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SUCCESS and FAILURE OF INDIGENOUS SOCIAL MOVEMENTS:  
A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF ECUADOR AND CHILE

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By Jenna White

A thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for completion of the  
Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies at the Croft Institute for International  
Studies

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## Abstract

This thesis is a comparative case study of the social movements of the Mapuche in Chile and the fourteen indigenous tribes in Ecuador. I study their social movements by utilizing the structural strain theory of social movements. This theory states that people in society experience deprivation, the people recognize the deprivation, a solution is proposed and this ideology is diffused to the society, events occur to begin motion of the movement, the society (including government) need to be open to change, and eventually there will be mobilization of resources in order to form a successful social movement. The dependent variable is the development of a successful social movement and the independent variables include the manifestations, political climate, and government representation.

I hypothesize that the lack of unity among Mapuche communities is the primary cause of social movement failure; however, my research points to a broader cause of failure. The political trajectory of the country is the primary variable that determines success or failure because it determines receptiveness to change. Ecuador's political climate encourages change, whereas, Chile's government has, since Pinochet, been rather stagnant in enacting social change based upon outside forces. The movements' success requires outside support. Since 1990, Ecuador's indigenous groups have ousted two presidents and achieved constitutional recognition, but what do the Mapuche achieve? With Ecuador's high indigenous population and its unstable government, the indigenous social movement is able to gather support from others and provide stability, whereas in Chile, demands from the indigenous social movement do not have the same national recognition and relevance.

## Table of Contents

Introduction.....	1
Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework.....	6
1.1 Social Movements Overview.....	6
Chapter 2: Background Information .....	14
2.1 History of Mapuche in Chile.....	15
2.2 The Case of Ralco Dam .....	20
2.3 History of Indigenous people in Ecuador.....	24
Chapter 3: Data/Analysis.....	29
3.1 Methodology.....	29
3.2 Analysis.....	31
Conclusion.....	45
Bibliography.....	49

## Introduction

About 42 million people in Latin America identify as indigenous, which makes up nearly eight percent of the total population of the region (Hoffay and Rivas 2016). However, the World Bank reports that they constitute fourteen percent of the poor and seventeen percent of the very poor in Latin America (Freire et al. 2015). As a result, indigenous people are vulnerable to exploitation by the government and other for-profit businesses that target low status populations for personal gain because they place profit and power in a higher position than the people that their work negatively affects. In Chile, this power gap is obvious. In Ecuador, some gaps have closed, but the indigenous people continue to fight for their rights to be recognized.

In the 1880s, Chile's indigenous Mapuche people were placed on *reducciones* (reservations) so that their land could be used for economic development by timber and hydroelectric companies, among others (Carruthers and Rodriguez 2009). Today, their land is further removed from their control and more large corporations implement environmentally destructive projects in the south of Chile. Politicians continuously promise to help and pass acts to return land to Mapuche control and enforce more regulations, such as stricter Environmental Impact Statements, but little concrete improvement follows. On the contrary, the indigenous people in Ecuador have achieved success in regards to their demands. However, they are not as successful today as they were in the 1990s and early 2000s. The indigenous people in Ecuador celebrated a successful ousting of the President and achieved constitutional recognition in Ecuador's

new 1998 constitution. However, the indigenous political party, *Pachakutik*, has lost momentum since the 2006 election year when they backed candidate Luis Macas, whereas many indigenous voters supported the opposition, Rafael Correa (Aranda 2016). It lost many of its supporters and failed to act as a strong political party rather than a small special interest party. They also struggle with many of the same land rights issues as the indigenous people of Chile; the indigenous people of Ecuador have not been able to get their land back, either. Upon first glance, it appears that the Mapuche people of Chile and the indigenous people of Ecuador, from about fourteen tribes, participate in many similar activities, such as protests, organization formation, and petitions. Why then do the Mapuche not celebrate the same success that came in Ecuador?

Since 1990, there has been a renewal in indigenous social movements in Latin America; therefore, I discuss how indigenous groups—specifically Mapuche in southern Chile—fight for identity recognition and land reform in the context of social movements. I compare two cases that have major contrasts in terms of political stability and numbers, to determine why the Mapuche are unsuccessful, and why Ecuador is not constant in their success. My hypothesis is that the Mapuche people have not united around one central cause, therefore, they focus on too many demands and are not united throughout the country. As a result of lack of unity, they fail to gather the support of the greater society to enact legislative change.

I guide my research with the theories of social movements; the structural strain theory describes these movements by explaining the steps necessary—which I will discuss in detail in Chapter 1—to be successful. I use census data from government

websites and reports of previous protests, occupations, and other action taken by the Mapuche, as well as the indigenous people of Ecuador. The census data provides me with percentages of people that identify as indigenous in various countries, so that I can analyze the role of representation and the connection with action and success. I look at the number of protests, as well as the theme of the protest.

I use surveys of Mapuche people in Chile, as well as other Chileans reported by the Centro de Estudios Públicos in Chile. There are surveys related to identity, urbanization, and the environment. This data is important to understand views towards Mapuche by non-indigenous people to determine if this plays a role in Mapuche achieving political goals. It is also important to demonstrate the Mapuche presence in rural and urban areas and their potential for social movements because social movements rely on a shared identity.

The Estudio Nacional de Opinion reports surveys. I use these answers to determine the political context of Ecuador and Chile and look at similarities and differences. Survey questions also report identity opinions and how constituents, indigenous and non-indigenous, feel organizations represent them. I use a conflict tracker to analyze where and why protest events occur. LAPOP reports data collected to show what citizens believe to be the biggest problems in Chile and Ecuador, as well as the percentage of people who participate in manifestations.

I compare the Chilean Mapuche case with a more successful indigenous social movement in Ecuador. I compare two indigenous groups that each participate in protests and have indigenous organizations to represent them, the Confederation of Indigenous

Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) and *Coordinadora Arauca-Malleco (CAM)*, and analyze what differs that would allow one to be successful and one to fail to achieve their goals. I use the collective case-study method, a multi-case study with cases in different locations, through my focus on the Chilean Mapuche and the indigenous people of Ecuador. I compare the cases with the variables—number of manifestations, political climate of the country, and group organization—to determine why the Mapuche have not been able to form a successful social movement.

The dependent variable is the development of a successful social movement. In successful cases, policy will be implemented but also followed through. In failed cases, no policy will be offered, or there will be no follow through. I will mention specific laws to determine answers to protests, or other actions. By looking at the similarities of the independent variables, number of manifestations, political climate of the country, and group organization, among multiple indigenous groups, I will analyze why the outcomes may be different.

I use Mill's Method of Difference, which compares cases to determine what they do not have in common. The variable they do not have in common is the cause. This helps determine what is missing that makes social movements successful. Why do some movements actually work while others do not? How did the indigenous people in Ecuador establish a plurinationalist state, but the Mapuche cannot achieve their goal of land reclamation?

My research fails to support my hypothesis that the failure of the indigenous social movement in Chile comes as a result of a lack of unity throughout the country on

specific claims. Based on the structural strain theory of social movements, the primary reason that Ecuador has had success and Chile does not is that the government must be receptive to change. An unstable government, like that of Ecuador, creates an atmosphere in which change is welcome because there is uncertainty of the future.

## Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework

In this chapter I explain three of the most prominent theories of social movements that help my analysis as to why the Mapuche indigenous community has not formed a successful social movement in Chile, but the indigenous people in Ecuador have achieved success in their social movement. Social movements are sustained mobilization of a group of organized people that share a common claim. The three theories in which I focus are the resource mobilization theory, the structural strain theory, and the new social movement theories. The theory that best explains the successes and failures of the indigenous groups in Chile and Ecuador is the structural strain theory.

### *1.1 Social Movement Theories*

Social movements are defined as sustained mobilization of a group of organized people for a common cause and purpose (Tilly 2008). They are comprised of social interactions with a campaign that develops when a group has a claim and a challenge. Examples of social interactions include city meetings, protest events, and petition campaigns, among others. In the case of Chile's Mapuche, the claim is that large corporations are infringing upon historically Mapuche land. In Ecuador, the indigenous people had success in their campaign for constitutional recognition. I frame my thesis around social movements because social movements are a change agent that are observable from the outside. They publicize priorities of a specific group that is united around common causes. Therefore, it is possible to observe how indigenous people are

marginalized and what they are doing, or not doing, to increase their visibility in the political scene and what rights they are awarded as a result of their efforts.

The basis of a social movement is a campaign that requires organized public effort to make collective claims on target identities. They utilize certain unifiers that project their claims, such as coalitions, public meetings, vigils, rallies, demonstrations, petitions, statements to and in public media, and pamphleteering. However, these actions alone do not constitute social movements. Charles Tilly explains social movements on the basis of the “WUNC display,” which stands for worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment. A cause must be worthy of action for a social movement to emerge. Unity comes in the form of matching clothing, marching in ranks, or chanting. Numbers can represent number of signatures on a petition, number of people participating in a protest, or number of messages from constituents. Commitment means that representatives of a social movement will brave bad weather, will remain fighting even when they face challenges, and are not willing to waver for the betterment of the masses. Sidney Tarrow argues that the most important aspects, since the emergence of social movements, are print and association; therefore, media is necessary to form a community and diffuse claims to the masses (Tarrow 1998, 53).

What differentiates a social movement from a social or political organization is that a social movement is a network of different actors that all have a common claim. An organization can be a part of that network, but it is not a social movement in and of itself. A social movement is not an individual protest, or conflict, but these events can help to mobilize and recruit for the actual social movement. Social movements can demonstrate

the current attitudes and culture of a specific group and they are interactive.

Democratization can provide the platform for social movements to emerge; this explains the timeline of the emergence of the Mapuche social movement in Chile, which came shortly after the dictatorship of Pinochet ended.

There are multiple levels of successes that social movements can achieve. Even if not all demands are met, a social movement can still be successful. One indicator of success is the extension of democratic rights, such as in the case of Ecuador, through the adoption of multicultural constitutional frameworks. Success can also be seen as a group gains political leverage through connections with the state; through this, steady action in favor of their group can be achieved. Collective identities encourage collective action, which is the basis of social movement theories.

There are five major approaches to study social movements, but I focus on three: the resource mobilization theory, the structural strain theory, and the new social movement theories. The resource mobilization theory (Tilly 2006) says that social movements emerge when resources such as money, labor, media, and other support can be used to mobilize on behalf of a stated cause. The structural strain theory says that social movements need six things to grow: deprivation, recognition of a problem by the people, a proposed solution, an event to spark the movement, a society and government that are open to change, and mobilization of resources. New social movement theories look at causes of collective action in politics, culture, and ideology instead of just economics. While each is similar and has aspects of the others, each offers certain

indicators of success. The movement of the Mapuche and indigenous people of Ecuador can best be understood in terms of the structural strain theory.

### *Resource Mobilization Theory*

The resource mobilization theory was one of the theories that emerged in the 1960s as social movements, such as the Civil Rights movement, began to change and new theories were needed to understand widespread participation in the movements. Charles Tilly, an American sociologist, is one of the most prominent resource mobilization theorists. The critique of this theory is that it does not explain how social movements have been successful with scarce resources. The resource mobilization theory says that a group in society that has certain grievances, may be able to alleviate these grievances with the mobilization of resources. However, the grievances themselves are not what cause the formation of social movements; grievances are constant and social movements emerge when there is a change in group resources, or organization (Tilly). These resources include money, labor, social status, knowledge, support of the media, and support from the elite, among other resources (Sen 2016, 126). In the world today with an increased importance of technology, one of the most important resources is the media.

The resource mobilization theory contrasts with traditional theories in that traditional theories offer a broader view of what is considered a social movement. The resource mobilization theory alludes to change that hopes to “alter elements of social structure and/or the reward distribution of society” (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1218). This

theory states that movements are against institutional elites and the organizers of social movements are often largely excluded from government. It usually focuses on actors that fight for institutional power, such as the indigenous communities. Often times, described by this theory, successful social movements employ a “conscience constituency” that includes supporters from the affluent elite, such as government organizations, mass media, and business corporations (McCarthy and Zald 1973). The indigenous social movements in Chile and Ecuador are best understood using a different theory. This theory offers a broader approach, so success is more easily understood with the specificity of the structural strain theory.

### *Structural Strain Theory*

The structural strain theory offers specific guidelines for social movements to follow. It was proposed by Smelser in 1965. Smelser’s theory says that social movements need six things in order to be successful: people in society experience deprivation, the people recognize the deprivation, a solution is proposed and this ideology is diffused to the society, events occur to begin motion of the movement, the society (including government) need to be open to change, and eventually there will be mobilization of resources (Sen 2016, 127). There is a strain in the organization of a group, or government, that offers the social movement room to move. The most prominent criticism of this theory is that it relies on cooperation between the elite and the group for a social movement to emerge. Therefore, it says that success cannot occur if the elite is not receptive and accepting of the group that is the main player in a social movement.

This theory helps to explain the United States civil rights movement of the 1960s. Although black people were in a better position in the 1960s than in the 1870s, they recognized the opportunity in the 1960s to create a successful movement because the structure of the United States was changing and it gave power to others. This is similar to the case of Ecuador because Ecuador has had an unstable government, which allows others to take power.

This differs from the resource mobilization theory. The resource mobilization theory recognizes that resources are constant and a change in resources available is the primary cause of mobilization, whereas the structural strain theory says that while resources are important, the society must be open to change, so the strain in society is the primary mobilizer. The indigenous people have recognized deprivation since the Spanish inquisition, but they did not form a social movement until they had adequate resources to do so and did not have support when there were strains in society. The structural strain theory places importance on a catalyzing event. An example is the bus incident involving Rosa Parks that sparked the civil rights movement in the United States in the 1960s, or a week-long protest in Ecuador's capital, Quito. The structural strain theory recognizes that institutional change can only occur if the six factors I previously discussed are present. I use the structural strain theory to guide my analysis.

### *New Social Movement Theories*

The new social movement theories emerged in the 1960s to the 1980s alongside the movements involving women and the LGBTQIA+ community in the 1960s (Tarrow

1998, 17). New social movements focus more on culture than any previous theory because they intend to explain the deficiencies of Marxism; yet, they do share some Marxist ideas, such as the exploitation of social classes. Marxism supported socio-economic class as the main component of a collective group that would participate in social movements. Whereas, new social movement theories use identity, such as sexuality, ethnicity, and gender to explain causal factors of social movements and places less emphasis on the importance of socio-economic class (Sen 2016, 128). Jurgen Habermas and Alain Touraine are the primary new social movement theorists. They say that new social movement theories focus on the exploitation of one societal class over another, instead of the socioeconomic class. New social movement theories give many explanations for why and how a group achieves success. This is the greatest criticism of this theory because it groups many different movements into one type and fails to discuss the conflict between different socioeconomic classes.

Scholars that study new social movements argue that there is not one explanation of why a social movement is successful. As social movements change topics, audiences change, and government changes, a new theory must be utilized to understand what is occurring because no two movements are exactly the same. One scholar, Alberto Melucci, says that new social movements go beyond goals of material gain; they also resist the expansion of the government and defend personal autonomy (Della Porta 13). New social movement theories help researchers to understand the environmentalist movement, the women's movement, and the anti-globalization movement. These aid to the understanding of social movements because they are worldwide, unify millions of

people, and change their claims as they gain successes and as society changes. This theory closely aligns with some of the goals of the Mapuche in Chile and the fourteen indigenous groups in Ecuador, but it fails to explain success. Since the Spanish Inquisition, the indigenous people place importance on their own identity, so it cannot explain the social movements now apart from the past. It cannot explain successes and failures because it is something constant. Therefore, I focus on the structural strain theory.

## Chapter 2: History of Indigenous People in Chile and Ecuador

In this chapter, I offer a brief background of the Mapuche in Chile and the indigenous people in Ecuador split between fourteen tribes, as well as a specific event that occurred as a result of the social movement led by the indigenous people in Chile. I focus specifically on the Mapuche in Chile because they comprise about 85% of the indigenous population in Chile and are the most vocal group; whereas the indigenous groups in Ecuador are more evenly split and have a group which unites them, called CONAIE, so I analyze the events of their collective action. The fourteen tribes that make up the indigenous population of Ecuador are Tsáchila, Chachi, Epera, Awa, Quichua, Shuar, Achuar, Shiwiar, Cofán, Siona, Secoya, Zápara, Andoa y Waorani, and Afro-Ecuadorians. I chose to focus on Chile as a result of personal experience in Chile studying the Mapuche. Ecuador provided an interesting contrast because the indigenous groups celebrated success, yet are now less successful. I explore key changes in the rights and organizations of the Mapuche and present the deprivations that the indigenous people face and attitudes towards them. I present the Ralco Dam case that is an important image of the greater social movement; the Mapuche people failed to achieve land reform, but the national government gave the appearance that they were willing to enact reform to satisfy the demands of the Mapuche. I mention the legal battles that occur between the state, the indigenous communities and the private, for-profit corporations. Finally, I give a brief history of the indigenous people in Ecuador, including the development of a social movement with some successes and some failures.

## 2.1 *The Mapuche in Chile*

The Mapuche are a group of indigenous people located in Chile and Argentina. There are many Mapuche communities throughout Chile that are, or have ancestors that are, united in their shared history, language, social upbringing, and economy. They are people of the land; their economy and social traditions are traditionally based upon agriculture. Now Chilean citizens, many Mapuche have migrated to urban areas to support their families, yet many still have a strong indigenous identity and are involved in the Mapuche conflict surrounding land reform and identity recognition.

The Mapuche constitute the largest group of indigenous people in Chile. They make up about 9% of the total population of Chileans, with almost 1.5 million Chilean Mapuches (Freire et al. 2015). They are predominately located in region IX of Chile, called the Araucanía located south of Santiago, and Santiago, the capital in the center of the country. After they were defeated by the Chilean state in 1883, they were forced from their land into areas known as *reducciones*, or reservations, so that the land could be used for economic gain by the Chilean government and businesses and so that the Chilean government may create national homogeneity (Consejo Nacional 2011, 23). The Chilean government auctioned off the remaining land to settlers and colonization companies, while further dividing the *reducciones*, so that the Mapuche were stripped of their land and were forced to be dependent upon the rest of the country rather than be self-sufficient. They went beyond stripping land; the Chilean state forced Christianity and the use of Spanish upon the Mapuche people through language programs and Christian

schooling for the children (Gómez 2012). The government said that national security was synonymous with national homogeneity. By the early twentieth century, the Mapuche people were living on only five percent of their original land plots and they were living on the least productive land in the Araucanía region. Traditionally, their lifestyle depends upon the land for food, medicine, and entertainment, so it is necessary to have productive, nutrient-rich soil to cultivate their food.

Mapuche people began to organize and fought for a voice in the national arena early in Chilean history. However, there was little advancement in the recognition of Mapuche rights. Some of the early organizations and demonstrations of Mapuche people began in 1906, the same year as the presidential election of Pedro Montt who expanded railroads to stimulate copper production. The early organizations were led by Mapuche teachers and businessmen because they were educated. An organization was formed which spoke a different language than Spanish, Mapudungun, which threatened the homogeneity as seen through the eyes of the Chilean government. In the 1920s, two Mapuche men, Manuel Manquilef and Francisco Melivilu, were elected to Congress, which signifies a small step towards Mapuche representation, but two members of Congress does not sway a vote with great force.

Furthermore, two presidents, Eduardo Frei Montalva and Salvador Allende had ambitious land reform propositions and restored about 70,000 hectares of land before the dictatorship of Pinochet re-severed ties (Rodriguez and Carruthers 2008, 4). Eduardo Frei Montalva represented the Christian Democrat Party and was president from 1964 to 1970. He ran on the promise of reform; his political goals included alleviation of poverty,

and the rural Mapuche are often times impoverished, as are other Chileans that live the same region. His successor, Salvador Allende was a Marxist who was also concerned with reform. Both men worked on land reform that nationalized land, but redistributed some agricultural land back to its owners. In 1971, the president intended to give some land back to the Mapuche, but by 1973, the regime of Pinochet began that reversed all progress and promised to open more of the land of the indigenous community to privatization. Pinochet allowed only 6 hectares of land per family and provided subsidies and tax breaks to timber companies to develop in the Araucanía region of Chile in Decree Law 701, for the economic gain of the country (Carruthers and Rodriguez 2009).

The fall of Pinochet in 1990 led to the renewal of indigenous social movements in Chile because a dictatorship does not give the people freedom to campaign; a democratic government allows social movements to form. However, after Pinochet's reign, it was still difficult to reform institutions put in place by Pinochet, so it was difficult for any group to have their demands met on a governmental level. Instead, the Chilean state was most focused upon reinstating themselves in the world economy through encouragement of economic growth and diversification of exports (Aranda 2016). The presidents that followed Pinochet were concerned with human rights, but they were most focused on alleviating hunger and poverty to achieve national co-existence rather than meeting the demands of specific groups of people. Furthermore, some laws leftover from the Pinochet regime hinder Mapuche movement. The government, education system, and media remain highly conservative with most things privatized; it is difficult to change every system with just a change in presidency. The 1987 and 1988 Constitutional

Organic Law of Political Parties, leftover from Pinochet, makes it difficult for a Mapuche political party, *Wallmapuwen*, to form because it divides the system into a political right and left and decides representation based upon the two political parties, so a third special interest party cannot compete (Aranda 2016).

In May of 1990, there was a special commission for indigenous people with the *Concertación*, a central-left alliance in Chile, to create a new, stronger relationship with the state (Carruthers and Rodriguez 2009). This created the foundations for the Indigenous Law of 1993. Throughout this time, the Mapuche families ultimately had a goal of land recovery and identity recognition. The Chilean Congress passed the Indigenous Law in 1993 that created CONADI (National Corporation for Indigenous Development), to work with the state as agents to promote indigenous rights, yet the indigenous people are not in positions of power in this organization (Rodriguez and Carruthers 2008, 5). Shortly after, Congress created the Land and Water Fund to buy land back and transfer it back to its original owners; however, this was not highly successful. In 1997, the descendants of 85 indigenous families initiated the land recovery process; but, a company hoping to develop on their land fought back. This led to a protest that ended in logging trucks in flames and 12 Mapuche arrests. The roadblocks and protest did not end with those arrests; but, they continue to this day (Carruthers and Rodriguez 2009).

Formed in 1998, Coordinadora Arauco-Malleco, or CAM, is a Mapuche-led organization dedicated to its claim of land recovery. Members occupy former Mapuche land in order to fight for land recovery from privatized companies (Kowalczyk 2013, 122). They are unwilling to unite with most other elite groups in order to prove their

independence, which leads to its low success rate. They are anti-capitalism and anti-systemic, so they are often criminalized. They are even labeled a terrorist organization through “Operation Patience” in 2002 (Kowalczyk 2013, 132). While they have been successful in recovering some land, they will never achieve full success if they do not unite with others to increase their numbers, create a more peaceful image, and negotiate with the institution, or the government.

The social movement of the Mapuche people centers around the protection of land and their rights that protect their individuality as indigenous instead of Chilean. One important demonstration of their social movement that shows their resilience, but also their repressed status, is the events that unfolded on the Bío Bío river at the proposed site of Ralco Dam. In the upper Bío Bío river basin in the heart of the Mapuche territory, construction began on a dam that would force relocation of Mapuche people from their land. The creation of this dam flooded Mapuche territory, which led to erosion of the soil, consequently sucking nutrients from their farmland. In the end, Endesa, the hydroelectric company, completed construction on the dam and the Chilean state promised to pay reparations to the Mapuche, but very few families actually benefitted from the government repayment (Vergara 2013). It included more empty promises and did not make the relationship between the state and the Mapuche stronger. The Mapuche had small successes in their protest of this project, but their goal was to halt construction entirely and it was ultimately completed.

Since 1990, the Mapuche have been consistently demonized in the media. They are often portrayed in the news as violent beings who will burn equipment and halt

economic growth in their country. One news article bearing the title, “In Chile’s forests, shadowy rebel groups threaten logging industry,” by journalist Gram Slattery, describes the Mapuche as people who “sabotage” and describes the fear that they invoke in their protests. However, when it benefits them, the government strategically uses the indigenous people for their personal support and gain. At government speeches and events, there will often be traditionally dressed *machi*, women of power in Mapuche communities, on stage to represent how accepting the Chilean state is and how they are supporting all diverse group of people (Warren 2009). Yet, in 2020, the Mapuche people do not have the same freedom as the other Chileans. The protests and events that take place under the indigenous social movement of the Mapuche are not successful despite their tireless work and persistence.

## *2.2 The Ralco Dam Case and the Forestry Industry*

In 1989, President Aylwin signed the *Nueva Imperial* Agreement which promised constitutional recognition of indigenous people in Chile, as well as the protection of their land rights. However, neither of these promises were met and Ralco Dam opened in 2004 which flooded Mapuche territory at the Bio Bío river in Chile—a Mapuche lifeline located just 350 miles south of Chile’s capital city, Santiago (Richards 2005, 208). Endesa Chile, or *Empresa Nacional de Electricidad*, is the largest hydroelectric company of Chile and was privatized in 1988 with its primary shareholders consisting of the armed forces and upper class (Jana 1997). They are responsible for the construction of Ralco Dam, that is reported to provide nine percent of Chile’s power requirements, just one of seven

planned projects along the Bío Bío river (Endesa 2004). Endesa's projects are located along the Bío Bío Alto where some of the remaining native forests are located. The projects include construction of roads which allow forest access to logging companies. They developed relocation projects for the affected Mapuche communities, but only to alleviate pressure by human rights activists and the indigenous communities. The dam damaged rightfully Mapuche land, removed Mapuche people from locations where they have a shared culture with their community, and blocked access to the river from which the indigenous people live. The plans to provide aid to the indigenous communities do not meet requests by the communities themselves. The company that worked on the dam often worked without permits and took no consideration in protecting territory, such as ancestral graves (Barba 2018).

The Ralco Dam case demonstrates a specific experience of the Mapuche people that shows how the Chilean state takes advantage of the vulnerable Mapuche community of the Bío Bío region for economic gain. Although protected by law under the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, local governments and other citizens still do not recognize the rights of the Mapuche people in Chile. The Mapuche people make up 9% of the Chilean population, yet have little support to keep their culture alive in urban settings, such as Santiago (Becerra 2018). Therefore, indigenous groups must make themselves visible in the political scene by staging protests against their exploitation. The protests often come in the form of property destruction; they burn equipment that loggers use. The Mapuche people showed their support for Standing Rock in the United States; they put a face to the fight against land and

environmental exploitation that happens all over the world. The disregard of indigenous land rights is a human rights issue and it establishes a hierarchy of power of non-indigenous people above indigenous people. Indigenous people are marginalized and, as a result, violence often erupts. The emergence of Ralco Dam and the logging and forestry industries provide an example of the social movement regarding the fight for Mapuche land legitimacy.

Sisters Berta and Nicolasa Quintremán led the Ralco Dam protests. Nicolasa Quintremán was not able to be buried in her ancestral cemetery because of the presence of Ralco Hydroelectric Dam, the dam she fought so hard against, but ultimately did not succeed in halting the. The Endesa electricity company that implemented the dam displaced the remains of people from 92 Mapuche families for the dam's construction without warning; they also used tear gas and home invasions in response to the peaceful blockades to suppress opposition (Vergara 2013). Quintremán and her sister peacefully blocked the streets to stop construction, which resulted in new environmental protections after years of protests. The protections said that companies must provide a more in-depth study of environmental impacts before the implementation of projects, such as the building of dams. In the end, the dam was built to provide electricity to Chile and Mapuche people were relocated with the empty promises of scholarships and housing utilities. The protests failed to stop the dam's construction, but they succeeded in the implementation of environmental protections. Although the protests at Ralco Dam achieved one small success, the indigenous people failed to achieve land reform and the

success they achieved did not directly benefit the indigenous communities, it just forced compliance with environmental regulations.

The logging and forestry industries have come under the greatest attack by the indigenous communities, because companies, subsidized under Pinochet, come and possess land that is supposed to be Mapuche land and do not respect territory rights of the Mapuche (Richards 2005, 208). Pine and Eucalyptus plantations surround Mapuche villages and leech nutrients from soil and make agriculture almost impossible for the Mapuche people who depend on the agriculture for their food and incomes. As a result, many Mapuche take part in land sabotage, land occupation, and equipment burning of logging and forestry companies. This leads to violent encounters between Mapuche and the police. The Benetton Corporation, an Italian fashion brand, bought a large portion of land from the government at subsidized prices. This land is land on which the Mapuche people lived. The Benetton Corporation diverts the water source from the local Mapuche community for their own use in logging, raising livestock, and fossil fuel extraction. This results in animal deaths, drought, and displacement (Reuque and Mallon 2002, 14). Corporate leaders agreed to meet Mapuche leaders to discuss the issue, but failed to show up at the scheduled meeting time, so the Mapuche reacted in violence. The Araucanía region, in the southern part of Chile, is considered a red zone of conflict and houses many of the logging industries that take over Mapuche land (Barba 2018).

The Ralco Hydroelectric Plant produces 690 megawatts of electricity, but at what cost? While economic opportunity is pertinent in society, the government must offer reparations for resources it removes from its owners. It forced relocation of a community

without repayment and it flooded a gravesite and homes. The construction workers utilized tear gas and violence against the indigenous community. It led to a long-standing legal battle over indigenous land rights. Two chairs and two advisors of the National Commission of Indigenous Development were forced to resign because they opposed the construction of the dam, so this group was delegitimized. Formed to protect and project the interests of the indigenous minority, the removal of those that voiced the opinions of the indigenous people were simply forced to resign so that the group would represent the opinion of the state. With every effort of the Mapuche people, the Chilean state and the company constructing the dam, Endesa, further diminished the status of the indigenous population. Some reparations were paid to four affected families, but the dam was completed, which establishes the fact that the state will always have more power than the indigenous people whose land is supposed to be protected (Gonzales 2004). Because land reform is one of the main goals of the Mapuche and they cannot maintain a leadership seat in the organization that determines land reform, the social movement fails. This is also a goal that does not benefit the country as a whole, or even a majority because the forestry and hydroelectric companies are a large influencer in the economy.

### *2.3 Indigenous People in Ecuador*

The percentage of indigenous people in Ecuador is greater than that of Chile—it is estimated to be about 25%, but up to 75% of Ecuadorians report as mestizos, or mixed. The group with the most representation are the Quichua people, but there are about 14

other indigenous people in Ecuador including both the Andean and Amazonian Quichua, Jivaroan, Záparo, Waorani, Cofán, Tucanoan, Barbacoan, and others (Whitten 2003, xiii). Since 1990 and the renewal of indigenous social movements in Latin America, the indigenous people of Ecuador have enjoyed a number of successes. Some of their greatest successes came in the forms of electing a President, removing two presidents from office, and advocating for a plurinational state. They still face challenges today because of the state's interest in oil and mining opportunities on indigenous territory, but they have a voice in the workings of the government. The diverse indigenous groups are united by the idea that they are "people united." At many of their strikes and takeovers, the people involved in the social movement chant "*El pueblo, unido, jamás será vencido,*" which means "people together will never be defeated (Whitten 2003, xiii). Used as a phrase in every Spanish speaking country, the indigenous people in Ecuador created an organization to show their dedication to their unity.

In Ecuador in the 1980s, there was a debt crisis that unfairly affected indigenous people through an increase in the number of unpaid indigenous workers. Corporations paid indigenous people less for equal work. This led to a heightened sense of indigenous identity to unite the differing indigenous tribes for a common purpose. In 1986 came the formation of CONAIE, the *Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de Ecuador* (Jameson 2011). This organization is one by the indigenous people, for the people and its main purpose is to unify indigenous groups throughout the country and create an agenda of demands. The mission statement is similar to that of CONADI, but it differs in that it is an organization by the indigenous people, something that is not present with the

indigenous people in Chile to the same extent. CONAIE created the plurinational concept, that would formally recognize the coexistence of multiple ethnicities in the country and provide that all groups have rights. Between 1995 and 2001, in the peak of their fight for a plurinational state, the indigenous people of Ecuador ranked first in number of arrests, second in number of protest events, and fourth in the number of deaths and injuries—they were relentless and would not stop their efforts until they were awarded rights (Jameson 2011). In order to be a national player on the governmental level, CONAIE served as a mechanism for the movement to project itself into national debates.

In 1990, an indigenous uprising led to road blockages to assert their political power and demonstrate their relentlessness. Alongside this was a central meeting of the indigenous people to discuss 16 demands around which they would unite. Two of these demands are “the declaration of Ecuador as a plurinational state” and “the return of lands and the legalization of territories for the indigenous people, without costly legal fees” (Jameson 2011). They adopted a system of communication from the Spanish that elected local leaders, called *cabildos*, that would make decisions to be consulted at a national level. *Cabildos* function like small towns with elected mayors and councilmembers to make decisions, so it is organized to represent a group of people.

What brought the indigenous movement to the center of economic policy making was the junta to oust President Jamil Mahuad in 2000 after he gave too much power over the economy to a group from the United States, the Harvard Boys. He froze bank accounts, so inflation rose 60% and the poor and working class people were unable to convert their Ecuadorian dollars into more valuable US dollars. The economy plummeted

and people lost 75% of their purchasing power while Mahuad's popularity declined from 60% to 6% (Whitten 2003, 1). The junta demonstrated the organization of the indigenous people and their ability to inspire change through a military revolt led by Lucio Gutiérrez. The indigenous people successfully made contact and received help from the armed forces that guarded the Legislative Palace in Quito. At 10:00am on January 21, 2000, the national police signaled to the armed forces to draw back, which allowed thousands of indigenous, and nonindigenous supporters, to enter the palace and wave a national flag (Whitten 2003, 1). They dictated on national television that "*El pueblo está en poder,*" or "the people are in power." The President was ousted and the indigenous people demonstrated their influence and their ability to fight for the betterment of their people, but also the country as a whole. To further strengthen a working relationship between the government and the indigenous people is the referendum on dollarization. The indigenous people gathered one million signatures to reject dollarization, which describes the process of aligning currency with the United States dollar. Although the referendum ultimately failed, this indicates the voice they have on a national level and shifts the movement away from just conceptual ideas; they are strategically working towards their demands. However, the indigenous demands were sidelined quickly after they ousted Mahuad. Opposition to Mahuad came from other sectors of people in the debt crisis, so CONAIE had the support of other elite, including the military. In a way, this occurrence described CONAIE's weakness: they depend on military, or other elite support (Bowen 2011, 470).

In 2002, the foreign minister, minister of agriculture, and minister of education were indigenous. These are strategic cabinet positions because the indigenous people demand land rights, as well as equal education and indigenous education in schools (Jameson 2011). The indigenous people of Ecuador recognize what policy goals of the government officials are aligned with their own to advance their demands. Their constitutional reform demand was granted in 2008 by President Correa. Although the indigenous people of Ecuador still have goals to fight for, their social movement was far more successful than the social movement of the Chilean Mapuche. In this thesis, I present the data that indicates why this is true and what the Chilean Mapuche may do to achieve more successes.

## Chapter 3: Data/Analysis

### *3.1 Methodology*

I compare the Chilean Mapuche case with a more successful indigenous social movement in Ecuador. I compare two indigenous groups that each participate in protests and have organizations to represent them, CONAIE in Ecuador and CAM in Chile, and analyze what differs that would allow one to be successful and one to fail to achieve their goals. I primarily focus on the Mapuche in Chile, rather than the indigenous people of Ecuador, to explore why the Mapuche are not successful. I utilize the case of Ecuador to provide a contrast as to what is occurring, or not occurring in Chile. I compare the cases with the variables—number of manifestations, group organization, manifestation demands, and representation to determine why the Mapuche have not been able to form a successful social movement. Success is defined as the ability to form a bottom-up indigenous group that has clear, measurable goals that it achieves on a governmental level. My thesis tests my hypothesis that Chilean Mapuche are unable to create a successful social movement because their demands are not unified between all Mapuche. I measure this claim through an analysis of surveys that indicate what Mapuche and non-Mapuche people in different regions believe to be the biggest issues, topics of individual protests, and goals stated by different groups that claim to represent the indigenous population. I use the theories of social movements, specifically the structural strain theory, to guide my thesis. I briefly introduce the relationship between the Mapuche and the state. Then I analyze the development of a successful social

movement, as a result of voting action, political environment, and manifestations in conjunction with the theories of social movements that were discussed in Chapter 1.

I begin by comparing the formation and foundation of the indigenous social movement in both Chile and in Ecuador. I then discuss CONAIE and CAM and analyze specific events they have formed a part of and their relationship with the state and the indigenous people they claim to represent. CONAIE proves to be a better representation and agent for change than CAM, so I analyze why this occurs to help answer my hypothesis and why the Chilean Mapuche are unable to form a group of the same caliber. To follow, I present election results for city council of areas in Chile that have a high density of Mapuche. I use this information to analyze their ability to enact change on a governmental level through their representation. The Mapuche represent a much smaller proportion of the population than the indigenous people of Ecuador, so it makes sense that they would be marginalized. Therefore, I analyze the numbers of representatives in regions with a high density of Mapuche people in Chile and discuss their failure to enact legislative change in areas where they have representation to analyze how numbers affect their success. Political party existence and platform is used as an indicator of success in representation, as well.

The dependent variable is the development of a successful social movement. In successful cases, policy will be implemented but also followed through. This is measurable through constitutional change, government representation, or the passage of laws. In failed cases, no policy will be offered, or there will be no follow through. The independent variables will include the actions being done, such as protests, burnings,

strikes, as well as campaign organization, such as presence of public meetings, petitions, and political climate to determine which affects the dependent variable. By looking at the similarities of the independent variables among multiple indigenous groups, I will analyze why the outcomes may be different.

I use Mill's Method of Difference, which compares cases to determine what they do not have in common. The variable they do not have in common is the cause that indicates why one group celebrates success while the other fails. How did the indigenous people in Ecuador establish a plurinationalist state, but the Mapuche cannot achieve their goal of land reclamation and constitutional recognition?

### *3.2 Analysis*

I analyze the development of a successful social movement through the use of the following independent variables: representation, manifestations, and political climate. In order to be successful, social movements require the mobilization of a large group of people for a common cause with a common purpose (Tilly 2004). They require a specific claim. Indigenous people in Chile and Ecuador have formed social movements, yet the movement in Ecuador has seen both success and failure and Chile's case is largely unsuccessful. My data, that I will present in this section, indicates that the indigenous people of Ecuador achieve success because they have a closer relationship with the state when the state is experiencing a strain, and are more unified in their demands across manifestations. On the contrary, the indigenous people of Chile are far too separated in their demands among individual groups of people, they do not have the same numbers

as Ecuador, and they do not have a close relationship with the relatively stable state to be able to implement change.

The cases of Ecuador and Chile share some similarities. The social movements strengthened, as they often do, in times of political turmoil. In the 1980s, the debt crisis in Ecuador strengthened the sense of indigenous identity and led them to band together to fight when fewer indigenous people were offered paid employment and had to compete with other skilled laborers for the available jobs. Whereas, in Chile, the indigenous social movements emerged after Pinochet was forced out of office, because a new government formed that was more receptive to change and democratic representation than a dictatorship, like that of Pinochet. Therefore, a political crisis unites those with a common identity and encourages a platform to mobilize. Both countries have this in common, so this does not indicate the reason the Chilean Mapuche are unable to create a successful social movement. This aligns with the structural strain theory. Although both groups experienced constant grievances before they formed, the social structure was altered which offered indigenous groups a political environment in which strains are recognized.

Chile and Ecuador each have organizations through which the indigenous people are provided a platform to communicate with the government and project national debates. According to the structural strain theory, this diffusion of ideas into society is pertinent to success. While both countries have indigenous social movements, that of Ecuador is more successful, in part because it has an indigenous-run organization that has goals that align more closely with other non-indigenous groups, whereas the Chilean

CAM is demonized and labeled a terrorist organization (Kowalczyk 2013, 132). In Chile, there is also an organization called CONADI that supposedly works for indigenous rights, but is not so much a representative of the Mapuche people, but a bureaucratic office within Chile's development ministry. Therefore, CONAIE's equivalent is CAM. The Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador, or CONAIE, is the organization of Ecuador. It was formed in 1986 to strengthen indigenous identity and achieve land recuperation and a plurinationalist state. *Coordinadora Arauco-Malleco*, or CAM was created in 1998 to diffuse the idea of and begin the fight for land reclamation. However, CONAIE is more productive than CAM. CONAIE successfully removed two presidents: President Bucaram in 1997 and Jamil Mahuad in 2000. In 2002, Lucio Gutiérrez was elected president with 55% of the vote (Jameson 2011). Pachakutik, the indigenous political party of Ecuador, helped him win the election through their support. CONAIE had a close relationship with the government, largely as a result of their referendum on dollarization of the Ecuadorian economy. They collected one million signatures on a petition to oppose dollarization and led road blockages and protests to oust the president. Although the referendum on dollarization failed, it showed the scope of their influence. They shifted from a concept creator to a national player in governmental affairs through this event, as they had to work closely alongside the government on specific concessions. They gained a certain level of trust with the government and made the government realize that the goals of the indigenous people are closely aligned, or overlap with the goals of the government. By ousting President Mahuad with the help of the police and armed forces in Ecuador, they brought the indigenous movement to the

center of policy decision-making. Conversely, CAM does not have a relationship that is open to communication with the Chilean state because the Chilean state has labeled them as a terrorist organization. Their relationship is based upon arrests instead of compromises.

CONADI, created in 1994 by the Chilean government, gives the illusion that the society is receptive to change, but it fails to unify indigenous people and does not have success in working alongside other organizations. CONADI is significantly less successful than CONAIE in Ecuador and the indigenous people of Chile have not formed an organization that is as large as CONAIE. A 2006 survey reports that only 40% of Chilean Mapuche have confidence in the abilities of CONADI to represent them (CEP 2006). CONADI demonstrates that the society is not open to change; based upon the structural strain theory, this is a cause of failure. Before the Indigenous Law that established CONADI was even passed, right-wing senators removed final provisions that set up procedures for consultation with indigenous communities (Sznajder 2003). Furthermore, the director of CONADI is not indigenous - this is a failure of the indigenous social movement in Chile. If they cannot represent themselves in indigenous organizations, this indicates a failure to be a national player in politics. My analysis indicates that the failure to unite the indigenous people of Chile and form a group like CONAIE, or a popular bottom-up indigenous political party alludes to a failure of the Mapuche social movements.

The Mapuche make up a small percentage of the population in Chile, so it is understandable that they will not create motion as affectively as the indigenous people in

Ecuador; they simply do not have the numbers. However, they do not have success in regions that are heavily populated by Mapuche and do not have success working through organizations that supposedly support indigenous rights. Two indigenous men, Domingo Namuncura and Moises Huenchela were removed from the position as director of CONADI in the 1990s because they opposed the construction of Ralco Dam, which was a detrimental failure on their goals on land reclamation. Huenchela voiced his skepticism upon his resignation:

I became an obstacle to the implementation of a political-economic path that does not take into consideration the damage it can signify to the indigenous population... Those in government who believe that this institution is simply another instrument for the state to accommodate a diversity of interests are wrong... [the president's intervention] will only provoke an end to the pact between the state and indigenous peoples (Diario Austral 1997).

Two more men were removed from office for opposing the Ralco Dam, so the new director swore to vote in favor of the dam before he was voted into CONADI (Rodriguez and Carruthers 2008, 7). A non-indigenous man was named director to protect the large hydroelectric company in 1998 (Gonzales 1989). The government established these organizations to improve the strained relationship between the state and the indigenous people, but when the government faced opposition from constituents towards indigenous recognition, they stripped CONADI of its intended goals and placed non-indigenous people over the organization (Rodriguez and Carruthers 2008, 3). This is a huge failure. CONADI is influenced by the government instead of influencing the government. They achieve small successes, but do not have the power to successfully represent the Mapuche people. At Ralco Dam, the Mapuche people did not gain support


from the police, or other governmental entities. Conversely, in one of the most successful events in the social movement in Ecuador is the coup that removed President Mahuad, in which the indigenous people had help from the Ecuadorian police and armed forces, who left their posts at the door, so that the indigenous people would be able to enter the Legislative Palace.

**Table 1: Mapuche Representation as Councilors**

Year	Region	Percent Candidates Mapuche	Percentage Votes Mapuche	Mapuche Winners
1992	Santiago	6.45	6.45	2
2004	Bio-Bio	47.06	60.40	4
2008	Bio-Bio	60.00	72.14	5
2012	Bio-Bio	59.26	65.00	5
2012	Araucanía	40.00	27.94	4
2016	Santiago	2.04	1.29	0
2016	Araucanía	43.33	32.06	1
2016	Bio-Bio	15.15	14.83	1

Source: "Mapuche Representation 1989-2017," Mapuche Data Project, accessed 7 December 2019.

**Figure 1: Mapuche Population 2011**



Source: Lewis, Martin. 2015. Geocurrents, information from 2013 Casen Study.

Figure 1 is presented for reference while I analyze governmental representation; it shows the population density of Mapuche in the different regions of Chile. Table 1 presents the percentage of Mapuche city council members elected in areas of highly populated indigenous populations. The data comes from the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas. The percentage of Mapuche votes is not too different from the percentage of Mapuche people in those areas. However, the data only shows winners of city council. This is because they did not have success in the elections of deputy, mayor, or senate throughout most of the years. While city councilors work on and vote on city finances, infrastructure improvements, and other major projects, the national government still has

the power to allow outside companies to buy land when they determine it will help the national economy. In the recent 2017 election, the Mapuche people in the Araucanía region gained some success in the senate election with about 20% of the candidates being Mapuche. The areas with the highest concentration of Mapuche people are Araucanía, Bío-Bío, and metropolitan Santiago. The problem lies in Santiago. This area with a high concentration of Mapuche people fails to elect councilors to represent them in the capital. Also, we should see more success in the Araucanía and Bío-Bío regions because there are more Mapuche representatives, but we see little progress in the acquisition of demands. Yet, as I discussed already, the senators in Congress want to please the masses, so they will largely disregard indigenous demands if they face opposition from the majority. Whereas, in Ecuador, the majority of citizens have indigenous blood along with Spanish blood, so Congress may not face as much opposition regarding indigenous reforms and the political atmosphere welcomes change as there is government turmoil; this allows different groups to voice their demands so that the government may be restructured to become more stable. Furthermore, the Mapuche have very little representation in Congress. There are 155 deputies and 50 senators in Chile. The indigenous population of Chile constitutes about 10% of the total population, so there should be about 20 indigenous representatives in Congress. Yet they only elected 4 into office from 2012-2017. This is another failure of the indigenous social movement in Chile. The indigenous people cannot unify to elect candidates to office and the rest of society does not elect them.

Indigenous political parties are an indicator of success of social movements. In Ecuador, the party Pachakutik is an active party that helped elect Gutiérrez in 2002. Through this political party, they enter the political scene. There is not a successful equivalent in Chile. There is an attempted political party, called *Wallmapuwen*. However, there is almost no news about their successes, failures, or actions. This indicates that they are not successful, have no support, and cannot serve as an option in which to enter the political scene with the current level of support. This is understandable through the small population of Mapuche. However, my analysis indicates that this success is contingent on parties, like Pachakutik, to gain representation in the government, so that the government may be receptive.

Ecuador provides a useful contrast to Chile because I am able to analyze the period in which they had success in comparison with their deteriorating success rate. Today in Ecuador, this political party, *Pachakutik*, is losing support as a result of infighting, support lost from goals no longer aligning with other political organizations, and financial struggles. CONAIE also struggles today. In Ecuador today, the social movement is failing alongside Pachakutik and CONAIE. The indigenous people are no longer able to achieve their day to day goals of halting oil drilling on their ancestral lands, which is not an issue in which the non-indigenous are focused because the economy will create better opportunities for them and the land destruction has no immediate effects towards them. They are not successful in their day-to-day demands, but find success when united with other groups. Researcher James Bowen describes CONAIE's relationship with the state with the term multicultural market democracy, which he says

“fulfills each of these functions [multiculturalism, economic liberalism, political democracy] by incorporating indigenous peoples into the political system but excluding demands and tactics that undermine elite political power” (Bowen 2011, 480). One example to support this claim is that President Lenín Moreno was forced to restore fuel subsidies after violent protests in the capital, Quito, in October 2019 (Weisbrot 2019). Moreno announced Decree 883 that would cut subsidies to energy, which made fuel prices double, so that vulnerable communities could not afford gas; Moreno rescinded the Decree because it affected the masses, but he does not respond to many demands by only the indigenous. Many organizations protested, but Moreno requested peace talks with CONAIE. This is a success of the indigenous people because they have established their organization as a change-maker, but it also demonstrates the tactics used by the government to choose which demands to grant and which to ignore. They have most success in a time of political turmoil when their ideology aligns with other groups.

**Table 2: Survey of Participation in Manifestations (percent of total protesters that are indigenous)**

	Percent Indigenous	
	Chile	Ecuador
2008	—	19.2
2010	—	7.6
2012	9.1	—
2014	3.2	—
2016	9.5	4.6

Source: *Alguna vez en su vida, ¿ha participado usted en una manifestación o protesta púb.*

Query November 29, 2019. Data set Chile 2016 from The Latin American Public Opinion Project: <http://lapop.ccp.ucr.ac.cr>, November 29, 2019.

Table 2 shows the participation of people in manifestations, or protests that are indigenous drawn from LAPOP data. In 2008, indigenous people in Ecuador protested for constitutional reform that would recognize Ecuador as a plurinational state. As seen in Table 2, 19.2% of all of those that protested, in any protest, in 2008 in Ecuador were indigenous. They came together when there was a time with a specific need. They achieved their goal when a high percentage of indigenous people participated in the events. Furthermore, about 72% of the population of Ecuador is mestizo, or mixed Spanish and indigenous (World Bank). Since 2016, there has been an upsurge in the conflicts in the regions where Mapuche are concentrated in Chile. In 2016, 9.5% of those responding to the survey said that they were indigenous and participated in protests in the last year. This alludes to an increase in Mapuche participation; therefore, we should see more success. However, as I discuss in the following paragraph, there are multiple themes in which these conflicts focus, so there is little unity which prohibits achievements.

Data indicates that there were 11,518 manifestations, or protest events between 2012 and 2017, which averages to 2,304 per year (Garretón 2018). However, from 2015 to 2016, only 136 of the manifestations were reported to be related to the Mapuche conflict. This indicates that there is a lack of focus on the Mapuche conflict. There are other social movements occurring at the same time, so the Mapuche social movement is overshadowed by others, such as the women's movement and the student movement.

Furthermore, many Mapuche are students and women, so they may choose to focus their energy on protesting alongside the other movements and lose time for a Mapuche protest. There is a low percentage of Mapuche protests in comparison with all Chilean protests and data reveals that there is a lack of unity in the themes of Mapuche protests. This is a factor that causes social movements to fail. They are not united on one issue because Mapuche communities are divided regionally, instead of ethnically. Many Mapuche people disagree on the use of violence against the police during manifestations, so they cannot be united with this foundational issue of how manifestations should occur—with violence or without (Rodriguez and Carruthers 2008, 13). In the 136 actions related to the Mapuche conflict, 45.5% were related to identity, 24.3% were related to legal measures, and the remaining 30.3% surrounded land rights. The Mapuche people were too widely split in regards to their priorities, so they lack representation numbers, as well as a common theme that unites different manifestations across time and space.

One of the Mapuche demands is to be recognized constitutionally as an autonomous people. The demand was similar for the indigenous people of Ecuador. They wanted a plurinational state with constitutional recognition, which they achieved with the constitutional reform of 2008. A survey published in 2006 (CEP 2006) indicates reason for failure in the case of the Mapuche. In successful social movements, constituents must show up in numbers and be unified. The Mapuche live in different geographical regions: urban Santiago and rural Araucanía. Regarding a question about what problems the government should prioritize, the urban and rural Mapuche answered

differently. The concerns of the rural Mapuche focused more on unemployment. The answers of rural Mapuche indicate that they are just trying to survive and want land to live. The urban Mapuche are more focused on constitutional recognition. Until they can unify in their priorities, they will not be a successful social movement.

Data indicates potential success for the Mapuche social movement in the future, as the political climate becomes less rigid and student demands coincide with indigenous demands. However, they are unsuccessful. Social movement success depends on the acronym WUNC: worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment. Ecuador demonstrates each of these characteristics. For example, they have a stated cause by which many are affected and they have one overarching theme and every other claim is related to the umbrella theme. They accumulate numbers in protests, road blockages, and signatures on petitions and they are committed in their resistance through a presidential coup. The unsuccessful Mapuche social movement lacks unity, protests are not connected across regions, or years, and they do not have the same numbers as the indigenous people of Ecuador. The data indicates that a lack of unity prevents successful representation, which keeps a group from gaining momentum, national support, and a voice. Therefore, I fail to accept my hypothesis that unity is the key to indigenous success, rather it is a step in gathering support to make the society receptive to change.

Today, a decline in the success of Ecuador's indigenous people is obvious and they experience similar land rights issues as the Mapuche. The indigenous people of Ecuador had success in uniting people when the government was having economic issues and their goals aligned with the goals of others, not just the goals of indigenous peoples.

Now, Pachakutik does not draw the same support as it did after its formation and is not as united as it once was as a result of struggles with finances and infighting (Valencia and Stargardter 2019). They had success when they ousted a president that did not have popular support and supported a widely supported president. They began to fail when they backed Luis Macas instead of the more popular candidate Rafael Correa. They are successful when they have the support of other political groups, yet in order for this to happen, they need to have aligning goals. CONAIE has some success because the politics are unstable and many other citizens recognize the corruption; they have success when it makes political sense. Chile has had a relatively stable government since Pinochet, so the government is not receptive to change.

## Conclusion

The Mapuche social movement is unsuccessful as a result of an unreceptive society to change. A lack of unity within the group and with the general population and a strained relationship with the state that makes it difficult for the other Chileans and respected political parties to align their goals with the Mapuche, so their cause does not seem worthy for the masses. The indigenous people of Ecuador established a communication network between the indigenous people and the Ecuadorian state, so that they may have power in the national government. As a result, they achieved a constitutional reform and ousted two presidents with help from the police and armed forces. The indigenous social movement now fails because they do not have unity with the general population and the alliance with respected political groups.

In the terms of social movement theories, the structural strain theory is most useful to explain why the social movement of Ecuador was successful, whereas, the Mapuche in Chile do not achieve success and Ecuador's now fails. The resource mobilization theory is the most basic theory and says that a community with a grievance can help alleviate the grievance with a mobilization of resources, including money, labor, social status, knowledge, support of the media, and support from the elite. In my analysis, it is not indicated that the Mapuche are any more successful with the resource of CONADI than they were before the formation of CONADI. Also, the indigenous people of Ecuador gained support as their movement became more successful, so this does not

provide convincing evidence that a change in resources leads to the successes, or failure, of the indigenous social movements.

The structural strain theory is similar to the resource mobilization theory, but it has one descriptor that is key to success. There are six requirements for a social movement to be successful: people in society experience deprivation, people recognize the deprivation, a solution is proposed, events occur to begin motion of the movement, the society needs to be open to change, and there will be mobilization of resources. The most important aspect in this to explain the successes and failures is that society, or the government, must be in a position to be open to change. There must be a strain in society that creates holes in a system that must be filled. The Mapuche experienced a deprivation—lack of government recognition that led to land privatization—and the people recognized this and began planning protests. However, the society is not very open to change and there is a lack of unity in the solutions proposed for their deprivation; both of these facts makes it impossible to have success in a social movement. Conversely, the indigenous people of Ecuador acted through each step to gain success; one form of success is constitutional reform. They recognized that they did not have a nationally recognized identity, so they formed a political party and opened communication networks between different groups of indigenous people so that they were able to unite around 16 demands. The society was open to change, in large part because the majority of Ecuadorians have some indigenous blood and there was an economic crisis in which the majority were affected when their first measurable success came to fruition. The difference between the case in Chile and Ecuador according to the

structural strain theory is the level of manifestation organization and unity and openness to change from others.

The new social movement theories do a better job of explaining why social movements begin in the first place. The resource mobilization theory and the structural strain theory are best used to understand how social movements gain success. The new social movement theories focus on culture and identity as a catalyst for social movements. They also defend personal autonomy and resist government expansion. This explains both the beginnings of the social movement of indigenous people in Ecuador and Chile, but does not offer an explanation as to why the Mapuche do not have success when they do defend personal autonomy and resist government expansion. Therefore, I rely on the structural strain theory.

I expected more contrast between the two movements than I found in my research. My research has indicated that Ecuador's indigenous movement is not as successful as I previously thought. While they did succeed for many years, they are no more successful now than the indigenous movement in Chile. Therefore, while unity in demands is important and Mapuche people in Chile lack the unity that CONAIE brought in Ecuador, this is not the only cause of failure. Ecuador is about 25% indigenous and the majority of the population identifies as mestizo, whereas Chile is only 10% indigenous. It makes sense that indigenous people in Ecuador would be more represented in the government because the country, including the economy, depends majorly on the indigenous people. In Chile, they simply do not have the numbers to require such big strides by the government to keep the country at peace and they do not have enough

support to elect a president. It is evident, too, that Chile's government still has not fully recovered from the restrictive Pinochet era, so the country is not in a place for any social movement to succeed, including those advocating for students' and women's rights. As the government continues to recover in the coming years, it will be evident whether or not this is the reason behind the failures of the indigenous people in Chile.

In conclusion, the Mapuche case is unsuccessful because they do not have support from the elite and they do not have the proper organization throughout the country to organize unified demands and manifestations in different regions. In order to be successful, they must clearly define their demands and work together with others, not just the indigenous people, to gain a voice on the national level to enact change.

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