UN PEACEKEEPING IMPACTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS

A Thesis
presented in partial fulfillment of requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts
in the Department of Political Science
The University of Mississippi

by

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August 2014
ABSTRACT

This paper seeks to explore the impacts of peacekeeping operations by the United Nations on the human rights abuses associated with civil wars. Previous research has consistently found evidence that civil wars increase human rights abuses; however, the literature has not adequately analyzed possible factors that could decrease this violence or the affects peacekeeping could have on human rights performances. The UN has four types of peacekeeping operations: observer, traditional, multidimensional, and enforcement. The results of a Heckman selection model for 57 countries that have experienced a civil war between 1976 and 2012 suggest peacekeeping does impact human rights performances, although the impact is dissimilar for different types of missions and different types of human rights. In comparing mission effectiveness, multidimensional missions decrease human rights abuses more than observer/traditional missions and enforcement missions for current and future rights. Enforcement missions are associated with more abuses for current rights in comparison to traditional missions, but have fewer abuses five years in the future. Differences in time lags also suggest that the larger multidimensional and enforcement missions are more effective for future rights, whereas smaller traditional missions can be sufficient in impacting current human rights performances. These inferences apply to physical integrity rights, though, as the different mission types do not seem to affect civil liberty rights using the selection model.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am especially thankful to my advisor, Dr. Susan H. Allen, whose guidance and support enabled me to develop a greater understanding of the subject and pushed me to be more confident in my abilities.

I also express my deepest gratitude to my other committee members, Dr. Matthew R. DiGiuseppe and Dr. Robert D. Brown, for their insightful suggestions and help in navigating the thesis process.

Last but not least, I would like to thank my family for their unending love and continuous support.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMAN RIGHTS AND PEACEKEEPING</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPARING MISSIONS’ ABILITIES TO REDUCE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METHODOLOGY AND MEASUREMENTS</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMPIRICAL ANALYSES</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. INTRODUCTION

In the past few decades, the fields of human rights and peacekeeping have evolved and expanded into important issues and areas of study across both the international system and political science literature. Helping these two fields to prominence, the United Nations (UN) began the fight for peace and freedom at its inception in 1945 when it required all members to sign its Charter, pledging to promote and encourage “respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all” (“Chapter I,” 1945). Three years later the General Assembly adopted into force the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to explicitly describe the fundamental freedoms of all human beings to which the international community should aspire to uphold. That same year the Security Council authorized the deployment of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its neighbors in the Middle East. Since then, the UN has deployed 69 peacekeeping operations with hundreds of thousands of personnel from more than 120 contributing countries (“History of Peacekeeping,” n.d.). Using the foundations for international human rights laws as laid out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN has also adopted into force nine human rights treaties, with all 193 UN members a voluntary party to at least one.

However, it was not until decades after the UN introduced human rights and peacekeeping operations as internationally important multilateral issues that they gained prominence in the international system. In the 1970s human rights issues evolved into transnational movements in response to the publicized abuses of authoritarian regimes and the
introduction of human rights concerns in a rising number of countries’ foreign policies. The burgeoning issue of human rights permeated political science literature in an attempt to explain behavioral variation across states with empirical analysis. The number of studies regarding human rights expanded dramatically following the Cold War and a continuing wave of democratization that diffused and ingrained the growing human rights movement into an international effort (Cardenas, 2009). Peacekeeping operations are largely referred to as “the deployment of international personnel to help maintain peace and security” (Fortna and Howard, 2008) and also gained in notoriety around the same time. Before 1989 peacekeeping was largely used in interstate conflicts, and the primary purpose of the few intrastate missions was to contain civil conflict in the hopes of preventing direct involvement by superpowers or to aid decolonization (Fortna, 2008). After the Cold War and end of the deadlock in the Security Council between the United States and Soviet Union, the amount of peacekeeping operations increased dramatically and the main purpose of the operations progressed into preventing the resumption of war. The end of the Cold War also brought a change in the peacekeeping literature. The few early studies focused on case histories and limited testing on interstate conflict. The amount of scholarly work increased with the number of missions after the Cold War and turned from optimistic pieces into case studies analyzing the failures and limitations of well-publicized fiascos. At the beginning of this century, the UN renewed its efforts at peacekeeping with the 2000 Brahimi Report and the international community renewed its positive view of the missions. Peacekeeping literature additionally changed, with more focus on rigorous quantitative testing to examine whether peacekeeping empirically impacts the likelihood and duration of peace during and after civil wars (Fortna and Howard, 2008).
Unfortunately, some of the most notorious United Nations peacekeeping operations are associated with egregious human rights abuses. The UN operation in Somalia withdrew from the country almost twenty years ago, leaving Somalis in the midst of a brutal power struggle between the government and multiple clans fighting for control. This left innocent civilians to encounter indiscriminant fire in the capital and abusive and arbitrary law in opposition-controlled territories. The true extent of destruction to the population is unknown, but all parties to the conflict have been accused of war crimes (“Somalia,” 2010). After this publicized failure, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda failed to stop the 100 days-long massacre of an estimated 800,000 people (“Rwanda,” 2011). One year later, the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia failed to stop the culmination of a Serbian ethnic cleansing campaign in Srebrenica where the Army of the Bosnian Serb Republic killed and mutilated an estimated 7,800 Muslim males of all ages (Smith, n.d.). These and other well-publicized fiascos have called into question the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations to secure lasting peace and protect innocent civilians.

Less publicized missions, though, have helped to secure the end of conflicts, foster reconciliation to prevent a resurgence of war, and aided in curbing violence. The UN operation in Liberia helped manage the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants and helped other UN and international agencies to restore basic services to the population. The mission also implemented a series of humanitarian projects, including sending the first all-female unit of peacekeepers who were uniquely positioned to help the regularly targeted female war victims. The operation not only increased the number of women coming forward to report gender-based violence but further lowered the country’s overall crime rate (“UN Peacekeeping is a Success in Liberia,” n.d.). The United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala helped demobilize the
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) by overseeing the separation of forces between the Guatemalan Army and URNG and collecting URNG weapons and military equipment to ensure the process of reintegration by former combatants. It also assisted in numerous peacebuilding projects that reinforced the decline in political violence, including organizing human rights and judicial training programs by experts and installing an easy to use database for documenting abuses ("Missions Coming Down," 2004). The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) helped implement the Lomé Peace Agreement by disarming over 75,000 ex-combatants and assisting in holding the country’s first free and fair national elections. UNAMSIL was vital in instituting a war crimes tribunal and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The operation additionally helped the government end illegal diamond trading, which had fueled the conflict by giving rebels money to buy weapons, and worked with other UN agencies to generate jobs for unemployed youth and former fighters ("Sierra Leone," n.d.). While missions viewed as successful are not as notorious as failed missions, the UN has indeed managed to positively impact states involved in the destructive violence of war and its chaotic aftermath.

With the continued prevalence of human rights abuses in the international system, especially in relation to civil wars, I want to identify whether peacekeeping is one factor that can limit the number of abuses committed by states. In light of the mixed record for perceived successes and failures, I specifically want to analyze the impact of different types of United Nations peacekeeping operations to identify which type is most effective in limiting abuses. There are four types of peacekeeping operations, although I combine two to form three groups. Observer and traditional missions are consent-based and are deployed to monitor and report compliance with cease-fire or war termination agreements. Multidimensional missions have
larger scopes and consist of both military and civilian personnel in order to engage in peacebuilding. Finally, enforcement missions consist of substantially more soldiers with the ability to use force in order to guarantee compliance with cease-fire/settlement agreements and to provide security (Fortna, 2008, p. 7). To test the different impacts of these three groups of peacekeeping operations on states’ human rights performances, I use panel data from 1976 to 2012 for 57 countries. Because the UN does not send peacekeepers to every state involved in a civil war, I utilize a Heckman statistical model to test current and future impacts on human rights to account for selection bias in the Security Council’s decision to approve a mission. This model is also important as previous scholars argue UN missions are sent to the “harder” conflicts; therefore, abstaining from using a two-stage selection model could potentially underestimate the positive impacts of peacekeepers in relation to civil wars that do not experience peacekeeping.
II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND PEACEKEEPING

One of the most consistent findings in the human rights literature is the positive relationship between human rights abuses and civil war (Poe and Tate, 1994; Krain, 1997; Keith, 1999; Poe, Tate, and Keith, 1999; Zanger, 2000; Keith, 2002; Davenport and Armstrong, 2004; Bueno de Mesquita, Cherif, Downs, and Smith, 2005; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005; Murdie and Davis, 2012). Political restrictions, torture, unlawful imprisonment, politically-motivated murder, and censorship are all methods employed by governments wishing to “neutralize political opponents” or rebel leaders and increase the costs of resistance “to such a large extent that it is no longer deemed a worthwhile strategy” (Davenport, 1995). While conflict of any kind would logically seem to coincide with rights abuses, international war does not share as strong or as significant a relationship with respect for human rights as civil war. The first study to test the link between human rights abuses and international and civil war is Poe and Tate (1994). They argue governments can impose restrictions and violence on citizens to combat internal threats to their authority and rule. They hypothesize states are more coercive when challenged by an armed and organized resistance, and using four measures of physical integrity rights they find civil wars to significantly and substantially increase the propensity to engage in repression. Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999) expanded this analysis to include a larger time frame, 1976 to 1993, and argue that the most extensive factor causing leaders to resort to repression is the existence of internal or international threats in the form of war. Their findings largely confirmed the results from the 1994 study, although the effects of international war are slightly smaller and the effects of civil war slightly larger.
Numerous other studies have since corroborated the strong relationship between human rights abuses and civil war, although they continue to analyze this indicator as a control variable and not as a main independent variable. Examining regime change, Zanger (2000) argues that “civil war presents the most serious and most violent domestic threat to elites in power,” who are likely to resort to the use of violence against domestic opponents (p. 223). She finds civil war to consistently be highly significant and international war to be less significant with regard to personal integrity rights between 1976 and 1993. Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) analyze the impact of treaties on human rights performance and find civil war to be highly significant and negatively associated with personal integrity rights for 153 states in the same time period as Zanger, while international war has no effect. They argue governments “tend to be more coercive, defending their authority against internal challenges” (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005, p. 1388). Neumayer (2005) produces a similar study and additionally finds civil war to strongly affect both personal integrity rights using the Political Terror Scales and civil rights as measured by Freedom House, while international war is again largely insignificant. In the seminal study by Davenport and Armstrong (2004), in which they challenge the negative and linear relationship between democracy and personal integrity rights violations, civil war is again highly significant while international war is less significant with a much smaller effect for 147 countries between 1976 and 1996. Murdie and Davis (2012) assess the impact of ‘shaming’ by international human rights organizations on targeted states’ human rights performance and argue civil wars can initiate instances where repression is utilized to “prevent coop attempts, temper opposition, and can even be condoned for security reasons” (p. 7). They find intra-state wars to be significantly and negatively associated with the CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index for 130 states between 1992 and 2004. Although these are but a few examples of empirical studies
including an indicator for civil war, they do demonstrate the variety within the human rights literature as to the different statistical models, measures of human rights performances, and independent variables of interest that continue to verify this prominent finding. These examples also demonstrate a lack of thorough theoretical explanations for why states have empirically abused citizens’ rights, and an even greater lack of explanations for why other parties to the civil war might violate the public’s rights.

In contrast to the consistent and highly statistically significant relationship between human rights abuses and civil war, findings relating to the success or influence of peacekeeping are varied. The peacekeeping literature is largely concerned with the success or failure of peacekeeping operations, with the definition of “success” debated. Success is largely argued to mean one of three things: the mission fulfilled its mandate, the mission ended the conflict in which it intervened, or the mission enabled peace to endure longer post-conflict.

Recent studies, though, emphasize the selection effect of peacekeeping missions, and argue that this can potentially bias the success rate of these missions due to the propensity to get involved in more ‘difficult’ cases. Examining the post-Cold War era, Gilligan and Stedman (2003) find the UN is most likely to intervene the more severe a conflict, as measured by the amount of deaths, and the longer the duration of the war. They also found UN peacekeeping operations are less likely to be deployed to intrastate wars where there are large government armies. Fortna (2004) finds consent-based UN peacekeepers are more likely to be deployed after stalemates than wars that end in a decisive victory for one side, whereas the relationships are insignificant for enforcement operations. She also finds peacekeepers are not more likely to intervene in conflicts where a formal treaty has been signed, where there are identity conflicts, or with a large number of deaths. Fortna (2008) additionally finds UN consent-based Chapter VI
missions are more likely to intervene in countries with lower living standards, relatively strong rebel groups, smaller government armies, and rougher terrain. Enforcement-based Chapter VII missions “are more likely in less democratic states, where levels of mistrust are higher, and where there are multiple factions” (Fortna, 2008, p. 45). Also analyzing the post-Cold War era, Hultman (2013) finds the number of civilians killed increases the likelihood of UN peace operations, especially when civilians are specifically targeted, as well as the likelihood that the Security Council provides a more robust mandate and the use of force. Finally, Mullenbach (2005) contrasts the other findings by suggesting international-level factors impact the decisions to deploy peacekeeping missions more than state-level factors. Even though some of his results correlate with previously mentioned studies, he finds previous interaction and intervention by IGOs or global or regional powers to be some of the strongest influences on deployments, especially regarding UN peacekeeping. With this selection bias in mind, recent studies have been able to more aptly test the effectiveness of peacekeeping.

On the question of peacekeeping success, quantitative analysis generally finds peacekeeping to help maintain peace after civil wars. Analyzing post-WWII civil wars, Doyle and Sambanis (2000) conclude peacekeeping operations are most successful at maintaining durable peace when missions have the appropriate capabilities and scope to help with institutional and political reform in the form of elections and democratization. Fortna (2004; 2008) concludes peacekeeping significantly drops the risk of another round of fighting, especially after the Cold War and with consent-based missions. Using matching techniques, Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) find UN peacekeeping is strongly and significantly related to longer post-war peace, although it is insignificant in shortening ongoing wars. Madhav (2013) argues UN missions indirectly contribute to durable peace by incorporating former rivals into the
“institutional setup of the postwar state” and ensuring rivals have a way to resolve their differences without violence (p. 366). Analyzing post-WWII civil wars, he finds UN operations are positively and significantly associated with the democratic process, which in turn positively impacts post-war peacebuilding. However, not all studies echo these positive results. Greig and Diehl (2005) argue peacekeeping can actually discourage conflict settlement and find there are no significant positive impacts on peace agreements, although the results are much more negative for interstate wars than civil wars. Sambanis (2008) finds UN peacekeeping only has short term effects on the durability of post-war settlements and political openness. He argues UN missions do not foster the economic growth required to sustain peace in the long term. The peacekeeping literature in general, though, views peacekeeping operations as effectively increasing the duration of peace after civil wars. However, it does not explore the relationship between peacekeeping operations and the propensity of civil war actors to engage in human rights abuses.

Only one study specifically tries to combine these two fields. Murdie and Davis (2010) analyze the impact of peacekeeping on states’ human rights abuses after civil wars. They test all states with a history of at least one civil war in the past ten years for the time period 1980 to 2004. They broadly define a peacekeeping intervention as “any intervention by an outside state or international organization into the internal affairs of a state with the goal of preventing a resumption of military hostilities or to provide an environment where negotiations can occur” (Murdie and Davis, 2010, p. 50). Using four measures of human rights abuses as their dependent variables, they find the mere presence of a peacekeeping intervention does not have any significant relationship with change in a state’s human rights performance. Missions that include
a humanitarian purpose, though, positively impact human rights performances for three years in the future, but not the present, and negatively impact future empowerment rights.
III. COMPARING MISSIONS’ ABILITIES TO REDUCE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES

“It can be argued that the exercise of force by a state is directly related to the magnitude of the opposition to its regime” (Aflatooni and Allen, 1991, p. 29). If one of the largest threats to governments consists of violent strategies of dissent (Davenport, 1995, p. 687), then opposition groups forcing the state into a civil war is one of the greatest challenges to political systems. For opposition groups to challenge the government enough to classify the country as experiencing a ‘civil war,’ it means they have (even minimally) effective power, military capabilities, and/or public support. Otherwise, the government would prevent dissidents from escalating to the ultimate form of internal conflict. In response to this ‘magnitude’ of oppositional threat to their rule, government leaders can resort to physical and civil human rights violations to weaken their opponents’ capabilities. Failing to respond to serious dissent can lessen the state’s ability to extract resources from its territory and citizens, protect itself, effectively use its military, or continue to execute its day-to-day tasks (Krain, 1997, p. 335). Leaders could also be responding to citizens’ demands for violent action to neutralize dissident combatants if the groups are viewed as dangerous towards the public (Davenport, 1995, p. 687). Politically weak and centralized states might use violence against citizens to quell rebel movements due to the inability of weak, inept, or corrupt local police or military to disband violent opposition groups, especially in periphery territories with limited administrative control (Fearon and Laitin, 2003, p. 75-76). Violent reaction to stop and deter rebels might be the only feasible option to financially or administratively weak officials, when they deem the relative cost of losing office or conceding to rebel demands too high. Moreover, under weak officials, unrestrained military and police units
can carry out their own abuses against citizens or react more harshly to opposition groups than intended by state leaders.

In using repression to quell dissidents, governments can violate both physical integrity rights and civil liberty rights. To directly weaken the opposition, officials can use military or police forces to physically find rebels and torture, unlawfully detain, or execute them. Torturing can be used to extract strategic information or to deter further involvement in rebel groups. Violating citizens’ rights to due process can be used to hold rebels or suspected rebel supporters in secure locations to ensure they are unable to participate in their group’s activities. Killing opponents and suspected supporters is the ultimate act to ensure threatening combatants are unable to challenge the regime, and acts as a deterrent to others by substantially raising the cost of dissenting. The government could also engage in mass killings to eradicate rebel hierarchies simply because they are unsure of who is part of the opposition. Officials can additionally resort to harming civilians in order to directly destroy or weaken a rebel group’s support base, or to undermine the legitimacy of rebel groups by demonstrating that they cannot protect the public and would thus be an inadequate replacement for current leaders (Krain, 2005, p. 370). In addition to physical violations, political elites can respond to threats by abusing the public’s civil liberties. Officials can restrict political access and participation to keep opponents from gaining access to government offices. Moreover, they can restrict the freedom of speech, assembly and association, or expression and beliefs to prevent the messages and ideals of rebel groups from spreading to the mass public and inciting larger oppositional support. Elites could further control the flow of information by restricting news sources. In order to economically weaken rebel groups, political officials can restrict workers’ rights, trade unions, equality of the sexes, and
economic activity. All of these methods can be employed to help the incumbent government retain control over its citizens and state apparatuses.

Rebels additionally have incentives to engage in violence. Rebel groups typically have fewer resources than the government, due to less access to collecting rents, taxes, and orienting the economy in a way that benefits them. Also, groups rebel because they feel they are not benefiting enough from the status quo. If combatants are fighting to gain a greater share of economic benefits or in response to insufficiently compensated work (Ross, 2004, p. 41), then it most likely means they are not doing as well financially as they deem fair and thus have less resources to challenge the government. Therefore, to substantially challenge the government, rebel groups can resort to guerrilla tactics, which can indiscriminately harm everyone in the surrounding area. They might resort to physical violence against civilians in order to deter those who may fight against them or to frighten those who are not participating in anti-system behavior to join the rebel organization (Davenport, 1995, p. 687). Moreover, they could use violence to disrupt the provision of public goods or to demonstrate the government’s inability to protect its citizens in order to dissuade the population from supporting the state’s regime (Wood, Kathman, and Gent, 2012, p. 648). When low on resources, guerrilla tactics and targeting unarmed civilians are relatively low-cost mechanisms with potentially high payoffs in gaining attention and demonstrating abilities or resolve to the government. These mechanisms are especially cost-effective when rebels do not have the capacity to directly fight military or police forces. In addition, rebels may not have access to the intelligence technology of the government, so they may resort to torture in order to acquire information. Violent opposition groups can not only kill, torture, or kidnap civilians, but they can also impede on the public’s civil rights. Although opposition groups cannot legally impinge on citizens’ rights since they are not officially
members of the government, they can use violence to frighten the public from exercising their rights to free speech, assembly, equality, or government participation. Finally, wars are violent by nature, and that violence is seldom limited to armed combatants. Each side is trying to destroy the other by any means necessary in order to fulfill its goals, whether it be replacing the incumbent government, gaining autonomy over a territory, forcing policy changes, or retaining power.

The potential for violence and restrictions does not always end with the cessation of war. Without adequate compromises, implementation, or guarantees, war-ending agreements can fail and the country can dissolve back into war with all the abuses inherently associated with it. Unsatisfied parties and the absence of third-party intervention can also leave the public, former combatants, and government-affiliated personnel susceptible to retaliatory abuses. The incumbent or new government leaders can physically harm former members or supporters of opposition groups in anger over devastation suffered during the war and to deter future uprisings. In addition, the government can restrict civil liberties for the same purposes, or to ensure the public at large or specific groups remain economically and politically weak to prevent future threats. Rebel groups who feel they did not fully receive their deserved goals may violently lash out to demonstrate their contempt for the agreement or to cause a peace agreement to fail.

Previous literature is clear about this relationship between human rights abuses and civil wars, but it is unclear about how peacekeeping operations can impact it. There is also disagreement in the literature about which components of peacekeeping are the most essential in maintaining peace. Being that previous literature found civil wars to significantly and substantially affect human rights performance more than international wars, this paper seeks to compare the three groups of UN peacekeeping operations and their ability to decrease the human
rights abuses associated with civil wars. First, observer and traditional missions act as a conduit of credible information to both sides of a conflict and to the international system. The peacekeepers allow belligerents to credibly signal information to the opposing side without resorting to human rights abuses. Peacekeepers also report their observances to the international community, which can then “shame and blame” belligerents into using avenues other than violence to achieve their goals. Second, multidimensional missions can decrease the amount of abuses committed more than the previous group since they go beyond monitoring and reporting to implementing peacebuilding components. These missions include substantial civilian elements to ensure representation by opposing parties in the post-war state structure and aid in implementing a more non-violent system. Multidimensional missions additionally put more direct effort into humanitarian aims. Third, enforcement missions help to physically ensure security for fighting factions and civilians and deter abusive behavior with the threat of force.

All UN peacekeeping operations entail monitoring the implementation of the country’s cease-fire agreement and reporting on the adherence of the agreement by all fighting factions. The mandates of observer missions do not go beyond monitoring and reporting. Traditional missions can include the creation of buffer zones, mine clearance, minor military or police training, facilitating the withdrawal of foreign troops or refugees, and facilitating humanitarian aid programs. Both observer and traditional missions are generally only lightly armed, with strict instructions to refrain from using force other than in self-defense. They also generally have consent from all warring factions and attempt to remain unbiased toward any particular party. Through consent and neutrality, international attention, and other non-military mechanisms, these types of peacekeeping missions reduce the amount of human rights abuses associated with civil war by facilitating credible information between belligerents and encouraging non-violent
behavior. However, these missions typically have the least amount of personnel, financial support, and mandate expansiveness, which could limit the ability to quickly and decisively end hostilities in a manner conducive to future respect for human rights.

Observer and traditional missions place more emphasis on obtaining consent from warring parties and maintaining neutrality than multidimensional and enforcement missions. Consent by all parties in a civil war for the UN to establish a mission in-country is important because it signals the warring factions have at least some desire for peace and some desire to carry out their cease-fire agreement, at least for the near future. By agreeing to be monitored by a third-party as international as the United Nations, warring factions know they are involving themselves in an organization that is not only important in recognizing the legitimate rulers of a state but also one that holds a lot of international attention. For the other types of peacekeeping operations, consent is not always given by all belligerents. If a faction does not consent to the operation, it indicates they believe the operation will harm their chances of reaching their goals. Therefore, non-consenting parties would be more likely to continue or increase violent behavior in an attempt to undermine the operation (Diehl, 1988, p. 503). Additionally, consent allows peacekeepers to gather more information about the war situation and the actions and motivations of each group. Howard (2008) argues consent can “be a precondition for learning,” and increases the abilities of peacekeepers to collect and disperse information by being able to interact with local populations and members of each faction (p. 328). Neutrality is also significant because it facilitates the continuation of consent for the mission. If the operation is perceived as biased toward one side, other parties may not want to continue cooperating since it might hinder their ability to gain or retain power. Other states may also disagree with the biased party chosen to
help win the conflict, and consequently might withdraw resources or counteract the mission by sending their own oppositional support.

Peacekeeping operations are important because they allow for a less-violent alternative for the transmission of credible information. Because warring groups in a civil war are all working to achieve a different goal, information is difficult to gather and send because of the strategic incentives to remain secretive and misrepresent. It is not advantageous for any group to reveal any or all of its true intentions, motivations, resources/capabilities, bases, supporters, resolve, or costs. Therefore, combatants may resort to the use of torture, unlawful detention, murder, mutilation, or other physical integrity abuses to force individuals to reveal credible information. Sending information through credible signals is also difficult due to the incentive to misrepresent. Peacekeepers reduce information asymmetries by transmitting intelligence between groups without the use of violence. Since peacekeepers are part of a multinational organization committed to securing world peace, belligerents can be more trusting of information relayed through them concerning other parties. The neutrality of observational and traditional missions also makes the information relayed more credible since there is no incentive for peacekeepers to misrepresent or withhold vital information from cease-fire implementations. UN peacekeepers strive to remain neutral and truthful so that they will not compromise future missions or the willingness of future combatants to consent to interventions. By closely monitoring the actions of each group, peacekeepers can confirm and reassure that all groups are genuinely trying to fulfill the directives of cease-fire agreements. This, at the very least, makes it harder for any group to launch a surprise attack, stockpile resources for later attacks, or renege on other aspects of the agreement. Therefore, belligerents can at least lessen the naturally
mistrustful nature of war by sending and receiving signals and information through peacekeepers instead of resorting to physical integrity abuses.

The international attention that accompanies UN operations can further reduce rights abuses by deterring belligerents from using violence and by preventing unintentional escalations of violence. Peacekeepers report noncompliance to an agreement and any violence carried out by each faction. Parties to a conflict are generally dependent upon some form of foreign aid or foreign resources. Using violence could put future aid in jeopardy, especially since other organizations are generally more willing to give resources to conflicts that have peacekeepers on the ground for assistance (Fortna, 2008, p. 90-92). Moreover, abusive behavior could result in sanctions, which could economically hurt belligerents resulting in less available resources. The UN can additionally maintain the legitimacy of the government or grant legitimacy to rebel groups. Committing violent acts, especially towards the civilian population, could result in the loss of a group’s legitimate power to the international community, which could affect how legitimately they are viewed by the domestic population. This is especially important to rebel groups who are fighting for control of the government or if either side has an incentive to win future elections (Ibid.). In addition to reporting actions to the international community, peacekeepers can help prevent unnecessary violence through retaliation or misunderstandings. Instead of having to choose between retaliation and looking weak, a group can respond to attacks by reporting the incident to peacekeepers who can then relay the information to the international community. Furthermore, by facilitating a credible flow of information, peacekeepers can prevent misunderstandings from escalating into abusive behavior (Ibid., p. 94-95).

Despite these positive influences that observer and traditional missions can impart on parties to a civil war, the missions lack the mandate scopes and resources of multidimensional
and enforcement missions. As previously stated, observer and traditional missions are not authorized to physically protect local populations from violence or ensure their civil and political rights are respected. They must simply monitor and report the treatment of civilians, not interfere. Even if peacekeepers on the ground wanted to interfere, these missions typically have limited resources. Compared to multidimensional and enforcement missions, they have significantly less military and civilian personnel and budgets, which impedes their ability to physically reach all conflict areas in a nation or all areas instantaneously. These limits confine peacekeepers’ abilities to effectively deter warring factions from using violence. Furthermore, these limitations can provoke warring factions into using more violence. Authorizing observer or traditional missions in lieu of the other two types can be a signal to combatants that the UN has a weak resolve for the conflict and/or that they are not prepared to risk resources for protecting civilians (Hultman, Kathman, Shannon, 2013a, p. 880), which could decrease the effectiveness of ‘shaming and blaming’ reports of abuses to the international community. Seeing peacekeepers could also give civilians an unrealistic sense-of-security and lead to them wandering out of safety to become targets to combatants who feel limited pressure to avoid attacking civilians. In addition, if warring factions have reason to believe the Security Council will authorize one of the other two larger mission types in the future, government or rebel fighters could carry out violence in the urgent need to “secure civilian loyalty, deter civilian defection, restock their fighting ranks, and acquire more resources” before more peacekeeping personnel arrive to solidify an unfavorable status quo (Ibid., p. 881). Alternatively, combatants could conclude that the international community has low resolve for ending their conflict and respond to a heightened future security dilemma by committing mass abuses to secure resources and support for a resurgence of warfare when the peace agreement fails (Kathman and Wood, 2012, p 19).
The neutrality of these missions can also hinder their effectiveness by taking longer to resolve the issues in dispute. To remain impartial, observer/traditional operations must refrain from supporting one side or the other. Therefore, wars with neutral interveners have been argued to last longer and been found to be less likely to remain settled due to the fact that they do not ‘tip the balance’ with military weapons or soldiers and help one side to victory (Toft 2010; Regan 2002). Quick and decisive victories can create more stable and lasting peace as compared to negotiated settlements due to the destruction of the enemy, or at least a credible threat of harm if the opposition reneges with violence, and by effectively demonstrating the capabilities of each side (Toft, 2010, p. 33-34). Negotiated settlements do not always clarify which side would have won the conflict, which could lead to a lapse back into fighting for the side that feels thwarted by the peace agreement. Although decisive military victories can lead to human rights violations post-conflict through revenge violence to the opposition or to quell resistance to the outcome, not to mention abuses that occur through defeating all opponents, they can also prevent future violations that occur from a resumption of hostilities. Conversely, negotiated settlements may prevent abuses in the short term with peace agreements but may not in the long term if fighting resumes. On the contrary, it can be argued that the longer wars of negotiated settlements create environments more conducive to stable peace and respect for human rights through information convergence and war weariness. Through repeated confrontation, all sides to a conflict slowly gain information on their opponents and eventually converge on the knowledge of each group’s capabilities and resolve, which leads to a cessation of hostilities because each side knows who will win. Long durations of violence can also leave all parties weary to more violence, thus decreasing prospects for human rights violations in the future.
Even though observer and traditional missions are mainly focused on simply monitoring and reporting events instead of militarily forcing belligerents to comply with cease-fire agreements or engaging in better human rights practices, they can still be effective in deterring abusive behavior through transparency and raising the costs of violence. States left on their own do not have the same conduit of credible information or the same incentives to discontinue or lessen abusive behavior. These impacts, though, can be overshadowed by insufficient mandate scopes and resources and the ability to quickly and decisively end hostilities. Therefore, I expect there will be no significant impact with reducing current human rights abuses as compared to the other two types. I also do not expect traditional missions to impact future human rights performances because any deterring impact will occur while peacekeeping personnel are still on the ground and will cease once the international community has deemed that the conflict is either finished or not worth the cost of intervention. Furthermore, since the focus of these missions is mainly concerned with implementing cease-fire agreements, I expect any statistical significance to decrease physical integrity rights, but not necessarily civil liberty rights. Because personal violence, such as murder and torture, is viewed as more horrific than civil liberty abuses, such as restricting free speech, the international community is more forceful at preventing the former over the latter. Therefore, combatants should be more reluctant to engage in physical integrity abuses than civil liberty abuses for fear of an enlarged peacekeeping operation or negative consequences in other aspects of the international community.

Multidimensional operations go beyond observer and traditional missions by including peacebuilding measures. While they still continue to deter abusive behavior through monitoring and reporting, multidimensional operations go a step further and attempt to build and change state institutions to reinforce belligerents’ behavioral change and ensure better human rights
performances for the post-conflict state. Multidimensional mandates can include: organizing and supervising elections, investigating human rights abuses and/or holding trials for abusers, judicial reform, delivering humanitarian assistance, repatriating refugees, military and police training, security sector reform, social and economic recovery and development programs, facilitating the creation of a stable government with democratic principles, or even temporarily administering a territory (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2003, p. 2). Not all missions include the same mandates, but multidimensional missions generally include at least some human rights aspects and/or state reconstruction toward democratization. Multidimensional operations can decrease the amount of human rights abuses associated with civil wars not only by deterring factions from engaging in abusive behavior, but by helping to build or restructure a state’s system to better respect human rights.

In addition to facilitating a system conducive to protecting physical and civil rights, these missions can help solve some of the problems that resulted in a civil war, thus facilitating an end to civil war related abuses. After more than a hundred years of colonial rule, the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) for Namibia intensively worked to provide the country with its first elections through: voter education, establishing polling stations, ballot-box supervising to guard against fraudulent voting, policing electoral stations to keep voters safe, organizing regular meetings of the leaders of all parties in the election (who had never before convened) to create a political Code of Conduct, and helping to negotiate the release of political prisoners and repatriate refugees for a comprehensive voter turnout. UNTAG even went so far as to “neutralize” the old biased colonial newspaper and broadcasting systems prone to propaganda perpetuating colonialism and apartheid and sent special missions to neighboring states to physically track down missing Namibians and verify they were not being detained (“Namibia,”
n.d.). By ensuring free and fair elections, peacekeepers can protect against unlawful political exclusion and help to create a stable government with democratic values that incorporates all groups into the post-civil war system. Power-sharing institutions can lessen security concerns by ensuring each group is represented and in a position to influence future decisions of the state (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003). Political power-sharing can protect against one group gaining enough power to abuse the rights of others and can act as a ‘check’ to prevent abusive policies from evolving. Walter (1997) found institutional power-sharing arrangements are not only crucial to long-term peace, especially in the absence of decisive military victories, but can also offset limited security guarantees allowing the UN to facilitate peaceful conflict settlements without having to get the Security Council to declare a Chapter VII and deploy a substantial amount of troops (p. 361-362).

In conjunction to political power-sharing, military power-sharing and economic restructuring can help combat abuses committed in the post-civil war state system. Military power-sharing keeps one group from gaining enough power to abuse the rights of the other, while forcing each group to work together and thus lessening the differences between the two groups and the incentive to carry out violence against one another. By re-training and monitoring unified military and police forces, peacekeepers can deter the use of torture, unlawful imprisonment, forced disappearances, and murder (Fortna, 2008, p. 99-100). Reforming and monitoring the judicial sector further helps lessen abusive behavior by ensuring abusers are punished, which can deter potential abusers and retaliators from engaging in abusive behavior. Moreover, an independent judiciary can ensure political officials maintain respect for citizens’ civil liberties and do not infringe on their abilities to express and exercise their beliefs. Additionally, economic reconstruction might relieve some of the pressures that resulted in
fighting by helping disadvantaged groups gain economic leverage within the system and can make them less vulnerable to abusive behavior. The peacebuilding that is important in multidimensional missions is intended to institute a structure conducive to peaceful conflict resolution (Ibid., p. 101) and ensure no group in society is vulnerable to physical or civil infringements.

Furthermore, multidimensional operations should have a greater impact on lessening human rights abuses because they specifically include humanitarian objectives. The deterrence associated with observer and traditional missions is greatly increased not only because there are larger soldier and civilian components, but also because the missions are specifically searching for abuses and actively trying to discourage abusive behavior. While observer and traditional missions do report on human rights abuses, it is not always a focus. The focus for observer/traditional missions is more on whether the sides are following the accords of the cease-fire agreement, and peacekeepers can even deem it harmful to the completion of the mission by dwelling on human rights concerns. Missions with humanitarian objectives not only monitor abuses but investigate complaints and give more detailed reports to the UN and the international community that specifically focus on abusive actions. Restructuring of the government is also carried out with humanitarian objectives in mind, especially with training soldiers and police to respect human rights and ensuring the judicial system is active and ethical. Operations further restructure the education system, as the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) accomplished, by incorporating human rights studies into university curriculums and providing education and expertise to teachers, health professionals, and public officials. Moreover, UNTAC trained judges, defense lawyers, public defenders, justice officials, and intensely monitored and investigated all prisoners suspected of politically motivated detention
while pressuring authorities to improve their situation to the fullest possible extent (“Cambodia,” n.d.). Furthermore, the emphasis on democratization can help decrease human rights abuses through power-sharing as well as forcing leaders to be accountable to citizens by giving citizens the right to vote abusive or potentially repressive leaders out of office. By laying the foundation for a state with democratic principles, peacekeepers can ensure future respect for human rights, as numerous studies have found democracies to be associated with a decrease in human rights abuses (McKinlay and Cohan, 1975; Mitchell and McCormick, 1988; Henderson, 1991; Poe and Tate, 1994; Davenport, 1995; Poe, Tate, and Keith, 1999; Davenport, 1999; Zanger, 2000; Davenport and Armstrong, 2004).

However, as mentioned previously, negotiated settlements have been found to fail more often than decisive victories, and part of the reason behind this involves the negative consequences of political, economic, and military power-sharing. Survivors of civil wars must decide how political and economic benefits will be divided throughout all parties to the conflict and across the population at large. The incumbent government faces a significant cost in redistributing the political and economic benefits it fought so hard to retain, to opponents who have correspondently fought as hard to take full control of those benefits (Toft, 2010, p. 42-43). Although peacekeepers actively seek to include all factions in the post-war state system, they also tend to ‘freeze’ the military status quo when they arrive to intervene, which usually favors the government. By not allowing a continuation of fighting, rebels are robbed of the opportunity to win and change the system in their favor. This dissatisfaction with the antebellum status quo, coupled with distributional problems, creates the potential for defection from the peace settlement. As Werner and Yuen (2005) argue, durable settlements require distributional terms to reflect belligerents’ convergent expectations about military consequences sans agreement. Even
with democratization and free and fair elections, multidimensional missions cannot ensure respect for future human rights if the foundations of the post-civil war state are viewed as unrepresentative or if one side can easily be blocked from power with winner-take-all elections or laws that can easily be changed (Walter, 1997, p. 362). Civil liberty restrictions could additionally be employed by the majority to further eschew power from the group disadvantaged at the time of the peace settlement. Minorities can still be victimized or have their rights infringed upon if power is not distributed in a way that grants them enough influence to retain a voice and sufficient economic income.

I hypothesize multidimensional missions to have a positive and significant impact on respect for human rights, despite the potential for disruptions caused by the distributional consequences of peacebuilding. The additional objectives of multidimensional mission mandates over observer and traditional missions allow for peacekeepers to go beyond deterrence and information transmissions to actively promote better human rights practices and install respectful behavior into the state structure. Therefore, because multidimensional missions have elements of peacemaking and peacebuilding through humanitarian objectives and building state structures to respect human rights, I hypothesize multidimensional missions to be negative and significantly related to human rights abuses in the present and future. Since multidimensional missions put forth the most effort into ensuring the state will continue to make positive progress after the mission is completed, I expect multidimensional missions to have the largest impacts on future human rights performances. Also due to their peacebuilding nature, I hypothesize multidimensional missions to have the largest effects on civil liberty rights.

Enforcement operations additionally go beyond simple monitoring and reporting by helping to resolve the credible commitment problem of war-ending settlements through the use
of force. These missions are generally authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and include a significant military component to carry out large-scale combat operations. Chapter VII of the UN Charter authorizes the Security Council to grant peacekeeping missions the right to use force to maintain international peace and security (“Chapter VII,” 1945). While the other types of peacekeeping operations generally obtain consent from all groups participating in the cease-fire agreement, enforcement missions are not required to gain consent from all sides nor obligated to depart if consent is withdrawn. The use of force can physically stop human rights abuses or it can further deter belligerents from resorting to abusive behavior because they know force will be used against them.

One of the major challenges to the success of war-ending agreements is the issue of credible commitments, and enforcement missions can provide security guarantees to prevent a lapse back into fighting. For a civil war to successfully end, combatants must lay down their weapons and consolidate into a single state with a single military force. This means adversaries make themselves vulnerable to exploitation if the opposing side does not follow through with demobilizing or sharing power. Once groups surrender their weapons and/or occupied territory they are unable to force the other side to comply with the terms of the agreement and unable to protect themselves from attacks (Walter, 1999). Self-enforcement is especially difficult in conflicts with strong distrust between combatants, multiple factions, substantial hostility, or lack of coherent leadership (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, p. 781). Therefore, a third party can guarantee compliance for all groups by monitoring the situation and creating transparency about everyone’s actions. Furthermore, enforcement missions can deter noncompliance by threatening reneging groups with military action to force them to comply with the terms of the agreement or forcefully restore public order. They can also provide protection should one side renege and
attempt to attack an already demobilized group. Thus, peacekeepers raise the difficulty, and therefore cost, of cheating so that it no longer exceeds the payoff of implementing the remaining terms of the peace agreement. This makes “promises to cooperate gain credibility and cooperation becomes more likely” (Walter, 1997, p. 340). Therefore, enforcement missions can decrease the amount of human rights abuses that would have been suffered in their absence by preventing a lapse back into fighting and deterring belligerent groups from using violence to undermine peace agreements.

Numerous studies argue successful interventions require strong enforcement elements to maintain security with a credible threat of force (Walter, 1997; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild, 2001; Toft, 2010; Kathman and Wood, 2012). Enforcement missions are characterized by significantly larger military elements than the other two types and can subsequently send a stronger signal of resolve by the international community to conclude the civil war and raise the political costs of ending the operation before its completion. Establishing enforcement missions sends a signal to belligerents that the international community is committing itself not only to forcefully securing the execution of a peace agreement but also to forcefully protecting civilians (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon, 2013a). Authorizing troops to use force to protect civilians signals that the international community is deeply concerned about the welfare of the general population, which increases pressure on combatants to avoid violence more than traditional or multidimensional missions. Instead of potential future negative consequences in the form of sanctions, loss of legitimacy, etc., violent belligerents face an immediate punishment of retaliation by troops in the form of return fire. Moreover, soldiers can physically force reluctant belligerents to demobilize and turn in their weapons, reducing their ability to target and harm civilians. The authorization to use force further allows peacekeepers to create effective buffer
zones to separate combatants in order to reduce disruptions to cease-fire agreements and to create safe zones for civilians (Ibid., p. 879). Simultaneously, more personnel allows the operation to protect civilians throughout the country and leaves it less restricted as compared to traditional missions. Reaching larger swaths of the country and its inhabitants increases the operations’ ability to succeed and prevent abuses.

Furthermore, troops on the ground physically protect civilians and use force to stop abusers from committing violence. Soldiers defend designated safe areas from attacks, patrol villages for signs of violence or aggressors, silence deadly fire against civilians with reciprocation, and apprehend suspected war criminals to be tried for humanitarian atrocities. In addition, soldiers protect and aid humanitarian relief, which could help decrease the amount of abuses suffered from a lack of necessary resources. For example, soldiers stop factions from disrupting relief convoys by forcing belligerents to retreat or provide security detail for protection. It can be argued sending soldiers to forcefully stop perpetrators from committing acts of violence is preferable to economic sanctions. As stated previously, one of the deterrents associated with the other types of peacekeeping missions is the potential for sanctions to be placed on groups engaging in abusive behavior. Economic sanctions can sometimes result in hurting the regular citizens of a country more than the affluent leaders who capitalize on the available rents associated with sanctions. Peacekeeping soldiers can police countries torn apart by civil wars and specifically target abusive perpetrators without causing large-scale unintentional harm to innocent civilians (Lepard, 2002).

Even though enforcement missions are authorized to protect civilians and use force, it is dubious whether they actually possess the credibility and strength required to deter belligerents from resorting to violence. Walter (1997) states three conditions credible interveners must fulfill
in order to effectively solve the credible-commitment problem: they must have self-interest in executing their commitments, they must have sufficient resources and will to punish treaty defectors, and they must be able to effectively demonstrate their resolve with costly signals (p. 340-341). If the Security Council cannot commit a sufficient amount of troops or resources to the mission, then its ability to decrease human rights abuses diminishes. This echoes studies showing that as troop size increases, the chance of war reoccurring decreases (Hultman, Kathman, Shannon, 2013b) and the use of violence decreases (Kathman and Wood, 2012). Past enforcement missions, though, have been criticized for their lack of resolve and resources. For example, the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I and II) suffered from the beginning, with troops and resources that were slow to arrive on the ground, and throughout with unclear chains of command and poor communication and coordination between units and the states involved. UNOSOM II failed when it withdrew all personnel after the United States and Europeans withdrew troops due to widely publicized mission failures and troop deaths, which left Somalis at the violent mercy of warring factions (Howard, 2008, p. 27-28). In addition, reeling from the failure in Rwanda the UN authorized the largest peacekeeping force in its history to help the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The sheer volume of personnel from such a large dispersion of countries proved difficult to manage. Upwards of 18,000 troops from 51 countries proved impossible to configure into a unified and robust mission to combat multiple warring factions and complete a complex mandate. The operation has additionally run into problems relating to contradictions in its mandate. While aiming to protect civilians, the operation is also essentially taking sides in the conflict by militarily supporting the country’s armed force (FARDC), which has habitually targeted the civilian population for rape, harassment, and homicide. Bosco Ntaganda, who has been convicted by the International
Criminal Court for conscripting child soldiers, is also a member of FARDC, which contradicts the mission’s goal to bring to justice those who commit humanitarian abuses (Clark, 2011). Therefore, not only can enforcement missions suffer from a lack of resolve or resources necessary to protect civilians, they can also be impeded by their superior size and complexity.

I hypothesize enforcement missions to also have a greater and more statistically significant impact on human rights performances than observer and traditional missions, since they have the authority to use force. However, as with observer and traditional missions, the mechanisms through which they prevent and deter abusive behavior occur while troops are still on the ground. Therefore, I do not expect them to have significant impacts on long term human rights performances, as the deterrence effect for refraining from abusive behavior diminishes as soldiers leave the country and the international community no longer retains a credible threat of punishment if the newly constructed or reconstructed central authority of the state spirals into engaging in repressive behavior. I also expect the negative characteristics of enforcement missions to outweigh the positives in comparison to the negative and positive characteristics of multidimensional missions, leading to a less significant and substantial effect for enforcement missions. As previously mentioned, it is more pertinent for peacekeepers to stop physical abuses than civil liberty rights abuses, and even though enforcement missions have grown in scope over the years, they do not concentrate on peacebuilding for the post-war state system as much as multidimensional missions. Therefore, since they do not actively work to incorporate civil rights into countries’ political systems, I expect enforcement missions to have a substantially smaller effect on civil liberty rights than multidimensional missions.
IV. METHODOLOGY AND MEASUREMENTS

For this study I utilize data on all countries involved in a civil war and a UN peacekeeping operation since 1976. To test the relationship between the three types of peacekeeping operations and their effects on human rights performances after civil wars, I constructed a panel dataset of one row per year (t) per country (i) from 1976 to 2012. For each country, data starts at the onset of its civil war and ends ten years after the civil war ends or troops for its peacekeeping operation left. Since peacekeeping operations are not sent to every country involved in a civil war, I utilize the two-stage Heckman selection model to correct for non-random selection. The first stage is a probit model estimating the probability of a UN peacekeeping operation using a dichotomous indicator as the dependent variable. The results are used in the second stage OLS model to assess the effects of peacekeeping on multiple measures of states’ human rights performance. Since ‘human rights’ encompasses a plethora of privileges and freedoms, I utilize multiple popular measures of human rights abuses as each takes into account slightly different elements of the relatively broad term and codes abuses differently. The five dependent variables measuring human rights performance are: physical integrity rights as measured by the Political Terror Scales (PTS) from Amnesty International Reports, physical integrity rights as measured by PTS from the U. S. Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, the Civil Liberty Rights Index by Freedom House (FH), physical integrity rights as measured by CIRI, and empowerment rights as measured by CIRI. The sample consists of 57 countries with a history of civil war and 1,346 observations. This includes 24
countries that have experienced a peacekeeping operation. To account for the likely non-independence of observations from the same country, I applied country clustered standard errors.

Although Sambanis (2008) found the positive impacts of peacekeeping operations occur mainly in the short term, measured by two years in the future, I expect some of the mechanisms of peacekeeping to take time to effect change. Since multidimensional and enforcement missions entail substantially more personnel and more complex mandates, their impacts on reducing human rights abuses could take longer than the smaller and simpler traditional missions. Therefore, I include measures for future impacts of peacekeeping operations. I assess impacts for two years in the future and again for five years in the future. I chose two years following the study by Sambanis (2008) and five years to test whether the impacts last longer than what his results indicated. This makes fifteen models, each utilizing one of the five measures of human rights as the dependent variable. The first five models measure current human rights performances with the dependent and independent variables all measured in the same year, the next five assess the effects of future human rights performances by lagging the independent variables by two years, and the last five measure future impacts by lagging the independent variables by five years.

Dates for each country’s civil war are taken from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2013 (v.4-2013) (Themnér and Wallensteen, 2014) and the Correlates of War Project (COW) Intra-State War Data version 4.0 (v4.0) (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010). UCDP defines intra-state conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” per year and encompasses the time period 1946 to 2012 (Themnér, 2013, p.
The COW database defines intra-state war as sustained combat between organized armed forces, where parties can be state or non-state entities, that results in a minimum of 1,000 battle-related combatant deaths per year and encompasses 1818-2007 (Sarkees, 2010). Though I generally utilized the UCDP/PRIO dataset for the start and end dates of combat for each civil war, I utilized either start or end dates from the COW for a few countries to reflect more sustained combat due to the low minimum of required deaths per year for UCDP.

The first stage of the selection model includes six predictor variables. The dependent variable is simply a dummy indicator for the presence of a UN peacekeeping operation. For the independent variables I follow the guidance of previous studies on where UN peacekeepers are sent. Fortna (2004; 2008) found consent-based peacekeeping is less likely after decisive victories and more likely to intervene in countries with lower living standards, while Chapter VII missions are more likely to be sent to less democratic states. Gilligan and Stedman (2003) found the UN is more likely to intervene in wars with longer durations. Therefore, the first two independent variables are dichotomous indicators of a decisive victory and any type of peace or war-ending agreement. Information for both variables came from the COW Intra-State War Data v.4.0 (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010) and the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2013 (Themnér and Wallensteen, 2014). Victory includes a war outcome with either the government or a rebel group defeating its opponent. The agreement variable includes a war outcome by compromise (COW) or a peace or ceasefire agreement (UCDP/PRIO). Since the original purpose of UN peacekeeping operations was to monitor or enforce peace/ceasefire agreements, I expect war agreements to be associated with the presence of peacekeeping. I expect decisive victories to be negatively related to peacekeeping because victories can lead to more stable peace (Toft, 2010) and because winners are unlikely to want international peacekeepers observing or interfering in
the post-war treatment of the losing side or remaining internal threats (Fortna, 2008, p. 22). Logged GDP per capita in constant US dollars and logged population size are collected from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI, 2014). Data for regime type comes from the Polity IV project and measures regimes from -10 (most autocratic) to 10 (most democratic) (Marshall and Jaggers, 2011). The last predictor measures war duration and is simply the number of years a country was engaged in a civil war. GDP, population size, regime type, and war duration can influence the propensity of a return to war and might therefore influence whether the UN Security Council deems it wise to send a mission. A low GDP or a high population size could fuel economic grievances or make it hard for former combatants to find community jobs and return to civilian life. Fully autocratic governments should be more unlikely to incorporate all sides of a conflict into the post-war setup than governments with power-sharing mechanisms already in place and might also be more averse to peacekeeping attempts to democratize since they would have the most power to lose.

The second stage of the Heckman estimation tests the relationship of interest. The first and second dependent variables, personal integrity rights, refer to the freedom from torture, cruel and inhumane treatment, unlawful physical harm, forced disappearances, and unlawful imprisonment. They are measured by the Political Terror Scales, with scores compiled from Amnesty International’s annual human rights reports (PTS Amnesty) and the U.S. Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (PTS US). Country information for both reports is based on a scale from one to five that was originally developed by Freedom House and with the time period 1976 to 2012 (Gibney, Cornett, Wood, and Haschke, 2014). A score of one indicates that a state is operated under a secure rule of law where political murder, torture, or imprisonment is exceptionally rare. A score of five indicates that the whole population
experiences extensive and common imprisonment, executions, and unlimited detention with leaders that “place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals” (Ibid.). The primary goal of these scales is to measure state sanctioned political violence, although “coders are instructed not to turn a blind eye towards violence by non-state actors” and use their best judgment for measuring civil war situations where state and non-state violence in particular “often go together” (Ibid.).

Previous literature generally only examines the effects of physical integrity abuses; however, human rights encompass civil freedoms as well as physical freedoms. Therefore, I include two measures of civil liberty abuses. The first is the civil liberties index by Freedom House (FH). It measures freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, personal autonomy, the extent of equality, the amount of restrictions placed on aspects of society such as the media or trade unions, and restrictions placed on economic activity. The measure is largely based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations and takes into account laws and actual implementation, as well as government and non-government impediments to citizens’ freedoms. Their survey data includes analytical reports and numerical ratings for all countries and territories on a scale of one to seven. The ratings are based on fifteen survey questions grouped into four categories: freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights. Scores from the previous year are taken into consideration, with scores for years under review only changing for on-the-ground developments. A country with a rating of one typically enjoys a wide range of civil liberties, has an established and fair rule of law, allows for free economic activity, and generally seeks equal opportunity for all races and genders. Countries with a score of seven have few or no civil liberties, allow for virtually no
freedom of expression or association, do not protect the rights of prisoners or detainees, and usually control economic activity (Freedom House, 2012). The data was obtained from the Quality of Governance Dataset (version 20Dec13) and includes data from 1976 to 2012 (Teorell, Charron, Dahlberg, Holmberg, Rothstein, Sundin & Svensson, 2013).

Both CIRI measures range from 1981 to 2011 and were taken from the Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights Data Project (Cingranelli and Richards, 2014). The CIRI indexes only measure the actual practices of governments and its agents towards its own citizens. Coders for the index are also “forbidden to look at existing CIRI or other human rights scores for the countries they are coding” (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay, 2014). The CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index is a scale from zero to eight based on the use of torture, extrajudicial homicide, political imprisonment, and forced disappearances. For this scale CIRI utilizes both the U.S. Department of State and Amnesty International’s annual reports, although Amnesty reports were used when the scores differed (Ibid.). A cumulative score of zero indicates a state has no respect for physical integrity rights and an eight indicates that a state fully respects these rights. The second civil liberties measure is the CIRI Empowerment Index, which is based on U.S. Department of State Reports. It measures rights such as free speech, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of religion, freedom of movement, women’s rights, political participation, electoral self-determination, and workers’ rights. These scores are also cumulative and range from zero to fourteen, with zero indicating no respect or adherence to these rights and fourteen representing full respect and adherence (Murdie and Davis, 2010, p. 62). In order to interpret the results easier I have flipped these scores to match the PTS and FH measures; therefore, low scores represent respect for human rights and high scores indicate a high amount of abuses.
In addition to each dependent variable including slightly different elements and practices for scoring, each measure has different strengths and weaknesses. The PTS takes the range of violence into account more than the CIRI indexes by scoring states based on who is targeted within the population and the magnitude of violence relative to total population size. CIRI scores do not reflect these distinctions and additionally computes overall measures from cumulative scores of the component parts. For example, even if a country experiences widespread and indiscriminant killings or torture but does not have many reports of forced disappearances or political imprisonment, its cumulative score will be restrained (Wood and Gibney, 2010). While PTS scores do not have this limitation, the subjective assessment coders place on abuses is critiqued as reducing the reliability of the measure. CIRI creators maintain that the cumulative coding schemes and numeric thresholds increase inter-coder reliability, and criticize both the PTS and FH projects for failing to report reliability statistics (Cingranelli and Richards, 2010). Even though these are but a few critiques of the measures, I decided there were enough overall differences to include all five in order to get a more accurate and robust assessment of peacekeeping impacts.

The independent variables of interest are the three groups of UN peacekeeping operations. As explained above, the United Nations and subsequent literature classify four types of peacekeeping operations; however, I combine two since they are more similar in scope than the others. The first group contains both observational and traditional missions. These two groups were classified as such if their mandates did not contain any authorization for the use of force other than self-defense or major tasks other than monitoring and reporting. Traditional missions do include minor tasks, though, as mentioned previously. The next type, multidimensional, expands beyond the scope of the previous group and includes at least two
major dimensions other than monitoring and reporting. Finally, enforcement missions include a much larger military component with the authorization to use force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and are not required to have consent from both sides of belligerents in the conflict. Classifications of these groups are based on data by Fortna (2008), Doyle and Sambanis (2006), and the wording of mission mandates (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2014). As for the distribution of each mission type for the sample, traditional and enforcement missions tend to last longer than multidimensional missions. Distributions for different types of missions and their association with specific human rights scores tend to be more delineated by year than the level of abuses.¹

For control variables I utilized the top controls in both the human rights and peacekeeping literature. The three most common controls in the human rights literature are economic development, population size, and regime type. As economic benefits are dispersed throughout a state, citizens are less likely to revolt due to scarcity or inequality and are more likely to have the resources to combat repressive belligerents (Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe et al., 1999; Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko, 2001). Therefore, I expect higher levels of economic development to be associated with less human rights abuses. This variable is measured by logged GDP per capita in constant US dollars from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI, 2014). Data for (logged) population size is also collected from the WDI and has been found to be associated with decreases in respect for human rights (Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe et al., 1999). I expect an increase in population size to be correlated with an increase in human rights violations. As population size increases, it could lead to a scarcity of resources creating revolts or exacerbating the conditions typically associated with civil wars, and with more people there are

¹To see a distribution of the length of each mission type and its relation to human rights scores, please see the appendix.
simply more chances for violations (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005). Democracy has been correlated with better human rights practices; therefore, I expect democratic countries to have less human rights abuses due to the political mechanisms conducive to more peaceful conflict resolution. Democratic states are speculated to help human rights practices for numerous reasons, such as: political freedoms, civilian control of the military, promotion of civil society, systems of checks and balances that block repressive action, and the ability to vote coercive authorities out of office (Poe et al., 1999; Murdie and Davis, 2012). Data for regime type comes from the Polity IV project and measures regimes from -10 (most autocratic) to 10 (most democratic). Institutional features that distinguish the two regime types include: competitiveness of the process for chief executive selection, the openness of that process to social groups, the level of institutional constraints on the chief executive’s authority for decision-making, competitiveness of political participation, and the extent to which binding rules govern political participation.

In conjunction with the peacekeeping literature, it is also necessary to control for variables that impact peacekeepers in relation to civil wars. Therefore, I include a measure of the duration of the civil war. It is simply the number of years a country was engaged in war, which is consistent with data compiled by Lacina and Gleditsch (2005) and used by Murdie and Davis (2010). Obviously, the longer the conflict the more opportunities there are for human rights abuses to occur; therefore, I expect an increase in this variable to be associated with an increase in human rights abuses. There is a competing theory, however, regarding the duration of conflict. As the length of conflict increases, it allows for information convergence between adversaries and battle exhaustion. This can result in a more durable peace settlement and a reluctance to engage in abusive behavior. Next, since the data includes observations during war and after the war ends, I include a war count variable to delineate between war and post-war years. Civil war
years are coded with zeros and post-war years are coded by the number of years since the war ended. Finally, I include a variable measuring operation resources to control for differences in the size of the three mission groups. Data for mission budgets is not as consistent or extensive as data for mission personnel; therefore, I utilize a measure for personnel since it encompasses yearly change. The number of military, police, and civilian personnel was collected from the United Nations ("Troop and Police Contributors Archive," 2013).² I expect greater resources to correlate with less human right abuses, as those missions will have greater means and opportunities to effect positive change. However, since previous studies have established peacekeeping missions are sent to the “harder” conflicts, missions with more personnel may correlate with worse human rights performances simply because they are sent to areas where more abuses are occurring.

² Ideally, I want a measure of personnel that includes as much of a civilian component as police and military, such as election organizers, training experts, and volunteers. Unfortunately, there was not as much comprehensive yearly data for civilians, so this variable should be taken with caution as it disadvantages the impacts of multidimensional mission personnel.
V. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES

The statistical analysis indicates that the different types of peacekeeping operations do impact human rights performances differently. Table 1 displays the results of current impacts on human rights performances by peacekeeping operations. Table 2 displays the results of future performances as measured by two years, and Table 3 displays the results for five years in the future. For each model, traditional missions are the reference category. All models meet a minimum goodness of fit to the population; however, the results should be taken with caution due to a limited number of multidimensional mission-years. Most models also demonstrate that the relationship between human rights performance and peacekeeping missions is best modeled as a selection process. The parameter rho (ρ) reports the correlation between the errors of the first and second stages. Statistical significance reveals that testing the relationship between human rights and peacekeeping in a one-stage model would yield biased results. A few models, however, do not achieve a significant rho (most notably models including the FH civil liberties and CIRI empowerment variables as the second stage dependent variables) and thus may not require a selection model. As an additional variable, I originally included a yearly measure for battle-related deaths in conjunction with peacekeeping literature. Data for logged battle deaths was taken from the PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset version 3.0 (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005), which was designed for use with the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4.0 (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005), and for a few instances of missing data I supplemented numbers from the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset version 5-2013 (“UCDP,” 2013). However, the variable
restricted the sample below an acceptable amount of observations. I then used the same data to construct a measure for total battle-related deaths for each conflict; however, I ultimately left this variable out of the final equation because it never achieved significance and did not significantly change any of the results in an already restricted sample.

The bottom portion of each table reports the selection (first) stage probit estimation results. The three tables indicate that victories, agreements, and population size significantly predict whether a country experiences a peacekeeping mission. Interestingly, both victories and agreements are consistently negative. This means that the probability of a country experiencing a peacekeeping mission decreases with a victory or an agreement. Population size, although less significant, is additionally negative. Thus, the models predict that as a country’s population increases, its probability of having a mission decreases. Therefore, countries are not likely to receive peacekeeping operations if their civil war ends with a victory, an agreement, or if they have a large population. While not significant, the other variables indicate that countries with higher GDPs, more democratic governments, and longer wars also have low probabilities of experiencing UN peacekeeping.

For the second stage OLS estimation, and relationship between human rights and the three types of peacekeeping missions, Table 1 indicates that there are somewhat mixed results between traditional missions and the other two groups for the amount of current human rights abuses. Model 1 indicates that enforcement missions are associated with more physical integrity abuses than traditional missions, and on average score about 0.71 points higher on the PTS scale. Model 4, however, indicates multidimensional missions are significantly associated with less physical integrity abuses. When controlling for the other variables, multidimensional missions on average score 1.49 points lower than traditional missions on the CIRI index. Analyzing the
Table 1: Effects of Peacekeeping on Current Human Rights Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Rights Scores: Second Stage</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amenity</td>
<td>PTS</td>
<td>PTS</td>
<td>FH Civil Liberties</td>
<td>CIRI PIR</td>
<td>CIRI Empower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-1.49***</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.57)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.72</td>
<td>1.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.80)</td>
<td>(1.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Log) GDP</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.23**</td>
<td>-0.54***</td>
<td>-0.97***</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Log) Population</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.55***</td>
<td>0.79**</td>
<td>1.76***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
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<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
<td>(0.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Type</td>
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<td>-0.05**</td>
<td>-0.08***</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.24***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Duration</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
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<tr>
<td>War Count</td>
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<td>-0.08**</td>
<td>-0.09***</td>
<td>-0.14**</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
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<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Log) PK Personnel</td>
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<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.40**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.09**</td>
<td>6.55***</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
<td>-2.14</td>
<td>-17.89**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.38)</td>
<td>(2.17)</td>
<td>(2.15)</td>
<td>(5.27)</td>
<td>(8.00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Peacekeeping: Selection Stage

| Victory                          | -0.73***| -0.75***| -0.66**  | -0.75***| -0.66**  |
|                                  | (0.25)  | (0.23)  | (0.27)  | (0.26)  | (0.27)  |
| Agreement                        | -0.50** | -0.63** | -0.47*   | -0.64** | -0.59** |
|                                  | (0.26)  | (0.28)  | (0.27)  | (0.29)  | (0.29)  |
| (Log) GDP                        | -0.16   | -0.17   | -0.16   | -0.13   | -0.13   |
|                                  | (0.13)  | (0.13)  | (0.13)  | (0.12)  | (0.13)  |
| (Log) Population                 | -0.21*  | -0.21*  | -0.20*  | -0.21*  | -0.21*  |
|                                  | (0.11)  | (0.12)  | (0.11)  | (0.11)  | (0.11)  |
| Regime Type                      | -0.01   | -0.01   | -0.01   | -0.01   | -0.01   |
|                                  | (0.03)  | (0.03)  | (0.03)  | (0.03)  | (0.03)  |
| Duration                        | -0.01   | -0.01   | -0.02   | -0.01   | -0.01   |
|                                  | (0.02)  | (0.02)  | (0.02)  | (0.02)  | (0.02)  |
| Constant                        | 3.78**  | 3.95**  | 3.70**  | 3.58**  | 3.49**  |
|                                  | (1.87)  | (1.84)  | (1.83)  | (1.74)  | (1.77)  |
| ρ (rho)                          | 1.18*** | 1.12*** | 0.42    | 0.95*** | 0.45    |
|                                  | (0.36)  | (0.26)  | (0.31)  | (0.29)  | (0.47)  |
| Wald Test (ρ=0)                  | 10.40***| 18.89***| 1.85    | 10.52***| 0.92    |
| Chi²(1)                          |         |         |         |         |         |
| Observations                     | 154     | 158     | 159     | 145     | 145     |

Note: Country clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance at
*p≤0.10; **p≤0.05; ***p≤0.01
differences between multidimensional and enforcement missions yields only two statistically significant coefficients. With PTS Amnesty as the dependent variable, multidimensional missions on average score about 0.48 points lower on the human rights scale with a p-value of 0.08. With the CIRI Empowerment Index, multidimensional missions average about 2.10 points lower than enforcement missions with a p-value of 0.01. Hence, multidimensional missions are associated with fewer abuses than enforcement missions. While it is unexpected that enforcement missions coincide with more abuses than traditional missions, the table does lend some support to my hypotheses that multidimensional missions are associated with less human rights abuses than traditional and enforcement missions. These assertions are tentative, though, because only a few statistics achieved significance out of five human rights measures.

Furthermore, these results also favor physical integrity rights. Civil liberties largely do not seem to be affected differently between the three mission types. Only one of the FH and CIRI empowerment measures yielded a significant coefficient for the mission variables. Both measures additionally fail to achieve a significant rho and fail the Wald Test, meaning the correlation of errors in the two stages may be zero.

Table 2 demonstrates that differences between the three mission types are slightly less significant for two years in the future. The CIRI physical integrity rights measure is the only human rights measure to gain significance, and indicates that multidimensional missions are still associated with fewer rights abuses than traditional missions. Multidimensional missions on average score about 1.50 points lower than traditional missions. These results should be taken with caution, though, since both CIRI indexes and the FH measure do not have significant rhos and fail the Wald test. While all models again had negative coefficients for multidimensional missions in comparison to enforcement missions, only the same two dependent variables
### Table 2: Human Rights Abuse Scores for Two Years in the Future

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Rights Scores: Second Stage</th>
<th>Model 1 PTS Amnesty</th>
<th>Model 2 PTS US</th>
<th>Model 3 FH Civil Liberties</th>
<th>Model 4 CIRI PIR</th>
<th>Model 5 CIRI Empower</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multidimensional</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
<td>-1.50**</td>
<td>-1.65</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.45)</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td>(0.74)</td>
<td>(1.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.92</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.70)</td>
<td>(0.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Log) GDP</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>-0.32**</td>
<td>-0.53***</td>
<td>-0.94***</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
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<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Log) Population</td>
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<td>-0.20</td>
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<td>0.86**</td>
<td>1.83***</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td>(0.58)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regime Type</td>
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<td>-0.23***</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
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<tr>
<td>War Duration</td>
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<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.002</td>
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<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Count</td>
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<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.06***</td>
<td>-0.10**</td>
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<td>(0.02)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Log) PK Personnel</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(2.74)</td>
<td>(2.45)</td>
<td>(2.82)</td>
<td>(5.48)</td>
<td>(8.62)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Peacekeeping: Selection Stage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 PTS Amnesty</th>
<th>Model 2 PTS US</th>
<th>Model 3 FH Civil Liberties</th>
<th>Model 4 CIRI PIR</th>
<th>Model 5 CIRI Empower</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victory</td>
<td>-0.44**</td>
<td>-0.53***</td>
<td>-0.52**</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>-0.67***</td>
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<td>(0.26)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agreement</td>
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<td>-0.52**</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
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<td>-0.36</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Log) GDP</td>
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<td>-0.15</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
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<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Log) Population</td>
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<td>-0.20*</td>
<td>-0.20*</td>
<td>-0.20*</td>
<td>-0.20*</td>
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<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>3.41*</td>
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<td>(1.79)</td>
<td>(1.80)</td>
<td>(1.92)</td>
<td>(1.75)</td>
<td>(1.74)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\rho$ (rho)</td>
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<td>(0.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald Test ($\rho$=0)</td>
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<td>24.04***</td>
<td>2.38</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chi$^2$(1)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>159</td>
<td>158</td>
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<td>144</td>
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</table>

Note: Country clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance at
$p \leq 0.10$; **$p \leq 0.05$; ***$p \leq 0.01$
indicated a significant difference. Multidimensional missions score about 0.62 less than enforcement missions on the PTS Amnesty scale and about 1.94 points lower on the CIRI Empowerment Index, both with a 90% confidence level. Thus, although Models 3-5 should be taken with caution, the table again suggests multidimensional missions are associated with fewer abuses than traditional and enforcement missions.

Table 3 indicates that the effects of the different types of peacekeeping on human rights take time. The differences between the three groups have increased for scores five years in the future. While the model containing the FH civil liberties measure again fails to achieve a significant rho, every other human rights measure reveals a statistically significant difference between the three mission types. In comparison to traditional missions, multidimensional missions consistently score significantly lower on physical integrity rights scales and the empowerment rights scale. In Models 1 and 2, multidimensional missions on average score 0.94 and 0.64 points lower than traditional missions for the PTS scales and 1.45 and 3.91 points lower on the CIRI indexes, respectively. While enforcement missions only achieve significance in relation to the PTS Amnesty dependent variable, Model 1 indicates that they score about 0.69 points lower than traditional missions. Even though the statistic only achieves a 90% confidence level, it is the first result indicating enforcement missions are associated with fewer abuses than traditional missions. In conjunction with the previous two tables, there is also a difference between multidimensional and enforcement missions. With PTS Amnesty as the dependent variable, multidimensional missions on average score about 0.26 points less than enforcement missions. For PTS US, multidimensional missions score 0.51 points lower, both with a p-value of 0.09. In Model 5, multidimensional missions score about 2.98 points lower on the CIRI Empowerment Index with a p-value of 0.001. These results suggest that there is a larger
Table 3: Human Rights Abuse Scores for Five Years in the Future

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Rights Scores: Second Stage</th>
<th>Model 1 PTS Amnesty</th>
<th>Model 2 PTS US</th>
<th>Model 3 FH Civil Liberties</th>
<th>Model 4 CIRI PIR</th>
<th>Model 5 CIRI Empower</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multidimensional</td>
<td>-0.94**</td>
<td>-0.64*</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>-1.45**</td>
<td>-3.91***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.46)</td>
<td>(0.70)</td>
<td>(0.87)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enforcement</td>
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<td>-0.14</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
<td>-0.94</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
<td>(0.69)</td>
<td>(0.79)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Log) GDP</td>
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<td>-0.30</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>-0.85**</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
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<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Log) Population</td>
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<td>-0.17</td>
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<td>0.69</td>
<td>1.30***</td>
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<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.45)</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.08</td>
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<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
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<td>-0.02</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
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<td>(0.10)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(2.60)</td>
<td>(4.19)</td>
<td>(7.42)</td>
<td>(6.78)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Peacekeeping: \[Selection Stage\] | | | | | |
| Victory                          | -0.19**             | -0.45**       | -0.63**                   | -0.51**          | -0.50*              |
|                                  | (0.09)              | (0.20)        | (0.27)                    | (0.21)           | (0.26)              |
| Agreement                        | -0.36**             | -0.35*        | -0.44*                    | -0.18            | -0.25               |
|                                  | (0.14)              | (0.20)        | (0.26)                    | (0.26)           | (0.26)              |
| (Log) GDP                        | -0.13               | -0.14         | -0.16                     | -0.17            | -0.19               |
|                                  | (0.12)              | (0.12)        | (0.14)                    | (0.13)           | (0.13)              |
| (Log) Population                 | -0.18*              | -0.18*        | -0.20*                    | -0.18*           | -0.18*              |
|                                  | (0.11)              | (0.11)        | (0.11)                    | (0.11)           | (0.11)              |
| Regime Type                      | -0.01               | -0.01         | -0.01                     | -0.002           | -0.002              |
|                                  | (0.03)              | (0.03)        | (0.03)                    | (0.03)           | (0.03)              |
| War Duration                     | -0.02               | -0.02         | -0.02                     | -0.02            | -0.02               |
|                                  | (0.02)              | (0.02)        | (0.02)                    | (0.02)           | (0.02)              |
| Constant                         | 3.11*               | 3.24*         | 3.67**                    | 3.25*            | 3.35**              |
|                                  | (1.69)              | (1.72)        | (1.84)                    | (1.68)           | (1.70)              |
| \(\rho\) (rho)                   | 3.24***             | 1.71***       | 0.16                      | 1.48***          | -1.08*              |
|                                  | (0.41)              | (0.27)        | (0.56)                    | (0.51)           | (0.63)              |
| Wald Test (\(\rho=0\))          | 61.52***            | 35.37***      | 0.09                      | 8.48***          | 2.96*               |
| \(\text{Ch}^2(1)\)              | 155                 | 157           | 157                       | 128              | 129                 |

Note: Country clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance at *\(p \leq 0.10\); **\(p \leq 0.05\); ***\(p \leq 0.01\)
difference in the contributions of each type of mission five years in the future, and that multidimensional missions in particular may have more lasting effects. To investigate any further future effects, I ran additional regressions for scores eight and ten years in the future. Unfortunately, every single model fails to achieve a significant rho, Wald test, and/or goodness of fit to the population. Hence, the results imply that the effects of peacekeeping generally have short term contributions, as found by Sambanis (2008), but the impacts wane after about five years instead of two.

The controls generally follow expectations. An increase in GDP per capita is associated with a decrease in human rights abuses across all models. The impacts of population size are dubious, as almost every significant result occurs in models that fail the Wald test. However, all significant coefficients imply that as population size increases, the amount of human rights abuses increase. The effects of regime type tend to decrease over time, although the models indicate that more democratic countries have fewer abuses. War duration is surprisingly insignificant, with no statistical significance in any model. The variable is consistently positive though, suggesting longer wars are associated with more rights violations. The war count variable measuring the amount of time since the end of the civil war generally indicates that as the amount of time since the war’s end increases, the amount of human rights abuses decrease. It follows expectations that more rights violations occur during war and gradually decrease in the following years. The variable measuring the number of personnel participating in peacekeeping missions is only significant in two models that both fail the Wald test. Therefore, taken with caution, Tables 1 and 2 indicate that as the number of personnel increases, the amount of empowerment rights abuses decrease. It is unexpected that this variable only significantly
impacts empowerment rights and not physical integrity rights, as soldiers and police would be expected to deter physical abuses over civil liberty abuses.

Of special note is the consistent difference between the physical integrity rights measures and the civil liberties measures, as the models suggest selection bias is a problem with physical integrity rights but not necessarily for the empowerment or civil liberties measures. Across all three tables, none of the models with either the Freedom House Civil Liberty Index or the CIRI Empowerment Index as the dependent variable achieves a significant rho or passes the Wald test with a 95% confidence level. This implies that the relationship between civil liberties and peacekeeping missions may not require a two-stage selection process. This makes it difficult to interpret peacekeeping effects on civil liberty rights and hence draw inferences on this aspect of human rights, though it could indicate that these types of rights are affected less by peacekeeping operations in general than the more physically abusive rights.
VI. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

In general, the results suggest that there are some differences in the impacts of peacekeeping operations. Although the results should be taken with caution, as explained previously, they indicate multidimensional missions are more effective in reducing human rights abuses than traditional and enforcement missions for current and future rights. The analysis also provides evidence that there is a time lag in some of the peacekeeping mechanisms that impact rights abuses, most surprisingly for enforcement missions. For current rights, enforcement missions are associated with more abuses than traditional missions, which is against my hypotheses. However, for five years in the future, enforcement missions are associated with fewer abuses. Even though there is less significant difference than expected, the results could imply that traditional missions may affect more change in the present since it easier to operate with smaller mandate objectives and less personnel, while enforcement missions entail substantively more personnel. It logically follows that those missions would take longer to coordinate and implement activities across war-torn countries. After all, coordinating thousands of troops that all speak different languages to forcefully protect civilians would naturally take longer than dispensing smaller groups of soldiers to simply observe activities.

The results further suggest that it might be more productive for the UN to invest in multidimensional missions as opposed to enforcement missions. Although there was again less significance than expected, states with multidimensional missions demonstrated lower scores
than states with enforcement missions for current and future practices. It is unexpected that more rights measures did not correspond with significant and substantive differences between the two mission types. With significant effort invested in peacebuilding for multidimensional missions, and the deterrent impacts of enforcement missions confined to when troops are still in-country, it could demonstrate that enforcement missions have lasting affects unaccounted for by this paper. However, this is most likely due to significant overlap in enforcement mission mandates. For multiple operations, the Security Council updated mandates as they deemed necessary for the situation on the ground. This led to multiple multidimensional operations shifting into enforcement missions when the Security Council deemed Chapter VII status to be appropriate for deteriorating or lasting violence. For several states, this left mandates and resources continuing to pursue multidimensional peacebuilding in conjunction with larger military campaigns. Therefore, since multiple mission-years could be classified as both multidimensional and enforcement, the overlap could account for insignificant differences between the two. Alternatively, it could suggest that the mechanisms for decreasing abuses for the two types offset each other, as Walter (1997) found that the peacebuilding measures of multidimensional missions can offset security guarantees without the substantial military component of enforcement missions.

Future studies could improve these findings by better controlling for endogeneity in which mission types are approved for which types of situations. Are peacekeepers decreasing the amount of human rights abuses, or are the levels of abuses dictating the types of peacekeeping operations deployed? While the Security Council’s decision to send peacekeeping operations suffers from selection bias, so too does its decision for the type of force sent. This is especially true considering the Security Council has been more willing to authorize the use of force for
enforcement missions in the past two decades, whereas before they mainly sent traditional missions to maintain the policies of consent and neutrality. There are also several instances where the Security Council has “upgraded” or “downgraded” missions to reflect changes in the situation on the ground. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to address this selection bias, future studies could test the robustness of this paper’s results by accounting for the selection into different types of peacekeeping missions. Also, it would be advantageous to know the change in countries’ human rights scores after the war as compared to before the war, in comparison to countries’ scores before and after civil wars without peacekeepers. That way, researchers might get a clearer picture of the overall effects of peacekeeping.

Future studies could additionally find a better measure of human rights for this topic. The five scales used for this project mainly measure abuses committed by the government. During civil wars, though, the government is not the only group capable of carrying out large-scale violence or the only group that can be affected by peacekeepers and their international attention. It would make a more comprehensive study if the dependent variable thoroughly captured abuses being committed by all groups involved in the civil war, both governmental and oppositional.

Despite the possible improvements to this study, the results suggest peacekeeping operations do impact the human rights abuses associated with civil wars. If the results persist through different statistical techniques and control variables, it could indicate that the larger and more comprehensive multidimensional and enforcement missions are necessary to reduce future rights abuses, but that smaller traditional missions are capable of enacting positive change for the present. It could also indicate that analyses of success or failure in future peacekeeping studies should encompass more than whether any party reneged on cease-fire agreements or whether the operations created a more lasting peace. The treatment of the population is important also and
should be taken into consideration when evaluating UN missions. Furthermore, studying the
different types of missions is important as each type has different strengths and weaknesses.
Analyzing which aspects of peacekeeping missions prevent or deter violence could help
peacekeepers be as effective as possible in carrying out the humanitarian and security aspects of
their mandates and in ensuring the establishment of a stable and respectful state for post-war
peace. Due to the duration and amount of devastation of civil wars, it is important to continue
studying factors that could decrease human rights abuses during and after these conflicts to help
spare innocents from the pain and suffering inflicted by combatants.


http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD and
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL

and a Comparison to CIRI. Human Rights Quarterly 32(2), 367-400.

Wood, Reed M., Jacob D. Kathman, and Stephen E. Gent. (2012). Armed Intervention and

LIST OF APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: DISTRIBUTION OF MISSION LENGTH
Graph 1: The Length of Each Type of Peacekeeping Mission by Country

Blue = Traditional; Red = Multidimensional; Green = Enforcement
APPENDIX B: DISTRIBUTION BY HUMAN RIGHTS SCORES
Graph 2: Peacekeeping Missions by Human Rights Scores

Blue = Traditional; Red = Multidimensional; Green = Enforcement
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Phi Theta Kappa Honor Society, 2007
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Honor Society of Phi Kappa Phi, 2009
Study Abroad Award, 2009
Honor Society of Omicron Delta Epsilon, 2010
Outstanding Senior in International Studies Award, 2010
Gamma Beta Phi Honor Society, 2014