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WHEN WORLDS COLLIDE:
CHARLIE HEBDO AND ISLAM IN THE 21ST CENTURY

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By Mildred J. Morse

A thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for completion
Of the Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies
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ABSTRACT

Caricatures are entrenched in French socio-political identity. That identity has shifted due to internal and external forces, but the most important event for the socio-political identity of France in the 21st century is the attacks at *Charlie Hebdo* in January 2015. The event and the responses to it reignited the ideas of incompatibility of France and Islam, furthering the schism between French society and the integration of Islam. The nature of the memory of *Charlie Hebdo* and its effect on the perception of Islam before January 2015 and after necessitates the question, “How does *Charlie Hebdo* reveal contradictory ideas of Frenchness and Islam?”

This thesis presents an introductory history to the *Charlie Hebdo* attack, the importance of Charlie Hebdo’s caricatures and how they reflect representations of Islam since 1998, and literature relevant to caricatures and the theories of Islam en France and Islam de France. The latter chapters are composed of data collected while abroad with the permission of the University of Mississippi Institutional Review Board. This data includes interviews and online survey data conducted in Angers, Maine-et-Loire, France.

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A note on translation and interviews

Unless otherwise stated, I have translated all French quotes to English for ease of reading and wider accessibility. The original French is in the footnotes for reference. This is particularly applicable to the write-in survey responses and the interviews conducted in French and then translated to English. There is always something lost in translation and the exclusion of both French and English would be irresponsible.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CFCM	Conseil français du culte musulman (French Council of Muslims)
CRIF	Conseil représentatif des institutions juives de France (Representative Council for Jewish Institutions of France)
FPF	Fédération protestante de France (Protestant Federation of France)
IeF	Islam en France (Islam in France)
IdF	Islam de France (Islam of/from France)

Chapter One: Introduction

After two decades of increasing tension, the issue of how Islam exists in France came to a head in 2015. The attack on the offices of satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo* in January, followed by the Hyper Marché and the Bataclan attacks in November, shook France's concept of security and relaunched the debates of multiculturalism, social cohesion, the limitations of freedom of expression, and identity politics. While the Hyper Marché and the Bataclan attacks are important to understand how France arrived to the security oriented state in which it currently exists, the attack on *Charlie Hebdo* is the most emblematic event of 2015 in France.¹

The attack itself happened on the 7th of January 2015, just after the morning staff meeting. Two French shooters of Algerian descent, Chérif and Saïd Kouachi, entered the unmarked building in search of the offices of *Charlie Hebdo*. Over the course of the ten minute attack, the brothers succeeded in killing staff cartoonists Charb, Cabu, Honoré, Tignous and Wolinski, the economist Bernard Maris, editors Elsa Cayat and Mustapha Ourrad, Michel Renaud, maintenance worker Frédéric Boisseau and police officers Brinsolaro and Merabet while also wounding others.² The Kouachi Brothers fled but

¹ "Understanding the Implications of France's Strategic Review on Defense and National Security." Understanding the Implications of France's Strategic Review on Defense and National Security | Center for Strategic and International Studies. Accessed March 5, 2020. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-implications-frances-strategic-review-defense-and-national-security>.

² "Charlie Hebdo." Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, December 29, 2019. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charlie_Hebdo.

ultimately died in a standoff in Dammartin-en-Goële on the 9th of January. After a two-day manhunt and hostage situation that resulted in no casualties, the Kouachi Brothers committed suicide when they charged the lines of gendarmes and state police forces surrounding their hideout in Dammartin-en-Goële.

The brothers were recorded shouting “Allahu akbar” outside of the offices of *Charlie Hebdo* and declared connections to the prominent Sheikh Anwar Al-Awlaki, an American-born Al-Qaeda affiliate operating in the Arabian Peninsula, but there was no immediate responsibility claim issued by any organization.³ A few days later, however, the Yemeni branch of Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the actions of the Kouachis.⁴ The Kouachis had travelled and studied in Yemen, and were already suspected of ties to terror organizations in the Arabian Peninsula. The Kouachi Brothers exclaimed, “We have avenged Muhammed! We killed *Charlie Hebdo*!” as they left the building, bolstering the claim that the attack occurred in response to repeated disrespect toward the Prophet Mohammed.⁵ The attack was a violent response to perceived disrespect toward Islam and the Prophet in particular that *Charlie Hebdo* viewed as freedom of expression rather than blasphemy and the promotion of idolatry.⁶

³ "The Assassination of Anwar Al-Awlaki." 2011. *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, 12, 26-27. <http://umiss.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.umiss.idm.oclc.org/docview/923612469?accountid=14588>.

⁴ Eric Schmitt, Mark Mazzetti, and Rukmini Callimachi. “Disputed Claims Over Qaeda Role in Paris Attacks.” *The New York Times*. *The New York Times*, January 14, 2015. <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/15/world/europe/al-qaeda-in-the-arabian-peninsula-charlie-hebdo.html>.

⁵ Cassandra Vinograd, Alastair Jamieson, Florence Viala, and Alexander Smith. “Charlie Hebdo Shooting: 12 Killed at Muhammad Cartoons Magazine in Paris.” *NBCNews.com*. NBCUniversal News Group, July 24, 2018. <https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/paris-magazine-attack/charlie-hebdo-shooting-12-killed-muhammad-cartoons-magazine-paris-n281266>.

⁶ “The Issue of Depicting the Prophet Muhammad.” *BBC News*. BBC, January 14, 2015. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30813742>.

In 2006, two years after the approval of President Chirac's law that banned displays of religion in public spaces, *Charlie Hebdo*, which considers itself a guard dog of freedom of expression, republished the cartoons of the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten that portrayed Mohammed.⁷ These were widely condemned by the Danish Muslim community and garnered threats to the publication. Ahmed Akkari, a Danish Muslim, brought the controversy to the international stage claiming that Danish freedom of speech laws were discriminatory and visited Middle Eastern leaders in an attempt to garner support for the punishment of the paper.⁸ *Charlie Hebdo* saw this as an affront to freedom of expression and took it upon themselves to republish the works as a means of rejecting outside influence on freedom of expression. This in turn caused international uproar. *Charlie Hebdo* remained steadfast in their right to publish images of Mohammed and won a court case validating their right to such publications.⁹ Five years later in 2011, *Charlie Hebdo* published an "edition Charia [Sharia] Hebdo," which featured Mohammed, in response to the Tunisian elections. This resulted in a firebombing of the then public office of *Charlie Hebdo*.¹⁰ This attack prompted the relocation of the *Charlie*

⁷ The title of President Chirac's law is "loi sur les signes religieux dans les écoles publiques" (law on religious symbols in public schools) and while the title suggests limitations on the grounds of conforming equating to equity, the law appears to discriminate against religions that include expression through specific garb, such as the hijab which is from where the name hijab law in English media comes.

"Laïcité: Ce Qui Est Autorisé Et Ce Qui Ne L'est Pas Dans L'espace Public." 20 Minutes, information en continu, actualités, politique, sport... 20minutes, April 7, 2015.

<https://www.20minutes.fr/societe/1580955-20150407-laicite-autorise-espace-public>;

"Those Danish Cartoons." The New York Times. The New York Times, February 7, 2006.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/07/opinion/those-danish-cartoons.html>.

⁸ Spiegel Online, Hamburg. "Crisis in Denmark: Alienated Danish Muslims Sought Help from Arabs - SPIEGEL ONLINE - News - International." SPIEGEL ONLINE, February 1, 2006.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20120307221716/http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,398624,00.html>.

⁹ Deutsche Welle. "Court Acquits Satirical French Mag Over Mohammed Cartoons: DW: 22.03.2007." DW.COM. Accessed January 14, 2020. <https://www.dw.com/en/court-acquits-satirical-french-mag-over-mohammed-cartoons/a-2414455>.

¹⁰ David Jolly. "Satirical Magazine Is Firebombed in Paris." The New York Times. The New York Times, November 2, 2011. <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/03/world/europe/charlie-hebdo-magazine-in-paris-is-firebombed.html>.

Hebdo offices to the unmarked building in the 11th Arrondissement where the 2015 attack took place.

To understand why *Charlie Hebdo*, the satirical magazine whose covers are always caricatures, continued to publish depictions of Mohammed at insensitive times and against the very vocal wishes of various Muslim countries and organization, it is necessary to understand the importance of freedom of expression that came out of the 1789 Revolution and caricatures that started appearing in force in the early 1800s. From the first instances of usage in the 19th century, caricatures became an art accessible to low and high class alike that provided commentary on current events.¹¹

Caricatures are entrenched in French socio-political identity. That identity has shifted due to internal and external forces, but the most important event overall for the socio-political identity of France in the 21st century is the attacks at *Charlie Hebdo* in January 2015. “Satire has shown itself to be an indicator of the sentiments in France” because it is so “ingrained in French culture.”¹² Therefore, the attack on *Charlie Hebdo*, the most prominent satirical magazine in France, was an attack and shock to the French system. Like 9/11 in the United States, January 7, 2015 caused a major shift in ideological expression towards Islam. The event and the responses to it reignited the ideas of incompatibility of France and Islam, furthering the schism between French society and the integration of Islam. The nature of the memory of *Charlie Hebdo* and its

¹¹ Rolf Reichardt and Hubertus Kohle, 2008, *Visualizing The Revolution: Politics & The Pictorial Arts in Late 18th-Century France*. London: Reaktion Books Ltd. p 8.

¹² Connor T. Holeman, *Succès de scandale: The Role of Satire in French Society*. 2017. University of Mississippi.

effect on the perception of Islam before January 2015 and after necessitates the question, **“How does *Charlie Hebdo* reveal contradictory ideas of Frenchness and Islam?”**¹³

Firstly, it is important to define Otherness. Rather than relying solely upon the definition given by Edward Saïd, which I believe would limit the scope of this project, I will use the definition of Jean-François Staszak from the International Encyclopedia of Human Geography (2008). Staszak argues that Otherness means, “to choose a criterion that allows humanity to be divided into two groups: one that embodies the norm and whose identity is valued and another that is defined by its faults, devalued and susceptible to discrimination.”¹⁴ The Other is therefore the devalued party which is reinforced through societal norms “like segregation or territorial constructions, [that] allow the opposition between the Self and the Other to be maintained or accentuated.”¹⁵ I proceed with this definition because it is the wider lens with which it is necessary to view France, as Islam in France is not restricted to religious discrimination or racialization alone. This wider lens allows the understanding of Islam in France to extend beyond Edward Saïd’s idea of identity only as a power dynamic. Constraining the definition to Saïd’s conceptualization of Otherness runs the risk of being reductionist and repetitive of existing literature.

“*What are caricatures and why are they important?*”

Secondly, it is pertinent to understand that caricatures have been an outlet for French political expression, social commentary, and avenues of free expression since the

¹³ Isabel Hollis-Touré. 2016. "The Multidirectional Memory of Charlie Hebdo." *French Cultural Studies* 27 (3): 293-302.

¹⁴ Jean-François Staszak. 2009. Other/Otherness. In *International Encyclopedia of Human Geography: A 12-volume set.*, ed. Kitchin & Thrift. 1st ed., -. Oxford: Elsevier Science.

¹⁵ Ibid.

1830s. The satirical nature of these caricatures embodied the ideal “that the people have the right to criticize their rulers and so it became intensely associated with republican ideals.”¹⁶ Caricatures remain one of the largest avenues for mass consumption in France and after the attack, *Charlie Hebdo* became the guard for freedom of expression. *Charlie Hebdo* represents not only freedom of expression to many French, but also the right to dissent and question the powers in place. Caricatures are still published weekly, if not daily, across the country and continue to reflect underlying social concerns and opinions. *Charlie Hebdo* has not ceased publication once since the attack and garnered more subscriptions in the aftermath.¹⁷ The use of physical and electric forms of media led to immediate support, responses, and a schism between those who declared #jesuisCharlie [#IamCharlie] and those who did not.

“Why is Otherness important now?”

Thirdly, the attack on *Charlie Hebdo*, had a massive ripple effect in French society which led to increased social tensions, internal suspicion, and distrust. France instituted the Plan Vigipirate (the three level French national alert system) in 2016 in an effort to combat increasing numbers of terror incidents and promote citizen safety.¹⁸ The people of France have been “on alert” since 2015 and France itself has been on Level 2: Reinforced Security - Risk of Attack or higher since the new anti-terror Plan went into effect.¹⁹ Despite these efforts, terror incidents committed by Islamist groups have

¹⁶ Jack Richard Censer and Lynn Hunt, 2001. *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, Exploring the French Revolution*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. p.174.

¹⁷ David Carr. “Flocking to Buy Charlie Hebdo, Citizens Signal Their Support of Free Speech.” *The New York Times*. The New York Times, January 15, 2015. <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/15/business/media/flocking-to-buy-charlie-hebdo-citizens-signal-their-support-of-free-speech.html>.

¹⁸ **“Comprendre le Plan Vigipirate.” *Gouvernement.fr*. Accessed January 14, 2020.** <https://www.gouvernement.fr/risques/comprendre-le-plan-vigipirate>.

¹⁹ “Level 2: Sécurité renforcée - risque attentat.” This is

continued, although the degree of destruction has greatly diminished. Since January 2015, France has seen the Bataclan attack in Paris (November 2015), the Nice attack (July 2016), the hostage situation in Trebes (March 2018), the Strasbourg Christmas market attack (December 2018), and eight other major, though less devastating terror incidents.²⁰ The persistence of Otherness in terms of people who can and do define groups as “others” fuels the existing tensions between social groups and lingering questions around what it means to be French. This question remains unanswered as the republican model on which France rebuilt in 1789, exists in the acceptance of laïcité (France’s version of secularism) and the nebulous interpretations of “liberté, égalité, fraternité.”²¹ The very nature of republicanism, Anthropologist Mayanthi Fernando argues, complicates matters because it “continues to represent a set of particular, embodied identities -- usually white, male, bourgeois, heterosexual and secular or Catholic - that have proclaimed themselves universal.”²²

“Why are the years since the attack on Charlie Hebdo important?”

Finally, France has become more nationalistic and fearful, as evidenced by the rise of far right leader Marine Le Pen as the second most popular contender for the presidency in 2017.²³ As leader of the Front National, Le Pen represents the pervasive xenophobia, islamophobia, and pro-France movements in France that mirror the rise of Donald

²⁰ “Terror Attacks in France: From Toulouse to the Louvre.” The Telegraph. Telegraph Media Group, February 3, 2017. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/terror-attacks-france-toulouse-louvre/>.

²¹ The Local. “A Fragmented Country: What Does It Mean to Be French Today?” The Local. The Local, February 6, 2019. <https://www.thelocal.fr/20190206/what-does-it-mean-to-be-french-today-deeply-divided-poll-reveals>.

²² Bowen, John R. 2015. "FRANCE AFTER CHARLIE HEBDO." *Boston Review*, Mar, 18-22,24-35,2. <http://umiss.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.umiss.idm.oclc.org/docview/1662859340?accountid=14588>.

²³ Vox. “Marine Le Pen: France's Trump Is on the Rise.” YouTube. YouTube, April 20, 2017. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BdcrP-5bDIk>

Trump's Republican Party in 2016. This fear after the *Charlie Hebdo* attack led to France's heightened security, which means the French are more focused on maintaining what they view as intrinsically French traits. This means that the more leftist, anti-authoritarian, anti-traditionalist perspective (like the writers of *Charlie Hebdo* itself) and right wing perspective that sees European identity as under threat have become stronger, and stranger bedfellows. Globalization and the influence of immigrant cultures in France directly threaten laïcité, as strong religious, cultural, and ethnic identity among immigrants poses a problem to successful integration.

Due to the apparent escalation of hostility between French society and Islam, the confusion surrounding French Muslim identity, and the socio-economic schisms affecting Islam in France, I seek to understand the characterization of Muslims and Islam by *Charlie Hebdo* based on perceptions of the predominant discourses of Muslims. Caricatures are a constant in French society and can therefore be a means of qualitatively measuring perceptions of Islam and providing insight into apparent and potentially hidden realities of how Islam is perceived and acknowledged.

Chapter Two: Periodization

Charlie Hebdo's History

Charlie Hebdo's history aligns with the timeline of shifting attitudes in France. A broader look to the recent past allows the reader to trace these shifts by major dates in the context of the magazine. 1998 had the most diverse, winning French soccer team and was a unifying force, 2004 saw the enactment of the ostentation symbols law which primarily affected hijabi women, in 2006-2007 the republication of Danish cartoons detailing Mohammed and the court case that ruled in *Charlie Hebdo's* favor, allowing them to continue publishing images of Mohammed, the 2011 firebombing of *Charlie Hebdo*, and finally, the terror attacks of 2015, including *Charlie Hebdo*, Hyper Cacher, and Bataclan. All the while, the tensions around religion, freedom of expression, and the reality of equality in France amplified the othering of Islam in France.

Charlie Hebdo Covers

The covers of *Charlie Hebdo* were at one point accessible through a subscription service, but this is no longer the case. Due to this change, I found covers through books, informal online fan pages, and news sources that reported on covers that elicited intense criticism or international attention. The years 1992-2011 are available through "Charlie Hebdo: les 1000 Unes", the years 2012-2018 are largely available online, and all attack anniversary covers are available through the official *Charlie Hebdo* site and informal fan pages. The periodization of 1998, 2006, 2011, 2015, and after is intentionally based upon increases in national interest or discussion surrounding Islam in France.

Charlie Hebdo's history can be broken down into four eras. The first era is 1960-1970 because *Charlie Hebdo* grew out of the satirical magazine Hara-Kiri and had the same founders. The second period is 1992-2009; in 1992, the satirical magazine known as *Charlie Hebdo* was formally established. The end date of 2009 marks the departure of Phillippe Val, the most influential editor of the magazine until 2010. The third era is 2010-2015 and the fourth, current era is 2015 to the present.²⁴

1st and 2nd Eras: 1969-81 and 1992-2009

The first era publicly ended in 1970 after the publication of Hara-Kiri that mocked the death of Charles de Gaulle after which the publication was prohibited.²⁵ It did, however, continue under the new name of *Charlie Hebdo* with a reduced staff and decreasing recognition until closing its doors in 1981.²⁶ The second era commenced in 1992 under the leadership of Director of Publication Gebe (cartoonist), Chief Editor Philippe Val, Cabu (cartoonist), and Gebe (cartoonist) as well as Bernard Maris and the staff consisting of Luz (cartoonist), and Tignous (cartoonist). Under the direction of Val, *Charlie Hebdo* became considerably more political, targeting French politicians and France's activity in the Gulf War, the Bosnia War and the Kosovo War until the end of the century.²⁷ In 1998, with the wars de-escalating and the victory at the World Cup

²⁴ "Charlie Hebdo." Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, January 17, 2020. https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charlie_Hebdo.

²⁵ Marie Monier, Loïc Farge. "Le 17 Novembre 1970, Le Journal 'Hara-Kiri' Était Interdit De Parution." RTL.fr. Accessed January 20, 2020. <https://www.rtl.fr/actu/debats-societe/le-17-novembre-1970-le-journal-hara-kiri-etait-interdit-de-parution-7780536034>.

²⁶ Oliver Duggan. "The History of Charlie Hebdo, Bastion of French Satire." The Telegraph. Telegraph Media Group, January 7, 2015. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11330322/The-history-of-Charlie-Hebdo-Frances-most-satirical-magazine.html>.

²⁷ Georges Wolinski, Charb, Cabu, and Riss. "Charlie-Hebdo: Les 1000 Unes." Paris: Les Échappés, 2011.

against Brazil, the focus shifted to an internal reflection rather than an external analysis. The 1998 World Cup team, referred to as the “multicultural team” that reflected a “successful integration,” represented all genres of French citizens under the nickname “black-white-arab”²⁸ The team unified French society and, when depicted in *Charlie Hebdo*, was noticeably without race or differentiating characteristics besides hairstyles.

Figure 1: *Charlie Hebdo* 1998, no. 329



As cited by Luz, the point of *Charlie Hebdo* was “*Charlie* must be an instrument in the battle against stupidity.”²⁹ It is worth noting that the word translated “stupidity” is originally *la connerie* which is an intentionally vulgar, pejorative French term that can

²⁸ Sylvain ROUSSEAU, Vincent ROUX, and Achraf ABID. “Billet Retour - Que Reste-t-Il De La France ‘Black-Blanc-Beur’ De 1998 ?” *France 24*. France 24, June 8, 2018.

<https://www.france24.com/fr/20180608-billet-retour-football-mondial-bleus-france-black-blanc-beur-zidane-1998-2018-russie>;

“équipe multiculturelle”; “intégration réussie”; “black-blanc-beur”

²⁹ “*Charlie* must be an instrument in the battle against stupidity”

Frédérique Roussel, and Isabelle Hanne. “‘Charlie’, Satire Dans Tous Les Sens.” *Libération.fr*. *Libération*, January 7, 2015. https://www.liberation.fr/ecrans/2015/01/07/charlie-satire-dans-tous-les-sens_1175870.

also mean “nonsense, bullshit, and crap”.³⁰ The turn of the century and following years reveal the shift in prevalence of Islam in public discourse.

The 2000s are divided into the periods of 2000-2004 and 2005-2009 due to the shifts in leadership that took place within the magazine. After 9/11 in the United States, *Charlie Hebdo* took an uncharacteristically centrist stance and publicly supported America.³¹ The covers briefly fixated on events in the Middle East and American involvement there before returning to stories on President Chirac. In 2004, with the death of Gebe, Val, who was known to be more politically conscientious, became the director of *Charlie Hebdo*. From 2004 to his departure in 2009, *Charlie Hebdo* continued to provide social commentary through caricatures but at the same time developed a fixation on Islam.

In 2006, *Charlie Hebdo* republished the work of Dutch cartoonists from Jyllands-Posten under the cover “It’s hard to be loved by idiots” as a show of solidarity with the publication for the right to free speech despite threats from Muslim leaders and nations.³² The word “idiot” here is translated from the nominal form of “la connerie” as mentioned above and can mean idiots.

³⁰ *Word Reference*, s.v. “connerie,” accessed March 12, 2020, <https://www.wordreference.com/fren/connerie>.

³¹ The French political system operates on the same left to right scale as the American system.

³² “C’est dur d’être aimé par des cons”

Figure 2: *Charlie Hebdo* 2006, no. 712



The re-publication sparked international backlash and was shortly followed by a legal case against Philippe Val by the Grand Mosque on the grounds of “*public injury of a group of people on the basis of their religion.*”³³ The Grand Mosque, built in 1926, was the first visible symbol of Islam in France. It remains a significant cultural symbol and representative organization for French Muslims. Their legal case was not prompted by the republication alone, but would have certainly followed the republication had it not already been in court. Ultimately, the French court ruled in 2008 that *Charlie Hebdo* was within its rights of freedom of speech. However, the difference in the way religions are treated was made evident in 2007. Siné, who had been part of *Charlie Hebdo* since the 1980s, published a cartoon that caused great debate. It depicted the son of President

³³ Serge Kaganski. “De L'affaire Des Caricatures à La Tuerie Du 7 Janvier, Comment Charlie Hebdo Est Devenu Une Cible.” *Les Inrocks*, March 21, 2012. <https://www.lesinrocks.com/2015/01/07/actualite/actualite/de-laffaire-des-caricatures-la-tuerie-du-7-janvier-comment-charlie-hebdo-est-devenu-une-cible/> ; “injures publiques à l'égard d'un groupe de personnes en raison de leur religion.”

Sarkozy considering converting to Judaism ahead of his marriage to a Jewish heiress. Siné denied antisemitism, but was ultimately fired when prompted by Val to either retract the cartoon or be fired and face prosecution.³⁴ He was subsequently tried and found not guilty in France's legal system, but remained guilty in the eye of the public.³⁵ The handling of the supposed anti-Semitism versus the continued portrayal of Islam in an aggressively negative manner highlights the disparity in treatment of religion. Islam remained a heavy feature of Val's *Charlie Hebdo* up until the date of his departure in 2009. Siné work is not included because it was not available online or in print.

3rd Era: 2010-2014


Stéphane “Charb” Charbonnier took over as director of publication in 2010 and *Charlie Hebdo*'s leadership evolved. Charb, Riss, Eric Pothault, and Bernard Maris, and Cabu became the influential voices of the magazine. Under this new management, *Charlie Hebdo* continued to satirize Islam and satirized the Arab Uprising in Tunisia in 2011. In November, *Charlie Hebdo* announced that the next edition would be dubbed “Charia [Sharia] Hebdo”; this announcement promoted the firebombing of *Charlie Hebdo*'s offices mere hours before the edition went out. It featured a sticker of “Mohammed: Editor-in-Chief” and a depiction of Mohammed mocking the Tunisian election of the Islamist party Ennahda with the caption, “100 lashes of the whip, if you do not die from laughter!”³⁶

³⁴ L'Obs. “Siné Fait Un Malaise, Le Procureur Demande La Relaxe.” L'Obs. L'Obs, January 28, 2009. <https://www.nouvelobs.com/rue89/rue89-medias/20090128.RUE8130/sine-fait-un-malaise-le-procureur-demande-la-relaxe.html>.

³⁵ France-Presse, Agence. “France: Le Caricaturiste Siné Relaxé Pour Une Chronique Sur Jean Sarkozy.” La Presse, February 24, 2009. <https://www.lapresse.ca/international/europe/200902/24/01-830624-france-le-caricaturiste-sine-relaxe-pour-une-chronique-sur-jean-sarkozy.php>.

³⁶ “Mahomet, rédacteur en chef”; “100 coups de fouet, si vous n'êtes pas morts de rire!”

Figure 3: *Charlie Hebdo* 2006, no. 1011



Charb responded that the perpetrators were "radical stupid people who don't know what Islam is."³⁷ There were no disruptions in publication and the following week featured Mohammed and Charb kissing.

Figure 4: *Charlie Hebdo* 2011, no. 1012



This only further increased tensions and attention on *Charlie Hebdo*, prompting the office to move to an undisclosed location in the 20th arrondissement. In the following years,

³⁷ Elaine Ganley. "Fire at French Newspaper after Muhammad Issue." Boston.com. The Boston Globe, November 2, 2011. http://archive.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2011/11/02/fire_at_french_newspaper_after_muhammad_issue/?page=full.

Charlie Hebdo continued to spark controversy through depictions of Mohammed and has run-ins with other religions as well, though not to the same extent. In 2014, Charb announced a fundraising campaign to keep *Charlie Hebdo* financially sound.

4th Era: 2015-present

The fourth era began on 7 January 2015 with the attack itself. The magazine received an unprecedented swell in attention from French media as well as international outlets. The first cover after the attack bearing the title “All is Forgiven” and featuring a depiction of Mohammed holding a sign with the hashtag “Je suis Charlie” became an international focal point.³⁸

Figure 5: *Charlie Hebdo* 2015, no. 1178



From Western powers such as the United States and the United Kingdom, France received support on the basis of free speech. Under the hashtag “#jesuisCharlie” solidarity poured out from social media at home and abroad, just as newspapers had

³⁸ “Tout est pardonné”

published “We are all Americans” in the wake of 9/11 in the United States.³⁹ This current era saw the apex of tension in France between perceived French ideals and Islamic ideals. The two appear incompatible in post-attack France, as evidenced by the division the calls for solidarity with *Charlie Hebdo* created. The magazine became a cultural institution in the center of a subsurface social identity war.⁴⁰ The light the January attack casts on this social identity is inextricably linked to political identity. The attacks revealed the fissures in France’s socio-political boundaries, questions of compatibility, and what it means to be French.

³⁹ “nous sommes tous américains”

Nash Jenkins. “Paris Attacks: How Paris Stood With the U.S. After 9/11.” *Time*. *Time*, November 14, 2015. <https://time.com/4112746/paris-attacks-us-september-911-terrorism/>.

⁴⁰ James McAuley. “A Terrorist Attack Turned Charlie Hebdo into a Revered Institution It Never Sought to Be.” *The Washington Post*. WP Company, May 26, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/a-terrorist-attack-turned-charlie-hebdo-into-a-revered-institution-it-never-sought-to-be/2018/05/25/c5a392d8-4e11-11e8-85c1-9326c4511033_story.html.

Chapter Three: Literature Review

Caricatures

Caricatures have been an outlet for French political expression, social commentary, and avenues of free expression since the 1830s. Originally intended to critique politics or current issues, caricatures have remained a means of public expression for many.⁴¹ It “became hugely popular because it bridged both the language and the illiteracy gap better than the written word.”⁴² *Charlie Hebdo* represents not only freedom of expression to many French people, but also the right to dissent and question the powers in place. Caricatures are still published weekly, if not daily, across the country and continue to reflect underlying social concerns and opinions.

The largest, most accessible avenue for critique of French society remains the caricature. *Charlie Hebdo* addresses Islam often through readily digestible pictures with overt political tones. My surveys and interviews conducted in France pressed the issues of compatibility of Islam and France, perceptions of “autres” (others) in France today, and why caricatures remain one of the cornerstones of free speech in post-*Charlie Hebdo* France. This data will provide a snapshot of the sentiments of regular citizens between the ages of 18 and 70 who lived through the Hebdo attack and the Bataclan attack in

⁴¹ Connor T. Holeman. *Succès de scandale: The Role of Satire in French Society*. 2017. University of Mississippi.

⁴² “French Caricature: Social Commentary & Scenes of the Day.” “Very Ill!” The Many Faces of Medical Caricature in Nineteenth-Century England & France. Accessed January 20, 2020. <http://exhibits.hsl.virginia.edu/caricatures/fr1-scenes/>.

November 2015 firsthand. Before addressing these interviews and surveys, it is important to address two of the conceptualizations of Islam in France: Islam *EN* France and Islam *DE* France.

Islam *EN* France

Islam en France refers to the conceptualization of Islam existing *in* France as an independent entity and was first suggested in the late 1980s during the hijab debates.⁴³ This is the idea that Islam creates pockets of communitarianism, particularly in suburbs of larger cities. These communities are at first a bolstering force for a sense of unity, but are believed to divide France by allowing for a secondary identifying marker. Not only are these residents French, but they are more specifically bound by one community that is smaller and more receptive to them. The idea of communitarianism “equates to a refusal to integrate and a refusal to adopt important French values.”⁴⁴ To understand how this phenomenon has developed, one must trace interactions of religion and politics to pre-Revolution France.

1.1 What religion was France?

Pre-Revolution France was Catholic. The Church and the State were, for all intents and purposes, completely intertwined. In the centuries leading up to 1789, the Church became the largest landowner in France and supervised hospitals, primary, as

⁴³ Gino G. Raymond. 2009. “From Islam En France to Islam de France: Contradictions of the French Left’s Responses to Islam.” *Patterns of Prejudice* 43 (5): 481–96.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/00313220903339022>.

⁴⁴ Jonathan Ervine. *Humour in Contemporary France: Controversy, Consensus and Contradictions*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2019.

well as secondary education. The upper echelons of the Church were populated by noblemen who cemented close political and power relations, and the Church itself was immensely wealthy.”⁴⁵ So, the Church played a role in religion, social, political, and economic decisions made in France. The Church effectively was the State and because the Church supervised education, the vast majority of the French practiced the state religion. The Church had created a way of perpetuating its power in all domains.

Dissatisfaction with the power structures in France led to the 1789 Revolution and the de-Christianization of the country. The schools were no longer under the care of the Church and the power structures in place were obliterated to make way for new, universalist policies. The Jacobins made the first move from a religious state to a secular state, starting with the anti-clerical Reign of Terror.

1.2 French Revolution

The whole country revolted, but the political left picked up the pieces and began reshaping the country. The left’s strong historical roots in Jacobin legacy translates to the model of a society with “social harmony that was unconditional and free, accessed by a citizenship that was solely defined by the individual’s adherence to the founding principles of the revolution as a kind of civic, secular faith.”⁴⁶ In a religiously homogeneous society, this is simple. This homogeneity, however, means that the new Republic’s success as a secular state is predicated upon common religion at most and at

⁴⁵ “Catholicism in France.” Religious Literacy Project. Accessed January 20, 2020. <https://rlp.hds.harvard.edu/faq/catholicism-france>.

⁴⁶ Gino G. Raymond. 2009. “From Islam En France to Islam de France: Contradictions of the French Left’s Responses to Islam.” *Patterns of Prejudice* 43 (5): 481–96. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00313220903339022>.

least on religion that is not tied to everyday, visible expression. That is, “the republic could only accommodate the action of the individual in the public space as a citizen...not as an actor also identified by particularities such as color, race or religion.”⁴⁷ At the same time as republican ideology took hold, so did the idea of majoritarianism.

Majoritarianism, the “public sentiments of the majority are sacred and ought to be protected by state and society alike,” reinforced the idea of equality on the basis of conformity.⁴⁸ General secularism, and then codified *laïcité*, was a means of reinforcing equality between citizens.

Looking forward to the 20th century, France saw great influxes of people. France was a superpower, an empire, and seeing increases in Muslim immigrants. This increase in Muslim residents and citizens first became a source of contention when girls wore their hijabs to school. This caused immense debates and years of socio-political turmoil that ultimately resulted in the idea of *Islam en France* and *Islam de France*. In an effort to solve what would prove to be a long standing societal issue, the socialist Jean-Pierre Chevènement said that the next step “would be a project to ... “passer de l’Islam en France à un Islam de France” to effect the transition from Islam in France to a French Islam.”⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Sadia Saeed. 2015. "The Charlie Hebdo Affair and the Spectre of Majoritarianism." *Economic & Political Weekly*.

⁴⁹ Gino G. Raymond. 2009. “From Islam En France to Islam de France: Contradictions of the French Left’s Responses to Islam.” *Patterns of Prejudice* 43 (5): 481–96. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00313220903339022>.

1.3 Islam as an external force

Islam, in many ways, has one foot in each camp. It is both an external and internal element with which France has to reconcile. Over the past forty years, since the first clash of French societal norms and Islam, France has been trying to solve the question of Islam in France. No one party has come close: “Despite their best efforts, these goals have been impeded by multiple factors, including the legacy of French colonialism, the unique interpretation of the separation of church and state in France, various internal divisions within French Muslim communities, and the ongoing influence of various external actors including foreign governments.”⁵⁰ One of the largest internal influences has been the rise of the Front National, first under Jean-Marie Le Pen and now with his daughter Marine Le Pen. This right wing party has been particularly vocal with policies that promote nationalism and xenophobia amid increasing state insecurities and terror incidents. This has made the push for Islam de France even stronger.

Islam *DE* France

Islam de France refers to the conceptualization of an Islam tailored to French normative standards, primarily *laïcité* and religion remaining in the private sphere. This term also originated from response to the hijab incidents in the late 1980s to early 1990s. The steps involved to create an Islam de France were obscure, but in 1999 Chevenement “launched a major consultation involving seven federations, five major mosques and half a dozen leading figures from the Muslim community” who were all required to sign the

⁵⁰ Rim-Sarah Alouane. “Islam, Made in France? Debating the Reform of Muslim Organizations and Foreign Funding for Religion.” Brookings. Brookings, May 2, 2019. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/05/01/islam-made-in-france-debating-the-reform-of-muslim-organizations-and-foreign-funding-for-religion/>.his is not the same as the next

“declaration of intent with regard to the rights an obligation of the Muslim faithful’ as proof of their “commitment to the French republican state.”⁵¹ This process ultimately resulted in the formation of the French Council of Muslim Faith (CFCM) which joined the Representative Council of French Jewish Institutions (CRIF) and Protestant Federation of France (FPF) as representative religious institutions to the French government.⁵² In 2001, as “other main religions in France have ... been organized at the national level, ... the French government is currently discussing with several Islamic groups to achieve a similar national representative body for Islam.”⁵³ While the CFCM was founded in 2003, the FPF and CRIF were founded decades earlier, in 1905 and 1944 respectively. This reticence to form a national representative body for French Muslims speaks to France’s intentional blindness to the Muslim population.

2.1 What religion is France?

The French State is legally secular. While the governing body has been disentangled from the Church, French society has not. As Father Matthieu Rougé, pastor of Paris’s St. Ferdinand des Ternes Catholic Church and an expert in political theology said, “We have a secular state but not a secular society...The majority of the French are recognized as cultural Catholics. They may have studied in a Catholic school, they marry in churches, and they baptize their children. They are Catholic,” he said. “All our streets, the names of our towns and villages — everything is related in some way to the Catholic

⁵¹ Gino G. Raymond. 2009. “From Islam En France to Islam de France: Contradictions of the French Left’s Responses to Islam.” *Patterns of Prejudice* 43 (5): 481–96. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00313220903339022>.

⁵² Conseil français du culte musulman (CFCM), Conseil représentatif des institutions juives de France (CRIF), Fédération protestante de France (FPF)

⁵³ Dominique Decherf. “French Views of Religious Freedom.” Brookings Institution. Brookings, July 28, 2016. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/french-views-of-religious-freedom/>.

faith.”⁵⁴ Catholicism is still the number one religion in France, followed by Islam. This culturally Catholic legacy complicates understandings and enactments of laïcité, which is evident in the laws passed in 2004 and 2010.

The 2004 law banning ostensible signs that revealed a student’s religion in public schools and the law no. 2010-534, July 2010 banning of any coverings of the face were not explicitly aimed at Muslims, but predominately affect the Muslim population.⁵⁵ There is no other group in France that features widely visible signs indicating religion. While Islam represents the largest challenge to French secularism and republican ideologies of equality, Islam is not the first religion to face obstacles in France.

2.2 France in 20th century

Before World War II, France was still largely homogenous. There had not been influxes of immigrants outside of Judeo-Christian ideologies. French republican ideals were easier to defend and uphold in terms of religion, but elements of Otherness still existed. Anthropologist Mayanthi Fernando argues that republicanism is a barrier because it “continues to represent a set of particular, embodied identities -- usually white, male, bourgeois, heterosexual and secular or Catholic - that have proclaimed themselves universal.”⁵⁶ This is evident in the actions of the Vichy Regime which aided Hitler’s roundup campaigns and spread anti-Semitic propaganda before the arrival of the Nazis. True to French tradition of caricatures and the visual nature of Nazi propaganda, France

⁵⁴ “In Secular France, Catholic Conservatism Makes a Comeback.” PressFrom, December 9, 2016. <https://pressfrom.info/us/news/world/-10548-in-secular-france-catholic-conservatism-makes-a-comeback.html>.

⁵⁵ Law no. 2010-524, 13 July 2010 ; Law no. 2004-228, 15 March 2004.

⁵⁶ Bowen, John R. 2015. "FRANCE AFTER CHARLIE HEBDO." *Boston Review*, Mar, 18-22,24-35,2. <http://umiss.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.umiss.idm.oclc.org/docview/1662859340?accountid=14588>.

began circulating caricatures of Jews. In the post-war reflection, these caricatures are considered racist and manipulative because they were made by those in power to effectively isolate, ostracize, and alienate a particular group of people in France. The same tropes, the overdrawn nose, lips, and eyes, appear in the depiction of Muslims at *Charlie Hebdo*. *Charlie Hebdo* therefore successfully continues the tradition in the French Republican ideal of freedom of speech, but in doing so reinforces the identity behind that ideal. Considering this, it appears that Islam is the newest scapegoat in France. As Anthropologist Mayanthi Fernando suggests, France has to seriously reflect to discover how to answer their concerns about Islam in France and its compatibility with republican ideals that may no longer represent the country.

Reality of Islam

Islam is in a precarious position. The reality of Islam lies somewhere between Islam en France and Islam de France. There are French Muslims and Muslims in France and confusion about both. This is due to the larger confusion about France's national identity and fear in a time of increasing terror incidents.

This state of uncertainty leaves room to shift politically left or right. In the late 2000s, the left appeared "to be increasingly wedded to a belief that a multicultural French republic would be better served by an accommodating Anglo-Saxon-style ethos of community cohesion."⁵⁷ That is no longer the case. Because of the economic downturn in 2008, the increase in terror incidents, and rise of the Front National, France faces an ever

⁵⁷ Gino G. Raymond. 2009. "From Islam En France to Islam de France: Contradictions of the French Left's Responses to Islam." *Patterns of Prejudice* 43 (5): 481–96. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00313220903339022>.

intensifying social conflict between Frenchness and Islam. This conflict was particularly intense in 2015 when the offices of *Charlie Hebdo* were attacked and 12 people murdered.

Interior vs. Exterior Islam and Charlie Hebdo

The popularity of the hashtag #jesuisCharlie after the attack cracked the fragile stability of Islam and France's relationship.⁵⁸ The use of the hashtag to promote French solidarity became contentious when the solidarity was politicized and caused French Muslims to choose whether they fell into the French collective group or the French Muslim group. The Front National (FN), now operating under the moniker the Rassemblement National (RN), took advantage of the emergence of this question and promoted Islamophobia and xenophobia by labeling Muslims who did not report #jesuisCharlie as Others. Hollis-Touré reinforces this argument that the use #jesuisCharlie pushed the attacks from a limited French perspective to a global event, widening tensions within France itself and the West and Islam. The calls then, for self-identification were heightened; the question of being a good Muslim or a good French citizen was again posed and further exacerbated by a global audience.

The juxtaposition of Islam as an internal and external force is most thought provoking because it presents a shift in perception both within and outside of France. The idea of Islam as a factor in French society has been a source of contention, has hit boiling point, and now France, as well as the West, is trying to figure out what the next step is. Because the boiling point was the Hebdo attack and both national and international media

⁵⁸ Isabel Hollis-Touré. 2016. "The Multidirectional Memory of Charlie Hebdo." *French Cultural Studies* 27 (3): 293-302.

are giving such attention to the magazine in the aftermath, it only makes sense to look at *Charlie Hebdo* once again. It is the lightning rod of attention; we see this in the use of social media, through the proliferation of images, hashtags, and tweets, and again in traditional media. The predominant response from France, and the international community, is in defense of France's free speech, but begs the question of limitations. *Charlie Hebdo* has always prided itself on the satirical nature of its caricatures and as a defender of liberté d'expression and French ideals. Though it publishes under the mantra "satirical, secular, joyous" *Charlie Hebdo*, especially after 2015, poses the question of limitations.⁵⁹ How responsible is *Charlie Hebdo* for its publication? Are there limits to subject and portrayal? As an entity, it views itself as without limitations because limitation means censorship in French understanding of liberté d'expression, but the question must be asked in this time of globalized media. Remembering the historical importance of caricatures in France, and because the attack evoked such a visceral, national response in 2015, we should return to *Charlie Hebdo* to ask: *In what way does Charlie Hebdo reveal an incompatibility between French identity and Islam?*

⁵⁹ "satirique, laïque et joyeux"

"Journal Satirique & Laïque - Dessins De Presse." *Charlie Hebdo*. Accessed January 20, 2020. https://charliehebdo.fr/page/3/?post_type=ch_news.

Chapter Four: Methodology

Surveys and Interviews

During June 2019, while studying abroad in France, I interviewed and surveyed students and faculty from Université Catholique de l'Ouest as well as doctoral students and advisors at the Institut National de la Recherche et de l'Agriculture (INRA). Both the interviews and surveys, Institutional Review Board approved, were conducted in French although the online survey had an English option if desired.⁶⁰ Though I was abroad at Université Catholique de l'Ouest, I was unable to disperse the online surveys en masse to all students of the university and instead relied heavily on graduate students, faculty, and friends of these two groups to participate in my research. The same is true of the interviews. Due to the sensitive nature of the topics at hand, university officials allowed interviews to be conducted on campus, but would not allow an informational email to be sent to all university students. For these reasons, the interview and survey demographics cannot be considered a comprehensive sampling though the responses garnered still matter. The students from the Université Catholique de l'Ouest are demographically homogeneous while the research candidates and advisors from the INRA come from across France on scholarship to work for the government in their field. There is some overlap in participants from the survey and interview although this overlap is minimal.

⁶⁰ See Appendices A and B for all IRB approved questions

I sent the online survey via email to faculty willing to send it to their friends, family, and graduate students. It was live from 6 June 2019 to 25 June 2019. The principle themes addressed caricatures and their importance, the attack of January 2015, and Islam in France.⁶¹ Of the 28 respondents, 14 completed the survey in its entirety. Eight of these participants are female, six are male, and all are white French citizens. All maintained anonymity.

I conducted interviews from 6 June to 14 June. Of the 18 interviewees, nine were male and nine are female. The questions most visibly impactful are question nine in Section I and question eight in Section II concerning tolerance and open-mindedness of France today.⁶² No respondent was entirely comfortable at any point in the interview process, although a few appeared excited to participate where others appeared apprehensive to address social tension in France. Many respondents elected not to remain anonymous; however, all respondents are referred to only by their initials if they gave their name or their gender and age if they decided to remain anonymous.

Demographics of Interview Respondents

The interview portion of my data collection garnered 18 interviewees over the course of two weeks. Of these 18, nine were men and nine were women. While this group is not racially homogeneous, the majority of respondents were white, all over 18 years old, and are French nationals. Five respondents fall into the adult (45+) category and eleven fall within the youth category (18-34) outlined in the survey analysis chapter. I did not ask about religion or where in France the person is from. However, the much larger

⁶¹ See Appendix A for the full list survey of questions

⁶² See Appendix B for the full list of interview questions

youth category are from the Angers area or from all over France and received scholarships to work at the Institut National de la Recherche Agricole.

Demographics of Survey Respondents

The survey portion of my data collection garnered 14 completed responses over the course of two weeks. Of these 14, six were men and eight were women. All were white, over 18 years old, come from the middle or upper middle classes, and were French nationals. The majority of respondents (11) came from smaller cities such as Angers while two were from villages in the countryside and one is from a major city, such as Paris. Twelve of the 14 reported currently practicing or having been raised in Christian households. No respondent identified as Muslim; two are Buddhist and Atheist. Though 14 is not an adequate sample size for immense data extrapolation, these respondents provide insight into overarching themes relative to contemporary French society. It is important to note that the range of respondents age is 18+ with two respondents being between 18-24, four between 30-34, two between 45-49, and six 50 or older. This range of ages suggest generational differences in the conceptualization of caricatures and Islam in France. I delineate the generational ages as youth: 18-34 and adult: 45+. The gender, race, and religion all factor into the traditional, Republican French identity on the surface. The ages ranged from 18-34 and 45+. These factors show a perspective limited by racial experiences that fit the traditional narrative that implies one collective identity based on race and religion.

Chapter Five: Survey Analysis

The analysis chapter is laid out in the following way: the question as it was presented in French, followed by the question in English, which is in turn followed by analysis of the question and corresponding responses. The original French response to the question will be in the footnote, when appropriate, rather than the analysis itself in order to streamline analysis.

Conceptualizations of Frenchness

Based on the demographic data collected, the sample group represents the 18th century demographics that founded what is now the French state. White Christians redefined the country in 1789, redistributing power and importance under terms that applied to a rather homogenous nation. The sample size acts as an indication of 18th century power structures. The power structures and legacy of 1789 inform the social and power structures that exist today. The changes between 1789 and 2019 are visible in the economy, the rise in ethnic diversity, and the rise in religious diversity. In some ways, however, France holds so tightly to the values established during the Revolution and reinforced during colonialism that globalization and demographic shifts have become a threat to their identity. In the wake of *Charlie Hebdo*, Francis Ghilès, a Research Fellow at Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, stated that “[France’s] last three presidents have been incapable of articulating a new identity for their country” in this new era where

France has somewhat fallen from grace.⁶³ The attack on *Charlie Hebdo* underscored that feeling of unease and fragmentation.

When asked, “Do you consider yourself French?” and given the option of “yes” or “no,” respondents unanimously answered “yes”.⁶⁴ Therefore, self-identification with French identity is established. Because the aim of this survey is to analyze social identities, the next question was given. When asked, “Does French society consider you French?,” all reported that they felt themselves to be French and that other French see them as belonging to French society as well.⁶⁵ When given the options of “yes,” “sometimes,” and “no,” there was once again a unanimous response. All 14 respondents identify, and feel validated in that French identity by others; therefore, although not representative, the responses can provide useful insight into French ideas on caricatures, *Charlie Hebdo*, and the associated questions concerning race, discrimination, and contemporary society at large. With the fact established that all respondents are French, identify as French, and feel seen as French, necessitated the following question.

When asked to characterize the French mentality, the most frequent responses were unsurprising.⁶⁶ Before analyzing responses, the word *la mentalité* in French does not carry the same connotation as “mentality” in English. It is more closely related to mindset and “la mentalité française” refers to defining principles for the French, which is clear in the following free responses. The most common words are liberty and individuality, two foundational concepts from the 1789 revolution. This legacy of

⁶³ “France’s Deep Identity Crisis.” CIDOB. Accessed January 19, 2020.
https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/opinion/europa/france_s_deep_identity_crisis.

⁶⁴ Appendix A

⁶⁵ Appendix A

⁶⁶ Appendix A

conforming to Republican ideological norms is therefore visible, but so is the shift in perspective. Other respondents said French mentality is, at present, preoccupied with “ethnocentrism and critiques of those different than themselves” and “a difficulty to accept social and economic evolutions that result in a society” that is “more and more extremist.”⁶⁷ As *Charlie Hebdo* is a reflection of French mentality and perspective, the content of caricatures is a form of national self-expression. Unsurprisingly, when asked what the principal themes, and in keeping with the historical development of caricatures, the responses show politics, religion, and the news as the largest categories for types of caricatures.⁶⁸ *Charlie Hebdo* specifically touches on taboos, war, politics, and religion. The purpose of these caricatures remains the same: to convey national and international news at a glance while pushing the observer to think on the subject matter. While *Charlie Hebdo* is a vehicle for the expression of one of many French mentalities, it is important to go further and address the fractured French identity. This fracture is evident by the responses to the question: What is the difference in utilization between the words : “étranger” and “autre”?⁶⁹

The French suffer from a crisis of identity.⁷⁰ They cannot generally define themselves outside of nationality but can immediately reject others as French. There is no answer to what it means to be French. This confusion is evident in the discord among the free responses about the significance of “l’étranger,” “l’autre,” and “l’intégration.” The consensus that “étrangers” means coming from other places, having another nationality,

⁶⁷ “l’ethnocentrisme, la critique de l’autre” ; “Une difficulté d’accepter les évolutions sociales et économiques” ; “De plus en plus extrémistes”

⁶⁸ Appendix A

⁶⁹ Appendix A

⁷⁰ “France's Deep Identity Crisis.” CIDOB. Accessed January 19, 2020.

https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/opinion/europa/france_s_deep_identity_crisis.

and “autre” meaning someone who is not me and that both can be used interchangeably or depending on context, shows the internal confusion and struggle to self-define. This confusion on the definition results in confusion about immigrants and the concept of integration of those who can be both “étrangers” and “autres”. One participant responded: “In France, the first word [étranger] concerns nationality or the fact to come from immigration (sometimes the 2nd or 3rd generation). The second word [autre] represents “someone who is not me,” which is different. Certain people use étranger in the same sense as “other.””⁷¹ It is important to note that the Kouachi brothers fell into the first category according to the participant’s definition. The use of both of these terms reveal degrees of distance between the French and those who are not French. Contradictorily, some participants view the word “étranger” to carry a deeper disdain than “autre” because “autre does not have a connotation of race” and “there is less respect in the word “autre”⁷² The naturally subsequent question to those on the topic of “other” and “foreigner/outsider” follows.

When asked, “Do you think that ethnic minorities are well integrated in France? Why?,” five responded “yes” and nine “no.”⁷³ Of those who said “yes” and gave further detail, they said the holdback was location and “the real problem is education more than racism.”⁷⁴ The location refers to pockets of immigrant communities where education quality is poor. This response implies that poor education leads to racism, an interesting perspective. It is unclear from the response if the education mentioned is education on

⁷¹ “En France, le premier mot concerne la nationalité ou le fait d’être issu de l’immigration (parfois de 2eme ou 3eme génération). Le deuxième mot représente “ce qui n’est pas moi”, ce qui est différent. Certains Français utilisent “étrangers” dans le même sens que “autre”

⁷² “Autre n’a pas de connotation de race” ; “Moins de respect dans le mot « autre »”

⁷³ Appendix A, question

⁷⁴ “Le vrai problème est plus au niveau de l’éducation qu’à celui du racisme”

integration practices and procedures or education provided in the school systems near these communities. Furthermore, the question of whether the respondent means tolerance education is unclear. Those who responded “no” cited the retention of the native culture in terms of language, clothing, and lack of structures intended to welcome immigrants. These perspectives echo the ideas that France accepts one singular identity and implies integration as assimilation even though the state advocates multicultural integration. According to respondents, factors contributing to the failure to integrate are: “lack of tolerance,” “difficulties around jobs,” and “because there is a type of discrimination in integration”; one respondent said “divided to better rule,” implying that the failure to integrate Muslims is done to keep the power standard in place.⁷⁵ The lack of tolerance reflects resistance to non-French customs while the difficulties around jobs reveal underlying racism and employment discrimination. Though not further expounded upon in the survey responses, one of my classes dealing with interviews and CVs expressly touched on the Frenchification of names that happens in order to increase chances for job interviews because of how widely spread name-based profiling has become.⁷⁶ If integration is not well-achieved in France as of today, what does it truly mean to integrate according to this sample size?

When asked to define the word and process of integration, the most striking answers were “true integration doesn’t exist. Each guards their own culture” and

⁷⁵ “manque de tolérance” ;
“Difficultés d’embauche” ;
“divisé pour mieux régner” ;
“Car il y a une sorte de discrimination dans l’intégration”

⁷⁶ **Le Figaro.** “En France, Mohammed a Quatre Fois Moins De Chances D’être Recruté Que Michel.” *Le Figaro.fr*, October 9, 2015. <https://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2015/10/08/01016-20151008ARTFIG00364-en-france-mohammed-a-quatre-fois-moins-de-chances-d-etre-recrute-que-michel.php>.

“integration is assimilation of a person to a group”.⁷⁷ These are the two prevailing ideologies surrounding integration and the other responses to this question run the gambit. Others include: “Bend to the rules of the welcoming country, which must then work against discrimination” and “the ability of an individual to accept and respect a culture and to live there respecting the laws and customs written and unspoken.”⁷⁸ Notably, one response was the line drawn between assimilation and integration “that which was called assimilation before: a person lives in a new language culture in the process of adapting to a new country, all while remaining rich in their own.”⁷⁹ The phrase “that which was called assimilation before” is particularly notable as it reveals the persistent expectation of assimilation rather than integration. These differences of what it means to integrate and the contradiction of how much of the originating culture can be maintained and accepted also contributes to confusion and tension between immigrants and French natives. The conflicting responses to the questions about tolerance underscore the disagreement around integration.

The idea of tolerance in France is not the same as tolerance within the US. As I will discuss in the following section concerning the interviews conducted in June 2019, questioning the French on the differences of tolerance and acceptance produced confusion and reticence to respond.⁸⁰ In the survey, the question of what tolerance means garnered the largest disparity in responses. There were responses about tolerance

⁷⁷ Appendix A

“La véritable intégration n'existe pas. Chacun garde sa propre culture”

“L'intégration est l'assimilation d'une personne à un groupe”

⁷⁸ “Se plier au règles du pays d'accueil, qui a son tour doit veiller à combattre les discriminations”

“La capacité d'un individu à accepter et respecter une autre culture et à y vivre en respectant les lois et les coutumes écrites et tacites”

⁷⁹ “ce qui s'appelait avant assimilation : la personne vit dans la nouvelle langue-culture en adaptation au nouveau pays, tout en restant riche des siennes”

⁸⁰ Appendix A

meaning acceptance, but the dissent present in this word is worth noting because it reveals the underlying complexities of integration as well as the proliferation of topics such as Islam on the covers of *Charlie Hebdo*. Of the 14 respondents, nine hold that minorities do not integrate well into French society. One respondent remarked: “The French are not generally tolerant people because they have a problem with that which is different from ‘French norms’ while another said “Too tolerant yet too lenient. Tolerance means colonization.”⁸¹ The respondent did not elucidate further but the hostility of the response implies tolerance allows slow colonization by immigrating populations and dilution of Frenchness. The animosity in these phrases is tenable and the fracture in French society between those who welcome difference and those who see it as a challenge is visible. The visual nature of caricatures picks up the baton on fixating on these differences. As the oldest form of political and social dissent, caricatures play an important role in the rhetoric projected to the public on political and social issues.

Caricatures

Because of the long history of caricatures in France, and the fact that caricatures of Charlie Hebdo has become the epicenter for the debate about identity, freedom of expression, and islamophobia, questions on caricatures are necessary. To establish the importance of caricatures to the participant pool, the first questions were: “Do you look at Caricatures? If yes, why?” Two of the 14 respondents do not look at caricatures. The other 12 responded that they refer to caricatures as a means of learning about news and

⁸¹ “Les Français ne sont en général pas des gens tolérant car ils ont du mal avec ce qui est différent des ‘normes françaises’
“Trop tolérante et trop laxiste. Tolérance signifie colonisation.”

politics in a glance or to laugh. Caricatures are still a universally accessible, direct means of communication with the general public that have the power to transcend social class because there is no requirement for literacy or language.⁸² The danger in this universal accessibility is digestibility. Caricatures are a visual medium and therefore always visible but also inherently nuanced and potentially intellectually inaccessible. While two respondents do not look at caricatures, the majority do and that means the caricature is seen, processed, and in some form or fashion, shapes the observer's perspective on the subject of the caricature.

Perception of the viewer and intention of the creator are not always aligned. So, "what's the point of caricatures?"⁸³ Caricatures have a historical origin in the right to freedom of expression, dissenting against those in power, and promoting a culture that uses its voice to inquire. France sees the lack of free speech as inhibiting democracy, inhibiting independent thinking and promoting conformity. That sentiment persists today. The overwhelming response of all 14 respondents all fall under the response that caricatures are "a counterpoint to power."⁸⁴ They are intended to create a forum where it is acceptable "to laugh, to mock in order to evacuate the discomfort because we are manipulated and conditioned. All and everywhere. Caricature is a valve offered to the people to laugh against the powers. They are a sign that we live in a liberal democracy."⁸⁵ These responses reflect the sentiments of 1789 in that they imply a liberty of expression

⁸² "French Caricature: Social Commentary & Scenes of the Day." "Very Ill!" The Many Faces of Medical Caricature in Nineteenth-Century England & France. Accessed January 20, 2020. <http://exhibits.hsl.virginia.edu/caricatures/fr1-scenes/>.

⁸³ Appendix B

⁸⁴ "un contre pouvoir"

⁸⁵ "A rire à se moquer à évacuer le malaise car nous somme manipulés en conditionnés. Tous et partout. La caricature est une soupape offerte au peuple pour rire des pouvoirs. Elles sont le signe que nous vivons en démocratie libérale"

driven by the collective power of the people flying in the face of political powers. This endorsement implies the traditional “punching up” power dynamic which is not the case in France where “Islam is the religion of the marginalized.”⁸⁶ Visual media is open to much wider scopes of interpretation and despite state-provided education, caricatures assume a level of education and self-reflection that is not always well-developed.

Caricatures also influence the observer by promoting certain topics in particular ways. While caricatures can be a way of “interrogating our rapport with a subject: what does this caricature evoke for me? Do I laugh? Do I recognize myself? Am I shocked?”⁸⁷

Caricaturists operate under the condition of total freedom of speech. This is legally true, but culturally relevant as it demands the question, does freedom of speech mean freedom to offend? If so, what group or groups occupy the main themes of caricatures?

Aside from their status as French, “What are the most prevalent themes in caricatures?” is the only other question on which all 14 respondents agreed on.⁸⁸ The consensus is that the most prevalent subjects portrayed in caricatures are politics, religion, and the news. This is indicative of the historical origins and the strength of caricatures as an inherently political tradition. However, caricatures, despite freedom of speech and the free use of caricatures by all political parties, diversity in opinion and that expression can become controversial. The expression itself is legal, but the impression left by caricatures attract certain people and repulse others. *Charlie Hebdo*’s intention of “to laugh, to mock” while pointing out the hypocrisy and irony present in contemporary

⁸⁶ Heer, Jeet. “France’s Deep-Seated Tradition of Subversive Satire.” *The Globe and Mail*, February 26, 2018. <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/frances-deep-seated-tradition-of-subversive-satire/article22389678/>.

⁸⁷ “A interroger notre rapport à ce sujet : qu’est-ce que cette caricature évoque-t-elle pour moi ? Est-ce que je ris ? Est-ce que je me reconnais ? Est-ce que je suis choquée ?”

⁸⁸ Appendix A

France offends some and emboldens others.⁸⁹ This is a residual effect of the fierce defense of freedom of speech as limitless. Mockery, however, often leads to controversy. This leads to the question, “is the objective of caricatures to create controversy?”⁹⁰

When asked if the objective is to be controversial six said no, two said yes, and six said both yes and no. Responses range from “In certain cases, yes. The caricatures of Plantu on the topic of veiled women for example” to “No, not a controversy but a certain truth.”⁹¹ From these answers, the difference in interpretation is clear. While it is intended to “incite [people] to debate” or “to reflect,” the presence of malicious intent is real.⁹² Reflecting the French mindset of no holds barred, caricatures necessarily represent a chance to critique, change, and question as was intended in the original development of visual satire in news sources. This mindset explains the seeming blasphemy against religious sects.

When asked “In your opinion, do religious allusions in caricatures represent contemporary French society?,” seven of the 14 respondents thought that caricatures depicted religions in ways that represent contemporary religious climate.⁹³ Two did not think caricatures represent contemporary religious climate at all and five had stipulations attached to their response. Of the five with stipulations, two came to the conclusion that caricatures are representative of sentiments towards religion in France. This results in an over nine of 14 leaning towards “yes” and five leaning toward “no.” In a clear reference to Islam, one respondent remarked that there was a resistance to dogmatic religions in

⁸⁹ “à rire, à se moquer”

⁹⁰ Appendix A

⁹¹ “Dans certains cas, oui. Les caricatures de Plantu sur les femmes voilées par exemple” ; “Non pas une polémique mais une certaine vérité”

⁹² “inciter [les gens] au débat”; “faire réfléchir”

⁹³ Appendix A

France. This is particularly interesting as it aligns with leftist, anti-religious perspectives at the same time that The Pew Research Center's Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey that found increasing leanings toward the political right which align with the success of the Front National before the 2017 election.⁹⁴ The views are once again strange bedfellows. This sentiment is also clear in the depictions of Islam by Charlie Hebdo. All caricatures work twofold to speak to the French about the news and religion's place in France while also shaping the way religion is conceptualized and digested by the masses. Therefore the continual references to Islam as an outlier through caricatures can be seen as 1) indicative of the French reticence to accept visible, dogmatic religion in a "secular" state and 2) France's fear that visible markers create a sense of division in the society as a whole and lead to a less unified France. As Francis Ghilès argues, France has a collective fear of Islamization that has been building for years and fostering the growth of an "us versus them" mentality.⁹⁵

Continuing in the in-group, out-group theme, the survey posed the questions: "Do caricatures deal with French culture only or foreign cultures as well? What do you associate with the word 'étrangers?'"⁹⁶ All respondents agreed, concerning the first question, that caricatures deal with all societies, topics, and cultures although the predominant are those that directly concern France. Everyone and everything is fair game for commentary, critique, and dissent. The important question in this duo is the second. When asked "what do you associate with the word "étranger," the responses were nearly

⁹⁴ Wike, Richard, Bruce Stokes, and Katie Simmons. "Negative Views of Minorities, Refugees Common in EU." Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project. Pew Research Center, December 31, 2019. <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2016/07/11/negative-views-of-minorities-refugees-common-in-eu/>.

⁹⁵ "France's Deep Identity Crisis." CIDOB. Accessed January 19, 2020.

https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/opinion/europa/france_s_deep_identity_crisis.

⁹⁶ Appendix A

uniform. Though most had responses in the vein of “non-natives,” “nationality/culture,” one responded “the concept of French culture is complex and very heterogeneous.”⁹⁷ This response warrants unpacking. In the first, complex applies to all cultures and is clearly understood. The comment “very heterogeneous” is unclear.⁹⁸ Based on the previously posed questions, the answer could be political opinion, race, or sexual orientation but not nationality or culture. This is where the creation of us vs them rhetoric causes more immediate problems. The heterogeneity of France seems to be a point of pride, but that heterogeneity also seems to be a source of trouble that has allowed the rise of the *Rassemblement National*.⁹⁹ These issues of identity are not new. *Charlie Hebdo* provided a mutual rallying point for a country with an ambiguous national identity and uncovered the conflicting feelings of unity and division within the country. With no slow in immigrating Muslim populations, France continues to see social fissures which have resulted in the theories of Islam de France and Islam en France.

***Charlie Hebdo*, Islam, and France**

The attack on *Charlie Hebdo* and the Bataclan are the most significant national events in France since the election of Édith Cresson to the post of Prime Minister in 1991.¹⁰⁰ It has already made an indelible mark on French history. The *Charlie Hebdo* attack elicited responses from politicians of all credence, but in particular the response of

⁹⁷ “Non-natifs”; “nationalité/culture”; “le concept de culture française est complexe et très hétérogène”

⁹⁸ “très heterogene”

⁹⁹ Formerly known as Front National (FN). It is the same party, but changed names after the failure of Marine Le Pen’s 2017 presidential campaign.

¹⁰⁰ William Drozdiak. “FRANCE THE FEMALE PRIME MINISTER.” *The Washington Post*. WP Company, May 18, 1991. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1991/05/18/france-the-female-prime-minister/6124e5d4-3baa-4eb3-9067-aa7ba3cbc8c3/>.

former Prime Minister Valls (2014-2016). The first question addressing the aftermath of *Charlie Hebdo* is based on his response.

When asked to respond to former Prime Minister Valls' quote, "A territorial, social, ethnic apartheid establishes itself on our country," in the aftermath of *Charlie Hebdo*, two people decided not to respond.¹⁰¹ Before analysis, it is important to note that apartheid refers to racial segregation and the pronominal verb *s'imposer* is used to assert that there is no one group that is to blame for the apartheid but that it is a virus that has taken on a life in France.¹⁰² The 12 responses can be summed up in the following selections. The response "it only highlights phenomena that have always existed, the country begins to be governed by fear and exclusion," and "that inequalities exist more and more and are not managed" account for the largest number of responses.¹⁰³ It is clear that there is a general understanding that something is not working to create a French collective. Otherwise, the types of responses would have varied. The lack of unified response reinforces the issues surrounding the definition of French identity, *étranger*, *autre*, and integration. There will naturally be degrees of understanding among people but this response to *Charlie Hebdo* reveals very deep fissures. The response that most ardently represents the deep divide is : "*Charlie Hebdo* is the window into the French soul. Mr. Valls understood nothing."¹⁰⁴ The respondent accuses the Prime Minister, a naturalized Frenchman, of not understanding *Charlie Hebdo*, which he claims as

¹⁰¹ Appendix A

¹⁰² Y Loiseau. (2019). *question de connotation*. yves.loiseau@uco.fr.

¹⁰³ "elle ne fait que monter en épingle des phénomènes qui ont toujours existé, le pays commence à se laisser gouverner par la peur et l'exclusion" ; "Que des inégalités existent de plus en plus et qu'elles ne sont pas gérées."

¹⁰⁴ "Charlie Hebdo c'est la vitrine de l'esprit français. M. Valls n'a rien compris."

inherently French entity. The irony of this situation is representative of the larger condition of the state of France.

Following the theme of responses to the attack, the question of social media came into play. Especially on Twitter, the responses were immediate and international. Initially, the responses were #jesuisCharlie, which was meant to be a show of solidarity against violence. As the news broke, counter responses emerged such as #jesuisAhmed, in honor of the Muslim police officer who died in the shooting and was heralded as a good French Muslim in the face of national and international press outlets generalizing all Islam as a vehicle for violence. I elected to make this question of whether or not hashtag activism created a division in France a multiple choice question, with two options being #jesuisCharlie with caveats and the third #jesuisAhmed. When asked if not saying #jesuisCharlie meant the writer was against France, 7/14 survey respondents felt that “#jesuisCharlie is an example of French solidarity.¹⁰⁵ Not saying it means I am not part of the French collective.” Two people did not respond to the question at all. 4/14 selected the option that they would use the hashtag but understand how it can marginalize the Muslims in France who did not support the attack. 11/14 would use the hashtag #jesuisCharlie to be part of the collective and only one said that the hashtag should have been #jesuisAhmed, in reference to the Muslim police officer that died in the attack. The importance of the French collective identity overrides all else. The attack prompts questions on the origins of extremism in France.

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The respondents were presented with competing ideologies on the origins of extremism in France. The response options were: true, neither true nor false, and false.

They are presented below in the same order as given on the survey:

A) What do you think of this statement? : Extremism is born within the borders of France, which results in Otherness in France

B) What do you think of this statement? : Extremism is born outside of France but has consequences for the French population.¹⁰⁶

When asked if extremism within France resulted in a sense of otherness in France (A) the responses were 10/14 saying no or neither true nor false; conversely, the supposition that extremism outside of France resulted in otherness in France (B) garnered 12/14 true or neither true nor false responses. These responses indicate that extremism does not come from within France, seemingly absolving France of any fault in integration or integrationist policy while blaming exterior sources for acts such as the attack against *Charlie Hebdo* and Bataclan on external forces alone. Because the word “extremisme” is currently associated with political parties and Islam, the following question concerning Islam is pertinent.

When asked if France exists in a state of Islam *de* France (IdF) or Islam *en* France (IeF) and if that status is likely to change in coming years, the respondents were provided with the following definition.¹⁰⁷ Islam de France is the idea that a form of Islam tailored to French normative standards should be the prevailing embodiment of Islam in France. Islam en France is the idea that Islam should exist as an independent entity within France. 6/14 respondents believe IdF is the current status of Islam in France, 6 believe it is IeF

¹⁰⁶ Appendix A

¹⁰⁷ Appendix A

and 2 refrained from answering at all, and none of them are certain of what the future of Islam looks like in France. The two who refrained from responding also failed to give an explanation for how they see the current state of Islam or their views of the nuances surrounding Islam. Of the six who remain support Islam de France as the prevailing expression of Islam in France maintained the party line in stating that “religion adapts to the republic, not the inverse.”¹⁰⁸ This conflict is echoed in the responses to the idea behind the #jesuisCharlie movement in the immediate aftermath of the attack. Only 2/14 responded to whether or not their response would change. One held that IdF was the reality, but that there was no way to say what’s to come and the other said IeF is the way now and will be in the future. This discord in response reflects the uncertainty of what’s to come in France as it enters its fourth decade of pondering: How does Islam work here?

¹⁰⁸ “La religion s’adaptent à la République, pas l’inverse.”

Chapter Six: Interview Results

The analysis chapter will be laid out in the following way: the question as it was presented in French, followed by the question in English, which is in turn followed by analysis of the question and corresponding responses. The original French response to the question will be in the footnote, when appropriate, rather than the analysis itself in order to streamline analysis. From Section I, the first questions confirming age, consent to the recording of the interview, and anonymity preferences are not listed as they do not add to the analysis. Those who requested anonymity will be referred to as “anonymous male/female, young/adult.” Those who did not elect to remain anonymous are presented by their initials. In Section II, each interviewee was read the same introduction.¹⁰⁹

Responses:

Section I

Section I contains questions about caricatures and Otherness in France. These are designed to open conversation on *Charlie Hebdo*, the attack, and the state of Islam in France. Of all the questions posed, 4, 5, 8, and 9 are the most elucidating. Like the

¹⁰⁹ English: *Charlie Hebdo: the attack has reignited the ideas of incompatibility of France and Islam. The following questions are intended to delve deeper.*

French: *Charlie Hebdo: l'attentat a ravivé les idées d'incompatibilité de la France et de l'islam. Les questions suivantes sont destinées à approfondir.*

survey, I began the interview with the following question: What is the purpose of caricatures?¹¹⁰

All 18 people responded in accordance with the traditional function: to mock, to laugh, to critique or to denounce. A few noted that caricatures appear in the media very often due to, as one respondent said, caricatures have “always existed...from the 19th century on.”¹¹¹ Posing this question allows the interviews to begin in the same vein as the surveys. Since this is a historically founded, the natural follow up is: Do you look at caricatures?¹¹²

Question four also received very similar answers across all 18 respondents. Three, however, provided additional insight. LY, an older white male, expressed an interest in caricatures saying, “From time to time; I like cartoons in general...I regularly purchase *Le Canard Enchaîné*”¹¹³ *Le Canard enchaîné* is a competing satirical magazine that publishes weekly. It is the largest rival to *Charlie Hebdo*. LD, a young female scientist, at first acknowledged caricatures as a very French thing and clarified later in the interview that “it’s true that sometimes caricatures push a little too far toward the extreme. It mocks a person. It is for this reason that I do not look at them”¹¹⁴ ME, a young female teacher of French as a second language takes a similar stance. She acknowledges the use of them in the classroom to teach her students about the cultural codes and symbols the French use for visual association, but does not care for them herself. Among these responses, a generational divide becomes apparent. The younger women are less accepting of

¹¹⁰ Appendix B

¹¹¹ Toujours existé...très fréquent de 19eme siecle.

¹¹² Appendix B

¹¹³ De temps en temps, j’aime bien les dessins en general...j’achete regulierement “le canard enchaîné”

¹¹⁴ **C’est vrai que parfois les caricatures sont un peut peu trop pousser vers l’extrême. On se moquer de la personne. C’est pour ca que je ne regarde pas.**

caricatures in general because they find them unappealing or pushing past the respectful limits of humor. The older man views them as an outlet, truly, as a funny release or update on what is happening in the world. All three view caricatures as a freedom of expression and see that as the Frenchman's right, but the two women do not engage in this particular expression. This difference appears to be evidence of both a generational and gender divide.

When asked the battery of questions ““What is “otherness?” Is there an “otherness” in France? Who or what is the source of otherness? What is the largest source of “otherness” in France?,” the questions took a few moments of reflection.¹¹⁵ This question struck these respondents in very different ways. LY, a straight white male, found this question “annoying” because “it is an obligation” to have an otherness because a society is built on others and the interactions of others.¹¹⁶ LY appears to think of otherness in the broad scope of individuality, as does ME, who says that otherness is “that which defines us as other.”¹¹⁷ She acknowledges that the use of “other” here is confusing, but continues that in this context it is what sets someone apart from other individuals. While LY had a philosophical response and ME a sociological one, LD had a personal reaction. As a non-white female from an immigrant family, LD has a different perspective. She explains: “For me, I know that because I look the way I look, children put me in a box...you are not French even if I speak French and there is no difference between me and a French person....just by my physique and Colombian origins, I am

¹¹⁵ Appendix B

¹¹⁶ Anonymous (LY). Interview by Mildred Morse. In person, in French. Angers, Maine-et-Loire, France. 16 June 2019.

¹¹⁷ Anonymous (ME). Interview by Mildred Morse. In person, in French. Angers, Maine-et-Loire, France. 16 June 2019.

considered an Other”¹¹⁸ Here the faults in the Republican model, as previously cited by Anthropologist Fernando, are evident. LD is designated as an Other on the basis of her parent’s immigrant status, falling into the same category, in this sense, as the Koachi brothers who were also French and yet considered Other. Speaking to this division between white Republican model France, as Fernando asserts, LD and LY view Otherness as a more nebulous concept than a personal reality.¹¹⁹ There are no questions between this one and the next in the order of the interview questions. This is done intentionally to see how the French conceptualized Otherness and openness of the French.

The next question requires self-reflection and reflection on France as a whole. When asked if France is an open-minded country, the respondents were divided.¹²⁰ LY answered immediately “yes” and then paused, chuckled, and said “France is an open country because ... (hesitates). There are many reasons” including the waves of immigration from former colonies to immigrants from other countries today.¹²¹ LD, however, had a very contrasting response. She laughed. Then, as I pressed for a response, LD said “I think that certain French people can be very open. Like I said, that depends on your sphere and where you’re from. For me, it’s the people who have travelled” who are more accepting.¹²² The teacher, ME, went further, saying she is “unsure if the French are ready to accept, in relation to the evolution of the country and how values change in

¹¹⁸ **Anonymous (LD). Interview by Mildred Morse. In person, in French. Angers, Maine-et-Loire, France. 16 June 2019.**

¹¹⁹ Mayanthi Fernando. "The Republic's "Second Religion": Recognizing Islam in France." Middle East Report, no. 235 (2005): 12-17. Accessed March 8, 2020. doi:10.2307/30042443.

¹²⁰ Appendix B

¹²¹ **Anonymous (LY). Interview by Mildred Morse. In person, in French. Angers, Maine-et-Loire, France. 16 June 2019.**

¹²² **Anonymous (LD). Interview by Mildred Morse. In person, in French. Angers, Maine-et-Loire, France. 16 June 2019.**

relation to the society around them that is changing”¹²³ Each of three physically indicated that they were uncomfortable with this question. LY tilted his head, DL laughed and looked away, and ME looked down. These indicators alone show the consternation around France’s openness and underlying social dynamics. I chose this question as the last with the intention of ending the first section with the interviewee thinking about tolerance before asking about the January 2015 attacks.

Section II: questions designed to delve deeper on *Charlie Hebdo* and Islam

Section II contains questions directly related to *Charlie Hebdo* and Islam in France. Numbers 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, and 10 are the most insightful. This section of questions begins with a question of what *Charlie Hebdo* means to each respondent. Every individual said though they may not have read *Charlie Hebdo* personally, it became a symbol for solidarity around the French right to free speech. So, what are the social ramifications of the attack?

The question of whether social tensions “between France and the perceived “Other” found in Islamic communities in France?” yielded unsurprising responses.¹²⁴ Each person had a different view of Islam that aligns with their previous answers. LY outright denied that *Charlie Hebdo* created the tensions, citing that “it has existed for many years...Islam is not compatible with *Charlie Hebdo*, it isn’t new.”¹²⁵ LD’s initial response was nearly the same. She acknowledges that the tension was already there, but that

¹²³ Anonymous (ME). Interview by Mildred Morse. In person, in French. Angers, Maine-et-Loire, France. 16 June 2019.

¹²⁴ Appendix B

¹²⁵ Anonymous (LY). Interview by Mildred Morse. In person, in French. Angers, Maine-et-Loire, France. 16 June 2019.

Charlie Hebdo was an intensifying “trigger event for waves of critiques” and “people started to understand that they were different.”¹²⁶ ME builds on this. She asserts that the attack “created three groups:” first, those that supported *Charlie Hebdo* for its defense of free speech, second, those who supported religious freedom for Islam, and a third group that amalgamized Muslims and extremists.¹²⁷ In short, that there is a clear short-term effect from the politicization of the attack on *Charlie Hebdo*, while long term effects are not as clear. This leads to the question: how does the government talk about Islam?

The biggest problem with this question of whether French discourse toward the Muslim population is ambivalent was the use of the word “ambivalent.”¹²⁸ LY and ME did know what it meant while LD did not and required an explanation.¹²⁹ LY pointed to the belief in France that religion is constrained to the private sphere and should not be in the public discourse. The French state presents itself as open to everyone, while simultaneously denying the construction of new mosques.¹³⁰ This example shows the chaos that the ambivalence creates. ME’s response also supports this confusion. She says, “yes...France is between security discussions and we can’t be discriminatory.” ME says she has seen a societal shift that has resulted in increased preference for a security state within France, yet also notes France’s continual efforts to claim that a security state does

¹²⁶ Anonymous (LD). Interview by Mildred Morse. In person, in French. Angers, Maine-et-Loire, France. 16 June 2019.

¹²⁷ Anonymous (ME). Interview by Mildred Morse. In person, in French. Angers, Maine-et-Loire, France. 16 June 2019.

¹²⁸ Appendix B

¹²⁹ Ambivalence in this context translates to “mixed messages;” *Word Reference*, s.v. “ambivalent” accessed March 12, 2020, <https://www.wordreference.com/fren/ambivalent>.

¹³⁰ Anonymous (LY). Interview by Mildred Morse. In person, in French. Angers, Maine-et-Loire, France. 16 June 2019.

not mean a discriminatory state.¹³¹ LD, the youngest respondent in this group, hesitates, sighs, giggles and then responds: “it’s complicated. I think that France does what it says and that sometimes people don’t want to integrate if it means losing their originating culture.”¹³² While ME and LY are different generations, they have a similar outlook in comparison to LD. LD is herself a first generation French citizen, but is the same age as many second generation French citizens. So, has *Charlie Hebdo* struck a nerve that was already agitated? Did it create a division or just uncover it? Did *Charlie Hebdo* create a division or unification of French society?¹³³

LY says the attack on *Charlie Hebdo* was no more important than any other terror incident. It was simply a moment of solidarity when “people came out to support liberty of expression and protest the violence of the killings.”¹³⁴ ME said that those in support of the liberty of expression were only half of the response. The division lay between those in support of free speech and those “who said that maybe they can’t laugh at everything.”¹³⁵ These two responses seem to represent the societal fissure that exist in France. LD’s expression of surprise at the question, followed by the response that *Charlie Hebdo* was a unifying event in France and that “satellites (satellite groups) made the fissure between extremists and the rest.”¹³⁶ These seem to be the largest modes of thought as far as

¹³¹ Anonymous (ME). Interview by Mildred Morse. In person, in French. Angers, Maine-et-Loire, France. 16 June 2019.

¹³² Anonymous (LD). Interview by Mildred Morse. In person, in French. Angers, Maine-et-Loire, France. 16 June 2019.

¹³³ Appendix B

¹³⁴ Anonymous (LY). Interview by Mildred Morse. In person, in French. Angers, Maine-et-Loire, France. 16 June 2019.

¹³⁵ Anonymous (ME). Interview by Mildred Morse. In person, in French. Angers, Maine-et-Loire, France. 16 June 2019.

¹³⁶ Anonymous (LD). Interview by Mildred Morse. In person, in French. Angers, Maine-et-Loire, France. 16 June 2019.

personal impressions. Others among the 18 respondents answered along similar lines though they leaned toward the more patriotic response of LY.

Finally, when asked if she had any comments to add after the interview, ME said “I heard people ... say that there is a pressure, a force of Islam on France and that will change the society. There is a great, great fear that France is changing.”¹³⁷ This seems to be the underlying message, that France is in a state of growing pains that manifests in social upheaval.

¹³⁷ Anonymous (ME). Interview by Mildred Morse. In person, in French. Angers, Maine-et-Loire, France. 16 June 2019.

Conclusion

The personal and internal turmoil amongst the French is evident in the survey and interview results. Interview responses revealed that most respondents became visibly uncomfortable when asked about the open-mindedness of France and the relationship that Islam has with France today. Survey responses revealed a majority of contemporaries between 20 and 50 find political discourse ambivalent, that extremism is associated primarily with Islam and had no similar views or ideas about how Islam fits in France in the post-*Charlie Hebdo* world. Though this is a small cohort of respondents which poses limitations to the static conclusions that can be drawn from this data.

The value of this data comes from the intergenerational views of the participants. The age split of youth (18-34) and adult (45+) reveals the generational differences present in approaches to inclusivity and Otherness. Those 45 and older came of age in the post-colonial age, witnessing the independence movements, and immediate societal shifts of these movements, of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. They witnessed the immigration, naturalization, and apparent equality that the immigrating populations experienced. Conversely, the 18-34 year old have observed the disillusionment of their parents and the more and more evident contradictions in French openness. The attack on *Charlie Hebdo* exacerbated these differences, forcing them to the public eye.

The original intention of this conclusion was to analyze the memory of *Charlie Hebdo*. A few month ago that would have been appropriate. The fifth anniversary

commemorations featured on France24, debates on freedom of expression, and the memory of the attack on *Charlie Hebdo*. Riss, the current owner and primary content producer at *Charlie Hebdo* mourned the attack, saying : “Yesterday, we were saying shit to God, the army, the Church, the State. Today, we must learn to say shit to tyrannical associations, navel-gazing minorities, and bloggers who slap us on the wrists like little school teachers.”¹³⁸ Freedom of speech seemed again them most pressing problem facing France’s national memory. Today, the French face a new challenge: COVID-19. The distinctions of Otherness, social fissures and fractures, and intolerance that seemed so pervasive quickly faded to the background. The idea of a collective France is embodied in the comradery and support for medical workers, respect of the confinement order, and ambition to flatten the curve so that life can return to normal. At the beginning, the question of “**How does Charlie Hebdo reveal contradictory ideas of Frenchness and Islam?**” highlighted the fractures present in France’s social structures. COVID-19 shifts perspective. Does the emergence of COVID mean that France is more unified? Is it actually social unity and does it matter? Has this indiscriminate disease been to the 21st century what the Revolution was to the 18th?

The issues presented herein will not dissipate so easily as it currently appears. There will still be camps that advocate Islam de France and Islam en France. Marine Le Pens will still exist, but this new collective trauma will have profound effects on the political and economic psychologies of France and the potential to completely alter

¹³⁸ « Hier, on disait merde à Dieu, à l’armée, à l’Église, à l’État. Aujourd’hui, il faut apprendre à dire merde aux associations tyranniques, aux minorités nombrilistes, aux blogueurs et blogueuses qui nous tapent sur les doigts comme des petits maîtres d’école » ;

“Les Nouveaux Visages De La Censure.” *Charlie Hebdo*, January 20, 2020. <https://charliehebdo.fr/2020/01/edito/les-nouveaux-visages-de-la-censure/>.

normative customs. On the other hand, the leftist, anti-religious side will remain as well. The unity of these strange bedfellows against Islam appears most important in sociopolitical discourse until the introduction of COVID-19. Now, the world exists in a suspended reality; when normalcy returns, the underlying racisms, prejudices, and problems of Otherness will recur in national spotlight because the solidarity and unity in this time of panic due to COVID-19 will no longer exist.

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Appendix A

Survey - English

Q1 Are you 18 years or older?

Yes (1)

No (2)

Skip To: Q2 If Are you 18 years or older? = Yes

Skip To: End of Survey If Are you 18 years or older? = No

Q2 Please select your gender:

Male (1)

Female (2)

Q34 Please select your race:

White (1)

Black (2)

Asian (3)

Middle Eastern or North African (4)

Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origins (5)

One or more (6) _____

Q3 Do you consider yourself French?

Yes (1)

No (2)

Q4 Does French society consider you French?

Yes (1)

Sometimes (2)

No (3)

Q5 Do you look at caricatures? Why?

Yes, to better understand the news (1)

Yes, to laugh (2)

Yes, to get a quick glimpse of today's politics (3)

No: (4) _____

Q39 What are the most prevalent themes in caricatures?

Free Response

Q6 What purpose do caricatures serve?

Free Response

Q35 Is the objective of caricatures to create controversy? Give examples.

Free Response

Q7 In your opinion, do religious allusions in caricatures represent the views of current French society? Why?

Free Response

Q35 What is your religion (raised or practicing currently)?

Christianity (1)

Judaism (2)

Islam (3)

Other: (4) _____

Q9 Do caricatures deal solely with French society or with foreign cultures as well? With what do you associate the word "étrangers"?

Free Response

Q31 What characterizes the French mentality?

Free Response

Q33 What is your age range:

18-24 (1) 25-29 (2) 30-34 (3) 35-39 (4) 40-44 (5) 45-49 (6) 50+

Q10 Have you or someone you know been the object of discrimination? In what situation(s)?

Free Response

Q33 What is your source of individuality? (what defines you as an "other"; i.e. religion, maternal language , immigrant status)

Free Response

Q18 What do you think of the statement: extremism is bred within the borders of France which results in Otherness in France

True (1)

Neither true nor false (2)

False (3)

Q19 What do you think of the statement: extremism is bred outside of France, but results in Other-ness in France

True (1)

Neither true nor false (2)

False (3)

Q36 Please select your social-economic standing:

Lower (1)

Middle (2)

Upper middle (3)

Upper (4)

End of Block: CM/MC

Start of Block: Free Response/response libre

Q11 Define the word "l'integration" and what it means to integrate.

Free Response

Q12 What is the difference of usage for the word: "un(e) étranger(ère)" and "une autre"?

Free Response

Q13 In your opinion, is "Islam de France" or "Islam en France" the current state of affairs? (IdF: Islam tailored to French normative standards, IeF: Islam existing as a separate entity in France). Do you think it will remain this way in the coming years?

Islam de France; (1) _____

Islam en France; (2) _____

Q14 Would you say France is a tolerant country? How would you define the word "tolérance"?

Free Response

Q17 In response to Charlie Hebdo, former Prime Minister Valls said "un apartheid territorial, social, ethnique, qui s'est imposé à notre pays." What do you understand from this statement?

Free Response

Q34 In your opinion, did hashtag activism (#jesuisCharlie and counter-responses) created more division in French society. That is to say, did not saying "#jesuisCharlie" mean that the writer was against France in their response?

#jesuisCharlie is an example of French solidarity. Not saying it means I am not part of the French collective (1)

#jesuisCharlie; I would use the hashtag but understand how other people would feel marginalized (2)

#jesuisAhmed should have been the trending tag. (Ahmed was Muslim cop who died in the attack on Charlie Hebdo). #jesuisCharlie represents the singular view of the white majority and the continued disregard for French Muslims. (3)

End of Block: Free Response/response libre Start of Block: Selon vous, vrai ou faux

Q20 According to you, are ethnic minorities well integrated into French society?

Yes; (1) _____

No; (2) _____

Q22 Imagine the slogan: "laïcité, diversité, identité" for France. What do you think of it? *Free Response*

Q37 Where are you from?

Major French city: (1) _____

Countryside/village community: (2) _____

Smaller city community (ie Angers, Nantes): (3) _____

End of Block: Selon vous, vrai ou faux Questions

Survey - French

Q1 Avez-vous 18 ou plus que 18 ans?

Oui (1)

Non (2)

Skip To: Q2 If Are you 18 years or older? = Yes

Skip To: End of Survey If Are you 18 years or older? = No

Q2 Identifiez-vous:

masculin (1)

féminin (2)

Q34 Identifiez-vous:

Européen (1)

Afrique (2)

Asiatique (3)

Moyen Orient et Afrique du Nord (4)

Hispanique (5)

Un ou plus: (6) _____

Q3 Vous considérez-vous français?

Oui (1)

Non (2)

Q4 La société française vous considère-t-elle française?

Oui (1)

Parfois (2)

Non (3)

Q5 Regardez-vous les caricatures? Si oui, pourquoi?

Oui, pour mieux comprendre les nouvelles (1)

Oui, pour rire (2)

Oui, pour avoir une idée de la politique française actuelle (3)

Non: (4) _____

Q39 Quel sont les thèmes privilégiés dans les caricatures ?

Reponse libre

Q6 À votre avis, à quoi servent les caricatures?

Reponse libre

Q35 À votre avis, l'objectif des caricatures est-il de créer une polémique? Donnez des exemples :

Reponse libre

Q7 À votre avis, est-ce que les allusions religieuses dans les caricatures représentent la société française actuelle ? Pourquoi ?

Reponse libre

Q35 Quelle est votre religion (élevée ou pratiquant actuellement)?

Christianisme (1)

Judaïsme (2)

Islam (3)

Autre: (4) _____

Q9 Les caricatures touchent seulement la culture française ou également les cultures étrangères ? A quoi associez-vous le mot « étrangers » ?

Reponse libre

Q31 Qu'est-ce qui caractérise la mentalité française ?

Reponse libre

Q33 Quelle est votre classe d'âge:

18-24 (1) 25-29 (2) 30-34 (3) 35-39 (4) 40-44 (5) 45-49 (6) 50+

Q10 Avez-vous déjà été ou connaissez-vous quelqu'un qui a été l'objet de discrimination ? Dans quel(s) domaine(s) ?

Reponse libre

Q33 Qu'est-ce qui fait votre individualité ? (qqch qui vous définit comme autre ; par exemple : religion, langue maternelle, statut d'immigrant)

Reponse libre

Q18 Que pensez-vous de cette affirmation: l'extrémisme est élevé dans les frontières de la France, ce qui entraîne l'altérité en France.

Vrai (1)

Ni vrai ni faux (2)

Faux (3)

Q19 Que pensez-vous de cette affirmation: l'extrémisme est élevé hors de France mais a des conséquences sur la population française?

Vrai (1)

Ni vrai ni faux (2)

Faux (3)

Q36 Veuillez sélectionner votre statut socio-économique:

classe populaire (1)

classe moyenne (2)

classe moyenne supérieure (3)

classe supérieure (4)

End of Block: CM/MC

Start of Block: Free Response/response libre

Q11 Définissez le mot "intégration" et ce que cela signifie d'intégrer.

Reponse libre

Q12 Quelle est la différence d'utilisation entre les mots: "un(e) étranger(ère)" and "un(e) autre"?

Reponse libre

Q13 Selon vous, «Islam de France» ou «Islam en France» est-il l'état actuel des choses? (IdF: Islam adapté aux normes normatives françaises, IeF: Islam existant en tant qu'entité séparée en France). Pensez-vous que votre réponse sera la même dans plusieurs années ?

Islam de France (1) _____

Islam en France (2) _____

Q14 Diriez-vous que la France est un pays tolérant? Quelle définition donneriez-vous du mot « tolérance. »

Reponse libre

Q17 En réponse à Charlie Hebdo, l'ancien Premier ministre Valls a déclaré: "Un apartheid territorial, social, ethnique, s'est imposé à notre pays." Que comprenez-vous par cette phrase ?

Réponse libre

Q34 Selon vous, l'activisme de hashtag (#jesuisCharlie et ses contre-réponses) a-t-il créé davantage de division dans la société française? C'est-à-dire que le fait de ne pas dire #jesuisCharlie ne signifie pas être contre la France?

#jesuisCharlie est un exemple de solidarité française. Ne pas dire que cela signifie que je ne fais pas partie du collectif français (1)

#jesuisCharlie; J'utiliserais le hashtag mais comprendrais comment d'autres personnes se sentiraient marginalisées (2)

#jesuisAhmed aurait dû être la balise tendance. (Ahmed était un policier musulman décédé lors de l'attaque de Charlie Hebdo). #jesuisCharlie représente la vision singulière de la majorité blanche et le mépris persistant des musulmans français. (3)

End of Block: Free Response/response libre

Start of Block: Selon vous, vrai ou faux

Q20 D'après vous, est-ce que les minorités ethniques en France sont bien intégrées ? Pourquoi ?

Oui: (1) _____

Non: (2) _____

Q22 Imaginez-vous le slogan suivant pour la France : « laïcité, diversité, identité. » Qu'en pensez-vous ?

réponse libre

Q37 D'où êtes-vous?

Grande ville française : (1) _____

Communauté de campagne / village : (2) _____

Petite communauté urbaine (Angers, Nantes) : (3) _____

End of Block: Selon vous, vrai ou faux

Appendix B

Additional questions arose as the interviews occurred. These additional questions were not uniformly asked to each interviewee; they spontaneously came out of conversation and based on the responses of the respondent.

Interview Questions: English

Section I:

Caricatures – Charlie Hebdo – Other/Extremism

1. Are you 18 years or older?
2. Do you consent to the recording of this interview?
3. Would you like to remain anonymous?
4. What is the purpose of caricatures?
5. Do you look at caricatures?
6. What are your views on caricatures? (how are they used? Are they appropriate?)
7. Are caricatures racist?
8. What is “otherness?” Is there an “otherness” in France? Who or what is the source of otherness? What is the largest source of “otherness” in France?
9. Is France an open-minded country?

Section II:

Charlie Hebdo: the attack has reignited the ideas of incompatibility of France and Islam. The following questions are intended to delve deeper.

1. What does Charlie Hebdo mean to you?
2. Charlie Hebdo: in the world after Charlie Hebdo, are social tensions heightened between France and the perceived “Other” found in Islamic communities in France?
3. Pour vous, est-ce que le discours de la France concernant la population musulman est ambivalent ?
4. If extremism arises from a crisis of identity, does caricature art represent a defense against the crisis of identity in France?
5. Why use caricatures? What’s the point?
6. In your opinion, why is there extremism in France?
7. Does the immediate funding of rebuilding efforts for Notre Dame reveal the underlying majority Christian values of France? Please explain.
8. Would you say France is a tolerant country? How would you define “tolérance”?
9. How does Islam fit in France?
10. Did Charlie Hebdo create a division or unification of French society?

Interview Questions: French

Section I:

Caricatures - Charlie Hebdo -L'autre/l'altérité

1. Avez-vous 18 ans ou plus?
2. Consentez-vous à l'enregistrement de cet entretien?
3. Souhaitez-vous garder l'anonymat?
4. A quoi servent les caricatures ?
5. Regardez-vous les caricatures?
6. Que vous pensez des caricatures (comment sont-elles utilisées ? Sont-elles appropriées ?)
7. Les caricatures, sont-elles racistes ?
8. Qu'est-ce que c'est l'altérité ? Existe-t-il une « altérité » en France ? Qui est la source de cette altérité ? ou quelle est la source de cette altérité ? Quelle est la plus grande source d'altérité ?
9. Pensez-vous que la France soit un pays ouvert ?

Section II:

Charlie Hebdo:*l'attentat a ravivé les idées d'incompatibilité de la France et de l'islam. Les questions suivantes sont destinées à approfondir.*

1. Pour vous, que représente Charlie Hebdo?
2. Après l'attentat contre Charlie Hebdo, les tensions sociales se sont-elles intensifiées entre la France et « l'altérité » retrouvée dans la communauté musulmane en France ?
3. Pour vous, est-ce que le discours de la France concernant la population musulman est ambivalent ?
4. Si l'extrémisme résulte d'une crise d'identité, la caricature est-elle un moyen de défense contre la crise d'identité en France ?
5. Pourquoi utilise-t-on les caricatures ?
6. Quelles sont les raisons de l'extrémisme en France, à votre avis ?
7. Les financements immédiats pour la reconstruction de Notre-Dame révèlent-t-ils les valeurs chrétiennes majoritaires sous-jacentes en France? Pourriez-vous expliquer, s'il vous plaît.
8. Diriez-vous que la France est un pays tolérant? Quelle définition donneriez-vous du mot « tolérance. »
9. Quelle est la place de l'Islam en France ? (historique, etc).
10. Est-ce que Charlie Hebdo a créé une division ou une unification en France ?