Mandated representation: the effect of legislative gender quotas on attitudes toward gender equality

Rustin Suray

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MANDATED REPRESENTATION:
THE EFFECT OF LEGISLATIVE GENDER QUOTAS ON ATTITUDES TOWARD GENDER EQUALITY

A Thesis
presented in partial fulfillment of requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts
in the Department of Political Science
The University of Mississippi

by
RUSTIN SURAY
August 2019
ABSTRACT

Do gender quotas actually change attitudes toward gender equality? Research suggests that quotas influence gender norms, but very little work has looked at whether individual attitudes themselves change when gender quotas are enacted. This paper attempts to fill this void by studying the relationship between quota implementation and gender attitudes at a cross-national level using longitudinal survey data from the World Values Survey in a two-level random intercept multi-level model. This type of model is appropriate because it does not assume that individual observations in the data are independent from one another. The individual respondents from the WVS data are nested within specific countries and years and thus do not constitute independent observations. My results show a statistically significant negative relationship between implemented gender quotas and positive gender equality attitudes. This outcome does not reflect an unimportant relationship between quota implementation and gender attitudes but implies missing components. I conclude by discussing the importance of international influence to future research.
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to everyone who provided moral, spiritual, and emotional comfort during this enlightening yet stressful journey.

To Dr. Susan Haynes, who convinced me that I would excel in graduate school.

To Ethan Bennett, for challenging my ideas and keeping me on my toes.

To my family, for inspiring and supporting my dreams.

And to the Department of Political Science—I will cherish the relationships I have formed.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my deepest appreciation to my advisor, Dr. Yael Zeira and my committee members, Drs. Greg Love and Susan Allen, for all their help and advice. Dr. Zeira’s endless encouragement was a needed constant in finishing this project.

I would also like to thank the Department of Political Science, especially Dr. John Winburn, for its support and financial assistantship in helping me pursue my scholarly interests.

Finally, I would like to thank my fellow political science students and teachers for pushing my thought processes to new levels. Thank you for your encouragement, constructive criticism, spirited debate, and loads of fun.
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1. INTRODUCTION

There is a growing body of literature discussing the role and importance of gender quotas in many countries. Over 130 countries have enacted some form of gender quotas, ranging from designated seats to a percentage of political party candidates (QAROT). Most existing literature focuses on the use of gender quotas to change the status quo of political institutions, such as women’s movements, or party strategy (Beckwith 2003; Caul 2001). Furthermore, a few known case studies have looked at quotas’ effects on gender attitudes (Meier 2008; Burnet 2008; Zetterberg 2008; Beaman et. al. 2008). However, to the best of my knowledge, no research has systematically examined the relationship between the implementation of gender quotas and attitudes toward gender equality at a cross-national level. It is my goal to help close this gap in the literature by exploring this relationship. I hypothesize that the presence of gender quotas should be associated with an increase in popular support for gender equality.

To investigate this relationship, I will estimate a two-level random intercept multi-level model looking at gender equality attitudes in countries from the years 1947-2015, which is the time span available for quota measurement. By using a multi-level model, I am able to estimate the mean and variance of the intercepts by country and year. This type of model is appropriate because it does not assume that individual observations in the data are independent from one another but are nested within specific countries. I use survey data from the World Values Survey to code my dependent variable and QAROT quota data to code my independent variable. My analysis finds a statistically significant negative relationship between the implementation of gender quotas and attitudes toward gender equality. However, as I discuss in my literature review
and conclusion, this finding may be due to not controlling for international incentives for the adoption of quotas. I also speculate that the gender quotas may only change attitudes in the long run in a way that is not captured by my data structure. Regardless of my findings, I urge future gender quota scholars to not only look at women in legislative settings but also societal acceptance of quotas as a whole across a multitude of country settings. The purpose of quotas is not to simply put women into legislative seats but to normalize women in political positions across an entire society.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Current State of Literature on Gender Quotas

In the study of electoral reforms, quotas for women are among the widest reaching, with over 130 countries today having modified constitutions (compared to a handful in the 1970s) (QAROT). Quotas are clearly influential in transforming government composition: they have been shown to influence party strategy, legislative behavior, public opinion, political engagement, and the education of women (Franceschet et al 2013; Hughes et al 2017). Much of the existing literature on gender quotas centers on an understanding that quota reform develops through domestically-led change, such as a response to grassroots women’s mobilization or party leader strategy (Beckwith 2003; and Caul 2001). There are four basic causal formations that individual cases can conform to when explaining quota implementation: that women mobilize for quotas to increase women’s representation; political elites recognize strategic advances for supporting quotas; quotas are consistent with existing or emerging notions of equality and representation; and quotas are supported by international norms and spread through transnational sharing (Krook 2006).

Quota Implementation through Women’s Mobilization to Increase Representation

Grassroots women’s movements that work at both national and international levels to promote women’s political participation are likely to articulate quota demands (Baldez 2004; Beckwith 2003; Pires 2002). These movements are able to create cross-partisan networks among women by connecting through transnational networks or international gatherings in order to
exchange information on successful implementation strategies (Bruhn 2003; Hassim 2002). Nationally, women’s organizations inside political parties are able to propose specific quota policies by highlighting gains made by women in other parties to encourage change within their own (Connell 1998). On an individual level, women inside these political parties work to lobby male leaders to advance female candidates, creating an incentive for these male leaders to promote women leaders (Araújo 2003; Kittilson 2006; Schmidt 2003). Furthermore, women involved with grassroots women’s organizations support gender quotas as a means of accomplishing their broader goal of women-friendly policy change (Costa Benavides 2003; García Quesada 2003).

*Strategy for Political Elites to Support Gender Quotas*

Many scholars point to the role of party competition as incentive for political elites to look into enacting quotas in their respective countries. Elites often embrace quota reform after one of their electoral rivals establishes or promises to establish them (Caul 2001; Davidson-Schmich 2006; Meier 2004). This competition is often heightened when parties seek to overcome a long period of opposition or a dramatic decrease in popularity by closing a gap in support among female voters (Perrigo 1996; Stevenson 2000). Further strategic motivations include promoting female candidates to win electoral campaigns or sustain existing regimes, engaging in empty gestures to express commitment to women’s rights without necessarily altering existing patterns of representation, applying quotas to consolidate control over party representatives and political rivals, and supporting quotas to demonstrate autonomy from other branches of government (Araújo 2003; Baldez 2004; Chowdhury 2002; Goetz and Hassim 2003; Htun and Jones 2002; Rai 1999; Schmidt 2003).
Quota Implementation Parallel with Existing or Emerging Ideas of Equality and Representation

Some scholars equate gender quota implementation with ideas about equality and fair access by noting that quotas in left-wing parties match more general goals of social equality and grassroots decision making (Hassim 2002; Opello 2002). Other scholars view quotas in terms of other representational guarantees meant to recognize difference and the need for proportional representation (Meier 2000; Sgier 2003). A third group of scholars associate quota implementation with democratic innovation by observing that demands for quotas emerge during periods of democratic transition, the creation of new democratic institutions as a means for guaranteeing the representation of traditionally underprivileged groups, or establishing the national and international legitimacy of the new regime (Brown et al. 2002; Reyes 2002).

Quotas Supported by International Norms and Spread through Transnational Sharing

Often coexisting with literature supporting domestic reasons for quota implementation is the idea that international dynamics, such as norm diffusion, emulation, and foreign imposition, are spread through transnational sharing (Dahlerup 2006; Ellerby 2009; Krook 2006). This literature emphasizes that domestic debates often have international subtext and often intersect in distinct ways with transnational trends. This idea concerning quotas offers the greatest potential for understanding the rapid diffusion of gender quota policies seeing as it explicitly addresses potential connections among quota campaigns (Krook 2006). The origins of these policies can be located in international meetings and conferences that focus on recommendations for member states to improve women’s access to political decision making. Furthermore, specific international organizations have issued similar recommendations that embrace quotas for women. This has prompted numerous transnational actors to emerge and serve as catalysts to the
rapid spread of quota policies around the world (Krook 2006). These actors include NGOs; groups formed under the protection of international institutions; and networks among scholars, activists, and politicians who share information that enable domestic campaigns to learn new tactics from across their own national borders (Krook 2003). Cross-national policy diffusion means that international actors can be teachers of international norms; transnational actors are cross-national policy entrepreneurs and advocates; and local actors are active translators of international norms to specific domestic contexts (Acharya 2004; Finnemore 1993; Keck and Sikkink 1999; True and Mintrom 2001). Quota support through international norms and transnational sharing explains the connections among the various quota implementation literatures. Furthermore, it opens the door to further study in international relations on quota implementation.

Implementation of Domestic Quotas Lead to Positive Attitudinal Change

It is imperative to study the effectiveness of domestically-led quotas, specifically through the lens of overall attitudinal change in order to add validity to my study. Once gender quotas are implemented, they do not solely affect legislature counts. The parties and publics that respond to quota laws are likely to be influenced by changing domestic and international norms about women’s political representation (Paxton and Hughes 2015). Numerous studies have shown the emergence of a new norm stressing women’s greater inclusion in political life once a quota has been implemented (Berkovitch 1999; Paxton, Hughes, and Green 2006; Towns 2010). Furthermore, empirical studies have demonstrated that this norm influences a wide range of attitudes and outcomes for women, including suffrage, rape laws, mainstreaming women into public life policies, and quota updates (Bush 2011; Frank, Hardinge, and Wosick-Correa 2009; Hughes, Krook, and Paxton 2015; Paxton, Hughes, and Green 2006; Ramirez, Soysal, and
Shanahan 1997; True and Mintrom 2001). Attitudes concerning the incorporation of women into politics have grown positively over time as lower-level gains in women’s representation were solidified. This is reflected in the higher thresholds for women’s representation written into quota legislation over time. These positively changing norms may also then be internalized by publics that will later demand greater gender inclusion, regardless of their gender identity. Gender quotas become more effective over time as everyone from party leaders, to electoral monitoring bodies, to judges, to voters come to accept that having a higher percentage of women in politics is normatively appropriate of strategically useful.

Quota Implementation and its Effect on Representation

Men and women often have different policy goals (Thomas 1991), and these distinctions in policy goals by gender do not always translate into gains for women as a group. This is due to a myriad of reasons: the proportion of women elected, factors affecting party membership and feminist attitudes, and institutional factors such as party discipline and civil society support. Literature on the subject shows that as the number of women elected to political office grows, attention to women’s policy issues will follow suit (Childs and Krook 2008). As female legislators become more numerous in respective chambers, they are increasingly able to form coalitions to promote legislation for women’s interests (Thomas 1994). Of course, this representative growth also leads to other possible scenarios. A rise in female legislators may influence men’s behavior towards women’s policy initiatives: male legislators may move in a feminist direction or try to obstruct these initiatives (Bratton 2005; Hawkesworth 2003). Furthermore, the effectiveness female legislators experienced when they were able to specialize in women’s policy issues without “undermining male domination” may reduce as women move into other political domains (Crowley 2004). On the other hand, the growth of women’s
representation can also lead to further election of diverse legislators more interested in pursuing similar issues (Carroll 2001).

**Representation Effects on Voter Perception**

The presence of female legislators can change voter preferences by affecting the perceived legitimacy of elected bodies (Childs 2004; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005) or altering voters’ beliefs about the nature of politics as a male domain (High-Pippert and Comer 1998). Both of these effects have been analyzed by scholars in terms of their impact on citizens as well as on women’s attitudes and behavior. So far, findings have been mixed, and research is seeking to define a more specific cultural meaning of political representation. Citizen studies show that both men and women believe that government is more democratic when women are in elected office (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005). Regardless, studies vary on the attitudinal response of women to women in a traditionally-male political domain. Several say that women’s increased presence sends signals to female citizens that increase political involvement or at least feel more politically successful (Atkeson and Carrillo 2007; High-Pippert and Comer 1998). Others find that the election of women has little effect on women’s engagement (Karp and Banducci 2008).

Quotas have been associated with the introduction of women-friendly policy proposals, even though they only rarely alter policy outcomes (Devlin and Elgie 2008; Franceschet and Piscopo 2008). In terms of substantive representation, quotas affect more than how many feminist policies are produced. Quotas transform expectations about policy outcomes and potentially affect the maneuverability and success of women legislators. Exposure to female leaders as a result of quotas can weaken gender stereotypes and biases toward the performance of
female leaders (Beaman et. al. 2008). However, the outward acceptance of quotas’ legitimacy often masks resistance. Resistance is not only found among elite male groups but sometimes among individual females as well (Meier 2008; Holli, Luhtakallio, and Raevaara 2006).

Many single-country studies indicate that quotas increase the probability of female voters contacting their political representatives (Childs 2004; Kudva 2003). Other studies find that quota implementation encourages women to enter politics, acquire political skills, and develop sustained political ambitions (Bhavnani 2009; Geissel and Hust 2005). Quotas can also help build support for organizing women’s movements (Sacchet 2008). However, in some instances, quotas have little to no effect on women’s political activities or ambitions (Zetterburg 2009; Davidson-Schmich 2009). Sometimes, quotas are associated with decreased strength (Britton 2005) and increased repression of women’s groups (Hassim 2009; Longman 2006). Therefore, it is safe to assume that, at a symbolic level, quotas generate a variety of diverse and contradictory effects, ranging from short to long term. Some scholars suggest that women’s inclusion will heighten citizens’ perceptions that the political system is progressive and legitimate; others hold that women’s greater presence in office will enhance female citizens’ feelings of equality and willingness to participate in civic/political life. Overall, quotas can complicate political dynamics by adding additional considerations about equality to citizens’ beliefs about elections and politics.

*Previous Case Studies on Quotas’ Impact on Gender Attitudes*

Though no cross-national statistical study has been done relating quotas to gender attitudes, there have been a few case studies done in certain countries on the relationship, all compiled in the book *The Impact of Gender Quotas* (Franceschet et. al. 2012). One case study,
entitled “Paradoxes in the Meaning of Quotas in Belgium” looks at the seemingly symbolic achievements of instituting gender quotas to create a more gender-equal political space. Petra Meier claims that gender quotas, at least in the case of Belgium, focus on numbers and not the larger setting of what makes politics a male domain. Through an original survey, she finds that female politicians consider the quota as a legitimate representation of equality and justice, but the male politicians saw it as undermining Belgium’s democratic principles. Her study highlights the conclusions found in a lot of gender-related literature that men and women think differently about underrepresentation and discrimination, and the Belgian quota could have aggravated the root of those disagreements (Meier 2008).

Similarly, Jennie Burnet conducted a series of interviews and focus groups in Rwanda to look at quota effects on “ordinary” people as opposed to political figures. She finds that the quotas have encouraged women to participate more actively in their community, work outside the home, speak at public meetings, and demand greater equality in their intimate relationships. Like Meier, Burnet finds that the quotas have caused indignation among men, leading them to express open resentment. She concludes that quotas can be a part of cultural transformation, and men and women go through these ideological changes differently (Burnet 2008).

Another case study in the book explores whether Mexico’s legislative quota has altered the attitudes and behaviors of citizens. Using mass survey data from federal and state sources, Par Zetterberg inconclusively tries to find whether the quota has effectively increased women’s political engagement, positive gender attitudes, or confidence in democracy. The inconclusive findings may have been marred by factors such as electoral fraud allegations and a deepening economic crisis (Zetterberg 2008). In India, Lori Beaman, Rohini Pande, and Alexandra Cirone find more reliable results, though their conclusions mirror Zetterberg’s apparent inclusivity.
They conduct surveys and field experiments to determine how reserved seats have affected citizens’ views of women as leaders in local politics. They find that exposure to female leaders has caused citizens to reevaluate their implicit beliefs about women as leaders and has promoted higher counts of voting for women. However, the exposure to female leaders seems to neither shift stated survey attitudes toward women nor leads to female empowerment specifically (Beaman et. al. 2008).
3. THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS

The literature review has indicated that there is extant research showing the effect of gender quotas on modernizing policies to include women. Literature has also shown that there are direct relationships between quota implementation and gender equality attitudes. However, there is an apparent need to further existing research on quotas relating to gender equality attitudes by implementing a cross-national study. A cross-national study allows for a way to look at similar effects across all included countries as opposed to singular country studies. This wide viewpoint is beneficial for determining positive and/or negative correlations for implementing quotas in general that are not just based on country effects. Country case studies often suffer from selection bias and can have a hard time being quantified. They are certainly beneficial for analyzing detailed nuances, but their scientific legitimacy might be scrutinized in terms of applicability. It is often difficult to apply conclusions from a country study with a particular research population to worldwide people and scenarios. Cross-national studies can miss details, but their generalizability is helpful to distinguishing impactful political phenomena. In relation to this study, I expect that a cross-national study on the implementation of gender quotas will help provide a generalizable idea of their impact on gender equality attitudes. From there, it will be easier to pinpoint certain areas in need of closer, more detailed analysis.

Due to the available research, I am able to posit a hypothesis in favor of such a study:

\( H1: \) The implementation of gender quotas should be associated with greater popular support for gender equality among a country’s citizens.
Though admittedly controversial, overall, gender quotas appear to be helpful for promoting a political atmosphere and policies that benefit women. Gender quota laws can lead to an increase in the number of female candidates available for office since they make political parties consider gender as an important criterion for selecting candidates. Though quota laws can take time to affect existing procedures and laws, they at least facilitate discussion toward a more progressive future for countries that enact them. Attitudinal and behavioral shifts may happen directly after the implementation of the quota, or they can build onto the initial reactions caused by increased women profiling in politics. Escalated exposure to women in influential and empowering positions should help change preconceived conceptions about traditional gender roles. Observing same-sex men or women in empowering positions helps trigger learning processes where these observers internalize previously-held gender-stereotypical knowledge of roles and act in favor of gender congruent aspirations and behavior (Olsson & Martiny 2018). Then, these observers can become aspirants themselves, thus furthering a cycle of overall empowered attitudes.

Assuming that it takes time for attitudes to change, the analysis might not show the impact of quotas for a number of years after they are implemented. Stated that the majority of quotas were not implemented until the late 1990s, early 2000s (QAROT), it is reasonable to expect that countries have not experienced much positive change in attitudes. Given the process of fulfilling a quota’s requirements, fighting to change existing policies to promote women, and allowing for time to change pre-existing connotations toward women in political leadership positions, it is anticipated that there be somewhat of a lengthy delay in positive attitudinal change toward overall gender equality. Furthermore, because quotas are often implemented in countries with low gender equality to begin with, this could then potentially explain any negative
correlation later found in my analysis. If a country already has detrimental records of gender equality, it likely has other factors influencing low attitudes that an implemented quota would not amend. Societies that are poor tend to hold cultural views that promote gender inequality, but they also tend to have poor educational rates, lack of personal autonomy, poor healthcare, etc. The relationship between low economic growth and inequality cultural norms is complicated, and it is hard to simply use control variables to get to the root of the causes for inequality. Being poor does not seem a sufficient enough reason in itself to explain cultural inequality norms, which is why I thought conducting a study between quotas and gender attitudes could help dissect the complexity.

Seema Jayachandran in her piece “The Roots of Gender Inequality in Developing Countries” explains the relationship between developing countries and gender inequality in terms of historical development. First, there needs to be a shift away from agricultural toward services, and overtime, technological advances will reduce the time needed for traditional household work. Along with advancement comes the decline in the frequency and risk of childbearing. Each of these steps leads to more women able to enter the workforce, which increases human capital investment in women’s personal autonomy (Jayachandran 2015). That is not to say that growth automatically advances women’s positions in society: cultural practices are able to stand on their own. That is why I see the need to inspect the role of quota implementation in the gender equality process, since many developed countries have some form of a quota, too. However, the fact cannot be ignored that most countries with implemented quotas are considered developing, which I strongly suspect is a main reason for my null results in the next section. All in all, attitudinal and cultural change is broad and complicated, and the political empowerment of women through quotas is a small part of the complex jigsaw.
4. DATA AND MEASURES

**DV Measurement:**

The dependent variable, gender attitudes, is defined using variables deemed consistent with gauging gender equality standards in a country. I use the longitudinal data from all six waves of the World Values Survey (WVS), spanning from 1981-2014. This time period includes most of the implementation dates for all gender quotas worldwide. I chose the WVS to measure my dependent variable because it is “the largest, cross-national, time series investigation of human beliefs and values ever executed…covering the full range of global variations, from very poor to very rich countries, in all the world’s major cultural zones” (Inglehart et. al. 2014). In total, there are 49,539 individual survey respondents over a period of 40 country years. The variables I chose are: approval of women’s movements; support of equal rights to jobs; support of equal rights; approval of women as main household breadwinner; approval of women’s independence; and men as more effective political leaders. I combined the chosen variables into a continuous index ranging from 0-1, with higher values of the index representing greater support for gender equality. I will be able to track gender attitudes in countries both with and without quotas and look for meaningful trends with a country-year unit of analysis.

**IV Measurement:**

The independent variable is quota implementation. Conceptually defined, the variable is simply whether or not a country has an implemented quota in a given year. Ideally, the analysis will show that years with an implemented quota will have higher rates of gender equality
attitudes. The independent variable is the presence of a gender quota, and all years from the implementation onwards are coded “1” as long as the quota remains in place. Operationally, this variable is defined using the Quota Adoption and Reform Over Time (QAROT) Dataset, which combines data on quota reforms with data on quota implementation and effects from 1947-2015 (Hughes et. al. 2017). This dataset proves to be the most useful because it combines previously separate coding efforts on gender quotas. Using QAROT, I will be able to track quota implementation at a country-year level of analysis, where 1 is coded for a country if it has an implemented quota within a given year and 0 if it does not.

Though the study of gender quotas has gained popularity over the last several years, compared to other recent political developments, they remain understudied. The recently updated QAROT Dataset makes up for the previous lack of operationalized measures of quotas accounting for global factors (Hughes et al 2019).

Upon merging the WVS and QAROT datasets, only 17 countries ended up in my final dataset used for analysis. These countries are listed in the table below, as well as the survey responses marked under years with quota implementation and without. It is difficult to determine why more of the 130 countries with quotas did not match with the available survey responses, of which there are many. I assume this is an unfortunate product of error in merging two large and complex datasets. While this limited and non-random sample may account for the results that follow, the diversity of the countries included suggests the possibility that the results may nonetheless generalize to a wider set of countries.
Table 1: Final Dataset Countries used in Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>No Quota Implementation Responses (WVS)</th>
<th>Quota Implementation Responses (WVS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>1,999</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>2,482</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andorra</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,003</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>3,004</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2,925</td>
<td>2,986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1,072</td>
<td>1,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1,931</td>
<td>2,164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>5,700</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>5,491</td>
<td>2,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>3,025</td>
<td>1,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republika Srpska</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>3,245</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Research Design:

To test the relationship between the implementation of gender quotas and gender equality attitudes, I will estimate a two-level random intercept multi-level model. This type of model is appropriate because it does not assume that individual observations in the data are independent
from one another. In the case of the WVS data, the individual respondents from the dataset are nested within specific countries and years and thus do not constitute independent observations. Simply adding country fixed effects to a standard regression model is not an appropriate solution because they compare individuals within the same country, and the outcome of interest—gender quotas—is a country-level variable. To better study the effect of country-level quotas on individual-level attitudinal variables, I use a two-level model that will estimate the mean and variance of the intercepts by country and year. This random draw acts as an intermediate solution between having one intercept for all countries and a separate intercept for each country (Steenbergen & Jones 2002).

The multi-level model addresses the problem of error correlation and includes both individual-level predictors (i.e. age, gender, etc.) and group-level predictors (i.e. quota implementation) within the model. The multi-level model estimates the mean and variance of the intercepts by country and year, allowing for both individual and group level predictors within the same model.

Controls:

In order to determine what factors influence whether quota implementation is likely as well as overall gender attitudes in a country, I have included some relevant individual and country-level variables to help control for endogenous relationships. Individual-level control variables include gender, age, married, income, and education and were obtained using the WVS Dataset. Most of these were standardized globally on a 0-1 scale and/or made into dummy variables. For the gender variable, 0 represents male respondents, and 1 represents female respondents. For the age variable, lower numbers represent younger respondents while higher
represent older. For the married variable, 0 represents respondents who are not married, and 1 represents those who are married. For the income variable, lower numbers represent respondents with less income while higher represents more income. For the education variable, lower numbers represent respondents with less education while higher represents more education.

Country-level control variables include regime type, GDP, and freedom score. These variables are measured using the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Dataset (Coppedge et. al. 2019; Pemstein et. al. 2019). Regime type and freedom score are ordinal variables. Regime type is measured from 0-3, with 0 representing “closed autocracy,” 1 “electoral autocracy,” 2 “electoral democracy,” and 3 “liberal democracy.” Freedom score is measured from 1-3, with 1 representing “free,” 2 “partly free,” and 3 “not free.” GDP, available from the years 1789-2016, is measured per capita using exact the exact GDP statistic in a country in a given year. Overall, these three country-level variables will help account for what types of countries are more likely to implement gender quotas.
5. RESULTS

Main Findings:

As the table below indicates, there is significant support against my hypothesis. Statistically, the model shows a negative relationship between the implementation of gender quotas and support for gender equality, which is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. Implementing quotas is associated with a 6 percentage point decrease in popular support for gender equality. This is a 6 percentage point decrease compared to “normal” levels of gender equality support in included countries without quotas factored into the equation. In substantive terms, quotas are associated with a 0.25 standard deviation reduction in support for gender equality. Furthermore, the mean of the country-level intercept is .0354 and its standard error is .00931. The mean of the country-year level intercept is .0336 and its standard error is .0052.

<table>
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<th>VARIABLES</th>
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<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00193)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.0320***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00613)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marital Status</td>
<td>0.0121***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00215)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-0.0204***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00470)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.0292***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00354)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime</td>
<td>0.00903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0134)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom Score</td>
<td>0.0130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0135)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>7.57e-07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.17e-06)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Implemented Quota -0.0628***
(0.0166)
Constant 0.455***
(0.0452)

Country:
Mean .0354
Standard Error .0093

Country-Year:
Mean .0336
Standard Error .0052

Observations 49,539
Countries (N) 17
Country-Years (N) 40

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Other variables that proved to be statistically significant at the 95% level were the individual-level control variables age, income, and education. Specifically, older people, lower-income people, and less-educated people were more likely to hold negative attitudes toward women and gender equality. These results are unsurprising and are consistent with the findings of numerous other studies. Surprisingly, the individual-level control variable gender was not statistically significant at any conventional level, showing no clear correlation between gender identification and attitudes toward gender equality.

Another surprising result is that none of the country-level controls were statistically significant at any conventional level. Though many wealthier countries have gender quotas, they are found in concentrated numbers in many poorer countries, so I was expecting GDP to be a significant variable.

Upon checking my data, it seems that upon merging the QAROT and WVS datasets, non-matched variables dropped. It seems that the WVS is lacking variable data in a lot of the
countries that contain some form of quota. Upon closer inspection on my part, it looks like the WVS is lacking data in both under-developed countries and in general with the specific gender equality variables I chose. In regard to the lack of survey data in the under-developed countries, that seems like a negative side effect of conducting surveys or wanting to use survey data. It can be difficult to obtain survey data in under-developed countries for a myriad of reasons: perhaps civilians do not live in concentrated areas and are spread out; perhaps there is a lack of infrastructure or technology to interview civilians; or perhaps there are political reasons as to why it is hard for surveyors to access citizens in a particular country. Regardless, though it is too late to amend this disappointing lack of data for this project, I think it important to stress that it does not take away from the originality or importance of theory that the project offers. Again, the diversity of the countries included suggests the possibility that the results may nonetheless generalize to a wider set of countries. In the next section, I hypothesize the theoretical implications for this project and what they mean for future research.

*Theoretical Interpretation:*

Substantively, accounting for clustering by country and year, there is a negative relationship between implementing a gender quota and gender attitudes. This divergence may result in the fact that a large-scale survey (WVS) was used to compare attitudes and behaviors (Karp & Banducci 2008). Understood literature about the genesis of women’s representation in politics and its apparent consequences largely centers on non-quota studies, so it can be difficult to use it to explain quota cases. Therefore, in the discussion below, I speculate about why increasing women’s political representation does not lead to heightened gender equality or which biases might exist in my model.
Based on my knowledge on the topic of gender equality and quotas, I do not necessarily think the negative relationship found in my analysis holds across all cases. Most literature on quota implementation has focused on a domestic level: why would an individual country’s citizens want to enact a quota? However, there has been a recent push in literature pointing to the importance of international influence in incentivizing quota implementation in certain countries (which, though my model does not show it, would explain why most gender quota countries seem to be poorer).

Since the end of the Cold War, international involvement in post-war countries has skyrocketed. A section of post-Cold War literature has focused on how international actors help spread domestic liberalization in various ways (Hyde 2007; Pevehouse 2002; and Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006). This reasoning extends to gender quotas. Through commonplace peacekeeping operations, international actors are able to promote gender equality and gender quotas when new constitutions are being written. Sarah Sunn Bush (2011) found a positive correlation between international incentives and a country’s likelihood of implementing a gender quota. Oftentimes, political leaders implement quotas as both sincere and insincere signals to the international community that they are taking steps to democratize, for doing so could provide foreign aid and/or improved legitimacy. Factors such as UN peace presence, receiving foreign aid, and election monitors are significantly more likely to be related to the implementation of quotas than other measures of gender-related development, democracy levels, transnational civil society presence, and implementation of other related laws (Bush 2011). Therefore, it seems that the types of countries that tend to implement gender quotas are not necessarily trying to advance gender equality on a domestic level, but are trying to pander to international aid organizations.
Relating back to my results, controlling for international incentive could help explain the negative correlation between quotas and gender attitudes. I do not see any reason to believe that adding an international incentive variable would create a positive impact on gender equality. If countries are trying to appear democratic to international humanitarian organizations to utilize aid, the institutional framework as well as citizen attitudes are likely not receptive to feminist change. As for discrepancies in the model that could have caused a negative relationship between quota implementation and gender attitudes, I think the lack of time passage as a structure in my data could have harmed my results. I studied the correlation between a country implementing a gender quota and gender attitudes of its people, but looking at the change in gender attitudes over time could show a delayed effect. Perhaps it takes multiple decades for the effects of gender quotas to show. Regardless, overall, I am forced to conclude from the analysis that enacting a quota may not simply generate positive attitudes toward women in a country.

**Future Research:**

Existing research on gender quotas has demonstrated its importance in the field of structuring domestic institutions, and now it is branching out to highlight international influence in quota implementation as well. When starting my thesis, I wanted to look at a variable that no scholar had associated with gender quotas before, which is why I chose a cross-sectional study on gender equality attitudes. If gender attitudes do not grow positively after the enactment of quotas, what is the point of even implementing them? However, after running my analysis, I realize that I am missing international incentive as an important component and control for gauging the true affect of quotas on gender attitudes. Including this variable could explain why quota implementation is negatively correlated with gender attitudes. If a country with already
low gender attitudes is trying to implement a quota just to entice foreign aid, chances are the country is not serious about gender equality reform and attitudes will not improve. For future research, scholars should look to measure the change in gender attitudes in countries deemed to have international incentive and those are deemed to have no international incentive. Then, we will be able to see more clearly if countries implementing quotas due to international incentive are actually making steps toward democracy and gender inclusion, or if they are acting under a guise. Observing whether gender attitudes become more positive lends clearer vision to a country’s true motives in implementing quotas.
6. CONCLUSION

The growing prominence of quotas in gender and politics literature highlights the need for researchers to brainstorm new correlative relationships concerning their implementation and effect on societal norms. Quotas exist in over 130 countries and come in various shapes and forms, including candidate quotas and seat quotas (QAROT). Given some relationships found between quota implementation and female empowerment, I expected my analysis to follow this trend of positive change by incorporating attitudes toward gender equality.

I stand by my theory that I deduced from my literature review: that the need for cross-national correlations can add to the understanding of quota effects by looking at a diverse variety of cases as opposed to a select few. Cross-national studies provide the important factor of generalizability that is helpful in distinguishing important political variables. The implementation of gender quotas did not provide insight to improving gender equality attitudes, but I relate this more to characteristics missed in my model than the use of the cross-national study itself. Running a two-level random intercept multi-level model provided the ability to observe the phenomenon of gender equality attitudes in all countries with quotas during an extensive time span. As in country case studies looking at quota effects on gender attitudes, the model incorporates individual-level survey data. Zetterberg attributes his inclusive results to a failing economy and electoral fraud, a hint that the already unstable progression of quotas in a society can be marred by numerous negative events. But the case study focusing on local Indian elections is most interesting to me (Beaman et. al. 2008). The authors find that increased exposure to female leaders has already changed a lot of implicit stereotypes about women in
leadership positions, and it has also encouraged direct voting of women in elections. However, regardless of these positive shifts, there has been no shift in gender equality attitudes in either direction. Perhaps my analysis’ negative relationship between implemented gender quotas and gender equality attitudes is due to an international incentive variable, where unstable countries want to appear to be shifting into democracies to appeal to democratic aid organizations. But perhaps there truly is a delayed reaction effect in implementing gender quotas that makes them hard to study at present. There most often exists a delayed reaction when looking at the effects of most political phenomena and the active change of gender equality attitudes is one of the slowest moving. As for now, I suggest further research into the effect of international incentives of gender quota enactment, for I believe that will help contribute to quota literature in major ways. However, perhaps this is an apt study to revisit years later: further literature advancements can be applied and the delayed effects of attitudes might be present.
LIST OF REFERENCES


Hughes, Melanie M., Paxton, Pamela, Clayton, Amanda, and Zetterberg, Par. Quota Adoption and Reform Over Time (QAROT), 1947-2015. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2017-08-16. [https://doi.org/10.3886/E100918V1](https://doi.org/10.3886/E100918V1)


### APPENDIX 1: Descriptive Table of Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Job Scarcity</td>
<td>1.775</td>
<td>.7213</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>319,588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Women’s Income</td>
<td>2.474</td>
<td>.9011</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>67,198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Male Leaders</td>
<td>2.436</td>
<td>.9814</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>286,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Women’s Independence</td>
<td>1.895</td>
<td>.9504</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2,382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Approval of Equal Rights</td>
<td>8.168</td>
<td>2.488</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>160,396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Approval of Women’s Movements</td>
<td>1.902</td>
<td>.9074</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20,583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Gender</td>
<td>1.518</td>
<td>.5000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>343,808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Age</td>
<td>40.72</td>
<td>16.13</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>344,279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Marital Status</td>
<td>2.675</td>
<td>2.187</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>343,688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Income</td>
<td>4.620</td>
<td>2.337</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>314,846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Education</td>
<td>4.713</td>
<td>2.229</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>299,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Regime</td>
<td>1.536</td>
<td>.9246</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>71,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Freedom Score</td>
<td>2.266</td>
<td>.8617</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>71,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 GDP</td>
<td>9,799</td>
<td>12,006</td>
<td>4,176</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>42,314</td>
<td>68,476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Implemented Quota</td>
<td>.1850</td>
<td>.3883</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>65,764</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note: The descriptive statistics in the above table are for the cleaned, un-standardized variables. However, I later standardized the individual-level survey variables 1-6 that later were combined in an additive index scale. I also standardized the individual-level survey control variables 7-12 gender, age, marital status, income, and education on a 0-1 continuous scale.
VITA

Education

**BA in Political Science/BA in Communications**
Lipscomb University—GPA: 3.8
Graduated Magna Cum Laude in three years.

Professional Experience

Department of Political Science at the University of Mississippi—August 2017-May 2019

**Graduate Assistant**
Oxford, Mississippi

Studied political analyses, comparative governmental systems, and organizational cooperation.
Wrote numerous papers on various political institutions and cultures.
Taught and researched material for political science classes.
Audited two years of advanced Arabic.

TLS-Tennessee Legislation Services—June 2016-August 2017

**Associate Editor/Legislative Analyst**
Nashville, Tennessee

Led a team that organized and communicated legislative business to clients.
Provided intelligence and support to policymakers, developing a keen instinct in distinguishing useful information and judging actions.

Congressional Campaign—January 2016-May 2016

**Field Researcher**
Murfreesboro, Tennessee

Directed research in the TN 4th Congressional District regarding key campaign issues.
Conducted multiple projects regarding policy solutions which broadened ability to compare political structures.

2nd Vote: Shopper App—January 2015-August 2015

**Research Intern**
Nashville, Tennessee

Investigated and then informed consumers of political/social biases of businesses.
Performed analysis of a major United Way investigation.
Used evidentiary-based analysis to conduct market research and search news sources for blog post ideas.

Congressman Marsha Blackburn’s Office—May 2014-August 2014

**Senior Advisor to the Interns**
Franklin, Tennessee
Responded to concerns of constituents, conducted research, performed administrative tasks. Developed leadership experience, especially decision-making and problem solving.

**Collegiate Honors and Awards**

Pi Sigma Alpha  
- National Political Science Honor Society  

Christian Scholars’ Conference Presenter  
- Presented *The Relationship between External Aid and Internal Armed Conflict.*  

Lipscomb’s Student Scholars Symposium Presenter  
- Presented *Analyzing Women’s Roles in Muslim and Christian Culture.*

Presidential Scholarship  
- August 2013-May 2016

Honors College Member  
- August 2013-May 2016
  - Took 18 hrs of honors courses & completed an honors senior project.
  - Named “Honors Mentor” to incoming students.