employing these approaches separately. Future research should attempt to fuse these disparate approaches in order that we might gain a better understanding of civil war processes.

5.3 Conclusion

What my research suggests is that there are deficiencies of understanding and communication between democratic publics and policy makers. Democratic publics may be, perhaps understandably, less inclined to consume vast quantities of hard news. The trend of individuals turning away from hard news sources in favor of more personalized and sensationalized content has been exhibited throughout much of the literature on media usage. I have argued that citizens in democratic states may only be exposed to discussions of foreign policy and the implications of world events on their lives. Much of the coverage of international events tends to focus on world crises at their peak. That is, the initial stages of conflict and humanitarian crises along with the events toward the end of these conflicts tend to be ignored by media outlets. Thus many individuals are quite ill informed about these events and are often only viewing these events with little context as to the nature of them. I have argued that being exposed to peak conflict leads to an emotional response in publics that fails to consider the conflicts and their implication as a whole.
Furthermore, individuals have little concept of the costs, both human and capital, of intervening in these conflicts. Many times media tends to focus on troop levels. I argue that this distorts the actual cost of conflict and perhaps leads many citizens to underestimate the true cost that will be incurred. For example, during the peak of the Iraq war, the functional Teeth-to Tail ratio of combat troops to noncombat troops was 1 to 2.5 in 2013. With the cost of contract workers included the combat element in that conflict was around 28%. I suspect that these figures are reflected in intervention campaigns as well. An inattentive population that is largely ignorant of this reality may well underestimate these costs and therefore be more likely to accept this deflated perception of costs.

I argue that it is imperative that policy makers make efforts to inform the broader population of these “hidden” costs. However, I concede that this task is one that will require tremendous effort and will force administrations to modify their information campaigns to more effectively target citizens. The ever increasing options in available media outlets will only make this job more difficult. Moreover, the tendency of policy makers to want to make policy out of view of the public only amplifies the problem. I have presented evidence that indicates that democratic publics push policy makers to intervene in intractable conflict. If policy makers wish to resist the pressure to intervene they will have to be willing to communicate more openly with citizens in order to better explain what they believe is in the interest of their nation. Future research focusing of effectively conveying information to mass public in a growing sea of information would be useful in attempting to close the gaps between policy makers and citizens regarding n the national interests and citizens preferences.

My work here has focused on a very narrow question. Does regime type matter when states choose to intervene in civil wars? What about institutions like the United Nations and
NATO? Throughout the 20\textsuperscript{th} and 21\textsuperscript{st} centuries we have increasingly witnessed these organizations engage in interventionary behavior. I believe that an extension of my argument could be made with regard to these organizations. Again, we witness democracies intervening more often in hard to resolve conflicts more often than non-democracies. It may be that the latter are willing to assist in interventions but perhaps do not have the capacity to do so unilaterally. It would be interesting to see how non-democracies willingness to work through the United Nations compares to democratic states. Future research may find that less capable and less democratic states are just as willing participate in interventions. One could argue that my arguments apply more so to powerful democratic states’ behavior than democratic states in general. Because of my decision to exclude United Nations activities this is a legitimate point of view. Research applying my theoretical arguments to United Nations or NATO campaigns could very well indicate that democratic states without the capacity to intervene themselves might choose to work through other organizations and alliances. If this is the case we may be able to argue that democratic publics are not in fact as insensitive to costs as my research indicates. Such research could also shed better light on my theories about democratic success in interventions. Perhaps democracies are more successful when they operate as coalitions than as unilateral actors. Whatever the results of future research indicate regarding regime type and civil war intervention, the contribution of my research has not only been to help answer the questions that I put forward but to generate new questions for myself and other researchers to address.


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