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The Pendulum's Dance with Dictatorship and Democracy: A Look at Journalistic Successes and Failures of the Twentieth Century Spanish Press

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THE PENDULUM'S DANCE WITH DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY: A Look at Journalistic Successes, Failures and Trends of the Twentieth-Century Spanish Press

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ABSTRACT
MARGARET WHITAKER HUTTER: The Pendulum's Dance with Dictatorship and Democracy: A Look at Journalistic Successes, Failures and Trends of the Twentieth-Century Spanish Press
(Under the direction of Melvin Arrington)

The Spanish press has been compared by some to a pendulum, oscillating back and forth between a free press and a press subject to complete censorship by the Spanish government. This thesis is a study of the twentieth-century Spanish press between the years 1939 and 1989. In it I examine the swinging of the pendulum of the Spanish press between the dictatorship of Francisco Franco, the transition to democracy, and throughout the first decade of the established democratic Spanish state. I take a critical look at the journalistic successes, failures and trends of the Spanish press throughout this 50-year scope as well as the significant relationship between a free press and a successful democracy. These twentieth-century trends are contextualized within political, economic and social frames as well as within the extensive history of the Spanish periodic press. In order to provide concrete examples of my findings, I have analyzed specific articles from the Spanish periodical *ABC*—examples which illustrate the trends, successes and limitations of the twentieth-century Spanish press.

PREFACE

This study has been inspired by and written considering two different perspectives. The first perspective comes from my fascination with the history of the Spanish state. This thesis examines profound social, economic and political changes in Spain during the nation's transition from dictatorship to democracy, using the press as a way to streamline that study. The second perspective comes from my view as a journalism student. In this study, I define two of the fundamental elements of journalism and examine the successes and failures of the Spanish press in the context of these elements. This thesis uses the history of the Spanish press to examine certain journalistic trends and implications, and it also uses certain journalistic elements to study and analyze a period of great change and importance in the history of the Spanish state.

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INTRODUCTION

Journalism is the act of reporting news, and news, at its core, is simply necessary information. Facts regarding the economy, statements made by public figures, sports scores, everyday personal opinions and details regarding the weather each classify as information people need to make informed decisions throughout their day-to-day lives. Throughout history, the basic need for news has been ever-present—a trend that has persisted over centuries and across the globe. In the days of hunter-gatherers, news came in the form of oral messages, reporting whether or not food was over the next hill (Kovach and Rosenstiel 1, 2). In the Age of Enlightenment, papers reported news of inventions, discoveries and new theories. Now, in the twenty-first century, news surrounds us. Internet, television and traditional print publications all provide a steady flow of information, constantly connecting different corners of the world through the simple commonality of an instinctual need for news. Through different mediums, in different countries and at different speeds, information has always been spread to the general public.

In addition to this basic human need for news, another journalistic trend has emerged over time—the concept that an organic and mutually beneficial relationship exists between a free press and democracy. At the heart of democracy lies the fundamental belief that people can govern themselves—the belief that, with enough information, citizens can make informed decisions regarding their nation and their

individual lives. In order to make the decisions and choices necessary to successfully govern itself, the public must be informed. The key to democracy is public awareness and producing public awareness is a journalist's job. Thomas Jefferson once said regarding the press—"If I had to choose between government without newspapers, and newspapers without government, I wouldn't hesitate to choose the latter"—reflecting the belief that while journalism can exist without democracy, democracy would be fatally ruined without a free press (Cardin).

Countries across the world have distinct histories with both a national periodical press and democracy. Some nations have experienced democracy, while others have not; some have had a free press, while other nations have not. Spain, a country dating back to the fifteenth century, has a significant history with both. While the periodical press and democracy are both significant pieces in the patchwork of the nation's past, Spain's journalistic history goes back far beyond that of its relationship with democracy. The history of the Spanish periodical press dates back to the 1400s, while the first successful Spanish democracy was not established until the second half of the twentieth century.

On November 20, 1975, General Francisco Franco died, bringing the caudillo's 38-year-long dictatorship over the Spanish state to an end. Over the following year, King Juan Carlos and Prime Minister Adolfo Sáurez worked to successfully transform Spain from dictatorship to democracy—achieving that goal with the ratification of the 1976 Political Reform Act, which called for a democratically elected parliament (Ross 1-7). Between November 20, 1975 and December 15, 1976—just 390 days—Spain was transformed, by law, from a dictatorship to a democracy. (Ross 1-7).

Spain's journalistic history is unique. The history of the Spanish press has been compared by some to the swinging of a pendulum—left to right, right to left. On the left of the trajectory lies freedom of the press, on the right, complete censorship (Schulte 2). With such extremes on either side, in the center of the pendulum's trajectory lies a moderately free press—an elusive blend of freedom and control. From the fifteenth century to the twenty-first, ever-changing sociopolitical influences have caused the pendulum to oscillate, swinging back and forth between the two extremes. In order to examine trends of the twentieth-century Spanish press, it is important to contextualize the study within the extensive history of Spanish journalism, a history that will be explored in Chapter One.

This study will take a detailed look at the state and quality of the twentieth-century Spanish periodical press in terms of two fundamental elements of journalism. The criteria by which I will judge the journalistic quality are as follows:

1. Is the press' first obligation to the truth? And,
2. Does the press provide the public with information necessary for citizens to live their day-to-day lives?

Across different cultures and throughout different times, these two elements have surfaced as bulwarks of the periodical press—bulwarks that represent the spirit and the original intention of journalism at its core (Kovach and Rosenstiel 1, 2). This study will examine the oscillating pendulum of the Spanish press over a 50 year range, from 1939 to 1989. Within this half-century scope, it will focus on the state of the Spanish press throughout three distinct periods. The first period dates from 1939 to 1959—the first twenty years of Francisco Franco's authoritarian rule; the second period covers the years

1960 through 1976, the last sixteen years of Franco's dictatorship and a period that saw the first social, economic and legal transitions from dictatorship to democracy; and the third period stretches from 1977 to 1989, covering the first decade of the new democratic state and completing the half-century scope of time. The study will analyze the successes, the failures and the trends of the periodical press throughout these years and will show the organic relationship that was formed between the press and the democratic Spanish state.

In order to pinpoint specific examples of the successes, failures and the evolution of the Spanish press, individual articles of the Spanish periodical *ABC* have been analyzed—each case study reflecting certain aspects of the twentieth-century Spanish press in relation to the two previously defined fundamental elements of journalism. A historically conservative paper, *ABC* was established in Madrid on January 1, 1903 by Torcuata Luca de Tena. Still published today, it is currently the third most widely read newspaper in Spain. With a long and distinctive past, the lifespan and archives of *ABC* stretch throughout the scope of this study and the content of the publication reflects trends within the whole of the nation's periodical press.

CHAPTER 1: History and trends of the Spanish press

In order to examine the successes, failures and trends of the Spanish press from 1939 to 1989, this timeframe must first be situated within the extensive history of the Spanish periodical press. As a nation, Spain's history stretches back over five-hundred years to when it was unified in the second half of the fifteenth century. Throughout these centuries, there have been five pivotally important times in the history of Spanish journalism, each representing a movement of the pendulum that symbolizes the periodical press (Schulte 12).

The first of these moments was the arrival of the moveable-type printing press in 1470. German inventor Johannes Gutenberg invented the printing press in 1440, and within three decades it had reached Spain, dramatically changing the nature of both printing and the press within Spanish society. Prior to Gutenberg's invention, printed documents were made by using non-reusable wooden blocks—making the process time-consuming, inefficient and expensive. Gutenberg's invention both simplified and shortened the printing process. Also, because the press was reusable, printing was made much more affordable for the average citizen. Gutenberg's invention spread throughout Europe within decades. By 1500, over 2,500 printing presses had reached Western Europe, and by 1470 they had reached Spain (Kreis).

Almost immediately following the invention of the printing press, there was a major increase in the circulation of printed documents and newspapers, allowing for

information to be to spread more quickly and accurately throughout all of Western Europe. An important consequence of Gutenberg's printing press was a shift of the control over printing and printed materials. Prior to Gutenberg's invention, almost all books and documents in Spain were printed by the Catholic Church. The Church, therefore, had almost complete control over what information was spread to the public. However, as the printing press became more affordable and more available to secular groups in society, the Church lost this complete control (Butler). The emergence of the moveable-type printing press in Spanish society marks the true start of the Spanish press and the introduction of the metaphorical pendulum. As the Church gradually lost exclusive control over the distribution of information, the natural birth of a free press occurred. This loss of control and infant free press marks the first movement of the pendulum—its neutrality offset for the first time, falling towards the left of its trajectory.

The second pivotal moment in the history of the Spanish press came just 32 years after the arrival of the printing press. In 1502, Spain's monarchical rulers Ferdinand and Isabella introduced a regulation that called for the censorship of all publications produced within Spain or entering the country from abroad (Spain: From Ferdinand and Isabella to Phillip). For the first time, the youthful press was restricted, a restriction that marks the swing of the pendulum to the right of its trajectory.

The regulation was established within the first three decades of the Spanish Inquisition, which began in 1480 and lasted until 1834. The Spanish Inquisition is said to have caused the deaths of between 3,000 and 5,000 people throughout its 350 year history. One of the monarchy's main motives behind the Inquisition was to achieve religious and political unification of the autonomously divided country (Chalmers). Prior

to its establishment as a Christian state in 1492, the country was composed of independent kingdoms, each with distinct histories, traditions and leadership. Despite the nation's legal unification in 1492, these cultural divisions persisted long aftewards. Adding fire to the cultural divisions within the new Spanish state, religious division throughout the area remained strong as well. Following the Moorish Invasion of 711, Islam dominated the Iberian Peninsula for nearly 800 years. After a long period of decline, however, Muslim domination officially ended in 1492, with the conclusion of the Christian Reconquest, or *Reconquista*. Prior to the reconquest, three religions coexisted to a certain extent in the Iberian Peninsula—Christianity, Islam and Judaism (Islam: Muslim Spain). After 1492, however, only one was dominant: Christianity—more specifically, Catholicism.

Paired with the long-established cultural and political differences dividing the nation, the country's history of religious diversity was a major factor in Ferdinand and Isabella's establishment of the Inquisition. During the Inquisition, court hearings were held that dealt with religious heresy, and thousands of Muslims and Jews were sentenced to death. Catholicism emerged even stronger as the dominant religion of the Spanish state. During the Inquisition, the monarchy flexed its control over the public religiously, politically, and in terms of freedom of expression—an example of which was the 1502 regulation calling for the censorship of all printed documents. This regulation, the second pivotal moment in the history of the Spanish press, led to the pendulum's first movement towards the right of its trajectory, a rightward lean that would remain for almost three centuries, not shifting again until the nineteenth century.

The third pivotal moment in the history of the Spanish press was the promulgation of the Spanish Constitution of 1812, which took place on March 19, 1812 (Schulte 12). Along with rights to both individual freedoms and education, the constitution called for freedom of the press as well—swinging the pendulum strongly towards the left. These constitutional rights were enjoyed almost immediately by the journalistic profession and the Spanish people as a whole, and the constitution proved to be one of the most liberal legal measures in Spanish history (H.B.). These liberties, however, were short lived.

The constitution was established in the midst of the Spanish War of Independence—a subset of the Peninsular War, which took place from 1808 until 1814 on the Iberian Peninsula. The Peninsular War was part of the greater Napoleonic Wars—a series of conflicts throughout Western Europe from 1805 until 1815. The Spanish War of Independence was fought between Spain and France and resulted from a series of rebellions in Madrid, where the people rioted against the installation of Joseph Bonaparte, the brother of French-ruler Napoleon Bonaparte, as king of Spain (Thomas). Although Spain faced initial defeats in its War of Independence, with help from England, Spanish forces were able to cause the French to retreat in 1813, and in 1814, Spaniard Ferdinand VII was established as king.

Soon after being named King of Spain, Ferdinand VII abolished the liberal and much-loved Constitution of 1812. Ironically, Spain's success in the Spanish War of Independence led directly to the abolition of the freedoms that the constitution had defined just two years earlier. The constitution was reinstated twice, first from 1820 to 1823 and again from 1836 to 1837 (Thomas). Following the third abolition of the liberal constitution, the Spanish press fell into a sort of limbo, having truly experienced a free

press under the Constitution of 1812 but having also experienced government-imposed restrictions when those liberties were taken away. Thus, after having swung towards the left with the liberties provided by the Constitution of 1812, the pendulum settled into the vague area found in the center of its trajectory.

The fourth pivotal moment in the history of the Spanish press marks the beginning of the period this study will examine (see Chapter Two). In 1938, General Francisco Franco enacted the 1938 Press Law, or la *Ley de Prensa de 1938*, calling for complete censorship of the Spanish press (Schulte 12). After having hung in the center for over a century, with the enactment of this legislation, the pendulum of the Spanish press swung rapidly to the right, where it remained for decades to come, stunting the expression, growth and success of the Spanish periodical press.

The fifth and most recent pivotal moment occurred 28 years later, with the enactment of the Press Law of 1966—*la Ley de Prensa e Imprenta de 1966*. This regulation, established a decade before the end of Franco's dictatorship, caused a slight but significant movement of the pendulum towards the left. The law was passed during the nation's transition from dictatorship to democracy, a transition that had begun decades prior to Franco's death and became legally official in 1976 (See Chapter Three).

As displayed by these five moments, the history of the Spanish press has been long and unbalanced. Stretching over five centuries and oscillating between two extremes, these pivotal moments display the swinging of the pendulum and provide historical context for the twentieth-century press that will be discussed in the following chapters. The 1938 Press Law and the Press and Print Law of 1966 are both examined in

detail within this study, and the successes and failures of the twentieth-century Spanish press are directly related to both pieces of legislation.

CHAPTER II: The Spanish Press under the Franco Regime (1939—1959)

Political and Social Background

On July 18, 1936, the three-year-long Spanish Civil War, or Guerra Civil, began. A military uprising against an elected official on July 18 sparked the bloody war fought between the two major political groups in Spanish society—the Nationalists, *los nacionalistas*, and the Popular Front, or *el frente popular*. By the end of the war in 1939, General Francisco Franco had risen to power both within Nationalist forces and as leader of the Spanish state. The end of the war marked the start of General Franco's 38-year-long dictatorship.

There were many factors that led to the outbreak of civil war. Politically, Spain had been unstable for over a century. Throughout the first three-quarters of the 1800s, numerous military coup d'états caused sudden changes in leadership, preventing the nation from having a steady leader or group in control. Political power shifted from the left to the right then from the right to the left. In 1873, the First Republic of Spain was established; however, after just one year, the republic fell to a successful military coup and the monarchy was subsequently restored. Decades later in 1923, King Alfonso XIII approved a military coup initiated by General Miguel Primo de Rivera, ending the monarchy's rule. Following the successful coup, Rivera established a mild dictatorship that lasted from 1923 until 1930, when he and King Alfonso XIII fled from Spain due to lack of support.

With these constant coups back and forth, Spain had grown politically divided between the left and the right. The left consisted of landless peasants, laborers and urban intellectuals, all influenced by different political leanings, including but not limited to Marxism, liberalism and anarchism. The right was composed of pro-tradition and pro-authority enthusiasts, including the Catholic Church, the monarchy, the military, wealthy landowners, and many urban, middle-class workers (Ross 2, 3). Through decades and decades of uncertain and quick-changing political times, one constant certainty prevailed—the stark divide between these two groups.

After King Alfonso XIII and General Primo de Rivera fled the country in 1930, the leftward-led Spanish Second Republic was established, lasting from 1931 to 1936. Although the Second Republic provided for a democratic state, it was founded more for the lack of other plausible alternatives than for a consolidated desire or push for democracy. Throughout the years of the Second Republic, tensions between the two groups of Spanish society had risen to an all-time high. With a staunchly divided populace, a loosely tied group of leftist supporters, and a rather impassionate start, the Second Republic had little chance of success. On July 18 and 19, 1936, a military uprising from the right brought the Second Republic to an end. Tensions were pushed to a breaking point and the Spanish Civil War officially began.

While political turbulence was the chief factor behind the outbreak of civil war, other factors played major parts in the war's start as well. Throughout the western world, the nineteenth century and the first few decades of the twentieth century had been a time of major technological and intellectual innovation. The Enlightenment of the eighteenth century had led to the distinction of Western Europe as a separate entity from Eastern

Europe, reflecting its distinguished push towards modernity (Sluga 183, 184). The Western Enlightenment spurred the technological advancements making industrialization possible. Increased industrialization, liberalism and nationalism had modernized many Western nations by the start of the twentieth century.

The Enlightenment, the effects of the Enlightenment, and the swift surge towards modernity, however, stopped short at the Spanish borders. Technologically and industrially, Spain fell far behind France, England, Germany, the United States and other swiftly modernizing nations. The nation's tense and long-divided political atmosphere had kept the sweeping phenomenon of nationalism and liberalism from passing over the country's borders, and Spain's failure to modernize at the rate of other Western nations had isolated it from international affairs and the international market. Isolation, lack of industrialism and a divided political atmosphere drastically hurt the nation's economy, and all of these forces came to a head in the 1930s. During the five years of the Second Republic, Spain entered a period of economic depression. Industrial output dropped one-third from just a decade before and the nation's economic development was practically at a standstill (Payne 48).

Lack of modernization and the economic depression led to another problem for the nation as well. As opposed to almost all other Western nations, by the 1930s, Spain was still lacking a strong, unified middle, or bourgeois, class (Ross 2). With industrial, economic, political and social problems plaguing the nation, the Spanish Civil War erupted after more than a century of multifaceted frustrations. Having lacked strong leadership for so long, Spain, it seemed, was ready for a leader, and during the Civil War, General Francisco Franco emerged to fill that void.

By the time the war began in 1936, Franco, then 44, had been active in the Spanish military for over 25 years. As a teen, Franco enrolled in the Army's Infantry Academy at Toledo, and by the age of 18 he had been commissioned as a second lieutenant. Franco quickly made a name for himself within the Spanish army, both for his introverted, serious demeanor as well as his quick upward mobility within the ranks. In just 16 years, Franco moved from lieutenant to captain to major *comandantín* (little major) to lieutenant colonel to colonel to general and finally to major general (Payne 2-10).

Although Franco was not involved with the military coup that had started the war, he was soon unanimously elected to be the head of the nationalist forces. At the start of the war, Franco's army was greatly outnumbered by leftist forces. However, with the support of the Spanish military and the training, skills and leadership of Francisco Franco, the nationalists soon grew in both size and success. Throughout the war, nationalist forces received military and economic support from Italy and Germany, diplomatically linking Franco with fascist leaders for the first time. With the support from Mussolini and Hitler, the nationalists made great strides, and by mid-1937 the republican forces had dwindled significantly.

Despite their success on the military front, in 1937 the nationalists still lacked a plan for governmental organization. While Franco had been successful as a military leader, he had little political experience and was rather uncreative when it came to organizing the development of the future nationalist-led government. After months of procrastination, Franco decided to adopt the political ideals of the Falange—a political party that had been modeled after Mussolini's fascist government in Italy. The adopted

Falange platform was in favor of imperialism, nationalism, dictatorship, violence and syndicalism, and was strongly against liberalism and capitalism. The government would also be pro-military and ultra-Catholic, and Franco said that he would base his totalitarian rule after the monarchs Ferdinand and Isabella (Payne 19-24).

The Spanish Civil War came to an end on April 1, 1939 when the last remaining Republican forces surrendered unconditionally in Madrid. As commander-in-chief of the winning side, Franco had risen to the position of both military and political leader of Spain. With no other government structure having been suggested, Franco held on to the authoritative power he had ruled with over his own forces—now having absolute control over the nation as a whole. The dictatorship of Francisco Franco had begun, and would last until his death in 1975.

The Press Law of April 22, 1938

Although Franco was not officially recognized as the leader of Spain until 1939, by the time the war had ended, Franco and his top nationalist supporters had already established a Council of Ministers, or Cabinet, to draw up new legislation. One of the very first regulations enacted by the Cabinet was the Press Law of 1938—the fourth pivotal moment in the history of the Spanish press (Schulte 12). Just as Ferdinand and Isabella had put strict limitations on the press in 1502, Franco, as promised, followed suit in imitating the monarchs' totalitarian rule and enacted a similarly restrictive press law in 1938. With the establishment of this law, the pendulum of the Spanish press, which had been resting in the center of its trajectory for decades, swung swiftly towards the right.

On April 22, 1938, Franco signed the new law into effect. With a detailed preamble and many subset articles, the legislation formally denounced the freedom of the Spanish press—putting specific limitations and restrictions on all periodicals. The preamble of the law condemned "freedom in the democratic style" and Article One gave the Ministry of the Interior of the Spanish State "the organization, supervision and control of the national institution of the periodic press" (Tusell 17) (Ley de Prensa de 22 de abril de 1938, Artículo 1). The government's power over the press was multifaceted and all-inclusive.

"The government was given the right of:

1. Regulating the number and size of periodical publications,
2. Participating in the designation of directive personnel,
3. Ordering the journalistic profession,
4. Supervising press activity, and
5. Censoring all publications" (Schulte 13).

Regulating the number and size of periodical publications

Prior to the Press Law of 1938, the size and scope of the Spanish press had been substantially weakened by the politically unstable decades leading up to the Spanish Civil War as well as the turmoil of the Civil War itself. During the war, groups from both the left and the right were known to siege or shut down opposite-leaning periodicals. An example of this can be found within the history of *ABC*. Since its start in 1903, *ABC* has been known as a traditionally rightward-leaning paper. In 1936, however, Popular Front forces took over the paper's office in Madrid and began publishing issues with a pro-

leftist slant. In reaction to the siege of the paper's Madrid office, owner Torcuata Luca de Tena opened a second *ABC* office in Seville—an office that continued to run nationalist-supporting content. The contrast between the Madrid and Seville offices can be seen in the headlines the two papers ran the day the Civil War broke out (see Figure 2-1, p. 35) (ABC Newspaper). The front page of the *ABC* Madrid paper (on the left of the figure) read "*¡Viva la república!*" or "Long Live the Republic!" while the Seville edition (on the right) featured the headline, "*Viva España,*" or "Long Live Spain." This *ABC* example is unique because the publication was able to open a second office after the seizure of its headquarters; however this case is significant in a broader sense because it reflects the precarious nature of the periodical press during the Civil War.

Statistics reflect the alarming decrease in the number of periodicals during the Spanish Civil War. In 1920, there were 41 daily newspapers in Madrid. By the end of the war in 1939, however, just four remained. Because the Press Law of 1938 had given the government the power of "regulating the number and size of periodical publications," the recovery of the Spanish press following the Civil War was a slow and one-sided process. By 1944, Madrid had nine daily periodicals—just five more than at the end of the war. Nationwide, in 1920 Spain had 290 dailies. In 1944 there were just 104 (Schulte 20, 21). These statistics show that the Franco regime indeed exercised the first power given to it in Article One of the Press Law of 1938. With control over the number of periodical publications within the nation, the government was able to suppress the restoration of and prevent the emergence of leftward-leaning periodicals. The liberal or left-wing press was totally silenced, and only one voice, one opinion and one set of ideals filled the pages of the Spanish periodical press for years to come (Stanley 99).

Participating in the designation of directive personnel

Two of the main ways the Franco regime exerted power over the Spanish press was by having hands-on influence over who exactly worked in each newsroom and by threatening the publications and individual journalists with potential punishments. First, each publication's editor was either approved by or appointed by the authoritarian government (Tusell 17). A concept known as the "responsible editor" was also enacted, putting total legal authority in the hands of one person in each newsroom. The "responsible editor," also known as the director, was held legally accountable for any unauthorized content published by the paper or any transgressions made by individuals connected with the publication. Each director was approved by the Ministry of the Interior and had to be registered in a National Registry of Journalists (Schulte 13). In being held legally responsible for the publication, the director had an enormous responsibility to prohibit any content that could be seen by the regime as offensive or harmful to the State. Individual reporters also had to be approved by the government, giving the regime total control over all personnel in the profession. The application process to obtain a journalistic license was a tough one. Less than half of those requesting permission to work in the profession were actually accepted (Tusell 17).

Article 18 of the Press Law of 1938 stated that the Ministry could punish any publication that "directly, or indirectly, may tend to reduce the prestige of the Nation or Regime, to obstruct the work of the government of the new State, or sow pernicious ideas among the intellectually weak" (Schulte 13). With the vague wording of this article, the law basically outlawed any information unflattering to the regime. Punishments for including information deemed to "reduce the prestige of the Nation or Regime" ranged

from slight to severe. Fines were a common penalty and ranged on the lighter side of the spectrum. Because they were legally responsible, if any transgression occurred, directors could be removed from that publication or possibly from the journalistic profession as a whole. More severely, the publication itself could face confiscation or could be shut down (Schulte 14). With direct control over who worked for the publications and with the power to punish any slight transgression, the regime had very specific, tangible controls over the Spanish press. The next power mentioned in the Press Law of 1938, although more abstract in definition, solidified the government's power over the press.

Ordering the journalistic profession

The right of "ordering the journalistic profession" was the most open-ended and authoritative control given to the Spanish government over the press. With the Franco regime having the control to "order the profession," it was therefore given the control to actually define the nature and scope of journalism itself within the country. The ability to define the purpose of journalism was taken from the hands of journalists themselves and placed under the authoritative control of Franco's regime.

In *The Elements of Journalism,* Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel stated that "the principles and purpose of journalism are defined by something more basic: the function news plays in the lives of people" (Kovach and Rosenstiel 11). By this definition, the purpose of journalism is naturally defined by the public, by the people for whom the news is written. Based on what the public needs and desires to know, journalists deliver information accordingly. Putting the power to "order the journalistic profession" in the

hands of the regime, however, gave the government the authority to decide what the public could or could not know.

The preamble of the Spanish Press Law of 1938 stated that the purpose of the new law was "to awaken in the press the idea of service to the State..." (Schulte 13). The press law stated that, "The existence of a fourth estate cannot be tolerated. It is inadmissible that the press can exist outside of the State. The evils that spring from 'freedom of the democratic kind' must be avoided . . . The press should always serve the national interests; it should be a national institution, a public enterprise of the service of the State" (International Commission of Jurists 48). The 1938 press law defined service to the Spanish State, rather than service to the public, as the primary purpose of the Spanish press. This ability to order and define the journalistic profession was one of the first and most restrictive powers given to the government by the Press Law of 1938.

Supervising Press Activity

With appointed officials and approved professionals in the newsrooms, the government had strong control over the activity of the press and the content published in national periodicals. Today, *ABC* and other Spanish national periodicals publish stories on a wide range of subjects, including local and international politics, the economy, science and technology, sports, culture, entertainment and opinion (ABC.es). Under the censorship of the Franco regime, however, the Spanish press reported on a very limited scope of subjects. For all practical purposes, politics, both local and national, went uncovered by the Spanish press during the dictatorship.

Rather than covering politics, the press focused on feature stories, sports and entertainment news. Feature stories are narrative pieces that provide an interesting or entertaining account or description of an individual, group or event. Feature stories, sports reporting, international information and entertainment news made up a large majority of the content published by Spanish papers under the Franco regime. In 1960, feature stories, sports, religion and entertainment took up 34.7 percent of the editorial space of *La Vanguardia,* a morning newspaper published in Barcelona. Only 2 percent of content contained political news, and the paper ran over 13 times more international or foreign news than it did local and national political news (See Figure 2-2) (Schulte 22, 23). So from movie stars to soccer, Germany to the United States, periodicals covered almost all topics except what was happening within the Spanish political spectrum, reflecting the regime's success in supervising the activity of the Spanish press.

Censoring All Publications

The government's freedom to censor publications was not limited to the press. The regime had control over all written materials, including textbooks, novels and scientific work as well. With the ability to censor all types of publications came the power to inject the Franco regime's political propaganda into every aspect of Spanish society. Pro-Franco propaganda appeared in almost every national document, newspaper and book published during the time. Under the Franco regime, word problems in math books featured soldiers, military jargon and other pro-nationalist and pro-military propaganda, reflecting the regime's influence over all aspects of society (Payne 95, 96).

There was censorship of artistic and literary work as well. The two generations preceding the Spanish Civil War have been referred to as the "Silver Age" of Spanish literature. Artistically, literarily and scientifically, Spanish figures gained national and international acclaim for their work during these years. The renowned paintings of artists such as Pablo Picasso and Salvador Dalí and the writings of social and natural scientists like historian Rafael Altamira justify the flattering term "Silver Age" in reference to the Spanish intellectual and artistic achievements of this period (Payne 97). Following the start of the Franco dictatorship and the promulgation of the Press Law of 1938, however, the production of internationally renowned literary and artistic works from Spain declined significantly, due to the repressive censorship outlined in the new law.

As discussed earlier in the chapter, urban intellectuals made up a substantial portion of the leftist Popular Front. With the Republican forces' loss to the Nationalists in 1939, these urban intellectuals and other Popular Front supporters fell under the total control of the anti-liberal, anti-individualist regime. Under Franco's dictatorship, any oppositional or challenging viewpoints, whether direct or indirect, were censored. Unfortunately, this included artistic, social and scientific work as well. Under the dictatorship, the "*Falangist intelligentsia*" surfaced as the major intellectual force in Spanish society. This *Falangist intelligentsia*, however, channeled "nostalgic romanticism" and "fascistic irrationality" and produced very few internationally appreciated artistic or literary works (Delgada Idarreta 220). Their work, like the propaganda flooding almost all printed publications throughout the nation, served to advance the nationalist and anti-liberal cause of the Franco government.

Effects on the Two Fundamental Elements of Journalism

With the Press Law of 1938, General Francisco Franco and his authoritative government had complete control over Spanish press. With the government's ability to order and define the profession and censor all publications, and with the presence of government appointed officials in the newsrooms themselves, severe restrictions were in place over what could or could not be published by the periodicals. So what exactly did this censored press look like? What did a publication under censorship publish? And what effect did this censorship have on the press' ability to deliver the basic, fundamental elements of journalism? The first journalistic element to observe is the press' obligation to the truth.

Is the press' first obligation to the truth?

One of the press' most fundamental jobs is to deliver the truth—to deliver relevant and factual information to the public. With strict controls over what it could or could not publish, did the Spanish press adhere to the fundamental journalistic principle of reporting the truth? Superficially, it did—but in reality, it did not. The evidence behind the press' superficial commitment to the truth can be seen in the oath that each Spanish journalist took during the years of the dictatorship. The oath stated: "I swear before God, for Spain and its leader, to serve the Unity, the Greatness and the Freedom of the Fatherland with complete and total faithfulness to the principles of the Spanish State, *without ever permitting false-hood,* craft, or ambition to distort my pen in its daily labor" (Schulte 25).

The oath included a vow to truthfulness, against "ever permitting false-hood"—implying an obligation and dedication to the truth. However, the tendency of the Spanish periodical press under the Franco regime was not to lie by the distortion of truth, but rather to lie by omission. By filling the papers' pages with feature stories, sports information, advertisements and photographs, there was a severe lack of hard news, investigative reporting and enterprise reporting throughout the Spanish press, limiting the complete truthfulness that the publications could deliver.

During the Spanish Civil War, both the Nationalists and the Popular Front were known to have killed thousands of people on the opposing side. However, it is vaguely estimated that following the Nationalists' victory in 1939, possibly more than 100,000 people were executed by the Franco regime, simply for being associated with the pro-Republican left (Payne 112, 113). Although various attempts have been made over the past few decades to gather exact death toll statistics, no set statistic has yet been reached.

A major reason that no statistics can be accounted for is the lack of investigative reporting done by the Spanish press under the Franco dictatorship. By its commitment to reporting the truth, journalism as a profession has the important role in societies of documenting information. Because of the censorship under the decades of dictatorship, the Spanish press was unable to report wrong-doings, crimes and even murders committed by the Franco regime. Without having had a free press as the truthful scribe of society, documentation of some aspects of twentieth-century society under Franco is severely lacking. Although the Spanish press may have printed accurate information, censorship of the press led to lies by omission that were detrimental to the society, evolution and documentation of the history of the Spanish state.

Does the press provide citizens with information necessary for them to live their day-to-day lives?

In addition to an obligation to the truth, a fundamental element of journalism is to provide the people with information necessary for them to live their everyday lives. Because the government had the control of "supervising the activity of the press," the scope of the nation's press was severely limited. As explained earlier in the chapter, the majority of the content of the Spanish press was devoted to feature stories, sports, religion and entertainment—somewhat trivial matters in the everyday lives of the Spanish public during this period.

Under Franco, Spanish reporters were punished for writing about topics that would seem to hold extreme importance in a person's day-to-day life. In terms of public safety, a poliomyelitis epidemic is significant information to include in a national periodical. However, as reported by the International Commission of Jurists, one Spanish reporter said that under Franco, he was arrested and issued fines for a story he wrote about just that. Among other newsmen reported by the Commission of Jurists to have received citations was one who reported on a deficit in the orange crop and another who pointed out defects in a public housing project (Schulte 25).

So, what exactly could publications print under the Franco regime? The following information reflects the findings of a case study from the *ABC Seville* issue published on June 1, 1947. The issue had a total of 22 pages, six of which were devoted to feature articles, sports and entertainment information; five pages contained international news; two featured national news; two provided local news from within Seville; and the remaining seven pages contained advertisements. Out of the available editorial space, 40

percent was soft news, or feature, sports and entertainment stories, 33.3 percent was devoted to foreign news, 13.3 percent was given to national news and an equal 13.3 percent was given for local news (see Figure 2-3) (ABC.es Hemeroteca). The small percentage of both categories reflects the Franco regime's intent in downplaying both national and local political news, keeping the public in the dark about what was occurring within the Spanish government on all levels. With lighthearted feature stories filling the pages of the national periodicals, the Spanish public was being denied important information necessary in their day-to-day lives, therefore reflecting the failure of the Spanish press during this time to deliver this second fundamental element of journalism.

The cover of the June 1, 1947 paper features a large photo of Native-Americans with the headline "*Somos Norteamericanos*," or "We are North Americans." One of the most widely read national Spanish newspapers boasted a front page featuring Native-Americans from North America. This cover article reflects the Spanish press under Franco's hefty coverage of international affairs. This is also reflected on pages nine, 10, 11 and 13, which featured articles entitled "The Political Situation in Italy," "The Political Situation in Hungary," "The Chinese Civil War," and "North American Politics" (ABC.es Hemeroteca).

The two pages devoted to national news, pages seven and eight, reported Franco's approaching visit to Madrid. The headline reads, "At 7 o'clock tomorrow night, His Excellence, the Chief of State, will arrive in Madrid." The story goes on to tell of the caudillo's planned visit and his previous travels around the country, and it continues onto the following page to report the travels of Franco's wife and daughter as well. "The caudillo's wife and daughter will return to Madrid," one headline reads. These articles are

the only national news that the issue contains and are reflective of the content of the Spanish press during this time (ABC.es Hemeroteca). Rather than reporting details on the possible political motives behind Franco's visit to Madrid, the paper treated the trip as a feature story—lightheartedly reporting the who, what, where and when of the situation rather than answering the meaningful why.

The two pages containing local news offer official messages from local government administrators, messages that announce an upcoming lunar eclipse and public transportation information. Page five includes a feature article on artist José María Labrador, and there are other arts and entertainment pages reporting upcoming theater shows, sports scores, marriage announcements and anniversary notices (ABC.es Hemeroteca). The inclusion of these messages delivered straight from government officials reflects the role of the press as a public relations vehicle for the Franco regime. With these stories, the periodical published exactly what the government wanted to say, literally word for word and line by line. Also, this wide array of feature topics reflects the paper's emphasis on soft news and its virtual avoidance of hard news, enterprise or breaking news stories.

Other case studies from this period report similar findings. On June 1, 1948, June 1, 1949 and June 1, 1954, feature stories, sports and entertainment news made up the majority of the issues' editorial content—with majorities coming in at 64 percent, 42 percent and 60 percent. In 1947, 1948 and 1949 the lengths of the issues studied were 22, 14 and 16 pages, and in the 1954 case study the length had increased to 44 pages. This increased length is a trend that will be explored in detail in Chapter Three. Careful

examination of these three additional case studies reveals the same trends and failures as those described in detail with the June 1, 1947 study.

These findings are reflective of the failures and trends of the Spanish press during the years of the Franco dictatorship. Further evidence to these claims can be found in the following observation made by historian James Cleugh in 1953 about the periodical press in Spain:

> [Newspapers] are not read for enlightenment, nor even primarily for information about happenings at home . . . They are read for foreign news, which is usually printed without comment, and above all for their numerous and judicious articles of a non-political, mainly cultural kind. In Spain, the newspaper reader has a host of opinions on every subject but politics. In the Anglo-Saxon and French press, the reader has a host of views on the political party which he favors, but lacks information on other subjects. (Cleugh 140)

As a result of the Press Law of April 22, 1938, the regime was able to define the press. The government had the power to say what would or would not be published and it exercised its authority by punishing any publications that tried to deviate from its restrictions. Although there were articles here and there that slipped through the cracks of the strict censorship, they were few and far between. The national press delivered to the Spanish citizenry a carefully calculated and narrow view of the public's own nation—a view painted by the authoritarian government.

Edging towards Change

The Press Law of 1938 outlawed the publication of any opposing or less-than-flattering viewpoints of the Franco regime. Facing such a strict and all-inclusive law, the media and the public had almost no ability to resist or speak out against the censorship of the press. However, after over a decade of no resistance, criticism of the Press Law of 1938 began to surface in the 1950s and early 1960s. The most significant and influential source of criticism came from the Catholic Church.

In the early 1950s, both Father Jesús Irabarren, editor of *Ecclesia*, a weekly publication printed by the Catholic Action group, and Enrique Cardinal Pla y Deniel, Primate of Spain at the time, spoke out in criticism against the censorship of the Spanish press (Schulte 37). Cardinal Pla y Deniel wrote, "It is highly deplorable that it is not recognized that between the liberties of damnation—the unrestrained license of the press for cheating and corrupting the public, always condemned by the Church—and the absolute state control of the press, exists a happy medium of a responsible freedom of the press, proper to a Christian and civilized society" (Schulte 31). This quote expresses a major figure in the Catholic Church's desire for a more middle-of-the-road press—a press with the freedoms and liberties that were at the time being fundamentally denied to the Spanish media.

At the same time these criticisms were being voiced, the political and social atmosphere within the nation was beginning to change. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Spain's international isolation began to loosen, exposing the country to more liberal economic, social and political influences from abroad and leading the nation to its eventual transition to democracy. The transition, however, was a slow one—especially in

terms of the liberalization of the Spanish press. This is reflected by a particular cabinet change that occurred in the 1950s. In 1951, the Ministry of Information and Tourism was created with jurisdiction over the press, tourism and propaganda within the nation. Because they are, in essence, public relations vehicles for a country, the grouping of the periodical press with tourism and propaganda reflects the government's continued political manipulation of and dominance over the Spanish press.

Figure 2-1


ABC
¡VIVA
LA
REPÚBLICA!
SUPLEMENTO EXTRAORDINARIO
ABC
VIVA ESPAÑA
EL GENERAL QUEIPO DE LLANO SE ENCARGA DE LA JEFATURA DE LA DIVISION Y DECLARA EL ESTADO DE GUERRA. DIVERSAS MANIFESTACIONES POR «RADIO». RECTIFICADAS SOBRE INFORMACION DE MADRID. ORDENES A LA POBLACION CIVIL. OTRAS NOTAS

Figure 2-2



Figure 2-3



CHAPTER III: The Spanish Press during the Transition to Democracy (1960—1976)

Political, Social and Economic Background

On November 20, 1975, flags throughout Spain flew at half mast. After 38 years of authoritarian rule, General Francisco Franco died at age 82, leaving behind a legacy of repression, hesitant hopes for democracy, and overall domestic and international uncertainty over the future of the Spanish State. For more than a decade, the question of "After Franco, what?" had circulated throughout the country and the world; and on the day of the dictator's death, the question still remained unanswered ("Spain: After Franco: Hope and Fear"). Prior to his death, Franco famously stated that the future of the Spanish government was "*atado y bien atado*," or that things were "all tied up" and scrupulously planned out (Ross 5). This assurance, however, soon proved to be false.

On paper, the transition of power following Franco's death went as he had planned. Legally, the nation had been prepared for the restoration of the monarchy for decades. In 1947 Franco had signed into effect the Law of Spanish Succession, officially defining Spain as a kingdom and setting up for a future transition to monarchial rule. Two days after Franco's death, Prince Juan Carlos de Borbón, grandson of King Alfonso XIII, was sworn in as King of Spain, just as Franco had arranged almost three decades before ("BBC on this Day"). Immediately after being sworn in as King, Juan Carlos confirmed francoist Carlos Arias Navarro as Prime Minister. The dictator had originally planned for pro-authoritarian Admiral Luis Carrero to be named Prime Minister; however, in 1973

Carrero was killed in an unexpected accident (Ross 5-7). Despite this one glitch, power was transferred just as Franco had drawn out.

In reality, however, Franco's plan to keep government controls in the hands of pro-authoritarian, conservative leaders was altogether unsuccessful. Following two decades of major social and economic change, the nation was poised for a total transformation. During a speech at his inaugural ceremonies, King Juan Carlos employed diction hinting at democratic reform, addressing a transition that had, in many ways, already begun ("BBC on this Day"). In July 1976, Juan Carlos convinced Carlos Arias Navarro to step down as Prime Minister, appointing liberal francoist Adolfo Suárez in his place. Suarez's appointment has been labeled as the beginning of Spain's legal *transición democrática*, or transition to democracy (Ross 7).

Within five months of his appointment, Suárez successfully pushed for the Political Reform Act of 1976, calling for democratic elections of a new parliament. After decades of totalitarian rule, democracy officially arrived in Spain with the signing of this new legislation. Within a year and a month of Franco's death, the nation was legally transformed from dictatorship to democracy. Signs of this transition, however, had begun to surface as early as the 1950s, as a result of many social, economic and international factors.

Forces towards Democracy

International isolation was a dominating characteristic of the first decades of Franco's regime. Diplomatically, economically and culturally, Spain was entirely secluded from the rest of Western Europe and the world. One of the major ways Franco

kept this isolation intact was through political and social propaganda forced upon the Spanish public. As described in Chapter Two, the Press Law of 1938 put control of media content in the hands of the government. With that control, pro-Francoist propaganda circulated throughout the nation, feeding society a forced sense of nationalism which, in turn, hardened the nation's international isolation even more.

This isolation stayed firm until the mid-1950s, when signs of increased participation in the worldwide community first began to show. On September 26, 1953, Franco signed a "mutual defense assistance agreement" with the United States in exchange for tax relief—one of the first pieces of international diplomatic legislation signed by the authoritarian Spanish State. This start of international diplomacy began to thaw the isolation that had been frozen in place around the nation for over a decade (50 Years 6, 13). As a result of increased global diplomatic participation, Spain underwent major economic and social changes throughout the 1950s and 1960s, resulting in a slight loosening of Franco's unchecked authoritative control over the Spanish state.

One area of Spanish society that underwent a major transition was the nation's economic policy. Between the 1940s and the 1970s, Spain's economy shifted from being under strict governmental control and isolated from international markets to being more liberal, capitalistic and part of the global market. Overall, this transition greatly helped the economy. The 1940s were known as the "years of hunger," brought on by the destruction of the Spanish Civil War. The nation's agricultural output was severely damaged by the war, and levels of production and consumption were at an all time low. Throughout the forties and fifties, the Franco regime exercised complete control over the economy, with interventionism as a major component of the nation's economic policy.

Fiscal recovery following the war was slow, and national income levels matching those before the Civil War were not reached until 1951 (Carr and Fusi 49-52). This interventionism and international economic isolation remained in place until the late 1950s.

In February 1957, the government underwent positional and ministerial changes, the most significant of which was the arrival of Opus Dei to Spanish politics. Opus Dei was the first official secular institution of the Catholic Church, and today it is self-described as a conservative Catholic group with the mission "to help people turn their work and daily activities into occasions for growing closer to God, for serving others, and for improving society" (Opus Dei). Members of the group were appointed to ministerial positions within the Spanish government and, therefore, had power over major economic and social decisions.

Credited as being a major force behind the modernization of Spanish society, Opus Dei technocrats introduced policies that integrated Spain into international economic markets (Spain: Opus Dei). The interventionism and isolation of the past two decades faded, and in its place came an increased participation in international markets and a liberalization of the Spanish economy. There came an explosion of new industries and substantial growth in the production of older ones. The automobile, food processing and construction industries all expanded rapidly, along with older industries such as ship building. With the loosening of the nation's international isolation, both exports and imports increased as well. The transition is reflected well with the contrast between the following two quotations. In 1953, Cleugh wrote, "The outlook for Spain's foreign trade cannot yet be a rosy one" (195). But by the 1970s, this outlook had certainly changed:

"Foreign investment was encouraged by allowing the repatriation of profits and the importation of advanced technology by permitting royalty payments. Spain became part of the world capitalist economy" (Carr and Fusi 54). These changes led to what became known as the "economic miracle" of the 1960s. In this decade, the Spanish economy had almost unparalleled capitalistic growth, matched only by that of Japan (Carr and Fusi 49).

The most significant industrial growth, however, brought social transformations as well as economic changes to the nation. The service industry, especially tourism, underwent the most substantial economic growth during the 1960s. Tourism rates, which had showed slight signs of growth in the 1950s, grew exponentially in the 1960s, and by 1973, over 30 million tourists visited Spain annually, providing a yearly profit of 3 billion dollars (Carr and Fusi 57). With tourists from Western Europe flooding the country, Spanish society was introduced to liberalized social norms in addition to its more profitable economy. Two-piece bathing suits and bare arms and legs filled the beaches of Spain, introducing modern Western European trends and styles. After decades of cultural isolation, Spanish society was beginning to come in contact with examples of freedom of expression and liberalization in ways it had never seen.

The social changes of the 1960s did not stop at two-piece bathing suits or a slight loosening of social norms. From the start of his dictatorship, Franco's regime had maintained extremely close ties to the Catholic Church. Raised a devout Catholic and having been supported by the Church during the Civil War, Franco had incorporated "National Catholicism" into the patchwork of the Spanish State, an ideology that, at least on the surface, had been strictly adhered to by the public for decades (Payne 1, 2).

However, during the late-1950s and 1960s, with capitalistic ideals influencing the

national economy and new social standards filling the shores of the beaches to the streets of the cities, a shift in the social mores of Spanish society occurred—including a trend towards secularization: "Secularization marched hand in hand with the lifestyle of a car-owning, holiday-taking society" (Carr and Fusi 100). So, in addition to diplomatic and economic shifts towards liberalization of the Spanish State, social norms, including those related to religion, shifted as well. "To the liberal middle classes, for whom economic conditions were easier, democracy offered the attraction of greater intellectual and artistic freedom. To younger Spaniards in general it promised a more relaxed and enjoyable lifestyle" (Ross 6).

Although these economic and social changes permeated the country unevenly and at varying rates, the changes were indeed present and ongoing. With a speedily modernizing society, Franco's authoritarian government was becoming more and more outdated in the international and national scope. The regime's strict, heavy-handed control over Spanish society seemed out of place with the bikinis on the beaches and the new liberalized international economy and diplomacy. Criticism against the dictatorship became louder and more widespread throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Surfacing in the form of student protests, regional discontent and working-class demonstrations, displeasure with the archaic government became hard to ignore (Carr and Fusi 133-160).

After decades of economic and social changes and an increase in criticism and protest, Franco's regime conceded to an expansion of citizens' individual liberties and freedom of expression—to a degree. This transition towards democracy occurred in regards to the Spanish press as well, surfacing in the form of the 1966 Press and Print Law, which will be discussed in detail later in this chapter. The new, more democratically

inspired press law took the place of the repressive 1938 Press Law that had called for censorship of all printed materials. So from diplomacy to the economy to society and to the press, the Spanish State underwent a more than decade-long process of liberalization, a transition to democracy that took true form with the Political Reform Act of 1976.

Challenges in Creating a Democracy

Although both King Juan Carlos and Prime Minister Suárez had democracy in mind following Franco's death in 1975, creating a democracy from the legal structures of an authoritarian government was a daunting task. The job proved to be difficult because of prior measures put in place by Franco, and many in the country and throughout the world were skeptical of the leaders' ability to make the transition a success ("Spain: After Franco: Hope and Fear"). On December 6, 1975, the American magazine *The Nation* ran a letter that the members of an Ad Hoc Committee for a Democratic Spain had written to United States President Gerald Ford following the death of Franco. The letter expressed the concerns members of the Spanish government had regarding the hopeful transition from dictatorship to democracy and asked the United States' president for help on making the transition a success. The following excerpt reflects the challenges and potential limitations that faced the transition:

> The new ruler of Spain does not come to his post as a free agent. He wears the mantle placed on his shoulders by Franco. Guardians and advisers are Franco's men, chosen by him, loyal to Franco's precepts, skilled in the execution of Franco's policies. Twenty years of training in statecraft in Franco Spain, under Franco's tutelage, provide no assurance that Spain's new King has the desire, or

will, or capacity, or courage or fortitude to abolish the totalitarian regime which is his inheritance. (Shirer and Tuchnan 582)

Newly sworn in King Juan Carlos indeed wore a "mantle placed on his shoulders by Franco." With the 1947 Law of Succession, Spain had been named a monarchy, with Franco serving as Head of State. By that law, Franco gave himself the power to choose the successor of the Spanish kingdom. Within the Bourbon lineage, former Spanish King Alfonso VIII's son Don Juan was next in line for the throne. Franco, however, saw Don Juan as a liberal threat to the conservative Spanish State. So, in 1948, a year after the Law of Succession was signed, Franco convinced Don Juan to allow for his ten-year-old son Juan Carlos, who was living in Portugal, to move to Spain and be educated and mentored under the control of General Franco himself (Cavendish). Thus began King Juan Carlos' "training in statecraft in Franco['s] Spain." With the ability to name a carefully raised, purposely trained successor as Head of the Spanish State, Franco certainly had influence over the transfer of power that was to follow his death.

In addition to Franco's legal control over the future of the nation, a major challenge to the transition to democracy was the repressive history of the dictatorship itself. As described in Chapter Two, for 38 years, the Franco regime had silenced public opinion and personal expression. Despite the diplomatic, economic and social trends towards liberalization that had ensued during the late-1950s, 1960s and 1970s, the fact of the matter was that, until the day of his death, Franco still had authoritative control over all of Spanish society. In the letter written to President Ford, the Ad Hoc Committee for a Democratic Spain wrote:

> Since 1930, after Franco's defeat of the legal Republican government of Spain with the arms and armies of Hitler and Mussolini, an unremitting reign of terror has enslaved the Spanish people, denied them elementary human rights and Spain as a whole the validity and benefits of a free society. The practices of terror were legalized by virtue of laws promulgated by the totalitarian state established by Franco when he assumed power on April 1, 1939. This totalitarian state, its laws and its practices still exist, *unrepudiated*, in Spain today... (Shirer and Tuchnan 581-582).

When Franco died in 1975, in spite of increased international diplomacy, a more capitalistic economy, and legislation such as the 1966 Press and Print Law, Spain was still very much a totalitarian state being denied "the validity and benefits of a free society."

The Political Reform Act of 1976

Despite the challenges and doubts facing the transition, King Juan Carlos and Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez did indeed transform Spain, by law, from a dictatorship to a democracy. As previously mentioned, the first decisive moment in the legal transformation came in July 1976 when King Juan Carlos succeeded in encouraging Carlos Arias Navarro to resign as Prime Minister. Arias had been appointed to the position in 1973 by Franco himself; and, despite his reputation as a "timid liberalizer," outside of the authoritative scope of Franco's regime, Arias proved to be much less of a liberalizer than his reputation had led on (Ross 7). Throughout his three years as Prime Minister, Arias failed to take any real steps towards democratizing Spain. However, with the appointment of Suárez following Arias' resignation, the transition was underway.

Suárez, who was a former secretary-general of Franco's political party, the National Movement, was well-versed in the ins and outs of the Franco-regime's laws. Having an in-depth understanding of the prior legislation, Suárez was able to work within the guidelines of the old regulations in order to create new legislation allowing for the democratization of the Spanish government. Within five months of his appointment as Prime Minister, Suárez convinced the Franco-appointed national Parliament, or Cortes, to vote itself out of power. The Political Reform Act, or *la Ley de Reforma Política*, was ratified in a national referendum in December 1976 and called for the democratic election of a new Cortes. The act was the first official piece of democratic legislation signed after Franco's death and it signaled the start of the legal transformation from dictatorship to democracy (Ross 7).

Effects of the Transition on the Spanish Press

For decades following the enactment of the 1938 Press Law, the Spanish press had been suffocating beneath the legislation's numerous articles calling for complete censorship. The state of the Spanish press, constrained and directed by the authoritarian government, as described in Chapter Two, remained practically stagnant for nearly 30 years. The press' failure to deliver truthful, complete and relevant coverage of national affairs and politics continued, and the pendulum of the Spanish press remained frozen to the right. However, by the 1960s, the social and political shifts sweeping the nation had reached the Spanish press.

In 1959 a special commission was formed to discuss possible revisions to the Press Law of 1938, which, in the words of regime spokeswoman Angela Martínez de

Banos, was "somewhat out of date, considering the dynamism and the needs of modern journalism" (Schulte 39). A rough draft of the commission's recommended revisions was completed within a year; suggestions included the end of prepublication censorship as well as the overall forfeit of governmental controls over the press. For the Franco regime, this proposed legislation was radical. For regime critics, however, it was almost humorous. One stated:

> . . . it is so ridiculous that one wonders if it is possible that it could really become law in a modern state in the middle of the twentieth century. It provides, basically, for the following: pre-publication censorship of the press and magazines is ended, but it defines a most detailed and endless series of "Crimes of the Press," so unprecedented that were they to be applied in any other country of the so-called free world, like France, England or the United States, it would mean the end of all publications. This list includes "crimes" of action and omission, and they range to everything from criticizing the regime or its officials to failing to give adequate importance to a speech by Franco or some "success" of the regime. (Schulte 39-40)

Although these recommendations were proposed in 1960, plans to revise the press law were halted, due to feuds between members of the special commission, which included Church officials and Ministry of Information officials. It was not until 1962 that any substantial changes were introduced to the press legislation.

The first step towards the democratization of the Spanish press came on July 10, 1962 with the appointment of Manuel Fraga Iribarne as head of the Ministry of Information and Tourism. Soon after being appointed, Fraga eliminated prepublication

censorship of the Spanish press. Except for in Madrid and Barcelona where political opinion was at its most concentrated, daily editions were no longer "blue-penciled," or edited by government-controlled censors prior to publication (Schulte 23). This appointment of Fraga and the regime's subsequent surrender of prior censorship mark the start of the Spanish press' own transition to democracy.

After eliminating prepublication censorship, Fraga promised the nation a new liberalized press law by the end of 1962. This promise, however, proved to be overly ambitious. Over the following years, Fraga delivered varied and often contradictory opinions of and promises to the Spanish press. In some instances he seemed wary of journalistic reform, expressing fears of the potential dangers of a completely free press. In others, however, he spoke in strong support of delivering those freedoms of expression and speech to journalism in Spain. In a 1964 article written by a foreign correspondent with the Manchester paper *The Guardian*, Fraga was quoted saying, "We want to encourage all free discussion which is in the national interest," reflecting his support of a more liberalized, free press ("Franco's Finesse").

While a desire for a more liberal press certainly came from within Spain, the Spanish government was forced to recognize and give merit to the idea of updating the press law as a result of international diplomatic factors as well. As the nation began to participate more and more in international diplomacy and foreign markets, Spain's worldwide image became a cause for concern. After years of increased capitalization, heavy tourism from Western Europe, and a loosening of social mores, the strict censorship of the Spanish press contrasted sharply with the signs of liberalization that were coming from all sides. The contrast looked foolish in the eyes of domestic as well as

foreign observers. Spanish poet and political commentator Dionysio Ridruejo wrote the following in an article entitled "Spain's Restless Voices," published in *Catholic World* in May, 1963: "The present government can no longer exert the control it once did over communications . . . [for the government] depends in large measure upon the good will of international opinion" (Schulte 6). Following years of international as well as domestic pressures from all sides, a new press law was finally passed in 1966.

The 1966 Press and Print Law

On April 9, 1966, *la Ley de Prensa e Imprenta*, or the Spanish Press and Print Law of 1966, was approved by General Francisco Franco. Answering more than a decade of pressures for greater liberalization of the Spanish press, the law took the place of the overwhelmingly restrictive Press Law of 1938. The signing of this legislation was the fifth and most recent pivotal moment in the history of the Spanish press. After almost three decades of hanging along the right side of its trajectory, the pendulum of the Spanish press swung towards the left.

The Press and Print Law redefined the authoritative government's control over the media—loosening controls while including intentionally vague restrictions as well. The Preface of the bill mentions previous policies regarding the Spanish press, including the Press Law of 1938. The section goes on to specify that, "The mention of these dates highlights the need to adapt those legal norms to the current aspirations of the Spanish community and to the situation of the present times" (Ley 14/1966, Preface). This statement reflects the government's recognition of the cultural and social changes that had ensued since the time of the Spanish Civil War, adding that the new legislation had,

in fact, been tailored with these changes in mind. This acknowledgment of social and international change reflects a transition in the regime's attitude towards both the role of the government and the role of the press.

The differences between the 1966 Press and Print Law and the Press Law of 1938 are clear, starting with the very first article of the new bill. Article One of the law is labeled "*Libertad de expresión por medio de impresos*," or "Freedom of expression through print." In terms of tone, the 1966 legislation instantly differentiated itself from the prior press law. Rather than outlining what rights were given to the *government* over the press, the 1966 statute stated what rights were provided for the *press*—a significant change in perspective and attitude. This article, the first and most explicit in terms of giving freedom of content to the press, stated that the press was given "the right to the diffusion of any information through print" (Ley 14/1966, Artículo 1). "Any information" is a bold phrase and sharp departure from the jargon of the 1938 Press Law. With this article, the power to define the journalistic profession was handed back to the actual professionals of the field. With the ability to diffuse any information, the bill stated that journalists would be put in charge of determining what information to actually publish, thereby regaining control of their own occupation. This article clearly reflects a loosening of authoritarian control over the press.

Article Three of the Press and Print Law made official what Fraga had previously called for in 1962. The article states: "The Administration may not issue or require prior censorship or compulsory consultation, except in states of emergency and war expressly provided for by law" (Ley 14/1966, Artículo 3). The end of prepublication censorship was, with this language, officially worked into the legal patchwork of the nation. This

article also, however, introduced the first of many vague restrictions that are scattered throughout the 1966 Press and Print Law. With the clause, "except in states of emergency and war expressly provided for by law," the government subtly limited the freedom of expression that had been outlined in Article One of the bill. With the power to determine what constitutes a state of emergency, the government had the subsequent ability to censure certain unspecified information and potentially punish publications.

Article Seven of the law, labeled "Right to official information," displays another fundamental difference between the old press law and the new. The article is divided into two parts, the first stating: "1. The Government Administration and Public entities must provide information on their actions to all periodicals and news agencies in the manner determined by law or regulation" (Ley 14/1966, Artículo 7). With this article, the regime recognized the right of the Spanish press to actually report on national politics and the government itself. As described in Chapter Two, under the Press Law of 1938, stories on politics and governmental affairs were all but absent in the Spanish press. Article Seven, however, allows for the press to have access to this information and, subsequently, for it to be conveyed to the public—a major indication of the democratization of the Spanish press.

The second half of Article Seven, however, displays yet another vague restriction slipped into the new law. It states: "2. The activity of the specified bodies and the Administration of Justice will be reserved when per provision of the Act or when the very nature of the proceedings, arrangements or agreements are not public or if the documents or acts which are formalized are declared to be reserved" (Ley 14/1966, Artículo 7). Within the legal jargon of the second half of this article, it states that documents or

information "declared to be reserved" can, in fact, be kept from the press and, therefore, kept from the public. With this clause, the regime included yet another safeguard against total freedom of the press.

The 1966 Press and Print Law contains five chapters and 72 individual articles. These three before-mentioned articles include some of the most democratizing freedoms provided by the new legislation. They also, however, contain subtle restrictions, signaling a hesitation from the Franco regime to allow for total freedom of expression and total freedom of the press. The mixture between extremely liberal articles and understated restrictions creates an interesting combination of progress and pause. Article One—labeled "Freedom of expression through print," provided the press with freedom of speech—a fundamental liberty of democracy and a fundamental element of a free press. However, as seen in the second clause of Article Three and the second half of Article Seven, these new freedoms were not given without limitations. Throughout the nation's transition from dictatorship to democracy, the state of the Spanish press was in somewhat of a limbo, balancing the government's vague warnings with the simultaneously presented freedoms of the new law. However, despite the haziness of some aspects of the law, there was a definite improvement in the quality of the Spanish press between the start of the transition and the end—in large part because of the 1966 Press and Print Law.

Effects on the Two Fundamental Elements of Journalism

Substantial differences can be seen between the quality of Spanish journalism in the 1940s and of that in the 1960s. In the range of topics covered, the quality of reporting, and the length of the individual issues themselves, *ABC* and other national newspapers

expanded greatly between these decades. In terms of the two fundamental elements of journalism discussed in previous chapters, the Spanish press saw significant improvement over these years. Even further improvement can be seen between the press of the 1960s and the reporting of the 1970s—with the quality of Spanish journalism continuing to improve.

Does the press provide citizens with information necessary for them to live their day-to-day lives?

One of the most important changes in the quality of the Spanish press between the 1940s and the 1960s was an increase in the scope of information covered throughout the pages of the periodical. In order to provide citizens with necessary and pertinent information, the press must report on situations, people and happenings that actually affect the lives of the public that it serves. In comparing the June 1, 1947 issue of *ABC* and the issue from May 5, 1960, the first and most obvious discrepancy between the two was the difference in the actual length of the periodicals. The length of the daily expanded greatly between the 1947 issue and the 1960 edition, as hinted at in the previous chapter. In 1947, the paper was 22 pages long, seven of which were devoted to advertisements. On May 5, 1960, however, the *ABC* issue was a total of 76 pages, with 30 pages of advertisements—a total increase of 54 pages (ABC.es Hemeroteca). The 1960 issue had more than three times the amount of editorial space than the 1947 issue—translating to three times the number of individual articles. The issues grew even longer by 1970. The May 5, 1970 *ABC* issue consisted of 120 pages, 77 of which were devoted to editorial content (ABC.es Hemeroteca). Although the high percentage of advertising stayed consistent throughout these three different decades, the increase in overall pages allowed for an increase of editorial space.

With more space available for editorial content and the social and economic forces of the nation's transfer to democracy at play, the 1960s and 1970s brought more room for and an increased tolerance for an expansion of the topics covered in the pages of the Spanish press. In the 1947 issue case study, feature stories, sports and international news dominated the editorial content of the newspaper—making up almost three-fourths of all editorial space. The remaining 25 percent was devoted to national and local news, including politics, military and business information. In the 1960 case study, the numbers were similar, with 72 percent of the editorial content containing feature, or cultural stories, sports news and international news. Although national news, politics, local news, business, military, health and education information made up little more than one-fourth of the content, the increase in editorial space from 1947 to 1960 meant an increase in stories for each of the individual categories. In the 1960 issue, five pages contained national political news, three featured enterprise stories on health and education, and four contained business and economic news (ABC.es Hemeroteca) (see Figure 3-1).

The trend continued throughout the following decade. In the May 5, 1970 *ABC* issue, 74 percent of the editorial content was devoted to the same areas of emphasis as in prior decades—feature stores, international news, sports and entertainment. However, like the increase in 1960, the dramatic increase in overall editorial space led to the inclusion of even more hard news stories in the publications—expanding and improving the quality and scope of the other sections. In the 1970 issue, seven pages, or 9 percent of editorial content, contained national and political news. An equivalent 9 percent covered business and economic news as well (ABC.es Hemeroteca) (see Figure 3-2). Another important change between these decades was the emergence of new sections in the

periodical press. In the 1970 *ABC* issue, there was a breaking news and crime reports section as well as, most importantly, an opinion column, two sections that had been absent in each of the prior case studies.

One of the most significant changes in content between the 1947 and the 1960 issues was the growth in the number and quality of business and economic stories. On May 5, 1960 a story entitled, "*SPAR Española, Integrada en la SPAR Europea*" or, "Spanish SPAR, Integrated into the European SPAR," ran on page 14 of the daily edition of *ABC*. The story offered a description of the integration of the supermarket chain SPAR in Spain with the European community of over 214 SPAR supermarkets (ABC.es Hemeroteca). This story is significant in that it reported on changes occurring within the Spanish economy as well as the shifting international relations between Spain and other Western European nations. Another story on the Spanish economy ran on pages 52 and 53 of this issue. The story provides a detailed chart of "*Las deudas del estado*," or "The debts of the State." The chart offers a close examination of the nation's economy—including numbers and statistics on the country's spending habits (ABC.es Hemeroteca).

These in-depth stories reflect a presence of economically-focused enterprise reporting in the Spanish press. According to a study done by Bu Zhong and John E. Newhagen, content decisions made by journalists reflect current cultural values of a society (590). The story describing Spain's international economic interaction reflects the shift in the cultural values of the country that had occurred—the shift towards greater capitalization of the Spanish economy. This economic trend and cultural value was reported in even greater depth in the May 5, 1970 issue. One story reported that Spain had consumed 3,050 million liters of gasoline in the year 1969 alone. Another gave an

update on the expansion of the tourism industry—which, as discussed earlier, was a major social and economic transition within the nation during the sixties and seventies (ABC.es Hemeroteca). These in-depth stories on the Spanish economy, especially the 1960 chart of the nation's debt accumulation and spending habits, reflect an increase in candidness between the press and the people—showing that there was indeed an improvement in the press' ability to deliver information necessary for citizens' to live their day-to-day lives.

This improvement was seen in other content shifts as well. In the May 5, 1960 issue, page 50 featured both a story on cancer trends and an enterprise story on parenthood. These articles reflect a deep, critical look at problems and trends in Spanish society. This presence of the press' critical, skeptical eye on the Spanish state strengthened even more between 1960 and 1970. In the May 5, 1970 issue of *ABC*, page 33 reported various crime incidents, including murders, that had recently been committed, and on the next page, a story reported that Spain had been ranked 30th internationally in traffic deaths (ABC.es Hemeroteca). A departure from the general lack of hard news during the early decades of Franco's dictatorship, these two stories reflect the increasingly critical, watchful eye of the Spanish press. These general and specific shifts demonstrate an improvement in the press' ability to supply the public with information that it needed. In short, the Spanish periodical press improved and succeeded in delivering to the public this fundamental element of journalism throughout the transition years of the Spanish state.

Is the press' first obligation to the truth?

As discussed in Chapter Two, during the first decades of the Franco regime, the Spanish press failed in terms of the journalistic obligation to the truth—having the tendency to lie, not directly, but rather by the omission of extremely significant information. Between the 1940s and the 1960s, there was substantial improvement in regard to this fundamental element of journalism as well. As stated in the previous section, with the increase in length of the actual publication, there was an overall growth of the editorial content within the periodical. This expansion of content served to provide improved coverage of the daily happenings of the Spanish people—thus avoiding a failure by omission in its obligation to the truth.

One of the most extreme changes between the Spanish press of the 1940s and the press of 1970 can be seen on page three of the May 5, 1970 issue, which featured an opinion column that was named "*Opinar: Riesgo*," or "Voicing Opinion: Risk." This editorial actually critiques the fact that opinion columns were so scarce within the press—a daring and strong claim against the repression of the Spanish press, written at a time in which the nation was still under Franco's authoritative rule (ABC.es Hemeroteca). Published in 1970, four years after the signing of the Press and Print Law of 1966, the presence and content of this opinion column demonstrates the loosening of regime controls over the Spanish press. It also reflects a greater range of opinions and angles in stories, further improving the paper's obligation to the truth.

Providing "a forum for public criticism and compromise" is another fundamental role of the press, and opinion columns help to broaden that public forum (Kovach and Rosenstiel 166). As a reflection of the cultural norms of a society, as Zhong and

Newhagen describe, the presence of the editorial columns in the Spanish press reflects the increased freedoms of speech and expression that were beginning to sweep the nation during Spain's transition from dictatorship to democracy. Publishing a variety of political opinions adds to the trustworthiness of a publication because it better reflects the multifaceted opinions and beliefs of the public.

Another important change that improved the press' obligation to the truth was an increased use of direct quotes, numbers and statistics. Rather than running political announcements and notices actually drafted by the Spanish government or Franco himself, as seen in previous case studies, the 1960 and 1970 case studies show an overall increased use of short quotations, providing clips of statements made by public officials without running an entire government-controlled press release of information. A greater use of numbers and statistics was seen in the case study comparisons as well, as illustrated by the content of the 1960 *ABC* story "*Las deudas del estado.*" Rather than having the information pre-analyzed, censored and checked by the government, the use of raw, hard facts such as direct quotes and statistics allowed for individuals to make analytical and interpretive decisions for themselves—thereby creating a stronger, more trustworthy bond between the reader and the actual news or information. Again, as Zhong and Newhagen described, the decision to include more direct quotes and statistics represents the changing cultural values of the Spanish state. An increased use of hard facts reflects a more trustworthy and freer press, reflecting the improvement of the Spanish press in terms of these two fundamental journalistic elements.

Limitations of the press' improvement: Confusion in the midst of new liberties

Although the transition from dictatorship to democracy certainly brought a liberalization of the Spanish press and an improvement in the fundamental standards of journalism, the improvement was not black and white and challenges were met along the way. With the hazy wording of the 1966 Press and Print Law, the hesitation of the government to allow for total freedom of the press, and the questioning of whether or not democracy would actually come to Spain following Franco's death, backward steps were taken throughout the transition. An example of this lies in the history of *ABC*.

On the morning of July 21, 1966, the daily edition of *ABC* Madrid was taken from the shelves and confiscated in full by the Spanish government. The cause of the confiscation was an editorial entitled "Everybody's Monarchy," a column that carried the opinion that Don Juan, son of King Alfonso VIII, should be made king of Spain following Franco's future death rather than Juan Carlos, the grandson of Alfonso VIII, who Franco had been mentoring since the age of 10 (Schulte 244). Occurring three months and 12 days following the signing of the 1966 Press and Print Law, the confiscation of this national periodical's morning edition reflects an obvious limitation to the freedoms provided by the new, liberalized press law.

The government defended its confiscation of the periodical by citing Article 64 of the 1966 Press and Print Law which "gives the government the right to confiscate 'printed matter or a publication . . . wherever they may be found as well as the matrices in order to prevent their distribution' when government officials 'have knowledge of an act which may constitute a crime committed by the press or printing business'" (Schulte 244). The crime *ABC* was accused of with the July 21, 1966 issue was never revealed by

the government. This act of the Franco regime is an example of the limitations that were sewn into the patchwork of the new press law and of the vaguely worded threats sprinkled throughout the law's many articles.

ABC, however, did not accept the confiscation of its issue without explanation and ended up taking the matter to court. The case was heard in two separate court hearings, and in the end, it was ruled that the government was to void the confiscation (Schulte 245). Although this was an eventual victory for the publication and for the Spanish press as a whole, the confiscation of this issue of *ABC* reflects the limitations and limbo in which the Spanish press danced between the passing of the 1966 Press and Print Law and the official transition of Spain from dictatorship to democracy.

Figure 3-1



Figure 3-2



CHAPTER IV: The Spanish Press in the Early Years of Democratic Spain (1977—1989):

Political, Social and Economic Background

Overwhelmingly ratified by the Spanish public on December 15, 1976, the Political Reform Act of 1976 called for the democratic election of the *Cortes*, or legislative branch of the Spanish government. This bill was the first step of the legal transformation of the Spanish state to democracy—reflecting the success of Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez and King Juan Carlos in converting Francisco Franco's hodgepodge of authoritarian regulations into a platform on which a successful democracy could be built. The next step in the legal transformation came exactly half a year later. On June 15, 1977, the first democratic elections of the new government were held, with Suárez's own National Movement winning by a large majority over the Communist Party, the only other option on the ballot (Ross 8, 9). After years of being subjected to one party, one person, one voice and no choice, the Spanish people were given the freedom to vote in a national election and to express their individual political opinions without fear of castigation.

Since 1941, Freedom House, an independent watchdog organization in Washington D.C., has supported, monitored and ranked nations of the world according to degrees of freeness. Following Francisco Franco's death in 1975, the organization shifted Spain's classification from "Not Free" to "Partly Free" (Encarnación 37). A straightforward, two-word distinction, this label spelled out with simplicity the nation's transfer from Franco's obviously "Not Free" authoritative rule to the "Partly Free" limbo

in which King Juan Carlos and Prime Minister Suárez were left to maneuver. Two years later, following the first successful democratic elections in 1977, Freedom House shifted the nation's ranking from "Partly Free" to "Free"—an official, internationally recognized distinction that has since remained constant for over 30 years (Encarnación 37).

While the elections of 1977 clearly signified the nation's transition to democracy, the infant democratic state faced a number of challenges throughout its first five years, including a deteriorating economy, an initial lack of streamlined enthusiasm for the new democracy, and an unsuccessful attempt by a small military group to usurp the Spanish government. After decades of international isolation and self-sufficiency, the economic boom of the 1960s and early 1970s led to a strong dependency on foreign nations and markets abroad—especially in terms of oil imports. With limited natural resources of its own, Spain's industrial sector relied heavily on cheap oil imports from the Middle East, a dependency which proved to be dangerous when the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Counties (OPEC) raised oil prices drastically in 1973. This substantial rise in oil prices severely damaged the entire Spanish economy over a period of many years, resulting in severe inflation and an increase in unemployment rates (Ross 136). With devastating changes plaguing the economy, the legal transition from dictatorship to democracy came at an uneasy, unsure time for much of the Spanish citizenry.

Another challenge to the young democracy was Prime Minister Suárez's and King Juan Carlos' need to please a number of different political opinions, with extreme expectations for the new democracy being vocalized from many different sides. As a member of the right-wing National Movement, Suárez had to juggle both reluctance from his own party and extreme demands from the left. King Juan Carlos faced these pressures

as well. Two years before the 1977 elections, members of the left-wing opposition voiced their opinions and demands for change with gusto in the international press. In a *Time* article published November 3, 1975, a Communist Party official stated that, "If Juan Carlos does not offer change and change quickly, he will be consigning himself to oblivion" ("Spain: After Franco: Hope and Fear"). Another quote featured in the article was even harsher. Santiago Carrillo, secretary-general of the Communist Party during the time, stated that "a wave of terror that will lead to a new civil war" would ensue if drastic change was not made by the new Spanish leaders" ("Spain: After Franco: Hope and Fear").

Threats like these, however, faded throughout the following months. Juan Carlos and Suárez displayed their intentions for a democratic Spanish state with the Political Reform Act of 1976 and the ensuing democratic elections. The need to please different ideologies while drafting the constitution, however, persisted—resulting in a search for a political consensus from all sides (Encarnación 39). The leftward opposition, which had previously hoped to break completely from the past, ultimately agreed to work within the restrictions of the Franco regulation, resulting in the description of the new government as "a negotiated break from the past" (Ross 9).

One of the last and least subtle challenges to the young democracy was an attempted military coup against the newly elected government. Having been a principal element of the Franco regime's power, some in the military had shown reluctance towards the nation's transition to democracy from the start of the process, and on February 23, 1981, a small, extremist group of Spanish civil guards resorted to drastic and unsuccessful measures. Led by Lieutenant-Colonel Antonio Tejero Molina, a small

group invaded an active session of the Cortes, holding the members in confinement for 36 hours. The coup was unsuccessful, however, due to the loyalty of the majority of the Spanish military and the nation's law enforcement sector to the new democracy. Ultimately, instead of taking down the new democracy, the coup strengthened it—bringing together political leaders from various factions, unified in support of the new democratic Spanish state (Ross 9).

Overcoming these challenges, the Cortes passed the Democratic Constitution of 1978—a constitution that remains intact today. In it, there is a concentration on three main points: "basic rights and liberties, the role of Parliament, and provisions for regional self-government" (Ross 17). The category "basic rights and liberties" included regulations allowing for the unrestricted formation of other political parties, including the *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE), or the Spanish Socialist Party. A clear change from Franco's abhorrence of political parties, the surfacing and consolidation of these new political ideologies was seen as a sign of hope for the young democracy (Encarnación 37). This freedom to express various beliefs was not only intended for politicians and political figures—it also called for freedom of expression for individuals and groups, including news organizations as well.

With the democratic freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution of 1978, the failure of the military coup in 1981, and the subsequent support from varied political leaders, the success of the infant democracy seemed tangible by the start of the new decade. The new government clearly proved to be living up to Freedom House's distinction as a "Free" state. And on October 28, 1982, the success of Spain's transition to democracy was sealed with the third general election of the new Spanish state. Defeating Suárez's

National Movement and the other political parties in the running, the Spanish Socialist Party won by a landslide, marking, for the first time in Spain's extensive history, the successful transition from one democratically elected party to another (Ross 7-10). The transition from dictatorship to democracy was officially complete.

Following the completion of the transition years, a number of social factors throughout the 1980s indicated the lasting success of the new Spanish democracy. Within the decade, Spain was accepted into both the United Nations and NATO—acceptances which reflected the nation's dramatic change from the diplomatically and economically isolated Spain of the 1930s and 1940s to the internationally linked Spain of the 1950s and beyond. Although its acceptance by these communities was largely facilitated by the nation's geographic vicinity to the other stronghold Western European democracies, such as France and England, the rapidity in which it was incorporated into these intrinsically democratic institutions reflects the true success of the transition (Encarnación 37-38). Through its subsequent diplomatic, political and economic affiliations with these and other democratic states, the consolidation of the new democratic state was strengthened even more.

In 1939 Spain was under the tyrant rule of Caudillo Francisco Franco. Individual liberties were denied, the press was silenced and one man ruled. Half a century later, in 1989, Spain was, as it is today, a parliamentary monarchy. With a democratically elected parliament of 300 to 400 representatives, the legislative body has the law-making power. Individual liberties have been granted to the public and the press and the people have the ability to voice multiple opinions. The 1978 Constitution put the law-making power in the hands of the electorally chosen parliament rather than the monarch—thereby ensuring

the democracy of the Spanish state: "Both the monarch and his heir—on coming of age—must swear an oath of loyalty. Its wording expresses the Crown's subordination to the law of the land and, above all, to the Spanish people as a whole" (Ross 22).

The Spanish Press: The Transition and Beyond

From 1966 to 1975, ambiguity and uncertainly plagued the Spanish press. With the combination of the progressive yet limited 1966 Press and Print Law as well as Franco's ever-present but loosened authoritative rule, the Spanish press spent a decade dancing between vaguely drawn lines—hesitantly flexing the muscles provided by the new press law but still keeping in mind the dictator's watchful eye and possible punishments. However, with Franco's death in 1975 and the subsequent transfer of power from authoritarian rule to a democratically elected representative government, the fear that had threatened individuals and reporters alike was theoretically lifted. The floodgates were raised, allowing for the realization of a free press.

Is the Press' First Obligation to the Truth?

As Kovach and Rosenstiel point out, "The notion of freedom of the press is rooted in independence. Only a press free of government censors [can] tell the truth" (30). With the arrival of democracy and the newfound freedom of journalism in Spain, for the first time in decades, periodical publications had the opportunity to deliver the truth to the Spanish public. Although professional journalists had for decades been pledging an oath to journalistic truth—to never "[permit] false-hood, craft, or ambition to distort [their] pen in its daily labor," as discussed in Chapter Two, there was a clear lack of truthfulness

in the Spanish press under the restrictions of the Press Law of 1938. So, supported by the guaranteed freedoms of speech and expression, did the Spanish press turn to truth as its first obligation?

In order to answer this, a second influence on the truthfulness of a nation's press must be considered. Kovach and Rosenstiel maintain that "In a modern context, that freedom was expanded to mean independence from other institutions as well—parties, advertisers, business, and more" (30). In addition to independence from government restrictions, the Committee of Concerned Journalists that Kovach and Rosenstiel have written the findings of has specified that to be considered a truthful free press it must be free of all institutional, political or commercial ties as well. In one sense of this definition, there was major improvement of this journalistic ideal throughout the first decade of the Spanish democracy. In another, however, a paradoxical switch was made.

During the Franco years, the majority of periodical publications were owned by either the government itself or institutions with governmental connections. For example, the major national daily *Ya* and many other publications were under direct ownership of the Catholic Church (Ross 125). With the media financially dependent on bulwarks of the Franco regime, this ownership of the press served as yet another way in which Franco held control over the content and "truthfulness" of the nation's periodical press. However, following the 1977 installment of the first democratically elected Cortes, a significant drop in the number of governmentally owned publications began—a drop that continued throughout the turn of the decade. "By 1984 the last of the state's own chain of newspapers had been sold off" (Ross 125). In this regard, the independence and freedom

of the Spanish press improved—adding to the credibility and truthfulness of the media content.

While there was a decrease in government ownership of publications, there was a simultaneous increase in partisanship of the Spanish press—a trend that goes against the need for "independence from other institutions" including political parties (Kovach and Rosenstiel 30). The press under Franco was able to support and publish one point of view and one point of view only. It had to be pro-caudillo, pro-Church, pro-nationalist and anti-liberal—no exceptions without the risk of serious repercussions. After the transition to democracy, however, voices from all sides of the political spectrum were allowed to offer their opinions. The publication *El País*, founded in 1976, is a traditionally liberal daily, whereas *ABC* has been regarded as a historically conservative paper (Media). In contrast to the one-voiced press of the Franco years, the slightly partisan press of the new democracy provided a variety of voices—a more truthful and accurate representation of the Spanish society that had been silenced for so long. In this sense, yes, the periodical press indeed succeeded in terms of truthfulness, despite the presence of slight political leanings in the opinion and editorial sections of the publications.

Does the press provide citizens with information necessary for them to live their day-to-day lives?

As displayed by the case studies discussed in Chapter Three, there were a few significant changes between the *ABC* issues from the first decades of the Franco dictatorship and those from the 1960s and 1970s. There was an increase in the length of the actual publications, an expansion of topics covered, and a new presence of editorial or

opinion columns. These notable changes remained and developed even more in the second half of the 1970s and the 1980s.

In terms of length, the individual issues continued to get longer and longer throughout the years. The May 5, 1970 issue of *ABC* consisted of 120 pages. Five years later, on May 6, 1975, the paper contained 160 pages—an increase of 33.3 percent. Throughout the following decade, the length continued to grow. In the December 5, 1982 issue, the page count was up to 192 pages, and on December 31, 1989, there were a total of 162 pages (ABC.es Hemeroteca). The December 5, 1982 issue was a Sunday edition, calling for a longer classified ad and advertisements section, in addition to a longer-than-usual feature section. However, stretching to 192 pages for one individual Sunday edition, this issue reflects the publication's enormous expansion since the days of the 14-page-long edition run on June 1, 1948—the 1982 edition being over thirteen times as long as the 1948 paper.

As discussed in the Introduction, journalism is the act of delivering newsworthy information to the public—to engage the public with the happenings around them and to create a better informed citizenry. The need for a well-informed citizenry grew far more important with the nation's transition from dictatorship to democracy. With power in the hands of the people, democracy calls for responsible, informed decisions made by the public. In contrast to the encouraged disillusionment and detachment of the citizenry from governmental affairs under Franco's dictatorship, an informed public was considered necessary within the new Spanish democracy.

Investigative or watchdog journalism is often regarded as a staple of democratic freedom. A form of journalism in which publications reveal detailed information on

groups, people or institutions in power, this watchdog role of the press provides for the accountability and transparency of those with authority. Each nation's press has a unique history with investigative journalism; however, from culture to culture, the definition and role of investigative journalism more or less stays constant. The importance and need for this form of reporting is well-described in a 2008 Neiman Reports article written by Rex Smith.

> "Most of us went into journalism to make a difference. And our role as an independent public watchdog—recognized as an essential balancing force to hold powerful interests accountable—has its roots in the founding documents of our democracy. Our hope today is that by continuing to focus resources and attention on investigative reporting we will reveal a true picture of experiences that affect people's lives. Watchdog reporting is vital to what newspapers offer readers . . . our readers assure us they need us to keep doing it, so when we do we send an important signal that even in tough times we recognize the value of journalism that matters." (Smith 16)

In his lecture entitled "Secrets of the Past, Accountability in the Present: the Challenge for Journalism in Latin America," John Dinges discussed trends regarding the periodical press of Latin American nations throughout their own transitions from dictatorship to democracy. Dinges said that in many cases, there was an explosion of investigative reporting throughout these nations' transitions. According to Dinges, Chile had "its most robust period of journalism during the transition" in the 1980s and that many other Latin American nations experienced the same trend. He added, however, that following the periods of change and once democracy is reached, this increase in

investigative journalism typically levels off, and "watchdog journalism wanes, withers" (Dinges).

A similar yet limited trend occurred within Spanish journalism during the nation's transition from dictatorship to democracy. With the loosening of controls over the Spanish press, an increase in investigative reporting did indeed occur. In the May 6, 1975 edition of *ABC*, half a year before Franco's death, an investigative piece ran that documented the year's record of labor strikes throughout the nation. The story, which ran on pages 39 and 40 of that day's edition, provided statistics and details regarding the 365 strikes that had already occurred within the first quarter of the year (ABC.es Hemeroteca). The strikes reflected the dissatisfaction of a portion of the working class, and reporting on them revealed and recorded this unhappiness. On December 5, 1982, an investigative article in *ABC* reported on the devaluation of the peseta, the nation's currency, and explored reasons behind the nation's economic trouble (ABC.es Hemeroteca).

Although there was an increase in articles such as these in the pages of *ABC* and other periodicals, the focus of Spanish reporting stayed fixed on features, sports and international news, reflecting the limitations on this increased focus on investigative reporting. *ABC*'s distribution of editorial space in the 1970s and 1980s reflected the same trend seen in the 1960s and early 1970s. Still dominated by features, lifestyle articles and sports stories, 52.4 percent of the editorial content of the May 6, 1975 issue was devoted to these sections—26.2 percent to feature and lifestyle articles and an equal 26.2 percent to sports. In order by percentages, the remainder of the content was spread throughout the following sections: 16.5 percent to national news and politics, 14.5 to international news,

11.6 to business, three to opinion and two to local news. These percentages stayed almost constant over the following decade, reflecting little change in this aspect of the Spanish press (ABC.es Hemeroteca).

While there was little variation in terms of the breakdown of editorial content in the transition to democracy and the first decade of the new democratic state, the Spanish press took on a new, fundamentally important attitude and role in society during these years. After decades of authoritarian rule, democracy was an entirely new concept to the Spanish people, who were uninformed of and unaccustomed to the political jargon associated with democracy—of elections, political parties and other key aspects of a democratic state. During the transition and throughout the first decade of democracy, the periodical press served as a translator between the politicians and the people, making sense of the new terminologies and concepts that the Spanish public was being introduced to. There was a consensus within the Spanish press to unite in order to help achieve and facilitate the emergence of democracy—a unification which helped bring out the successful transition from dictatorship to democracy (Montero 6). The role of the Spanish periodical press during these years reflects the organic, mutually beneficial relationship that was formed between the free press and the new democracy.

In the May 6, 1975 issue of *ABC*, two articles were included that dealt with the nation's political transition. The first of the two ran on page 43 and referenced multiple conferences that had been held throughout the year planning for the transition following the death of Franco. The article expressed doubt and questions over the future of the Spanish government, representing the fact that Franco's plan of continued authoritative rule certainly was not set in stone. The second article, "*Un centro-derecho democrático*

como opción político" ("A Right-centered Democracy as a Political Option"), also contained facts regarding the potential transition (ABC.es Hemeroteca). *ABC*, a historically rightward-leaning publication, published these articles during the transition of the Spanish government to democracy—representing the unified aim of the Spanish press as a whole in spreading awareness of and bringing about the new government. Through taking on this role, the Spanish press did indeed provide the public with necessary and newsworthy information needed throughout these years, a role which directly affected the successful emergence of the Spanish state.

CHAPTER V: Final Conclusions

Between 1939 and 1989, the pendulum of the Spanish press swung from the center of its trajectory to the right, then from the right of its path to the left. Within half a century, the Spanish press went from being under complete censorship by Franco's authoritative regime to having full freedoms of speech and expression under the new democratic Spanish state. The oscillations seen throughout the twentieth century are part of the more than 500-year tradition of the pendulum of the Spanish press, and they reflect the major cultural, social and journalistic changes that occurred over this 50-year time period in the history of the Spanish nation.

The successes and failures of the Spanish press varied greatly throughout these years. Subjugated to the Press Law of 1938, the Spanish periodical press from 1939 through the 1950s was used as a public relations vehicle by the regime of Francisco Franco. The press was used to spread pro-nationalist and pro-caudillo messages to the Spanish public. Lighthearted feature stories, sports statistics, international events and cheery advertisements filled the pages of the nation's periodical publications, showing a false sense of contentment under the Franco dictatorship. Unable to run necessary, truthful and relevant accounts of the repressive national government, the restrictions of the 1938 law produced a press that failed both in substantiating its fundamental journalistic obligation to the truth and in providing the Spanish citizens with the necessary hard news needed to make informed judgments about the nation in which they lived.

In the 1960s and early 1970s, *alongside* the liberalization of Spanish social norms, international relations and the national economy, a liberalization of the Spanish press occurred. This greater-liberalized press brought with it increased success in terms of these two fundamental aspects of journalism. With more room for editorial content in the longer individual issues, the Spanish press was able to fit more stories covering a wider variety of topics within the pages of its periodicals. The most notable additions were the arrival of opinion columns and an increased emphasis on economic stories, changes that reflected the shifting cultural norms of Spanish society during these decades of transition. The Spanish press improved in terms of truthfulness as well. With its greater use of quotations and statistics, the press put substantial distance between itself and the authoritarian government, thereby strengthening the relationship between the press and the public.

Within the scope of this study, the most important role of the Spanish press appeared during the nation's legal transition from dictatorship to democracy and throughout the first year of the new democratic state. With even greater success in terms of the two basic fundamental elements of journalism behind it, the Spanish press served as a key component in the nation's successful transition to democracy. The press succeeded in providing the public with the day-to-day information needed to become an informed, involved citizenry—a vital element to a successful and healthy democracy.

As seen in Chapter Three, despite the liberalization of the authoritative regime in the 1960s and the passing of the 1966 Press and Print Law, the press under Franco was never free. The freedom of the Spanish press could not have been reached without the nation's successful transition to democracy. At the same time, the Spanish press filled a

vital niche during the nation's transformation to a democratic state—providing the people with the vocabulary, information and news necessary to be an informed public. The free Spanish press and the democratic Spanish state formed a mutually beneficial relationship between 1975 and the first decade of the new democracy—one in which each depended on the other for support and for success. The histories of the two have been interwoven, and the present and future state of each will forever be influenced and determined by the other.

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