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**The Differences in Talk about Violence and Terrorism: A Case Study of Northern Ireland
and the Basque Country**

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By McClellan A. Davis

A thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for completion
Of the Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies
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Abstract

The Northern Irish and Basque conflicts have been studied throughout the years, as both serve as examples of conflicts involving ethnonationalist terrorist groups and successful disarmaments. While there are similarities, there are also distinctions between the two conflicts. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) both fought for independence from a larger government, inflicted horrific pain on populations where they considered themselves members, but ultimately both ended without accomplishing their goal of separatism. This thesis seeks to understand the differences within these conflicts and their subsequent peace processes/disarmaments, which I believe contribute to the differences in ‘talk’ about each conflict. I conducted qualitative research using a newspaper source from each country, *The Belfast Telegraph* for Northern Ireland and *El Diario Vasco* for the Basque Country. Throughout my research, I found that the main actors in each case are drastically different. For the Northern Irish case, political actors monopolized newspaper articles with talk of The Good Friday Agreement, which is the 1997 peace agreement that still exists today between the government and the IRA. While there was no similar peace process in the Basque case, societal groups representing victims prevailed in the Basque newspaper articles, making victims and their families the center of Basque talk.

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I. Introduction

While spending a semester in Bilbao, the heart of País Vasco, I learned so much about a culture that I barely knew existed. The Basque citizens are proud of their differences from other Spaniards: they feel they have a separate identity due to many factors like food and sport, but the most prominent of these being language. During a weekend trip to Paris, in the bookstore Shakespeare and Co., I picked up a book called *Homeland* and discovered that it is a fictional story about two families living in the Basque Country who have been friends for decades but that are ultimately divided by Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (hereafter, ETA) due to one family's involvement and the other's staunch disapproval of the terrorist group. This sparked my interest in a terrorist group that was previously unknown to me. When I returned to Bilbao, I was shocked that no one was willing to talk with me about ETA. This group was active from 1959 until 2018 and killed somewhere between 800-950 people (historians debate the exact number). (04-29-2018). Their history overlaps with that of Basque repression under Franco and continues until more recent separatist movements like that of Cataluña. While some see them as terrorists, others see them as a group of freedom fighters.

I took a Basque Language and Culture class, and not one word was mentioned about the terrorist group that killed hundreds and was active for decades. My host mother told me “no llamamos de ETA aquí” (We don't speak of ETA here) on more than one occasion. ETA was an anomaly to me- I did not fear it like al-Qaeda or ISIS because as far as I knew, it had nothing to do with the US, but it was certainly a subject that piqued my interest.

In order to compare what I believed to be ‘silence’ on the part of the Basque people, Dr. Ana Velitchkova helped me choose another case: the Northern Irish and their experiences with the IRA (Irish Republican Army). As I felt that I had very basic knowledge about the IRA, their fight for a united Ireland and complete removal of British rule, and had even heard of massacres like Bloody Sunday, I immediately felt comfortable hypothesizing that the Irish were more willing to speak about their case than the Basque. After a little bit more research, though, I realized that one group was not more likely to speak about their conflict than the other, but that the dialogue about the two cases was very different.

Research Question:

Beginning this research, I felt like I knew much more about the Good Friday Agreement and specific terrorist atrocities committed by the IRA while I knew relatively nothing about ETA even after having lived there. While I believe that the two cases share some aspects, there are differences between them that determine what kind of aspects of the conflict that people are willing to discuss. Therefore, my questions are: *What differences in these two cases dictate what kind of talk is produced? Who is willing to talk about the conflict in each case?*

This project seeks to compare the differences between the two societies and their respective conflicts/peace processes, which I believe to be the reasons why there are differences in the type of discourse surrounding the conflicts. The two cases are similar in that the terrorist groups are both nationalist groups who fought for independence; they both killed hundreds of their own people in grotesque ways; and ultimately lost power and were forced to disband.

II. Case Studies

Northern Irish Case

The majority of the literature I read concerns articles that provide background information about the conflicts themselves in order to present a more robust, complete understanding of the events that transpired in both cases.

For the Irish case, articles such as “Reflecting on the Northern Ireland Conflict and Peace Process: 20 Years since the Good Friday Agreement,” “The Northern Irish Peace Process: From Top to Bottom,” “Communities and Peace: Catholic Youth in Northern Ireland,” and “Resolving Nationalist Conflicts: Promoting Overlapping Identities and Pooling Sovereignty - The 1998 Northern Irish Peace Agreement” provided me with a look at many aspects of both the conflict and the peace process. Additionally, I was able to read the actual “Good Friday Agreement” and “The Belfast Agreement: The Agreement: Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations.”

These articles primarily focused on the divisions in Northern Irish society between nationalists and unionists, or those who wanted a united Ireland (nationalists/republicans) and those who wanted Northern Ireland to remain part of Britain (unionists/loyalists). These political groups were divided by religion, too. The majority of nationalists were Catholic; the majority of the unionists were Protestant. The conflict ended with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement. Political parties and individual members were the primary actors. Sinn Féin is the nationalist political party that has been historically linked to the Irish Republican Army (IRA) since its founding in 1917. The IRA has transformed considerably since its founding. The 1917 IRA was a group of Irishmen who did not fight with the British Army in WWI. When the war

ended, the Irishmen who had fought alongside the British fought against those same British in the Irish War of Independence in 1919. The Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 resulted in the group splitting, with the IRA including only those who did not agree with the treaty, which ended the civil war. The next split, and the most relevant to my research, occurred in 1969 and resulted in the Official IRA (OIRA) and the Provisional IRA (PIRA), with the latter continuing to engage in military operations. There was another split in 1986, where the Continuity IRA (CIRA) broke away from the PIRA because the PIRA “recognized the authority of the Republic of Ireland.” Lastly, the Real IRA (RIRA) broke off from the PIRA in 1997 because it did not support the peace process in Northern Ireland.

The OIRA was thought to not be militarily active, but it was the political branch, closely tied to Sinn Féin. Sinn Féin, founded in 1905, is the largest Irish-nationalist party active in both Ireland and Northern Ireland. Sinn Féin high-ranking officials have been accused of holding IRA positions; the leader during my timeframe, Gerry Adams, was an outspoken individual who refused to condemn the IRA as a terrorist organization and was disliked by many other political parties’ members. For example, Rev. Ian Paisley, a Protestant church pastor and the founder of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) in 1971 strongly condemned Sinn Féin and Gerry Adams. The DUP favored Northern Ireland staying loyal to Britain, and Paisley himself strongly disagreed with allowing Sinn Féin to be represented during peace negotiations due to their relationship with the IRA. Billy Hutchinson, leader of the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP), also strongly disagreed with Adams representing Sinn Féin at the peace talks. Hutchinson and his party were tied to the Ulster paramilitary groups, which were British-loyal forces who fought against the IRA.

With this distinction as a foundation, articles that focused on the peace process (such as “From Top to Bottom”) argued that while peace is “made” from the top down, it cannot be implemented without “social preparation” from the bottom up. This clarification promotes the idea that peace in Northern Ireland was not easy to achieve, as oftentimes it was difficult for opposing parties to reach a governmental agreement; furthermore, civilians had to be willing to live in peace. “Communities of Peace” looks at the willingness of the public to be peaceful, paying particular attention to young Catholics. The article argues that the bipolarity of the political system in Northern Ireland is a driving divisive factor, and that where the young Catholics live also influences their willingness to support a peaceful agreement.

Important outbreaks of violence commonly referenced throughout my research include: Bloody Sunday, the January 1972 killing of 26 unarmed Northern Irish protesters by British forces; Bloody Friday, the July 1972 bombings done throughout Belfast by the PIRA that killed some but injured over one hundred; and the Omagh Bombing, the August 1998 car-bombing done by the RIRA that killed 29 and injured 220. The last was done in ‘retaliation’ for peace talks not being more forgiving to the IRA, but ultimately hurt the nationalist movement due to the amount of backlash it received. The process of drafting the Good Friday Agreement took years of discussion and meetings, and this bombing during the talks did little to help the case of the IRA/Sinn Féin to win any of the demands they wanted during the talks.

For the Basque case, the articles fixated on ETA and on terrorism rather than on a peace process. Articles that I found to be relevant included: “Basque Nationalism and the Spiral of Silence: An Analysis of Public Perceptions of ETA in Spain and France,” “The Strategic Communication Power of Terrorism: The Case of Eta,” “ETA and State Action: The

Development of Spanish Antiterrorism,” and “The ETA: Spain Fights Europe's Last Active Terrorist Group.”

Basque Case

It is important to begin by stating that the Basque case does not have a comparative peace process. There was no political debate for years about ending an armed struggle like there was in the Northern Irish case. Articles on the Northern Irish case are more concerned with a lasting peace process, while articles on the Basque case focus heavily on victims of ETA and on terrorism in general. ETA, which stands for ‘Basque Homeland and Liberty’, was a terrorist organization/separatist group located in the Basque Country of Spain. It was founded in 1959 as a means of fighting for autonomy from Spain and France, as the Basque Country is located in both countries. It stemmed from the Partido Nacional Vasco, or the Basque Nationalist Party, which operated in exile in Paris during Franco’s regime. Younger members of the party were angry that the party rejected an armed struggle, and formed ETA as a means of having an armed resistance to Franco. ETA was more brutal in Spain than in France. While most of the Basque Country is located in Spain, it also stems from the harsh repression that the Spanish Basques faced under Franco, who essentially made being Basque illegal. Under Franco’s regime, Basques were not allowed to speak their language at all, which is the essential component to their identity; language is what makes them unique to their Spanish neighbors.

ETA’s most notable killing was the 1973 bomb that killed Franco’s successor, Adm. Luis Carrero Blanco. There was still some support for ETA at this time, as many people who belonged to a minority group in Spain appreciated that at least some group was able to stand up to Franco’s regime. However, after Franco’s death, Spain transitioned back to democracy and

support for ETA grew less and less, as citizens throughout Spain saw their attacks as pointless now. One particular event that caused international outcry was ETA's most deadly single attack: the 1987 bombing of a market in Barcelona that killed twenty-one. There were some short-term ceasefires after talks with the government throughout the 1990s, but none of them held. ETA officially ended their armed resistance with a written statement in 2011. ETA officially dissolved in 2018, turning their arms in by announcing where some of its weapons storehouses were located.

GRAPO, or the First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Groups, is a terrorist group that was founded in 1975. It was against fascism, capitalism, and imperialism by Spain. The group killed police officers and conducted kidnappings of high-profile Spaniards in the late 70s. Its support waned in the 1980s, but it was compared in Spanish media outlets to ETA in the way that it sought to kill Spaniards and instill fear in the population, although it was not associated with ETA. The Guardia Civil, which is the Spanish police force, was a target of both groups and oftentimes the most susceptible to attacks.

The Basque Country itself is very concerned with victims of ETA, both at the civil society level and at the government level. Civil society groups, such as COVITE and The Villacisneros Foundation that give victims a voice are extremely important in the articles I analyzed. COVITE, or Colectivo de Víctimas del Terrorismo en País Vasco, is the primary group that my articles focus on. Its goal is to give victims of terrorist (mainly ETA) violence in the Basque Country a voice. The Villacisneros Foundation is less-specifically aimed at helping victims of terrorism in the Basque Country, but it is a nonprofit that seeks to better Spanish society through projects and dialogue, including projects aimed at "justice in relation to victims

of terrorism.” The government has also played a role in the Basque conflict, and this is most notable through the Via Nanclares initiative. The Via Nanclares is an initiative that seemingly benefits both sides of the conflict. The initiative is set up in a way that seeks to allow dialogue between ETA prisoners and victims/families of those killed, in exchange for ETA prisoners working towards better conditions in prison/eventual release if they complete the process. The prisoners have to distance themselves from ETA, willingly engage in dialogue with the families of those they have killed by asking for forgiveness, and agree to pay compensation for the damage they have caused.

The People’s Party of the Basque Country (PP), Podemos, EH Bildu, and the Partido Nacional Vasco (PNV) are all important political parties invested in the conflict in the Basque Country. Of these parties, EH Bildu is the only one that is still very pro-Basque independence.

III. Theoretical Background

Talk Regarding the Northern Irish Conflict

The articles I found in relation to the Northern Irish conflict centered on The Good Friday Agreement (hereafter, the Agreement) and how specific groups felt and/or feel about it today. For example, Burgess's article "Rebels' Perspectives of the Legacy of Past Violence and the Current Peace in Post-Agreement Northern-Ireland: An Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis" argues that while the Agreement was put in place to join the two separate "ethno-religious communities" so that they have a more shared society, and while 70% of Northern Ireland voted for it to be implemented, that as time progresses the divisions between the two groups on a societal level are still very blatant given that they still live very separately. This article calls into question, then, the success of the Agreement because while peace is currently maintained, there is more support on both sides for the more extremist political groups (Sinn Féin and the DUP). "Identity, Interest, and The Good Friday Agreement" explains that this Agreement was an effort to create a "plural sense of belonging" that allowed for both groups to coexist peacefully, but it also points out that 'wants' drive identity, and that these groups want different outcomes. The republicans/Catholics want a united Ireland, while the unionists/Protestants want to remain loyal to Britain. "The Church and Northern Ireland" highlights the importance of religion in this conflict, as it is written by priests and highlights both the role of Christians on both sides working for peace, but also notes the "political priests" who have "undisguised political affiliations." Therefore, my hypothesis for the Northern Irish case is: **due to the complexity and length of the peace process, most of the talk about the Northern**

Irish case will be about the Good Friday Agreement and the actual terrorist group (the IRA) and not the victims. “Suffering, Victims and Survivors in the Northern Ireland Conflict” explains perfectly why the focus is not on the victims: because the victims are tied together with politics. The author argues that in most conflicts, victims are able to exist in one collective group, (whether that be national, ethnic or religious) and that there is a sense of unity among victims due to their similarity. However, by this definition, there are two collective victim groups in Northern Ireland (the Protestants and the Catholics) so politically there is much back-and-forth for victim support/recognition.

Talk Regarding the Basque Conflict

The article, “From Invisibility to Power: Spanish Victims and the Manipulation of their Symbolic Capital” discusses the repression victims faced which resulted in the inability to openly discuss the pain and suffering they felt in the last 70 years of the country’s history, from the Civil War to franquismo to ETA. This article touches on the importance of guilt with regards to ETA, and how the group tried to emphasize that those that they killed were “undeserving of being in the Basque state” so that instead of “receiving the solidarity of their neighbors, they were treated with suspicion.” It then discusses how in recent years, there is much more opportunity for victims to grieve/relate to one another publicly, which is why there seems to be such a push for public acknowledgment of victims when that idea used to be relatively nonexistent. I believe this “push” has resulted in changing the dynamic of the conversation about the Basque case from a former hushed discussion about ETA to a much more open discussion of the importance of remembering victims of ETA terrorism. ETA was the main focus for so long because it was the most important tool for Basque separatism, but support for

the separatist movement has gradually declined over time. Now that ETA is dissolved, what is left of the conflict are the numerous victims.

One aspect of my research that stood out to me are the “social collectives” (as Vázquez referred to them in his article “After the Quarantine: A Closer Look at Monuments to Victims of ETA in the Basque Country and Navarre”) that are present throughout the Basque case but not so prevalent in the Northern Irish case. This article concentrated specifically on the monuments that have been erected throughout the Basque Country in remembrance of the victims of ETA violence, and oftentimes ‘social collectives’ such as Asociación para la Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica are the driving force behind the projects. These social collectives are an important tool for victims, as they allow the victims to come together and instead of being afraid to speak about their personal experiences, they have a space where they can relate and talk to others who have been through similar situations. I have found that organizations representing victims matter in that they produce dialogue seemingly without a political agenda that strictly supports recognition of victims and victims rights. Based on articles like these and my newspaper sources, I hypothesized that **due to the fact that the Basque Country has more social collectives representing victims, the dialogue around their conflict will focus more on victim reintegration into society instead of the end of the terrorist group ETA.**

IV. Methodology

I used newspaper articles as my primary sources in order to examine (on a relatively individual level) the talk about each case from members of the local population (local being defined as people who reside in either the Basque Country or Northern Ireland). Wikipedia has a page dedicated to “Online Newspaper Archives” that is broken down into countries. There, I was able to access free, online newspaper archives for my two cases: Spain and Ireland. I chose from the following newspapers from the Basque Country: *El Diario Vasco*, *El Correo*, *Naiz* from the years 2017-2019, which are the years prior to, of, and one year after the disarmament/dissolution of ETA. Due to the constraints that this project required, I relied on convenience sampling. I selected *El Diario Vasco* as my Basque primary source to perform my qualitative research. This newspaper has articles during the previous years of my timeframe that I could access and is in Spanish, whereas all of the other Basque newspaper sources have a conflict with my timeframe or are written in Basque. As a way to narrow down articles while also focusing on themes that interested me, I used keywords such as ‘Euskadi ta Askatasuna’, ‘violencia de ETA’, ‘víctimas de ETA’, and ‘fin de ETA’.

Just as I had choices for the Basque newspaper, I also had choices for the Northern Irish newspaper. I selected the *Belfast Telegraph* to perform my qualitative research for this case. Similarly to the Basque case, the deciding factor in choosing this newspaper was that the other sources did not have an archive that I could access for the years of my time period. The keywords for this search were the same as the Spanish; they just replaced “ETA” with “IRA.” The three-year time constraint for these sources was 1997-1999, which are the years before, during, and after the Good Friday Agreement, the IRA peace deal that is still in place today.

It is important to note the limitations of my research relating to using newspapers. First, the “society” that is created by newspapers is typically well-educated, interested in day-to-day activities in the government, or generally knowledgeable about a conflict. These writers and readers of these articles are predominantly scholars, professors, historians, writers, etc., who have a vested interest in the topic at hand. These limitations imply that the society is incomplete in that there may be groups of people who do not feel the same way or take the same position that is represented in the articles.

Additionally, each newspaper has a bias. *The Belfast Telegraph* is said to be favored by the Protestant population of Northern Ireland, while also being read by the Catholic nationalist population. It was founded in 1870, and according to Wikipedia it has a “centrist, unionist” bias, while Reddit users presumably from Northern Ireland believe that it is a paper with a “British Unionism” bias that “makes mountains out of molehills.”¹ *El Diario Vasco* is thought to have a very-anti ETA bias. Personally, I believe this source to be pro-Spanish unionism, anti-Basque separatism. However, based on the articles I read, I felt that the most blatant criticism was against ETA and her sympathizers (particularly those wanting to move prisoners closer to home. Unlike with *The Belfast Telegraph*, I was unable to find a Spanish source stating what the bias was believed to be for *El Diario Vasco*, but I did discover that the financial director of *El Diario Vasco* was killed in an ETA attack in Madrid in 2001. *The New York Times* called *El Diario Vasco* a “moderate nationalist newspaper strongly opposed to separatist violence.”² These biases could affect my findings by unfairly criticizing the “other side” (whoever that is depending on

1

https://www.reddit.com/r/northernireland/comments/9spqro/what_level_of_bias_would_you_say_the_belfast/

2

<https://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/24/world/papers-executive-shot-dead-attack-tied-to-basque-rebels.html>

the conflict) by, for example, not providing a complete picture of violence against Catholics by Protestant groups in the Northern Irish case. *El Diario Vasco* could be underrepresenting the amount of support there actually was for ETA/a separatist movement.

In the online archive, I was able to set the specific three-year time constraint so that when I chose my articles, I was confident they were only being sourced from those three years. I then searched the four specific keywords for each of the two cases inside that three-year period. That totaled to 60 articles for each source. In order to fairly choose the articles, I totaled up the number of articles for keyword search within the three-year time period. If there were under ten articles, I used them all. I did not repeat any articles. For example, for ‘fin de ETA’, there are 165 sources between January 1, 2017 and November 1, 2019. I ordered the sources by date from 2019 to 2017, and then I looked at the three other keywords to determine how many each had. I did this before selecting the articles because, for example, the keyword phrase ‘Euskadi ta Askatasuna’ only had 13 sources. So, while I aimed to have 20 sources for each of the three years, it did not always work. I did not repeat any articles, and when I had a sufficient collection of works, (such as the 165 for ‘fin de ETA’), I chose one article per month until I reached my quota of twenty per year. I then repeated the exact process for the Northern Irish source, the *Belfast Telegraph*. Again, the proportions were not always exactly even, but I went about it the same way to make it as ‘random’ as possible in order to be consistent.

After selecting the articles, I imported them into the software program Atlas.ti. I first tried to use TAMS Analyzer, but my computer is not compatible with the software. Atlas.ti offers a less expensive program for students so I found it more accessible. I read each article and coded them based on keywords I believed to be important to my research. In total, I used 23

keywords: apology, Basque State, Catholics, civil society, Collectivism, ETA, foreign players, individualism, IRA, nationalism/patriotism, negotiations, political actors, Protestants, proximity to conflict, remembrance, repression, responsibility, silence, talk, terrorism, victims, violence, and working together. This allowed me to determine, for example, with the code ‘talk’, who was doing the talking, what they were saying, how they were saying, what words they used to express themselves, et cetera.

After coding all 120 articles, I took these codes and made memos out of them. The memos allowed me to look at the individual quote(s) that I had coded from the articles and compare them to the other quote(s) from other articles with the same codes. Keeping ‘talk’ as the example, I pulled the 46 coded quotes from all articles and asked the question “What does this exemplify?” For those codes, I was able to determine five subsections: General Talk on ETA by the Public, Talk By ETA, IRA Talking About Their Actions, Political Actors Talking about the IRA, and General Talk about the IRA. I created a memo for all 23 codes, and divided each one into subsections based on the same question: “What does this exemplify?” After all codes were analyzed, I was able to see similarities between ideas/topics, and therefore was able to combine what was relevant and remove what was not. To make the process easier on myself while writing, I translated all of the Spanish quotes to English in order for everyone to be able to read. Therefore, some meanings “could have been lost in translation,” although if I was ever unsure about the true meaning I reached out to friends who speak Spanish as their first language, or used the help of an online translator.

V. Findings

The Peace Processes

The Basque disarmament was handled differently than the IRA one. ETA chose to “*give their arms to the people*”, rather than letting the Spanish government handle the process.

(05-02-2018). While this could be seen as a move to snub the Spanish government, it also keeps conflict resolution close to home. The Basque case also deals with the complex prisoner issue: relatives and friends want their prisoners close to home, where the conflict occurred, while the Spanish government wants them dispersed throughout the country in order to deflect any potential continuation of ETA. (04-10-2017). With regards to the Irish conflict, Rev. Ian Paisley said that “*the people of Northern Ireland need to be in possession of the talks...They must be from the people themselves.*” (11-29-1997). This goes to show that while Rev Paisley himself was invited to the talks, he believed the most important thing to consider was not how the governments felt about the conflict, but rather how normal citizens felt.

Working Together—The ‘Working Together’ code for the Basque Country dealt specifically with ETA- whether that be through them surrendering their arms to the state/citizens, or them trying to usher in a period of no conflict between themselves and the families of those that they had killed through open dialogue in the Via Nanclares. Working Together in the Northern Irish case was centered around the peace process and what different political groups/actors did or did not do in order to achieve lasting peace.

Working together in the Basque Country looks different from the Northern Irish case. The Basque conflict was much less political, so the focus I found in some of the articles related

mainly to the terrorist group itself, and its interactions with the Basque people. To begin, ETA turned over its weapons to the Basque people in the Basque Country because they trusted them to help with the peace process and they wanted to keep it within their own sphere. (04-10-2017). Later on in the process, the ‘etarras’, or ETA prisoners, worked willingly with police to “*bring around the end of ETA*” and help the victims know who committed crimes. (08-28-2017).

‘Working Together’ focuses mainly on the IRA case. This was obvious from the beginning, since their peace process was extremely political. Parties on all ends of the Northern Irish political spectrum participated in discussions about how to get the IRA to disarm and disband, as did political actors from the UK and even from the US (Bill Clinton). In addition to people and parties working together, there was also a significant amount of quotes that offered evidence to the opposite side: lack of working together.

The ‘lack of working together’ section focused mainly on heated politicians who represented their parties at ‘the tables’ (where leaders met to discuss the terms for IRA disbandment and disarmament). When politicians who opposed the IRA or even their political counterpart Sinn Fein being at ‘the tables’ to discuss the future, oftentimes politicians would just leave and refuse to help or compromise. For example, Rev. Ian Paisley, who was a political leader within the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), “*withdrew from the talks at Stormont.*” (11-29-1997). Paisley also did not get along well with another anti-IRA political party leader, David Trimble of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). On the other hand, the IRA hurt the process too, because it was a widely held belief that any IRA violence would “*derail progress in getting the peace process revived.*” It was the US that vocalized this concern after another IRA attack in the summer of 1997. (06-13-1997). Finally, mediators were vocal in saying that opposing ends

of the political spectrum needed to be able to compromise in order to move the process forward. Billy Hutchinson, “*The refusal of Ulster Unionists to share power with Sinn Fein in the absence of IRA decommissioning is threatening the future of the Agreement.*” (01-21-1999).

While there were many objections about working together, there were also plenty of willing participants (in the Irish case specifically). To begin, it is important to note that Sinn Fein was allowed at ‘the tables’ during talks, unless of course the IRA violence was out of hand, and then the party was not allowed to be present. The British and Irish governments continually worked together to find the best possible solution. In 1995, for example, the two governments “*produced a document that nationalists loved but unionists called ‘too green’.*” (04-10-1998). From there, the governments continued to work together throughout the following years, culminating in the 1999 “*The British and Irish governments today signed four treaties to help breathe life into the Good Friday Agreement...*” (03-08-1999).

Finally, and probably most importantly, there were two key players that worked tirelessly to reach an agreement for the Irish case. In 1998, “*First Minister David Trimble and SDLP leader John Hume*” were awarded Nobel Peace Prizes. (10-16-1998). They were both awarded the prize as a means to recognize the work done on both sides, with Mr. Trimble being a Protestant and Mr. Hume being a Catholic. While they had many critics, the international community felt that these two men were the two that led the country in trying to reach a peace agreement.

Negotiations-- The differences here are lack of negotiations versus plethora of negotiations.

ETA just ended- the IRA did not. The IRA made a peace agreement with the Irish government

and the Northern Irish government, which took years to create and several failed attempts until they finally were able to establish a plan that has resulted in years of lasting peace.

Basque negotiations were virtually non-existent. ETA did have some discussion with the French and Spanish governments, but that took place earlier than my timeline, such as 2012. 2012 was a pivotal year in that it was when ETA ended its armed conflict, but the group did not dissolve at this point. Even in 2012, the only discussion in the articles I used was that ETA wanted to discuss the “*release/treatment of its prisoners and the demilitarization of the Basque Country.*” (03-17-2017).

‘Negotiations’ can be linked to ‘Working Together’ in the sense that it focuses heavily on the Irish case, with very little discussion of any kind of negotiation for the Basque case.

In dealing with the Irish case, the majority of the talk revolves around the political parties and their representatives at the talks. Much of this was previously covered in the section ‘Working Together.’ The only different quotes in this section talk about how the IRA handled the negotiations, with one article talking about how “*the IRA abandoned the cessation that lasted 17 months because the British government and Unionists blocked any chance at real or inclusive negotiations.*” (07-19-1999). That statement came in January of 1996, which resulted in the new set of peace talks that ultimately produced the Good Friday Agreement two years later.

The rest of the articles focused on the ‘who’ in each political party, and how they felt about working with Sinn Fein and the IRA. Many Unionists were staunch opponents to allowing Sinn Fein any part of a coalition government in order to reach an agreement, but ultimately they relented slightly in order to have a comprehensive peace plan that saw the end of IRA violence. Another interesting article that was only included in this memo others talked about how it

“should be concerning to people that if the leaders of IRA/SF are in the government.”

Anti-Agreement UUP member Jeffrey Donaldson said this in regards to the fact that the IRA/SF had been using the fear of continued IRA violence to push their own agenda in the talks to get clauses put in the Agreement that they wanted. Donaldson claimed that *“there is always a threat of violence hanging over peoples heads if things don’t go their way.”* (05-08-1998).

Similarities

Nationalism-- Nationalism serves as a justification for the violence inflicted by both terrorist groups. One can argue that both of these conflicts stem from nationalism, due to the fact that both terrorist organizations are fighting for independence from what they deem to be a repressive government. In addition, the groups are also both historically tied to nationalist political parties.

The number of nationalism codes that relate to the Basque case compared to the Irish case emphasize the idea of collectivism and a proud shared history/culture. The foundation of ETA is built on Basque nationalism. *“Nationalist students founded ETA in 1959 in response to Franco’s harsh repression.”* (04-20-2018). A political scientist named David C. Rapoport is credited with doing much research on terrorism in Spain, paying particular attention to the Basque case. Rapoport broke terrorism into ‘waves’ and made the claim that the *“‘second wave’ of terrorism in Spain was nationalism/anticolonialism”* and that *“the only terrorist groups that survived the 80s were those with ‘etnonationalist ideas’, like the IRA and ETA.”* He claimed that the ETA members *“continued to kill in the name of the homeland.”* (01-06-2019).

There is some speech by individuals (particularly individuals who have had a family member killed by the terrorist violence) that are not just critical of ETA, but also of the

nationalist political parties in the Basque Country. However, these people usually choose to let groups speak on their behalf. On that same note, the PP has previously stated that “*In the Basque Country there are people that are not nationalists and have the right to express their own ideas.*” (01-19-2019). In a more collective sense, there was a film made called ‘Fe de etarras’, which “*humanizes ETA members but also pokes fun at nationalism from an ‘everyday perspective’*”. (12-07-2017).

There is still a major divide in the Basque Country between the very patriotic Basques and the people who are more moderate and consider themselves Spaniards. When interviewed about his book on the Basque conflict, Ludger Mees commented that there “*is not an agreement between nationalists and non-nationalists on how Euskadi should be governed in the future.*” He went on to say that “*the nationalists will never give up the right to decide*” and that “*the PNV has never renounced the idea of independence or sovereignty.*” (08-12-2019).

There was much less talk of Irish nationalism, but that could be contributed to the bias of the newspaper. The main speech in support of nationalism came from the IRA itself, when they stated in 1994 that they were “*committed to ending British rule in Ireland. It is the root cause of divisions and conflict in our country.*” (07-19-1999). Another article quoted Sinn Fein officials saying that they “*are committed to a united Ireland*” and that its mission was “*to bring an end to Northern Ireland.*” (07-08-1999).

One town, Carrickmore, was known for being an area “*proud of its republican heritage and deeply resentful of the security forces and British influence.*” (04-05-1999). A political actor critical of the IRA and Irish nationalism, Rev. Paisley, was angry that David Trimble “*sat down with the IRA and justified their actions.*” (11-29-1997). Lastly, just before the implementation of

the Good Friday Agreement, an article was published stating that “*the future depends on the centre ground of unionism and nationalism finding ways of living together.*” (02-17-1998).

Apology-- For both cases, there was little effort to apologize by the terrorist groups to the victims during my timeframe. Both groups issued blanket statements saying something along the lines of they regretted the damage caused to those not involved in the conflict. The Via Nanclares offered a slightly different aspect to the Basque case- some individual prisoners wanted to move home, and this allowed them to be transferred to prisons closer to home. One of the steps of the Via Nanclares stipulated that prisoners must be willing to talk with the family members of the victims they killed, which usually resulted in individual apologies and expressions of regret.

With regards to the Basque case, victims never received the apology that many of them thought and/or think they deserve. As a collective group, the closest that ETA came to apologizing was when the head of their military branch said that “*the group regrets the damage caused to victims of attacks that ‘had nothing to do with the conflict.’*” (03-17-2017). While this seems to acknowledge the ‘random’ victims of ETA terrorism, it does not address the hundreds of purposeful deaths that ETA carried out. That apology came in 2013 right after ETA had officially announced the end to its armed struggle. Later, after the group officially disbanded in 2018, they basically made the same statement, saying they “*regretted the damage caused to those who were not involved*” and they “*asked for forgiveness.*” (04-20-2018).

Some individual members of ETA were willing to engage more. A project called the ‘Via Nanclares’ allows for ETA prisoners to reduce their prison sentences and/or be sent closer to home, since many of them have been dispersed throughout the Spanish and French prison

systems. In the ‘Via Nanclares’ prisoners have to do several things, including publicly denounce ETA and the use of violence, as well as ask forgiveness from the families of those they are responsible for killing or injuring. In one instance, an ETA prisoner named Urrosolo Sistiaga participated in the Via Nanclares and willingly spoke to the family of victims. He said the best part about the Via Nanclares was that “*we were able to decide for ourselves*” and that they had to “*close wounds, assuming the brutal, the unjust and unacceptable of having generated (bad things).*” (10-16-2018). Those that chose not to participate are still criticized by victim’s families who have not received an apology, with one sister of a girl killed by ETA saying that she “*wished she could ask the ETA member responsible for killing her sister to apologize to the family.*” (09-08-2019).

Interestingly enough, the only acknowledgment of an IRA apology³ was when a group of Real IRA members “*admitted responsibility and ‘expressed regret’ for loss of life and injuries.*” (08-31-1998). This came after the Omagh bombing, which took the lives of 28 people and injured over 200. It also was a point of contention within the IRA, with some parts of the terrorist group condemning the attack due to the fact that it “*damaged the republican struggle for Irish independence.*” (08-31-1998).

Differences

Terrorism-- A major difference between the two cases that is showcased by the ‘Terrorism’ code is the willingness to use the words terrorism/terrorist. For example, the Basque case has COVITE, which is a group seemingly dedicated to calling ETA terrorists and criticizing the government for not doing enough to punish the members of ETA or recognizing the victims of

³ In 2002, the IRA issued an apology to victims. However, this was outside of the timeframe that I researched.

ETA. There is not a comparative group like this for the IRA, and most of the terrorism talk on the Northern Irish case comes from political actors. I believe this is due to the fact that the IRA was so closely tied to Sinn Fein, so there were many settings where Sinn Fein/IRA personnel were seated across from their political opposition during peace talks. It is also notable that for the Northern Irish case, there was more specific talk about the kinds of violence used to perform terrorist acts: bombings, murders, etc. The ETA case usually steers the conversation away from the violence but more toward the victim, or highlighting that a person (mother, father, brother, etc) is dead at the hands of ETA, rather than saying “ETA bombed ---.”

‘Terrorism’ served as the basis for my research. I was curious to see who was discussing terrorism in each case to determine whether or not there were differences, as well as what they were saying. Many of these codes for both cases deal with one of the following subsections: how specific political parties view terrorism, what the government does to combat terrorism, and/or how victims feel affected by terrorism. Since terrorism was the underlying theme throughout this project, many other codes overlapped with this section; therefore, this section concerns the outliers that I was unable to place in other categories.

The Basque case begins with the mention of when the government “*launched a comprehensive program for terrorist prisoners in April 2012.*” (03-17-2017). The article does not say what the comprehensive program is, but based on other readings I know that this refers to the ‘Via Nanclares.’ Interestingly, this article gives credit to the government, while other articles credit ETA prisoners for starting Nanclares as a way to get themselves moved into prisons closer to home. The next article discusses the 2016 case where the Supreme Court overturned the sentence imposed by the National Hearing of a year in prison for the “*outreach of terrorism*” to a

young man who posted Facebook messages justifying the activity of ETA and calling for the return of the Anti-Fascist Resistance Group First of October (GRAPO). The Second Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court (of Spain) ruled that it had not been sufficiently proven that his will was to incite terrorist acts:

“The National Hearing in October 2016 judged this young man accused of praising and justifying the activity of terrorist organizations such as ETA or GRAPO for posting ‘multiple’ comments from his Facebook profile, such as badges from terrorist organizations.”

(05-26-2017).

The third article focuses on one of the main categories: how specific political parties view terrorism. This shows dissent within the Basque political parties when the PP critiques the “other parties” of the Basque country for basically refusing to say that ETA victims are victims of terrorism. The Secretary General of the Basque PP, Amaya Fernández, boldly stated that the other parties have taken a position that *“with submission, collaboration or putting themselves on the side, are contributing to the disarmament being a success of the terrorist band ETA.”* This was said at an event hosted by the PP which sought to *“empower Basque civil society in front of the terrorist group ETA’ under the slogan ‘the value of freedom. For all those who lay their voices to defend democracy.’”* (04-05-2017).

COVITE, Colectivo de Víctimas del Terrorismo en el País Vasco, also chimed in to criticize some of the Basque political actors, like the Secretary-General for Peace and Cohabitation of the Basque Government, Jonan Fernandez, saying that some of the legislation passed while he was in office was interpreted *“in favor of terrorists by seriously violating the rights of victims.”* COVITE’s main complaint was that of the *“more than 800 murders*

committed by ETA, more than 300 remain unsolved.” The group believes that if the legislation was interpreted differently, the police would have more answers to the murders due to how “*active collaboration with authorities*” is defined in the law. (08-28-2017).

The next article is an interview with three different young individuals in the Basque Country. One of them recognized that due to his young-adult age, he was unable to completely understand the decades of terror at the hands of ETA, but stated that “*young people are aware that it is ‘now up to us to pick up the legacy of those who raised their voices against terrorism.’*” (04-10-2017). Another article comes from a Basque citizen who was angry about the sale of ETA merchandise on a Japanese website. The woman wrote, “*It’s a disgrace. Do you know the meaning of terrorism? Would you like it if a website sold merchandise from the killer Aum Shinrikyo sect? In the legal field, in Japan this practice is not subject to prosecution.*” (08-11-2018). Finally, the last article deals with the complex issue of prisoners being placed far from home. The article states that “*the 16 people who have died traveling to see family members/friends who were ETA members are part of the ‘active suffering’ that ‘remains behind the end of terrorism.’*” (08-23-2019).

The IRA references of terrorism are far fewer. This also is a notable difference, as the Basque seem more willing to call ETA a terrorist group than the Northern Irish with the IRA. Additionally, the IRA case articles involving terrorism seem almost more closely tied to violence, in the way that they discuss some of the methods used to inflict pain on society.

One of the articles that discusses IRA terrorism comes directly from the IRA. The article talks about how one division of the IRA said that “*the booby trap bomb they made was meant for security personnel*”, but loyalist forces replied saying “*they could not rule out the possibility that*

it was intended to kill civilians." (08-08-1997). The next article is from an interview with Unionist Billy Hutchinson, who was issuing a warning about being wary of IRA motives. He stated that the *"last time the IRA declared a ceasefire they were killing loyalists just beforehand."* (07-19-1997).

The rest of the articles all involve Sinn Fein. One was between political correspondent Martina Purdy and Rev. Ian Paisley. Purdy asked Paisley, *"If you want to leave Sein Fein outside the door, what do you propose to do about the problem of IRA violence? You can't negotiate terrorism away."* Paisley, a Unionist, then replied, *"this idea of giving concession and concession and concession to terrorist organizations doesn't do away with terrorism. It increases terrorism. It feeds it."* (11-29-1997). Obviously, he did not agree with allowing Sinn Fein to negotiate a treaty with the rest of the political parties, but Purdy made a fair point in noting that in order to end terrorism, the terrorists needed to be involved. Paisley's point was driven home by a concerned mother who wrote an article discouraging allowing Sinn Fein to have the Education and Culture cabinet position. She stated that *"Sinn Fein, no matter how you look at it, is a party linked with the Irish Republican Army and therefore has supported the many forms of terrorism unleashed on our community for 30 years."* (02-20-1999). Finally, the last article comes from the leader of Sinn Fein, Gerry Adams. He stated that *"he regarded loyalists as terrorists but not the IRA."* (10-15-1997).

Violence-- A recurring theme in my findings is reactions to ETA violence. Very little detail was mentioned about the specific types of violence, such as what the terrorists used to kill. The emphasis is on the fact that they did kill. Articles also refer to the people who fought against

ETA violence, such as the State Security Forces. There is talk about overcoming ETA violence through measures such as the Via Nanclares, where ETA prisoners basically repent to the families of the victims that they killed. The IRA case is different- many of the articles I read had to do with/at least mentioned the Omagh Bombing, which was a very deadly attack by a section of the IRA during peace negotiations (which caused a lot of division within the group).

Additionally, Bloody Sunday and Bloody Friday are both mentioned as massacre days. Articles on IRA violence focus more on big events where the IRA killed or injured mass numbers. There are also plenty of articles that talk about individuals being killed. Both sets of articles talk about the total number of people killed during the whole conflict by the respective terrorist groups.

A recurring theme in this section is reactions to ETA violence. One example of this is from 2011 when the *“Basque separatist parties showed its ‘regret’ to the victims caused by both the violence of ETA and the repressive and dirty war strategies of the Spanish and French states.”* (03-17-2017). Another source says that *“the terrorists exhibited all their cruelty and all of Spain shouted enough is enough.”* This same article goes on to praise the State Security Forces for their work, saying that the *“courageous and selfless work of the State Security Forces during the endless years of fighting terrorism...They suffered, and were victims, because the terrorists pointed them as a priority target, and they were responsible from the law and respect for the rule of law.”* (07-12-2017).

Next, an article that interviews young Basque citizens quotes one saying that when he thinks of ETA, *“two things come to mind: armed struggle and fight for independence political ideals.”* (04-10-2017). This ‘fight’ had been ongoing since 1959, although ETA *“killed its first person in 1968, and the IRA in 1969.”*(01-06-2019). However, a different article states that a

“1959 report noted that the perpetrator in Santander was the first attack by ETA, which was an unknown acronym.” (09-17-2018). An article that claims to list all the highlights of ETA’s history said that *“850 people were killed by ETA in their 59 year period.”* (04-29-2018). Of those 850, the *“City Council of San Sebastian reports that 107 people were killed in San Sebastian by ETA.”* (10-29-2019). Another location that suffered many attacks was the headquarters of the Errenteria PSE. It was attacked 27 times by ETA.

“They and their environment had to endure the violence of ETA and that of persecution that was used as a strategy of intimidation and threat. However, they were able to overcome adverse circumstances and because in a context of extreme violence they continued to defend plurality and freedom.” (05-05-2019).

In talks during the Via Nanclares, a former ETA member had this to say about the violence: it is *“as unjustifiable to kill as to be killed.”* (10-16-2018). There is also some talk of the Via Nanclares and the movement of ETA prisoners. For example, there was a talk between an ETA member and a widow whose husband was killed in 2000 by ETA. (10-16-2018). With regards to ETA prisoners, *“in 2018 France began moving the ‘blood free’ ETA members (etarras) to the prisons closest to the border.”* (08-23-2019). Very little detail was mentioned about the specific types of violence, such as what the terrorists used to kill. The emphasis is on the fact that they did kill.

COVITE says that *“the Basque government is concerned about the terrorists”* (to the extent that they seem to be the focus more than the victims), and that they need to *“delegitimize terrorism because that is key to building a decent society and preventing the use of violence.”*

(08-28-2017). Another foundation called La Fundación Joxe Mari Korta will continue to work to make ETA recognize "*that they were unjust murderers.*" (07-28-2017).

The IRA case seems to focus more on the peace process than anything, including the violent tactics they used, except for the case of the Omagh bombing. That is the focus of their 'violent acts', and it also caused much division within the terrorist group. This particular bombing killed 28 and injured roughly 220, and the "*Real IRA called a 'suspension of military action' after public outcry.*" (08-31-1998). This, as well as other 'returns to violence' "*shattered the so-called pan-nationalist front.*" (04-10-1997). One article states that there were two motives for the IRA return to violence, "*targeting the security forces in general to take advantage of nationalist disillusionment with Stormont talks and to provoke the loyalist paramilitaries into retaliation.*" (02-13-1997). "*IRA violence also escalated immediately after the breakdown of the ceasefire culminating in Bloody Sunday.*" (07-30-1997).

Another focus on IRA violence was prior to the time period I focused on but nevertheless mentioned in the articles. A book was written by a Catholic priest from one of the hardest hit parishes. The book is called "*Facts and Figures of the Belfast Pogrom*" and it is "*a detailed history of the violence that tore up the city between 1920 and 1922.*" It was commissioned by IRA leader Michael Collins as a work of propaganda, and 450 people died during that timespan. "*While it may play down the IRA violence, it contains a chilling list of all those kills and reminds us of the old sectarian map of Belfast.*" A spokesperson for the publishers of the book said that "*the violence was so random and so frequent in some areas that tram passengers would lie on their bellies in certain areas.*" (12-16-1997). In summary, "*During the past 30 years, more than*

3,000 people have been killed in our province, with many thousands injured or maimed, the majority being victims of the IRA.” (04-24-1998).

‘Other Irish violence’ focuses on loyalists responding to the nationalist violence. DUP Party Member Hutchinson said that a *“deal that resembled the Anglo-Irish Agreement would be met with more violent loyalist backlash at the Republic of Ireland.”* (01-21-1999). Then, the IRA spoke about how *“for 30 years we have endured this assault”* while referencing the rule of the British government. (07-08-1999).

Lastly, there was relatively little mention of response to violence in NI. *“Belfast City Council turned down a 25th anniversary Remembrance service for the victims of the IRA’s Bloody Sunday bombings”*, instead opting to remember all victims of violence at a later date. (07-02-1997). Prince Charles met with survivors of the Omagh bombing after it happened, saying that it revoked feelings of revulsion for him. (05-05-1999). Lastly, *“the Bridge Centre in Enniskillen is set up to remember all victims of the IRA.”* (01-07-1999).

Victims-- While the IRA victims are discussed on a much more individual level, the ETA **victims** are discussed usually as a group by a group. Sometimes that group is representative of the victims, such as COVITE, and other times they are talked about by a political party or the government as a whole. Many times when they are referenced by political actors or the government, it seems that they are passive for political gain, such as trying to get anyone affected by ETA to vote for the party that appears to feel the ‘most sorry’ for the victims. Again, COVITE is the main speaker, and then there is another group called The Villacisneros Foundation, and then there is the Memorial Center for the Victims of Terrorism. The latter is not

a group, but more of a place where people can come to remember their loved ones in a space that seeks to remember the victims of terrorism (some of that is considered to be state sponsored, as well). The only real individual level talk about victims in the Basque Country was done in the form of a series of interviews by journalist Arantza Gonzalez Egana, but even then these interviewees were anonymous and mainly spoke in a group setting with other families of other victims. The IRA victim codes were predominantly individual articles about people killed, whether they were Constables or teenagers.

One of the groups that works on behalf of victims is The Villacisneros Foundation, which *“called for the reopening of 4 unsolved cases- the President of the Foundation Inigo Gomez-Pineda, explained that the decision was a ‘hope for the victims’ relatives, when almost 40% of ETA’s murders have gone unpunished.”* In 2015, there were still *“377 ETA crimes where the ‘author’ had not been found.”* (01-12-2017). Another article details the foundation and goals of COVITE, saying that *“the remembrance group COVITE was established in 1998 to defend the rights of those affected by terrorism.”* (11-18-2018). While the Memorial Center for the Victims of Terrorism is not necessarily considered to be a group that works on behalf of victims, the historian had much to say on behalf of the victims:

“The victims of terrorism, organized in association or for free, have not only broken the chain of evil by not responding to their aggressors with their own weapons, and not only make a major pedagogical and democratic contribution by protecting the rights of all, also those of the executioners, for those who have never asked, for example, the death penalty. Besides, they’re much more than victims. People are much more than victims

and you have to see them for what they are: women and men, mothers and brothers, fans of travel, sport or literature, police, shopkeepers,..." (07-29-2019).

Another category of victims that were recognized in the articles were the State Security Forces. President Rajoy called them victims due to the fact that they were "*a priority target, and they were responsible from the law and respect for the rule of law.*" Rajoy went on to say, "*The Spaniards will never let victims and murderers be equated.*" (07-12-2017).

There is one article that delves into torture and its relationship with victims. Investigator and writer Edurne Portela "*torture is a crime that is difficult to prove*" and that "*the victim, in most situations, is afraid to report immediately, as to do so he must rely on the same system of which his torturers are part.*" This comes after a study conducted by the government that was found to be inclusive due to the fact that many victims do not want to vocalize what they went through, whether at the hands of ETA or the government. (01-01-2018).

Finally, there was a series of interviews done by Arantza Gonzalez Egana, who received the Oroimen Hegoak by the Basque Socialist Youth of the Basque Country for this series and reports conducted over the past two decades on the victims of terrorism. One man listed "*events in his life marked by ETA violence, such as his first day of work when ETA killed someone, the day after his daughter was born,...*" Gonzalez Egana says that the public is able to remember thanks to victims sharing their stories that are "*often painful but full of truth. Many ETA victims tell us that murder and subsequent social contempt were all one. That what they have suffered they would not even wish for the worst of their enemies.*" (02-25-2019).

As with 'Terrorism' and 'Violence', 'victims' is more relevant to the Basque case than the Northern Irish one. While this memo started out as one of the largest, almost all of the codes

were covered in a different section. Those that remain for the Northern Irish case that have not been previously mentioned are mainly individual names who are being spoken about their families. For example, one article talks about two Constables who were killed in an IRA double murder. *“Constable John Graham was a 34 year old father of 3 when he was murdered”* and then *“hundreds also attended the Lisburn funeral of Constable David Johnston (30), the other victim of Monday’s IRA double-killing.”* (06-19-1997). Another article states that *“two Creggan teenagers were shot dead that night.”* (07-30-1997). This article was remembering the 25th anniversary of Operation Motorman and the victims that were killed in that time in Northern Ireland. Another article was written by a mother who lost her husband and referred to her son as a *“victim of the Real IRA.”* She then said, *“Surely all victims murdered between 1969 and 1999 are the real and innocent victims of the Troubles?”* (07-24-1999). Another article looks at the victims of the Omagh bombing, detailing how their funerals started taking place in August of 1998. The article then goes on to say that *“at times over the past 30 years the media has been accused of not paying enough attention to the victims of violence”* but that the *“spotlight”* on Omagh has definitely focused on the plight of the victims and their families. (08-18-1998). The only political actor not previously discussed was UUP MP William Thompson, who said that *“any unionist sitting at the negotiating table with Sein Fein would be betraying the memory of those who died at the hands of IRA violence.”* (08-30-1997). Finally, a journalist summarizing the totality of damage done by IRA violence said, *“During the past 30 years, more than 3,000 people have been killed in our province, with many thousands injured or maimed, the majority being victims of the IRA.”* (04-24-1998).

Talk-- Basque talk centers around COVITE, and COVITE focuses on the victims. Therefore, much of the narrative coming out of the Basque newspaper articles focuses on what is happening inside the Basque country to remember the victims of ETA, or how the government is failing to respectfully honor the dignity of the victims. This ‘talk’ manifests itself in different forms. There are art exhibits, movies, and books that recognize the victims, and several articles highlight either the authors or artists, or what places are honoring these victims. There is some talk by political actors, whether that be from leftist groups who were more separatists or the PP from the Basque country. The Northern Irish case differs in who is the main section of society talking. While the Irish government plays a key vocal role about the need for the terrorist group to disband, there is less speech by the public involving the attacks, the IRA, or the years spent in fear that something bad could happen. Additionally, much of the talk that related to the IRA was about the involvement of Sinn Fein, the political party that acted as the IRA’s voice in politics. Gerry Adams was the center of a lot of talk, and many times he was the one actually talking. There are also instances of mothers writing articles about their children, and one mother wrote that she did not want Sinn Fein to have government cabinets dealing with education.

Basque talk centers around the group called COVITE that represents victims of violence in the Basque country. COVITE sees itself as not

“just one voice because there are so many people with different experiences of being a victim of ETA, but someone that does speak up for victims.” The organization went on to say “We cannot let others talk for us. We need a voice from the Basque country.”

(11-18-2018).

COVITE has heavily criticized the government of the Basque country, saying that “*The Basque government re-tramples on the dignity of the victims, which it believes it can content with empty tributes, and prioritizes the supposed rights of terrorists who are proud of their criminal curriculum.*” (11-18-2018). This quote demonstrates the ongoing disagreement between the victims (and their support organizations) and the Basque government. Clearly, some of the talk being generated in the country involves the relative ‘silence’ from the Basque government regarding the terrorism that left many victims. Finally, an important understanding of terrorism in the Basque country can be summed up by this COVITE quote: “*now terrorism is not understood without the voice of victims.*” (11-18-2018).

Additionally, there seems to be more ‘talk’ in the form of artistic expression regarding the Basque case than the Irish. For example, a man wrote a fictional book series about ETA and violence in the Basque country. While yes, it is a fictional story, it is centered around ETA and the violence and pain that they inflicted upon Basque citizens for years. The plot of one of the books revolves around a “*new Euskadi without ETA violence where it's ‘easier to introduce violence of another kind’.*” (02-09-2017). Additionally, there is a film called “Fin de ETA” that actually won a prize at a film festival in Marsella. (11-21-2017). Furthermore, there have been art exhibits set up to honor the victims of ETA violence. The exhibit was called “*Luces en la memoria. Arte y conversaciones frente a la barbarie de ETA*” and the goal of the exhibit is to “*honor victims of ETA set up in a museum...with interviews and written works about the conflict.*” (02-05-2018).

Political actors in the Basque country who have spoken about ETA and the conflict were much fewer in number. The PP (or the People’s Party in the Basque Country) which is a

traditionally conservative party that promotes Spanish nationalism, criticized ETA, with the secretary general saying “*that the manifesto announcing the dissolution of ETA didn’t use words to describe them properly. ‘It is a terrorist group.’*” They also hosted an event that “*‘seeks to empower Basque civil society in front of the terrorist group ETA’ under the slogan ‘The value of freedom. For all those who lay their voices to defend democracy.’*” (04-05-2017). In contradiction with the PP, EH Bildu, a leftist, Basque-nationalist political party, stated that it “*will not put more blame on ETA violence than any other violence because ‘we have to have the ability to live with the different stories, not just those that are imposed on others.’*” (03-12-2018).

The Irish and the Basque seem willing to talk about their respective terrorist organizations in different ways. While the Irish government plays a key vocal role about the need for the terrorist group to disband, there is less speech by the public involving the attacks, the IRA, or the years spent in fear that something bad could happen. Additionally, much of the talk that related to the IRA was about the involvement of Sinn Fein, the political party that acted as the IRA’s voice in politics.

A particularly pertinent figure was Gerry Adams, the leader of Sinn Fein during the height of the tensions between the IRA and the government. Gerry Adams was criticized by other political party leaders, the public, and church leaders. The main event that resulted in talk about Gerry Adams was that he “*did not condemn the IRA killing of a British soldier when all other political leaders ‘on the island’ did.*” (02-13-1997). After that, he said that what happened was “*tragic*” and that there needed to be a “*re-doubling of effort on the peace process,*” but he never condemned the act or the people who committed it. (02-13-1997). Loyalists criticized Adams and his party’s every move. The Taoiseach Party “*warned that a vote for Sein Fein was*

a vote for the IRA.” (04-10-1997). Rev Ian Paisley, who was both a Protestant religious leader in Northern Ireland and a loyalist political leader, “*believes that anyone who refuses to give up their arms and is capable of terrorist attacks should not be invited to the Stormont talks*” (referring to the IRA and their unwillingness at the beginning of the peace talks to turn over their weapons). (11-29-1997). On the other side of the political spectrum, the SDLP, or Social Democratic and Labour Party (an Irish nationalist political party), said that “*no one should give any ‘credibility or political sustenance’ to Republicans until there is an ‘unequivocal cessation of violence’*” meaning that the Republicans should be held to the same standards- they needed to stop retaliating to IRA attacks with their own violence. (02-13-1997).

Other forms of ‘talk’ in Northern Ireland come in the form of two different mothers who wrote newspaper articles about losing their sons to IRA violence, one of which focused on how she was “*hopeful to find his body*” (06-24-1999) and the other about how he was “*killed by a Real IRA bomb*” (07-24-1999). The last example of talk that is slightly different is one that comes from a mother who works as a teacher. She wrote an article opposing the proposition that Sinn Fein would have an Education and Culture cabinet position. The woman did not support this due to Sein Fein being linked to the IRA. (02-20-1999).

Silence-- Silence from victims came in different forms. In both cases, there have been rallies or marches that honor victims. Articles from both sides cite that many victims did not attend, either out of fear or a reluctance to participate (which hints at the fact that there are very bad memories attached to these events for some victims.) Another aspect of silence from victims in the case of ETA results from the support that ETA prisoners still receive, both from some government actors

and some members of society. This ‘support’ mainly pertains to the prisoners of ETA that were sent to prisons far from the Basque country when they were captured. In many cases, the families and friends of these prisoners have been extremely vocal about wanting their relatives moved to prisons closer to home, and the government has relented in some cases, but at the very least there is dialogue about it. Both the IRA and ETA had relatively little to say, especially with regards to apologies. While both groups in some form acknowledged the violence that occurred as a result of their actions, neither issued a direct apology during the time frame examined.

Many victims felt slighted due to the fact that ETA remained silent when it disbanded and issued no significant apology. One quote addresses the “*collective amnesia with regards to those killed, kidnapped, or suffering*” in the Basque society at the hands of ETA. (04-05-2017). While ETA acknowledged that violence had been caused by their hands, the only semblance of an apology was that “*they were sorry to the victims that had nothing to do with the conflict.*” Some individual members of the group chose to participate in the Via Nanclares, which was a way for ETA prisoners to speak to members of a victim’s family- usually the ones that the specific prisoner was guilty of killing. As a whole, though, the group never demonstrated regret; “*The gang does not plan to make any rectification or supplement to the statement of recognition of the damage caused...*”. (04-29-2018). A history professor who focuses on Basque nationalism noted that “*the leftist groups in Pais Vasco have a collective mentality that ignores the wrongdoings of the group (ETA) that it supported. They do not acknowledge the killings.*” (08-12-2019).

Silence from victims came in different forms. For both groups, there have been rallies or marches that honor victims. Articles from both sides cite that many victims did not attend, either

out of fear or a reluctance to participate (which hints at the fact that there are very bad memories attached to these events for some victims.) One article regarding ETA states that “*Only a handful of people gathered in a square to condemn ETA’s acts— people did not avoid these because they supported ETA, but rather because they were too scared to show up.*”

(04-10-2017). The same is true in Northern Ireland: “*many victims of all terrorist violence in Northern Ireland stayed away from the Long March.*” (07-24-1999).

In an article titled, “And the drop (of blood) filled the glass,” which reflects on a victim of ETA violence 22 years prior, the author, an anthropology professor, says that “*The victims (of ETA violence) will be absent from public spaces.*” (07-13-2019) This goes to show that even 22 years after the killing, victims are still scared into silence. They do not want to participate directly, which is why COVITE seems to be so important in the Basque case.

Another aspect of silence from victims in the case of ETA results from the support that ETA prisoners still receive, both from some government actors and some members of society. This ‘support’ mainly pertains to the prisoners of ETA that were sent to prisons far from the Basque country when they were captured. In many cases, the families and friends of these prisoners have been extremely vocal about wanting their relatives moved to prisons closer to home, and the government has relented in some cases, but at the very least there is dialogue about it. For example, “*in August of 2019 there was a march in Bilbao about returning ETA prisoners to the Basque country. About 1,000 marched, and there was no mention of ETA victims during the entire thing.*” (08-23-2019). Additionally, historian Juan Avilés studied the works of political scientist David C. Rapoport regarding the waves of terrorism, and applied it to the Basque case. He said, “*Tributes hurt ETA’s victims. They also perpetuate the hate speech*

from which the terrorist group came and nurtured. It is a breeding ground in which violence can regenerate. That must cease now. It's time to bury the third wave of terrorism without honor."

(01-06-2019).

‘Silence’ within the two countries works differently. However, they are similar in that there was silence from both terrorist groups when it came time to apologize. Both the IRA and ETA had relatively little to say, especially with regards to apologies. While both groups in some form acknowledged the violence that occurred as a result of their actions, neither issued a direct apology during this time frame.⁴ The IRA stayed silent about the “*revelation of 9 graves until an amnesty comes into force from both sides of the border.*” (04-08-1999). Until Sinn Fein was allowed to come to talks during the peace process, the IRA stayed silent about many killings. Even then, Sinn Fein and Gerry Adams did most of the talking on the group’s behalf, and the political party during the peace process never “*publicly disavowed the terrorist group.*”

(09-18-1997).

Remembrance-- The local governments and COVITE are the ones most important in remembering victims of Basque violence, but the Spanish federal government and individual families are also talked about in the articles. For the IRA case, there is only one example of a collective style of remembrance, and this comes in the form of the Enniskillen Bridge Centre.

Like ‘Apology’, the ‘Remembrance’ code has a much higher number of quotes from the Basque case compared to the Northern Ireland case. The Spanish federal government, Basque local governments, and families of victims all work to remember their lost ones. The most

⁴ In 2002, the IRA issued an apology to victims. However, this is outside of the timeframe that I researched.

significant of these groups is the local governments subsection. In Vitoria, which serves as the Basque government capital, there is a memorial set up to honor the memory of ETA victims, called ‘Centro de la Memoria de las Víctimas.’ (02-21-2017). Additionally, the People’s Party of the Basque Country, which is commonly called the PP, said that it “*always will defend the memory and dignity of the victims of terrorism.*” (09-14-1997). In yet another example, the City Council of San Sebastian “*has restored the five plaques that honor ETA victims*” all three times they have been defaced. (10-29-2019).

Remembrance by families is vocalized mainly by COVITE, although there are some instances of family members speaking out about their loved ones by themselves. In a more specific example, ETA victim Gregorio Ordóñez was remembered by his family and friends 24 years after he was killed when everyone “*went to his grave*” in January of 2019. (01-19-2019). One article says that when victim’s families “*organize tributes to keep the memory of their loved ones alive*” that it annoys former ETA members. (07-29-2019). Another says that “*some family members choose not to remember their loved ones as a victim of ‘horrible’ violence but rather how they were as a living person.*” (09-08-2019).

The Spanish government also seeks to remember victims of ETA violence. All of the talk about remembering victims of ETA that comes from the federal government comes from President Rajoy. President Rajoy was satisfied with the “*“very voluminous’ delivery of documents, objects, recordings, etc that allow Spain to be able to continue the work of remembering ETA victims.*” This delivery was sent to the memorial in Vitoria, but the Spanish government takes credit for helping. (02-21-2017). On the twentieth anniversary of the death of

a specific ETA victim, Miguel Ángel, who sparked public outrage about ETA violence when he was killed, President Rajoy wrote an article. In it, he said,

“We must pay tribute to all the victims; we should be grateful for the work of judges, policemen, civil guards, journalists who knew not to shut up and politicians of different ideologies who have collaborated in the victory of democracy. To do so is justice.”

(07-12-2017).

For the IRA case, there is just one example of a collective remembrance, and it comes in the form of a Bridge Center in Enniskillen, Ireland. *“The Bridge Centre will be a living memorial to the victims of the IRA bombing, in which 11 people were killed and 63 were injured”* who *“died in the town’s darkest day.”* (01-07-1999).

There was some individual expression of mourning by IRA victim’s families. The most public comes from Prince Charles, who spoke about how *“the Omagh bombing revoked feelings of revulsion since the IRA had claimed the killing of his great uncle Lord Mountbatten in 1979.”* The following two came from close family members: one said that she was hopeful that *“they would find her son’s body in the bog”* (06-24-1999) while the other was unhappy that the IRA would not reveal where the graves were (referring to the nine graves that the IRA kept secret) *“until their members are safeguarded.”* (04-08-1999).

The Role of Different Actors

Civil Society- Groups established in the Basque society are the most commonly mentioned groups who work to remember the victims of ETA. There is a significant overlap between this code and the ‘Victims’ code. The ‘Civil Society’ code also includes “ The code also relates to how these groups have worked to take legal actions to ensure that the government also does its

part in remembering victims and punishing those responsible. The Northern Irish case has only one tag relevant to ‘Civil Society’, and it refers to a group working on behalf of civilian victims as well: Families Against Intimidation and Terror. Most of the civil society work done in the Northern Irish case was performed by the churches, both Catholic and Protestant.

There are foundations, established by victims’ families, that are meant to provide support and a non-partisan voice for the people against terrorism. An example of a foundation in the Basque Country would be the Villacisneros Foundation, which “*called for the reopening of 4 unsolved cases. The President of the Foundation, Íñigo Gómez-Pineda, explained that the decision was a ‘hope for the victims’ relatives, when almost 40% of ETA’s murders have gone unpunished.*” (01-12-2017). Another example is the Association of Victims of Terrorism (AVT), which has taken legal action against the transfer of ETA prisoners closer to home or their release by meeting with the Minister of Justice, Dolores Delgado, asking her “*to transfer all the information they have about it, through the State Attorney’s Court.*” (10-09-2018). The main group in the articles that works on behalf of victims in the Basque Country is COVITE. One article in particular focuses on their foundation process and then details their mission: “*We cannot let others talk for us. We need a voice from the Basque country.*” (11-18-2018). Interestingly, a poll published in 2017 said that “*45% of Basques know a prisoner of ETA directly, but only 29% were threatened by the terrorist organization.*” (07-29-2019).

While the ‘civil society’ tag did not mention remembering Northern Irish victims in particular, it notes a foundation that works in the arena called Families Against Intimidation and Terror. The only indication of this group that I located in any of the articles referred to an IRA shooting that left a man injured but not dead. The group stated that “*they believed the IRA*

stopped shootings as a political tactic and predicted last month that the shootings would return.”

The thought by many Unionists was that the IRA had paused shootings to help Sinn Fein in elections, but that after those passed they would continue with their violence. (10-23-1998). In a show of solidarity, *“church leaders (on both sides) condemned”* the shooting of Constable Alice Collins. She later died of cancer, which people contributed to the bullet with which she had been shot by the IRA. (05-09-1998).

Catholics/Protestants-- Whereas I previously stated that the civil society groups in the Basque Country were those that supported victims such as COVITE and the IRA sources mentioned only one comparative group, the churches in Ireland/NI played an active role both supporting the cause (in the past, it was said that the Catholic church was somewhat involved with the IRA during the 1920s which is obviously outside my timeframe) and supporting the peace process by encouraging their parishioners. Although usually on opposing sides of the conflict, both groups recognized the need for peace at an individual level of society in order to make implementation of the peace deal actually work.

In the first subsection, Violence against Catholics, there are four quotes based on the violence that was endured by the Catholics during the period of turmoil in Northern Ireland. It is important to remember that in general, the Catholics were the ones who supported a *“united Ireland”* and did not want to remain under British rule. (03-04-1997). Therefore, the violence against the Catholics was initiated by Protestants and those who supported remaining under British rule. The first quote deals with how a Catholic priest *“from one of the hardest hit parishes”* wrote a book for the IRA leader in the 1920s. (12-16-1997). This shows that while my

main point of focus were the years from 1997-1999, even articles from this time period reflected on the conflict in Northern Ireland from many years prior. The next, from a time perspective, comes in 1969. An MI6 member who helped facilitate Protestant/Catholic talks accused Protestant mobs of “*carrying out an ethnic cleanse*” against the Catholics. (11-1-1999). After that, the violence against the Catholics continued during the Anglo-Irish Accord in 1985. (11-14-1998). Lastly, the IRA, while mainly trying to inflict pain on the Protestants of Northern Ireland, was also hurting the Catholics. Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams was questioned by David Trimble in meetings about “*when social terrorism of the Catholic community by the IRA*” was going to end. (09-07-1998).

Obviously, without the Catholics there ultimately would have been no peace deal. They played a significant role in the process, but their priorities differed from the Protestants. Catholics prioritized “*commitments to non-violence, peace, and democracy*” while Protestants wanted the IRA to decommission first and foremost. However, both groups were “*unhappy with the level of decommissioning*” of the IRA. (10-26-1999).

Finally, very few people openly admitted they supported the IRA in the articles I analyzed, but I did locate one article that centered on a Northern Irish town named Carrickmore, which was predominantly Catholic and “*an area proud of its republican heritage and deeply resentful of the security forces and British influence.*” Their town was deeply affected by the conflict, and there were many names (of members of the community) read at a rally who had been killed during the previous 30 years. Additionally, the town “*cheered*” when a “*masked man took the stage to read the IRA’s Easter message, which reaffirmed commitment to the current political process.*” (04-05-1999).

As with the Catholic code, the Protestant code only relates to the IRA case and I was able to divide the codes into three subsections: Political Parties of Protestants/Role in Peace Process, How Protestants felt about the Good Friday Agreement, and Violence by Protestants.

The first subsection focuses on how predominantly Protestant political parties acted while trying to reach a peace deal. The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) was the largest political party at the time, was led by David Trimble, and was committed to “*maintaining unity between Northern Ireland and Britain.*” They were strongly opposed to a united Ireland. Likewise, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) took a “*hardline pro-union stance on constitutional issues*” and was involved in multi-party political talks. (03-04-1997). These two parties were the major ones that were constantly involved in peace talks.

As previously stated in the Catholics section, the Protestants and Catholics had differing priorities for the peace deal, yet most civilians “*wanted the Good Friday Agreement to succeed.*” However, when polled in 1999, “*51% of Protestants would vote against the Belfast deal.*” (10-26-1999). Lastly, a column written by a citizen of Northern Ireland claimed that the Protestants in the country were not heard or listened to by leading political parties. (03-09-1998). Finally, there is one article mentioning violence by the Protestants. A former MI6 member who facilitated Protestant/Catholic talks accused Protestant mobs of “*carrying out an ethnic cleanse*” against the Catholics in 1969. (11-1-1999).

Role of the State-- For the Basque case, this section is mainly focused on the treatment of the etarras and how many people feel that it is unfair for them to be in prisons far from home. There is continuous protest against this policy, which has resulted in trying to find a solution to get

many of them moved closer to home both through court appeals and the Via Nanclares. The IRA case deals more with actual forced repression of civilians by the government, but it only really focuses on one article that discusses Creggan, and how the government and the IRA set up rules that citizens needed to follow when the fighting was really dangerous. Another example of the role of the state in the NI case dealt with how the government did not want to honor victims of an IRA bombing and instead proposed honoring victims of all violence on an insignificant date, instead of the 25th anniversary of the IRA bombing which is what had been proposed. The main “role of the state” for the IRA case actually would be the role of the state during the peace process, but those codes were included in a different section so these are more outliers than anything else.

Originally, I had titled this section Repression, which by one definition means “to put down or quell (sedition, disorder, etc).” When keeping that definition of the word in mind, I was able to see, for the majority, two very different types of repression in the two different cases. On the one hand, the majority of Basque repression was done to members of the terrorist group once they had been caught. This ties into both the silence and talk section, and also can be related to victims. Usually, the victims were those that were harmed by the terrorist groups. However, in the Basque case, there are many instances of Basque society viewing the individual terrorist group members as victims- of state repression. I decided that ultimately the word ‘repression’ was too strong for all of the articles that fell into the section, as, in most cases, no one was being brutally forced to do anything. Therefore, I decided on the ‘role of the state’. Additionally, I was able to combine ‘role of the state’ with ‘responsibility’, due to the fact that every single responsibility code focused on how the state deals with the terrorists.

Once caught, many of these ‘terrorists’ were sent to prisons far away from the Basque country, and most of the time they were isolated in the sense that there were very few (if any) other Basques in these prisons. The Spanish government’s explanation of this was that in order to prevent an uprising in prisons or continuous plotting by members who had been jailed, separating the prisoners and sending them away would prevent this from occurring. The families and friends of these prisoners have and continue to protest this policy, saying that it is unfair. One example of this, they say, is when “*an ETA prisoner, Xabier Rey, imprisoned thousands of kilometers away, died.*” (03-12-2018).

Another role of the state in the Basque case is that the Spanish government has made political parties tied to ETA illegal. For example, “*in 2002 the Spanish government made the political party Batasuna illegal due to its ties to ETA.*” (03-07-2018). Additionally, much earlier in ETA’s history, there was a “*police crackdown on the youth of the PNV (Partido Nacional Vasco)*” who were tied to ETA. (09-17-2018). This crackdown occurred while Spain was still under the rule of Franco, but the aforementioned illegalization of a political party was fairly recent. The Spanish government acted in one more way to repress general talk about ETA: in 2016, the Spanish government, with Rajoy at its head, would not allow a Basque film (called ‘Loreak’) to “*represent Spain for an Oscar*” as it was “*an insult to national unity*” even after the Academy proposed that it be listed as a nominee. (03-04-2019).

The Basque case has sparse mentionings of political actors and their relationships to ETA. In 2016, the “*Public Prosecutor’s Office of the National Hearing did not believe that ETA would be dissolved soon, but intended to perpetuate itself as a political agent while maintaining a clandestine structure in France.*” (03-17-2017). In 2017, some pressure was applied by the

government when National Court Judge Ismael Moreno “*reopened the investigation into a 1979 ETA bomb that killed a civil guard and his partner.*” (01-12-2017). Another article discusses a meeting between Interior Ministers from both Spain and France meeting to turn over “*archives and objects seized by the French police of ETA since 1999.*” (02-21-2017). There was some discussion by political parties within the Basque Country, such as the differing opinions of EH Bildu (the Basque nationalist political party) and the People’s Party, which is commonly referred to as the PP (a more conservative, Spanish nationalist political party) with regards to ETA. Additionally, there has also been writing on the dissolution of ETA, some of which came from chats with ETA members/prisoners and some from citizens talking about how they think the situation in their homeland will progress. A large majority of articles focus on moving forward and remembering violence in the area, whether that be at the hands of ETA or state-sponsored violence.

The remembrance of violence in the Basque country deals not only with ETA, but also with the violence and repression at the hands of Franco. The Basque state dealt with “*two types of terrorism- that of the dictatorship of Franco, and then that of ETA.*” (03-04-2019). A citizen of the Basque country, who is a college-aged student that did not live during the violence but has heard the traumatic stories from his family, stated that “*to not remember the violence at the hands of both ETA and GAL (state terrorists) in the Basque Country in the 80s would mean that the ‘history of the Basque Country would be based on a lie.’*” (04-10-2017).

The role of the state/responsibility in the Northern Irish case was closer to repression in that the general public was under strict rule of both the British government and the IRA during times when tensions were high. In the early 1970s, the IRA set up ‘no-go areas,’ which many

citizens felt were like internment camps. A Northern Irish man sympathetic to the fight for independence from Britain described the “*no-go areas*” as something that “*gave us some real feeling of security and solidarity*” against the British army. (07-30-1997) He later goes on to say that in “*Creggan (Northern Ireland) there was military occupation, block searches, surveillance arrests, street riots and gun battles (regularly between the British and the IRA).*” (07-30-1997). This type of repression was meant to keep civilians safe, but ended up creating feelings of resentment towards the British within some Northern Irish households. This was made clear in the celebratory language used by the author of this article, who said that “*the IRA owned the bogside and had established checkpoints, barricades, etc.*”

A different state role in Northern Ireland is directly linked to victims of the IRA and governmental silence. In 1997, “*the Belfast City Council turned down a 25th anniversary Remembrance service for the victims of the IRA’s Bloody Friday bombings.*” (07-02-1997). This was a massive snub to the victim’s families, but the council wanted instead to have a service for the victims of all violence. While this was a nice gesture, it stripped significance from IRA violence and thus belittled the fact that so many people died from one day of bombings by a terrorist organization. Since most of the government actors in the IRA case have been either the British or Irish governments, it is interesting to see that a group located inside the actual territory of Northern Ireland would not host a remembrance day for victims of IRA violence specifically. I believe this speaks to how many Northern Ireland citizens felt; in the two examples of repression for this case, there seems to be support for Northern Irish independence from Britain, which illustrates that citizens supported the mission of the IRA.

Political Actors-- The difference here seems to be that there are more parties within the Basque Country that advocate for Basque independence from Spain, although not necessarily through violent means or through supporting ETA. There are numerous parties within the Basque government that seem to be more separatist than pro-Spain, while in the IRA case we see a lot of anti-Sinn Fein/IRA speech. Sinn Fein is really the only party that constantly wants separation from British rule. Both cases list several different political parties that played a role in the articles I read, with the IRA ones focusing more on what the parties did during the peace process and the Basque ones focusing more on post-dissolution of ETA.

For the first section, which focuses on politics in the Basque state, I found articles that talk about the changes in who had the most control over the Basque parliament by the number of seats they won. It was interesting to see that in 2011, one month after ETA announced the end of its armed conflict, the PP “*won an absolute majority.*” (03-17-2017). This seemingly signifies a swing in the direction of unity among Basques and Spaniards, or at least that an impressive amount of voters voted for the “Spanish unity” party option. Then, in 2016 “*PSE, Podemos, PNV and EH Bildu advocated the movement of ETA prisoners to the Basque Country, which the PP opposed.*” The four first parties are all Basque nationalist parties with significant control in the parliament because they tend to work together, meaning that the Spanish nationalist PP was/is often isolated. (03-17-2017). With all of this support, it is not surprising that the Spanish government “*under Pedro Sánchez has authorized more than twenty transfers to prisons near the Basque Country in recent months.*” (08-23-2019).

In 2017, the PP went on to say that they were “*backed by Basque society who believe, like us, that we defeated the terrorist group ETA and that there were victims of terrorism.*”

(04-05-2017). Just under a year later, on the other side of things, EH Bildu was “*isolated in the Basque Parliament’s vote*” when it voted to pay homage to ETA prisoners. (03-12-2018). The party claimed that prison politics were “revenge” and that if the prisoners were not thousands of kilometers away, things would be different. Finally, in 2019 the “lehendakari” (which means “President” in Basque) of the Basque Government, Iñigo Urkullu, who is from the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), called on “*Basque parties, all of them, (to have a) shared and clear pronouncement to condemn ETA’s violence and its past of extortion and terrorism.*”

(09-20-2019). COVITE, the group that acts as a collective voice for victims in the Basque Country, was critical of the government as a whole, arguing that certain government initiatives such as the ‘Acto de Baiona’ is something that tries to introduce the Basque Country to “*collective amnesia towards those killed, kidnapped, who suffered and were destroyed by Basque society.*” (04-05-2017).

After the end of the armed conflict of ETA in 2011, the calls for complete dissolution became normal from the Basque Parliament. In February of 2012, the Basque Parliament demanded “*the unconditional dissolution of ETA*” and then in November of that same year, “*ETA wanted to negotiate about prisoners, their dissolution, and the demilitarization of the Basque Country.*” (03-17-2017). The same article fast forwards three years to 2015 when ETA showed “*its willingness to share with the Basque Gov and with the rest of the Basque ‘political and social agents’ the design of a disarmament process.*” In April of 2017, roughly a year before the dissolution, a citizen of Spain born in Barcelona but that has lived in the Basque Country for many years stated that disarmament/dissolution “*will mean that the Basque nation itself gains in internal trust.*” (04-10-2017).

A vocal group of political actors in the Basque Country during the dissolution of ETA was the PP, as they are still one of the only non-nationalist political parties in the region. The Secretary General of the PP once said that they are facing “*a blatant strategy of the ETA terrorist group to wash away its past and in passing, put pressure on the democratic governments of Spain and France.*” (04-05-2017). EH Bildu, a Basque nationalist party, vocalized how they felt about ETA victims. The party stated that “*all victims who are victims must be recognized because they have suffered an injustice, but EH Bildu does not place different levels in suffering.*” (03-12-2018).

Lastly, an article written by Ludger Mees about the waves of terrorism talks about an important nationalist political figure in the Basque Country realizing that there was no longer a place in society for the “patriotic left:”

“the unpopularity of any kind of terrorism in Western society after 9/11; and finally, the late but effective emancipation of an important political sector in its environment led by Arnaldo Otegi, who knew that, with ETA acting, there was neither present nor future for the politics for the patriotic left.” (08-12-2019).

As with the other categories that focus on any type of discussion between political actors/parties, this code is predominantly concentrated on the IRA case. Additionally, many of these tags for both cases have been previously mentioned in other sections, such as ‘Working Together, Negotiations, Basque State, and Remembrance.’

The IRA case focuses on the Taoiseach Party, Sinn Fein, the British Government, the DUP, and the UUP. All of these codes revolve around the negotiations that took place in order to achieve a peace deal. To begin, Martin McGuinness, a member of Sinn Fein, “*led a Sinn Fein*

delegation to Stormont at noon for exploratory talks in what is hoped will be the first step towards an unequivocal IRA ceasefire.” He was one of the key negotiators on behalf of Sinn Fein/IRA. However, the meeting angered the DUP, since the leader of Sinn Fein, Gerry Adams, had *“again attacked Prime Minister Tony Blair for his pro-union stance and ‘insensitivity’ to nationalists.”* Furthermore, the article said, *“the Prime Minister has made it clear that the (Stormont) talks are not about negotiating the terms of a truce but wants to assess if the IRA is ready to end violence.”* Then, the DUP deputy leader Peter Robinson accused Blair and the British government of *“being reckless and irresponsible in their rush to talk to terrorists.”* (05-21-1997). On the other hand, Gerry Adams said that the IRA would *“not return to violence if Stormont talks are productive.”* (10-15-1997).

A different DUP leader, Rev Paisley, said that he wanted to see *“the British government going back to the drawing board and making it clear there can be no real talks, but on the basis of pure democracy.”* (11-29-1997). President Clinton was also involved in the peace talks, and in 1998 he was *“needed to exert maximum pressure on Sinn Fein to get talks ‘back on the rails again.’”* (02-17-1998). Another accusation against Tony Blair came from the Tories, who *“accused Blair of a ‘betrayal’ of people’s trust and backed a demand for the early release of paramilitary prisoners to be halted.”* (10-07-1999). Blair, as a negotiating tool, had agreed to the release of some IRA prisoners in order to meet IRA demands so as to move the peace process forward.

Foreign Actors-- For the Basque case, ‘foreign actors’ constituted Pablo Escobar, who was not involved in the peace process at all, two international bodies, The European Left Group and the

International Verification Committee, and the French government (the latter three all were involved in the peace process. To begin, it must be said that it was not really a peace process, it was more a ‘disarmament process.’ To be honest, I think the main actor is ETA, and that the foreign actors just kind of facilitated in whatever way ETA allowed/needed help. The foreign, or outside actors in the Northern Irish case were mainly political actors, such as Bill Clinton. The Norwegian Nobel Committee did not do anything active to facilitate peace, but they did recognize efforts by two men for their work towards peace. Lastly, there was some action taken by an Australian official against Gerry Adams, and he was not let into the country due to being considered a terrorist. Most of the peace process surrounding the IRA was in fact handled by political figures within Northern Ireland/Ireland, so Bill Clinton was the only real political actor outside of the country.

To begin, ETA had a relationship with Pablo Escobar. In particular, Mr. Escobar was “*fascinated by the car bombs*” that ETA used in many of its attacks, and that we later see Mr. Escobar use in Colombia against his opponents. While the article that this comes from is about a fictional book exploring the theme of terrorism in the Basque Country, the facts regarding the terrorist group and Escobar’s relationship are definitely real. (02-09-2017). The only other mentioning of ETA in relation to a foreign actor that did NOT deal with the peace process was when an American businessman, Tim Rowe, participated in a tribute to ETA’s businessmen victims. Rowe founded the CIC in Boston, or the Cambridge Innovation Center, which is well-established all over the US and in many other countries. (05-31-2017).

ETA’s peace process involved relatively few foreign players: the French government, the European Left Group, and the International Verification Committee (CIV) were the three

groups that interacted with this process. The French government was active throughout the processes of both disarmament and dissolution. First, ETA needed the approval of the French authorities for the disarmament, since the French were to play “*the role of international notaries.*” (06-24-2017). Then, ETA started communication with the French government in 2012 post-end of their armed activity. The goal was to create “*dialogue on the consequences of conflict.*” (03-17-2017). Lastly, “*France allowed ‘blood free’ ETA members to be put in prisons closest to the borders, as the Spanish government did under Sanchez.*” (08-23-2019). The European United Left-Nordic Green Left Group, which is commonly referred to as the United European Left Group, played a small role in the peace process, specifically by trying to promote talk between the two sides. They stressed “*the importance of the participation of ETA victims and families of prisoners in the process.*” Additionally, they encouraged other leftist political parties in the EU to “*support the need for a peace process in dialogue with the Spanish and French governments.*” (06-09-2017). Finally, a “*Mexican politician named Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas was one of very few international representatives to be present at an event in the French Basque Country that certified the end of ETA.*” (03-19-2019).

Lastly, the International Verification Committee, which the Spaniards abbreviate to CIV, played a small role for some time in the Basque country. The CIV was “*instrumental in 2011 in guaranteeing that ETA had ended its armed fight*”. The CIV “*helped mediate the peace process in the Basque Country, with the group having to work between the ‘peace craftsmen’ and the Basque Government.*” However, the CIV left the Basque Country in 2017, saying that it “*decided to definitely conclude its work in the Basque Country because ETA had disarmed.*” (06-24-2017).

As for the Northern Irish case, individual interaction outside of the peace deal revolved around Gerry Adams, the leader of Sinn Fein. Australian Immigration Minister Philip Ruddock “denied Gerry Adams a business visa because of his involvement with the IRA” when Adams tried to promote his book in Australia. (07-02-1997). The other reference to Gerry Adams occurs in an article which covered Martin McGuinness and his peace talk trips to the USA. However, this is the only example I could find of a Northern Irish individual traveling to the US to discuss the case. (08-30-1997).

The main foreign actor in the Irish peace deal (outside of the British government, as they were sometimes seen as a foreign actor) was the US government. Specifically, the politician mentioned the most was Bill Clinton. The US government was vocal about many ideas during the peace process: how the “ongoing IRA violence was a problem in that it could derail the peace process” (06-13-1997) and how “if IRA violence was to start back after the agreement was reached, the US would not be helpful to Sinn Fein/IRA.” (05-14-1998). Tony Blair asked that the general population “trust in the terms he and the Irish government had set with regards to Sinn Fein/IRA disarming.” (07-08-1999). Lastly, the “Norwegian Nobel Committee recognized two Irishmen, David Trimble and John Hume, by giving them each a Nobel Peace Prize for their work in the peace process in Northern Ireland.” (10-16-1998).

VI. Discussion

When I began this research, I sought to argue that the Northern Irish people were more willing to speak about the conflict/peace process that occurred in their country than the Basques were about their own. However, my research revealed that that is not the case, as both societies are willing to discuss the trauma of conflict that occurred within their own borders, and also how they have overcome this conflict. While both countries are peaceful and without conflict today, they took very different routes to get there and the dialogue that has resulted for both is very different. Therefore, I hypothesized that differences within the two cases, specifically institutional representation groups, have greatly affected what is discussed.

My findings proved my hypothesis for the Northern Irish case to be true; due to the complexity and length of the peace process, the majority of the talk was politically-focused, not victim-centric. My research for the Northern Irish case is dominated by discussion of the political process that ultimately resulted in the Good Friday Agreement. This took years to create, much discussion from members of political parties throughout the political spectrum, and even allowed IRA representatives to be present during negotiations. The victims seemed to be lost in the process as opposing sides of the political spectrum fought over what should be included in the Agreement.

My findings proved my hypothesis for the Basque case to be true, too; talk in this case does focus more on victims than the end of ETA. I believe that because the Basque Country has many active, vocal, non-partisan “social collectives” that represent victims, the majority of the dialogue that stems from this case centers on victims of terrorist violence and what efforts are being made to remember these people. The dissolution of ETA was a “win” for the Basque

Country and Spain as a whole, but in this post-terrorist-group period there are still many families affected by the violence of the group. These victim representation groups turn the dialogue from the atrocities committed by ETA to focusing on how best to help victims now, whether that be by commemorating loved ones through monuments or parades, or encouraging etarras to engage in dialogue and apologize to the families of those killed.

As with any year-long project, there were limitations to my research. While newspapers were my best option at conducting fair and congruent research for both cases, I believe that newspapers represent only a section of society. Social media or interviews could have given me a different look at how individuals living in both areas feel about the conflicts, but as I only had a school-year to complete this, and social media was not around during the time-period of the Good Friday Agreement, these options were impossible. Additionally, my Spanish newspaper source had to be translated, so some meanings might have been lost in translation. However, everything was translated to the best of my ability.

I do feel like I witnessed some of both biases from the newspaper sources. In my sixty articles from *The Belfast Telegraph*, there was little recognition of violence by Protestants in more recent years, instead focusing on the violence against Catholics at the beginning of the IRA's foundation. An unbiased source would have most likely discussed Protestant violence more, as a way to show that the conflict was not so one-sided. I believe *El Diario Vasco* represented the aspects of the conflict as best as they could. While reading, I felt like there was little acknowledgment for the amount of support for ETA, but I imagine that it would be difficult to find people willing to state that they supported a terrorist group. Additionally, there were several articles about support for ETA prisoners and the movement/support for prisoners to be

moved closer to home, which I believe does address support for the group (or at least its members) in an underlying way.

Today, both countries maintain peace within their own borders. Academics are continuing to delve into both conflicts, sometimes in comparison to one another, to look at different examples of countries that once were extremely divided by conflict but are now living in harmony. These cases demonstrate the dangers of extreme nationalism, but also the ways in which governments and societal representation groups try their best to remember victims of violence.

VII. Bibliography

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