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SUPPORT FOR REGIONALIST AND NATIONALIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN SPAIN

By

Bailey Brown Burleson

A thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for completion
Of the Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies
Croft Institute for International Studies
Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College
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ABSTRACT

BAILEY BROWN BURLESON: Support for Regionalist and Nationalist Political Parties in Spain (Under the direction of Dr. Miguel Centellas)

This research investigates the variation across the autonomous communities of Spain in the level of support for both regionalist and nationalist political parties such as the new far-right political party, Vox. This research looks at four cases: Andalusia, Catalonia, Galicia, and Murcia. Together these cases represent a spectrum of regionalist sentiment, support for regionalist parties, and support for nationalist parties. Using survey data from the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas ahead of the Spanish general election of November 2019, this thesis analyzes individual-level determinants of voting behavior corresponding to regionalist and nationalist political parties in Spain. Of the individual-level determinants of voting behavior with regard to the particular parties, the demographic variables such as gender, age, religiosity, education level, and ideological self-placement as well as the perception of immigration as a major Spanish issue showed the greatest distinction between voters of regionalist parties and voters of nationalist parties. Economic and political evaluations, the influence of the Catalan Independence Movement, and personal income were variables that were significant in the same manner across all types of parties studied.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BNG	Bloque Nacionalista Galego
C's	Ciutadans-Partido de la Ciudadanía or Ciudadanos
CIS	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas
CUP	Candidatura d'Unitat Popular
ECP	En Comú-Podem
ERC	Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya
JxCat	Junts per Catalunya
PA	Partido Andalucista
PP	Partido Popular
PSOE	Partido Socialista Obrero Español

Introduction

There is a varying degree of support for regionalist political parties. In certain autonomous communities, substate nationalism and strong regional identification has historically been more prevalent. Catalonia has made news recently for its strong support for an independence movement and has very often had strong support for regionalist political parties even in Spanish general elections. However, certain autonomous communities like Andalusia have not had the same level of support for these types of parties. In an autonomous community like Andalusia, there has been some level of support for regionalist parties in more local elections but not strong enough to appear in national elections. Instead, Andalusia has seen recent support in national elections for *Vox*, a party that represents many of the opposite views of regionalist parties with regard to the Spanish state. This presents a curious case in which Andalusia could have the potential to have growth in their regionalist party support but instead has growth of the opposite type of party.

Various Catalan regionalist parties have had a degree of electoral success. These parties can be found on both sides of the political ideological spectrum, and not all Catalan regionalist parties advocate for separatism. Some examples of Catalan regionalist parties that have had electoral success are Together for Catalonia (*Junts per Catalunya*, JxCAT), Republican Left of Catalonia (*Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya*, ERC), and Popular Unity Candidacy (*Candidatura d'Unitat Popular*, CUP). Regionalist parties similar to the types found in Catalonia are found in other autonomous communities, but

not all of these have been as successful in elections. An example of this is one of Andalusia's recent semi-prominent regionalist parties the Andalusian Party (*Partido Andalucista*, PA) that dissolved in 2014 after merging with another party and losing seats.

However, Spain has also, until the past few years, lacked a strong far-right movement. This "Spanish Exceptionalism" (Turnbull-Dugarte 2019, Ortiz Barquero 2019) appears to be at its end with the creation and rise in popularity of the party *Vox*. In the most recent elections, Andalusia has seen growing support for *Vox*, a right-wing nationalist party that advocates for a more united Spain with less emphasis on individual autonomous communities. Support for *Vox* has grown throughout Spain in recent years but not equally in every autonomous community. An example of this is how Catalonia has had much less support for *Vox* than Andalusia has had.

Why does support for regionalist parties vary across the different autonomous communities of Spain? Why has a nationalist party like *Vox* found electoral success in Andalusia and other autonomous communities across Spain when it is seemingly the antithesis of a regionalist party and substate nationalism? This research examines individual factors that influence voting behavior pertaining to the rise of far-right parties, the strength of regionalist parties, and any potential interaction between the two.

Nationalism and Party Success or Failure

The substate nationalism and sense of identity that exists in Spain's autonomous communities prompts the creation of regionalist parties that either advocate for more autonomy with the extreme case being independence or advocate for certain issues on

behalf of the autonomous community. According to the constructivist school of thought, national identity is created rather than something that has always existed in a community or group (Anderson 2016, Hobsbawm 1992, Gellner and Breuilly 2008). This school stresses the fact that nationalism and the idea of a nation is a relatively new concept in the history of the world. One of the major points of Hobsbawm (1990) is that nationalism is a product of modernity. Anderson (2016) discusses how print capitalism as well as the decline of older, powerful institutions such as the Catholic church and “the dynastic realm” have led to the birth and growth of nationalism agreeing with the idea that nationalism has only come about in more recent eras of history.

Anderson writes that a nation is an “imagined political community” (2016). He elaborates that a nation is made up of people that feel a connection towards other members of the group whether or not they personally know the other members. In other words, there exists a national consciousness (Anderson 2016). Hobsbawm (1990) asserts that this “national consciousness” does not exist evenly across a state and agrees that it is not an idea that predates states or nations. In fact, many constructivist thinkers (Hobsbawm 1990, Gellner and Breuilly 2008) directly assert that it is nationalism itself that created the “nation”.

My research relates to this particular definition of nations and nationalism because I examine variables that may be relevant in how individuals and the autonomous communities create these identities and in how that relates to the success of regionalist and nationalist political parties. In other words, my research looks at the individual-level variables that are common in individuals who choose to align with regionalist or nationalist political parties.

A second major concept with my research is why parties fail or succeed. Heinrich W. Ursprung (1984) identifies two different types of explanations for party success: theories of a sociological nature or theories from the economic approach. The economic approach is that economic reasons can explain all types of human behavior while the sociological approach operates under the assumption that certain sociological variables can influence attitudes and behaviors of individuals (Ursprung 1984). In Ursprung's (1984) view, the reasoning behind the economic approach is that economic motives can explain human behavior and that humans, as rational beings, will act in their own benefit in an attempt to accomplish their desires. This relates to voting behavior because voters will vote in a manner that will benefit them. In later chapters, this will be relevant to theories such as the "losers" of modernization theory in which individuals are likely to vote in opposition to what they see as the cause of their economic troubles. The sociological approach looks at how a variety of determinants influence the individual and their preferences (Ursprung 1984).

Kay Lawson and Peter H. Merkl (1988) propose a theory of linkage in which major parties "fail" when they fail to provide enough effective linkage between the individuals and the state. They discuss how alternative organizations in four categories, environmentalist, supplementary, communitarian, and anti-authoritarian, have been able to gain support (Lawson and Merkl 1988). Another topic discussed is the definitions of "failure" or "success". These definitions can be relative: a major party might define success as being the party in charge of the government, while success for a minor party might entail being part of a coalition government or having its goals adopted by a major party (Lawson and Merkl 1988). Through my analysis, I can identify particular groups of

people that might be affected by this failure of linkage with the major parties and have instead turned to peripheral parties.

Research Design

In order to look at reasons for certain parties receiving or not receiving electoral support, I analyze individual-level variables as determinants for voting for each type of political party involved in my original research question: both nationalist and regionalist. I include four different particular cases that each represent a spectrum of regionalist sentiment as well as support for either nationalist or regionalist parties.

Case Selection

In choosing my cases, I was interested in two main variables: regionalist vs. nationalist sentiment and support for regionalist or nationalist political parties. I wanted to have a spectrum that represented several combinations of these variables. The four cases I have chosen are: Andalusia, Catalonia, Galicia, and Murcia. Catalonia and Galicia are both what is described as “historic nations” or autonomous communities that have been designated as having greater cultural distinctiveness and consequently greater regionalist sentiment. However, the support for regionalist parties is not the same across all of these autonomous communities that are “historic nations.” Catalonia has a much higher level of support for regionalist parties than Galicia. Regionalist sentiment and identity is also not the same across the other autonomous communities. Preliminary data shows that Andalusia has a lower sense of regional identity than the historic nations like Catalonia, but it does have a higher sense of regional identity compared to an

autonomous community like Murcia. Vox, a far-right nationalist party, also has a high level of support in Andalusia and Murcia.

Andalusia, my primary case, is an outlier through its contradictions. Andalusia does have a moderately high level of regionalist sentiment compared to an autonomous community such as Murcia. However, regionalist parties have not had much electoral support in Andalusia, when compared to other autonomous communities like Catalonia and the Basque Country. In recent elections, there has also been high support for Vox, a Spanish nationalist party that wants to deemphasize autonomous communities, in Andalusia. This is interesting because not only does Andalusia have a lack of significant support for regionalist parties, but it also has shown to have greater support for a party that might be considered an opposite to regionalist parties.

Catalonia, my second case, is frequently classified as a historic nation. While similar to Andalusia in that the regionalist sentiment is higher than in other autonomous communities, Catalonia has a different outcome. In Catalonia, support is higher for regionalist parties than in Andalusia. Regionalist parties have even had success at the national level. Support for Vox is much lower in Catalonia. Since certain undeniable differences exist between an autonomous community like Catalonia and an autonomous community like Andalusia, I include two more cases to provide additional controls.

Galicia is another autonomous community that is frequently described as a “historic nation” or “historic nationality”. In contrast to Catalonia, however, it does not have the same high level of support for regionalist parties. In fact, it can be considered an outlier among the historic nations in that it does not have the same level of support for

regionalist parties in their political system like Catalonia or the Basque Country (Hamann 1999).

Murcia and Andalusia have had some of the highest growth in support for Vox while the “historic nations” like Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque Country have had some of the lowest growth in Vox. While both Galicia and the Basque Country would be interesting additions to my research, I believe that Galicia would be the better addition as it has more differences in level of regionalist party support to Catalonia than the Basque Country does.

Data Sources

I plan to use survey data produced by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas. My data for my analysis comes from the survey titled “Barómetro de Noviembre 2019” (Barometer of November 2019). This data was gathered through interviews conducted in the weeks preceding the national election of November 2019. The survey asks respondents about what party they intend to vote for in that election as well as a variety of questions pertaining to demographic information, political opinions, and economic status. I also reference some regional post electoral surveys. These surveys are the most recent post electoral surveys for each case that was provided by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas: Catalonia (Postelectoral de Cataluña. Elecciones Autonómicas 2017), Andalusia (Postelectoral Elecciones Autonómicas 2018 Comunidad Autónoma de Andalucía 2018), Murcia (Postelectoral Elecciones Autonómicas 2015. Región de Murcia 2015), and Galicia (Postelectoral de Galicia. Elecciones Autonómicas 2016).

Dependent Variable

My dependent variables are support for two types of peripheral political parties paying special attention to my cases of Catalonia, Andalusia, Murcia, and Galicia.

“Nationalist parties” are those parties that advocate for Spanish nationalism or are in direct opposition to substate nationalisms within Spain. “Nationalist parties” includes both *Ciudadanos* and *Vox*. However, as is discussed later in this paper, *Ciudadanos* is not as extreme as *Vox*. Therefore, I have also decided to look at the voters for *Vox* separately as a subcategory of nationalist parties.

“Regionalist parties” are the regional parties within at least one of my cases that advocate for greater autonomy for the autonomous community they represent. However, it is important to note that nationalism is a factor in both of these types of parties.

“Regionalist parties” include regionalist parties from Catalonia and Galicia. Of all my cases, only regionalist parties from Catalonia and Galicia received support from the respondents for the upcoming election. I have also decided to create two subcategories of “regionalist parties.” These two subcategories are “Catalan regionalist parties” and “Galician regionalist parties.” These different subcategories will allow me to see any differences between the individual determinants that affect a voter’s decision to vote for regionalist parties of each autonomous community.

Independent Variables

My independent variables are categorized into three groups: demographic variables, performance variables, and political variables. Demographic variables include

gender, age, religiosity, education level, and personal income. Performance-related variables include the perception of the current economic situation in Spain and the perception of the current political situation in Spain. Political variables include the influence of Catalan independence movement on vote, self-placement on a left-right scale of ideology, and choice of major issues facing Spain.

Hypotheses

I develop the following hypotheses to explain a voter's choice.

- *H1*: As negative feelings about the current political situation increase, support for peripheral parties like the regionalist parties or Vox will increase.
- *H2*: People who state that their vote was influenced by the independence movement in Catalonia will be more likely to vote for peripheral parties, whether regionalist parties or Vox.
- *H3*: People who state that one of the major problems facing Spain is immigration will be more likely to vote for Vox.
- *H4*: The Catalan Independence Movement will be an important issue for voters of all types of parties.

Structure of Paper

After this brief introduction, Chapter 1 focuses on broad theories and concepts underlying my research such as nationalism and party success and failure. Chapter 2 narrows the focus to Spain-specific background information on the political system relating to substate nationalism and previous research done surrounding these topics.

Chapter 3 includes a brief overview of each case as well as some descriptive statistics providing background on how each autonomous community stands with regard to nationalistic sentiment and voting behavior. Chapter 4 gives an overview of the political parties included in my analysis and how they are organized into my dependent variables. Chapter 5 presents my data and analysis as well as more in-depth information on methodology. My conclusion follows Chapter 5.

Chapter 1

Literature Review

Nationalism

The study of nationalism focuses primarily around two schools of thought: primordialism and constructivism. Primordialism is the idea that nations and the qualities that define nations have always been salient and present. Nations are set in stone and have always existed among groups of people. Constructivism refers to the idea that nationalism and the sense of “nation-ness” is a constructed idea or concept by the group of people that it pertains to. A nation is not defined by unchangeable criteria or qualities but rather by the changing perceptions and beliefs about identity of the people within the so-called “nation”.

In the words of Benedict Anderson (2016), a nation is an “imagined community” because while no member can be fully acquainted with every other member of the “nation,” each feels a connection to the other creating a salient and distinct group in the eyes of the community. These nations are often defined by cultural, linguistic, and ethnic differences that seem to have always defined groups and “nations,” but it is important to note that, in the constructivist school of thought, “nationalism” is a new movement and idea that came to be with the modern era (Anderson 2016, Hobsbawm 1990, Gellner and Breuilly 2008). Modernity and elements that caused the modern age like print capitalism caused the growth of nationalism (Anderson 2016, Hobsbawm 1990).

It is also important to note that the “nation” and the “state,” while often conflated in common speech, are not equivalent (Gellner and Breuilly 2008). This is evident in how with certain states such as Spain, the national consciousness and the sense of identity of citizens are not evenly distributed. The “nation” and the “state” are not equally strong and defined entities. This makes it interesting to look at the competing “nations” within a state like Spain.

Party Success and Failure

When thinking about the success or failure of political parties, it is important to consider what qualifies as a success or failure. Depending on the particular study or purpose of research, each can be defined differently. Success can be defined as becoming the party of the government, winning elections, receiving some support in elections (in the case of peripheral parties), or even having the agenda of a peripheral party adopted by a major political party (Lawson and Merkl 2007). This last idea about what qualifies as success can be attributed to a type of political party that Lawson and Merkl label as a supplementary political party which represents particular policies that might be adopted by a mainstream party if the supplementary party receives enough attention from the public (1988). Parties like supplementary parties as well as parties that are labelled as environmentalist, communitarian, and anti-authoritarian are the parties that are given support when the major political parties “fail” (Lawson and Merkl 2007).

Failure for political parties can be defined as what happens when major or mainstream parties fail to garner the same amount of electoral support or are in decline in the political arena of a country (Lawson and Merkl 1988). When, this happens, something

else will take up that place with voters whether they be movements or peripheral parties. Lawson and Merkl hypothesize that the reasons major parties fail and minor parties gain support is through the linkage theory (Lawson and Merkl 1988). Linkage theory states that major parties lose support when they fail to provide adequate connections or “linkage” between the voter and the party’s decisions and actions (Lawson and Merkl 1988). After this failure to link the voter and the party, the voters may look elsewhere for that desired linkage and connection (Lawson and Merkl 1988).

Theories Applied in Existing Research

Articles studying party success or failure in Spain look at several different theories that might explain voting behavior. The basis of these theories varies from economic, cultural identity, and even psychological. Below is a brief overview of theories referenced in regard to voting determinants that were most common in the existing literature.

Regional Language

A primordialist perspective of nationalism proposes that there are certain cultural and ethnic factors that make a “nation” and decide the strength of behavior related to that “nation.” In the context of Spain, the most distinctive cultural element that separates one autonomous community from the other is the presence of a regional language. Many theorists (Bollen and Medrano 1998, Sorens 2005) study how much a regional language affects behavior and regionalist sentiment.

Economic Development and Losers of Modernization Theory

In economic terms, theorists (Sorens 2005, Georgiadou, Rori, and Roumanias 2018, Bollen and Medrano 1998, Ortiz Barquero 2019) studying Spain often look at data relevant to the wealth of autonomous communities as a whole or the wealth of individuals and how likely they are to support certain movements to autonomy as well as opinions toward immigrants. Sorens (2005) discusses if, at the regional level, there would be greater economic benefit of greater autonomy/secessionism. Autonomous communities that would be worse off after independence, like Andalusia, would be less likely to support secessionism; therefore, the hypothesis would follow that wealthier regions would be more supportive of a potential move towards independence (Sorens 2005). This same logic could apply to individuals who feel that they would suffer economic losses if the situation of autonomy changed.

The theory of the “losers” of modernization is a theory most often applied to voters of far-right nationalist parties that suffer losses as a result of modernization and globalization (Bollen and Medrano 1998, Ortiz Barquero 2019, Georgiadou, Rori, and Roumanias 2018). This theory will be discussed more fully in the following chapter in the section on “Spanish Exceptionalism.”

Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric

A theory closely related to that of the losers of modernization theory in much of the existing research is the identity vulnerability theory that relates to anti-immigrant sentiment (Ortiz Barquero 2019, Georgiadou, Rori, and Roumanias 2018). The “losers” of modernization can often become anti-immigrant when their economic losses are

accompanied by a growth of discourse about immigration (Georgiadou, Rori, and Roumanias 2018). Ortiz Barquero (2019) hypothesizes that due to the increasing salience of immigration in Spain and Andalusia, the rise of far-right political parties can be in part explained by the fear of immigrants as a threat to national identity and traditional religion.

Chapter 2

Spanish Political System and Case Overview

Spain is divided into seventeen autonomous communities each with varying degrees of autonomy. Many of these autonomous communities have distinct cultures and even languages in certain autonomous communities such as Galicia, Catalonia, and the Basque Country. Certain ones of these autonomous communities have been designated as “historic nations” in Spain and are often given higher degrees of autonomy. Within these particular autonomous communities, it is often more common to have regionalist parties that receive a higher level of support and a higher level of substate nationalism

Center-Periphery Cleavage

When studying political parties in Spain, it is important to note that there is a second important divide within the Spanish political system along with the normal left vs. right cleavage. This second dimension of Spanish politics is the center vs periphery cleavage. With the way the Spanish state is set up with separate autonomous communities that have varying levels of autonomy and decentralization, there are parties that exist with agendas not necessarily based around the typical left-right spectrum but also around the opinions for or against further decentralization. This, rather than the typical left-right divide, is the basis of this paper. While a left vs. right ideology is undeniably important when studying center vs. periphery parties, it is not guaranteed that parties on either side

of the center-periphery cleavage are always right or always left. Generally, the Spanish parties that are proponents of a more centralized state and less autonomy for specific autonomous communities are more on the right. However, with parties that are proponents of further decentralization are much more varied. As they, the “regionalist” parties, are generally specific to an autonomous community, there is no set ideology or political leanings that is true across all the “regionalist” parties.

Spanish Exceptionalism

The concept of “Spanish Exceptionalism” (Turnbull-Dugarte 2019, Ortiz Barquero 2019) refers to the lack of a far-right extremist party in Spain’s recent history when other European countries have had recent movements for these types of parties. This “Spanish Exceptionalism” was even more curious when considering that Spain has many of the normal conditions for this type of far-right movement including the economic and unemployment troubles Spain faces (Turnbull-Dugarte 2019). However, with the rise of the political party *Vox*, there seems to be an end to what was once “Spanish Exceptionalism.” This is one of the curiosities that prompted this particular research into studying why voters have decided to vote for a party like *Vox*. This growth has been different across Spain with more support in certain autonomous communities than others. This was marked by *Vox*’s success in the regional elections in Andalusia in 2018 that showed that “Spanish Exceptionalism” was truly over.

There have been recent studies attempting to explain “why now?” with regards to the end of Spanish Exceptionalism. In a study by Turnbull-Dugarte (2019), it was noted that at the time of the growth of *Vox*, Spain had been facing newer issues that generally

spark political movements of this nature. Two of these issues were the Catalan independence movement holding a referendum for Catalan Independence and the growth of the migrant population in Spain of which the opinions against the further autonomy of regions like Catalonia proved to be significant in voting for *Vox* (Turnbull-Dugarte 2019).

An economic explanation for the end of “Spanish Exceptionalism” is that the rise of *Vox* in Spain can be attributed to the theory concerning the “losers” of modernization or globalization; Ortiz Barquero (2019) looks at this explanation among others noting that Andalusia, an autonomous community with a higher level of support for *Vox*, has had a lower GDP per capita. This theory proposes that individuals who are negatively affected by a more modern and globalized world tend to use immigrants and minorities as a scapegoat for their own economic problems (Ortiz Barquero 2019). In the case of Spain, this would seem to push voters affected by modernization towards *Vox*, a party with anti-immigrant stances. As Ortiz Barquero (2019) points out, this anti-immigration stance would only be aided by the idea that immigrants are a threat to the idea of the homogenous nation. This economic theory about why individuals turn to far-right movements combine both ideas about nationalism and the push against immigration that are both important to *Vox* in Spain. However, Spain has been having economic issues before the rise of *Vox*, and this particular theory does not have much support in the findings of Ortiz Barquero (2019).

Case Overview

The four cases I study are the autonomous communities of Andalusia, Catalonia, Galicia, and Murcia. They represent a spectrum of nationalist sentiment as well as levels of support for regionalist and nationalist political parties. Table 2-1 summarizes how individuals feel regarding their national identity in each case. This “nationalist sentiment” represents whether each respondent identifies more with Spain, their autonomous community, or both equally. In the surveys in which this data was found, the respondents were asked which of the statements they most agreed with.

Andalusia and Murcia are the cases that identify least with their autonomous community with Catalonia and Galicia identifying the most with their autonomous community. One reason to explain this is that Catalonia and Galicia are both “historic nations” that received autonomy sooner than other autonomous communities. They also both have a more distinct culture from Spain as a whole. Both have their own regional languages: Catalan and Gallego. However, there is also some difference between these two cases. Catalonia has a higher percentage of respondents that feel more Catalan than Spanish. There is also a difference between Andalusia and Murcia. Andalusia has higher levels of nationalist sentiment than Murcia. These autonomous communities represent a spectrum of nationalist sentiment in this way.

Table 2-1 Descriptive Statistics of Nationalist Sentiment Across Cases

Level of Nationalist Sentiment	Andalusia	Catalonia	Galicia	Murcia
Feel only Spanish	5.9	5.5	3.5	8.8
Feel more Spanish than ----	5.7	6.3	3.6	4.8
Feel as Spanish as ----	74.2	38.2	68.8	83.1
Feel more ---- than Spanish	10.0	24.4	18.8	1.9
Feel Uniquely/Only ----	1.1	21.5	4.0	0.3
N.S.	1.0	1.2	0.4	0.6
N.C.	2.2	2.8	0.9	0.5
Total Respondents	2,913	2,450	2,865	791

Source: “Postelectoral de Cataluña. Elecciones Autonómicas 2017” (2017) , “Postelectoral Elecciones Autonómicas 2018 Comunidad Autónoma de Andalucía” (2018), “Postelectoral de Galicia. Elecciones Autonómicas 2016” (2016), “Postelectoral Elecciones Autonómicas 2015. Región de Murcia 2015” (2015)

There is also a similar pattern when looking at our dependent variables. Votes for regionalist parties are highest in Catalonia and Galicia. While neither Andalusia nor Murcia have much regionalist party support on a national level, Andalusia does have regionalist parties that gain support in regional elections. Andalusia and Murcia also have the higher level of *Vox* support while Catalonia and Galicia have much less. Hamann (1999) gathered data to classify each autonomous community into three categories depending on how much support for regionalist parties was present in each autonomous community. His three classifications were as follows: 1. Regionalist parties have won a majority in an election, 2. Regionalist parties have at least ten percent of the vote, and 3. Regionalist parties have less than ten percent of the vote (Hamann 1999). Of my cases, Catalonia fell under the first category, Galicia and Andalusia fell under the second category, and Murcia fell under the third category (Hamann 1999). However, it is important to note that Hamann’s (1999) data and classifications is outdated. While this

data is old, it does show how the autonomous communities stood then and how they have changed since then.

Chapter 3

Political Parties

Although Spain has many different political parties, only certain parties receive a high enough level of support that would make them competitive in national or even autonomous community elections. The two most widely supported parties are *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE) and *Partido Popular* (PP). PSOE is the mainstream left-wing party while PP is the mainstream right-wing party. My research pertains to peripheral parties that do not receive enough votes to be a contender to be the party of the government, at least not on their own.

The political parties included in my analysis are parties that satisfy two criteria: 1) The party qualifies as either a regionalist party within Andalusia, Catalonia, Galicia, or Murcia or a nationalist party. 2) The party was indicated as the party for which at least one respondent in the survey data intended to vote. In Table 3-1, I have classified each political party that fits the criteria as either “nationalist” or “regionalist” according to the definitions of each of those terms that I have previously set forward in this paper. I have also included, if they are regionalist parties, which region they correspond to.

Table 3-1 Spanish Political Parties

Political Party	Party Type	Area of Influence
Vox	Nationalist	National
Ciutadans-Partido de la Ciudadanía (C's) or Ciudadanos	Nationalist	National
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC)	Regionalist	Catalonia
Candidatura d'Unitat Popular (CUP)	Regionalist	Catalonia
En Comú-Podem (ECP)	Regionalist	Catalonia
Junts per Catalunya (JxCAT)	Regionalist	Catalonia
Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG)	Regionalist	Galicia
En Marea	Regionalist	Galicia
En Común-Unidas Podemos	Regionalist	Galicia

Source: Parties found from CIS surveys: “Barómetro de Noviembre 2019” (2019)

In the following sections, I briefly discuss each political party included in my analysis along with some descriptive statistics that help demonstrate their role in my analysis.

Nationalist Parties

The category “nationalist parties” includes parties that are Spanish nationalist parties: *Ciudadanos* and *Vox*. Using survey data, I show how respondents viewed these particular parties in relation to the two mainstream parties on a 10-point left-right ideological scale. (see Table 3-2). We can see that the mainstream right-wing PP is very similar to *Ciudadanos* in terms of the public’s perception of its ideology while *Vox* is much farther to the right. This is due to what we know about the origin and trajectory of *Ciudadanos*.

Table 3-2 Descriptive Statistics of Left-Right Placement of Political Parties (1= Most Left; 10 = Most Right)

Variables	Mean	Standard Deviation
PSOE	4.15	1.57
PP	7.83	1.38
Ciudadanos	7.03	1.71
Vox	9.38	1.25

Source: “Barómetro de Noviembre 2019” (2019)

Ciudadanos is much less extreme than *Vox*. However, it is important to include in this analysis because it is a party that was born of anti-regionalism in Catalonia. This makes it a potential alternative to *Vox* in the eyes of voters who oppose greater regional autonomy but do not see themselves as extreme as *Vox*. To only use *Vox* as a measure of nationalist party variables would potentially leave out groups of voters.

Ciudadanos began in 2006 in Catalonia as a rejection of the regionalist parties there that were focused on greater autonomy and cultural distinctiveness for the autonomous community (Teruel and Barrio 2016). As this party grew to be a national party with support in national elections and in other regional elections across Spain, its discourse and aims have shifted. However, its origins make it relevant for my analysis, especially as an alternative for Catalan voters who may primarily see it as a party against the regionalist parties of Catalonia that advocate for more autonomy and at the extreme, independence.

Vox is a newer party on the right that has recently emerged and grown in popularity. Andalusia and Murcia have shown some of the highest support and growth of *Vox* in Spain. This is a party that advocates Spanish nationalism as well as other ideas rooted in the far-right. This party’s recent popularity ended what was known as “Spanish

Exceptionalism” since Spain had for so long avoided the rise of the radical right that was occurring throughout Europe in recent history. One explanation includes the Catalan Independence Movement being a trigger for its growth and popularity (Turnbull-Dugarte 2019). Another possibility is preferences for a more central Spanish state as well as right-leaning ideology to be some of the factors explaining *Vox* support (Ortiz Barquero 2019).

Regionalist Parties

The regionalist parties included in this analysis are only the regionalist parties that received some “intention to vote for” in one of my four cases. Catalonia and Galicia both had political parties that fit these criteria. In order to see if there is some difference in the regionalist parties from each of the two cases, I have also separated them into separate dependent variables.

Catalan Regionalist Parties

Catalonia has a wide variety of regionalist political parties. Many of them lean left but not all. Some of them advocate for total independence while others only for greater autonomy. The four Catalan regionalist parties that met the criteria for my analysis are *Junts per Catalunya* (JxCat, Together for Catalonia), *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC, Catalan Republican Left), *Candidatura d’Unitat Popular* (CUP, Popular Unity Candidacy), and *En Comú Podem* (ECP, In Common We Can).

Galician Regionalist Parties

The Galician regionalist parties that managed to receive votes in the general elections are fewer. Unlike the Catalan regionalist parties, they do not have the same national influence. There were three that fit the criteria including two that are more similar to coalitions with some Galician regionalist interests and parties included.

However, they were included in the analysis because the Galician voter would be able to recognize where their interests were represented. The three parties are *Bloque Nacionalista Galego* (BNG, Galician Nationalist Bloc), *Unidas-Podemos* (United We Can), and *En Marea*.

Chapter 4

Data and Analysis

My data comes from a national survey conducted by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) in Spain. This organization conducts multiple studies throughout the year including national barometers for each month, as well as pre- and post-election surveys within each autonomous community for elections at the regional level. For general elections, the barometers in the electoral months are targeted to election-related questions, such as about vote intention and other political variables. I use the November 2019 Barometer. This survey was administered through interviews within the period of October 28 to November 9, 2019. The general election took place on November 10. Every autonomous community was included in this survey, which had 4,805 total participants out of 5,000 potential respondents. Within my cases of interest, there were varying numbers of responses. In Andalusia, there were 651 respondents of the 700 potential respondents. In Catalonia, there were 586 respondents of the 594 potential respondents. In Galicia, there were 250 respondents of 250 potential respondents. In Murcia, there were 192 respondents of 200 potential respondents. The number of potential surveys dispensed in each autonomous community was determined by population

Dependent Variables

My dependent variables are the intention to vote for the specific types of political parties and specific political parties in the then-upcoming November 10 election. I discussed how specific political parties are classified in the previous chapter. However, in the context of my analysis, the dependent variable (party type) is labelled as “nationalist,” “Vox,” “regionalist,” “Catalan regionalist,” and “Galician regionalist.” Each of these was then converted into binary variables. They are coded as 0 if respondents did not intend to vote for the indicated party or type of party and coded as 1 if the respondents intended to vote for the indicated party.

Table 4-1 presents some descriptive statistics on each dependent variable. As previously discussed, the variables are coded as binary variables. One can see that each of these types of parties are peripheral parties. The majority of respondents did not intend to vote for any of the parties included in the dependent variables. However, the voters that did intend to vote for one of these peripheral parties are the interest of further analysis.

Table 4-1 Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables

Variables	Mean	Standard Deviation
Intention to vote for Nationalist Parties	0.12	0.33
Intention to vote for Vox	0.07	0.26
Intention to vote for Regionalist Parties	0.06	0.24
Intention to vote for Catalan Regionalist Parties	0.05	0.21
Intention to vote for Galician Regionalist Parties	0.01	0.11

Source: “Barómetro de Noviembre 2019” (2019)

Independent Variables

My independent variables are divided into categories for the purposes of organization. I have demographic, performance, and political variables. The demographic variables include gender, age, religiosity, and education level. Along with the traditional demographic variables, I have also included the economic variable of personal income. My performance variables are an evaluation of the current economic situation in Spain and an evaluation of the current political situation in Spain. My political variables include marking the Catalan Independence Movement as a current major issue in Spain, marking immigration as a current major issue in Spain, whether or not the Catalan Independence Movement influenced the vote of the respondent, and a self-placement on the left-right spectrum. Below, I discuss how I coded each variable for the analysis. For variables that included answers of “Did not answer” or “Did not know,” I removed those answers from the data and turned them into missing values. I wanted my analysis to focus on the respondents that had an answer to the question posed.

The demographic variables are coded as follows. The variable of gender is coded as a binary variable with 1 being “male” and 0 being “female.” The variable of age has not been changed. It remains the same as that of the original data.

The variable of religiosity is condensed into three categories. The first category (coded 1) is titled “Religious” and includes the answers of “Practicing Catholic” and “Other Religion”. The second category (coded 2) is solely the answer “Non-practicing Catholic.” I chose to make this a separate category from the “Religious” category because it is very common in Spain to have people who are culturally Catholic but are not actively religious. There is a large portion of the population that falls into this category, and this

group of people may behave differently to the group that consider themselves actively religious. The third category (coded 3) is the “Nonreligious” category and includes those that answered “Agnostic,” “Indifferent/No belief,” and “Atheist.”

The variable of education level has been condensed into seven categories. The first category (coded 1) is those that reported less than 5 years of education or no education. The second category (coded 2) is those that reported having a primary education. The third category (coded 3) is those that reported having the first step of a secondary education (in Spain this means not continuing on to Bacherillato). The fourth category (coded 4) is those that completed the second step of secondary education (Bacherillato). The fifth category (coded 5) is those that reported some type of vocational or professional training. The sixth category (coded 6) is all types of higher degrees. The seventh category (coded 7) is any other degrees not specifically asked about in the survey. In summary, the general trend of this variable is that a higher number is equivalent to a higher level of education.

I decided to use personal income as a more economic-related demographic variable. This variable differs from the variable of household income. I am interested in potentially distinguishing a certain group of people through the use of the variable of personal income. When comparing the distributions of both personal income and household income, household income is normally distributed. Personal income is not normally distributed as it has a large group of individuals that reported little or no personal income. This group disappears when looking at the normally distributed household income. This implies that there is a group of people who live in a household with income, but personally, they lack their own income. This group of people could be

the unemployed, most likely younger individuals caught up in the youth unemployment crisis in Spain and still living at home. Is this group of people more likely to vote for peripheral parties as a result of their dissatisfaction? By using personal income over household income, I can take this specific group into account.

The performance variables of economic evaluation and political evaluation have both been condensed into three categories. The first category (coded 1) is “Positive Feelings” about the economic or political situation. This corresponds to the answers “good” and “very good.” The second category (coded 2) includes respondents who have neither positive nor negative feelings about the economic or political situation. This corresponds to the answer “regular.” The third category (coded 3) is “Negative Feelings” about the economic or political situation. This corresponds to the answers “bad” and “very bad.”

The political variables are slightly more complicated. The variables pertaining to perception of major issues in Spain as either the Catalan Independence Movement or immigration are the combination of three questions asked in the survey. The survey asked the participants what they perceived as the major issues in Spain. They were asked for a first choice, second choice, and third choice in three separate questions. I combined the answers of these three questions into one binary variable for each response of interest: Catalan Independence Movement and Immigration. If a respondent listed the Catalan Independence Movement in any of the three choices, they were coded as 1 for “yes” (i.e., the respondent viewed CIM as an important issue). Respondents who did not list this were coded as 0 for “no.” I used the same process for the issue of immigration. If a

respondent answer immigration for any of their three choices, they were coded as 1 or “yes” (and 0 for “no” if they did not).

The variable of whether or not the Catalan Independence Movement affected their vote was directly asked by the survey as a yes or no question. Therefore, those that replied “yes” are coded as 1, while the respondents that answered “no” are coded as 2. It is important to note that the reply of “yes” does not necessarily mean that influenced their decision to vote or not to vote for a certain party. Instead, it can refer to deciding to vote at all or not to vote at all. It can also mean changing one’s party preference. It is a general question asking if the Catalan Independence Movement had any influence at all on one’s voting behavior prior to the November 2019 general election.

The variable of self-placement on a left-right scale is simple. It is a scale of 1 to 10 with 1 corresponding to the “most left” and 10 corresponding to the “most right.”

Table 4-2 displays similar descriptive data of the independent variables that was shown in Table 4-1 regarding the dependent variables. Also included is the minimum and maximum for each variable since the variables have varying numbers of categories and ways in which they were coded.

Table 4-2 Here

Methodology

From my hypotheses discussed earlier in this paper, the variables I am most interested in are the political evaluation, the direct question about if the Catalan Independence Movement affected the vote, and both major issue variables (immigration and the Catalan Independence Movement). Regarding Spain, both immigration and controversy surround

decentralization are topics of interest regarding the choice to vote for far-right nationalist political parties. However, throughout this analysis, I will also be looking at demographic variables, other evaluation variables, and other political variables. I will be conducting five logistic regression models for each of my five dependent variables. The models will be organized in the following manner:

- **Model 1:** Demographic variables only
- **Model 2:** Demographic and performance variables
- **Model 3:** Demographic and political variables
- **Model 4:** Repetition of Model 3 with the deletion of one political variable
- **Model 5:** All variables

Each model includes all demographic and economic variables. Models 2 and 3 are straightforward in that they will build on Model 1 with one additional category of the independent variables each. Model 4 is almost exactly the same as Model 3, but it excludes whether the Catalan Independence Movement influenced the vote of the respondent. Since this variable could potentially be very similar to the Major Issue variable pertaining to the Catalan Independence Movement, I wanted to see the significance of this variable without the interference. Model 5 consists of all the variables.

Analysis

Below, Tables 4-3, 4-4, 4-5, 4-6, and 4-7 show the results of the regression analysis done for each dependent variable. The data shows that the most distinction between voters of regionalist and nationalist parties come from the demographic

variables. However, there are also many variables that prove significant in the same ways across all the party types showing that they are significant for both types of the peripheral parties in the same way. All hypotheses with the exception of H4 have at least some support in the data.

Nationalist Parties

“Nationalist parties” includes both *Ciudadanos* and *Vox*. While *Vox* is a more extreme, peripheral party, *Ciudadanos* is becoming more mainstream. This means that this category may contain a more general group of respondents and voters. Table 4-3 shows the results of regression analysis. There are a number of variables that are highly significant with a few that are highly significant in all models. This analysis of the nationalist parties provides support for H1 in Model 2, H2 in Models 3 and 5, and H3 in Models 3-5. H4 does not have support with nationalist parties. Since respondents for “nationalist parties” also said that the Catalan Independence Movement did have an influence on their vote, this could signify that while they see it as important, these voters do not see it as one of the top three major issues in Spain. In a more targeted question where they do not have to prioritize issues, it matters. However, in a more general question that contains a multitude of potential responses, it is not as important. If this is the case and the reasoning behind this unexpected result, then it could signify that the idea of the Catalan Independence Movement is not as important to these voters as previously thought.

Other significant variables with regard to the intention to vote for nationalist parties are age, religiosity, personal income, the economic evaluation, and the left-right

self-placement. These results suggest that those more likely to vote for nationalist parties are younger, more religious, have a higher income, have negative feelings about the economy, and have a more right-leaning ideology. In some of the models, male respondents are slightly more likely to support nationalist parties. These results do not support the losers of modernization theory since they are not only not significantly lower income but they tend to have a higher income. However, these results do support a common idea that individuals who are more traditional and religious would be more likely to vote for anti-immigrant, far-right parties as a result of seeing them as a threat to their religious and conservative values (Ortiz Barquero 2019).

Table 4-3 Here

Vox

Vox supporters seem to be a more specific group. When isolating these voters, we can see more significant relationships and determinants with this particular analysis.

Table 4-4 displays the results from the regression models focusing only on *Vox* supporters. From this table, we can see similar support for these hypotheses as those of the nationalist parties. H1, H2, and H3 all have support while H4 does not have support. Like the voters of the “nationalist” category, *Vox*-specific voters are generally younger, more religious, with a higher income, negative feelings about the economy, and right leaning. However, what differs from the voters of the larger category is that *Vox* voters are also less educated and more significantly male. This difference helps us distinguish

between those that choose to vote for a less extreme alternative with the voters who chose to vote more extreme.

Table 4-4 Here

Regionalist Parties

The results of the regression analysis of support for regionalist parties are shown in Table 4-5. Since H3 only pertained to *Vox* and nationalist parties, H3 is excluded from this analysis. According to the results of this regression, H1 and H2 both have support. H4 has support in Model 4 when the variable that may be causing its significance to not surface is removed from the regression. With regionalist parties, there is not significance with the gender of the respondents nor with the choice of immigration as a major issue. In addition to the variables discussed in the hypotheses, the profile of a voter for regionalist parties is older (in some models), less religious, with higher level of education, higher income, negative feelings about economic situation, and left-leaning ideology.

Table 4-5 Here

Catalan Regionalist Parties

Narrowing down the broad “regionalist parties” variable to just Catalan regionalist parties in Table 4-6, we see that there is similar support for three hypotheses with H1, H2, and H4 all having support. However, H4 does have more support with this series of regression. This makes sense as the Catalan Independence Movement is perhaps most salient for voters of Catalan-specific regionalist parties. Similar to the larger

category of regionalist parties, there is no significant relationship with seeing immigration as a major issue. However, there is some significance in some models with voters being female. Other than this difference, the voter profile is nearly identical to the larger category.

Table 4-6 Here

Galician Regionalist Parties

The voters for the Galician regionalist parties are the most different compared to the other regionalist party dependent variables. The results of each regression model are shown in Table 4-7. Of the hypotheses, there is no support for any of the hypotheses. In fact, the opposite is true for H4 which states that the Catalan Independence Movement will be seen as a major issue for voters of all types of parties. While H4 has had the least support of any of the hypotheses, with Galician regionalist party voters there is actually a significant relationship of not seeing the Catalan Independence Movement as a major issue.

The profile of a Galician regionalist party voter is female (in some models), less religious, with higher education, negative feelings about the economy, and left-leaning ideology. The variables that have no significant relationship are age, personal income, the political evaluation, seeing immigration as a major issue, and the influence of the Catalan Independence Movement on the vote.

Table 4-7 Here

Results Summary and Discussion

By looking at each set of regressions for each dependent variable together, we can see which variables are the most influential and which of my original hypotheses have the most support throughout all the dependent variables and models. These individual-level determinants can help form a profile of a certain type of voter whether it be a voter for regionalist or nationalist political parties.

H1 which stated that as negative feelings about the current political situation increase, the support for peripheral parties would increase is supported in the analysis. This was supported by all sets of regression models with the exception of Galician regionalist party voters. It makes sense that a dissatisfaction with the current political climate and mainstream parties would lead to voters looking elsewhere for their support. This is reminiscent of the idea of the linkage theory in which parties that fail to represent or connect with the voters “fail” (Lawson and Merkl 1988).

H2 that connected the choice to vote for peripheral parties with marking yes that their vote was influenced by the Catalan Independence Movement is also supported in a similar manner. All sets of regression models supported this hypothesis except Galician regionalist parties. The mechanism linking these variables is of course that a strong opinion about the Catalan independence movement would lead to voting for a party that also has clear stances on this movement. That would of course refer to nearly all of our parties including nationalist, *Vox*, regionalist, and Catalan regionalist. However, it also would help understand why Galician regionalist parties do not have support for this hypothesis. Galician regionalist parties are somewhat separate from this issue as they are not directly for or against Catalan independence.

H3 focused more on nationalist parties or more specifically, *Vox*. It stated that respondents who perceive immigration as a major issue in Spain would be the respondents more likely to vote for nationalist parties or *Vox* in particular. This was supported by the relevant sets of regressions. Immigration was an important variable pertaining to the nationalist type parties but not with the regionalist type parties.

H4 was the least supported hypothesis. It stated that voters of all types of parties would record the Catalan Independence Movement as a major issue in Spain. However, this was primarily only done by respondents who voted for Catalan Regionalist Parties. However, it is interesting to note that all types of parties, excluding Galician regionalist parties, had a significant relationship with the variable of the influence that the movement had on their vote. This shows that while it did influence their vote in some way, it was not important enough to be considered a major issue in Spain by the nationalist parties, *Vox*, and regionalist parties (except in one model).

The analysis reveals certain variables that were very important or significant but were not predicted by my hypotheses. These were age, religiosity, gender, education level, personal income, the economic evaluation, and self-placement on the ideological scale. There was some variation in how these variables were related to the different dependent variables and in some cases if they were significant at all. These specific results are summarized in Table 4-8. This table summarizes the profiles of each type of voter with each significant variable. However, it is important to note that some of these significant variables are only significant in some of the models.

Table 4-8 Here

These results demonstrate that it is primarily demographic variables that affect voting behavior for Spain's peripheral parties. These demographic variables are more important in the analysis compared to general policy opinions and perceptions of the current state of politics and the economy in Spain. Seeing regionalist and nationalist political parties as opposites across the center-periphery cleavage in Spain has support in the demographic "opposites" seen in the analysis. Many of the general political variables such as having negative feelings about the current state of Spain are significant in the same manner for both types of peripheral parties. This leads to the conclusion that while certain dissatisfaction can lead to a voter choosing to support a party on the periphery, the demographic variables are determinants of which side of the center-periphery divide to support: regionalist or nationalist.

Table 4-2 Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables

Variables	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Demographic Variables				
Gender (1 = Male)	0.48	0.50	0.00	1.00
Age	50.96	17.90	18	98
Religiosity (1= Most Religious, 3 = Least Religious)	2.05	0.73	1.00	3.00
Education Level	4.22	1.60	1.00	7.00
Economic Variables				
Personal Income	4.32	2.09	1.00	11.00
Performance Variables				
Economic Evaluation (1 = Positive Feelings)	2.45	0.60	1.00	3.00
Political Evaluation (1 = Positive Feelings)	2.78	0.46	1.00	3.00
Political Variables				
Catalan Independence Movement as Major Issue (1 = Yes)	0.19	0.39	0.00	1.00
Immigration as Major Issue (1 = Yes)	0.12	0.32	0.00	1.00
Catalan Independence Movement Influence on Vote (2 = No)	1.57	0.50	1.00	2.00
Left-Right Orientation Scale (1= Most Left; 10 = Most Right)	4.67	2.07	1.00	10.00

Source: “Barómetro de Noviembre 2019” (2019)

Table 4-3 Logistic Regression with Dependent Variable: Votes for Nationalist Parties

Independent Variables	Model 1:	Model 2:	Model 3:	Model 4:	Model 5:
Male	0.209* (0.111)	0.221** (0.113)	-0.006 (0.132)	-0.001 (0.131)	-0.003 (0.134)
Age	-0.034*** (0.004)	-0.035*** (0.004)	-0.037*** (0.004)	-0.037*** (0.004)	-0.039*** (0.004)
Lack of Religiosity	-0.593*** (0.778)	-0.616*** (0.079)	-0.043 (0.100)	-0.028 (0.100)	-0.032 (0.102)
Education Level	-0.014 (0.040)	-0.013 (0.040)	-0.038 (0.047)	-0.016 (0.047)	-0.030 (0.048)
Personal Income	0.117*** (0.029)	0.122*** (0.029)	0.092*** (0.033)	0.098*** (0.033)	0.097*** (0.033)
Economic Evaluation: Negative Feelings		0.275*** (0.097)			0.257** (0.113)
Political Evaluation: Negative Feelings		0.437*** (0.142)			0.184 (0.163)
Major Issue: Catalan Independence Movement			0.139 (0.152)	0.246 (0.150)	0.185 (0.154)
Major Issue: Immigration			0.791*** (0.160)	0.811*** (0.159)	0.787*** (0.162)
No Influence of Catalan Independence on Vote			-0.636*** (0.130)		-0.616*** (0.132)
Self-Placement on Left-Right Scale (Right)			0.576*** (0.036)	0.604*** (0.035)	0.580*** (0.036)
LR chi square	131.36	154.82	588.86	571.56	599.46
P-value	0.000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R-squared	0.0515	0.0613	0.2541	0.2451	0.2608

Source: "Barómetro de Noviembre 2019" (2019)

*Note *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Table 4-4 Logistic Regression with Dependent Variable: Votes for Vox

Independent Variables	Model 1:	Model 2:	Model 3:	Model 4:	Model 5:
Male	0.604*** (0.145)	0.654*** (0.149)	0.496*** (0.176)	0.508*** (0.174)	0.568*** (0.182)
Age	-0.033*** (0.005)	-0.035*** (0.005)	-0.034*** (0.006)	-0.034*** (0.006)	-0.037*** (0.006)
Lack of Religiosity	-0.727*** (0.099)	-0.783*** (0.102)	-0.199 (0.133)	-0.178 (0.132)	-0.208 (0.138)
Education Level	-0.101** (0.051)	-0.089* (0.051)	-0.131** (0.061)	-0.104* (0.061)	-0.103 (0.063)
Personal Income	0.137*** (0.038)	0.154*** (0.039)	0.114*** (0.043)	0.118*** (0.043)	0.121*** (0.044)
Economic Evaluation: Negative Feelings		0.774*** (0.138)			0.853*** (0.164)
Political Evaluation: Negative Feelings		1.064*** (0.253)			0.849*** (0.295)
Major Issue: Catalan Independence Movement			-0.309 (0.205)	-0.175 (0.201)	-0.231 (0.211)
Major Issue: Immigration			1.311*** (0.184)	1.339*** (0.182)	1.309*** (0.190)
No Influence of Catalan Independence on Vote			-0.748*** (0.174)		-0.684*** (0.180)
Self-Placement on Left-Right Scale (Right)			0.648*** (0.045)	0.680*** (0.045)	0.652*** (0.046)
LR chi square	111.42	189.50	515.42	503.49	564.99
P-value	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R-squared	0.0631	0.1085	0.3224	0.3132	0.3566

Source: "Barómetro de Noviembre 2019" (2019)

*Note *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Table 4-5 Logistic Regression with Dependent Variable: Votes for Regionalist Parties

Independent Variables	Model 1:	Model 2:	Model 3:	Model 4:	Model 5:
Male	-0.165 (0.173)	-0.140 (0.176)	0.041 (0.187)	-0.115 (0.178)	0.090 (0.191)
Age	0.009 (0.006)	0.011* (0.006)	0.010 (0.007)	0.004 (0.006)	0.012* (0.007)
Lack of Religiosity	1.020*** (0.143)	1.036*** (0.145)	0.448*** (0.157)	0.444*** (0.151)	0.428*** (0.160)
Education Level	0.237*** (0.068)	0.265*** (0.068)	0.193*** (0.073)	0.197*** (0.070)	0.234*** (0.074)
Personal Income	0.147*** (0.047)	0.173*** (0.048)	0.122** (0.052)	0.144*** (0.049)	0.150*** (0.053)
Economic Evaluation: Negative Feelings		0.689*** (0.165)			0.683*** (0.176)
Political Evaluation: Negative Feelings		1.138*** (0.332)			1.197*** (0.349)
Major Issue: Catalan Independence Movement			0.228 (0.222)	0.521** (0.212)	0.204 (0.228)
Major Issue: Immigration			-0.366 (0.375)	-0.422 (0.362)	-0.252 (0.379)
No Influence of Catalan Independence on Vote			-1.852*** (0.205)		-1.820*** (0.209)
Self-Placement on Left- Right Scale (Right)			-0.592*** (0.061)	-0.533*** (0.059)	-0.594*** (0.0616)
LR chi square	123.15	169.31	305.85	209.75	346.74
P-value	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R-squared	0.0960	0.1325	0.2486	0.1693	0.2826

Source: "Barómetro de Noviembre 2019" (2019)

*Note *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Table 4-6 Logistic Regression with Dependent Variable: Votes for Catalan Regionalist Parties

Independent Variables	Model 1:	Model 2:	Model 3:	Model 4:	Model 5:
Male	-0.337* (0.194)	-0.326* (0.197)	-0.156 (0.208)	-0.312 (0.199)	-0.129 (0.214)
Age	0.011* (0.007)	0.014** (0.007)	0.013* (0.008)	0.005 (0.007)	0.015* (0.008)
Lack of Religiosity	0.919*** (0.156)	0.943*** (0.159)	0.374** (0.173)	0.395** (0.165)	0.371** (0.178)
Education Level	0.201*** (0.075)	0.226*** (0.075)	0.143* (0.082)	0.154** (0.077)	0.186** (0.083)
Personal Income	0.181*** (0.053)	0.209*** (0.054)	0.145** (0.058)	0.174*** (0.056)	0.177*** (0.060)
Economic Evaluation: Negative Feelings		0.595*** (0.183)			0.599*** (0.195)
Political Evaluation: Negative Feelings		2.570*** (0.716)			2.671*** (0.729)
Major Issue: Catalan Independence Movement			0.483** (0.233)	0.806*** (0.221)	0.440* (0.240)
Major Issue: Immigration			-0.238 (0.400)	-0.307 (0.383)	-0.092 (0.408)
No Influence of Catalan Independence on Vote			-2.453*** (0.274)		-2.424*** (0.278)
Self-Placement on Left- Right Scale (Right)			-0.559*** (0.066)	-0.484*** (0.064)	-0.568*** (0.067)
LR chi square	88.58	144.23	270.49	152.10	321.11
P-value	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R-squared	0.0830	0.1356	0.2629	0.1475	0.3129

Source: "Barómetro de Noviembre 2019" (2019)

*Note *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Table 4-7 Logistic Regression with Dependent Variable: Votes for Galician Regionalist Parties

Independent Variables	Model 1:	Model 2:	Model 3:	Model 4:	Model 5:
Male	0.451 (0.372)	0.495 (0.374)	0.673* (0.390)	0.576 (0.377)	0.730* (0.392)
Age	0.001 (0.013)	-0.000 (0.013)	0.001 (0.014)	0.000 (0.013)	-0.000 (0.014)
Lack of Religiosity	1.354*** (0.350)	1.336*** (0.350)	0.744** (0.375)	0.654* (0.358)	0.741** (0.376)
Education Level	0.350** (0.027)	0.373** (0.151)	0.316** (0.156)	0.320** (0.153)	0.336** (0.156)
Personal Income	0.027 (0.093)	0.045 (0.093)	0.027 (0.100)	0.022 (0.098)	0.042 (0.101)
Economic Evaluation: Negative Feelings		0.910*** (0.349)			0.804** (0.360)
Political Evaluation: Negative Feelings		-0.428 (0.391)			-0.456 (0.410)
Major Issue: Catalan Independence Movement			-1.809* (1.029)	-1.781* (1.025)	-1.762* (1.031)
Major Issue: Immigration			-0.870 (1.029)	-0.932 (1.028)	-0.897 (1.035)
No Influence of Catalan Independence on Vote			-0.160 (0.365)		-0.100 (0.368)
Self-Placement on Left- Right Scale (Right)			-0.613*** (0.135)	-0.625*** (0.133)	-0.591*** (0.135)
LR chi square	41.19	48.30	75.07	75.63	80.33
P-value	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R-squared	0.1064	0.1251	0.2032	0.1996	0.2178

Source: "Barómetro de Noviembre 2019" (2019)

*Note *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Table 4-8 Profiles of Types of Voters

Variables	Nationalist Voters	Vox Voters	Regionalist Voters	Catalan Regionalist Voters	Galician Regionalist Voters
Demographic Variables					
Gender	male	male	---	female	female
Age	younger	younger	older	older	---
Religiosity	more religious	more religious	less religious	less religious	less religious
Education Level	---	less educated	more educated	more educated	more educated
Economic Variables					
Personal Income	higher	higher	higher	higher	---
Performance Variables					
Economic Evaluation	negative feelings	negative feelings	negative feelings	negative feelings	negative feelings
Political Evaluation	negative feelings	negative feelings	negative feelings	negative feelings	---
Political Variables					
Catalan Independence Movement as Major Issue	---	---	yes	yes	no
Immigration as Major Issue	yes	yes	---	---	---
Catalan Independence Movement Influence on Vote	yes	yes	yes	yes	---
Left-Right Orientation Scale	right	right	left	left	left

Source: “Barómetro de Noviembre 2019” (2019)

Conclusion

Spain is an interesting case to study political parties and determinants of voting behavior because not only does the typical left-right cleavage exist, but there is also a center-periphery divide. This is the result of Spain's division into seventeen autonomous communities. Some of these autonomous communities, designated historic nations, have their own culture and language, and some were granted higher levels of autonomy earlier on in their history. These particular parties have had strong levels of support for regionalist political parties. Some of these autonomous communities and political parties have even advocated for independence with varying levels of support and success. However, peripheral regionalist parties exist all throughout Spain as does the sense of belonging to a group other than the "Spanish nation".

Other political parties have appeared to oppose substate nationalism. *Ciudadanos* was created specifically in opposition to Catalan nationalism, and more recently *Vox* has emerged a strong proponent of "Spanish-only" nationalism. The purpose of my research was to study why support for these different types of parties varies across Spain.

In this paper, I used logistic regression to analyze the most important determinants of voting for five specific groups of political parties in Spain. These parties were "nationalist", *Vox*, "regionalist", "Catalan regionalist", and "Galician regionalist." From this analysis, I was able to determine that the demographic variables of gender, age, religiosity, and education level as well as the self-placement on a left-right ideological scale showed the most difference between the two broad categories of parties. Other

variables such as economic evaluation, political evaluation, the influence of the Catalan independence movement on the vote, and income were almost always significant but in the same manner for all types of peripheral parties with no distinction between “nationalist” and “regionalist” parties.

From my findings, I found that negative feelings about the current economic and political situation, a higher income, and having one’s vote be influenced by the Catalan Independence Movement were the general variables that led to voting for the parties on the periphery. The variables that distinguished between voting for regionalist and nationalist parties were primarily the demographic variables as well as the left-right preferences. Nationalist and *Vox* voters were generally male, younger, more religious, less educated, and had a right-leaning ideology. Most regionalist voters were generally female, older, less religious, more educated, and had a left-leaning ideology.

While much existing research exists looking at autonomous communities as a whole regarding support for certain types of parties in Spain, this research looks only at individual-level data. While research analyzing data at the level of autonomous communities looks at variables such as GDP per capita and other broad variables, this analysis shows that on an individual-level, personal socioeconomic status does not seem to have an impact on voting intention. This analysis allows a closer look at the individual voters that exist within the broader context of their autonomous communities.

From the results of the analysis, one can see that demographic variables are the primary distinction between regionalist and nationalist voters. Topics that one might assume to be more impactful, such as specific political opinions on immigration and

decentralization, turn out to not be as important when differentiating between these two types of voters.

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