Social Identity, Economic Interest, and the Formation of Host Attitudes Toward Refugees

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ABSTRACT

Scholarly studies of refugee crises have historically focused on the causes of refugee flight, the experience of the refugees themselves, or the impacts of refugees on host countries. More recently, a growing body of literature has examined the interaction of refugees and host populations, and more specifically the orientations of host individuals toward refugees. This study focuses on attitude formation during refugee crises, seeking to better understand the role of social and economic factors in shaping the attitudes of host populations. The core questions for this study are whether and how social identity and economic considerations relate to attitudes. Original data were generated through a randomized survey in Jordan in 2015, providing a unique dataset of attitudinal, social, and economic variables. Analysis of the data shows that macro-economic evaluations are better attitudinal predictors than individual-level economic position and experience, while perceptions of shared culture with refugees is the strongest correlate of attitudes, outperforming all other variables. The empirical evidence points to the importance of shared social identity in shaping attitudes toward refugees, while calling into question the role of direct economic impact.
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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Refugee Crises and Attitudes

Refugee crises are a persistent and growing feature of the international system. International and civil conflicts have produced millions of displaced individuals and families, with ongoing conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar, and Somalia alone producing over 13 million refugees.\(^1\) These refugees are forced across international borders, into host countries typically ill-prepared and ill-equipped to receive them.\(^2\) As host governments struggle to meet the challenges of refugee crises, the refugees themselves are thrust into new social, political, and economic interactions with host individuals and communities. The nature of these interactions between refugees and host populations is an issue of broad and enduring importance, with political, social, and economic ramifications at the local, national, and international levels.

Over time, refugee crises may lead to a wide range of possible outcomes. On one end of the spectrum, refugees may integrate into the economic, social, and political structures of the host society. On the other end of the spectrum, refugee crises may result in conflict and violence. In between these two extremes lie multiple possible outcomes that are characterized by neither integration nor violent polarization, but rather by degrees of economic competition and

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\(^1\) Data from UNHCR Global Trends 2017. Accessed online at: https://www.unhcr.org/5b27be547.pdf. In 2017, over 4.4 million new refugees were recorded by UNHCR.

\(^2\) Approximately 85% of refugees are hosted in countries in the developing world (UNHCR 2017).
inter-group marginalization. Each of these outcomes is to some extent influenced by the quality of the relationship between refugees and hosts.

Although scholars and practitioners have long recognized the importance of refugee-host dynamics during refugee crises, these interactions, and in particular the underlying attitudes of both sets of actors, are both under-studied and poorly understood. Much of the existing scholarly work on refugees has focused on either the factors that motivate individuals to leave their homes, or on the experience of refugees themselves. Rather less attention has been given to the relationship of refugees with those with whom they come in contact. Consequently, there is a considerable gap in our understanding of the causal linkages that connect an influx of refugees into a host community to the interactions of refugees and hosts, and to the political, economic, and social outcomes that follow.

Central to this theoretical challenge is the role of attitudes, particularly those of the host population toward the refugees in their midst. Scholars have documented the impacts and externalities created by refugee inflows, and have studied the various outcomes of refugee crises. At the individual host level, though, there exists insufficient understanding of how orientations, perceptions, and attitudes of hosts are shaped by, and in turn influence, the dynamics of refugee crises. In particular, there remains considerable uncertainty regarding the factors that influence the attitudes of hosts toward refugees.

Though existing theories of attitude formation during refugee crises encompass a broad range of causal factors, a primary debate centers on the explanatory power of two sets of variables: economic and social. Scholars disagree on whether host attitudes toward refugees are

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3 See, for example, Maystadt and Verwimp (2009); Alix-Garcia and Saah (2009); and Whitaker (2002).
4 For example, scholars studying refugee-host relations and attitudes emphasize the importance of security threats (Kirui and Mwaruvie, 2012), religiosity (Bohman and Hjerm, 2013), manipulation of information (Murshid 2014), and social constructs (Jacobsen 1996).
driven by instrumental calculations and economic perceptions (Kibreab 1985; Jacobsen 2001; Murshid 2014), or whether attitudes are a function of social identities, whether common or discrete, of refugees and hosts (Kunz 1981; Loescher 1992). Existing scholarship suggests that both arguments could be true, with varied evidence supporting economic, structural, and social explanations for refugee-host attitudes and relations. However, the roles that these variables play, their relative strength, and their relationship to each other remain unclear, and in some cases, unexplored.

This debate concerning attitude formation has more than just theoretical implications. Policies of host governments, as well as the interventions of non-government and transnational actors, hinge to a large degree on the accepted explanation of refugee-host interactions and dynamics. Practitioners and political leaders tend, though not uniformly, to see refugee crises through an economic lens, focusing on the impacts and negative externalities of refugee inflows. The solutions therefore tend to be economic in nature. For example, if economic problems posed by refugees drive attitudes, interactions, and outcomes, the solutions are to reduce competition through development and livelihood security (Jacobsen 2002); to link refugee aid and economic development (Dryden-Peterson and Hovil 2003); and to foster productive and peaceful integration by targeting aid to both refugees and hosts (Jacobsen 2001). Economic problems prompt economic solutions, but there is as yet little empirical evidence that economic initiatives during refugee crises help to moderate individual host attitudes to refugees. Existing empirical evidence does not necessarily point to instrumental calculations as the primary driver of attitudes, but at the same time there is insufficient evidence to suggest that one’s social identity forms the basis of attitudes toward refugees.5 The theoretical foundations of attitude formation

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5 These assertions will be supported in Chapter 2.
are relatively weak, and by extension the resultant practical applications are potentially misguided.

The purpose of this study is to explore, and to shed light on, the question of attitude formation of host individuals during refugee crises. More specifically, this study focuses on individual-level economic and social factors and their direct and relative influence on the attitudes of hosts toward refugees. Do hosts develop attitudes toward refugees based on real or perceived economic threats and impacts, or are attitudes driven more by social identities and the perceived commonalities between refugees and hosts? This study seeks to establish answers to these questions, and ultimately a better understanding of refugee-host relations.

1.2 Attitudes and Outcomes

Both economic and social theories of refugee-host interactions hold, whether explicitly or implicitly, that attitudes link underlying individual factors (whether they be economic conditions, social identity, or perceptions) to the various outcomes that are seen during refugee crises.\(^6\) Though these theories diverge over the specific determinants of individual host attitudes, scholars generally agree that attitudes are important for their potential to influence three key areas: politics and political decisions; intergroup conflict; and durable solutions to refugee crises.

Although the policy choices of host states during refugee crises may be affected by a wide range of variables,\(^7\) a key factor in the decisions of policy-makers is the general attitude and orientation of the host population toward refugees (Basok 1990). The willingness of local communities to host and bear the cost of hosting refugees influences the political calculations of

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\(^6\) This point is established in more detail in the next chapter.

\(^7\) For example, state-level decisions concerning whether and how to receive refugees may be dependent on considerations of national security, international relations, state capabilities, and domestic social and economic structures (Jacobsen 1996; Basok 1990).
government leaders concerning state-level policies (Jacobsen 1996). Restrictive host policies toward refugees in many African countries can be linked to increasing levels of xenophobia in those societies (Loescher and Milner 2005). At the same time, governments in such refugee-receiving states as Kenya and Pakistan have shown a propensity to change existing refugee policies based on public opinion, protests, and the threat of domestic unrest (Aukot 2003; Lischer 2005). Finally, negative public opinion toward refugees, combined with dissatisfaction with government management of refugee crises, can have electoral consequences, as evidenced at the local level in Kenya (Aukot 2003) and at the regional and national levels in Europe, where we see the rise of anti-immigrant nationalist parties.8

To be sure, the degree to which individual attitudes matter in the formulation of refugee policies in host states depends on the extent to which host governments listen to their citizens. The majority of refugee crises occur in less-developed states,9 a large number of which are non-democracies or transitional states. Using Dahl’s (1971) definition of democracy, states may be categorized by the extent to which their governments are responsive to the preferences of their citizens. In non-democracies, the preferences of host communities may not have a large effect on refugee policy, particularly when the government’s capabilities are sufficient to maintain order. On the other hand, non-democratic governments cannot simply ignore popular opinion. Assuming that autocratic leaders desire to stay in power, they must take account of public opinion at least to the extent required to avoid rebellion or coup (Lischer 2005). When


9 Historically, refugee-producing states and states of first asylum have been concentrated in what may variously be described as the Global South or the Third World. As of 2014, the largest refugee-receiving states are Pakistan, Lebanon, Iran, Turkey, Jordan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Chad, Uganda, and China (UNHCR 2014).
aggregated, individual attitudes toward refugees may therefore influence the policy calculations of host states both through the feasibility of various policies, as well as through the impact those policies may have on popular support for the regime.

Host attitudes may also impact the potential for refugee-related violence. Though refugees may be motivated by political persecution, the vast majority of refugee movements stem from violence, civil conflict, and interstate war. A primary concern for receiving, or host states is the potential for refugees to either spread or generate new conflict. Recent studies have documented the link between refugee movements and the spread or onset of conflict, providing strong empirical evidence that a refugee crisis increases the host state’s risk of interstate war, civil conflict, military intervention, and terrorist activity (Saleyhan 2008; Saleyhan and Gleditsch 2006; Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008; Choi and Saleyhan 2013; Kathman 2011). These probabilities are not small, as evidenced by the fact that from 1987 to 1998, approximately 15% of refugee flows led to some sort of conflict involving refugee-receiving states (Lischer 2001).

While the exact mechanism remains unclear, scholars have argued for several potential dynamics, including the presence of “refugee warriors” embedded in refugee camps (Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo 1989); ethnic ties between refugees and hosts, which may disrupt ethnic power balances or exacerbate existing ethnic disputes in the host state (Lin and Shreve 2012; Ruegger and Bohnet 2011; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006); and economic disruption and competition posed by refugees in the host state (Salehyan 2008; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006).

Lischer (2005) provides a typology of refugee-related violence, including: conflict between the sending state and refugees; factional violence among refugees; interstate conflict; attacks between the receiving state and refugees; and internal violence within the receiving state. Host attitudes are, theoretically, most likely to play a role in the latter two cases, whether through
direct contact between refugees and host populations, or through political pressure by hosts on their government. Intolerance, xenophobia, and distrust can easily lead to violence against refugees, whether spontaneous or organized, sanctioned or not (Bookman 2002, 185). Host attitudes may therefore serve as a causal link between the negative externalities and threats posed by refugees and the onset of violence and conflict.

The third refugee-related outcome that may be influenced by the attitudes of host populations involves integration. In situations where refugees have entered into a host country, there are three main solutions that are recognized by the international community as both optimal and durable (UNHCR 2003). The preferred option, referred to as voluntary repatriation, is for the refugees to choose to return to their homes. This solution, while attractive in theory, is in reality difficult to achieve. The causes of refugee movements must be addressed before refugees can return home, and often these complex problems are difficult to resolve, leaving refugees in limbo for years or even decades. A second solution involves resettlement in other countries. Much like repatriation, third-country resettlement is an attractive policy on paper (particularly to the state of first asylum), but one which faces challenges in implementation. In particular, most states have a limited capacity to absorb large numbers of refugees, and fear the effects of resettled refugees on the political, economic, and ethnic order (Toft 2007).

The final durable solution, and the one most dependent on the goodwill of host populations, involves the integration of refugees into local communities in the host state. Particularly in protracted refugee situations, the inability to return home and the paucity of resettlement options mean that refugees have no other choice but to remain in countries of first asylum. Refugees and hosts have no option but to interact, and the nature and quality of this interaction varies considerably, from integration to marginalization to conflict. Integration is a
“complex and gradual process by which refugees legally, economically, socially, and culturally integrate as fully contributing members of the host society” (UNHCR 2013, 51). Conversely, marginalization of refugees, in the sense of exclusion from the economic, social, and political spheres of society, can lock refugees into perpetual poverty and create additional sources of competition, tension, and conflict.

The attitudes of hosts toward refugees are therefore important to integration for two reasons. First, attitudes shape the day-to-day choices of hosts as they interact with refugees, with the potential to affect the quality of that interaction. As pointed out by Kuhlman (1991, 16), “antagonism on the part of the host population is an important indicator of integration – or rather, the lack of it.” Second, as noted above, host attitudes may be linked to government policies toward refugees. Integration policies are neither formulated nor implemented in isolation from public opinion, and the attitudes of individuals in host communities may have a direct impact on the nature and success of those policies.

1.3 Research Design

The preceding section suggests that the attitudes of host populations may be useful in understanding and explaining conflict, integration, and political decisions during refugee crises. Previous research has shown, through both interviews and surveys, that attitudes toward refugees can vary significantly (Crush and Pendleton 2004; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Agblorti 2011; Rustenbach 2010). Given this variation, what are the factors that influence these attitudes? How do we explain this variation in attitudes?

In this study, I focus specifically on the individual-level factors that shape the attitudes of hosts toward refugees. In adopting an individual level of analysis, I naturally exclude potential
variables at other levels. International variables (Lischer 2005; Kuhlman 1991), structural factors (Ruegger and Bohnet 2011; Kuhlman 1991), and state-level political dynamics (Lischer 2005; Murshid 2010) may all play a role in shaping public attitudes toward refugees. The primary question for this study, though, concerns how individual-level variation in economic interests and perceptions, as well as social identity, relate to attitudes toward refugees.

Individual level of analysis allows for greater clarity, simplified analysis, and potentially more certain empirical results. Importantly, this permits a more focused research question: How do individual-level economic and social factors shape the attitudes of host populations toward refugees?

The scope of this study is limited to refugee movements in less-developed countries. Though most states in the international system host some refugees, there are several important differences between developed and less-developed states, making aggregate analysis and broad generalization difficult. Jacobsen neatly summarizes the problem by stating that “although all host countries experience similar types of problems from a refugee influx, the scale and intensity of these differ for less developed and Western countries” (1996, 656). Although the secondary movement of migrants and refugees into Europe since 2015 has magnified the problems faced by these countries, the intensity of the crisis and the manner in which developed states address it stand in sharp contrast to the experience of less-developed states.

Less-developed states bear a greater refugee burden. Though statistics do not tell the full story, they are nevertheless instructive. Approximately 85% of refugees are hosted in countries in the developing world (UNHCR 2017). This statistic is remarkably stable, with data from 2013 showing 86% of refugees in developing states (UNHCR 2013b, 16). For the previous 25 years, this figure was never less than 70%. Not only do less-developed states bear a disproportionate
refugee burden, they also are less able to handle refugee crises (Murshid 2014; Milner 2000; Adamson 2006, 177). These states often lack the funding, infrastructure, and capacity to provide basic services to their own populations, problems that are compounded by the influx of refugees in need of assistance. Finally, the process by which states receive refugees differs between developed and less-developed states (Jacobsen 1996). This is a function of both capacity and geography. Refugee flows are typically between less-developed states, due as much to proximity as to choice. Just as war and conflict cluster geographically (Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008), so does economic development (Gallup et al 1999). Because refugees are primarily generated in less-developed states, and typically flee to the nearest point of safety, developed states are not usually states of first asylum (Murshid 2014). In terms of capacity, developed states have the institutions, stability, and economic flexibility to process, settle, and support refugees. Less-developed states generally lack these. In short, developed states manage refugee inflows, while poorer states suffer refugee crises.

In light of these differences, I focus on non-Western, less-developed states, which suffer relatively greater refugee burdens, and which lack the capacity to effectively deal with refugee crises. Much scholarly attention has been given to host attitudes in Europe, North America, and Australia, while less has been devoted to non-Western contexts. A logical question relates to whether the process of attitude formation in these states differs from that in developed states. Though this is not a primary question of this research project, it does inform the scope of the study and helps to circumscribe the extent to which any results may be generalized.

In subsequent chapters, I examine the existing literature on refugee-host interactions and attitudes, set forth theoretical arguments concerning economic and social determinants of host attitudes, and derive testable hypotheses. In order to test these expectations, I generated data
through a randomized attitudinal survey of host individuals in Jordan in February 2015. With a sample size of 700, several attitudinal questions, and a battery of explanatory and control variables, the data set provides a unique opportunity to test various hypotheses suggested in this study.

1.4 Definitions and Terms

Before proceeding, it would be useful to define the core terms used in this study. A refugee is “a person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”

Refugees are by definition distinct from other immigrants, who may be driven by economic or social motivations. In practice, though, host populations don’t always perceive this distinction. Empirical evidence from both Europe and the United States shows that host individuals are able to conceptually distinguish between immigrants and refugees, and that attitudes toward refugees are generally more positive than attitudes toward immigrants (O’Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Murray and Marx 2013; Coenders et al 2004). However, this distinction is less clear in Southern Africa, where survey data suggest that individuals have trouble distinguishing different types of immigrants (Crush and Pendleton 2004). In order to establish both conceptual and empirical clarity, care must be taken both in the theoretical

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10 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, Section 1A.
treatment of refugees and immigrants, and with the generation of empirical data, especially with question-based surveys.

A refugee influx is “that which occurs when, within a relatively short period (a few years), large numbers (thousands) of people flee their places of residence for the asylum country” (Jacobsen 1996, 657). In this study, I will use terms such as refugee influx, refugee crisis, and refugee movement to describe, in general, the mass movement of refugees into a host state over a relatively short period of time. The host population refers to those individuals who a) are normally resident in a state that is hosting refugees, and b) are citizens of that state. I specifically exclude migrant workers, expatriates, illegal immigrants, citizens not resident in that state, and non-citizens.

A country of first asylum denotes that state where a refugee first finds protection and recognized status as a refugee. In practice, this is most often the neighboring country to which refugees flee, and where UNHCR provides recognition and humanitarian aid. A host state may be any country where refugees are found. In this study, though, I use the term synonymously with country of first asylum, in order to distinguish between states that receive mass inflows of refugees and those (primarily Western states) that typically serve as third-country resettlement options or secondary destinations. This distinction is evidenced, for example, when comparing Kenya (which hosts large numbers of refugees from neighboring states) and Canada (which resettles smaller numbers of refugees and accepts asylum applications from refugees from distant states). On the other hand, the distinction is blurred by recent mass migrant flows to Europe through the Balkans.

The term attitude presents perhaps the most difficult challenge. Definitions vary according to disciplines, with psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists approaching the
underlying concepts from different perspectives. Furthermore, attitudes may be divided into distinct elements, such as cognitive or affective. Adopting the position of Coenders et al (2004, 23, fn 1), I refer to attitudes generally as “sets of opinions,” and use the term interchangeably with “orientations.”

1.5 Outline

The remainder of this study concentrates on the core research question: In less-developed states, how do individual-level economic and social factors shape the attitudes of host populations toward refugees? In Chapter 2 I explore existing research on host attitudes and identify both the current state of knowledge and the relevant theoretical gaps. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical arguments for both economic and social determinants of host attitudes, along with appropriate hypotheses for testing each. I describe the context of the Jordanian refugee crisis in Chapter 4, tracing the historical influences, structural conditions, and economic challenges under which refugees and hosts interact. I also describe in more detail the data generation process of the 2014 Jordan survey. Chapters 5-7 focus on the empirical analysis, beginning with social identity in Chapter 5 and continuing with economic factors in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 models economic and social variables together to determine the relative explanatory power of each. In Chapter 8, I review the empirical evidence, offer several conclusions, and suggest practical applications for the findings.
2. REVIEW OF PREVIOUS STUDIES

2.1 The Economic-Social Debate

As established in the previous chapter, refugee-host interactions in less-developed countries merit focused analysis. The nature of refugee movements, the scope of refugee inflows, and the capacity of less-developed host countries present unique contexts that may, or may not, be reflected in attitudinal dynamics that differ from those in Western contexts. At the same time, though, scholarly studies dealing with the broader field of immigration in developed countries have produced theories and empirical evidence that may help to frame and shape a full consideration of host attitudes toward refugees. The core question is whether Western studies of attitudes toward immigrants (economic and forced) have generated theories and hypotheses that are transferable, and empirical results that are generalizable, to host-refugee attitudes in less-developed states of first asylum. I therefore examine the Western immigration literature as well as studies on refugee-host interactions, both to establish a baseline of current knowledge and to articulate a more comprehensive theory of how hosts develop attitudes toward refugees.

In attempting to explain host attitudes toward refugees, the key debate in the existing literature centers around the relative and, in some cases, the absolute influence of two sets of variables: economic and social. Scholars refer to and conceptualize these variables in different ways,¹¹ but the theoretical foundations for economic and social variables are commonly rooted

¹¹ Several examples include “economic circumstances” and “group consciousness” (Crush and Pendleton 2004); “socio-cultural identity” (Loescher 1992); and “economic competition” (Murshid 2014).
in theories of realistic threat and social identity, respectively. Realistic threats, as they pertain to migrants, involve threats to the material welfare of hosts (Murray and Marx 2013), and may be perceived as existential, political, economic, or personal (Bizman and Yinon 2001, 191). Social identity is generally understood as a specific focus area of symbolic threats, which involve threats to the values, identity, morals, and norms of hosts (Schweitzer et al 2005, 6). In the literature examining migration in Western countries, the basic classification of these sets of variables is into economic vs non-economic factors (Wilkes et al 2008), but scholars have also advanced more nuanced concepts such as interests and ideology (O’Rourke and Sinnott 2006).

In these developed, democratic contexts, the practical implications of refugee movements and migration center on public policy, particularly on the appropriate levels of immigration and asylum, as well as the long-term integration of migrants into the host society and economy. Studies that focus on refugee movements in less-developed countries deal with the same basic theoretical concepts, but reflect unique contexts that involve mass refugee flows into states ill-equipped to deal with the resultant economic, social, and political consequences. Thus, the economic framework of attitude formation in these contexts involves questions of economic impact, competition, and carrying capacity, while the dominant social questions center on common ethnicity (or the lack thereof). The practical implications of research in these less-developed contexts tend toward potential solutions for minimizing the impact of refugees, rather than managing their integration.

At its most contentious, the debate regarding social and economic variables revolves around two competing claims. On one hand, some scholars argue that social identities, and in particular shared group identity between hosts and refugees, are the primary determinant of refugee-host attitudes and relations. Shared social identity between refugees and hosts will lead
host individuals to have more favorable attitudes toward, and be more accepting of, refugees. Based on this position, scholars argue that ethnic ties are a good predictor of refugee acceptance, leading to better attitudes and greater assistance from hosts, while differences in socio-cultural identity help foster a perception of symbolic threat from refugees (Kunz 1981; Loescher 1992). Loescher and Milner (2005) connect shared group identity to host attitudes and further suggest a direct impact of this link on meso- and macro-level outcomes and policies, stating that “if a host community perceives the incoming refugee as ‘one of us’, then positive and generous conceptions of distributive justice will apply” (33).

Other scholars posit that attitudes and inter-group relations during refugee crises are primarily a function of resources, competition, and the personal impact of refugees on hosts. Few scholars would disagree that economic structures, conditions, and dynamics play a role in shaping host attitudes, with many acknowledging the “complexities of resolving livelihood needs while maintaining good refugee-host relations” (Porter et al 2008, 250). The core question, though, is to what extent economic considerations matter, both in isolation and in relation to other variables. In its strongest, most absolute form, the economic position holds that while social ties and group identities may impact host attitudes toward refugees, it is only to the extent that economic conditions are favorable, or at least neutral. Put another way, it is only in the absence of economic threat or vulnerability to potential economic threat that other factors, such as shared identity, help to shape host attitudes. Kibreab (1985) best represents this position, stating that, in reference to African refugee crises, “hospitality is…a function of resource availability” (70) and “whenever resources fall short of basic needs a conflict situation arises” (71). Economic scarcity therefore shapes refugee-host relations (Bookman 2002), with resource shortages, economic impact, and economic insecurity forming the “material roots of social
tension between refugees and the host community” (Bascom 1993, 323). More broadly, host attitudes are a function of host interests and the impact that refugees have on those interests. Looking at the conditions necessary for local integration of refugees, Jacobsen (2001, 10) highlights broad material interests, asserting that “the willingness of the local population to accept local integration depends on who benefits and who loses from the continued presence of refugees, and on whether the interests of the various actors, particularly the most powerful, are being sufficiently served.”

A different perspective on interests and instrumental calculations focuses not on objective material considerations but on perceptions and comparisons. Drawing on the theoretical concept of relative deprivation, some scholars argue that host individuals’ attitudes toward refugees are shaped in large part by cognitive comparisons with and economic evaluations of refugees. Hosts are prone to make mental comparisons between themselves and refugees regarding economic condition, humanitarian benefits, access to government services, and economic opportunity. According to Loescher and Milner (2005, 32), “refugees are sometimes seen as a privileged group in terms of services and welfare provisions.” This perception is not necessarily limited to economically disadvantaged hosts, but at the same time poor host individuals are more likely to express negative attitudes toward refugees (Murshid 2014), suggesting that negative comparisons may have a greater effect on attitudes among the poor.

Bridging the divide between the economic and social positions are scholars who argue that refugee-host interactions are influenced by a range of factors, and offer various and nuanced explanations for how social and economic variables interact and influence each other. For example, Bookman (2002) claims that refugee-related violence results from host state hostility and intolerance, which in turn is a function of, among other factors, both economic competition
and ethnic structures. Alternatively, Martin (2005) points out that resource competition does not automatically generate conflict, and it is intervening variables that frame the social construction of economic scarcity. Political systems, institutions, historical experience, and ethnic structures help determine whether economic competition results in conflict.

2.2 Economic Evidence from Western Countries

Within the Western immigration literature, many scholars have looked at the impact that immigrants (both economic and forced migrants) have on the host labor market. The foundational theoretical argument is that immigrants compete with hosts for jobs in those sectors where their skill-sets apply, and that host individuals attitudes will reflect the threat of labor market competition from immigrants. The general assumption is that most immigrants to Western countries have a lower skill level, with the implication that those host individuals who are most vulnerable to labor market competition (e.g. those with lower skill sets, poorer education, and job insecurity) are therefore most likely to hold negative attitudes toward immigrants. Scholars have considered this argument in a variety of contexts, and using multiple data sources. The evidence for labor market competition (LMC) theory, though, is inconclusive.

Quite a few studies, using data from a number of Western countries, find strong evidence that the skill level and occupation of individual hosts are correlated with attitudes toward immigrants (Fachini and Mayda 2009; Kunovich 2007; Wilkes et al 2008). More specifically, highly skilled workers tend to have more favorable attitudes toward immigration, based on evidence specific to the United States (Scheve and Slaughter 2001) as well as on broader data from the International Social Survey Program (O’Rourke and Sinnott 2006). Similarly, evidence from the ISSP shows that attitudes are dependent on the skill level of respondents relative to the
skill level of immigrants. In countries with relatively high per-capita GDP, highly skilled workers have more favorable attitudes toward immigration, while the opposite is true in countries with lower per-capita GDP (Mayda 2006). Importantly, in one of the few studies that focus on refugees in Western contexts, Coenders et al (2004) find that anti-refugee sentiment is more likely among those who are unemployed, working a manual job, or working for lower wages.

Other studies find mixed results, with some labor market indicators correlated with attitudes, and others not (Wilkes et al 2008). Multiple studies show that LMC theory holds for attitudes of lower-skilled hosts toward lower-skilled immigrants, but fails to account for the attitudes of higher-skilled hosts toward immigrants in general, even when those immigrants have higher skill levels. While lower-skilled hosts tend to oppose lower-skilled immigrants, there is also evidence that higher-skilled hosts favor higher-skilled immigrants (O’Connell 2011; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). O’Connell, who examines data from the European Social Survey (ESS), argues that skilled workers don’t typically face job competition from migrants, and thus perceive little or no labor market threat from any level of immigration. This may be due to the prevalence of low-skilled immigration in Europe, but may also stem from greater labor market protections for higher-skilled jobs, an argument put forth by Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) based on data from the ESS and Eurostat surveys. These results suggest that the usefulness of LMC theory may be limited to explaining attitudes among lower-skilled workers in the context of Western states.

Finally, some scholars find no support at all for LMC theory. In several studies, employment status has no correlation with attitudes toward immigration (Rustenbach 2010; Pardos-Prado 2011), suggesting that variation in attitudes may be driven by other factors.
Further empirical evidence for the limitations of LMC theory comes from Sides and Citrin (2007), who find that the subjective economic evaluations of host individuals are more important than labor market position in shaping attitudes toward immigrants. Overall, there appears to be no consistent relationship between labor market position and attitudes toward immigrants in Western countries.

Moving beyond a narrow consideration of labor market competition, an alternative approach considers the broader arena of economic competition. Studies and arguments that take this approach tend to highlight the various factors related to host individuals’ calculations of self-interest. For example, rather than myopically focusing on job prospects, host populations may be concerned with individual-level costs, perceived threats, and competition over resources, all stemming from immigration. Much like LMC theories, broader economic competition studies have returned contradictory and inconclusive empirical results. Several studies have shown that economic variables are correlated with host attitudes. For example, data from the European Social Survey and Eurostat survey indicate that income is positively correlated with orientations toward immigrants (Rustenbach 2010). Similarly, Pardos-Prado (2011) advances and supports the argument that economic vulnerability is negatively related to host attitudes. Pardos-Prado asserts that, based on this evidence, economic competition contributes directly to attitude formation, without the need for additional mediators or informational shortcuts. Economically vulnerable hosts perceive an economic threat from immigrants and form attitudes toward those immigrants. This claim, however, much like economic competition theories in general, has not found sufficient corroborating evidence in other studies. Quite a few scholars have found no empirical support for economic competition theories, using data from Europe, Canada, and the
Another argument involving self-interest centers on relative deprivation, in which the individual makes subjective evaluations involving comparisons across individuals or time. Individuals in the host populations may evaluate their current condition, economic or otherwise, in relation to a previous condition, or in contrast to the perceived status or condition of immigrants. Thus, a perception that the individual is worse off in comparison to a previous reference point, combined with the judgment that this change in condition is associated with the presence of immigrants, may lead the individual to form negative attitudes toward immigrants. Although the theory (as it relates to immigrant-host relations) is not as fully developed as other economic arguments, one particular study illustrates its usefulness as an explanation for host attitudes. Pettigrew et al (2008), using the Eurobarometer (1988) survey for Europe, as well as two national surveys from Germany, show that perceptions of relative deprivation are strongly correlated with prejudice toward foreigners and immigrants. A key insight from this study is that relative deprivation is more likely to be perceived among those from lower socio-economic classes. This provides a competing explanation to both labor-market and economic competition theories, suggesting that economics matters not because of direct or perceived competition but because of relative comparisons of economic conditions.

Building on this, another possibility is that attitudes toward immigrants may be driven more by perception of economic impact and competition, rather than objective reality. In other words, attitudes toward migrants may not be grounded in personal experience or objective fact, but rather in the individual host’s perception and beliefs, whether factual or not. For example, in Australia, attitudes toward asylum seekers are correlated with misperception and false beliefs.
concerning government benefits to refugees and the associated drain on collective resources (Pederson et al 2005).

As shown above, theories of host attitude formation that are rooted in individual calculations of self-interest have found mixed empirical support. Differing contexts, mediating variables, and data problems may all help to explain the inconsistent results of various studies. One argument, though, posits that sociotropic concerns, or national-level economic concerns, may outweigh individual self-interest, or at the very least counteract individual-level instrumental calculations. Sides and Citrin (2007) find evidence for this argument using data from the ESS (2002-2003). Incorporating both instrumental, personal economic variables and national economic evaluations in the same model, they find that “sociotropic orientations outweigh personal financial concerns” (490-491). Other studies show the relative weak explanatory power of personal economic concerns as they relate to attitudes toward immigration, with collective, or national-level concerns a much better predictor of attitudes (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Citrin et al 1997; Sides and Citrin 2007). This reinforces the conclusion of various studies that personal economic concerns are superseded by collective evaluations in the formation of a broad range of political preferences and attitudes (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981).

Overall, though the evidence is inconclusive regarding the role of economic interests in shaping host attitudes toward immigrants, studies have put forth plausible arguments for how instrumental calculations and material interests might affect attitudes. In particular, existing literature has constructed theoretical arguments for the influence of labor market position, economic condition, economic competition, and relative comparisons on host attitudes. The question remains, though, whether these theories, hypotheses, and variables are transferable, and whether empirical results are generalizable, to non-Western, refugee-specific contexts.
2.3 Economic Evidence from Less-developed Countries

Turning to less-developed countries, there are notably fewer empirical studies of attitudes toward immigrants in general, and refugees in particular. Similar theoretical arguments have been applied to these contexts, but the paucity of empirical data and scholarly attention has resulted in a lack of clarity regarding refugee-host attitudes and interactions. The basic proposition for the role of economic self-interest is that individuals’ attitudes vary with their economic condition, perception, and vulnerability to competition. At the individual level, most studies have focused on the question of variation in impact, identifying those host individuals who are most likely to suffer negative economic consequences as a result of refugee inflows. Other studies have concentrated on meso- and macro-level dynamics and outcomes during refugee crises, analyzing collective attitudes rather than individual orientations. As such, while there is documented variation in economic impact and condition at the individual level, and a reasonable connection between attitudes and economic variables at the collective level, there exists little evidence connecting economic variables and attitudes at the individual level.

Perhaps the most developed individual-level literature on refugee-host interaction centers on the varied impact of refugees depending on the socio-economic characteristics of hosts. Chambers (1986) was one of the first to systematically consider the economic impact of refugees in developing countries, highlighting the depletion of common property resources and competition over goods, services, and economic opportunities. Though his analysis encompasses both macro- and micro-level variables, one of Chambers’ key contributions is in emphasizing the variation in refugee impact according to the economic situation of individual hosts. Chambers argues that more-affluent individuals are less susceptible to economic shocks posed by refugee inflows, and can even benefit from such movements. On the other hand, laborers face depressed
wages caused by an expansion of the labor pool, and surplus farmers suffer from lower food
prices brought about by an abundance of food aid.

Subsequent studies have supported and expanded on Chambers’ basic proposition that the
economic impact of refugee movements on host populations varies according to the economic
characteristics of individual hosts. Most of these studies are based on the African experience
with refugees. For example, looking at the flow of Burundian and Rwandan refugees into
neighboring countries in the early 1990’s, evidence from Tanzania shows that agricultural
workers were negatively affected by refugee inflows, while self-employed farmers and non-
agricultural workers found their economic situation improved as a result of higher food prices
and increased economic activity, respectively (Maystadt and Verwimp 2009). At the same time,
the impact of these refugees varied across urban and rural locations, with rural communities
seeing greater economic benefits than individuals in urban settings, potentially because of the
massive levels of international aid poured into refugee camps in rural areas (Alix-Garcia and
Saah 2009). Refugees fleeing to west from Rwanda and Burundi had similar effects on
communities in and around Goma, DRC. Business owners and economic elites were able to take
advantage of economic opportunities during the refugee crisis, but poorer hosts suffered from
higher prices and increased competition for goods and resources (Buscher and Vlassenroot
2010). Focusing on Ghana, Codjoe et al (2013) found that hosts perceived both good and bad
economic impact from Liberian refugees, but that hosts with professional vocations were less
likely to emphasize economic costs and competition stemming from the presence of refugees in
their community. More recently, there is evidence that Syrian refugees in Turkey have displaced
lower-wage workers, while creating new opportunities for higher-skilled workers (Del Carpio
and Wagner 2015).
Though these studies have strongly linked both positive and negative impacts of refugees to specific economic and labor groups in the host states, the general thrust of these findings is that refugee crises tend to magnify the economic vulnerabilities or positions of strength of host individuals. Whitaker (2002, 355) speaks of this dynamic in the context of Tanzania, but her insight summarizes well the findings of other studies: “hosts who already had access to resources, education, or power were better poised to exploit the positive opportunities of the refugee situation. Meanwhile, hosts who were disadvantaged in the local socio-economic structure struggled to maintain access to even the most basic resources and thus became further marginalized.” In practical terms, host individuals who stand to benefit from refugee influxes tend to be those whose economic, political, or social position enables them to not simply avoid competition with refugees, but also take advantage of new customers, patrons, or labor (Lesailly-Jacob 1993). Vulnerable host individuals, i.e. those with low education and low skills, face the most competition and threat from refugee influxes.

While there is abundant evidence that the economic impact of refugees varies across individual hosts, there is as yet insufficient empirical support that such economic variation translates to or correlates with host attitudes toward refugees. Only a handful of studies have attempted to establish this connection at the individual level, and none provides convincing evidence. For example, in Mozambique, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe, survey data show that negative host attitudes toward refugees are correlated with individuals with the most to lose by the presence of immigrants (Crush and Pendleton 2004). However, most respondents had trouble distinguishing between economic migrants and refugees, raising the question of whether respondents’ attitudes actually reflect their orientation toward refugees specifically.
Overall, what is missing is an empirical link between individuals’ economic status, condition, or experience and their attitudes toward refugees. The empirical data are sparse and the few analyses are inconclusive. With some notable exceptions, there exists little support for the link between objective economic variables and attitudes at the individual level.

While the aforementioned studies emphasize the relationship between the economic impact of refugees and the individual characteristics of host populations, others have argued that the importance of economics extends beyond real and perceived impacts to encompass cognitive comparisons. The dynamics of refugee crises, with large amounts of international aid and services for refugees, may trigger unfavorable comparisons between the economic situation of refugees and hosts, regardless of the economic condition or status of individuals. Relative deprivation arguments have been applied to such situations, and scholars have argued that refugee-host relations are negatively affected by the perception of hosts that refugees are favored with aid, and have a higher standard of living (Voutira and Harrell-Bond 1995; Agblorti 2011; Dryden-Peterson and Hovil 2004). Two examples help to illustrate this dynamic. In the 1990’s, Guinea hosted over 100,000 refugees from Liberia and Sierra Leone. The initial waves of refugees drew on resources provided by Guinean communities, but as the refugee numbers and international aid increased, Guineans began to perceive that they were being overlooked in the distribution of that aid. The perception that refugees were receiving favored treatment at the expense of nationals contributed to heightened tensions between refugees and hosts. Lawrie and van Damme argue that unequal distribution of aid had the unintended consequence “of

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13 This relationship is more firmly established in Western, industrialized states, but as detailed earlier in the chapter, the evidence is mixed even in those contexts.
heightening the visibility of refugees as a separate and comparatively privileged group, thereby making them a potential target of hostility” (2003, 575).

The second example of cognitive comparison comes from South Asia. Murshid (2014, 5) points to a direct connection between attitudes and perceptions of relative deprivation: “In fact, much of the anti-refugee sentiment emanates from the poor, who feel that refugee camps are in much better condition than their own places of abode – as they often include schools and hospitals, for example.” Importantly, though the relative deprivation argument is different from that of economic impact, the empirical implications are thought to be the same. Poor, disadvantaged hosts are more likely to express negative attitudes toward refugees (Murshid 2014), prompting the question whether those attitudes are due to negative economic impacts, relative comparisons, or both. This issue has yet to be satisfactorily addressed in the literature.

2.4 Social Identity

Within the Western immigrant context, scholars have typically considered social identity in terms of exclusion, i.e. as a basis for categorizing and treating migrants as an out-group. Very few studies focus on social commonalities between host populations and migrants, emphasizing instead exclusive social groupings centered on host culture and national identity. As such, social identity is analyzed primarily as a basis for social exclusion, the salience of which leads host individuals to hold negative attitudes toward immigrants.

Overall, there has been insufficient attention paid to social variables in the Western context, leading to uncertainty regarding their overall influence on attitudes. Several studies, though, offer key insights into the relative and absolute role of social identity in shaping attitudes in Europe, North America, and Australia. Regarding the direct effects of social identity, studies
have shown that the salience of national identity is an important predictor of negative attitudes toward immigrants; individuals who express pride in or perceive threats to their national identity are more likely to hold negative attitudes toward immigrants and asylum seekers (Sniderman et al 2004; Pettigrew and Meertens 1995; Pederson et al 2005, Kunovich 2009; Mayda 2006; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Sides and Citrin 2007). Pehrson et al (2009) present a more nuanced argument, pointing out that national identification is more likely to lead to anti-immigrant attitudes when the nation is defined in terms of language rather than citizenship. Alternatively, culture may serve as the basis for group identity. Particularly in Europe, fears over cultural pluralism and the impact of immigrants on “European” cultures may lead individuals to form negative attitudes toward those immigrants. Sides and Citrin (2007) show evidence for this argument using the European Social Survey (2002-03). They find that a preference for cultural unity is strongly associated with negative attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policy. The core issue may be the perceived willingness or ability of migrants to integrate into the host culture. For example, in the context of Australia, host individuals tend to see asylum seekers as threats to the host culture and identity, based upon a perception of the inability or lack of effort on the part of refugees to integrate into the host culture (McKay et al 2012). Finally, religion, as an expression of culture, may serve as a source of group identity, leading host populations to hold negative orientations toward immigrants who may not share their religious identity. Though religion has not received the attention that has been given to culture and national identity, there is evidence that the greater the role of religion in defining the national in-group, the greater the exclusion of outsiders (Bohman and Hjerm 2013).

Turning to refugee movements in less-developed areas of the world, studies have focused less on push factors such as national identity and more on shared social identity between hosts
and refugees, as well as the effects such commonalities have on host attitudes. The primary focus of these studies has been ethnicity and kinship, particularly in the African context. As early as 1981, Kunz argued that ethnic ties are a good predictor of refugee acceptance, and there is some evidence that ethnic, tribal, and family connections affect the choices and attitudes of both refugees and hosts. For example, reflecting on refugee crises in Africa, scholars observe that refugees are more likely to self-settle when there are kinship ties with host populations (Hansen 1979). Beyond patterns of self-settlement, ethnicity may also moderate attitudes and facilitate more positive interactions. In comparing two different refugee-hosting areas in Kenya, the local population in Dadaab shares ethnic and clan kinship with Somali refugees, and has seen relatively little violence. In contrast, Kakuma, which hosts Sudanese refugees with little relation to the population, has experienced higher levels of tension and violence (Crisp 2000).

Regarding the specific mechanisms through which ethnicity works, scholars argue variously that shared ethnicity generates social capital through which refugees can access resources and support; that co-ethnicity facilitates “blending”; and that shared language facilitates interaction (Freund and Kalumba 1986). One challenge in dealing with language is that it is difficult to separate the effects of shared ethnic ties and shared language. While the existence of shared ethnicity usually points to a common language, language can be broader than ethnicity. In other words, co-ethnics usually speak the same language, but speakers of a particular language don’t necessarily share ethnic ties. That being said, at least one study documents the negative consequences of linguistic differences between hosts and refugees. Porter et al (2008) show that language barriers between Liberian refugees and Ghanaian hosts prevented constructive interaction between those two groups. The inability to speak the local tribal language prevented full refugee integration and limited the livelihood opportunities of
Liberian refugees. From the perspective of the Ghanaian hosts, refugees’ inability to speak – and unwillingness to learn – the local language pointed to a deeper resistance on the part of refugees to positive engagement with host communities. In this case, though, it is uncertain whether language exerts a separate effect from ethnicity, or if in fact it is a mechanism through which ethnicity works.

Other scholars argue that social identity, and particularly ethnicity, is either of limited importance, or an inconsistent predictor of refugee-host relations. As with most of the scholarly literature on this subject, evidence for this position comes from analysis of individual cases, either at the regional or country level. For example, in Guinea in the 1990’s, ethnicity did not substantially drive patterns of host violence against Liberian refugees, with attacks targeting refugees from multiple ethnic groups from Liberia (Onoma 2014). In Nepal, a comparison of the experiences of Tibetan and Bhutanese refugees challenges the argument that shared social identity facilitates positive attitudes and interaction between refugees and hosts. Bhutanese refugees, who share ethnic and linguistic ties with Nepalese, have faced a more difficult time integrating into Nepalese society than have the more socially distant Tibetan refugees (Banki 2004). Finally, in Sudan, shared identity has played a decreasing role in moderating attitudes as economic and structural changes to traditional Sudanese communities have increased the salience of economic and material interests (Bascom 1998). Cases such as these raise questions concerning the role of social identity in shaping host-refugee relations, pointing to the need for either different theoretical explanations or more nuanced analyses of social identity.

Complicating matters further, co-ethnic hosts or refugees may choose to maintain their distinct identities, thereby limiting productive interaction. In part, this choice may stem from an expectation by either or both that the refugee situation is temporary, and that the refugees will
soon return to their country of origin (Jacobsen 2001; Kibreab 1989). Given a short time horizon, co-ethnicity may not translate into more positive attitudes, since neither group has incentives to build cross-group ties on a foundation of common identity. At the extreme, co-ethnicity may actually contribute to negative interactions and outcomes, particularly when ethnic elites have incentives to maintain group distinctives. Considering immigration within Sub-Saharan Africa, there is evidence that cultural similarity between immigrants and nationals can actually lead to tensions and conflicts. Particularly in situations where economic, political, or social benefits are secured through group identity, near-culture immigrants may face difficulty assimilating into society. Despite ethnic ties and shared identity, host communities may choose to highlight differences and reinforce boundaries between hosts and migrants in order to protect existing group identity (Adida 2011).

Kibreab (1985, 70), responding to claims that ethnicity drives refugee-host interactions, argues that the belief that host populations will positively receive co-ethnic refugees is not empirically supported. As previously quoted, Kibreab claims that “hospitality is…a function of resource availability.” Ethnicity may moderate host attitudes toward refugees, but only to the extent that resources are available to support refugee influxes. According to Kibreab, “there is ample evidence which shows that whenever resources fall short of basic needs a conflict situation arises” (1985, 71). Since most of Africa is characterized by high levels of poverty, co-ethnicity cannot be a satisfactory explanation for refugee-host interactions. In short, ethnic ties do not necessarily translate into either positive attitudes or action toward refugees. Attitudes and actions toward refugees are conditioned by economic status and the availability of resources. Kibreab prioritizes the material basis of host attitudes, while suggesting an interactive relationship where shared social identity matters only when resources are plentiful.
This points to perhaps the greatest deficiency in the existing literature, specifically the
dearth of empirical analysis that incorporates both social and economic variables. Moving
beyond the lack of such studies in developing contexts, and looking at the broader literature on
immigration in Western contexts, a handful of studies focus on both sets of variables. When
modeled together, variables capturing cultural unity and social identity tend to be more important
than economic factors in shaping host attitudes toward immigrants in Europe (Sides and Citrin
2007; Sniderman et al. 2004), suggesting that social threat outweighs economic threat in hosts’
evaluations of migrants. However, in Australia, realistic (economic) threats are shown to be a
better predictor of attitudes toward refugees than symbolic (social) threats (Schweitzer et al
2005). In North America, the evidence is mixed, with some studies finding that economic
considerations are more important than cultural identity in the formation of attitudes toward
immigration (Harell et al. 2012), while other studies point to the primacy of cultural concerns
(Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014).

An analysis of Turkish attitudes toward Syrian refugees offers evidence that is perhaps
more relevant to this study. Employing both economic and socio-religious primes, Lazarev and
Sharma (2015) conducted an attitudinal survey among Turks, focusing on orientations toward
Syrian refugees. They find that social identity is correlated with more positive attitudes toward
refugees, while the effects of economic variables are mixed. The inclusion of economic primes
(information on the economic cost of refugees) led to reduced trust regarding refugees, while the
socio-religious prime (Sunni identity) resulted in more positive attitudinal responses.
Interestingly, though, when both primes were included in the survey, the effects of the social
identity prime were insignificant, suggesting that economics trumps group identity in the
formation of host attitudes. The results further suggest that perceptions matter more than objective criteria, but more evidence is needed to support such a claim.

Finally, one particular study provides key insights into the primary question of the role of economic and social variables in shaping host attitudes toward refugees in developing contexts. Alrababa’h et al (2019), using survey data from Jordan, find that neither individual nor sociotropic economic threats correlate with attitudes. Rather, attitudes vary in negative relationship with perception of cultural threat and in direct relationship with humanitarian concerns. In this study, cultural threat is captured by an index measuring respondents’ tolerance of individuals whose religion differs from their own, tying cultural identity to religious identity. Humanitarian concerns are measured by contact with refugees, religiosity, and Palestinian origin. This last measure assumes that Palestinians are more likely to welcome Syrian refugees based on a shared history of displacement, but in doing so potentially conflates humanitarianism with ethnic concerns and economic position.

In summary, scholars are divided concerning the relative and absolute effects of social identity on host attitudes toward refugees in particular and immigrants in general. In Western states, within a framework of immigration, there is evidence that attitudes are correlated with hosts’ cultural identity and the salience of national identity, with immigrants seen as potential threats to both. In developing states, arguments tend to center on ethnicity, but while certain studies have linked shared refugee-host ethnicity to more positive attitudes, some scholars point to cases where shared ethnicity lacks explanatory power, often playing a secondary or insignificant role compared to economic factors.

In considering how existing studies have addressed social identity in the formation of host attitudes toward refugees, a couple of issues arise. First, studies on refugee-host interactions
in less-developed countries have primarily considered ethnicity as a common social identity. Previous studies in the Western immigration context have focused on exclusive social identity, concentrating on the salience of host culture and national identity in the formation of attitudes toward immigrants. A more comprehensive understanding is needed of how both inclusive and exclusive social identity, reflecting both push and pull dynamics, influence host attitudes toward refugees.

Second, in developing states, evidence points to a pull factor between co-ethnics, leading to refugees gravitating towards co-ethnic hosts, as well as hosts expressing greater welcome to co-ethnic refugees. What is less clear is whether this relationship is limited to ethnicity, or whether other shared identities attitudes may also have moderating effects on attitudes. Furthermore, much of the empirical evidence supporting this relationship comes from cases where refugees are ethnically homogenous (Porter et al 2008; Crisp 2000). In cases where refugees are not socially, ethnically, or religiously homogenous, does shared group identity foster better host attitudes just toward those refugees with whom hosts share common identity, or do those attitudes extend more broadly to all refugees? Existing research has not addressed this question.

2.5 Summary of Existing Research

In the area of economics, existing research on attitudes offers some evidence of the role of instrumental calculations regarding real or perceived threats from refugee influxes.

Importantly, previous studies have both highlighted potential economic variables and offered

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14 As previously noted, several scholars have argued the explanatory weakness of shared ethnicity (see for example Onoma 2012; Kibreab 1985). I acknowledge the conflicting evidence of different empirical studies, while at the same time pointing to the large number of cases where co-ethnic refugees and hosts are observed to engage in positive, productive interaction (Kunz 1981; Loescher 1992).
theoretical arguments regarding the ways in which these variables relate to host attitudes.

Studies have shown that there is significant variation in economic impact of refugees on host populations in refugee-receiving countries. Much of this variation depends on demographic and economic characteristics of individual hosts, such as socio-economic position, employment sector, and economic vulnerability (Whitaker 2002; Chambers 1986; Maystadt and Verwimp 2009; Codjoe et al 2013). In Western contexts, evidence is inconclusive whether this variation in economic impact correlates with individual host attitudes toward refugees, but at the same time there is reason to believe that host perceptions matter more in the formation of attitudes toward refugees than does actual economic impact (Schweitzer et al 2005).

In developing states, although the varied economic impact of refugees is well established, there are as yet insufficient studies that attempt to link this variation to host attitudes. The few studies that focus specifically on attitudes have provided some evidence that economic variables, and specifically economic perceptions, are correlated with attitudes toward refugees (Codjoe et al 2013; Lazarev and Sharma 2015). Overall, though, because of mixed empirical results, we are left with uncertainty regarding whether and how the economic conditions, experiences, and perceptions of host individuals correlate with, and potentially impact, attitudes toward refugees. Regarding the social correlates and determinants of attitudes, existing literature focused on the Western experience with immigration shows that social identity is in some cases correlated with attitudes toward migrants, particularly when social identity is defined in terms of national (Sniderman et al 2004; Pettigrew and Meertens 1995; Pederson et al 2005, Kunovich 2009; Mayda 2006; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006) or cultural identity (Sides and Citrin 2002-03; McKay et al 2012). In most of these cases, social identity has an exclusionary effect on attitudes,
leading host individuals to express negative attitudes toward out-group migrants who may be perceived to threaten or resist integration into the host nation or culture.

Focusing on refugee influxes in the developing world, social identity has primarily been studied in the context of ethnicity in Africa. Studies that have looked specifically at host attitudes have returned conflicting results, with common ethnicity between hosts and refugees at times facilitating integration and welcome, and at other times having marginal or no effect on attitudes at all.

Finally, few studies have examined how these different sets of variables relate and interact with each other in refugee crises. Looking at immigration studies in Western states, results are mixed and conclusions difficult. In Europe, social concerns tend to outweigh economic concerns in determining host attitudes (Sides and Citrin 2007; Sniderman et al 2004), while economics trump symbolic threats in Australia (Schweitzer et al 2005) and studies in North America return mixed results (Harell et al 2012; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014).

2.6 Gaps in the Existing Literature

Focusing on the context of mass refugee influxes in developing countries, an understanding of the formation of host attitudes is characterized by four key challenges, or gaps. First, to date, few studies have actually considered the interplay of ethnic and economic variables in shaping refugee-host attitudes and interactions. Compelling arguments have been put forth for the importance of both social identity and economic competition, but there is little understanding of how these variables relate to each other.

The second challenge is that much of the empirical evidence generated by studies on this subject is not conducive to cross-case comparison. Part of this challenge relates to different methodologies employed by various scholars. For example, studies at various times rely on
surveys (Codjoe et al. 2012; Crush and Pendleton 2004; Maystadt and Verwimp 2009); interviews (Onoma 2012; Porter et al. 2008; Agblorti 2011; Murshid 2014); case studies (Basok 1990); and comparative cases (Crisp 2000). Different methodologies do provide a better understanding of how these economic and social variables play out in individual contexts, but they do not lend themselves to cross-case analysis.

A third challenge relates to the level of analysis adopted by most scholarly studies that focus on refugee-host interactions in developing states. Aside from a few individual-level surveys, most of the empirical evidence used by scholars in this debate comes from macro-level cases studies. At the level of refugee influxes, the tendency is to look at social identity from a structural perspective, focusing on the number of ethnic groups and any group-level linkages. Similarly, at the macro level, economic factors must be quantified through aggregate or structural measures, such as unemployment rates, resource availability, economic growth rates, and overall costs of the refugee crisis. Such approaches offer valuable insights into the dynamics of refugee-host interactions at the country or refugee crisis level of analysis, helping to explain why, in specific instances, refugee inflows have resulted in outcomes such as violence, competition, or specific state policies. However, most studies do not address the individual-level dynamics of attitude formation, limiting our overall understanding of how and why refugee inflows lead to various outcomes.

Furthermore, much of the early literature relies on observational evidence, at the macro level, in considering refugee-host interactions in developing states. For example Kibreab, in support of his argument that economics trumps social identity in determining host attitudes toward refugees, points to numerous cases where resource availability is perceived to be the primary determinant of refugee-host interactions. These cases, though, are typically supported
by direct observational quotes by non-profits or international organizations, with only occasional reference to scholarly case studies.\textsuperscript{15} Even where scholars have applied more rigorous analytical techniques to macro-level studies, the results have been mixed. For every refugee influx where economics is shown to drive attitudes, one can point to another where common ethnicity appears to have a moderating effect on refugee-host interactions (Onoma 2014; Banki 2004). The evidence suggests that economic factors predominate in some cases, while social identity drives outcomes in others, but the specific relationships remain unclear.

The final challenge relates to uncertainty regarding the link between the direct impact of refugees and the attitudes of host individuals. One of the most well-established dynamics of refugee crises is that refugee inflows have both direct and indirect impacts on host populations, and these externalities vary according to the individual characteristics of hosts. While there is documented variation in economic impact and condition at the individual level, and a reasonable connection between attitudes and economic variables at the collective level, there exists little evidence linking economic variables and attitudes at the individual level. At the same time, there is insufficient evidence linking social identity and attitudes at the individual level. Theoretically, both social identity and economic factors help to determine attitudes toward refugees, but empirically there is insufficient evidence to support these claims.

\textsuperscript{15} For example, Kibreab references observations by Oxfam and UNHCR (70-71).
3. THEORY, EXPECTATIONS, AND HYPOTHESES

3.1 Theoretical Framework

Within the broad spectrum of potential determinants and correlates of host attitudes toward refugees, I focus on two particular categories of variables. Specifically, I consider how social identity and economic perceptions and interactions relate to and affect host attitudes during refugee crises. The core questions are a) whether host individuals form attitudes toward refugees based on personal identity, instrumental calculations, and/or direct interaction with refugees, and b) how these variables affect attitudes both directly and in more complex interplay.

Two issues should be clarified at this point. First, while economic calculations and interactions are endogenous to refugee crises, in so far as they do or are perceived to relate to refugee flows, social identity is more complex. Though refugee inflows can affect the salience of a host individual’s social identity and group attachment, with few exceptions, actual membership in social groups precedes the arrival of refugees.16 Ethnicity, tribe, religion, and kinship, while not set in stone, tend to be durable categorizations, at least in the short to medium term. The relevance and importance of those identities, though, may change within the dynamics of refugee crises, whether through interaction, manipulation, or instrumental calculation. This is a key assumption, that identification with a social group is exogenous to refugee flows.

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16 It is possible for new social identities and groups to form as a functional response to migration and resulting interactions (see Eriksen 1993, 20-21); such cases could possibly result from either an identity vacuum or the insufficiency of existing shared identities. In the example described by Eriksen, new social identities and groupings developed around economic class rather than shared ethnicity, in response to a combination of economic migration, rapid urbanization, and the disintegration of traditional family and tribal units.
A second point is that, while these categories of variables are distinct, they are neither mutually exclusive nor sufficient in themselves to fully explain attitude formation during refugee crises. Social identity, as a determinant of attitudes, does not preclude the influence of resource competition,\textsuperscript{17} nor does the economic impact of refugee flows necessarily negate the potential influence of social commonalities between hosts and refugees. Acknowledging the complexity of attitude formation, the challenge is conceptual and theoretical clarity, especially since economic and political competition often develop and proceed along group lines. In this study, I examine durable social identities that precede the impacts and interactions of refugee crises, distinguishing between what Sniderman et al (2004) refer to as “predisposing factors and situational triggers.”

The basic theoretical framework involves the flow of refugees into neighboring states, where pre-existing social identities are thrust into new dynamics and interactions. The identities of hosts and refugees, whether shared or distinct, influence both the interaction between and the attitudes of each group. Over time, social identities may change, but each individual enters into the arena of a refugee crisis with preexisting social identity(ies), the salience of which may increase depending on the situation. Shared social identity between refugees and hosts can encourage more positive host attitudes, and differences in social identity can lead to negative attitudes. Where there are no social ties between refugees and hosts, social identity may still impact attitudes based on perceived intergroup threats and the relationships between host identity groups and power structures. Furthermore, as hosts and refugees interact, host individuals develop attitudes toward refugees based on instrumental economic calculations and evaluations of the impact of refugees. As hosts perceive personal and collective economic threats and suffer

\textsuperscript{17} Tajfel and Turner (1986) argue that social identity theory and realistic group threat (RGT) theory are not competing arguments, and may actually be mutually supporting.
personal difficulties that they attribute to refugees, their attitudes toward those refugees reflect these challenges. Finally, shared social identity and economic competition influence attitudes in opposite directions, creating complex socio-economic dynamics in the formation of host attitudes toward refugees.

3.2 Social Theory and Expectations

3.2.1 Social Identity Theory and Basic Propositions

Social identity has been defined as “those aspects of an individual’s self-image that derive from the social categories to which he perceives himself as belonging” (Tajfel and Turner 1986, 16). Group identity can be functionally defined as shared social identity. The general argument is that individual attitudes are a function of social categorization and of association with groups that are formed around common identities, which lead individuals to favor those within the group at the expense of the outgroup. Put another way, an individual divides the world into social categories, of which he is (“us”) or is not (“them”) a member, and this categorization influences both orientation and action toward others (Wimmer 2013, 9).

Social identity is a broad concept that encompasses a wide range of criteria around which groups form. Identity may be defined in terms of class, race, kinship, or citizenship, but it can also derive from political partisanship, voluntary associations, and religious affiliation. Not every social identity is relevant and salient in any given situation, but each identity has the potential to impact the attitudes and actions of individuals. In this study, I focus on four specific social identity categories: kinship, national identity, ethnicity, and culture.

Before proceeding, it is important to clearly mark the starting point of this analysis. The question of identity formation is an important one, and a lack of understanding of how social
identities develop or are chosen can hinder the application of social identity theory to certain political science research areas (Huddy 2001). The key question for this study, however, is how social identities, and in particular “sticky” or “thick” identities such as ethnicity and kinship, impact host attitudes toward refugees. While context and history may affect the interaction of groups, the theoretical processes by which individuals develop or choose identities and coalesce into groups are not necessarily critical to the question of intergroup attitudes during refugee crises. I assume that social identities precede refugee inflows, and that, while these identities may change over time, and their salience can change in the short-term, social categorizations are durable within the context of refugee crises.

In cases of refugee inflows to countries of first asylum, there are two propositions that can be posed regarding group identity and attitudes. The first proposition is that shared group identity will lead to more positive attitudes, while individuals from different identity groups will hold more negative attitudes toward each other. Groups naturally define themselves in reference to outgroups, and this process involves demarcating the boundaries between groups (Wimmer 2013). Groups are based on relevant and salient commonality between individuals, and for the purposes of this study may be structured around social categorizations such as kinship, nation, ethnicity, or culture. Often, these groups overlap national boundaries, creating shared identity that may affect intra-group attitudes between host populations and refugees. When hosts identify with a group that includes refugees, assuming that the group identity is salient, that shared identity should encourage more productive and positive attitudes.

The second proposition is that, when there are no shared ties between hosts and refugees, the impact of social identity on host attitudes will depend on perceived intergroup threat. When

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18 Ericksen (1993, 10) – “Group identities must always be defined in relation to that which they are not – in other words, in relation to non-members of the group.”
refugee inflows threaten to undermine ethnic, economic, and political power structures in the host country, individuals belonging to the host social group under greatest threat will be more likely to express negative attitudes toward refugees. Where there are shared social ties between hosts and refugees, the relative position of that host group will be strengthened, and the first proposition comes into play. Where there are no shared group identities, host attitudes will be shaped by perceived threats to each individual’s social group. I explore these two propositions in more detail below.

Regarding the first proposition, social identity theory (SIT) holds that individuals seek to maximize self-positive identity, and by extension, group positive identity. As part of social categorization, two processes are at work. The first is bias toward the in-group. The self-identification of an individual with a group is sufficient, in itself, to generate favoritism toward the in-group (Tajfel and Turner 1986). The second process involves the perception of and attitudes toward outgroups. In order to maximize positive group identity, individuals seek to positively differentiate their own group relative to other groups, and to use these points of differentiation evaluatively. Intergroup threats and competition may provoke negative attitudes toward outgroups. However, it is not necessary for there to be competition or opposed interests between groups in order for discrimination and bias to arise. According to Tajfel and Turner (1986, 13), “the mere awareness of the presence of an out-group is sufficient to provoke intergroup competitive or discriminatory responses on the part of the in-group.” Social identity theory therefore predicts both favoritism toward the in-group, and discrimination against and derogation of the out-group.

Moving beyond social identity theory, though, there are other mechanisms through which individual and group identities may impact host attitudes toward refugees. Group identities can
form the basis of social networks, which contribute to positive interaction and integration between refugees and hosts with common identities. These networks can be used by refugees to secure housing, jobs, and resources, while at the same time providing a pathway through which refugees can contribute economically and socially to the broader community. Linked to this mechanism is the concept of social capital, which can encourage cooperation, coordination, and trust (Putnam 1995; Fukuyama 1995). During refugee crises, social networks that are tied to common group identities can facilitate multiple processes related to settlement, livelihoods, and conflict resolution, leading to more positive attitudes.

A second mechanism centers on cultural and linguistic commonalities, which facilitate interaction and, potentially, integration between refugees and hosts by encouraging communication and reducing friction points between groups. Shared language provides a basis for communication, limiting misunderstandings and facilitating interaction. Conversely, language barriers may prevent refugee integration into the host community and limit refugees’ livelihood opportunities. In the case of protracted refugee crises, the reluctance of refugees to learn the host language may be perceived by hosts as lack of desire on the part of refugees to positively engage with the host society (Porter et al 2008). Also, groups that share values, history, and social processes may be less likely to engage in mutual conflict. In the middle of a potentially chaotic and overwhelming influx of refugees, the existence of linguistic and cultural commonalities can moderate hosts’ perceived threat from refugees. Even in cases where conflict does arise, common mechanisms for conflict resolution can prevent escalation and encourage positive outcomes and interactions.

Shared group identity may also provide informational shortcuts during refugee crises. Common social identity can provide information on macro characteristics of refugees, such as
worldview, interpretive processes, and values, while at the same time offering cues on
appropriate modes of situational and general interaction. This argument assumes that part of the
stress of refugee-host interactions stems from the uncertainty of two sets of people thrust
together suddenly and involuntarily. Shared group identity may therefore reduce host
uncertainty regarding refugees, fostering more positive attitudes.

Furthermore, common social identity may impose obligation or duty on group members
to welcome and support co-members. Social identity, in its broadest sense, may center on
criteria ranging from political partisanship to voluntary associations to ethnicity, and not all of
these social groups impose the same degree of responsibility on members. In general, though,
the less voluntary and more durable is membership in a group, the greater the obligation may be
toward co-members.19 During refugee crises, hosts may perceive a duty toward refugees who
are kin, co-ethnics, or co-religionists, moderating their attitudes and behavior accordingly.

A final potential mechanism is instrumental in nature. Realistic group conflict theory
(Sherif and Sherif 1969; Campbell 1965; Levine and Campbell 1972) posits that intergroup
competition and perceived threats contribute to negative attitudes and hostility toward outgroups.
Social groups can serve as the primary locus of competition over material and symbolic goods,
and host individuals form attitudes that derive from and reinforce the utility of group
membership. At the individual level, in the context of refugee crises, hosts who identify with
social groups that are discrete from refugees are less likely to hold positive attitudes toward
refugees, given the perception of zero-sum, intergroup competition over economic or political
goods. On the other hand, the addition of group members from outside the country may
strengthen the relative position of the group, and by extension the position of individuals within

19 Another way of stating this is that, the more primordial the social identity, the greater the obligation among group
members.
the group. Particularly where group identity is politically salient, as is often the case with ethnicity, hosts are more likely to welcome refugees who share their group identity, as this strengthens the relative position and helps maintain (or at least poses no threat to) the status of that ethnic group.

Given the general proposition that shared group identity encourages more positive attitudes, how might we expect this process to play out in the context of group identities formed around various commonalities? In proceeding sections, I focus on social identities centered on kinship, nationality, ethnicity, and culture, specifically considering if and how the various suggested mechanisms may affect host attitudes on the basis of such identities.

3.2.2 Cultural Identity

Beginning with the broadest categorization of group identity, a shared cultural identity may influence host attitudes toward refugees. A key challenge here is clarifying what is meant by culture, and how cultural identity is distinct from other social identities. On the one hand, culture is seen a fundamental component of ethnicity, with co-ethnics typically sharing common elements of cultural beliefs and expressions. However, whereas ethnicity, nationality, and kinship are membership-based identities, culture is defined in terms of shared values, practices, and customs. Culture involves a wide range of aggregate elements, each of which individually is neither necessary nor sufficient to define an overall culture. What is important, though, is not the specific components that constitute a culture, but whether an individual host perceives that refugees share with her a common culture, or at least elements of a common culture. In other words, it is not the objective existence of cultural commonality or community,

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20 Drawing on Weber (1985), Wimmer (2013, 7) defines ethnicity as “as subjectively felt belonging to a group that is distinguished by a shared culture and by common ancestry.”
but rather the subjective perception of a host individual that she shares a cultural identity with refugees.

Though culture is an amorphous concept, when a host individual perceives common culture with refugees, she recognizes those refugees as co-members in a shared social group. In this way, common culture may help to moderate refugee-host attitudes and interactions. Even if refugees and host do not share closer ties through ethnicity or kinship, common language, beliefs, and behaviors can help to bridge the two groups. Perception of common culture can reduce uncertainty, facilitate interaction, encourage integration, and generate warmth and affinity toward refugees. Though these mechanisms may be weak when they work through culture, the directional expectation is the same. Recognition of cultural common ground should therefore positively influence an individual’s attitudes toward refugees.

Hypothesis 1: Individuals who perceive that refugees and hosts share a cultural identity are more likely to express positive attitudes toward refugees.

3.2.3 Nationalism and National Identification

One of the more robust findings in the literature on Western attitudes toward immigration is that individuals who express national or nationalist sentiment are more likely to hold negative attitudes toward migrants. Identification with a national community, whether that be expressed as a preference for national cultural unity or in more political terms, is associated with both anti-immigrant and anti-refugee attitudes (O’Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Sides and Citrin 2007; Gallego fc; Kunovich 2009; Mayda 2006; Sniderman et al 2004). In moving from migration in Europe and North America to refugee movements in the developing world, the question is
whether the connection between national identity and attitudes is the same. Does national identification among host individuals correlate with negative attitudes toward refugees?

In defining national identity, it is important to distinguish between ethnic and political definitions of nation. Both involve common identity built on shared culture, symbols, and history, but while an ethnic national identity centers on common ancestry, through actual or metaphorical kinship ties, political national identity is a more encompassing concept, which may or may not be limited to a single ethnic group. In ethnically homogenous countries, the political national identity may be the same as ethnic identity, but in most cases, ethnicity is either a sub-state, supra-state, or cross-state identity. In this study, I focus on the political concept of national identity, specifically that aspect of one’s identity that derives from membership in the social and political group defined in terms of and coterminous with the nation-state. Put another way, national identity is synonymous with, and best measured by, state-level political citizenship.

In considering how national identity may affect host attitudes toward refugees, one suggestion is that “natives may derive utility from living in a society with a well-defined sense of national identity and well-understood and accepted social norms” (O’Rourke and Sinnott 2006, 843-844). Based on this argument, national identity is an instrumental collective identity that provides individuals both social belonging and structure, and the logical extension is that individuals develop orientations and act in such a way as to maintain the integrity and utility of the national group. Refugees are potentially seen as a threat to national identity and structure, and host attitudes reflect this threat perception. From a material standpoint, the utility of national identification may extend to tangible benefits such as political, economic, and social rights. Host individuals may perceive threats to these benefits during refugee crises, consequently viewing refugees with suspicion, prejudice, or outright hostility.
A more simple and basic process, though, may come into play. Returning to social identity theory, identification with a social group naturally leads to the designation of non-members as outsiders (Tajfel and Turner 1986). Social groups that are based on national identity are by nature exclusionary, defined both by internal characteristics and by comparison to other groups, leading to negative attitudes toward those in out-groups. Where national identity is based on the nation-state and membership in the group is marked by citizenship, refugees are naturally an out-group, and individual host attitudes will reflect the strength of their national identification.

There is therefore an expectation that greater identification with the national community is negatively correlated with attitudes toward refugees. Host individuals who express a strong national identity are more likely to perceive refugees as an out-group, and to use this group demarcation evaluatively, leading to negative orientations toward those refugees.

Hypothesis 2: Individuals who express a strong identification with the national community are more likely to hold negative attitudes toward refugees.

3.2.4 Co-Ethnicity Between Refugees and Hosts

A common argument concerning refugee-host relations is that shared ethnicity fosters more positive interaction. Co-ethnicity is associated with less refugee-host violence (Crisp 2000) and more positive reception of refugees (Jacobsen 1996; Kunz 1981). Co-ethnic refugees are less likely to be seen as a threat by host populations, facilitating productive and peaceful interaction (Crisp 2000; Loescher and Milner 2005).

Defining ethnicity is no easy task, but most scholars focus on the twin elements of shared ancestry and common culture (Wimmer 2013; Horowitz 1985). Though ethnicity is not fixed, it
is usually ascribed to the individual based on lineage, and can be conceived as an extension of
kinship ties beyond the immediate and extended family. Ethnicity also involves shared values,
culture, language, and history, and as such constitutes a potentially strong social group with
mores, patterns of behavior, and expectations of members. While ethnicity by definition
involves shared culture, culture is distinct from ethnicity, both conceptually and perceptually
(from the standpoint of the individual). Conceptually, culture is broader than ethnicity, in that
two people may share a culture without being co-ethnics. At the same time, culture is more
amorphous than ethnicity, relying not on ascription and defined membership but on perceived
connection. Finally, culture imposes few obligations on individuals, while ethnicity often
involves complex structures and expectations that shape the behavior of members.

Given the assumption of ethnic salience, that ethnicity is a meaningful and functional
basis of group identity, shared ethnicity may positively impact host attitudes through each of the
mechanisms suggested above. The cognitive mechanisms of social identity theory need no
further elaboration, but during refugee crises, other mechanisms can play important roles. First,
co-ethnics may benefit from social networks that facilitate the integration and transition of
refugees in host communities. Through these networks, refugees are better informed and better
positioned to secure housing, jobs, and livelihoods (see Steputat 2004, 8). Indeed, refugees often
choose to settle in co-ethnic host areas, using social connections to ease their transition (Hein
1997; Riddle and Buckley 1998). Based on this line of reasoning, shared ethnicity between
refugees and hosts is characterized by social networks and social trust, which lead to better
attitudes and more positive relations.

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21 Horowitz (1985, 59) refers to ethnicity as being “pyramided on family ties.”
22 Culture may influence behavior through norms, but typically imposes no sanction for non-conforming behavior.
Another potential way in which co-ethnicity affects host attitudes is through social and linguistic commonalities (Onoma 2014; Freund and Kalumba 1986), which may attenuate threats, competition, and suspicion brought on by refugee inflows. Co-ethnicity, through social networks and cultural similarities, may help to bridge the gap between refugees and hosts, facilitating productive engagement, moderating conflict, and fostering positive orientations, but it may also serve as an informational shortcut. When large numbers of refugees flow into a host state, the resulting crisis generates a high level of uncertainty. From the host perspective, questions arise regarding the character and nature of the refugees; how those refugees will impact the individual host; and what the outcomes will be. Co-ethnicity can reduce this uncertainty by providing information on refugees, leading to positive categorization and productive interaction.

Finally, co-ethnicity may be tied to macro-level group competition between ethnic groups. Several scholars point to the importance of ethnic balances and conflicts in host countries for understanding refugee-host relations (Cederman et al 2009; Lin and Shreve 2012; Murshid 2014). Where ethnic identity is politically salient, ethnic ties between refugees and hosts may strengthen, in reality or perception, the relative position of that host ethnic group, encouraging better individual host attitudes toward the refugees.

The negative consequence of these mechanisms is that those individuals who don’t share ethnicity with refugees are more prone to negative attitudes. Cultural and linguistic differences, lack of social capital, and perceived threat from refugees lead to tension and animosity. Underlying these mechanisms, though, is a more fundamental argument stemming from social identity theory. Groups who do not share ethnic ties are more likely to experience conflict, simply because the process of social categorization involves necessarily defining the in-group in
relation to an outgroup, which naturally encourages negative comparisons (Tajfel and Turner 1986). This theoretical process may underlie the empirical observation that, in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, “other ethnic groups are described in unflattering or disparaging terms. In general, ethnic identity is strongly felt, behavior based on ethnicity is normatively sanctioned, and ethnicity is often accompanied by hostility toward outgroups” (Horowitz 1985, 7).

The implication of these arguments is that, given the salience of ethnic identity, host individuals who share ethnicity with refugees should look upon those refugees more favorably than do hosts who do not share ethnicity with refugees. Co-ethnicity fosters positive orientations which should be reflected in host attitudes toward refugees themselves, in support for government policies related to the refugee crisis, and in perception of norms regarding how one should act toward and interact with refugees. Though focused hypotheses may be generated for specific empirical contexts, the general expectation is:

Hypothesis 3: Individuals who share ethnic identity with refugees are more likely to hold positive attitudes toward refugees.

3.2.5 Kinship and Family Ties

While ethnicity is the social identity most studied in connection with refugee-host relations, many of the same arguments can be made for kinship and family ties. Kinship may overlap or on occasion be used synonymously with ethnicity, but it is conceptually different in at least one important aspect. While ethnic groups may use common ancestry as one criterion for defining membership, this primordial concept of ethnic identity has been challenged by scholars who suggest that ethnicity is better understood in terms of instrumental social interaction rather
than cultural commonalities. Kinship, on the other hand, is by definition based on lineage, involving both a social and a biological component, and as such may constitute a more salient and less-fluid social connection between refugees and hosts.

Kinship ranges from close family relationships to broader connections through clan or tribe. The closer the relationship between an individual host and the referent refugee group, the greater the salience of that relationship should be. Family ties supersede shared clan or tribal identities. The same mechanisms identified for co-ethnics may be at work in cases where a host individual shares kinship ties with refugees, but could in fact be stronger. Social networks may be more dense (while at the same time potentially less extensive), and family ties suggest shared values and history. Kinship may simply foster greater trust and affinity, encouraging strong emotional and affective ties between refugees and hosts. Importantly, family ties can also be characterized by complex, reciprocal obligations to care for each other, the intensity of which increases with the closeness of the familial relationship. Shared kinship ties, therefore, may impose a duty on host individuals to support and assist those refugees to whom they are related, potentially fostering greater integration and adaptation of refugees into host communities, while at the same time reducing tensions and conflict. If this is the case, then we should expect to see more positive attitudes among host individuals who share family ties to refugees.

Hypothesis 4: Individuals who share close kinship ties with refugees are more likely to hold positive attitudes toward refugees.

On the other hand, while kinship may lead to better attitudes toward refugees who have familial ties to host individuals, those attitudes may not extend beyond family members. Hosts may welcome and extend help toward refugees who are kin, while at the same time holding

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23 See Eriksen (1993, Ch. 2) and Brubaker (2009) for reviews on this debate.
negative attitudes toward refugees as a whole. The question is whether attitudes towards family
generalize toward non-related refugees, and there is reason to believe that the positive
mechanism of shared kinship may have little impact at the macro level, particularly in contexts
characterized by competition and threats to identity, livelihood, and position. This suggests, not
an opposite effect to the above hypothesis, but rather a null effect of kinship at the macro level.

3.2.6 Ethnicity and Threat Perception

The second proposition is that, where there are no shared group ties between hosts and
refugees, the impact of social identity on host attitudes will depend on perceived intergroup
threat. Focusing on ethnic identities, within the context of refugee movements, it is important to
consider how refugees may alter the ethnic balance in the host country, with consequences for
political and economic power (Cederman et al 2009; Ruegger and Bohnet 2011; Whitaker 2003).
In situations where there are multiple ethnic groups in the host state, there are two main
possibilities during refugee crises. First, refugees may share ethnic ties with one or more host
groups. Referring back to the previous hypothesis, the expectation is that shared ethnic ties will
encourage more positive attitudes toward co-ethnic refugees. Second, refugees may not share
ethnic ties with any host group. In this case, how might ethnic identities affect host attitudes?
More specifically, how might attitudes toward refugees vary across different host ethnic groups?

Previous research has shown that the salience of ethnic identity is often catalyzed by
political or economic competition, particularly when political institutions such as party systems
and electoral cycles incentivize political mobilization along ethnic lines (Posner 2004; 2007;
Eiffert, Miguel and Posner 2010). In cases where ethnic groups compete for political or
economic power, changes to the relative balance of those ethnic groups may have consequences
for the distribution of power. Where there is real or perceived competition between ethnic
groups in the host country, an influx of refugees can change the dynamics of ethnic interaction.
In situations where there are no ethnic ties between refugees and hosts, attitudes toward refugees
may depend on the perception of economic or political threat posed by those refugees.

The simple expectation is that individuals from the ethnic group perceiving the greatest
threat from refugees are more likely to hold negative attitudes toward those refugees. This raises
the question, though, of which ethnic group should perceive the greatest threat. Economically, as
noted previously, the impact of refugees is mixed. Within an ethnic group, economic elites may
actually benefit from new economic opportunities during refugee crises, while other group
members may face increased competition and reduced economic opportunity. Attitudes may
therefore depend more on socio-economic status than ethnicity. Consequently, a more nuanced
expectation is that, where there is variation in economic threat between ethnic groups,
individuals from the group perceiving or experiencing the greatest threat from refugees will have
more negative attitudes toward those refugees. If there is no variation between ethnic groups
with regard to perception of economic threat, we must look elsewhere to explain intergroup
variation in attitudes.

Hypothesis 5: Where there are no refugee-host ethnic ties, and there is variation in
economic threat between ethnic groups, individuals from the ethnic group perceiving the
greatest threat from refugees are more likely to express negative attitudes toward those
refugees.

Refugees can also pose a threat to political and power structures. When ethnic groups are
a locus for political competition, the perceived threat from refugee influxes may rest on the
distribution of power among host ethnic groups. An ethnic group which dominates politics in a
host country may perceive greater threat from non-related refugee inflows, since that group’s privileged position must be defended against all other groups in that state. This threat may be both immediate, given the economic costs and security concerns posed by refugee inflows, and long-term, given the normative international expectation that political and economic rights be extended to refugees who may remain in the host country for years or even permanently. An ethnic group that either does not have access to political power, or faces discrimination from a more powerful group, may not perceive as great a threat from non-related refugees, since refugee inflows do not necessarily impact that group’s position.

Given ethnic salience in the host country, and an unequal distribution of political power between dominant and minority ethnic groups, a large influx of refugees from a non-related ethnic group is more likely to generate negative perceptions and attitudes among individuals from the politically dominant ethnic group, suggesting the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 6: Where there are no refugee-host ethnic ties, and there is variation between host ethnic groups in perceived political threat from refugees, individuals from the ethnic group perceiving the greatest threat from refugees are more likely to express negative attitudes toward those refugees.

3.3 Economic Theory and Expectations

3.3.1 Economic Threat and Instrumental Calculations

When faced with an inflow of refugees, a natural response for host individuals is to evaluate the personal and collective impact of such an influx. At the core of this response is an instrumental calculation regarding the costs, benefits, threats, and changes posed by the presence

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24 For example, this is an explanation given for the Maronite opposition to Palestinian refugees in Lebanon following the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 (Peteet 1995, 165-169).
of large numbers of refugees. The general proposition is that the perception of economic threat and/or economic impact drives host attitudes, with multiple triggers and variables that may potentially affect attitudes towards refugees.

Underlying the proposition that economic threat impacts host attitudes is a mechanism of perceived disequilibrium between what is and what should be. Grounded in social psychology, relative deprivation (RD) has been used to explain a wide range of behavioral and attitudinal outcomes by focusing on subjective comparisons to different referents (Stouffer et al 1949; Pettigrew et al 2008). In the context of intergroup attitudes, perceptions of relative deprivation are associated with greater prejudice toward the outgroup (Pettigrew and Meertens 1995). Gurr (1970) articulates a theory of relative deprivation as a motivation for collective action such as rebellion and conflict. According to Gurr, relative deprivation occurs when there is a perception of a discrepancy between value expectations (goods or conditions to which people believe they are rightly entitled) and value capabilities (goods or conditions that people believe they are capable of securing). Disequilibrium may result from increased expectations and static capabilities (aspirational RD), constant expectations and decreasing capabilities (decremental RD), or capabilities that increase but fall short of rising expectations (progressive RD).

At the individual level, relative deprivation involves a cognitive process in which people make comparisons between themselves and other individuals, between current and past conditions, and between their positive and normative states. Refugee crises create significant economic, social, and political disruptions in the host state, and individuals develop attitudes toward refugees based on their perception or evaluation of how these disruptions affect or threaten their livelihood, prospects for the future, or ideal economic situation. Instrumental calculations and comparisons may be triggered by a direct impact, whether positive or negative,
to the host individual or family. This is not necessarily an interpersonal interaction, but rather a measurable change in the personal situation of the host individual, which is attributed by the individual (rightly or wrongly) to the presence and actions of refugees. Attitudes toward refugees are thus affected by the actual individual-level consequences of refugee inflows, with positive impacts fostering positive attitudes, and negative impacts generating negative orientations toward refugees. A second trigger, though, involves the perception of a potential or actual impact. An actual impact is not necessary for hosts to form attitudes toward refugees; a perceived impact, threat, or benefit may be sufficient. The subjective possibility that a host may be adversely affected by refugee inflows can trigger negative orientations toward those refugees. Furthermore, while the comparison or impact may be at the individual level, it may also involve collective well-being and perceived threat at the group or national level.

Within this general framework of cognitive comparison, direct impact, and perceived threat, economic considerations may manifest in different ways and within different arenas. The existing literature has highlighted the various pathways through which refugee inflows impact, or are perceived to impact, host populations. Drawing from these insights, I explore three specific areas in which instrumental calculations may be relevant to host attitudes: economic competition, personal economic evaluations, and sociotropic evaluations.

3.3.2 Economic Competition

Realistic group conflict theory (Campbell 1965; Levine and Campbell 1972) argues that instrumental competition over scarce resources leads to group conflict, while the pursuit of common, interdependent goals fosters cooperation between groups. At the individual level, though, how do we account for intragroup variation in attitudes toward refugees? Moving
beyond social groups, one option is to focus on the economic characteristics, condition, and position of individual hosts and ascertain whether attitudes are patterned accordingly.

When refugees flow into a host country in large numbers, they create greater demand for economic goods. The supply of these economic goods can increase proportionally over time, particularly from aid resources and the economic activity generated by the refugee crisis. Certain goods, though, either exist in finite supply (such as natural resources) or cannot keep pace with the demand posed by refugee inflows (such as infrastructure, government services, and employment). The resulting economic scarcity, coupled with a zero-sum mentality, shapes the nature and quality refugee-host interactions (Bookman 2002), and the greater the concentration of refugees, the greater the scarcity and therefore the greater the volatility of refugee-host relations (Bohnet 2012).

The key point is that refugees pursue livelihood strategies in host countries, drawing on limited economic goods in the form of income, housing, healthcare, education, and natural resources. Demand for economic goods outstrips supply, leading to higher prices and greater scarcity, and generating competition between individuals and groups. Host individuals may perceive a gap between their economic situation and that of refugees, or some past economic status, or in reference to some ideal condition. In relative deprivation terms, during refugee crises expectations remain constant but the capability to meet those expectations falls with increased competition for resources and services.

Assuming that hosts blame refugees for economic scarcity, refugee-host competition should foster negative attitudes toward those refugees. In support of this assumption, it does not take a significant cognitive leap for host individuals to connect economic scarcity, and particularly changes in scarcity, with the influx of refugees. Large numbers of refugees, highly
visible in the community, combined with extensive media coverage, make it easy for host individuals to blame the refugee crisis for economic difficulties. Furthermore, given the potential for elite narratives and government manipulation of information, refugees present an easy scapegoat for both current economic competition and preexisting economic woes.

Economic competition between refugees and hosts can center on a wide range of economic goods, including jobs, natural resources, government services, commodities, and housing. In following sections, I examine in more detail the dynamics of competition in two areas: labor market and general competition over other resources and government services.

The three basic propositions concerning economic competition are that, during refugee crises:

1. Attitudes are a function of one’s economic position
2. Attitudes are a function of one’s economic experience
3. Attitudes are a function of one’s economic perceptions and evaluations

I explore these propositions below, within the contexts of specific areas of economic competition, but before proceeding, it is important to establish a baseline expectation for economic position. When faced with actual or perceived economic competition, individuals who are, by nature of their economic position or conditions, more vulnerable to exogenous shocks, should react differently than those individuals who are more insulated from the economic impact of refugees. Economic vulnerability should either lead host individuals to view refugees as a greater threat or expose those individuals to higher levels of economic competition, fostering more negative attitudes toward those refugees.

Hypothesis 7: Individuals with greater economic security are more likely to express positive attitudes toward refugees
The 1951 Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees set forth, among other principles, the right of refugees to work in host countries. Though the Convention provides for some policy leeway in the first three years of a refugee crisis, in order to protect domestic labor markets, the treaty established a standard of refugee labor market access comparable to the “most favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country” (UNHCR 1951, Art. 17-1). With 145 state parties to the Convention, the right of refugees to work in their host country is well established in theory.

Host countries, however, often ignore or contravene this standard in practice, whether for political, economic, or social reasons. The reality is that a sudden, and sometimes massive, influx of refugees can strain labor markets, with broader consequences for society and state. Since most states of first asylum are developing countries, with fragile economies, high unemployment, and relatively low state capacity, restrictions on refugee labor are common. Despite this, many refugees find work, whether illegally, extra-legally, or through self-employment.

At the individual level of analysis, how might we expect the influx of refugee labor to affect host attitudes? More specifically, do host attitudes vary according to individuals’ labor market position or status? Theories of labor market competition and migration tend to draw on the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) factor model of trade (though others favor the factor-proportions model; see Scheve and Slaughter 2001). HO posits that preferences toward trade and immigration policies are a function of one’s skill level (factor of production). The expectation is that immigration will affect those national workers whose skill level is most similar to that of immigrants. For example, given a large influx of low-skilled immigrants, HO predicts that low-
skilled native workers will be most vulnerable to labor market competition and wage decline, and will therefore express preferences for tighter immigration controls.

In the context of refugee movements, I assume that the primary labor market threat posed by refugees is to lower-skilled jobs. Though refugee flows are not necessarily characterized by a single labor market segment, there are several reasons why refugees are more likely to engage in unskilled work. First, host state restrictions on refugee labor opportunities tend to push refugees toward unskilled jobs that are less visible, require no certifications, and are more difficult to monitor. Second, host states often limit refugee movement to rural areas on the periphery of the state. In these areas, agricultural and manual labor are more prevalent than professional and technical occupations. Third, unskilled labor is more susceptible to wage competition, with some employers willing to hire the cheapest labor regardless of legal considerations.

Previous evidence tends to support this assumption. Research, including surveys, case studies, and anecdotal accounts, shows that refugee crises in Africa can lead to labor market competition and depressed wages for low-skilled laborers (Maystadt and Verwimp 2009; Chambers 1986; Bulcha 1988). At the same time, there is evidence that labor market competition involving lower-skilled and lower-educated workers may be correlated with negative attitudes toward refugees in Southern Africa (Crush and Pendleton 2004). This relationship, though, has not been rigorously tested.

In refugee crises in developing states, the implication of the labor market competition argument is that lower-skilled workers will be faced with both increased competition and decreased wages, leading these individuals to instrumentally evaluate their relative job security, wages, and economic security in reference to either refugees, a previous time period, or an ideal state. By extension, the expectation is that, compared to other workers, lower-skilled workers
are more likely to hold negative attitudes toward refugees. Furthermore, unemployed workers should have poorer attitudes toward refugees, whether because of perceived competition for available jobs, or because refugees are rightly or wrongly blamed for their unemployed status.

Hypothesis 8: Lower-skilled workers are more likely to hold negative attitudes toward refugees.

Hypothesis 9: Unemployed host individuals are more likely to hold negative attitudes toward refugees.25

Hypothesis 10: Individuals who perceive that refugees have taken host population jobs are more likely to hold negative attitudes toward refugees.

Hosts and refugees compete not only in the labor market, but also over resources, services, and other economic goods. Rapid inflows of refugees into host communities may place strain on environmental, economic, and social resources. Particularly in rural and arid regions, refugee crises lead to greater demand for water, grazing, and firewood, leading to shortages and depletion of water reserves, rangeland, and forests (Whitaker 2002; Birendra and Nagata 2006; Aukot 2003). Governments’ responses to refugee flows often strain their capacity to provide basic services to both refugees and nationals. Host communities and individuals often encounter increased difficulty in securing social services such as education and healthcare. For example, host states may accept refugee children into national schools, but without increasing physical infrastructure or the number of teachers. Medical resources may be directed toward the refugee crisis, making it more difficult for nationals to secure timely and effective healthcare.

International aid can help to offset the burden on host governments, but funding shortfalls must be borne by host states already facing fiscal challenges and inadequate service capability. In

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25 Hypotheses 8 and 9 are similar to those posed in studies on attitudes toward immigration (see, for example, Sides and Citrin 2007; Kunovich 2013).
some cases, host governments may divert funding from social and development programs, in order to address the more immediate refugee crisis. The end result is that, during refugee crises, host communities may encounter both decreased supply and increased demand for health, education, and social services.

Finally, refugee crises can have broad economic impacts on the cost and availability of foodstuff, housing, and commodities. Demand for and cost of housing have been shown to increase not only from the influx of refugees, but also from the associated increase in ngo staff (Buscher and Vlassenroot 2010; Mercy Corps 2013). Food and commodity prices also go up as demand outstrips supply, though price volatility may also pose problems as food aid is sold cheaply, but sporadically, in local markets. In some cases, refugee-related economic problems are manifested in the subsidies offered by governments. For example, in Tunisia, an inflow of refugees from Libya contributed to the Tunisian government’s decision to reduce fuel subsidies, increasing the cost of gas and diesel, and raising fears of further cuts to food and commodities subsidies (Asharq Al-Awsat 2014).

Macro-level analyses, such as Bohnet (2012), focus on aggregate measures in which economic scarcity and competition are linked to negative interactions such as violence. At the individual level, though, this link may not hold across different socio-demographic characteristics. Ever since Chambers (1986), it has been widely accepted that the economic impact of refugees on hosts varies according to such host factors as education, income, class, and employment (Whitaker 2002; Alix-Garcia and Saah 2009). A simplified assertion is that refugee crises are more likely to negatively impact those hosts who are most vulnerable economically, politically, and socially. Poor hosts have fewer resources with which to secure goods, services, and economic access, and are especially vulnerable to negative externalities posed by refugee
crises. For example, if housing costs increase during refugee crises, poorer hosts are less able to meet those costs and have fewer alternatives for securing housing. More affluent hosts can better adapt to economic shocks, and tend to have more options in pursuing livelihood strategies. There is some evidence that refugee crises may actually benefit hosts who own property and businesses, as they are better positioned to take advantage of economic opportunities such as larger markets and cheap labor. We may reasonably expect, therefore, that there is a general correlation between economic competition and negative attitudes toward refugees, and that this relationship is stronger among less-affluent individuals in host communities.

Hypothesis 11: Individuals who experience competition over resources or services are more likely to hold negative attitudes toward refugees.

Hypothesis 12: Economic competition is more likely to be correlated with negative attitudes among less-affluent individuals.

Finally, host attitudes may be affected by negative comparisons involving how refugees are perceived to be treated and supported by the government and/or international aid organizations. Host populations may perceive that aid organizations and government agencies are providing aid, services, and goods disproportionately to refugees, resulting in a higher standard of living for refugees, relative to host populations. This is a form of aspirational RD, in which expectations increase while capabilities remain constant or, given economic scarcity and competition, decrease.

There is ample evidence, both anecdotal and qualitative, to support this argument (Aukot 2003; Karadawi 1983; Lesailly-Jacob 1993; Murshid 2014). During refugee crises, large amounts of aid are channeled to refugees to provide for their basic needs. In some cases, refugees may receive free or subsidized services. Particularly in camps, refugees may benefit
from free educational and medical services, while nationals complain about the costs of those same services. This refugee-focused largesse can be a source of frustration for host populations who perceive that refugees are able to maintain a standard of living higher than that of nationals (Voutira and Harrell-Bond 1995; Agblorti 2011). Further support for this argument comes from the emphasis placed by host governments and the international community on both emergency aid (refugee-focused) and development aid (community-focused). Though intended to strengthen the capacity of communities and states to host refugees (UNHCR 2003; Gorman 1986), this emphasis on balanced response has in part stemmed from the need to address tensions that have been attributed to perceived differences in the provision of services, goods, and aid to refugees and host communities.

Summarizing this argument, the expectation is that perceived differences between refugees and hosts in the provision of aid and quality of life will help to shape host attitudes. When a host individual perceives that refugees are treated better by aid organizations or host governments, those individuals should, on average, express more negative attitudes toward refugees.

Hypothesis 13: Individuals who perceive that refugees are favored in the provision of aid and services are more likely to hold negative attitudes toward those refugees.

3.3.3 Personal Economic Evaluations

During refugee crises, host individuals may perceive that their ability to maintain a standard or quality of life is diminished. Termed decremental deprivation by Gurr, this involves a situation in which expectations established at some previous time remain constant, but one’s capacity to secure expected values declines. Refugee movements may pose negative
externalities, leading to lower quality of life for host populations. This may manifest itself in reduced livelihood security, poorer health, more difficulty securing services and goods, and competition. The perception of decremental deprivation, though it may be grounded in tangible impacts, nevertheless centers on a cognitive evaluation of an individual’s overall economic condition relative to a previous state. If there is a gap between expectations and value realization, hosts may blame the refugee crises for their economic condition. As noted above, it is a reasonable assumption that host individuals connect economic woes to the arrival of refugees, and assign blame accordingly. In short, if hosts perceive that their quality of life or economic condition has suffered relative to a previous, pre-crisis reference point, this perception may negatively affect their attitudes toward refugees.

Hypothesis 14: Individuals who perceive that their quality of life or economic condition has declined during a refugee crisis are more likely to hold negative attitudes toward refugees.

Alternatively, present economic evaluations may have a direct impact on attitudes, when compared to some ideal condition. In other words, in order to form attitudes toward refugees, it may be sufficient for host individuals to connect their present economic condition, whether positive or negative, to the refugee influx.

Hypothesis 15: Individuals who express negative evaluations of their present economic condition are more likely to hold negative attitudes toward refugees.

3.3.4 Sociotropic Economic Evaluations

Another instrumental argument, suggested in the Western immigration literature (Citrin and Sides 1997; Dancygier and Donnelly 2013), is that individuals are concerned not so much
with how they are affected individually, but with the economic impact of refugees on the country as a whole. Sociotropic explanations have been advanced for such political outcomes as policy preference (Mansfield and Mutz 2009) and voting behavior (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981). According to these models, rather than forming opinions and preferences based on personal experience, individuals instead use collective information to develop attitudes towards national-level issues such as immigration and trade policy. A key argument, which is based on the availability and processing of information, is that these macro issues may be too complex, or too distant, for individuals to connect them to their personal situation. Sociotropic preference formation requires only that individuals recognize general macro conditions and associate those conditions with a responsible group or phenomenon. As such, sociotropic attitudes are not altruistic in nature, but rather rational responses to complex problems that transcend the individual experience.

In the context of refugee crises, application of the sociotropic argument leads to the simple assertion that host individuals either do not consider or cannot make sense of the personal impact of refugee inflows, but rather evaluate macro-level conditions and form attitudes accordingly. Whether because they have not been personally affected by the refugee crisis, because they do not connect their personal experience to the influx of refugees, or because macro-economic conditions provide a better source of information, host individuals assess and evaluate national economic conditions in reference to either a previous state or some ideal standard, and blame refugees accordingly. Those who feel that the national economy is doing well are less likely to view refugees as threats and should hold more positive attitudes toward them. On the other hand, negative evaluations of macro-economic conditions should correspond to negative attitudes toward refugees.
Hypothesis 16: Host individuals who express negative evaluations of the national economy are more likely to hold negative attitudes toward refugees.

Another consideration, though, is that, given an unbalanced distribution of refugees in a host state and the variations in impact experienced by host individuals, the personal impact of refugee inflows may be unevenly felt among hosts. Pardos-Prado (2011) argues that, where there is no perceived personal economic threat from immigrants, hosts turn to other factors and predispositions to help interpret the issue. Attitude formation may therefore proceed from the most proximate information to the most distant, with sociotropic concerns only important for those who do not perceive or experience a direct personal threat from refugees. This suggests that sociotropic concerns are more important for certain segments of the host population, with multiple potential dynamics. The first, circumstantial in nature, is that host individuals’ economic vulnerability supersedes sociotropic concerns in the formation of host attitudes. Those whose low economic security renders them more vulnerable to economic competition may focus on the more personal threats posed by refugee crises. On the other hand, affluent individuals may be less likely to perceive any personal threat from refugees, since their economic condition helps to shield them from competition and volatility. For affluent hosts, attitudes toward refugees may therefore rely more on national-level evaluations regarding the impact of refugees.

Hypothesis 17: National economic evaluations are more likely to be correlated with negative attitudes among individuals with greater economic security.

Another possibility is that, if sociotropic evaluations serve an informational function, those who have more difficulty processing the impact of refugee crises may need to rely on macro-level information for preference formation, suggesting that sociotropic evaluations are
Hypothesis 18: National economic evaluations are more likely to be positively correlated with attitudes among individuals with fewer cognitive resources.

A final consideration is that host individuals who have personally experienced negative economic impacts during refugee crises may be less likely to use sociotropic evaluations in forming attitudes toward refugees. In informational terms, personal experience provides a proximate, salient, and easily accessible basis for forming attitudes toward refugees, but those with no personal-level information may be more likely to focus on collective information. Direct economic impact provides experiential evidence that is easily connected to refugees, allowing the individual to formulate opinions and attitudes according to the quality of that experience, and obviating the need for macro-level evaluations.

Hypothesis 19: Sociotropic concerns are less likely to be correlated with negative attitudes among individuals who have experienced personal negative consequences during the refugee crisis.

3.4 Conditional Effects of Social Identity and Economic Competition

The final question addressed in this study is how social identity and economic factors interact with each other in the formation of attitudes toward refugees. The previous literature is highlighted by contrasting propositions, derived primarily from observation of cases at the macro level, concerning the primacy and relative importance of social identity and economic calculations. Scholars advancing both sides of the debate have constructed reasonable theoretical arguments for the direct effects of both sets of variables, but the theoretical
foundations of the interaction of these variables are less sound. Relatively little research has focused on both economic and social variables at the individual level, resulting in both theoretical and empirical gaps.

In the existing literature, the clearest argument comes from the perspective of those who point to the primacy of economic factors. The core of this argument is not that social identity does not matter, but rather that any effects of shared social identity on attitudes will disappear if and when economic conditions deteriorate. At the individual level, attitudes may be linked to, and moderated by, co-ethnicity, kinship, and cultural ties, but this relationship should hold only to the extent that individual hosts do not perceive or experience economic difficulty or hardship. Put another way, considerations of social identity are a luxury of the economically secure, to be set aside once the imperatives of higher economic needs are threatened.

Hypothesis 20: Shared social identity is more likely to be correlated with positive attitudes toward refugees among host individuals with greater economic security.

In the following chapters, I conduct various empirical tests of these hypotheses, seeking evidence of the development and expression of host attitudes toward refugees. I begin, though, with the issue of data, and more specifically, with a focus on Jordan as a case for generating and analyzing data with which to test these hypotheses.
4. JORDAN

4.1 Introduction

In order to test the hypotheses generated in the previous chapter, I generated original data through an attitudinal survey in Jordan in February 2015. Before proceeding to the analysis of this data, though, it is necessary to address three issues. The first issue relates to case selection and the rationale for conducting the survey in Jordan. The second involves the particular situation in Jordan, specifically concerning the Syrian refugee influx and how the crisis has played out within the context of social identities, economics, and refugee-host interactions. The third issue is the specific design and implementation of the survey itself.

4.2 Jordan Case Selection

For this study, the population of interest is those citizens of developing states which host large numbers of first asylum refugees. As previously discussed, there are few data sources that can be used for quantitative analysis, necessitating data generation within one of these states. The selection process for data generation can be separated into two choices, or series of choices: selection of the country or countries for analysis, and the selection of the sample of individuals within the country or countries. I focus on the sample selection later in this chapter, but here I turn to the choice of Jordan as the focus of the empirical analysis, and the challenges this choice poses for generalization.
Selection of an appropriate state in which to conduct analysis centers around two key criteria: representativeness of the state and a sufficient level of individual-level variation (Seawright and Gerring 2008). Regarding representativeness, the state should exhibit typical features of other states in the broader population. Jordan is representative of other refugee-hosting, developing states in several key ways. First, it is a country of first asylum for Syrian refugees, and the sheer number of refugees (estimates range between 600,000 and 1,300,000\textsuperscript{26}) qualifies the situation as a refugee crisis. Second, economically, Jordan is considered a developing country. Terminology and classifications vary, but by any measure, Jordan sits well below the top tier of developed countries. Using 2014 per capita GNI as a measure, Jordan ($5,160) is slightly above the average of middle income states ($4,681), and well below the average of upper-middle income states ($7,926). For comparison purposes, the average GNI per capita of Sub-Saharan African states is $1,646, and the average for European Union states is $35,742. A more appropriate comparison, though, is with other states of first asylum with large numbers of refugees. As shown in Table 4-1, GNI per capita among the top 10 refugee-receiving states ranges from $550 (Ethiopia) to $10,830 (Turkey). Excluding Iran, for which data are not available, the average GNI per capita for the remaining 9 states is $3,624.\textsuperscript{27}

The third point is that, like many other developing states, Jordan faces a myriad of challenges related to effective governance, public goods provision, macro-economic stability, and social divides. Jordan is a developing country, not just economically, but also socially,


\textsuperscript{27} Data from World Bank Development Indicators (http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators).
politically, and institutionally. I explore several of these challenges below, but the important point here is that, while the severity of these challenges varies across states, Jordan is to a degree representative with regards to the general nature of the problems faced by developing states that host large numbers of first-asylum refugees.

Table 4-1: GNI (per capita) of Top 10 Refugee-Receiving States, 2014/2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Refugees</th>
<th>GNI pc (2014)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1,840,000</td>
<td>10,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>10,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>982,000</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>702,500</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>664,100</td>
<td>5,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>552,300</td>
<td>1,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>428,400</td>
<td>670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>420,800</td>
<td>980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>356,200</td>
<td>1,710</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Data from UN Mid-Year Trends (2015) and World Bank Development Indicators (2014); GNI per capita in current US$

The extent to which Jordan is representative of other states in the broader population is tempered, however, by the limits of generalizing from one case. In many ways, Jordan is a typical example of refugee-hosting, developing states, and as such serves as a useful case for testing the hypotheses generated in the previous chapter. Jordan, however, has a unique configuration of cultural, political, historical, and social variables, cautioning against broad generalization without corroborating empirical evidence from other cases. The risk of selection bias cannot be fully eliminated, given the purposive selection of Jordan. The challenge is to strike the “appropriate balance between a legitimate process of delimiting the scope of findings and a degree of particularism that excessively limits the contribution of the study” (Collier 1995, 465). Negative (or null) empirical results from Jordan may serve to falsify theoretical
arguments, but positive empirical results in Jordan are just the first evidentiary step. Jordan is a good place to empirically test the hypotheses suggested by the theories presented in this study, but the validity of these theories cannot rest on empirical results from Jordan alone.

Another key criterion for case selection is variation on the key variables of interest. For purposes of this study, the state in which analysis is to be performed must show variation in important variables such as attitudes toward refugees, ethnic composition, economic impact of refugees, and extent of interaction between refugees and hosts. Regarding the former, the survey results reflect significant variation in attitudes, and the remainder of this chapter will highlight the variation in other key variables.

4.3 Jordan Refugee Context

With the onset of the Syrian civil war in March 2011, Syrian refugees began fleeing to Jordan. In the early stages of the crisis, Syrians from the border region self-settled in urban areas in northern Jordan, taking advantage of existing kinship connections with Jordanians to find housing and livelihood resources. As the conflict worsened, greater numbers of refugees arrived from more distant regions of Syria, with few kinship and social ties in Jordan. Faced with the challenges of managing the inflow of refugees, Jordan maintained an open-door policy while at the same time establishing camps to house Syrians streaming across the border. The largest of these camps, Za’atari, opened in July 2012 and swelled to over 200,000 refugees by 2013; with

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28 Jordan serves as a crucial case, using Eckstein’s (2000, 148) definition: a crucial case is one “that must closely fit a theory if one is to have confidence in the theory’s validity.” Failure to find supporting empirical evidence in Jordan would bring into question the overall theoretical arguments presented in the previous chapter.
the opening of other refugee camps, this number was reduced to around 80,000 by July 2014 and has since remained stable.29

Overall numbers of Syrian refugees in Jordan are uncertain. Many Syrians have entered Jordan without registering with UNHCR, avoiding the camps and self-settling among kin or seeking livelihoods in urban areas. As of January 2015, there were over 620,000 registered Syrian refugees in Jordan, with this number topping 650,000 by June 2016. However, a 2015 national census reported nearly 1.3 million Syrians living in Jordan, suggesting that actual numbers of Syrian refugees are approximately double the registered figure.30 Most of the registered refugees, approximately 84%, are found in the northern governorates of Mafraq, Irbid, and Zarqa, as well as Amman governorate.31 The sheer number of refugees in these governorates (in 2013, Syrian refugees comprised 40% of the population of Irbid governorate),32 as well as their concentration in urban areas, contributes to a high degree of contact and interaction between Syrians and Jordanians.

In the area of government policy, Jordan is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and instead treats all foreigners under a common legal framework. Aside from the implications for refugees’ long-term political status, this policy limits the economic position of Syrian refugees in Jordan, as they must obtain employment permits in order to legally work, and the government is unwilling to issue these permits to Syrians. Regarding other rights, camp-dwellers have faced restrictions on free movement, with the government requiring Jordanian families to sponsor refugees seeking to leave the camps. Nevertheless, many Syrians have either

32 IRIN (2013), quoting figures from the Jordanian Ministry of Planning.
left the camps or avoided them altogether, with nearly 80% of refugees self-settled in Jordanian communities (Zetter et al. 2014).

At a macro level, Jordan lacks both the resources and the infrastructure to host the large numbers of Syrian refugees. Since independence, Jordan has struggled to develop a strong, diversified economy. The national economy is driven by the public sector, while the private sector is dominated by small to medium businesses. Jordan lacks natural resources and is dependent on energy imports, particularly natural gas from Egypt. The government has run large budget deficits for some time, and its fiscal problems were exacerbated by the 2008 global economic crisis and the Syrian refugee influx, with public debt more than doubling between 2009 (9.7 million JD) and 2014 (21.4 million JD) (Wazani 2014). As part of reform measures, and out of fiscal necessity, Jordan has reduced public subsidies, triggering widespread discontent among Jordanians (Sharp 2014). Jordan does receive large amounts of aid from Western and Arabian Gulf states, but historically these funds have been used, not for productive purposes, but primarily to cover budget deficits (Wazani 2014).

4.4 Jordanian Social Identity

Given this general context for the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan, it is important to examine in more detail the specific areas (social identity and economic competition) that form the core of this study. The goal here is to understand better the meanings, dynamics, and salience of identities, economics, and interactions in Jordan. Beginning with social identity, it is necessary to highlight the history of ethnicity and nationalism in Jordan.

Historically, and particularly over the past century, Jordan has been at the center of migration in the Middle East. Beginning with the immigration of Circassians in the late 1800’s,
Jordan has served as a destination for refugees and migrants in a particularly volatile region. Through successive waves of refugees from Palestine (1948, 1967), Iraq (1958), Iraq and Syria (1960-1990), Lebanon (1975-1991), and Iraq (1990-1991 and 2003-2006), Jordan has both shown itself to be a haven for refugees and at the same time developed a unique attitude toward the presence of refugees within its borders.

At the heart of the Jordanian refugee experience is the history of Palestinians in Jordan, and this history is interwoven with issues of national identity, political power, and political allegiance. Abdullah I, emir of Transjordan (1921-1946) and first king of the state of Jordan (1946-1951), came to power after World War I with a vision for creating a united Arab state in the Middle East. Abdullah I promoted a pan-Arab identity while maintaining designs on Syria and linking Jordan to Palestine. Faced with the twin processes of state- and nation-building, Abdullah I sought to unite the Bedouin tribes of Transjordan under a single political entity while fostering a national identity based on a broader vision of Arab unity and encompassing both Transjordan and Palestine. Following the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, Abdullah I welcomed hundreds of thousands of Palestinians refugees, and subsequently annexed the West Bank in 1950 and granted Jordanian citizenship to Palestinians living there. The pan-Arab aspirations of Abdullah I led him to treat Palestinians, both in the West Bank and as refugees in Jordan, as co-nationals with Transjordanians.

Hussein, who assumed the throne in 1951, abandoned the pan-Arabism of his grandfather in favor of a more particular Jordanian identity. While welcoming a second wave of Palestinian refugees to Jordan following the 1967 war, Hussein sought to disentangle Jordan from its claims to and identification with Palestine, in part because of Israeli and international efforts to designate Jordan as an alternative Palestinian state. Highlighted by the 1970-71 civil war, the
result of which was the PLO’s expulsion from Jordan, this process culminated in 1988, when Hussein severed administrative and legal ties to the West Bank, revoked Jordanian citizenship for West Bank Palestinians, and tied the status of Palestinians in Jordan to their political allegiance and willingness to integrate into Jordanian society (Al Oudat and Alshboul 2010; Chatelard 2010). By the 1990’s, there was a general consensus that Jordan (as a state and as a nation) is separate and distinct from Palestine (Lynch 1999, 74). Abdullah II, who succeeded Hussein in 1999, continued his father’s efforts to shape a distinctive Jordanian national identity, instituting a nation-building campaign called “Jordan First” in 2002 as part of a broader program to define the nation’s identity and interests as both a unifying force and a guiding principle of governance (Sharp 2014).

These two threads, Jordan’s relationship with Palestinians, both in the West Bank and in Jordan, and Jordan’s struggle with national identity, help to establish the context in which Syrian refugees and Jordanians interact. Several points are critical here. First, the Palestinian refugee history shapes the lens through which Jordanians view other refugees. Palestinian refugees are so deeply ingrained in the Jordanian experience that, to many, the term “refugee” is synonymous with Palestinian (Mason 2011; Stevens 2013). As a practical matter, any attempt to study interaction with refugees from other states must frame the conversation around their national origin. Furthermore, while Jordan has welcomed both Iraqi and Syrian refugees over the past two decades, the permanence of Palestinian “refugees” in Jordan and the extension of political rights and citizenship to Palestinians have made Jordanians wary of extending similar rights to new refugees. Put another way, “the association of ‘refugee’ with Palestinian, and hence with permanent residency, has patently distorted the discourse in Jordan. Jordan’s fear of creating semi-permanent residence for another large Arab cohort is very real” (Stevens 2013, 19). The
political and social divide between Palestinians and Transjordanians causes many East Bank Jordanians to consider new waves of refugees as potential threats to their political control of the country.

A second point is that Jordan is still in the process of nation-building. Despite the efforts of Hussein and Abdullah II to cultivate a unified Jordanian nation, national identity is to a great extent subordinate to ethnic and tribal identity. Among Jordanian Palestinians, there is a strong, but not consistent, connection to and affinity for Palestine. Camp dwellers, middle class businessmen, and civil servants tend to express greater attachment to their Palestinian identity, while salience is lower among economic elites who have a stake in the political status quo (Brand 1995; Chatelard 2010). Against the backdrop of the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Jordan’s role in the regional Palestinian issue, Jordanian efforts to develop a common Jordanian identity are complicated by the prevalence and salience of Palestinian identity.

National and ethnic identity in Jordan have been affected by several distinct and at times conflicting processes. On one hand, the necessity of defining Jordan as a single nation, distinct from Palestine (and contrary to Abdullah I’s pan-Arab vision), has led to efforts to establish a single national identity. On the other hand, there exists among Transjordanians a strong attachment to tribal identities, and much of the regime’s support comes from these tribes. In the process of maintaining this support, the regime has both strengthened tribal identities and ensured that tribal loyalties are to the regime itself rather than to the Jordanian nation. The result is a stunted national identity and strong ethnic and tribal identities.

The third point is that political and economic power are tied to ethnicity in Jordan. The regime’s political power is buttressed by East Bank Jordanians, and in turn East Bank Jordanians
dominate government, the civil service, and the public sector. Over the past several decades, the Jordanian government has entrenched Transjordanian power in these areas and made Palestinians’ access to public service and government jobs contingent on their political allegiance to the regime (Chatelard 2010; Reiter 2004). Palestinians, on the other hand, dominate the private economic sector, with strong representation among business elites, business owners, and private enterprises. Palestinians have failed, thus far, to translate this economic power into political influence, but the potential for this remains. Added to this, by most estimates Palestinians comprise a majority of the population in Jordan (Reiter 2004, fn. 7). Palestinians therefore pose a potential economic and demographic threat to the regime and its Transjordanian base, which in turn contributes to both tensions between Palestinians and Transjordanians and regime efforts to maintain the demographic and political status quo (Reiter 2004; Sharp 2014).

A final point is that, while pan-Arabism as a political goal has given way to Jordanian particularism, pan-Arabism as a social identity still influences many Jordanians. Historically, the concept of common Arab identity shaped norms of hospitality toward other Arabs. Perceptions of shared culture and identity led many Arabs to extend resources and rights to other Arabs, regardless of nation-state membership. In Jordan, though, this notion of hospitality must be understood in light of the Palestinian experience. Pan-Arab identity may lead some Jordanians to favor hospitality and express positive attitudes toward Syrian refugees, but at the same time refugees are seen as guests, with associated obligations and limitations. Hospitality therefore reflects and reinforces existing power structures (Mason 2011).

33 Reiter (2004) estimates that the public sector accounts for 50% of jobs in Jordan; of these, 75% go to Transjordanians. The Minorities at Risk Project (2009) points to significant gaps in Palestinian participation and leadership in government, civil service, and military.
An additional observation is that the border between Jordan and Syria, originating in the colonial and mandate system of the interwar period, does not perfectly match the geographic distribution of tribes and extended families. Some Syrians share tribal identity with Jordanians, there are common family names on both sides of the border, and there has been considerable cross-border interaction and intermarriage dating back to the colonial period. Though there are no reliable data on tribal demographics of Syrian refugees, it is a reasonable assumption that there exist, to some extent, tribal and family ties between Syrian refugees and Jordanian hosts, particularly along the Syrian border.

While the salience of social identity may change according to the endogenous interaction of Syrian refugees and Jordanian hosts, ethnic and national identities precede the refugee crisis. Syrian refugees, themselves neither Palestinian nor Jordanian, enter into a context where ethnic identities are politically, economically, and socially relevant, and at the same time stable, with group categorization based on individual ancestry. Baseline attitudes toward refugees in Jordan are therefore influenced by historical factors such as the interaction between Palestinians and Transjordanians, pan-Arabism, and government efforts to both solidify political support and foster national identity. Furthermore, based on the pre-Syrian civil war distribution and interaction of tribes and kin, there are also shared tribal and kinship connections that may impact attitude formation.

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34 UNRWA estimates that, as of 2015, 110,000 Palestinian refugees in Syria have fled the country, but only 17,000 of these have made their way to Jordan, primarily because of Jordan’s reluctance to accept more Palestinians (http://www.unrwa.org/syria-crisis). In fact, in 2013 Jordan restricted the entry of Palestinians from Syria (http://www.unrwa.org/prs-jordan).
4.5 Jordan, Syrian Refugees, and Economic Competition

Turning now to economics, labor market competition has been identified as an important source of tensions between Syrian refugees and Jordanians. Jordan has dealt with relatively high unemployment for a long time, particularly among young people. Over the past few decades, efforts to liberalize the economy have contributed to unemployment, as reform of the public sector has led to fewer government jobs (Ryan 2011). In addition, unemployment has been impacted by the 2008 global financial crisis, which negatively affected both the public and private sector as job creation failed to keep pace with demand. Data from 2010, before the Syrian refugee crisis, place the unemployment rate in Jordan around 14.5%, while in 2015, the rate had risen to 22.1% (Davis et al 2017). The Syrian civil war has presented a double blow to unemployment, with an influx of Syrian refugees into Jordan and the contraction of cross-border trade.

A simple assumption is that Syrian refugees compete with Jordanians in the labor market. The situation is more complex, however. Jordan requires foreign workers to obtain a work permit, which, in practice, is most often denied to Syrian refugees. Refugees must therefore either work extra-legally or engage in informal economic activity. Furthermore, before the Syrian crisis, Jordan hosted hundreds of thousands of foreign workers, primarily Egyptians engaged in menial labor. Among Transjordanians, there is a stigma associated with certain manual labor jobs, leading to high numbers of migrant workers in the construction, agricultural, and service industries (Sharp 2014). As most Syrians who have entered into the work force in Jordan are low-skilled workers (or at least engage in low-skilled jobs), they have generally displaced migrant workers in low-wage jobs shunned by Jordanians. Consequently, as of 2014, unemployment had not increased substantially in those governorates with the highest numbers of
refugees (Ajluni and Kawar 2014; Karasapan 2015). The primary (though not the only) impacts of Syrian refugees on the labor market have been the displacement of migrant workers and downward pressure on wages by refugees willing or forced to accept lower pay for informal and extra-legal work (Zetter et al 2014). On the other hand, one (non-representative) survey indicates that 44% of Jordanian respondents in the northern six governorates think that labor competition and job shortages contribute to tension between Jordanians and Syrians (REACH 2014). Subjective perception of labor market competition may therefore be more important than objective, quantifiable impacts on employment.

In addition to labor market tensions, the refugee crisis has also placed strain on economic resources and government services. In Jordan, refugees and hosts compete, or perceive themselves to compete, over a wide range of public and private goods, resulting in less access to public services, fewer economic opportunities, and higher cost of living. Four areas in particular stand out. First, Jordan is one of the most water-scarce countries in the world. Water challenges have both a regional component, as Jordan competes with Israel and Syria for water from the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers, and a domestic component, as Jordan struggles with limited aquifer reserves and insufficient water infrastructure. Though Jordanians have relatively high rates of water access, water supply is intermittent at best. Many Jordanians receive piped water only once or twice a week, filling rooftop storage tanks that must last until the next water day, and in some cases people must purchase water from delivery trucks. The Jordanian water problem thus predates the Syrian refugee crisis, but the refugee influx has placed even more stress on limited water resources. This has resulted in both political protests (Proctor 2014) and inter-communal tensions. Anecdotal evidence suggests that water shortages are negatively

35 http://www.wri.org/blog/2013/12/world%E2%80%99s-36-most-water-stressed-countries
impacting host attitudes toward Syrian refugees, and 48% of Jordanian survey respondents believe that water shortages are a key driver of negative attitudes toward and interactions with refugees (REACH 2014).

A second area of tension is education. Jordan has allowed Syrian refugee children to attend public schools, 36 placing stress on staffing, infrastructure, materials, and logistics. Many schools have implemented two sessions (morning and afternoon) to accommodate the new students, but others have integrated Syrian students into existing classes. Both approaches present problems, with one leading to shorter instructional sessions, the other to overcrowding, and both to overstretched staff and resources. While the majority of Syrian refugee children are not attending school, with estimates of unschooled Syrian children as high as 80-90% in some governorates (UNICEF 2013b; Zetter 2014), many Jordanians perceive that the Syrian refugee crisis has negatively impacted the quality of education in Jordan, and 33% of respondents in the northern six governorates report inadequate access to education (REACH 2014).

A third inter-communal stress point is medical care. Syrian refugees are able to access healthcare through a number of providers, including international ngo’s and Jordanian health care facilities. Importantly, refugee health care has been subsidized by both UNHCR and the Jordanian government (Davis and Taylor 2013), although the Jordanian government reversed its policy of free medical care for Syrians in late 2014. 37 Jordanian citizens, on the other hand, are limited to public health services and are responsible for paying fees for many of these services, and over a third of survey respondents in the northern 6 governorates report inadequate access to healthcare services (REACH 2014). In addition to intercommunal differences in access and

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36 Syrian families must be registered with both UNHCR and Jordanian authorities (Davis and Taylor 2013).
costs, there has been a general deterioration of the quality of health care services, due to rising demand and static capacity (Zetter 2014).

A final area of tension concerns access to and cost of housing. In areas hosting large numbers of refugees, survey, interview, and anecdotal data show that rental costs for housing have increased while the availability of housing has not risen proportionately with demand (REACH 2014). In Irbid, over the period 2012-2013, rents as much as tripled in some cases, and there were reports of landlords evicting Jordanian tenants in order to rent to Syrian refugees for higher prices (IRIN 2013).

Several observations are important. First, fiscal problems, high unemployment, water shortages, and inadequate public services predate the Syrian refugee crisis. The influx of Syrians, however, has exacerbated existing problems, straining the government’s limited capacity to address public goods provision, worsening a poor macro-economic environment, and ultimately placing refugees and hosts in a competitive, zero-sum environment.

Second, the government faces incentives to both manipulate information and assign blame. Jordan, a country already dependent on foreign aid, cannot deal with the refugee crisis without additional international support. Though the role of information, from both the government and media, is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is important to note the incentive for the government to overplay the scale and severity of the crisis in order to generate international funding and encourage burden-sharing. The other side of this argument is that the government also has the incentive to blame the refugee crisis for pre-existing economic and governance problems. As noted previously, scape-goating is common strategy by host governments, and the sheer number of Syrian refugees provides an easy, and potentially justifiable, opportunity for the government to reframe Jordan’s problems.
Finally, multiple studies and assessments, incorporating non-representative surveys, focus groups, and anecdotal evidence, have highlighted the areas of refugee-host tension in Jordan (REACH 2014; ACTED 2013; Mercy Corps 2012). In general, these studies suggest that tensions between refugees and hosts are linked to instrumental calculations regarding economic and resource competition. Hosts and refugees face difficult economic and social conditions, and tensions are attributed to refugee-host interactions under these conditions. What is missing, however, is evidence linking individual attitudes to the instrumental calculations, subjective perceptions, and economic status of Jordanian hosts.

4.6 The Jordanian Attitudinal Survey

In order to generate data to test the hypotheses detailed in the previous chapter, I designed and implemented an attitudinal survey of Jordanian hosts. I selected three of the northernmost governorates for the survey: Irbid, Mafraq, and Zarqa (Figure 4-1). I chose to focus on Mafraq, Irbid, and Zarqa, for four specific reasons. First, as of 2016, 84% of Syrian refugees were located in the governorates of Mafraq, Irbid, Zarqa, and Amman.38 I excluded Amman from the survey for reasons related to the unique context of the capital city. Amman is the economic and political center of Jordan, with a high level of economic development; a concentration of political and government activity; a large number of expatriates; and a plethora of international ngo’s. Each of these may confound host perceptions and complicate the generation of reliable data. Second, these three governorates lie in close proximity to the border, with Irbid and Mafraq together forming the northern border with Syria, and Zarqa located just south of Mafraq. This proximity ensures not only a high number of Syrian refugees in these

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governorates, but also a history of economic and social interaction with Syrians. Third, these governorates present sufficient variation in several key areas, including urban/rural population, ethnicity, economic development, and socio-demographics. Finally, on a practical level, selection of these three contiguous regions represents a trade-off between survey costs and the desire for a representative sample at the national level.

I developed the survey in 2014, and hired Accurate Opinion, a research company based in Amman, Jordan, specializing in the design and implementation of public opinion surveys, to manage the approval process and implement the survey. I worked with Accurate Opinion to establish the parameters for the survey, and Accurate Opinion translated the original survey into Arabic. I contracted an independent translator to produce a reverse translation, from Accurate Opinion’s Arabic version back into English, in order to verify the accuracy of the Arabic survey instrument.
Accurate Opinion shepherded the proposed survey through the approval process. The only official requirement was to secure permission for the survey from the Jordan Ministry of Interior, but the survey was also presented to Jordan’s security services and to UNHCR representatives in Amman to ensure the questions included in the survey would neither exacerbate any existing tensions nor present challenges for existing policies and procedures related to the refugee crisis. Through this process, all of the original survey questions were approved as written, with the exception of one, with no reason given. The Jordanian authorities rejected the following question: “To what extent do you agree with the following statement: Syrian refugees should be forced to remain in official refugee camps.” In all, the approval process took almost six months in late 2014 and early 2015.

Accurate Opinion implemented the survey over a one-week period, February 1-7, 2015. The target population was adult Jordanians in Irbid, Mafrak, and Zarqa, and the sampling frame was the Jordan Population and Housing Census 2004. This was the most recent census at the time (the government conducted another census later in 2015), but the 11-year interval between 2004 and 2015 presents a possible source of error stemming from households not included in the 2004 census.

The primary sampling units (PSU’s) were clusters from the 2004 Census. 70 clusters were drawn based on probability proportional to size. With a target sample size of 700, this resulted in 33 PSU’s drawn from Irbid, 28 from Zarqa, and 9 from Mafrak. In the second stage, 10 households were selected from each PSU, using a systematic selection process to ensure broad distribution and to limit correlation within each PSU. Finally, after systematic designation of males and female target respondents from each household (to ensure equal distribution of gender), one respondent was randomly selected from each household, using a ketch table. Only
Jordanian citizens over the age of 17 participated in the survey. The entire survey design yielded a sample that is statistically representative at the governorate level, with an overall margin of error of 3.7%.

The survey itself consists of 49 total questions, including six different questions regarding respondents’ attitudes toward refugees. The survey also asks questions related to respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics; their economic positions and perceptions; and their social identity and ties to Syrians. Furthermore, the survey poses questions about media and news consumption, political interest, religiosity, and levels of trust. Because of the Palestinian refugee experience in Jordan, as well as the previous inflows of Iraqi refugees, all questions regarding refugees are explicitly worded with Syrian refugees as the referent group. The resulting data set includes over 50 data points each for 700 Jordanian respondents, providing a unique opportunity to explore host attitude formation and to test the hypotheses formulated in the previous chapter.
5. SOCIAL IDENTITY AND ATTITUDES TOWARD REFUGEES

5.1 Introduction

I begin the empirical analysis by exploring the relationship between social identity, in its various forms, and attitudes toward refugees. Specifically, I seek to isolate the relationship between social identity and attitudes toward refugees, and ask whether certain social identities matter more to attitudes than other identities do. As detailed in Chapter 3, there are six specific hypotheses related to social identity. In this chapter, I focus the empirical analysis on five of these hypotheses,\(^{39}\) exploiting the rich data generated by the Jordan survey:

Hypothesis 1: Individuals who perceive that refugees and hosts share a cultural identity are more likely to express positive attitudes toward refugees.

Hypothesis 2: Individuals who express a strong identification with the national community are more likely to hold negative attitudes toward refugees.

Hypothesis 4: Individuals who share close kinship ties with refugees are more likely to hold positive attitudes toward refugees.

Hypothesis 5: Where there are no refugee-host ethnic ties, and there is variation in economic threat between ethnic groups, individuals from the ethnic group

\(^{39}\) Hypothesis 3 is the one most commonly posed, or at least suggested, by scholars focused on refugee movements in the developing world, but this hypothesis is not testable with the current dataset. Structurally, there are shared tribal identities between Syrians and Jordanians, particularly in the northernmost border governorates of Irbid and Mafraq. However, there are no reliable data on the ethnic and tribal identities of Syrian refugees in Jordan.
perceiving the greatest threat from refugees are more likely to express negative attitudes toward those refugees.

Hypothesis 6: Where there are no refugee-host ethnic ties, and there is variation between host ethnic groups in perceived political threat from refugees, individuals from the ethnic group perceiving the greatest threat from refugees are more likely to express negative attitudes toward those refugees.

5.2 Variables and Measures

The primary variable of interest is attitudes of host individuals toward refugees. The survey includes multiple measures of attitudes toward refugees, including five key questions that ask "To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement(s):

Jordan should not allow any more refugees to enter the country from Syria.

It is acceptable for Jordanian men to marry Syrian refugee women.

Syrian refugee children should be allowed to attend Jordanian schools.

Syrian refugees should be allowed to work in Jordan.

Jordanians have a duty to welcome refugees from Syria."

Possible responses include strongly agree, agree, disagree, and strongly disagree, and data are coded so that higher values reflect more positive attitudes.40

A principal component analysis on the responses for all five questions shows that the questions load heavily on one component (Figure 5-1), suggesting that these five variables are tapping into a common underlying dimension, and may therefore be scaled into a single variable. With a Cronbach’s alpha statistic of 0.715, the combined variable is fairly reliable. I use the

40 Unless otherwise noted, non-responses for all variables are coded as missing and are excluded from the analyses.
predicted values from the primary component to generate a scaled variable \((attitudes)\) with 674 observations and values ranging from -3.43 to 3.85, with higher values reflecting more positive attitudes toward refugees. The mean is essentially zero \((2.80e-09)\), and the standard deviation is 1.55.

As specified previously, with respect to social identity there are four key explanatory variables: cultural identity, national identity, ethnic identity, and kinship. Beginning with cultural identity, the hypothesis is that the perception of a shared culture between refugees and hosts is associated with more positive attitudes. The survey asks respondents the extent to which they agree or disagree with the following statement: “Syrian refugees and Jordanian citizens share a common culture.” Responses, and response count, include strongly disagree (125), disagree (263), agree (259), and strongly agree (40), and are coded so that higher values indicate stronger agreement.

Ethnic identity is measured by a respondent’s family origins, and is captured by the following survey question: “Where is your family originally from?” Responses include Jordan,
Palestine, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and other. As previously noted, in Jordan the key ethnic distinction is between Palestinians and East Bank Jordanians. For Palestinians, family origins are rooted in Palestine, often to the specific village where the family lived before migrating to Jordan. East Bank Jordanians trace their family origins within Jordan (or Transjordan). Based on survey answers, 505 respondents are East Bank Jordanian, 187 are Palestinian, and 8 are from other countries.\textsuperscript{41} I created a dummy variable for East Bank Jordanians (East Bank Jordanian), and use this as the primary ethnic variable in all models.

By national identity, I mean that aspect of one’s identity that is derived from membership in and attachment to that social group that is both defined by and is coterminous with the state. National identity is therefore an objective status best measured by citizenship. The Jordan survey begins with the question “Are you a Jordanian citizen?” to ensure that all respondents are Jordanians. Accordingly, there is no variation among respondents in national identity. Important variation is found, however, in the degree of attachment to that national identity. The survey also asks each respondent how proud she/he is to be a Jordanian citizen. Responses include not proud at all, not very proud, proud, and very proud. The resulting variable, national pride, is coded so that higher values indicate greater pride in a respondent’s Jordanian identity.

Kinship reflects close familial ties, and is measured by two different questions in the survey. The first asks whether respondents have any family members who are from Syria, and the second asks whether respondents have any close family members who are married to Syrians. The two associated variables are Syrian family and family married Syrian, both of which are dummy variables coded so that values of 1 reflect “yes.”

\textsuperscript{41} Descriptive statistics for all variables are located in Appendix, Table A-1.
All empirical models include four basic socio-demographic control variables. *Age* is the respondent’s age in years, *male* is a dummy variable for gender, and education is measured by years of formal education (*years education*). The final variable is *urban*, a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent lives in an urban or rural setting.

Contact theory posits that individuals’ attitudes toward outgroups are a function of the extent and quality of their interactions with individuals from those outgroups. Specifically, contact holds that repeated, productive, and equal-status social interaction between groups can reduce prejudice and improve overall intergroup orientations and attitudes. On the other hand, conflictual interaction can ultimately lead to negative attitudes (Allport 1958; Pettigrew 1998; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). During refugee crises, refugees and hosts tend to compete for resources, services, and opportunities, while refugee movements impose macro-economic burdens and impact individual hosts in various ways. While competition is not consistent across cases or individuals, broadly speaking, refugee movements tend to place refugees and host populations at odds with each other. Under these conditions, the expectation is that contact between refugees and hosts will foster negative attitudes. Because contact may increase with kinship and ethnic ties, and because contact has been shown to correlate with attitudes toward outgroups (Schneider 2008), it is important to control for the possible effects of refugee-host social interactions. I therefore include several variables that measure hosts’ experience with and exposure to refugees. Specifically, *number Syrian neighbors* is the respondent’s estimate of the number of Syrian refugees living in his/her neighborhood, and captures the opportunity for host-refugee contact. Possible answers include none, a few, some, and many, with responses coded so that higher values reflect higher estimated numbers of Syrian refugee neighbors. A second variable, *encounter Syrians*, measures the frequency of contact between respondents and Syrian.
refugees. Answers include never, at least once a month, at least once a week, and at least once a day, and are coded so that higher values reflect greater frequency of contact. A final variable, *argument*, captures confrontational interaction between refugees and host individuals. The survey question asks whether respondents have had an argument or confrontation with a Syrian in the past year. The variable is coded as a dummy, with 1 indicating a yes answer.

5.3 Variation in Ethnic Threat Perception

Before constructing a model for social identity, it is important to address the underlying condition for Hypothesis 5, specifically, that there is sufficient variation in economic threat between host ethnic groups. The first step is therefore to establish whether there are differences between host ethnic groups regarding the perception of economic threat. Though economic variables are addressed more comprehensively in the next chapter, there are several variables that can be used to test whether there are significant differences in economic threat between ethnic groups. As noted above, survey respondents’ ethnic identities are coded as East Bank Jordanian, Palestinian, and other, and *East Bank Jordanian* serves as the key variable. The survey also includes several questions that measure economic impact and threat, specifically concerning employment, access to water, and economic evaluations. Change in availability of water is measured by *water* and is coded so that 1 reflects a decrease in water availability, 2 indicates no change, and 3 is an increase in water supply. Retrospective economic evaluation is a measure of a respondent’s comparison of his/her present economic condition to three years previously. The variable *retrospective economic evaluation* is coded from 1 to 5, with responses including much worse (1), worse, same, better, and much better (5). Finally, *employed* is a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is employed or not, with employment including both full-time
and part-time work. Descriptive statistics for these variables are included in the appendix, while Tables 5-1, 5-2, and 5-3 show the results of cross-tab analyses of ethnicity by these three economic variables, with chi² tests of independence.

Table 5-1: Access to Water by Ethnic Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Access to Water Over Past Year</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Bank Jordanian</td>
<td>122 (24%)</td>
<td>267 (53%)</td>
<td>112 (22%)</td>
<td>501 (100%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>31 (16%)</td>
<td>102 (53%)</td>
<td>61 (31%)</td>
<td>194 (100%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>153 (22%)</td>
<td>369 (53%)</td>
<td>173 (25%)</td>
<td>695 (100%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson chi²(4) = 9.106  Pr = 0.011  gamma = -0.219
Note: Individual cell percentages may not match totals due to rounding.

Table 5-2: Retrospective Economic Evaluation by Ethnic Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Retrospective Economic Evaluation (3-Year)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Much Worse</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Much Better</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Bank Jordanian</td>
<td>95 (19%)</td>
<td>234 (46%)</td>
<td>97 (19%)</td>
<td>56 (11%)</td>
<td>23 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>60 (31%)</td>
<td>74 (38%)</td>
<td>39 (20%)</td>
<td>17 (9%)</td>
<td>5 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>155 (22%)</td>
<td>308 (44%)</td>
<td>136 (19%)</td>
<td>73 (10%)</td>
<td>28 (4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson chi²(8) = 13.530  Pr = 0.009  gamma = 0.164
Note: Individual cell percentages may not match totals due to rounding.

Table 5-3: Employment Status by Ethnic Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Employed</th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Bank Jordanian</td>
<td>313 (62%)</td>
<td>191 (38%)</td>
<td>504 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>132 (68%)</td>
<td>62 (32%)</td>
<td>194 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>445 (64%)</td>
<td>253 (36%)</td>
<td>698 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson chi²(1) = 2.138  Pr = 0.144
On the one hand, East Bank Jordanians are more likely to have experienced a decrease in water availability over the past year (Table 5-1), which could suggest that, at least in this area, East Bank Jordanians perceive a greater economic threat from the influx of refugees. With a Pearson’s chi² of 9.106, we can reject the null that ethnicity and water availability are independent of one another, and the gamma value is -0.219, indicating a negative association between the two variables. The same applies to ethnicity and retrospective economic evaluations (chi² = 13.530). In this case, however, East Bank Jordanians are more likely to express positive economic comparisons to the past (Table 5-3), meaning that they perceive their current economic condition to be better than before refugees arrived in great numbers, which is incongruent with economic competition. In the area of employment (Table 5-4), there is not sufficient evidence to reject the null of independence. There is no significant difference between ethnic groups in the percentage of group members who are employed and unemployed. Furthermore, there is no significant difference in threat regarding availability of medicine, loss of job, personal economic evaluation, or income.42 Overall, there is no consistent difference between East Bank Jordanians and Palestinian Jordanians with regard to the economic threat from Syrian refugees. The conclusion is that, while there is some evidence of variation in specific economic variables across ethnic groups, economic threat is insufficient to explain any difference in attitudes between these ethnic groups.

For Hypothesis 6, a similar question must be asked: is there a difference in perceived political threat between host ethnic groups? While the survey did not pose any questions related to political threat perception,43 we can refer back to the information presented in Chapter 4. In the case of Jordan, the key question is whether we should expect any difference in perceived

42 See Appendix, Tables A:2-4 for crosstab results.
43 The political and security climate in Jordan at the time of the survey precluded certain questions from the survey.
political threat from refugees between the two primary ethnic groups: East Bank Jordanian and Palestinian. As previously noted, East Bank Jordanians, as an essential base of support for the Hashemite regime, maintain a position of political power and influence in the country. The political and social divide between Palestinians and Transjordanians, and the complicated history of Palestinian’s social and political status in Jordan, leads many East Bank Jordanians to consider new waves of refugees as potential threats to their political control of the country (see Stevens 2013). Conversely, Palestinians suffer from political discrimination and a lack of political voice, with poor representation in the government, the civil service, and the military. I posit that, given an unequal distribution of political power along ethnic lines, the dominant ethnic group will perceive a greater threat from a refugee influx, because that group must defend its position of power against all other groups. In other words, the dominant ethnic group must defend against loss of power, privilege, and influence, and sees all other groups as threats, while the subordinate ethnic group risks forgoing any potential gain. In the case of Jordan, East Bank Jordanians should perceive greater threat from refugees, and should therefore, according to Hypothesis 6, express more negative attitudes toward Syrian refugees.

5.4 Attitudes and Social Identity

Table 5–4 shows the results of four separate regression models. Models A and B focus on perception of common culture and national pride, while Models C and D use objective measures of kinship and ethnicity as the primary independent variables. All four models include controls for age, education, gender, and urban/rural location, while Models B and D control for contact with Syrian refugees (argument, number Syrian neighbors, and encounter Syrians). All models are estimated using linear regression for survey data (svy: command in STATA).
### Table 5-4: Attitudes and Social Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common</td>
<td>0.846 **</td>
<td>0.826 **</td>
<td>0.834 **</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>(0.095)</td>
<td>(0.095)</td>
<td>(0.092)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Pride</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>0.498 *</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.087)</td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
<td>(0.216)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian family member</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td>0.400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.253)</td>
<td>(0.245)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Bank</td>
<td>-0.181</td>
<td>-0.131</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
<td>(0.136)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argument</td>
<td>-0.418 *</td>
<td>-0.644 **</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.192)</td>
<td>(0.201)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number Syrian Neighbors</td>
<td>-0.172 *</td>
<td>-0.139</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
<td>(0.086)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encounter</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>0.775 **</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.267)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Pride X Political Interest</td>
<td>-0.214 **</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>0.222</td>
<td>0.092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
<td>(0.099)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.169</td>
<td>0.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.113)</td>
<td>(0.118)</td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
<td>(0.113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of education</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.070 **</td>
<td>-1.739 **</td>
<td>-0.260</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>-3.866 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.494)</td>
<td>(0.565)</td>
<td>(0.337)</td>
<td>(0.364)</td>
<td>(0.820)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.214</td>
<td>0.231</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.220</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p≤0.05; ** p≤0.01

Considering Models A-D, there is no evidence that national pride, family ties, or ethnicity have any effect on attitudes toward refugees. The coefficient for national pride, though negative as hypothesized, is neither large (-0.001) nor statistically significant, a null result that points to
no relationship between attitudes and the strength of respondents’ attachment to their Jordanian identity. However, national identity often has a political underpinning, given its association with the state and its attendant notions of power, politics, and policy. National identity does not, on average, correlate with attitudes toward refugees, but at the same time there may be a different relationship between these two variables for those for whom politics are more salient. This suggests that political salience may moderate the relationship between national identity and attitudes toward refugees, with pride in one’s Jordanian identity more likely be associated with negative attitudes for those respondents who care more about political issues. The Jordan survey contains a question about political interest: “In general, to what extent are you interested in politics?” Answers are coded 1 through 4, with 1 indicating “not interested” and 4 “very interested.” Beginning with Model A, I add an interaction term between national pride and political interest, with the results shown in Model E.

The coefficient for the interaction term is statistically significant, indicating that relationship between national identity and attitudes is dependent on one’s level of political interest. Using the “margins” command in Stata, I generate predictive margins in order to better understand and graphically illustrate this relationship. The results, shown in Figure 5-2, reflect the marginal effects of national identity on attitudes at each of the response values of political interest. For respondents who express no, some, or a little interest in politics, the point estimates are not statistically distinguishable from zero, indicating no relationship. For those Jordanian hosts who are very interested in politics, however, pride in one’s Jordanian identity is associated with more negative attitudes. This result is statistically different from zero, and at the same time its vertical confidence bands to not overlap with those of “not interested.” While national
identity is not correlated with attitudes for all respondents, it is associated with more negative attitudes for individuals who express greater political interest.

Figure 5-2: Marginal Effects of National Identity Given Political Interest

[Diagram showing marginal effects with political interest categories: Not interested, Slightly interested, Interested, Very interested.

Note: Vertical bands represent 95% confidence intervals.

Returning to Table 5-5, the coefficients for Syrian family and East Bank Jordanian are both in the hypothesized direction, but neither approaches statistical significance. We cannot reject the null hypotheses of no relationship between attitudes and these social identity variables. As an alternative, I re-estimate Model C using the variable family marry Syrian instead of Syrian family, measuring whether or not each respondent has family members who have married Syrian nationals. The results (not shown) do not significantly differ, providing no evidence that close kinship with Syrians is associated with more positive attitudes toward refugees.

None of the four socio-demographic control variables is statistically significant in any model, indicating that age, gender, education, and location have no direct impact on attitudes as
modeled. Though not a focal point of the current analysis, evidence for contact theory is mixed. The coefficient for argument is negative and statistically significant in both models B and D, indicating that negative interaction with refugees is associated with more negative attitudes. The effect is strongest in Model D, where having an argument with a Syrian is associated with attitudes that are 0.644 points lower on the scale of 7.28. Respondents’ perception of the number of Syrian refugees in their neighborhood is also negatively associated with attitudes, but the estimate is statistically significant only in Model B. Finally, frequency of contact with Syrian refugees (encounter Syrian) has no relationship to attitudes. These results provide some support for contact theory, particularly those explications that focus on the quality of interaction. In the case of Jordan, confrontational contact is associated with negative attitudes, while general contact that does not distinguish between productive and confrontational interaction is not associated with attitudes at all. More important to the present analysis is the observation that perception (of the number of one’s Syrian neighbors) seems to be more important than actual interaction with Syrian refugees (encounter Syrians), except when the quality of that interaction is explicitly negative (argument). I return to this observation later in the chapter.

The most striking results relate to common culture, with coefficients positive and statistically significant in both models. Looking at Model A, and controlling for other variables, a one-unit change in perception of common culture with refugees is associated with a difference of 0.846 on the attitudinal scale. Another way of expressing this is that the expected attitudinal difference between responses of “Strongly disagree” and “Strongly agree” that Jordanians and Syrians refugees share a common culture is approximately 2.5 (a difference of 33% on a scale range of 7.28). These results for common culture are robust to the inclusion of control variables for contact and social interaction (Model B).
To provide a graphical representation of these results, I estimate the predictive margins of common culture (Model A) using the “margins” command in STATA. The resulting estimates reflect the predicted values of the dependent variable (attitudes) at each of the 4 responses to the question of common culture, with other variables in the model set to their means. As shown in Figure 5-3, the predicted values of common culture across all four responses are statistically significant, and each response is significantly different from the other responses.

In order to check the robustness of the overall results, I re-estimate models A and C using logit regression and employing should Syrian neighbors as an alternative dependent variable.\(^{44}\)

This dummy variable measures whether each respondent thinks that Syrian refugees should be allowed to live in his or her neighborhood, capturing attitudes toward normative social distance.

\(^{44}\) Responses for this variable include only yes or no, and as such are not compatible with the five variables, each with four possible responses, used to construct the attitudinal scale employed as the primary dependent variable.
Results from the two new models (not shown) are essentially the same as Models A and C, with only common culture reaching statistical significance.

Based on these results, the next question is whether the effects of the perception of common culture on attitudes vary across other variables. One possibility is that, while national identity may not drive attitudes, greater national pride may offset the positive effects of common culture perceptions. Perception of common culture is inclusive, while attachment to national identity is naturally exclusive, and these two may counteract each other. If so, we should expect to see a negative interaction between common culture and national pride.

Another possibility is that the effects of common culture on attitudes vary according to geography. There are two arguments here, corresponding to, firstly, respondents’ distance from the Syrian border and, secondly, urban or rural location. The underlying logic for distance from the border is that the positive effects of perceptions of common culture may be linked to other factors, such as familiarity, interaction, and linkages that are stronger among those Jordanians who live in closer proximity to Syria. The survey indicates the governorate in which each respondent lives, with Mafraq and Irbid lying on the border with Syria, and Zarqa farther south. The expectation is that the perception of common culture will have less effect on attitudes among residents of Zarqa, due to greater distance from the border. In order to test this, I include a dummy variable for Zarqa and interact this variable with common culture.

The second argument is that the meaning and value that individuals place on common culture may vary depending on their rural or urban locations. While there is no statistical difference between rural and urban respondents in the perception of common culture with Syrian refugees, the importance of shared cultural ties may be greater, and therefore more influential

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45 A basic crosstab of common culture and urban (not shown) generates a Pearson chi² of 4.033 and a p value of 0.258.
to attitudes, in rural areas. The basic argument is that, while urban life is associated with more modern and varied structures and interactions, rural life remains more traditional, with rural inhabitants more likely to rely on common culture, ethnicity, and kinship to order their socio-economic structures and interactions. Rural individuals may, to a greater degree than urbanites, rely on cultural commonalities to help make sense of refugee influxes and shape their attitudes toward refugees. The expectation, therefore, is that the interaction of common culture and urban

Table 5-5: Common Culture Interactions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>H</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common culture</td>
<td>0.828 **</td>
<td>2.302</td>
<td>1.293 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.133)</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National pride</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.961 **</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.081)</td>
<td>(0.333)</td>
<td>0.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common culture</td>
<td>-0.374 **</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X national pride</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.124)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zarqa</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.370)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common culture</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X Zarqa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.148)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common culture</td>
<td>-0.559 **</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X urban</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td>0.105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td>(0.098)</td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>1.308 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.136)</td>
<td>(0.119)</td>
<td>(0.359)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of education</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.084 *</td>
<td>-5.797 **</td>
<td>-3.089 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.554)</td>
<td>(1.416)</td>
<td>(0.526)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N  | 666 | 666 | 666 |
R² | 0.221 | 0.220 | 0.229 |

* p≤0.05; ** p≤0.01
will be negative, with common culture having a weaker effect on attitudes of urban respondents. Accordingly, I estimate three further models, including interactions of Zarqa, national pride, and urban with common culture. The results are shown in Table 5-5.

In Model F, the effects of the perception of common culture on attitudes do not vary across governorate. The interaction coefficient, 0.036, is neither large nor statistically significant, suggesting that the effects of common culture are fairly consistent, regardless of how far respondents live from the border with Syria. By extension, there is no evidence that cross-border linkages and interactions, as measured by proximity to the border, have any moderating effect on the direct impact of common culture on attitudes. The measure employed here, governorate, is admittedly rough, and doesn’t capture variation within governorates, so the empirical result must be treated with caution.

In Model G, the interaction of common culture and national pride is statistically significant, with a substantial coefficient of -0.374, indicating that, at higher levels of national pride, the effects of common culture on attitudes decreases. Figure 5-4 illustrates the marginal effects of common culture across different values of national pride. While the coefficients for common culture are positive and statistically significant at all levels of national pride, there is a significant difference between the estimated effect of common culture for respondents who are very proud of their Jordanian identity and for respondents who are not very proud and not proud at all. The positive effects of perceiving a common culture with Syrian refugees are therefore partially offset by pride in and attachment to one’s Jordanian national identity.

Finally, Model H includes the interaction of common culture and urban location, with the coefficient negative and statistically significant as expected. When comparing respondents in
urban and rural areas, the effect of the perception of common culture on attitudes is 0.559 less (on a 7.28 scale) for urban dwellers (Figure 5-5 shows the predicted marginal effects). The

Figure 5-4: Marginal Effects of Common Culture by National Pride

![Figure 5-4](image)

Note: Vertical bands represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 5-5: Marginal Effects of Common Culture for Urban and Rural Respondents

![Figure 5-5](image)

Note: Vertical bands represent 95% confidence intervals.
belief that Jordanians and Syrian refugees are linked through common culture is not more
common among rural Jordanians, but for rural hosts that belief has a greater, more positive
impact on attitudes toward refugees.

5.5 Conclusion

Studies on the effects of social identity within the dynamics of refugee flows tend to
focus on ethnicity (in the context of developing states) and national identity (in the context of
Western states). Structurally, the refugee influx into Jordan is characterized by social identity
linkages at multiple levels (culture, tribe/clan, and kinship) and several exclusive social identities
(ethnicity and national identity). Using the survey data from Jordan, we are able to consider four
different levels of social identity and explore how shared and exclusive identities relate, both
directly and interactively, to host attitudes toward refugees.

The data suggest that, in the specific dynamics of Jordan, shared kinship with Syrians is
not associated with better attitudes toward Syrian refugees as a whole. This is not to say that
shared kinship does not lead to more positive attitudes toward those refugees who are kin, since
the data do not speak this dynamic. Rather, any attachment to or goodwill toward Syrian kin,
whether stemming from familiarity, obligation, or in-group favoritism, does not generalize
beyond those specific kinship relationships.

The expectation for national identity was that greater attachment to one’s Jordanian
identity would be associated with more negative attitudes toward Syrian refugees, who constitute
a clear out-group to Jordanian citizens. The data show that this is not the case, with national
pride showing no direct correlation to attitudes. This finding poses an interesting juxtaposition

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46 A crosstab of common culture and rural shows no correlation, using an alpha of 0.05, between the two variables.
to certain studies on Western attitudes toward immigration, which tend to show a strong association between attitudes and national identity, patriotism, and nationalist sentiment (O’Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Sniderman et al 2004; Sides and Citrin 2007). Contextual differences, however, may help to explain the divergent results. In these Western-focused studies, national identity is often confounded with cultural identity, with immigrants posing a potential threat to both. The Jordan survey shows that Syrian refugees are not uniformly seen as a cultural threat to Jordanian identity, with many respondents perceiving cultural similarities between the two groups. Theoretically, it is possible that in the absence of a perceived cultural or political threat to one’s national identity, the degree to which one expresses attachment to that identity has no impact on attitudes toward refugees. The data suggest that the basic mechanism of in-group favoritism/out-group derogation, when applied to national identity, is not sufficient on its own to drive host-refugee attitudes.

Jordan is an ethnically divided society, with distinct differences between East Bank Jordanians and Palestinians, as well as between both these ethnic groups and Syrian refugees. In the absence of shared ethnic ties between refugees and hosts, attention turns to differences in perceived threat from the refugee influx. There is no evidence that East Bank Jordanians and Palestinians perceive or experience different levels of economic threat from refugees, but there is reason to believe that East Bank Jordanians see Syrian refugees as more of a political threat than do Palestinians. Because of this, I hypothesized that East Bank Jordanians are more likely to hold negative attitudes toward Syrian refugees, but the data do not provide strong support for this expectation. In Models C and D (Table 5-5), the coefficients for East Bank Jordanians are both negative, but these are neither large nor estimated with an acceptable degree of precision. The
results do not provide much clarity concerning the dynamics of ethnicity and ethnic threat in the context of refugee crises.

Common culture is the largest social correlate of attitudes toward refugees. Perceived cultural similarity with Syrians is associated with better overall attitudes in host individuals, and this relationship is robust to a wide range of controls and consistently positive across multiple interactions. While the moderating effects of common culture are somewhat tempered by attachment to Jordanian national identity, this influence also varies across geographic location, with the effect of common culture on attitudes stronger among rural respondents. Though the exact mechanism is not clear, the evidence suggests that the perception of cultural similarities between refugees and hosts exerts a strong influence on intergroup attitudes.

In summary, individuals who perceive a common culture with Syrian refugees are more likely to hold positive attitudes toward those refugees. The salience of being Jordanian has no direct effect on attitudes, but rather moderates the effects of common culture, working against the positive influence of shared cultural ties. Whether a respondent is Palestinian or East Bank Jordanian does not seem to matter much to that respondent’s attitudes toward Syrian refugees. Similarly, sharing kinship ties with Syrians is not a significant predictor of attitudes, with uncertainty regarding the extent to which any familial goodwill extends beyond immediate kin. The overall results indicate that social identity is related to host attitudes toward refugees, but also that the underlying criteria for social identification matter, with broader cultural connections more important than particular affinities based on kinship.
6. ECONOMIC FACTORS AND ATTITUDES TOWARD REFUGEES

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter showed that social identity is an important correlate of attitudes toward refugees, particularly when identity is based on a broad perception of common culture between hosts and refugees. In this chapter, I explore the relationship between economic variables and attitudes, focusing on the influence of instrumental calculations and perceptions of individual hosts during refugee crises. The theoretical foundation is that refugee inflows create both actual and perceived impacts for host individuals, and these hosts form attitudes toward refugees based on their economic vulnerability, experience, perceptions, and evaluations. In the following sections, I consider each of these economic areas and test the associated hypotheses formulated in Chapter 3.

6.2 Variables and Measures

The dependent variable, attitudes, is the attitudinal scale detailed in the previous chapter. I use five different variables as indicators for labor market competition. First, skill level is measured by years of formal education (years education), which ranges from 0 to 24. Second, I employ a categorical variable for employment status (employment), including responses for employed (full-time), employed (part-time), retired, student, unemployed (not seeking job),
unemployed (seeking job), and housewife (or home-based parent). Fourth, employed is a dummy variable with 1 indicating employed either full- or part-time. Fourth, lost job is a dummy variable indicating whether a respondent has lost a job in the past year. Finally, the survey asks participants whether they agree that Syrian refugees take jobs from Jordanians, which measures the general perception of labor market competition. Possible responses for refugees take jobs include strongly disagree, disagree, agree, and strongly agree.

Economic competition between refugees and host populations may center on a wide range of goods, services, and resources. The Jordan survey includes competition indicators for rent, medical care, and water. Rent increase is a variable indicating whether or not individuals have experienced a change in their rent over the past year. This variable only includes those individuals who rent their home, excluding all others. Of the 157 respondents who rent their home, 53 saw their rent decrease, 5 reported no change, and 99 say that their rent increased. Medical difficulty is a dummy variable measuring whether the respondent has had difficulty in the past year accessing or paying for medical services, with 1 indicating a yes answer. Finally, water measures the change in water supply over the past year, whether a decrease, no change, or an increase. In addition, the survey poses the question, “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Syrian refugees are responsible for the increased cost in housing?” The associated variable, refugees housing costs, is coded strongly disagree, disagree, agree, and strongly agree.

In order to capture both objective and subjective components, I use two separate variables for economic security. First, income is a respondent’s self-reported level of household income, with six possible responses: less than 300 JD; 301-500; 501-700; 701-1,000; 1,001-1,300; and

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47 As a check on the reliability of the survey data, I verified that all respondents self-identifying as housewives are also female.
more than 1,300. Second, *enough income* is an indicator of the perceived sufficiency of each respondent’s household income. Responses include insufficient income with considerable hardship; insufficient income; enough income to meet expenses; and enough income to save.

One arena in which perceptions of relative deprivation may play out is in the distribution of aid during refugee crises. Host individuals may believe that refugees are shown favoritism as international aid focuses on new arrivals at the expense of local populations who may already face economic competition and hardship. I use the variable *refugees more aid* to measure the perception that refugees are favored in aid distribution, with four possible answers ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. *Aid* is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the respondent received any form of aid in the past year.

I include three separate variables that capture different economic evaluations. Respondents were asked to evaluate both their family and the national economic situations, and to compare their current condition to that of three years ago. Responses for the first two variables, *personal economic evaluation* and *national economic evaluation*, are coded very bad, bad, good, and very good, while *retrospective economic evaluation* is coded much worse, worse, same, better, and much better.

Cognitive resources, in other studies, are typically captured by some measure of formal education. The use of education as a variable, though, creates problems related to the theoretical concepts to which it is tied. Mayda (2006) and Scheve and Slaughter (2001) use education as a measure of labor market position, while education can also point to a more cosmopolitan outlook, and Rustenbach (2010) connects education to a more overarching concept of human capital. Lacking a better measure, and acknowledging that education is most likely an indicator for elements of multiple concepts, I use years of education (*years education*) as a measure of
cognitive resources. In subsequent analysis, I employ *years education* as an indicator for labor market skill level, with a similar degree of caution regarding the empirical results, but in most models *years education* serves primarily as a control variable.

6.3 Economic Position

I begin with the most straightforward argument, that attitudes are a function of economic security, resource availability, or economic position in general. Hypothesis 7 formalizes this argument: Individuals with greater economic security are more likely to express positive attitudes toward refugees. In order to test this hypothesis, I estimate two regression models with *attitudes* as the dependent variable, using two measures for economic security. Model A regresses *attitudes* on *income* and includes controls for age, gender, urban/rural, and education. The second model (B) replaces *income* with *enough income*, capturing the subjective assessment of each respondent’s income sufficiency. Table 6-1 shows the results for both models.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6-1: Attitudes and Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Enough income</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Male</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urban</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Years education</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>constant</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R²</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
As shown in Table 6-1, there is no evidence that either income level or income sufficiency is related to attitudes. Both coefficients are positive, as predicted by Hypothesis 7, but neither is statistically significant. Neither model supports the assertion that attitudes are a function of one’s economic position, whether that is measured by income levels or perceived income sufficiency.\textsuperscript{48} This challenges the foundational argument of economic position, that attitudes depend on the resources available to host populations. At the individual level, hosts with economic security may well be able to weather refugee shocks more than poorer hosts, but based on these results, economic position and condition do not drive host attitudes toward refugees.

6.4 Labor Market Competition

Labor market competition theory, as applied to refugee crises in developing states, suggests that host attitudes toward refugees will be influenced by the influx of refugee workers, with host individuals who are most threatened or impacted by refugee labor competition less likely to see refugees in a positive light. The three labor market competition hypotheses are as follows:

Hypothesis 8: Lower-skilled workers are more likely to hold negative attitudes toward refugees.

Hypothesis 9: Unemployed host individuals are more likely to hold negative attitudes toward refugees.

\textsuperscript{48} Economic position, or economic security, may also be measured in terms of a respondent’s assets. Accordingly, I estimated a model using home ownership (\textit{own home}) in place of income, with the same controls. Results show no correlation between home ownership and attitudes.
Hypothesis 10: Individuals who perceive that Syrian refugees have taken Jordanian jobs are more likely to hold negative attitudes toward refugees.

In order to test these hypotheses, I estimate two OLS regression models with attitudes as the dependent variable. The first model I includes dummy variables for employment status, with housewife as the base category. Lost job indicates whether the respondent has lost a job in the past year, while years education is the measure for skill level. The second model (D) adds the perceptual variable refugees take jobs, with four responses indicating the extent to which the respondent agrees that refugees are favored in the distribution of aid. In addition to the basic control variables used in other models (age, gender, and urban), I also use East Bank Jordanian as a control for ethnicity. Because East Bank Jordanians dominate the public sector, which in turn constitutes around half of the Jordanian economy (Reiter 2004), they may be more protected from immigrant labor, and therefore less likely to be impacted by labor market competition.

Looking at Table 6-2, Model C provides no evidence that one’s employment status, skill level, or experience of losing a job have any effect on attitudes toward refugees. Three employment status coefficients are statistically significant, but since these categories are comparisons to the base category of housewife, these coefficients cannot be interpreted in isolation. In order to provide a clearer interpretation of these results, I calculate the predicted margins for all seven employment status dummy variables. Figure 6-1 shows the results, with estimates and 95% confidence intervals for each variable.
Table 6-2: Attitudes and Labor Market Competition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employed full time</td>
<td>0.609 *</td>
<td>0.549 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.249)</td>
<td>(0.247)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed part time</td>
<td>0.836 *</td>
<td>0.593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.347)</td>
<td>(0.326)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>0.410</td>
<td>0.309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.315)</td>
<td>(0.284)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>0.651</td>
<td>0.611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.430)</td>
<td>(0.410)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed (seeking job)</td>
<td>0.560 *</td>
<td>0.385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.246)</td>
<td>(0.254)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed (not seeking job)</td>
<td>0.320</td>
<td>0.288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.173)</td>
<td>(0.204)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lost job</td>
<td>-0.235</td>
<td>-0.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.176)</td>
<td>(0.146)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years education</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees take jobs</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.673 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-0.231</td>
<td>-0.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.170)</td>
<td>(0.168)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
<td>(0.115)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Bank</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordanian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.329</td>
<td>1.978 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.368)</td>
<td>(0.407)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N      | 672  | 663  |
| R²     | 0.027 | 0.170 |

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
Only the estimates for employed full time and housewife are statistically significant, with confidence bands that do not include zero, but more importantly, the only significant inter-category differences are between housewife and both employed full-time and employed part-time. These relationships show that respondents who are employed have, on average, more positive attitudes toward refugees than do housewives, a conclusion that is of little practical or theoretical interest. More relevant for labor market competition theory, however, is that there is no significant difference in attitudes toward refugees between those who are employed, unemployed, retired, or students. Even those who are unemployed and seeking a job are no more likely than those who are employed to hold negative attitudes toward refugees. The results suggest that Jordanian attitudes toward Syrian refugees are not driven by whether they are employed, unemployed, retired, or even university students looking to enter the workforce.

Similarly, the experience of losing a job in the past year has no effect on attitudes toward refugees. In Model C, the coefficient for lost job has a negative coefficient, as expected, but the estimate fails to achieve statistical significance, and we cannot reject the null hypothesis that
there is no relationship between losing a job and attitudes toward refugees. Years of education is employed as a measure of skill level, with the expectation that higher skilled individuals will express better attitudes toward refugees due to a lower level of labor market threat from those refugees. However, the coefficient for the education variable is not statistically significant. Furthermore, the expected difference in attitudes between an individual with zero years of education and one with 16 years of education (the equivalent of a college degree) is 0.21 on a scale with a range of 7.28, a 2.9% difference that is, as noted, not statistically significant.

Using these objective indicators for employment status, there is little evidence that labor market competition can explain host attitudes toward refugees. Model D, though, includes the variable refugees take jobs, which measures respondents’ perceptions of whether Syrian refugees compete with and take jobs from Jordanians. The inclusion of this variable does not change the results for the other labor market competition variables, but the second model does provide some empirical support for LMC theory. Individuals who believe that refugees take Jordanian jobs are much more likely to express negative attitudes toward Syrian refugees. The coefficient for this variable is -0.677 and is statistically significant. To illustrate the effect size, the expected difference between strongly disagree and strongly agree is just over -2 points, on the attitude scale of 7.28 points.

These results prompt a further question: are respondents who have lost a job in the past year more likely to perceive that Syrian refugees take jobs from Jordanians? The question has important implications for the theoretical connection between the impact of refugees and attitudes. For this connection to hold, there should be an assignment of blame to refugees for the economic experience of the respondent. Theoretically, blame for the loss of a job is assigned to refugees, and attitudes toward refugees are more negative as a consequence. To this point, the
evidence has shown that individuals who blame refugees for general job losses for Jordanians are more likely to hold negative attitudes, but individuals who have lost a job are not more likely, on average, to view refugees negatively. Do actual job losses correlate with general assignment of blame to refugees, or does the theoretical chain break down at this point? In order to answer this question, I run a simple crosstab (not shown) of refugees take jobs and lost job. The results show that the two variables are positively correlated, with a chi\(^2\) of 8.783, statistically significant at the 0.05 level, and a gamma statistic of 0.134. Combining these results with previous evidence in Table 6-1 shows that Jordanian respondents who have lost a job in the past year are more likely to believe that Syrian refugees are responsible for Jordanian job losses in general. At the same time, Jordanian job losses do not consistently lead to more negative attitudes toward refugees, a result that suggests either a breakdown in the theoretical argument or an incomplete model specification.

The results point to two things. First, the perception of labor market threat is a stronger predictor of attitudes toward refugees than individual labor market position or actual experience. This finding may perhaps be tempered by the nature of the data, which do not indicate the employment sector for each respondent. Since refugees are assumed to exert pressure on lower-skilled jobs and wages, employment status and experience may have a different impact on attitudes in the professional sector than in lower-skilled sectors. Second, individual-level indicators of socio-economic status and personal threat may not be as important as collective labor market concerns. Whether or not one has lost a job or experienced labor market competition as a result of a refugee influx has less impact on one’s attitudes than does the belief that refugees are competing with host populations in the broader labor market. Furthermore, the effects of perception are not driven by those who have experienced employment impact, with
those who have lost a job just as likely to perceive that Syrian refugees take Jordanian jobs as respondents who have not lost a job.

6.5 Resource Competition

As refugees enter into host communities, the imperatives of survival and livelihood change the dynamics of supply of and demand for economic goods such as food, water, employment, and government services. Previous studies have shown that the impact of these economic dynamics differs according to the economic position and experience of individual hosts, and this variation is argued to correlate with attitudes toward refugees. Beginning with the experience of economic competition, the following hypotheses capture the attitudinal expectations for hosts:

Hypothesis 11: Individuals who experience competition over resources or services are more likely to hold negative attitudes toward refugees.

Hypothesis 12: Economic competition is more likely to be correlated with negative attitudes among less-affluent individuals.

In order to test these hypotheses, I employ three variables that capture potential competition in areas identified in previous literature as key loci of refugee-host competition: water, housing costs, and medical services. The results, as shown in Table 6-3, are mixed across these three key indicators for economic competition. Among respondents who do not own their home, those who have experienced an increase in rent over the past year are no more likely to have negative attitudes than respondents who rent, but have not seen their rent go up (Model E). The coefficient is negative as predicted, but not statistically distinct from zero. In Model F, a statistically significant coefficient of -0.276 indicates that individuals who have experienced
Table 6-3: Attitudes and Resource Competition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>I</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rent increase</td>
<td>-0.064</td>
<td>(0.145)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees housing cost</td>
<td>-0.689 **</td>
<td>(0.094)</td>
<td>-1.057 **</td>
<td>(0.217)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees housing cost X income</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td>(0.119)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical difficulty</td>
<td>-0.276 *</td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
<td>-0.281 *</td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water availability</td>
<td>0.213 *</td>
<td>(0.095)</td>
<td>0.357</td>
<td>(0.179)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water availability X income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.074</td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.153</td>
<td>(0.218)</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td>(0.115)</td>
<td>0.197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>(0.338)</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>(0.124)</td>
<td>0.121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years education</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>(0.199)</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
<td>0.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Bank</td>
<td>0.494 **</td>
<td>(0.177)</td>
<td>-0.153</td>
<td>(0.144)</td>
<td>-0.149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordanian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>(0.588)</td>
<td>-0.513</td>
<td>(0.391)</td>
<td>-0.801</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N   152 665 665 670 666
R² 0.042 0.027 0.028 0.086 0.092

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

difficulty securing medicine or medical care over the past year tend to express more negative attitudes toward refugees. The magnitude of this effect, though, is not large, with a predicted attitudinal difference of about 4% between having and not having challenges with medical services. Finally, an increase in water supply over the past year is associated with more positive attitudes. With an estimate of 0.213, the expected difference in attitudes between those who saw
a decrease in water and those who had greater availability of water is 0.426, or approximately 6% on the attitudinal scale. Overall, there is some evidence that those who experience economic competition are more likely to express negative attitudes toward refugees.

Refugees housing cost, an indicator of the perception of economic competition, is a better predictor of attitudes toward refugees. Model H returns a statistically significant coefficient of -0.689 for refugees housing cost, the strongest performance of any economic competition variable. Respondents who strongly agree with the statement that refugees are responsible for high housing costs in Jordan have attitudes that are about 2 points lower on the attitudinal scale (a 28% difference) than individuals who strongly disagree with the statement. While personal experience with economic competition during refugee crises does not exert a strong influence on attitudes toward refugees, the perception that refugees drive up housing costs is associated with much poorer attitudes.

Turning to Hypothesis 12, not all of the economic competition variables are suitable for testing interactive effects. Rent increase is not statistically significant in Model C, and at the same time it is limited to a sample of only 152. Difficulty in securing medical care is, for the main part, a function of economic resources, with low-income individuals facing greater difficulty. Water supply, on the other hand, is more of a distribution function, with water usually delivered on certain days of the week for different neighborhoods. The availability of water should be relatively consistent across all households within distribution areas.49 Using change in water availability as the measure for economic competition, Model G includes an interaction term between change in water supply and income. The coefficient for this term is negative, which is the opposite direction from that hypothesized, but is not statistically significant.

49 Simple crosstabs show that there is no statistical difference in the change in water availability across either governorates or urban/rural locales.
Returning to *refugees housing cost*, it is possible that the perception that refugees are responsible for high housing costs is dependent on the degree to which individuals are insulated against economic shocks. Using income as a measure of economic vulnerability, Model I interacts *refugees housing cost* with *income*, with the expectation that the negative effects of blaming refugees for high housing costs will be stronger for those with lower levels of income. The results, though, do not support this expectation, with the interactive term failing to achieve statistical significance.

In summary, there is some evidence that the experience of economic competition negatively impacts attitudes toward refugees. Individuals who have had trouble securing medical services or have seen a decrease in their water supply are more likely to express negative attitudes toward refugees. However, the relative explanatory power of objective economic competition variables is not strong. In contrast, the perception of economic competition is a strong correlate of attitudes, with respondents who believe that refugees are responsible for high housing costs more likely to hold negative attitudes toward refugees. Finally, looking at Models G and I, there is no evidence that the relationship between economic competition and attitudes differs across income levels.

6.6 Economic Perception and Evaluation

Moving beyond experience to an expanded consideration of economic perception, Hypothesis 13 states that individuals who perceive that refugees are favored in the provision of aid and services are more likely to hold negative attitudes toward those refugees. To test this expectation, I specify a straightforward regression of *attitudes* on *refugees more aid*, including the four socio-demographic controls, and controlling for *aid*. Model J (Table 6-4) shows that,
even controlling for whether respondents have received aid in the past year, individuals who perceive that refugees are favored in the distribution of aid are more likely to have negative attitudes toward Syrian refugees. A one-unit change in perception that refugees receive more aid is associated with attitudes that are 0.526 points lower on the attitude scale of 7.28. Another way of stating this is that the difference in attitudes between those who strongly disagree and those who strongly agree that refugees receive more aid is about -2.1 points.

Model K includes an interaction between refugees more aid and aid, with the expectation that receiving some form of aid in the past year will moderate the negative effects of the perception of favoritism toward refugees. Contrary to this expectation, though, the coefficient for this interaction variable is negative and statistically significant, indicating that the perception of favoritism toward refugees is associated with even greater negative attitudes for those
individuals who actually received aid in the past year. As illustrated in Figure 6-2, the average
difference in the effect of perceiving that refugees receive more aid between those who received
no aid and those who did is -1.204. In summary, while having received aid in the past year has
no direct impact on attitudes, the perception of favoritism toward refugees is associated with
more negative attitudes, an effect that is exacerbated by actually receiving aid.

Figure 6-2: Marginal Effects of Refugees More Aid by Aid

Moving beyond perceptions of aid, cognitive comparisons and evaluations of economic
conditions may also impact host individuals’ attitudes. In Chapter 3, I formulated the following
hypotheses:

50 I also ran a separate model (not shown) including the variable income and its interaction with refugees more aid. The interaction coefficient was not statistically significant, suggesting that the correlation of the perception of favoritism toward refugees with more negative attitudes is not restricted to poorer respondents. The attitudes of poorer Jordanian respondents are no less likely to worsen as perceptions of economic favoritism toward refugees increase.

51 These results remain robust to the inclusion of other control variables, such as East Bank Jordanian, governorate, income, and enough income (results not shown).
Hypothesis 14: Individuals who perceive that their quality of life or economic condition has declined during a refugee crisis are more likely to hold negative attitudes toward refugees.

Hypothesis 15: Individuals who express negative evaluations of their present economic condition are more likely to hold negative attitudes toward refugees.

Hypothesis 16: Host individuals who express negative evaluations of the national economy are more likely to hold negative attitudes toward refugees.

Hypothesis 17: National economic evaluations are more likely to be correlated with negative attitudes among individuals with greater economic security.

Hypothesis 18: National economic evaluations are more likely to be positively correlated with attitudes among individuals with fewer cognitive resources.

Hypothesis 19: Sociotropic concerns are less likely to be correlated with negative attitudes among individuals who have experienced personal negative consequences during the refugee crisis.

In order to test these hypotheses, I estimate three separate models. Model L focuses on retrospective economic evaluation (Hypothesis 14), with controls for age, gender, location, education, ethnicity, and income. Model M drops the retrospective evaluation variable and includes measures for personal economic evaluation (Hypothesis 15) and sociotropic economic evaluation (Hypothesis 16). Model N incorporates two interaction variables with national economic evaluation, using income as an indicator of economic security/vulnerability (Hypothesis 17) and years of education as a measure of cognitive ability (Hypothesis 18).

Finally, Model O tests whether the relationship between attitudes and national economic evaluation is dependent on whether a host individual has experienced negative impacts of the
refugee crisis. As a measure of personal negative consequences, I use medical difficulty, which indicates whether a respondent has experienced difficulty securing medical services in the past three years.

Looking at the results in Table 6-5, and beginning with Model L, personal retrospective economic evaluation has a statistically significant and positive correlation with attitudes. An increase of one unit in retrospective economic evaluation is associated with an increase of 0.121 on the attitudinal scale. Since retrospective evaluation is a 5-point ordinal variable, the difference between “much worse” (response 1) and “much better” (response 5) reflects an approximate change of 0.5 in attitudes (on a 7.28 scale). For respondents, a change in one’s evaluation of previous and present economic conditions therefore matters to one’s attitudes toward refugees, but the effect size is relatively small.

Model M focuses on the effects of current personal and national evaluations. The coefficient for personal economic evaluation is not statistically significant, while national economic evaluations are significant at the 0.01 level, with a coefficient of 0.276. The implication for host attitudes toward refugees is that sociotropic concerns and evaluations tend to outweigh personal economic circumstances in the formation of attitudes. A one unit increase in national economic evaluation is associated with a 0.276 point improvement in attitudes toward refugees, and the difference in attitudes between a respondent who perceives the national economy as very bad and one who believes the national economy is very good is 0.828 (on the 7.28 point attitudinal scale).
Table 6-5: Economic Evaluations and Attitudes toward Refugees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes</th>
<th>L</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>O</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Retrospective economic evaluation</td>
<td>0.121 *</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal economic evaluation</td>
<td>0.166</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.097)</td>
<td>(0.101)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National economic evaluation</td>
<td>0.275 **</td>
<td>0.962 **</td>
<td>0.292 **</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.095)</td>
<td>(0.264)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.195</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>0.234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.116)</td>
<td>(0.113)</td>
<td>(0.113)</td>
<td>(0.115)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.151</td>
<td>0.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.119)</td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years education</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.110 *</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Bank Jordanian</td>
<td>-0.238</td>
<td>-0.201</td>
<td>-0.219</td>
<td>-0.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.139)</td>
<td>(0.140)</td>
<td>(0.139)</td>
<td>(0.139)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>-0.030</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>-0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.076)</td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
<td>(0.251)</td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National econ. eval. X years education</td>
<td>-0.046 *</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National econ. eval. X income</td>
<td>-0.097</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.091)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical difficulty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.555</td>
<td>(0.340)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National econ. eval. X meddifficult</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>(0.140)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>-0.474</td>
<td>-1.128 **</td>
<td>-2.606 **</td>
<td>-0.732 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.321)</td>
<td>(0.314)</td>
<td>(0.492)</td>
<td>(0.328)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Turning to conditional effects, Model N includes interactions of national economic evaluations with both education and income. There is no evidence that the effects of sociotropic evaluations are conditioned by economic security, with the interaction of income and national economic evaluation returning a negative coefficient while not achieving statistical significance. On the other hand, the interaction with years of education is negative and significant at the 0.05
level, indicating that as education increases, the effects of national economic evaluations on attitudes decreases. For every additional year of formal education, the average effect of a one unit increase in one’s national economic evaluation on attitudes decreases by 0.046 points (on the 7.28 point attitudinal scale). Figure 6-3 illustrates this relationship, showing the marginal effects of national economic evaluations on attitudes as educational level increases. While at higher levels of education the marginal effects are not statistically different from zero, the confidence bands for the lowest and highest values of education do not overlap, and the difference is therefore significant.

The takeaway from Model N is that Hypothesis 18 is supported by the results (while Hypothesis 17 is not). Individuals with lower cognitive resources, as measured by educational attainment, are more likely to rely on national-level economic data and evaluation in the formation of attitudes toward refugees. The results provide some support for the argument that macro-level information is used as a shortcut for organizing and understanding the complexity of mass refugee inflows, although interpretation of this relationship must be tempered by the fact that the measure employed, years of formal education, is theoretically cloudy.

Finally, Model O tests the hypothesis that national economic evaluations will have less impact on attitudes for those who have experienced some form of personal negative consequences during the refugee flow. The results show that those Jordanians who have experienced difficulty securing medical services are no less likely to rely on national economic evaluations in the formation of attitudes toward refugees.52 Overall, Models N and O reinforce the strong direct correlation between national economic evaluations and attitudes toward refugees, while at the same time supporting the argument that sociotropic evaluations serve as

52 Replacing the variable meddifficult with alternative personal experience variables, such as water, lostjob, and rentincrease, does not change the results (results not shown). National economic evaluation remains significant in all models, and no interaction variable returns a statistically significant coefficient.
informational shortcuts for individuals who lack either proximate information or the capacity to process and apply that information within the context of refugee crises.

Summarizing these results, the data reveal several points. First, and fundamentally, the results suggest that economic perception and evaluation matter in the formation of attitudes toward refugees. Both retrospective (Model L) and national economic evaluations (Models M-O) are positively correlated with attitudes. Second, sociotropic concerns appear to outweigh individual-level economic evaluations. The data show that personal economic evaluation is not related to attitudes, and when all three evaluative measures are modeled together, only sociotropic economic evaluations remain consistently correlated with attitudes. These results indicate that Jordanian individuals’ personal economic situations, not matter how poor or how much worse than prior to the refugee crisis, do not significantly impact their attitudes toward the massive numbers of Syrian refugees in Jordan. On the other hand, host attitudes are directly related to respondent’s evaluation of the national economy. An individual who has a positive perception of the state of the Jordanian national economy is more likely to express positive
attitudes toward Syrian refugees. The third point is that there is no evidence that the positive relationship between national economic evaluations and attitudes toward refugees is conditional on respondents’ cognitive ability, economic condition/position, or personal economic experience.

6.7 Conclusion

The general economic argument is that, during refugee crises, host individuals will form attitudes toward refugees based on the perceived economic threat or actual economic consequences of refugee inflows. The economic impact of refugees may be real or perceived, individual or collective, but the underlying logic is that host individuals form orientations toward refugees through rational calculations of economic loss, gain, or the possibility of either. The above empirical results provide moderate, but uneven, support for this argument.

Previous research has argued that certain host individuals are more vulnerable to the economic threats posed by refugee inflows, with those hosts lower on the socio-economic scale, working in lower-skilled occupations, or with fewer economic resources more likely to experience negative economic impacts during refugee crises. There has been insufficient effort, though, to connect these economic threats to attitudes at the individual level. Based on the Jordan survey data, there is little evidence that host attitudes are correlated with economic position, condition, or vulnerability. The data show no relationship between attitudes and either income or perceived sufficiency of income, indicating that poor Jordanians are no more likely to hold negative attitudes toward refugees than are wealthy Jordanians. Furthermore, an alternative socio-economic indicator, home rental, returns a null result, suggesting that an individual’s level of insulation from refugee-induced housing shocks has no bearing on that individual’s attitudes toward those refugees. In the Jordan survey, 22% of respondents rent their home, and 63% of
these saw their rent increase over the previous year. Despite the fact that almost 94% of respondents blame refugees for rent increases, those individuals who reported increased rent do not, on average, express more negative attitudes toward refugees.

These results directly challenge the assertion of those scholars who point to resource availability as the key factor in how host populations view and interact with refugees. Kibreab’s macro-level assertion that “hospitality is…a function of resource availability” (1985, 70) does not hold at the individual level, with the attitudes of Jordanian hosts not dependent on their economic circumstances, position, or vulnerability.

Turning to employment, there is mixed evidence that refugee-driven labor market competition helps shape host attitudes. Based on the Jordan data, neither individual respondents’ employment status nor the experience of losing a job in the past year exerts any influence on attitudes. There is no significant difference in attitudes between those who are unemployed (but seeking a job) and those respondents who are employed. At the same time, those who have lost a job during the refugee crisis are no more likely to view refugees negatively. While these results suggest that labor market competition theory, at least as measured positionally or experientially, does not hold in the context of Jordan, the perception of labor market competition does matter for host attitudes. Respondents who believe that Syrian refugees compete with Jordanians in the labor market tend to have more negative attitudes toward those refugees.

Similarly, economic competition measures return mixed results. The data show that there is no relationship between attitudes and housing competition (for those who rent). While medical difficulty and water availability are significant variables, the effect they exert on attitudes are relatively small. According to the data, what matters more than these objective indicators of economic competition is the perception of individual hosts that rising housing costs
are a direct result of Syrian refugees competing with Jordanians for limited rental housing opportunities. Similarly, host individuals who believe that refugees are favored in the distribution of aid and economic goods are more likely to express negative attitudes toward those refugees, a correlation that is not driven by economic position or experience.

Jordanian hosts’ economic evaluations are also important predictors of attitudes, but not consistently across all evaluation indicators. Personal economic evaluation and retrospective personal economic evaluation exert either no effect or relatively small effect (respectively) on attitudes. The strongest relationship and effect exists between macro-economic evaluations and attitudes, with perception of national economic conditions positively correlated with attitudes toward Syrian refugees.

There are two common, interrelated threads that run through the empirical results for economic variables. First, perception seems to be more important than objective experience and circumstances. Believing that refugees take Jordanian jobs has a negative effect on attitudes, while labor market position, skill level, and the loss of a job don’t seem to matter. Similarly, actually receiving aid is not associated with a change in attitudes, but the perception that refugees receive more aid than Jordanians is associated with more negative attitudes. Finally, the perception that refugees drive up the cost of housing is associated with poorer attitudes, but the experience of actual rent increases has no effect on attitudes. The results speak directly to the question of whether the economic impact of refugees translates directly to attitudes. That there is an impact, and that such impact is experienced unequally among hosts (as argued by Chambers 1986), is supported by the empirical analysis, as evidenced by the variation in such variables as rent increase, water, and medical difficulty. The empirical analysis, though, shows little link between objective, measurable economic impact and attitudes. Based on these data, negative
externalities and economic impacts do not necessarily lead to attitudes at the individual level. On the other hand, the perception of these economic impacts, at the macro level, has a clear association with attitudes.

This supports the observation of Murshid (2014, 5), who states that, in the context of Pakistan, “much of the anti-refugee sentiment emanates from the poor, who feel that refugee camps are in much better condition than their own places of abode.” Note the subjective assessment of Pakistani poor, and the connection to negative attitudes toward the Afghan refugees. The evidence from Jordan provides partial support to Murshid’s argument, in that host perceptions of refugees’ impact and treatment contribute to attitudes. In the case of Jordan, however, this relationship is not exclusive to poorer hosts, with economically secure respondents just as prone to negative attitudes associated with the perception of favoritism toward refugees (see fn. 3, this chapter).

Second, there is evidence that collective, macro-level evaluations and concerns outweigh personal economic circumstances. Table 6-5 (Model M) shows that national economic evaluations are positively correlated with attitudes, while personal economic evaluations have no relationship to attitudes. As previously noted, personal labor market position and experience matter less than whether one believes that, on a macro-level, refugees are competing with and taking jobs from Jordanians. Similarly, experiencing an increase in rent has no effect on attitudes, but the perception that refugees drive up housing cost (a macro-level measure) is negatively associated with attitudes.

Both of these observations, that perception trumps experience and macro-level evaluations matter more than personal evaluations, have theoretical and practical implications.
that I explore in more detail in Chapter 8. I now turn to the question of the relationship between social and economic factors in the formation of attitudes toward refugees.
7. COMPARING SOCIAL IDENTITY AND ECONOMIC VARIABLES

7.1 Introduction

The two preceding chapters have highlighted the relationships of social identity and economic concerns to attitudes toward refugees, with both categories of variables showing correlations with attitudes when modeled independently of each other. In this chapter, I bring together the two sets of variables and consider firstly, the interaction of social identity and economics, and secondly, the relative contribution of each in accounting for variation in attitudes toward refugees.

7.2 Interaction of Social Identity and Economic Variables

Hypothesis 20 states that shared social identity is more likely to be correlated with positive attitudes toward refugees among host individuals with greater economic security. The underlying argument53 is that shared identity between refugees and hosts may have a positive impact on attitudes, but only to the extent that hosts’ economic conditions are satisfactory or sufficient. At the macro level, the expectation is that once resources, measured collectively, run short, relationships between refugees and communities will be characterized by friction and animosity. At the individual level, the implication is that any positive effects of shared identity between hosts and refugees will be overwhelmed by economic concerns. If this argument holds, we should see empirical evidence that shared social identity positively correlates with attitudes

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53 See, for example, Kibreab (1985), Bookman (2002), and Bascom (1993).
toward refugees only for those individuals who are economically secure, or who express confidence in economic conditions at the personal or collective level.

Based on the empirical results from Chapter 5, common culture is the strongest social identity predictor of attitudes, and I therefore use this variable in the following models. I measure economic security in three ways. At the individual level, I focus on both income and income sufficiency. *Income* measures household income per month, with responses coded 1-6 to include increasing ranges of income. *Income sufficiency* is an ordered variable with four values ranging from 1 to 4. At the sociotropic level, I use *national economic evaluation* to measure respondents’ perception of collective economic security. Table 7-1 shows the results of three regression models that include interactions of these different measures for economic security with *common culture*. As in other models, I include controls for age, gender, rural/urban location, education, and ethnicity.

In all three models, common culture has a strong positive correlation with attitudes, even with the interaction terms assuming some of the explanatory power of the variable. Looking at Model A, the coefficient for income, while positive, is not statistically different from zero. The interaction of common culture and income, which serves to test Hypothesis 20, is not statistically significant. Figure 7-1 shows the marginal effects of common culture on attitudes by income level (with other variables at their means), illustrating both the decreasing effects of common culture on attitudes as income increases, as well as the overlapping 95% confidence intervals. Based on Model A, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference in the relationship between common culture and attitudes across different levels of income.

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54 For descriptive statistics of all variables, see Table A-1 in the Appendix.
Table 7-1: Interaction of Common Culture and Economic Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common culture</td>
<td>1.121** (0.179)</td>
<td>1.230** (0.176)</td>
<td>1.300** (0.197)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.355 (0.241)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common culture X Income</td>
<td>-0.136 (0.085)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income sufficiency</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.527* (0.227)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common culture X Income</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.188* (0.088)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National economic evaluation</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.787** (0.177)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common culture X nat. econ. eval.</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.219* (0.082)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.004)</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.004)</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.090 (0.100)</td>
<td>0.113 (0.101)</td>
<td>0.097 (0.102)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>-0.012 (0.115)</td>
<td>-0.054 (0.119)</td>
<td>-0.013 (0.131)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years education</td>
<td>0.005 (0.016)</td>
<td>0.004 (0.016)</td>
<td>0.002 (0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Bank</td>
<td>-0.308* (0.128)</td>
<td>-0.325* (0.125)</td>
<td>-0.332** (0.120)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordanian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.474** (0.458)</td>
<td>-2.793** (0.450)</td>
<td>-3.351** (0.491)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.225</td>
<td>0.229</td>
<td>0.253</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

An important observation is that the distribution of the income variable is skewed, with 98% of respondents reporting household income at or below 1,000 JD per month (responses 1-4) and 82% or respondents earning 500 JD or less each month (responses 1 and 2). Only 7

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55 Five respondents declined to answer the question regarding income. Missing values were dropped from the analysis.
participants reported income in the range of 1,001-1,300 JD (response 5), and 7 participants claimed income greater than 1,300 JD (response 5). Consequently, estimates for responses 5 and 6, while positive, are not estimated with precision. The results must therefore be treated with caution, but at the same time they question the argument that economic concerns override the positive effects of shared social identity.

Model B, using income sufficiency as the measure for economic security, provides a clearer picture of the relationships between common culture, economic situation, and attitudes. Common culture is still positive and statistically significant, the effect size remains large, and income sufficiency is likewise statistically significant, indicating that as income sufficiency increases, attitudes toward refugees are more positive.\textsuperscript{56} The estimate of interest, however, is the coefficient for the interaction term, which, contradicting Hypothesis 20, is negative and significant at the 0.05 level. The results lead to a rejection of the null hypothesis, that there is no

\textsuperscript{56} This is in contrast to Model B in Table 6-1, where income sufficiency is not statistically significant.
difference in the effects of common culture on attitudes income sufficiency, but the direction of the relationship is the opposite of the expectation set forth by Hypothesis 20. Rather than increasing as hypothesized, the strength of the relationship between *common culture* and *attitudes* actually decreases as income sufficiency increases. In other words, the perception of

Figure 7-2: Marginal Effects of Common Culture by Income Sufficiency

![Graph showing marginal effects of common culture by income sufficiency]

common culture has a consistently positive effect on attitudes, but this effect is greater among those whose economic situation is more tenuous. This suggests that host individuals whose income is insufficient for their needs are more likely to rely on perceptions of common culture in the formation of attitudes toward refugees. This relationship is graphically illustrated in Figure 7-2, which plots the marginal effects of common culture at different levels of income sufficiency.

Using objective income levels as the measure for economic security, there is no evidence for the argument that economic situation trumps social ties to refugees in the formation of attitudes. Replacing income levels with income sufficiency, the results point in the other direction. Rather than eschewing social ties and depending on economic circumstances to shape
attitudes, individuals who are struggling economically and who perceive a common culture with refugees are more likely to have positive attitudes than those who are more economically secure. Based on these results, individual economic circumstances do not overwhelm the social identities and ties of host individuals in the formation of attitudes toward refugees.

As shown in Chapter 6, though, sociotropic concerns tend to outweigh individual-level economic threats and impacts. Hypothesis 20 posits that, in the national context, common social identity will matter in the formation of attitudes toward refugees only so far as individuals are satisfied with the state of the national economy. According to this argument, once individuals perceive economic problems at the national level, this concern will overshadow any shared social ties in the formation of attitudes toward refugees. Empirically, we should expect to see the positive effects of shared common culture decrease with more negative evaluations of the national economy.

Model C, however, shows that the exact opposite is the case. For individuals who have a negative perception of the national economy, there is a more positive effect of perception of common culture on attitudes toward refugees. As with the income and income sufficiency interactive variables in Models A and B, the coefficient for the interaction of national economic evaluation and common culture is negative (and in this case is statistically significant). The expected impact on attitudes of a one-unit increase in the perception of common culture for an individual who believes the economy is very good is 0.657 points less (-0.219 multiplied by 3) than the effect of common culture for someone who perceives the national economy is very bad. Figure 7-3 illustrates the relationship, with the confidence intervals for “Very bad” and “Very good” distinct from each other, and each point estimate statistically distinct from a zero value. As with Model B, in Model C we reject the null that there is no difference in the relationship
between common culture and sociotropic concerns, but at the same time the relationship is in the opposite direction expected by Hypothesis 20.

Figure 7-3: Marginal Effects of Common Culture by National Economic Evaluation

Figure 7-4: Marginal Effects of National Economic Evaluation by Common Culture
Staying with Model C, since the coefficient for national economic evaluation is statistically significant, it is worth considering how the direct effects of sociotropic concerns on attitudes are conditioned by respondents’ perception of common culture. Using the same model specification, I estimate the marginal effects of national economic evaluation by common culture. The results, shown in Figure 7-4, indicate that national economic evaluations are positively correlated with attitudes toward refugees, but only for respondents who do not agree that Jordanians and Syrian refugees share a common culture. The estimates for “Strongly Disagree” and “Disagree” are positive and statistically significant, while the estimates for “Agree” and “Strongly Agree” have 95% confidence bands that include zero. Furthermore, the confidence bands for “Strongly Disagree” and “Strongly Agree” do not overlap, indicating a statistically significant difference in these estimates.

Taken together, the results of Models A-C offer no support for Hypothesis 20. Two of the models provide evidence that the relationship between perception of common culture and attitudes toward refugees is different across levels of economic security, but not in the direction posited by Hypothesis 20. Individuals who struggle financially and those who express concerns about the state of the national economy experience greater positive effects of the perception of common culture on attitudes toward refugees than do those respondents who are more economically secure.

Two observations are important for our understanding of the relationship between social and economic variables. First, social and economic variables do interact in their relationship to attitudes. The association of perception of common culture with attitudes is conditioned by economic perception (though not necessarily by objective economic condition), and vice versa.
In considering the formation of host attitudes toward refugees, this interaction necessitates a broader consideration of potential determinants, to include both economic and social variables.

The second observation is that economic perception conditions the effect of common culture on attitudes, but does not negate it. As shown in Figures 7-2 and 7-3, the marginal effects of common culture on attitudes decrease, but remain consistently positive and statistically significant, across all values of income sufficiency and national economic evaluation. The same cannot be said for the marginal effects of national economic evaluations given different values of perception of common culture (Figure 7-4). When considering attitudes toward refugees, sociotropic evaluations only matter for those host individuals who don’t perceive common culture with Syrian refugees.

The results provide no support for Hypothesis 20, and for the underlying argument that, in the formation of attitudes toward refugees, social identity only matters to the extent that economic conditions are favorable. In the case of Jordan, not only do the data show that perception of common culture has a consistently positive relationship with attitudes toward refugees, they also suggest that this relationship is stronger and more meaningful for individuals who are less economically secure.

7.3 Model and Variable Comparison

The second question posed at the beginning of the chapter relates to the relative contribution of economic and social identity variables in accounting for variation in attitudes. In seeking an answer to this question, I begin by estimating a model that includes those economic and social variables that performed well in previous models. Of the four measures of social identity, only common culture is a consistently strong predictor of attitudes. East Bank
Jordanian is statistically significant in some models (Table 6-3, Model E; Table 7-1, Models A-C), but the relative effect size is not strong, and in some models the variable shows no correlation with attitudes at all. Neither national pride nor Syrian family is correlated with attitudes. I therefore include common culture in the current analysis, but not the other social identity variables.

Table 7-2: Base Comparison Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes</th>
<th>Model D</th>
<th>Model E</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(&quot;svy&quot; prefix)</td>
<td>(no svy prefix)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common culture</td>
<td>0.682 **</td>
<td>0.682 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
<td>(0.064)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National economic evaluation</td>
<td>0.210 *</td>
<td>0.210 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retro. economic evaluation</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees take jobs</td>
<td>-0.351 **</td>
<td>-0.351 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.064)</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees housing cost</td>
<td>-0.326 **</td>
<td>-0.326 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.092)</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.093)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees more aid</td>
<td>-0.112</td>
<td>-0.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.064)</td>
<td>(0.085)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical difficulty</td>
<td>-0.246 *</td>
<td>-0.246 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.613</td>
<td>0.613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.729)</td>
<td>(0.482)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.322</td>
<td>0.322</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

The best-performing economic variables are national economic evaluation, retrospective economic evaluation, refugees take jobs, refugees housing costs, refugees more aid, water, and
medical difficulty. Of these seven, two are evaluative, three are perceptual, and two are economic competition measures. Combined with common culture, these provide eight explanatory variables. For these eight and the dependent variable (attitudes), I drop all missing observations to reach a common sample of 641. Results from the base model (D), using the “svy” prefix in Stata, are detailed in Table 7-2. Since post-estimation commands are not possible when using the “svy” prefix, I also estimate a straightforward regression model (E), which returns different standard errors than those in Model D.

Looking at the base regression model (D), several things are worth noting. First, common culture, as in all other models, has a relatively large coefficient that is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Of the economic variables, national economic evaluation, refugees take jobs, refugees housing costs, and medical difficulty achieve statistical significance, with the two perceptual variables proving the strongest economic predictors of attitudes in this model. Finally, retrospective economic evaluation, refugees more aid, and water do not perform well in this model, with none of the three reaching statistical significance. Removing the “svy” prefix and estimating a straightforward model (E) does not change the results, the one exception being that the coefficient for national economic evaluation is estimated with greater precision, making it statistically significant at the 0.01 level.

In order to identify the relative contribution and importance of each variable, I use the “nestreg” command in Stata to generate nested models based on the combined model (E) in Table 7-2. “Nestreg” estimates multiple models, adding a single variable or variable block to each model, and compares the models using two key outputs: an F-statistic for each variable or variable block and cumulative R², with the change in R² indicating the relative contribution of the added variable(s) to the percentage of variation in attitudes accounted for by the model.
Table 7-3 shows the initial results, beginning with *common culture* and adding a single economic variable to each subsequent model.

For the F-test in the “nestreg” output, the null hypothesis is that the coefficients for all new variables in each specific model are equal to zero (0). For the results in Table 7-3, an F-statistic and associated probability are generated for each variable as it is added to a model including all previous variables. *Common culture* has an F-statistic of 171.18, which is statistically significant at the 0.05 level, leading to a rejection of the null hypothesis that *common culture* has no relationship to attitudes. Of equal interest is the R², 0.211, which indicates that *common culture*, on its own, accounts for about 21% of the variation in attitudes toward refugees. Adding national economic evaluation to the model adds only 0.026 to the R², even though the variable is statistically significant. *Retrospective economic evaluation* is not statistically significant and its R² is negligible, suggesting that its inclusion adds very little to the model. *Refugees take jobs* is both statistically significant and a good predictor of attitudes, accounting for nearly 6% of the variation in *attitudes*. Refugees housing cost is likewise statistically significant, but its contribution to the overall model is less, with a change in R² of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Block df</th>
<th>Residual df</th>
<th>Pr &gt; F</th>
<th>R²</th>
<th>Change in R²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common culture</td>
<td>171.18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nat. econ. eval.</td>
<td>21.63</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.237</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retro. econ. eval.</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>0.305</td>
<td>0.238</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees take jobs</td>
<td>53.04</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.297</td>
<td>0.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refs. housing cost</td>
<td>16.05</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.314</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees more aid</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>0.701</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical difficulty</td>
<td>5.03</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.322</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 641 for all models
less than 2%. The relative contributions of *refugees more aid* and *water* are indistinguishable from zero (0), but the inclusion of *medical difficulty* does add to the explanatory power of the model, albeit to a slight degree (less than 1% change in R²).

The overall takeaway from Table 7-3 is that the perception of common culture outweighs all economic variables in the formation of attitudes toward refugees, accounting for about 21% of the variation in attitudes. For the economic variables, the results are mixed. Considering evaluative variables, national economic evaluation (R² of 0.026) is a more powerful predictor of attitudes than retrospective economic evaluation, which does not achieve statistical significance. Focusing on personal views and perceptions, the belief that refugees receive more aid is outweighed by the perceptions that refugees take Jordanian jobs and are responsible for increased housing costs, with the labor market competition indicator outperforming that of housing competition. Finally, while water availability offers very little explanatory power, *medical difficulty* contributes slightly to the overall model.

The “nestreg” command also allows us to consider the relative contribution and importance of blocks of variables by sequentially adding multiple variables at a time. Table 7-4 shows the results of two models that treat all seven economic variables as a single block. Model 1 begins with *common culture* and then adds the economic variable block. The order in which variables and blocks are added to the model matters, as the variable(s) entered first may account for some of the variation that might otherwise be attributed to subsequent variable(s). I therefore run two models, reversing the order the second time so that economic variables are estimated first (Model 2).

In both models, *common culture* and the block of economic variables are statistically significant, leading to a rejection of the null hypothesis that all variables in each are equal to
Table 7-4: Nested Regressions of Common Culture and Economic Variable Block

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable(s)</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Block df</th>
<th>Residual df</th>
<th>Pr &gt; F</th>
<th>R²</th>
<th>Change in R²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common culture</td>
<td>171.18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic variables</td>
<td>14.69</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.322</td>
<td>0.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic variables</td>
<td>22.39</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.198</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common culture</td>
<td>114.79</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.322</td>
<td>0.123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 641 for all models

zero. When common culture is estimated first, it accounts for about 21% of the variation in attitudes (R²=0.211). Adding the economic variable block to the model improves the R² to 0.322, adding about 11% to the explanatory power of the model. In Model 2, economic variables alone account for about 20% of the variation in attitudes, and including common culture adds about 12% (change in R² of 0.123). Looking at both the initial R² (0.211 versus 0.198) and the change in R² when new variables are added to the initial model (0.123 vs. 0.110), the difference is only about 1 percentage point. These results, though, suggest that common culture by itself has greater, or at least equal, explanatory power than the seven best-performing economic variables combined.

A final model fit comparison employs Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to distinguish between different model specifications. Comparing two models, positive changes in AIC and BIC indicate that the comparison model fits the data to a lesser degree than the base model. For the current analysis, the base model is Model E, and each subsequent model uses the same explanatory variables minus one, with AIC and BIC estimates reflecting whether the model performs better or worse without that specific variable. Table 7-5 shows the results of a series of models compared to the base model (E), where the first column lists the variable omitted from each specific model. Of particular interest are the AIC
and BIC differentials for each model, as compared to the base. Positive differentials indicate that the model performs poorly compared to the base model, thereby suggesting the value of the omitted variable to the model.

The model suffers the most when *common culture* is removed, with a positive difference between the full model and the model without *common culture* of over 100 for both the AIC and BIC. It is also worth noting that the amount of variation accounted for by the model, when *common culture* is left out, decreases by over 12 percentage points (change in R² of -0.124).

Table 7-5: Model Fit Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Base Model R²</th>
<th>New Model R²</th>
<th>Δ R²</th>
<th>AIC</th>
<th>Diff</th>
<th>BIC</th>
<th>Diff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Base Model (E)</td>
<td>0.322</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common culture</td>
<td>0.198</td>
<td>-0.124</td>
<td>2238</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>2274</td>
<td>101</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National econ. eval.</td>
<td>0.311</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>2141</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2177</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retro. econ. eval</td>
<td>0.322</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>2131</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>2167</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees take jobs</td>
<td>0.291</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>2159</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2195</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees housing cost</td>
<td>0.308</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>2158</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2189</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees more aid</td>
<td>0.302</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>2158</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>0.321</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>2131</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>2167</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical difficulty</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>2136</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2172</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 641

*Refugees take jobs* is also important to the overall explanatory power of the model, leading to positive AIC (26) and BIC (22) differentials and a change in R² of about 3 percentage points when excluded from the model. Beyond these two variables, only *national economic evaluation* makes a significant contribution to the overall model, with positive AIC (8) and BIC (4) differentials and a contribution of about 1 percentage point as measured by R². Neither *refugees take jobs* nor *national economic evaluation*, though, compare to the overall importance and
explanatory power of common culture. Retrospective economic evaluation, refugees more aid, water, and medical difficulty generate negative BIC scores when left out of the model, suggesting not only that they are not contributing to the explanation of variance in attitudes, but also that the overall model performs better without these variables.

Considering these results, and the results of the nested models above, the evidence overwhelmingly points to the relative importance and explanatory power of common culture. Furthermore, referring back to the first section above, the interaction of common culture with various economic variables shows that not only is common culture not overwhelmed by economic concerns, it is even more important in the formation of attitudes for those with low economic security and concerns about the national economy.

7.4 Conclusion

To summarize, based on these data from Jordan, it appears that host individuals’ attitudes toward Syrian refugees are impacted to a degree by economic factors, but not by all types of economic concerns. Specifically, evaluations of the national economy, resource competition, and perceptions that refugees compete with Jordanians for jobs and aid have varying degrees of influence on attitudes. Other economic measures don’t fare as well. On the social identity side, ethnicity, kinship, and nationality do not correlate with attitudes, but the perception of common culture between Jordanians and Syrian refugees is a strong, robust, and consistent predictor of attitudes toward refugees. On average, Jordanian respondents rely heavily on perceptions of shared cultural identity with refugees in the formation of attitudes, and this reliance only strengthens as resource availability and economic security decrease. In short, economic
concerns, competition, and perceptions matter, but shared cultural identity is a stronger predictor of attitudes than any economic variable.
8. CONCLUSION

8.1 Questions, Theory, and Data

During refugee crises, masses of refugees flee their homes and take refuge in neighboring host states. Some wind up in official camps, while others settle in host communities, with both scenarios imposing new social and economic interactions upon existing systems and structures. From this dynamic can emerge several outcomes, ranging from peaceful integration to economic competition to intergroup violence. The varying impacts of refugee inflows on host populations have been well documented, as have the varying outcomes of refugee crises. What is missing, though, is an understanding of how, at the individual level, the perceptions and experiences of host populations contribute to these observable outcomes. At the heart of the matter is the formation of individual attitudes which, when aggregated, help to shape macro-level interactions, policies, and outcomes during refugee crises.

The primary question addressed by this study concerns the formation of host attitudes toward refugees. More specifically, what are the individual-level economic and social factors that shape the attitudes of host populations toward refugees? This study has focused on two specific sets of variables, economic and social, which have been identified in the existing literature. What are the direct relationships of economic and social variables to attitudes? Which of these sets of variables are better predictors of attitudes? How do these two sets of variables interact and influence each other?
Social identity theory posits that individuals naturally identify and associate with one or more social groups, leading to bias toward group members and against those who are not part of a relevant social group. This basic categorization into “us” and “them” drives attitudes and orientations toward the out-group, and is reinforced by formal and informal boundaries, structures, and interactions. At the same time, more practical mechanisms come into play during refugee crises, with social ties and shared group identity facilitating productive refugee-host interaction through kinship networks, common language, cultural norms, and common social institutions.

This study identified four categorizations of social identity that may shape how host individuals perceive and interact with refugee populations. At the most particular level, kinship ties should provide the strongest bonds between hosts and refugees, positively shaping both attitudes and interactions. The same mechanisms are at play with shared ethnicity, though perhaps not as strongly or saliently. Common ethnicity between refugees and hosts should encourage more positive attitudes. At the same time, ethnicity may also provide a social structure for political and economic competition, which may lead to negative attitudes toward refugees with no ethnic ties to the host population. These negative attitudes should be strongest among the ethnic group perceiving the greatest threat from refugees. A third social categorization is national identification, which corresponds to state-level citizenship. Refugees are a natural out-group to host citizens, and the salience of national identification should negatively correlate with attitudes toward those refugees. Finally, host individuals may perceive common cultural identity with refugees, with this social connection moderating or even improving host attitudes.
Economics may also play a role in shaping host attitudes toward refugees. As refugees flow into a host state, individuals make instrumental calculations regarding how this influx impacts their personal and collective economic wellbeing. This may play out through the perception of economic threat or through actual negative impacts that are attributed to refugees. Alternatively, host individuals may make evaluations comparing their present economic condition to some past or ideal condition, through the mechanism of relative deprivation. Finally, hosts’ economic positions and conditions may place them in more direct competition with refugees, or at least increase their vulnerability to refugee-induced economic shocks. The expectation is that perceived threats, negative impacts, negative evaluations, and economic vulnerability should each correlate with more negative attitudes toward refugees.

In order to test these expectations, I generated data through a survey in Jordan in February of 2015. The survey focused on three governorates in northern Jordan and included 70 clusters from the 2004 Jordan national census as the primary sampling units (PSU). 10 households were selected within each PSU, with respondents randomly chosen within each household. Respondents were all adult Jordanian citizens. The survey included questions on attitudes toward refugees; economic position, perception, and evaluation; social identity and its salience; and a wide range of control variables.

8.2 Key Findings and Contributions

Though previous studies have found evidence that both economics and social identity matter in the formation of attitudes toward refugees, it is not enough to treat these as undifferentiated variables. One of the key contributions of this study is to identify and analyze

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57 Respondents were randomly selected, but gender was systematically decided to ensure fair representation.
the different aspects of both economic interaction and social identity as they relate to attitudes. In both areas, the complexity of both refugee-host interactions and host identities lead to difficulties in making sweeping, general statements regarding the formation of attitudes toward refugees. We can say in general that economic interaction and perception, as well as host identities, are important to attitudes. Beyond that, though, based on the differentiation provided by this study, we have a clearer picture of how, and in what ways, these contribute to attitudes.

Looking at economic position, based on the data from Jordan, there are few objective economic correlates to attitudes at the individual level. Those who are economically secure are no more likely to hold negative attitudes toward refugees. Income does not correlate with attitudes (Table 6-1), but neither do other socioeconomic status indicators such as education and employment (Table 6-2). The conclusion drawn from these data from Jordan is that personal economic circumstance and experience do not help explain variation in attitudes toward refugees.

This study found limited support for labor market competition theory, primarily in the correlation between attitudes and the perception that Syrian refugees take Jordanian jobs. The empirical results point to the importance of both perception and collective-level concerns regarding employment, with little evidence that labor-market position, personal experience, or individual characteristics drive attitudes toward refugees. Though 117 respondents reported having lost a job in the past year, these respondents do not, on average, express more negative attitudes toward Syrian refugees. At the same time, being unemployed and currently seeking a job not significantly differ from being employed full-time when it comes to one’s attitudes toward refugees (Figure 6-1).
The results offer some, but not much, evidence that experiencing greater economic competition is associated with poorer attitudes toward refugees. Individuals who experience either difficulty securing medical services or a decrease in water availability are more likely to express negative attitudes toward refugees, while at the same time an increase in rent has no effect on attitudes (Table 6-3, Model F). However, the effect size is small for both of these statistically significant relationships, suggesting that the explanatory power of these variables is relatively limited. Based on these results, we can say that economic competition matters from a statistical standpoint, but it does not have a large impact, on average, on the formation of attitudes toward refugees. Admittedly, economic competition may play out over a wide range of economic goods, including water, land, housing, jobs, services, food, and opportunity. This study has focused specifically on rent, medical services, and water, and revealed the relatively weak explanatory power of these variables, but it must be acknowledged that competition over other goods may prove better predictors of attitudes.

Those who received aid in the past year are no more likely to have better attitudes toward refugees, but receiving aid does have an effect on the attitudinal impact of the perception that refugees are favored in the distribution of aid. In other words, receiving aid doesn’t change one’s attitudes toward refugees, but it does exacerbate the negative effects of the perception of favoritism toward refugees (Table 6-4, Figure 6-2). Though the data do not speak to the question of why this relationship exists, one possibility is that the distribution of aid to host individuals triggers the salience of aid and, through this, the negative comparison to the perceived aid received by refugees.

This points to a broader pattern in the Jordan data, which suggests that perception of economic conditions and dynamics, particularly at the collective level, is closely associated with
attitudes toward refugees. For example, the perception that refugees take jobs is a better predictor of attitudes than objective measures of employment, such as employment status and history (Table 6-2). Similarly, the experience of having one’s rent increase does not affect one’s attitudes, but the belief that, in general, Syrians take Jordanian jobs has a strong negative effect on attitudes. Furthermore, the perception that Syrian refugees receive more aid than Jordanians has a strong effect on attitudes (Table 6-4). At the same time, receiving aid does not have a direct effect on attitudes, but may impact attitudes by triggering the salience of aid. These results mirror findings from the literature on attitudes toward immigration in developed countries, where sociotropic variables outperform personal economic concerns in predicting attitudes (Citrin et al 1997; Sides and Citrin 2007; see Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014 for a review of this literature). More distantly, the findings fit with theories and empirical results that suggest sociotropic concerns are more important than individual characteristics and contexts in shaping political actions such as vote choice (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981).

Multiple scholars have asserted, and in some cases have found evidence, that economic competition over scarce resources is a primary driver of tensions, animosity, and conflict between refugees and host populations (Loescher and Milner 2005; Pederson et al 2005; Coenders et al 2004; Rustenbach 2010). The data from Jordan, though, do not support the argument that actual economic competition contributes to poorer attitudes. Whether measured by individual host position or experience, the economic impact of the influx of refugees into Jordan is not consistently correlated with host attitudes. Rather, it is the perception of economic threat and favoritism that correlates with negative attitudes among hosts. The reality of economic competition, and whether one is poor, unemployed, or suffering economically, matters less than the belief that refugees pose an economic threat.
Scholars such as Chambers (1986), Whitaker (2002), and Kreibaum (2016) have shown that the economic impact of refugees varies with the socio-economic status of host individuals. The typical pattern is that host individuals who are economically vulnerable to shocks and resource competition experience disproportionate negative impacts from refugee inflows. Based on the evidence from the Jordan survey, the host individuals who should be expected to suffer most from the Syrian refugee influx (i.e., those with lower skill levels, economic vulnerability, and lower economic status) do not express significantly different attitudes toward refugees than do other Jordanians. This absence of an empirical connection between refugee impact and host attitudes has both theoretical and practical implications. Theoretically, it challenges the argument that objective economic impacts serve as a causal link that connects refugee inflows with host attitudes, and through those attitudes to observable outcomes. On a practical level, it questions the efficacy of policies aimed at mitigating the negative economic effects of refugee influxes on hosts who are less economically secure. To be sure, economic aid to vulnerable populations and marginalized communities is in itself a worthy endeavor. The Jordan data suggest, however, that such aid may not contribute to better host attitudes toward, and by extension more positive host interactions with, refugee populations. To the contrary, there is evidence that the very act of a host receiving aid triggers negative comparisons to refugees, though the reason for this is not clear.

Finally, the results of this study raise questions about the relative impacts of economic experience and economic perceptions. Most studies that look at refugee-host interactions in developing states focus on the economic impacts of refugees on host populations, and the associated competition and tensions between these two groups. Economic impact is often assumed to drive attitudes and interactions, yet few studies deliver empirical evidence to support
this assumption at the individual level. Analysis of the Jordan data offers very little evidence that objective personal economic experience is related to host attitudes toward Syrian refugees. Instead, the data point to the relative importance of individual perceptions and evaluations of economic threat and competition, particularly at the macro (national) level. Evaluation of the national economy is a much better individual-level predictor of host attitudes than is personal retrospective economic evaluation (Tables 7-2 and 7-3), but both variables outperform objective economic competition and position indicators.

Turning to social variables, this study differentiated four social identities – kinship, ethnicity, national identity, and culture – and explored how each relates to host attitudes toward refugees. Overall, the empirical results were mixed. While kinship ties to Syrian refugees do not correlate with attitudes toward Syrian refugees as a whole, the data hint that East Bank Jordanians may have, on average, poorer attitudes toward Syrian refugees. This relationship, though, is not consistently estimated with any degree of certainty. In most models that include ethnicity as an explanatory or control variable, the coefficients for East Bank Jordanian are negative, but the statistical significance of these coefficients is not consistent.58 Hypotheses 5 and 6 (Chapter 5) suggested that the host ethnic group perceiving the greatest economic or political threat should hold more negative attitudes toward Syrian refugees, but this is not the case. I hypothesized that East Bank Jordanians are more likely than Palestinian Jordanians to perceive a political threat from the influx of Syrian refugees, but statistical tests of the data show that there is no consistent difference in attitudes between the two ethnic groups. Given these results, and given that the Jordanian survey captures no measurable ethnic ties between

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58 The primary exception comes from Table 6-3, Model E, where the coefficient for *East Bank Jordanian* is positive and statistically significant. *East Bank Jordanian* is also statistically significant in the models (A-C) specified in Table 7-1.
Jordanians and Syrian refugees, the data do not shed much light on the role of either shared or discrete ethnic identity in the formation of host attitudes toward refugees.

Similarly, the degree to which individuals express pride in their Jordanian identity (national identity) has no relationship to their attitudes toward refugees. In Table 5-5, the coefficients for national identity are insignificant, both statistically and in terms of their relative size. Pride in being Jordanian, an exclusive identity, was hypothesized to correlate with poorer attitudes, but this is not supported by the data. Based on the empirical results, national pride has no direct effect on attitudes, but instead plays a role in partially offsetting the positive effects of the perception of common culture, a point to which I return below.

This leads to the strongest, most consistent empirical result from the Jordan survey. Host individuals who perceive that Jordanians and Syrian refugees share a common culture are much more likely to view those refugees in a favorable light. This result is robust to multiple model specifications and the inclusion of several key control variables. Perception of common culture with Syrian refugees is by far the best predictor of a respondent’s attitudes toward those refugees.

One interesting observation is that the social identity variable that has the greatest impact on attitudes (common culture) is also the broadest, most encompassing identity. Placing all four social identity variables on a spectrum from most particular to most general, kinship is the most narrowly defined. Ethnicity and national identity fall in the middle, and culture is the most broadly defined. One possibility is that kinship, which does not perform well in the empirical analysis, does matter in the development of attitudes, but only toward those the respondents identify as kin. Similarly, though the empirical analysis of this study focuses on the differences in ethnic identity between refugees and hosts, a key (and unanswered) question is whether any
positive effects of shared ethnicity on attitudes extend beyond co-ethnic refugees. The dependent variable in this study, attitudes toward Syrian refugees, treats refugees as an undifferentiated group. The conclusion that kinship doesn’t matter in the formation of attitudes toward refugees is therefore not supported by the data. A more measured conclusion is that any positive attitudes that host individuals may hold or express toward refugees with whom they share kinship ties do not necessarily extend to all refugees. A host individual may welcome refugee kin and at the same time express negative attitudes toward refugees as an undifferentiated whole.

Cultural identity, on the other hand, is not clearly delineated, and can transcend kinship, ethnic, and national identities. In the case of Jordan, possible elements of shared culture involve Pan-Arab sentiments, shared religion, and historical interactions, and the perception of shared culture is not specific to a particular subgroup, either Jordanian or Syrian. The wording of the survey questions frames both the dependent variable (attitudes) and shared identity (common culture) in terms of Syrian refugees as an undifferentiated group. With shared kinship, the referent group for attitudes is not the same as the social identity groups, and the non-significant results of the empirical analysis suggest that individuals’ attitudes toward a specific social group do not necessarily transfer to a higher order, more general group.

Two further results merit discussion. As noted above, common culture and national pride work in opposite directions. Though the direct effects of national pride on attitudes are negligible (Table 5-5, Model A), there is evidence that a higher degree of national pride can partially offset the positive effects of perceived common culture (Table 5-6, Model G). This result points to the complexity of social identity. Individuals may hold multiple social identities
at any given time, with varying degrees of salience, which may provoke conflicting attitudinal responses toward other people or groups.

Secondly, the effects of common culture on attitudes are different for urban and rural respondents. Though the effects are positive for both, urban dwellers on average rely less on perceptions of common culture to shape their attitudes toward refugees (Table 5-7, Model G). I previously posed a potential explanation for why this is so, suggesting that rural residents may place more importance on traditional social ties and affinities as part of their socio-economic structures and interactions.

Finally, this study examined the interactive relationship of social and economic variables. In the first part of this study, I focused on the direct influence of social and economic variables, in isolation from each other, on attitudes toward refugees. The data from Jordan show that both sets of variables are correlated with attitudes, with common culture the dominant social identity variable, and evaluation and perception measures the best economic predictors of host orientations toward Syrian refugees. In Chapter 7, I examined the interactions and interplay of these two sets of variables, seeking to establish firstly how they interact with each other, and secondly, the relative explanatory and predictive power of both.

Beginning with the second question, the Jordan data point to common culture as the strongest predictor of attitudes toward refugees, even when modeled together with economic variables. Looking at the various models presented in Chapter 7, what is clear is that common culture has a consistently significant and strong effect on attitudes, outperforming the strongest economic variables combined. Of those economic variables, three indicators performed well, even with common culture responsible for much of the variation in attitudes. National economic evaluations, and the perceptions that refugees take Jordanian jobs and are responsible for rising
housing costs all correlate with attitudes toward refugees, with each accounting for some of the variation in attitudes. All three of these variables are evaluative or perceptual, grounded in cognition rather than experience. Objective variables such as economic competition and position did not perform well, either not attaining statistical significance or having a negligible effect on attitudes.

The interactions of common culture and both income sufficiency and national economic evaluation (Table 7-1, Models B and C) challenge the idea that social identity matters only so far as one’s economic circumstances and outlook are positive. While both economic (income sufficiency and national economic evaluation) and social (common culture) variables are related to host attitudes, social identity is a stronger predictor of attitudes, one that is not diminished by changes in economic condition. In fact, the perception of common culture has a greater impact on one’s attitudes as income sufficiency decreases and sociotropic economic concerns increase.

Theoretically, these results are difficult to explain. The evidence provides some support for an informational argument in that shared identity could offer evaluative shortcuts for those whose socio-economic status serves as a proxy for cognitive resources. As shown in Table 6-5, Model N, national economic evaluations are better predictors of attitudes at lower levels of cognitive ability (as roughly measured by years of education). In reality, though, the answer...
might lie in the value that Jordanians place on social ties, affinities, and obligations, to the extent that social identities outweigh instrumental calculations in the formation of attitudes and orientations toward refugees. This raises the issue of the unbalanced body of research into attitudes during refugee crises. While scholars have generated a wide array of case studies and observations about the interaction of hosts and refugees in countries of first asylum, most of the empirical testing has been conducted Western contexts, with theoretical assumptions derived from Western experience. This is not to say that these theories are not useful, but rather that they may fail to capture important social dynamics and affinities that are either missing or latent in Western countries, or unique to non-Western countries.

This is not to say that results from Western contexts are monolithically economic in nature. As noted in Chapter 2, studies on attitudes toward immigrants in Western states have returned mixed results that tend to cluster geographically. The relatively strong performance of shared culture in the Jordan models aligns most with findings from Europe (Sides and Citrin 2007; Sniderman et al 2004), which point to the primacy of social variables when modeled together with economic factors.59 At the same time, the Jordan results contradict evidence from Australia (Schweitzer et al 2005), while North American studies have returned inconsistent evidence (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Harell et al 2012).

Returning to the original research question of this study, how do individual-level economic and social factors relate to the attitudes of host populations toward refugees? Based on the evidence from analysis of the Jordan survey data, both sets of variables matter in the formation of host attitudes. Host individuals do rely on economic evaluations, but these are not based on individual economic condition or experience. The economic impacts of refugee

59 These studies precede the mass refugee movements, primarily but not exclusively of Middle Eastern origin, that threatened to overwhelm Europe in 2015-2016.
inflows, which have been shown to vary according to the economic position of host individuals (Buscher and Vlassenroot 2010; Whitaker 2002), do not necessarily correlate with the attitudes of hosts toward refugees. Instead, host individuals are more likely to base their attitudes toward refugees on perception and evaluation of the macro-level economic impact of refugees. In other words, it is not economic self-interest that drives attitudes toward refugees, but rather sociotropic economic evaluations as well as perceptions of relative deprivation that shape attitudes.

The evidence also suggests that social identity plays a significant role in the formation of host attitudes, particularly at the broadest, most encompassing level. A perception of common culture between host and refugees is the strongest predictor of attitudes toward refugees, outweighing all other variables, whether economic or social. Host individuals tend to rely on a sense of common social identity, defined in broad cultural terms, in shaping their orientations toward refugees. On the other end of the spectrum, particularistic kinship ties do not strongly influence attitudes toward refugees in general, suggesting that the relative size of the referent group (kinship vs culture) is a determinative factor in attitude formation toward refugees as a whole.

8.3 Key Policy Implications

At the practical level, this study speaks directly to the development and implementation of refugee and immigration policies. The ultimate goal of this study to gain a better understanding of the dynamics of attitude formation in refugee crises so that policies and interventions may be designed in such a way that refugee-host interactions foster positive and productive outcomes.
Wilkes et al (2008) point out that if attitudes toward immigration are dependent on economic factors, governments can implement economic policies that alleviate concerns of and impacts on hosts. The same may be said for refugee crises; as noted in Chapter 1, economic problems prompt economic solutions. Given the results of the Jordan empirical analysis, however, it is unclear whether and how specific economic policies would improve attitudes to any substantial degree. Previous studies, primarily focused on the Western experience, have provided evidence that there are individual-level economic correlates to attitudes toward refugees, with various studies highlighting labor market position, skill level, income, and education (Pederson et al 2005; Coenders et al 2004; Rustenbach 2010). Furthermore, in developing countries, it is well-established that the economic impact of refugee flows varies across both individuals and groups of individuals (Lesailly-Jacob 1993; Maystadt and Verwimp 2009; Buscher and Vlassenroot 2010; Codjoe et al 2013).

The empirical results in the previous chapters provide counterpoints to both of these literature streams. First, contrary to much of the Western-focused literature, data from Jordan reveal very little correlation between economic characteristics of individuals and their attitudes toward refugees. Labor market position, labor market experience, education, income, and income sufficiency have practically no impact on Jordanian attitudes toward refugees (Tables 6-1 and 6-2). Second, while there are measurable economic impacts of refugee flows on different individuals and groups, these impacts do not necessarily translate into large variation in attitudes toward refugees. For example, in Jordan, there is considerable variation not only in economic status, but in negative economic impacts in the areas of resources, services, and prices. While water availability and difficulty securing medical services are correlated with attitudes, the impact of these variables is small and neither is a significant driver of attitudes. For all other
variables capturing economic competition and impact, the empirical analyses suggest no relationship with attitudes toward refugees.

The counterpoint to Wilkes et al (2008) is that, if economic factors are not a primary driver of attitudes, economic policies may not, in isolation, lead to better refugee-host interactions. The accepted wisdom of both policy-makers and non-government actors is that refugee influxes must be managed in such a way as to minimize economic competition, and that economic aid and development must be balanced between refugees and host communities. The data from Jordan suggest the insufficiency of these distributional policies in moderating host attitudes toward refugees. To repeat, there is little evidence from this study that, at the individual level, objective economic circumstances or experience markedly impact host attitudes toward refugees. Policies that promote the economic well-being of host populations might therefore have little to no effect on host attitudes toward refugees. Furthermore, the very act of channeling aid toward host populations might trigger negative comparisons to refugee aid, negatively affecting the way hosts view those refugees. As previously pointed out, emergency relief and development aid are necessary during refugee crises. The challenge comes not only in how these goods are distributed, but in the flow of information and the underlying narratives that accompany them.

The data from Jordan indicate that, in the area of economics, perception matters more than objective personal condition. If this is the case, the implications for policy are concerning. Some of the strongest economic indicators (perception of collective labor market threat, perception that refugees drive up housing costs, perception that refugees are favored in the distribution of aid) are also the most susceptible to misinformation and manipulation by elites. During refugee influxes, political leaders are under pressure to address both the economic and
social stresses associated with the crisis. As previously noted, however, economic difficulties often precede refugee inflows, with refugees exacerbating the situation. Political elites may find it difficult to alter objective economic circumstances, particularly if economic woes precede the refugee crisis and economic resources fall short of needs. On the other hand, leaders can have a major influence on perception, and by extension attitudes, through narratives, scape-goating, and framing.

The good news is that perceptions can be changed for the better with good information and productive narratives, even when governments have ulterior motives in shaping public perceptions and attitudes. In Pakistan during the 1980’s, the government framed the influx of Afghan refugees around the narrative of common religion, emphasizing a shared Islamic identity to encourage hospitality and local integration of Afghans. Though the government used these refugees to advance its national interest, the end result was peaceful, productive interaction between hosts and refugees (Grare 2003).

The bad news is that perceptions can be manipulated for the worse. The problem is that political elites from opposite ends of the spectrum can influence perceptions, and by extension attitudes, in both directions, depending on their specific agendas. Returning to the question of policy, scape-goating is sometimes easier than addressing economic concerns, and information manipulation is often an attractive alternative to trying to implement actual policies, good or bad, with insufficient resources. Ultimately, for refugee-host interactions, it is not the motivation behind elite framing of narratives, but whether or not such narratives encourage conflict or productive interaction between hosts and refugees.

The data show that social identity matters in the formation of host attitudes toward refugees. While shared kinship and national identification are not strong correlates of attitudes, a
perception of common culture with refugees is perhaps the greatest predictor of host attitudes. A key point is that the strongest correlation is at the broadest, most encompassing, and most inclusive conceptualization of the in-group. Applying this to policy, it is important that policy-makers understand the different possible levels of common identity, and that policies and narratives be crafted to emphasize the broadest level of salient shared identity. Efforts to emphasize common social identity at the particular, sub-national level may not be effective in influencing overall attitudes toward refugees, since positive attitudes toward kin or co-ethnics may not transfer to refugees as a whole. Instead, elites would be better advised to highlight broad commonalities between host populations and refugees, such as religion, culture, and shared historical ties and experiences. At the same time, it is important to deemphasize state-level national identities, a more difficult undertaking for states in the process of nation-building. While this present study found no direct relationship between national pride and attitudes, there is evidence that greater attachment to national identity can partially offset the positive effects of the perception of common culture on attitudes toward refugees. Nation-building during refugee crises may prove to be counterproductive to efforts to effect peaceful, productive refugee-host interactions.

8.4 Limitations of Present Study

Though this study has offered several important contributions to our understanding of host-refugee attitudes and interactions, it is important to recognize its limitations, particularly in regard to the extent to which the results can be generalized. This study relies on data from a single case (Jordan during the Syrian refugee crisis), with unique characteristics and dynamics,

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60 In the context of Jordan, the data do not speak to the importance of shared ethnicity, given the lack of shared ethnic identity with refugees.
and the results must be treated with caution when applied outside of this case. At the same time, Jordan shares many common factors with other refugee-hosting countries in the developing world. Jordan is a country of first asylum for a mass influx of refugees from a bordering conflict; it is in the mid-lower tier of economic development, with associated capacity challenges; and it is in the process of state and nation building. Despite its unique context, Jordan is in many ways representative of other developing states of first asylum for mass refugee flows, and as such the results of this survey may contribute to a theoretical and practical understanding of host attitudes in those contexts.

At the same time, the Jordan survey data are not representative of Jordan as a whole. While the primary sampling units were randomly selected, governorates (Irbid, Zarqa, and Mafraq) were purposefully selected based on proximity to the border, population, urban/rural nature, and Syrian refugee population. The Jordan survey data are representative of these three governorates, but are not necessarily representative of all Jordanian citizens.

Another factor to consider is the temporal nature of the data. The Jordan survey represents attitudes during the time of the survey, and as such cannot tell us anything about the temporal factors that may impact host attitudes toward refugees. This represents a fundamental challenge in our understanding of host-refugee attitudes and interactions, since over time both contexts and orientations may change. For example, multiple studies point to changing attitudes over time, with early receptiveness based on social identity and hospitality eventually giving way to friction based on cognitive comparisons and instrumental calculations (Vogelsang 2017; Kibreab 1985). In support of this, Banki (2004, 15) points out that “in Nepal and Pakistan, and

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61 Households were systematically selected within each primary sampling unit to ensure broad representation and to minimize interclass correlation within each PSU. Individuals were randomly selected within each household, but males and females were systematically selected to ensure proportional gender representation.
to a lesser extent in Kenya, the longer refugees have remained in the host country, the more likely they are to be integrated. All other factors being equal, refugees integrate over time. However, there is a caveat to this general statement: when the size of a refugee population increases over time (which is not infrequent as conflicts escalate), host communities are often overwhelmed and feel that their resources are threatened.” Temporal considerations add a degree of complexity that is not captured by the data from the Jordan survey.

The Jordan survey also does not distinguish between different categories and groups of refugees. The survey poses questions in reference to Syrian refugees as an undifferentiated mass. While this provides a degree of clarity and simplicity to the survey questions, and provides important insights into refugee-host attitudes, it does not measure variation in each respondent’s attitudes in reference to subgroups of Syrian refugees. The implication is that, while the data are sufficient to provide a test of the hypotheses formulated in this study, important nuance is lost in the inability to specify these subgroups as referents. For example, the role of kinship in shaping attitudes toward refugees is not empirically supported by the data, but this may be a function of the coarseness of the data. Kinship may play a different role when applied to smaller groups of kin within the broader mass of refugees. Similarly, ethnicity, economic competition, and economic position may shape attitudes in more nuanced ways when applied to subgroups of refugees.

Importantly, the analyses in this study do not effectively deal with the issue of causality. The economic and social variables discussed in previous chapters cannot be proven to be determinants of host attitudes toward refugees, based on the quantitative methods used to analyze the data. Where there is a statistical relationship, variables are definitely correlates, but not necessarily determinants, of attitudes. The nature of causality requires not only a degree of
covariation, but also time ordering of variables. Several of the variables studied here are naturally time ordered in relation to attitudes toward refugees. For example, social variables such as kinship, ethnicity, and national identity precede the refugee crisis, as do control variables such as gender, education, and age. None of these variables, though, are good predictors of attitudes. A perception of common culture with Syrian refugees is potentially endogenous to the refugee crisis. The same can be said for most of the economic variables, especially given the theoretical arguments regarding both objective economic impact and instrumental evaluations during refugee crises. Finally, though this study has identified key correlations and relationships between attitudes toward refugees and both economic and social variables, it is possible that some variables not included in the analyses are driving these results. This study focused primarily on economic and social variables, while controlling for inter-group contact, socio-demographics, and political interest. Other factors, such as concerns for security and the manipulation of information, may be driving the results returned through the analyses in previous chapters, further complicating the issue of causality.

8.5 Suggestions for Future Research

The limitations detailed above present both a challenge and an opportunity. The limitations have been sufficiently addressed, but the present study has also identified several avenues for future research. Foremost among these is the need to expand this research to other countries experiencing refugee crises. This study has attempted to articulate and contribute to a general theoretical model of host attitudes toward refugees in developing countries, while the data used for the empirical analysis is specific to Jordan. Though analysis of this data contributes to our overall understanding of attitude formation, more testing is needed in different
contexts. To date, a serious limitation has been the lack of suitable data for testing, and while the Jordan survey offers a significant step forward in the availability of data, more effort needs to be given to data generation in other countries. Based on the current study, we cannot say with certainty whether the key findings can be generalized to other contexts, and only further country-specific and multi-country data generation can address this question.

Based on the challenge detailed in the previous section, future research should explore if, and under what conditions, the positive effects of shared social identity extend beyond the specific in-group. In this study, the positive effects of shared identity are only seen where hosts perceive a common cultural identity with refugees, which is the most general and inclusive categorization of shared identity. At the other end of the spectrum, shared family ties are particularistic in nature, and any positive attitudinal impact may be directed solely to those refugees within the family group. Questions remain regarding how, and under what conditions, shared social identity extends beyond the referent in-group.

Empirical results from the present study strongly indicate that perception is more important than objective economic circumstances in shaping host attitudes toward refugees. This suggests the need for further research in two areas. Firstly, we must increase our understanding of elite manipulation of information, framing, and scapegoating during refugee crises, augmented by experimental work on positive framing and narratives. If attitudes are to a great degree dependent on the both the flow of and cognitive processing of information, more scholarly work needs to focus on the various narratives offered by host governments, international aid organizations, and community influencers. Secondly, questions remain regarding the mechanisms by which information is received, processed, and converted into attitudes during
refugee crises, particularly given the influences of experience, economic competition, and social identity on attitude formation in these contexts.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Descriptive Statistics

Table A-1: Descriptive Statistics for Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min. Value</th>
<th>Max. Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>age</td>
<td>Age in years</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>40.04</td>
<td>14.99</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aid</td>
<td>Received aid in past year</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0 (652)</td>
<td>1 (48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>argument</td>
<td>Argument with Syrian in past year</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0 (613)</td>
<td>1 (87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attitudes</td>
<td>Attitudinal scale</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>-3.43</td>
<td>3.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>common culture</td>
<td>Perception of common culture</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Bank Jordanian</td>
<td>East Bank Jordanian</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0 (195)</td>
<td>1 (505)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>employed</td>
<td>Employed (full- or part-time)</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0 (445)</td>
<td>1 (253)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>employment status</td>
<td>Employment status</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>4.21</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>encounter Syrians</td>
<td>How often encounter Syrians</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enough income</td>
<td>Sufficiency of household income</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>family married Syrian</td>
<td>Family member married Syrian</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0 (624)</td>
<td>1 (76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income</td>
<td>Level of household income</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lost job</td>
<td>Lost job in last year</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0 (583)</td>
<td>1 (117)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>male</td>
<td>Male gender</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0 (350)</td>
<td>1 (350)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>medical difficult</td>
<td>Difficulty securing medical services over past year</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0 (479)</td>
<td>1 (221)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>national economic evaluation</td>
<td>National economic evaluation</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
<td>Min. Value</td>
<td>Max. Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>national pride</td>
<td>Pride in Jordanian identity</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number Syrian neighbors</td>
<td>Number of Syrians in neighborhood</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>personal economic evaluation</td>
<td>Personal economic evaluation</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>refugees more aid</td>
<td>Perception that refugees receive more aid than Jordanians</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>refugees take jobs</td>
<td>Perception that refugees take Jordanian jobs</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rent increase</td>
<td>Change in rent over past year</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>retrospective economic evaluation</td>
<td>Retrospective economic evaluation (3yrs)</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian family</td>
<td>Syrian family member</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0 (662)</td>
<td>1 (38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urban</td>
<td>Urban location</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0 (150)</td>
<td>1 (550)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>water</td>
<td>Change in water supply over past year</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>years education</td>
<td>Years formal education</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>10.88</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2: Additional Crosstabs For Chapter 5

Table A-2: Difficulty Securing Medical Care by Ethnic Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Bank Jordanian</td>
<td>350 (69%)</td>
<td>155 (31%)</td>
<td>505 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>125 (67%)</td>
<td>62 (33%)</td>
<td>187 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4 (50%)</td>
<td>4 (50%)</td>
<td>8 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>479 (68%)</td>
<td>221 (32%)</td>
<td>700 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson chi2(2) = 1.6550  Pr = 0.437

Table A-3: Job Loss by Ethnic Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Bank Jordanian</td>
<td>420 (83%)</td>
<td>85 (17%)</td>
<td>505 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>157 (84%)</td>
<td>30 (16%)</td>
<td>187 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6 (75%)</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>8 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>583 (83%)</td>
<td>117 (17%)</td>
<td>698 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson chi2(2) = 0.4601  Pr = 0.794

Table A-4: Personal Economic Evaluation by Ethnic Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Very Bad</th>
<th>Bad</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Very Good</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Bank Jordanian</td>
<td>78 (15%)</td>
<td>140 (28%)</td>
<td>271 (54%)</td>
<td>16 (3%)</td>
<td>505 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>27 (14%)</td>
<td>48 (26%)</td>
<td>104 (56%)</td>
<td>8 (4%)</td>
<td>187 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>4 (50%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>8 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>107 (15%)</td>
<td>190 (27%)</td>
<td>379 (54%)</td>
<td>24 (3%)</td>
<td>700 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson chi2(6) = 1.7053  Pr = 0.945

Note: Individual cell percentages may not match totals due to rounding.
Appendix 3: Survey Instrument

Survey of Jordanian Attitudes Toward Syrian Refugees

**Information/Consent**
Hello, my name is ______________. I am from _____________. We are conducting a survey on the opinions of adult citizens in Jordan concerning the Syrian refugee situation. This survey is conducted by taking a sample of representative and random households in _________ governorate. Every household in this governorate has a chance of being included in this study, and your household has been randomly selected. The survey will take approximately 30 minutes, and will involve questions about you and your opinions concerning various topics. All information collected in the survey will be used only for academic research purposes and will be kept absolutely confidential. We will not collect any personally identifiable information, and you may choose to not answer any question.

Are you willing to participate in this study?
1. Yes
2. No
* If “No”, end the interview.

Are you a Jordanian Citizen?
1. Yes
2. No
9. No response
* If not a Jordanian citizen, or no response, end the interview.

1. What is your age?
   _____ Write down actual age.
999. No response
* If under 18 years of age, end the interview.

2. Gender
   1. Male
   2. Female

3. How many years of formal education have you completed?
   _____ Write down number of years.
99. No response

4. What is your marital status?
   1. Single/not married
   2. Married
   9. No response
5. How would you describe your religious identity?
   1. Sunni Muslim
   2. Shi’ite Muslim
   3. Christian
   4. Druze
   5. Other
   9. No response

6. Where is your family originally from?
   1. Jordan
   2. Palestine
   3. Iraq
   4. Syria
   5. Lebanon
   6. Other
   9. No response

7. What is your employment status?
   1. Employed full time
   2. Employed part time
   3. Retired
   4. Student
   5. Unemployed but not seeking a job
   6. Unemployed and seeking a job
   9. No response

8. Have you or someone in your family lost a job in the past year?
   1. Yes
   2. No
   9. No response

9. Is the home you live in…?
   1. Owned by you or your family
   2. Rented
   3. Owned with mortgage payments to a bank
   4. Other
   9. No response

10. If your home is rented, has the amount you pay in rent increased, decreased, or stayed the same in the past year?
    1. Increased
    2. Stayed same
    3. Decreased
    4. Not rented
    9. No response
11. I will read you some statements related to your household income. Which of these statements comes closest to describing your household income?
   1. Our household income covers our expenses well and we are able to save.
   2. Our household income covers our expenses without notable difficulties.
   3. Our household income does not cover our expenses and we face some difficulties in meeting our needs.
   4. Our household income does not cover our expenses and we face significant difficulties in meeting our needs.
   9. No response

12. In considering all income from all members of your household, what is your total household income each month?
   1. Less than 300 JD
   2. Between 300 and 500 JD
   3. Between 501 and 700 JD
   4. Between 701 and 1000 JD
   5. Between 1001 and 1300 JD
   6. More than 1300 JD
   9. No response

13. Have you received any aid from charitable organizations or from the government in the past year?
   1. Yes
   2. No
   9. No response

14. How would you evaluate the current economic situation in your country?
   1. Very good
   2. Good
   3. Bad
   4. Very bad
   9. No response

15. How would you evaluate the current economic situation of your family?
   1. Very good
   2. Good
   3. Bad
   4. Very Bad
   9. No response
16. How would you compare your current personal economic situation to your economic situation 3 years ago?
   1. Much better than 3 years ago
   2. Better than 3 years ago
   3. Same as 3 years ago
   4. Worse than 3 years ago
   5. Much worse than 3 years ago
   9. No response

17. Has the amount of water available to your household increased, decreased, or remained the same in the past year?
   1. Increased
   2. Stayed the same
   3. Decreased
   9. No response

18. Have you or anyone in your family had difficulty in getting or paying for medical care in the past year?
   1. Yes
   2. No
   9. No response

19. Do you have any family members (father, mother, uncle, aunt, cousin, nephew, niece) who live in, or are from Syria?
   1. Yes
   2. No
   9. No response

20. Do you have any family members (father, mother, uncle, aunt, cousin, nephew, niece) who are married to a Syrian?
   1. Yes
   2. No
   9. No response

21. Do you have any close friends who are Syrian?
   1. Yes
   2. No
   9. No response

22. How many Syrian refugees, if any, live in your neighborhood?
   1. None
   2. A few
   3. Some
   4. Many
   9. No response
23. Do you think that Syrian refugees should be allowed to live in your neighborhood?
   1. Yes
   2. No
   9. Declined to answer

24. How often do you encounter Syrian refugees?
   1. Never
   2. At least once a month
   3. At least once a week
   4. At least once a day
   9. No response

25. In the past year, have you had an argument or a confrontation with a person from Syria?
   1. No
   2. Yes
   9. No response

26. In general, how proud are you to be a Jordanian citizen?
   1. Very proud
   2. Proud
   3. Not very proud
   4. Not proud at all
   9. No response

27. In general, to what extent are you interested in politics?
   1. Very interested.
   2. Interested.
   3. Slightly interested.
   9. No response

28. Are you a member of a political party?
   1. Yes
   2. No
   9. No response

29. Are you a member of a charitable society?
   1. Yes
   2. No
   9. No response

30. Are you a member of a professional association or trade union?
   1. Yes
   2. No
   9. No response
31. Are you a member of a cultural, sports, or community association?
   1. Yes
   2. No
   9. No response

32. Are you a member of a cooperative association?
   1. Yes
   2. No
   9. No response

33. How often do you pray daily?
   1. Always
   2. Most of the time
   3. Sometimes
   4. Rarely
   9. No response

34. How often do you attend Friday prayer/Sunday services?
   1. Always
   2. Most of the time
   3. Sometimes
   4. Rarely
   9. No response

35. In general, how much do you trust people from your neighborhood?
   1. Trust completely
   2. Trust somewhat
   3. Do not trust very much
   4. Do not trust at all
   9. No response

36. In general, how much do you trust your fellow Jordanians?
   1. Trust completely
   2. Trust somewhat
   3. Do not trust very much
   4. Do not trust at all
   9. No response

37. In general, how much do you trust Syrian refugees?
   1. Trust completely
   2. Trust somewhat
   3. Do not trust very much
   4. Do not trust at all
   9. No response
38. To what extent do you follow political news in Jordan?
   1. To a great extent
   2. To a medium extent
   3. To a limited extent
   4. I don’t follow political news at all
   9. No response

39. From where do you get most of your news?
   1. Newspaper
   2. Television
   3. Radio
   4. Internet
   5. Social media
   6. Talking with other people
   9. No response

40. How many Syrian refugees do you think are in Jordan currently?
   1. Less than 200,000
   2. Between 200,000 and 500,000
   3. Between 500,000 and 1 million
   4. Between 1 million and 2 million
   5. More than 2 million
   9. No response

41. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Jordan should not allow any more refugees to enter the country from Syria.”
   1. Strongly agree
   2. Agree
   3. Disagree
   4. Strongly disagree
   9. No response

42. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “It is acceptable for Jordanian men to marry Syrian refugee women.”
   1. Strongly agree
   2. Agree
   3. Disagree
   4. Strongly disagree
   9. No response
43. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Syrian refugees take jobs from Jordanian citizens.”
   1. Strongly agree
   2. Agree
   3. Disagree
   4. Strongly disagree
   9. No response

44. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Syrian refugees and Jordanian citizens share a common culture.”
   1. Strongly agree
   2. Agree
   3. Disagree
   4. Strongly disagree
   9. No response

45. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Syrian refugee children should be allowed to attend Jordanian schools.”
   1. Strongly agree
   2. Agree
   3. Disagree
   4. Strongly disagree
   9. No response

46. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Syrian refugees receive more aid than Jordanian citizens.”
   1. Strongly agree
   2. Agree
   3. Disagree
   4. Strongly disagree
   9. No response

47. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Syrian refugees are responsible for higher cost of housing in Jordan.”
   1. Strongly agree
   2. Agree
   3. Disagree
   4. Strongly disagree
   9. No response
48. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Syrian refugees should be allowed to work in Jordan.”
   1. Strongly agree
   2. Agree
   3. Disagree
   4. Strongly disagree
   9. No response

49. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Jordanians have a duty to welcome refugees from Syria.”
   1. Strongly agree
   2. Agree
   3. Disagree
   4. Strongly disagree
   9. No response
VITA

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Education

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Master of Arts (1997) in International Relations, Baylor University, Waco, TX.

Bachelor of Arts (1996) in History, Mississippi College, Clinton, MS.

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Graduate Teacher, Department of Political Science, University of Mississippi (2014).

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