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Fundamental Humanitarian Principles in Aid Organizations: Impartiality and Neutrality in the Great Lakes Refugee Crisis

Maggie Elizabeth Savely

FUNDAMENTAL HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES IN AID ORGANIZATIONS: IMPARTIALITY AND NEUTRALITY IN THE GREAT LAKES CRISIS

Maggie Elizabeth Savely

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Croft Institute for International Studies
Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College
The University of Mississippi

University, Mississippi

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

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

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

Reader: Dr. William Schenck

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By Maggie Savely
Croft Institute for International Studies
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Advisor: Dr. Jeffrey Jackson
Second Reader: Dr. William Schenck
Third Reader: Dr. Gerard Buskes

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Abstract

Since the origin of formal humanitarianism with the Geneva Conventions of 1864, aid organizations have become a major player on the global stage. Humanitarian aid has gone through significant changes over the years, being influenced by international events and the evolution of international relations. As with other international actors, aid organizations encounter a number of dilemmas, and this thesis aims to address one of the more recent struggles of aid agencies. The fundamental principles of impartiality and neutrality have become controversial, especially in complex humanitarian situations such as the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide. This catastrophe is known as the Great Lakes Refugee Crisis, and this thesis addresses the difficulties faced by humanitarian aid agencies, how the crisis was perpetuated by aid, and some possible solutions for future crises. This includes an analysis of three organizations: the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Food Programme, and Doctors Without Borders. Data was derived from original documents from these organizations, as well as personal testimonies and secondary historical sources. Conclusions consist of policy recommendations on security, accountability, and training in aid organizations for an overall boost in professionalism in the field of humanitarianism.

Summary/Abstract Table

	Actions during the Great Lakes crisis	Relation to Impartiality and Neutrality
UNHCR	• UNHCR is responsible for overseeing the actions of other aid organizations, as well as ensuring the protection and security of the refugees themselves • In the Great Lakes crisis, security was the main issue for the UNHCR • Lack of manpower and willpower to provide this security caused the UNHCR to fail to ensure the safety of the refugees involved. This had a ripple effect on the work of other organizations that relied so heavily on that security.	• The militarization of the refugee camps during the Great Lakes crisis was a result of the lack of security, which was a result of a lack of adherence to these principles. • This compromises the neutrality of the aid that is being given and the impartiality of the way it is being given because there is no way to monitor who is being given aid. • Ensuring the UNHCR's ability to provide security during crises would heighten its ability to guarantee impartiality and neutrality.
WFP	• The World Food Programme is well known as the major food aid supplier during major crises. • Its policy did not recognize food aid as being able to be manipulated. Food aid was widely manipulated during the refugee camps in Zaire. • A lack of recognition of the ability of food aid to be misappropriated led to the organization's not paying attention to food pipelines and how the food was distributed once it arrived at the camps.	• In its belief that food aid is unlikely to be manipulated, the organization fails to ensure these principles, simply because it believes that there is no chance of the aid *not* being impartial or neutral. This, we can see, is a grave mistake. • Impartiality and neutrality are not innate characteristics of any type of aid and must be monitored and ensured by the aid agency.
MSF	• As an independent organization, MSF has set up pre-requisites for its involvement in a crisis. These pre-requisites include security in the area and support from local government. • During the Great Lakes crisis, the safety of the region (being the responsibility of UNHCR) did not meet MSF's standards; therefore, MSF should not have intervened. • When the organization did intervene, it encountered several issues in the camps and disagreements among its members.	• These pre-requisites were put into place in order to ensure MSF's impartiality and neutrality. Because MSF failed to follow its own policies, it also failed to provide impartial and neutral aid to the refugees. • This was partially due to the lack of security, and MSF had no way of monitoring who received aid. • Despite its good intentions, MSF could not have effectively provided aid in a neutral and impartial way. Had the organization been accountable within itself, it could have recognized this risk.

Chapter 1: Introduction

Since the Geneva Conventions of 1864 and the establishment of formal humanitarianism through the International Committee of the Red Cross, humanitarian aid has gone through an extraordinary evolution. The very concept of humanitarian aid has changed through the experiences of the last 140 years, but the founding principles of impartiality and neutrality have remained the same. The purpose of this thesis is to highlight the consequences of non-adherence to these principles during humanitarian crises by analyzing specific aid organizations and their actions during a crisis. My research will analyze the militarization of the Rwandan refugee camps in eastern Congo (then Zaire) during the Great Lakes refugee crisis from 1994 to 1996. More specifically, I will answer the following questions: what factors led to the militarization of the Rwandan refugee camps in Congo from 1994 until 1996, and what role did impartiality and neutrality play in creating an environment in which these factors could exist? To do this, I will look at the evolution of the concept of humanitarian aid and the founding principles of impartiality and neutrality, how those principles have been defined, and they have interacted with aid distribution.

The mission statement of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), according to the organization's website, explains that it is "an impartial, neutral and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence and to provide them with assistance" (ICRC). The organization is founded on seven fundamental principles: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and

universality. These principles are also reiterated in their code of conduct, which I will discuss later.

Impartiality and neutrality are defined by the ICRC in the document *The International Committee of the Red Cross: Its Mission and Work* as follows: first, impartiality is "a principle that rejects any form of discrimination, calls for equal treatment for people in distress, according to their needs. It enables the ICRC to prioritize its activities on the basis of the degree of urgency and the types of needs of those affected" (404). This principle, one that has been adopted by several other humanitarian organizations, reiterates the general principles of non-discrimination. However, *any* form of discrimination includes discrimination based on political and/or group affiliation, former actions that might have contributed to the need for aid, and participation in other abuses of aid, situations in which it would perhaps be logical to differentiate. This principle, as defined by the ICRC, allows for the differentiation based on needs, enabling the humanitarian organizations to organize its efforts and resources. Most organizations have various procedures of evaluating the needs of a population, and resources fund activities to meet those needs that the organization deems the most important or immediate. I give examples of this in chapter four.

> Second, neutrality enables the ICRC to keep everyone's trust by not taking sides in hostilities or controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature. Neutrality does not mean indifference to suffering, acceptance of war or quiescence in the face of inhumanity; rather, it means not engaging in controversies that divide peoples. The ICRC's work benefits from this principle because it enables the organization to make more contacts and gain access to those affected. (404)

In other words, the ICRC's concept of neutrality allows them to be a nonaligned party during a conflict in order to coordinate with both sides. Unlike the principles of

impartiality, neutrality is designed to keep the ICRC completely unbiased. Impartiality allows organizations to say no to giving aid to particular groups, such as those who committed genocide in Rwanda. After organizations have determined whom they can and will give aid to, the principle of neutrality ensures that no one within that group will be discriminated against because of race, gender, religion, or ideological nature. Authors such as Charlotte Ku and Joaquín Cáceres Brun discuss the neutrality of the ICRC in contemporary humanitarian operations and how neutrality has been questioned in blurry situations in which it is not clear to whom aid should or should not be given. Although neutrality is a widely accepted principle, it has been difficult to fully adhere to it in the aid community, "with some organizations implying that maintaining neutrality in instances of gross violations of human rights is tantamount of complicity with those violations" (Brun: 57). The Great Lakes refugee crisis is one such instance that falls in this category, as we will see later.

It is important to note here at the beginning of this thesis that I will be promoting my own interpretation of these principles throughout my argument. As one can see from the documented definitions, both principles are broadly defined. Like most other overarching principles, these definitions were meant to be applicable to all situations, thus their vagueness. As I will later describe, situations such as the Great Lakes crisis posed a challenge to these principles and the interpretations thereof. However, I present my interpretation of these principles in light of this crisis and argue that they should be more clearly understood throughout the aid community as well as more strongly enforced.

In order to understand these principles and their effects on the aid community, I

will begin this thesis with the history of the International Committee of the Red Cross. I do this for several reasons. First, the ICRC originated as an organization mandated by the 1949 Geneva Conventions to carry out formal, structured humanitarianism. According to the ICRC, the Geneva Conventions "task the ICRC with visiting prisoners, organizing relief operations, re-uniting separated families and similar humanitarian activities during armed conflicts" (Dörmann). In the aftermath of World War I, it was a priority of the participating countries of the Geneva Convention of 1864 that ambulances, military hospitals, and official medical personnel remain neutral and impartial in order to attend to the wounded without discrimination. States that are party to the Geneva Conventions also confirm the Statutes of the ICRC, which "encourage it to undertake similar work in situations of internal violence, where the Geneva Conventions do not apply," making the Statues "soft law" (Janis: 46). The distinction here between "hard" and "soft" law refers to "the difference between rules of law meant to be followed and norms meant merely to set out preferred outcomes" (Ibid.). The ICRC has defined itself as being the at "birth of international humanitarian law", and it has worked in most major crises of the past 146 years, making it a pivotal factor in humanitarian aid today (ICRC).

Secondly, the Red Cross has served as a model for other organizations. Dorothea Hilhorst, in her article "Being Good at Doing Good? Quality and Accountability of Humanitarian NGOs", notes that over 207 organizations have adopted the ICRC's code of conduct (Hilhorst: 207). This code of conduct, aiming to establish a common standard for relief work, "identifies the alleviation of human suffering as the prime motivation for humanitarian assistance, which must be provided on the basis of need alone and not as an instrument of government or foreign policy – ideals which correspond closely to the Red

Cross/Red Crescent Principles of humanity, impartiality and independence" (ICRC). These foundational principles are reiterated within its code of conduct, which has penetrated the humanitarian aid community and influenced the way in which many other organizations operate (ICRC). This influence implies several things about my proposed research: it gives validity to the ICRC and its strategy, and it raises concern about whether or not these organizations should be modeled upon the ICRC. It is clear that other organizations have taken up these principles, using the ICRC as a model for how aid is enacted.

The Great Lakes refugee crisis was one of the most devastating crises of the 20th century. After the genocide of the Rwandan Tutsi in 1994, Rwandan Hutus were forced by the Tutsi into neighboring countries, such as Congo and Tanzania. From 1994 to 1996, Rwandan Hutu military leaders established training bases inside and around the refugee camps. Military leaders were able to stockpile weapons, recruit and train refugee fighters, and launch cross-border attacks against Tutsi-controlled Rwanda. In late 1996, the militarization of the camps had become so strong that it provoked a Rwandan invasion of and attacks against the refugee camps. Not only did the militarization of the Rwandan refugee camps spur more conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups, it caused violence to be spread to more than a dozen surrounding states and rebel groups. Despite the fact that they contained thousands of perpetrators of genocide, the refugee camps were internationally supported in such a way that they were able to obtain resources to perpetuate the conflict (Lischer: 1-2).

Many scholars have done work on this crisis, especially on the Rwandan refugee camps in eastern Congo. However, the majority of these scholars research the effects of

the militarization of refugee camps and how aid organizations reacted or should have reacted. My research aims to track the variables that led to this militarization and to study how, specifically, impartiality and neutrality were related to these variables.

The Great Lakes crisis also begs the question of whether neutral humanitarian aid was even possible. Ignoring militarization while attempting to distribute aid to a refugee camp can aid belligerents and, in the case of the Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire, fuel the conflict. Failure to adhere to the principle of impartiality is also dangerous when an organization provides assistance based solely on *need* and does not determine whether or not the recipients of this assistance include refugee warriors. As stated before, adherence to neutrality would help to ensure that aid was given to those who might abuse or misappropriate it. As stated by the ICRC, "neutrality does not mean indifference to suffering, acceptance of war or quiescence in the face of inhumanity." My interpretation of this assumes that aid organizations will not provide aid to those who cause suffering or war. If aid organizations did not differentiate between those who caused suffering or war and those who did not, they would become indifferent to these atrocities. In defense of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Fabrizio Hochschild said, "Even the guilty need to be fed" (Rieff: 54). Despite the truth of that statement, whose responsibility is it to feed those who are guilty? Does that fall under the jurisdiction of humanitarian aid organizations, or does it actually compromise their foundational goals?

In the case of the Great Lakes, non-adherence to these principles compromised the purpose of aid organizations and their responsibilities to the victims. Because there is widespread acceptance of these principles as the model of how to enact humanitarian aid, it is evident that research that highlights the possible flaws in the foundation is of extreme

importance. In addition, however desirable these principles may be, "any humanitarian action in a conflict zone will have political, and possibly military, consequences no matter how apolitical the intent" (Lischer: 9). I recognize that some conflicts cannot be avoided, and there are unavoidable dilemmas in humanitarian aid that will always exist. However, this research aims to highlight those dilemmas that could be avoided if there were stronger adherence to principles such as impartiality and neutrality, thereby avoiding the creation of environments in which the militarization of refugee camps can thrive.

In the second chapter of this thesis, I will lay the historical background of formal humanitarianism and track its evolution from its birth in 1864 until the events of the Great Lakes refugee crisis, which I will be using as a case study. I detail the history of the International Committee of the Red Cross, because this organization is widely known to be the first formal humanitarian organization. Because of the importance of this historical framework, part of this chapter will be dedicated to answering the question, "How did formal humanitarianism begin?" In answering this question, I will also look at humanitarianism's legal ties to international humanitarian law and the law's significance in the establishment of the ICRC.

Upon the establishment of the ICRC, several humanitarian principles were also set in place. Two of these principles, impartiality and neutrality, will be the focus of my analysis. These principles have been engrained in the codes of the ICRC and have therefore been highly influential in the rest of the aid community. Since their founding within the ICRC, these principles have withstood global tension and international crises. But how have these principles of impartiality and neutrality changed since their

establishment? How do today's aid organizations enact or define them differently than in the past? In order to answer this question, I will mention several global situations that have forced humanitarian organizations to re-strategize or clarify these principles and their application. One example of an international crisis that reshaped humanitarian policy is the Vietnam War. I will discuss some of the major changes that international humanitarian law has experienced and the laws that were in place when the Rwandan genocide occurred. Over time, these doctrines have become more and more specific, so I will study the policies that directly pertain to the Great Lakes refugee crisis.

Throughout the chapter, I aim to explain the evolution of humanitarian aid in a way that helps to shed light on how humanitarian organizations function today. Particularly in regards to these founding principles, I highlight the historical content that justifies the changes that humanitarianism has gone through and show how these changes have molded how humanitarianism is enacted today. Are the ways and principles of humanitarianism outdated or are they still applicable to today's world and its modern crises? This chapter helps to answer my overall research question.

The third chapter explains the Great Lakes refugee crisis, which is the case study for this research. I give an account of the events in Rwanda and surrounding countries the preceded the genocide in the 1990s. I outline the major events that led to the genocide, as well as explain important social factors that set the scene for the conflict. This genocide led to a mass migration of Hutu refugees into neighboring countries such as Zaire and Tanzania, which was the stage for the Great Lakes refugee crisis.

I analyze specific factors that caused this refugee crisis, particularly the factors that led to the militarization of the refugee camps. This includes the political position of the

host countries, the refugees themselves, and the global community who participated in giving aid to these refugees. What factors were present before the humanitarian aid organizations entered the scene? I will describe the conditions inside the refugee camps that were set up in cities and towns in Zaire and Tanzania, as well as the social and political environment. Through this thorough description, readers will get a clearer picture of the crisis itself and the major factors that created this particular environment.

It is also important to discuss how this crisis is similar to or different from other major humanitarian crises of the 20th century. As discussed in the second chapter, crises such as the Vietnam War shaped how international aid organizations handled conflicts in which guerrilla warfare blurred the line between civilian and soldier. The newly reformed law should have applied to the case of Rwanda and surrounding countries; however, the lessons of Vietnam did not seem to influence the actions during the Rwandan crisis. Why weren't these new policies implemented, and what might have caused this shortcoming?

In the fourth chapter, I look more closely at the actions of the humanitarian aid agencies themselves. More specifically, I analyze the policies and programs of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Food Program, and Doctors Without Borders. What action or inaction by these organizations worsened the crisis? To do this, I will look at the programs and policies of major organizations that were working in the refugee camps, as well as direct accounts and personal experiences of workers of these organizations. These factors, which I list in chapter four, will reflect how the militarization of the refugee camps took place.

My research will then investigate the relationships between the ways in which the

aid organization contributed to the militarization of the refugee camps and the principles of impartiality and neutrality that I discuss in chapter two. Was it adherence or non-adherence that inspired these factors? These relationships will be a key contribution to the general question of my thesis. The following are the five variables on which I will focus: the number of humanitarian organizations that were participating in aid delivery; the various ways that humanitarian aid can be exploited; the role of the refugees; knowledge or lack thereof of the conflict on the part of the aid organizations; and accountability within the organizations to uphold these founding principles. I will look at each of these factors individually, based on information from primary resources as well as the work of scholars. I will then draw connections between the variables and the principles being studied. This these is therefore a relational study on how the presence or absence of these foundational principles to humanitarianism affected the factors that led to and fueled this crisis. The results of this study will show the significance and effectiveness of foundational principles within the aid community.

The final chapter will discuss the overall findings of the study and their implications. By looking at the development of humanitarian aid, the factors that led to this particular crisis, both within the aid organizations as well as from the state actors, and the significance and effects of the principles of impartiality and neutrality, the results of this thesis will shed light on this importance of holding aid organization accountable for their actions and call for a higher standard in the implementation of aid. The age of these principles may lead one to believe that the organizations themselves have forgotten their foundation. However, this case study will show that when these principles are not implemented on the field, the results can be dangerous and embarrassing. In the end, my

aim is not only to find the factors that led to the militarization of the refugee camps during the Great Lakes crisis, but to also find the relationship between those factors and these founding principles.

Chapter 2: History of the ICRC and the Foundational Principles of Humanitarianism

In order to better understand the aid community and the crises it confronts, one must look at its origin and evolution. Because the important humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality have helped lay a foundation for modern humanitarianism, their evolution sheds light on their influences and characteristics. I begin with the International Committee of the Red Cross, the grandfather of formal humanitarian aid, and look at the major landmarks of its evolution. The phases that the International Committee of the Red Cross has gone through show the hurdles that it has encountered, as well as adjustments to its policies that have surfaced along the way. The purpose of this chapter is to clarify the history of the ICRC and these foundational principles to more fully understand the very basis of humanitarianism.

Several authors have written extensively on the history of the ICRC, including London-based journalist Caroline Moorehead; John F. Hutchinson, history professor at Simon Fraser University; and David Forsythe, professor of political science at the University of Nebraska. According to these scholars, formal humanitarianism was born out of the Napoleonic War and began with the Geneva Conventions of 1864 and the establishment of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). During the Second Italian War of Independence, a spectator named Henri Dunant from Geneva witnessed the aftermath of the battle of Solferino. The violence and chaos he saw in Solferino inspired him to write a book, *A Memory of Solferino*, prompting influential leaders in Europe to set up societies of volunteers during times of peace that would be ready to help the wounded when wars broke out. He also encouraged the drawing up of

international principles that would help form the philosophical basis of these societies (Moorehead: 8).

One of the admirer of Dunant's book was Gustave Moynier, philanthropist and president of the Geneva Society for Public Utility (SGUP) (Hutchinson: 21). Moynier expressed a positive reaction to Dunant's proposition and raised the issue at an SGUP meeting in February of 1863 (Hutchinson: 23). A committee of five was formed consisting of Moynier, Swiss officer General Dufour, Swiss surgeons Dr. Louis Appia and Dr. Théodore Maunoir, and Dunant; this group would soon become the independent group of the International Committee to Assist the War Wounded (Hutchinson: 23). Dunant began traveling around Europe, touring the courts of the German states to promote the Committee's idea before the upcoming conference in Geneva (Hutchinson: 28). Support was necessary, as the Committee was asking for the neutrality of military medical personnel. In other words, the Committee wanted medical personnel to assist all sides of a conflict in an unbiased manner. He returned to Geneva to prepare for the convention that took place in October of 1863.

While the foundational proposal of the Committee to establish voluntary aid organizations in each country did not necessarily demand international action, the principle of neutrality behind military medical personnel could not be established without it, according to Hutchinson. This aspect of their proposal allowed states to "respond to an increasingly vocal public opinion aroused by reports of the callous treatment of soldiers, protect their investment in improved military medical services, and graciously accede to this manifestation of patriotic enthusiasm" (Hutchinson: 30). Incorporating a

mentality of neutrality allowed for the participating nations to protect their own soldiers during warfare, reaffirming the already strong sense of patriotism.

On October 26, the conference delegates assembled and began to draft an agreement drawn up by Moynier. The final resolution of the conference, however, reflected the necessity of neutrality by making the following recommendation:

> that in time of war the belligerent nations should proclaim the neutrality of ambulances and military hospitals, and that neutrality should likewise be accorded, fully and absolutely, to all official medical personnel, to volunteer nurses, to the inhabitants of the country who go to the relief of the wounded, and to the wounded themselves (Hutchinson: 37).

The International Congress that took place the following year aimed to draw up an agreement that would embody this recommendation; it was, however, such a controversial issue that in the end, volunteers were not specially designated at all in the final draft (Hutchinson: 49). Nevertheless, the Geneva proposals came to be seen as the "first codified humanitarian principles" (Moorehead: 23) through the foundation of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Thus, the first aid organization was grounded in international law, their mandate written by the parties of the Geneva Conventions. During 1863 and 1864, the national committees were established and the ICRC began.

By 1949, the ICRC had already experienced several major wars within Europe, including two world wars, and concluded seven conventions at Geneva in response to these conflicts (Forsythe: 110). 1906 and 1929 were years in which the ICRC convened to discuss the impacts of recent conflicts, including World War I, and reshaped their original Convention. Moorehead reports on the importance of the late 1940s for the Committee: At the end of World War II, there was a defeatist attitude among the organization, mostly due to the atrocities of the concentration camps. Apologies were

issued by those who felt that the Red Cross has failed in its duties to protect civilians and soldiers, but nevertheless the number of volunteers dropped dramatically, as did funding.

Questions of whether or not the organization actually remained neutral during the Second World War also resonated throughout the international community (Moorehead: 42-51). "No modern war had ever been as long, as intense, as murderous or as widespread; never had the Red Cross emblem been so profoundly violated: and had never had prisoners-of-war or civilians been so barbarically treated" (Moorehead: 553). The Geneva Conventions of 1864 had to be re-evaluated to discuss the impact that modern warfare had had on the continent and the ICRC. A conference was called for by the Swiss confederation for which the International Committee prepared four draft Conventions. The Convention that was held in 1949 dealt with a significant number of issues: prisoners-of-war, treatment of the sick and wounded, and civilians in war. By August, the new Conventions were ready to be signed, and they contained a new standard for humanitarian law (Moorehead: 553-555). This new focus on victims of war lead to a new strain of legal thinking called the "Geneva traditions", or "Geneva law", or "Red Cross Law" (Forsythe: 110).

The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocol I of 1977 grant the ICRC a specific mandate to act in the event of an international armed conflict (ICRC). The first of these conventions protects sick and wounded soldiers on land during war; the second protects wounded, sick, and shipwrecked military personnel at sea during war; the third applies to prisoners-of-war; and the fourth protects civilians, even in occupied territory (ICRC). Although all of these conventions are important, the fourth is most pertinent to this study. These conventions are the backbone of international humanitarian

law and of the norms that are widely followed. With respect to these conventions and protocols, the ICRC has the support of international law, a unique quality within the aid community. Nation-states collaborated to set up the mandate of the ICRC, thereby creating a set of norms that has developed into international law. Under these laws, the ICRC's mission statement reads as follows:

> The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an impartial, neutral and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance.
> It directs and coordinates the international relief activities conducted by the Movement in situations of conflict. It also endeavours to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles.
> Established in 1863, the ICRC is at the origin of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (ICRC).

This mission statement reflects the vision of the participating members to create an organization that upholds these specific principles with a purpose that will benefit the international community as a whole, or at least those participating nations. The actual application of this mission statement can be difficult to monitor, and this thesis aims to shed light on the consequences of not applying it to the full degree.

International Humanitarian Law, or IHL, has been developed through "hard law", such as conventions, covenants, protocols, pacts, or other documents that are formally signed by states that legally bind them to responsibilities. It can also develop through "soft law", or the widespread practice of states that is generally accepted throughout the international community as a norm (Janis: 47). Through both of these types of law, the ICRC has been regarded as the guardian of international humanitarian law. This special role has been designated to the ICRC through the Statues of the International Committee

of the Red Cross, which has been adopted by the states party to the Geneva Conventions (ICRC). In Article 4, the Statues define the ICRC's role as the organization to first, "undertake the tasks incumbent upon it under the Geneva Conventions, to work for the faithful application of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts and to take cognizance of any complaints based on alleged breaches of that law" and second, "work for the understanding and dissemination of knowledge of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts and to prepare any development thereof" (Statutes of the ICRC). This again reiterates the mission of the ICRC, declaring the mandate previously given by the party members of the Geneva Conventions.

The ICRC clearly has a unique place among the aid community. Its influence can be seen in that its Code of Conduct and practices have been widely adopted by other Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) (Hilhorst 207). Its abilities and resources are unlike any other in the aid community due to the amount of participants worldwide, their strong bond to international law, and how their actions have set a precedent for how aid is given and how IHL is enacted. The ICRC has been a significant influence in the molding of international humanitarian law and aid operations in general.

However, other factors continue to shape international humanitarian law and the ways in which aid can and should be provided. This includes various types of warfare that have posed challenges to the Geneva Conventions. Especially on the continent of Africa, the emergence of 'guerilla' warfare has gained a huge importance. While the economy and institutional infrastructure of certain African nations have faltered, armed insurrection in the countryside of these countries has emerged. Some of these insurrections are created by a country's own military forces in the form of military coups.

Guerrilla warfare is especially hard to study or observe, given the inaccessibility of the areas in which it usually arises and the level of violence and disruption that it creates (Clapham: vii).

'Guerilla' warfare has been largely contrasted in European history to warfare conducted by regular armies of well-established states. Therefore, it is sometimes regarded as a normal type of warfare in countries that lack a powerful government. Because of the lack of state organization in most African nations, guerilla warfare is especially prominent on the continent. Author Christopher Claphan describes the phenomenon as "the development of armed movements, usually originating in the countryside and often attacking across state frontiers, which have sought to contest the power of African states, and have frequently established their own forms of rule, in territories from which the control of established states has disappeared" (Claphan: 1). Particularly after the Second World War, African nations adopted this type of warfare as the most effective and efficient when trying to defeat the highly organized and heavily armed opponents, namely government regimes. Several insurgencies emerged out of the decolonization process, which we will see in my case study of Rwanda. Like Rwanda, several African countries experienced classical guerilla warfare, the emerging of small armed bands in rural areas, driven by a political agenda that sought some form of liberation (Claphan, 1-2).

The factors of leadership and ideology are particularly important in the case of guerrilla warfare. The initiating of such an insurgency takes individual initiative, and those who initiative the process have a great deal of power in how it should operate. Most leaders of guerrilla movements have come out of elite sections of society, as

politicians or military officials or among the educated sector (Claphan, 9). These leaders and the members of the movement share a commitment to principles or goals that drive the movement. The leaders in the movement may gain high authoritarian positions, like with the RPF in Rwanda where leaders were "able to enforce such stringent levels of discipline that individuals responsible for the rape or the murder of civilians were publicly executed" (Claphan, 10).

Historically, most insurgencies require external support, mostly for access across the border of a neighboring state "which is prepared at least to turn a blind eye to its activities, but also for weapons, money, diplomatic backing, and even food"(Claphan, 15). We will see this in Rwanda's history, especially in the roles of Zaire and Uganda. Therefore, guerilla war not only contributes to internal crises in a country but also often spreads to the surrounding region, as it the case with the Great Lakes crisis. Guerilla warfare it not a tactic that is used only in Africa. It has been used in Europe during both world wars; Mexico, Argentina, and Peru; Asia during the Vietnam War; and even the United States during the American Revolutionary war.

The prominence of guerilla warfare eventually forced the international community to make laws even more narrow and specific. In this type of unconventional warfare, guerillas often ignore the conventions' rules, in particular the responsibility to distinguish themselves from civilians. As opposed to warfare before the second half of the 20th century, there had arisen a need to somehow distinguish between combatants and non-combatants and formulate a way for the international community to approach these increasingly complex conflicts. Therefore, in 1977, directly after the Vietnam War, two protocols were proposed to be added to the Conventions of 1949: one for international

conflicts, the other for intrastate armed conflicts (Forsythe: 113). The first of these protocols defines armed forces and combatants in Articles 43 and 44 within the protocol. Article 43,1 defines "armed forces" as "groups and units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government or an authority not recognized by an adverse Party." It also equates armed forces with "combatants" in Article 43,2. Both articles are worth quoting in their entirety for our discussion:

> Article. 43,1. The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government or an authority not recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict.
>
> 2. Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate directly in hostilities.

Article 44,1 and 2 lays out the rights of the combatant when he becomes a prisoner of war while Article 44,3 defines the obligations of the combatants, such as the obligation to distinguish themselves from the civilian population. These are also worth quoting:

> Article 44,1. Any combatant, as defined in Article 43, who falls into the power of an adverse Party shall be a prisoner of war.
>
> 2. While all combatants are obliged to comply with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, violations of these rules shall not deprive a combatant of his right to be a combatant or, if he falls into the power of an adverse Party, of his right to be a prisoner of war, except as provided in paragraphs 3 and 4.
>
> 3. In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the effects of hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack or in a

> military operation preparatory to an attack. Recognizing, however, that there are situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself, he shall retain his status as a combatant, provided that, in such situations, he carries his arms openly:
>
> (a) during each military engagement, and
> (b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he is to participate.

Although these protocols may not be absolute in their application on the field, it is important to know how these terms- "combatant", "civilian", etc.- are defined in regards to legal and organizational documents. Especially in light of the ICRC's connection with international law and thereby humanitarianism's link to legality, it is helpful in understanding the implications of how the legal community classifies these terms. This applies directly to the study of the Great Lakes Crisis, as the perpetrators in the militarization hid their identity as combatants in order to manipulate aid.

The second protocol aims to protect the victims of internal wars, "often fought with more cruelty than international conflicts" (Protocol II). This second protocol reiterates the changes made in Protocol I, expanding further on humane treatment and prosecutions. Specifically, Protocol II more thoroughly describes the treatment of a civilian population:

> Art 13. Protection of the civilian population
> 1. The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from military operations. To give effect to this protection, the following rules shall be observed in all circumstances.
>
> 2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.

3. Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this part, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.

Article 13 states that civilians have a right to general protection against dangerous military operations. This is extremely important to the case study of the Great Lakes crisis, as the civilian refugee population was subject to threats of violence in the form of recruitment for the armed forces of the Hutu.

These two documents helped form a distinction between the international and domestic realm and assigned more specific regulations depending on the conflict (Forsythe: 113). Through protocols such as these, international law becomes more specific and attempts to help ease the application of law by making it less ambiguous and more concrete.

In 1993, the International Conference for the Protection of War Victims met and called upon the Swiss government to bring together an "open-ended intergovernmental group of experts to study practical means of promoting full respect for and compliance with that law" (International Humanitarian Law). This study was conducted in 1995 and aimed to improve the knowledge and implementation of humanitarian law. As shown, the Geneva Conventions and therefore the ICRC has gone through several major changes from its origin to the time right before the Great Lakes crisis. The world has become increasingly complex, and the international community has shown its efforts in adapting to those changes through the documents described above.

Through all of the adaptations that the ICRC and the aid community have undergone, humanitarian principles have been emphasized. As the grandfather of humanitarian aid, the ICRC has defined five humanitarian principles by which they abide: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and

universality. The Rwandan refugee crisis highlights specifically the principles of impartiality and neutrality. For clarification, I will reiterate here my ideas behind these two principles.

The principle of neutrality allows policies and programs to be formed on the basis of need, attempting to avoid any discrimination by putting everyone on the same playing field. This principle, one that has been adopted by several other humanitarian organizations, reiterates the general principles of non-discrimination. However, *any* form of discrimination includes political and/or group affiliation, former actions that have been committed that could have contributed to the need of aid, and other factors that should be considered when providing aid to a group of people, keeping in mind the distinctions between military personnel and civilians.

The ICRC's concept of neutrality allows them to be a nonaligned party during a conflict in order to coordinate with multiple sides. While is does allow the organization to gain and keep the trust of all parties involved, it also gives rise to the question of whether or not organizations actually follow these guidelines, especially in conflicts such as that in Rwanda. In this study, I will be focusing on these two principles, although I recognize the importance of the others as well.

These two principles will be foundational in examining the militarization of the Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire. Impartiality and neutrality are principles that intend to protect and assist civilian victims, and the militarization of refugee camps, I argue, is a violation of this safe space that is meant to uphold those principles. However, my research leads me to believe that aid organizations failed to respect these principles during this crisis. While the complexity of this particular crisis was overwhelming, it is

my opinion that humanitarian organizations should have been more partial to those who had not contributed to the genocide, both Hutu and Tutsi, or less neutral about providing aid to those more likely to abuse it, such as those who wanted to use the camps for military bases, to the best of their ability. My argument, therefore, is that giving aid to anyone without discrimination is not impartiality. Impartiality means distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants because policy dictates that these populations should receive different kinds of humanitarian assistance. For example, non-combatant civilians fell under the jurisdiction of humanitarian aid organizations. In the case of the Great Lakes crisis, there were also combatants that were refugees in Zaire. However, their label as refugees did not award them access to aid from these organizations. Because they were combatants and in fact had committed genocide in Rwanda, they were the responsibility of the host state, Zaire. Furthermore, aid was being given in a refugee camp, which by definition is a safe, civilian zone. I argue that there was a foundational instability within the aid organizations, a problem that was deeper than merely a shortcoming of planning and resources. I will be testing this notion by examining factors that led to the crisis and their relationship to these principles of impartiality and neutrality.

As we can see, formal humanitarianism has gone through several changes, especially since the end of World War II, and the circumstances in which aid is delivered have changed along with the formal legality. Most importantly, we can see milestone such as the establishment of formal humanitarianism, changes after World War II, and more recent reactions to crises such as guerilla war. While the strategies of aid have become much more advanced and agencies have become more aware of how to

effectively deal with individual crises, such as more thorough ways to determine the needs of a population and structured organizations with more funding and resources, there are also major dilemmas that have emerged out of formal humanitarianism. Several authors have theorized why problems have arisen, such as the large number of major crises, the number of actors involved in humanitarian aid, and the specific principles that have been questioned.

Now that we've seen how formal humanitarian aid was established and some major changes it has gone through, we can see how and why it operates as it does today. Obviously the world has gone through major crises, which have molded humanitarian policies. Specific events such as the Vietnam War showed the aid community that policies have to become clearer in order to more effectively deal with massive crises. These events have altered international humanitarian law, like the Protocols of 1977 that changes the legal status of civilians and soldiers. We've also seen the impact that has been made by this overarching global change, especially in regards to the ICRC, in defining aid organizations. Part of this formation revolves around those principles discussed: impartiality and neutrality. Those principles have had a widespread impact on organizations, who they help and why they help.

We see now that these principles are not out-of-date; on the contrary, they have been revised to deal with modern issues. Therefore, we can make the observation that it is not the principles that are lacking, but the application thereof. Now that we've looked at the underlying principles of humanitarianism, we can look at a specific case in which these principles were or should have been applied: The Rwandan refugee crisis is one example of how important humanitarian principles such as impartiality and neutrality can

be. The duty of humanitarian aid organizations is to ensure that these principles are respected and enforced throughout humanitarian spaces that they create such as refugee camps. Outside forces, however, can negate the efforts of aid workers to protect and assist victims when these principles are not adhered to. In the next chapter, I will show the events of the crisis itself and already existing factors that aid organizations dealt with. Then we will look at the factors caused by the aid organizations themselves. By doing so, I will explore the possible factors that caused the militarization of the Rwandan refugee camps and the absence of these humanitarian principles.

Chapter 3: Factors that led to the Great Lakes Refugee Crisis

The Great Lakes refugee crisis occurred in the aftermath of the Rwandan Genocide in 1994 and ended with the beginning of the First Congo War in late 1996. During these two years, over 2 million Rwandan refugees fled to neighboring countries, such as Zaire and Tanzania. The majority of these refugees were of Hutu ethnicity, the target of the then-dominating Tutsi in Rwanda. During this crisis, several of the refugee camps, particularly in Zaire, were militarized and politicized to launch attacks against the Tutsi in Rwanda. This chapter has two main goals: one, to explain some preceding events and contributing factors to this crisis to get a broader sense of the story in order to understand the specific factors that I will be analyzing; and two, to pinpoint specific actions on the part of humanitarian aid organizations that contributed to crisis. These two sets of factors will provide a basis of the argument that I will make in the next chapter. To be clear, I describe these sets of data as "factor" to mean that they are circumstances, facts, or influences that contribute to an outcome, in this case the militarization of the refugee camps during the Great Lakes crisis.

This chapter is presented mostly in chronological order in order to be clear about the sequence of events and the time frame that I'll be looking at. To describe the crisis itself and extract specific factors, I'll be explaining who was involved in the crisis, including countries, political parties, and ethnic groups, and the situation inside the refugee camps and the process by which they become militarized. Then, I will take a look at four major humanitarian groups who were present during the crisis: the International Committee for the Red Cross, CARE, Doctors Without Borders (MSF), and

the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR). I will be looking at the programs and policies that these organizations used during the crisis. It is important to note, however, that because of the large number of aid organizations that were working during the crisis, it is often difficult to differentiate between them. In some instances I was not able to find primary sources and therefore rely strongly on secondary sources. After looking at a general picture of the tendencies of these organizations, I'll extract a list of variables, which will become my second set of factors. At the end of this chapter, we will be able to more clearly see the outside forces that contributed to the crisis, as well as actions of humanitarian aid organizations that influenced the situation.

Rwanda is an East African country of 26,338 square miles, surrounded by Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and the Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire).[1] According to the United States Central Intelligence Agency, the population of Rwanda as of 2003 was 11,055,976 with a growth rate of 2.818% (CIA World Fact Book). The most important demographic factor I'll be looking at is the composition of various ethnic groups: Hutu and Tutsi. The Hutu make up about 84% of the population, while 15% are Tutsi (CIA). These numbers will come into play later on when we discuss the power struggle between the two groups and population growth and decline, especially in light of the civil war and genocide.

We begin with a description of the Great Lakes region, focusing specifically on the country of Rwanda. This will include a brief historical overview of the country before it's independence in 1962. Jean-Pierre Chrétien, author of *The Great Lakes of Africa: Two Thousand Years of History*, writes an extensive history on the entire region.

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[1] See Appendix II for the United Nations map of the Great Lakes region.

I, however, will begin in the middle of the nineteenth century with the arrival of the Europeans in the area. I chose this time period because of the drastic changes the region experiences with the arrival of foreigners, mainly with the shift in power and authority. Chrétien dates the Europeans' arrival at 1860, when several English explorers came to the region as missionaries or academics (Chrétien: 203-204). Thus, an era of conquest began- Britain and Germany being the main conquistadors. The territory was traded back and forth between European powers until World War I when Rwanda and Burundi were given to the Belgians (Chrétien: 260).

The arrival changed several structural factors about the society in the Great Lakes region, but one that will be most important to my study is the change in Hutu-Tutsi relations. According to Chrétien, the two groups experienced racial tension before conquest, but the Belgian regime only heightened the tensions. The Tutsi had the support of the Belgians, and as such had access to more resources such as schools. The Belgians even introduced identity cards in 1933, classifying individuals as Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa (Grünfeld: 29). Eventually the two social classes were separated by a great divide, one that has become "so obsessive to the point of eclipsing every other problem and being almost the only aspect of this region familiar to the Western media in the late twentieth century" (Chrétien: 282).

Although the genocide of 1994 was by far the worst massacre between the two groups in Rwandan history, author Fred Grünfeld tells us that this was not the first. By 1957, the Hutu had grown tired of their subjugated position under the Tutsi elite and therefore started a violent political combat (Grünfeld: 30). Over the next couple of years, the Hutu gained more control and staged another wave of violence in 1959. Although

there is no official data on the number of Tutsi that were killed during these raids, it is clear that thousands fled the country (Ibid.).

Three years later, on July 1, 1962, Rwanda became an independent country. Not surprisingly, the main Hutu party won the elections and Gregoire Kayibanda became the first president. As a form of revenge, Kayibanda limited access to education and employment for Tutsi. This only increased antagonism. The Tutsi retaliated only once in 1963, and afterwards Kayibanda started a campaign to kill the Tutsi. According to Grünfeld, there are estimates that 10,000 Tutsi were killed between December 1963 and January 1964, while others say that up to 20,000 Tutsi were killed and some 300,000 were made refugees (Grünfeld: 31).

In 1973, Habyarimana assumed presidency, and while the violence against the Tutsi significantly decreased during this time, they were still being discriminated against (Grünfeld: 31). By the 1980s, there was a second generation of Tutsi refugees in the neighboring countries to which they had fled in the '60s. In 1990s, The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that 900,000 Rwandan refugees were living in the surrounding countries at that time (Grünfeld: 32). Rwandan refugees in Uganda created the Rwandan Patriotic Front, or RPF. On October 1, 1990, the RPF attacked Rwanda and so began a three-year civil war.

There was a brief ceasefire on October 30 of that same year, but the RPF regrouped and began attacks again. Each time the Tutsi launched an attack, it would be countered by killings by the Rwandan army. After the fourth attempt at a ceasefire, an agreement was signed in 1992 (Grünfeld: 34). Nevertheless, the killings between the two groups continued: between 1990 and 1993, around 2,000 Tutsi died in ethnically

motivated violence (Lischer: 74). Negotiations to end the stalemated civil war took place, and a peace agreement was again signed in 1993; "despite the presence of a United Nations peacekeeping contingent (UNAMIR), Hutu hardliners prepared for genocide" (Lischer: 75).

The genocide of 1994 lasted from April to July, approximately 100 days; however, experts generally agree that between 500,000 and 800,000 Tutsi and a small number of moderate Hutu were killed (Lischer: 75). The genocide came to an end when the RPF defeated the Rwandan army forces and took control of the capital city of Kigali on July 4, 1994. While the genocide in and of itself was an extreme tragedy, the ramifications thereof were equally chaotic. The defeat of the Hutu forces spurred massive numbers of Hutu refugees to flee to neighboring countries, resulting in what is now known as the Great Lakes refugee crisis. According to Lischer, "nearly two million Hutu refugees fled at the instigation of an estimated 20,000 Hutu soldiers and 50,000 militia members, who joined the refugees in exile" (Lischer: 76). The main countries to which the Hutu fled were Zaire and Tanzania. Over one million people fled to eastern Zaire; these massive populations constituted states in exile with high tendencies for violence (Lischer: 76).

Now that we've painted a clearer picture about the events that preceded the crisis, as well as more about the setting of the crisis itself, we can look more specifically at factors within the crisis that led to the militarization of the refugee camps that were set up in Zaire. This first group of variables will consist of factors that were *not* actions of the aid organizations. I've organized these factors into four main groups, although most have subgroups that will provide further explanation: first, the identity of the refugees,

specifically militants and war criminals; second, the role of the host country, Zaire; third, the resources of the militants in the camps, consisting of both aid from other countries and that which they brought with them from Rwanda; and fourth, the tactics that the militants used to manipulate incoming aid.

First, it is most important to remember that the refugees in these camps were Hutu, the group that had unapologetically administered the genocide that led to their need to evacuate the country when the Tutsi took power. In fact, the OAU estimated that "around 10 percent- over 100,000 people- were actually militants and war criminals" (Lischer: 81). Based on information from the UNHCR, Fiona Terry tells us that the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), the former national army, were in two divisions: one containing 7,680 men and the other containing 10,240. Other units were created of an additional 4,000 men, coming to a grand total of about 22,000 soldiers. Some estimates reach 50,000 (Terry: 158-159). There were not only soldiers and politicians who were involved in the genocide. The genocide involved the entire Hutu population; "leaving few with clean hands minimized the risk of finger pointing and accusations once the extermination was complete" (Terry: 170). Non-military individuals became involved out of hatred or fear or for financial gain (Terry: 170).

According to Joel Boutroue, the UNHCR official in charge of the Goma camps, these political and military leaders led the majority of the refugees into Zaire; "their intention was to remain temporarily in Zaire, gather strength, and return to regain power," much like the Tutsi had done in Uganda (Boutroue, as quoted by Terry: 180). The authority structures that had been established in Rwanda carried over to the refugee population in the camps; this allowed the military leaders to maintain control of the

fearful population. According to the World Bank, these ex-FAR leaders also organized the camps into districts, sub-districts, neighborhoods, and groups of ten houses. This is just one example of the control they possessed over the refugee population (Lischer: 81).

On the other hand, it is important to recognize that the rest of the world saw these refugees as innocent victims. Despite the fact that they had engaged in genocide, they were also victims themselves of previous violence towards their own ethnic group, as well as of a cholera epidemic that hit the refugee camps. Terry reports that an estimated 50,000 refugees were killed by this epidemic, between 6 and 10 percent of the total population (Terry: 171). This factor only increased the amount of global attention that the refugees received, from the United States and Europe in particular. Seeing the chaos, the Western world responded in the most obvious way in their eyes: humanitarian aid.

In a hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee of Foreign Relations in the U.S. Senate, J. Brian Atwood said, "The United Nations must be on the front lines in the war against chaos… the desperate people in Goma, make no mistake about it, are the victims of this chaos… we simply can not let the cancer of chaos spread" (Atwood). Thus, these refugees were not only people attempting to escape revenge or persecution because of their actions, but also Rwandans who were forced to leave their homes and legitimate refugees. Therefore, it is important to know that refugees assumed multiple identities and to observe the events in light of them.

Second, the role of the host country of Zaire was also important. The proximity to Rwanda was obviously an important factor, but the involvement of the people and government of Zaire was also vital to the survival of the ex-FAR and their intentions in Zaire. The support of Zairian government and connections to outside influences meant

that the ex-FAR had extensive resources at their disposal outside of those provided by the aid organizations. Not only did Zaire provide the actual location for the ex-FAR to reorganize, but it also permitted free movement of the army and government officials and "ignored international calls for the arrest of war criminals" (Terry: 156). President Mobutu of Zaire was a close ally of Juvénal Habyarimana, president of Rwanda from 1973 to 1994, and had even sent several hundred troops to Rwanda after the RPF invasion from Uganda. Therefore, when the international community urged Mobutu to take action against the crisis in the refugee camps, he refused. Zairian border officials made little if any attempt to disarm the refugees as they entered the county, and did nothing to provide security for the camps or the surrounding area (Lischer: 85). The weakness and incapability of the failing Zairian government to act only made its ground more fertile for the ex-FAR's intentions to militarize the camps.

The arrival of the Hutu refugees also had an effect on Zairian society: this led to violence against Zairian Tutsi, violence supported by the Zairian government (Lischer: 82). This made it less and less appealing for Zaire to act against the situation in the camps. This inaction led to the involvement of other international actors, but no one attempted to demilitarize the refugee camps or secure Zaire's borders when it was became clear that Zaire itself had no intention of doing so. It should be noted that the role of Zaire was noteworthy because, in contrast, the refugee camps in Tanzania did not create the spread of violence, nor did they become launching sites for nearly as many cross-border attacks (Lischer: 76).

The third category of factors is resources: both those that were brought to the camps from Rwanda and those which were given as aid during the crisis by other

countries. Overall, the ex-FAR had considerable amounts of resources, both financial and military. Financial and military resources came to them through private and government foreign bank accounts, as well as states willing to breach the UN's arms embargo. In addition, the Hutu did not escape from Rwanda empty-handed: Terry gives an estimation of $60-80 million in local and foreign currency that was taken into Zaire during the exodus (Terry: 160). Not all of that money went towards the military's aims, but the military head in the camps frequently used intimidation and force in order to coerce their fellow Hutu into supporting their cause. Terry provides a list of several significant items that were carried across the border: vehicles and machinery worth millions of dollars and massive quantities of military hardware, including helicopters, artillery pieces, light weapons, and armored vehicles (Terry: 160-161).

In addition, the Hutu militants had resources delivered to them. Rumor had it that flights to the Goma airport contained military equipment for the FAR. Eventually, inquiries by Human Rights Watch Arms Project, Amnesty International, and the press led to verification that there were deliveries of AK-47s, mortar shells, and ammunition to Goma, compliments of the government of the Seychelles (Terry: 161). Invoices found in the camps indicated that other shipments had been made, some worth more than $1 million.[2] According to author William Reed, France sent military assistance to the Rwandan government after the RPF invasion, and supervised an expansion of the Rwandan army in 1990 and 1994 (Lischer: 87). France also conducted an aid operation, Operation Turquoise, which set up a humanitarian zone in the southwest corner of Rwanda to provide safe haven to the defeated ex-FAR. Obviously the militants could use

[2] See Appendix B of *Condemned to Repeat?* for multiple invoices (Terry: 250-259).

this area as well for organizing and launching attacks, which made Operation Turquoise controversial, and it also provided a French-protected zone where supplies could be shipped (Lischer: 88). Humanitarian aid came in all forms to the refugees in the camps, food and protection being the two main ways. Lischer provides a more detailed description of the role of food and protection, which will be discussed momentarily.

Finally, the exploitation of the aid that was given to the refugee was a crucial, if not the most important factor in how the camps were militarized. I include this factor in this category to point out the difference between the actions of the aid organizations and the innate nature of aid itself. The exploitation of aid is not necessarily always the fault of the aid agencies, as we will see in the examples below. It is important to note, therefore, that those who receive the aid are largely at fault for the exploitation, especially in situations in which organizations have taken measure to avoid manipulation. Because this thesis aims to include both sides of aid manipulation, it is essential to point out the exploitation that took place that was not the fault of the aid agencies.

International donors spent around $1.4 billion on relief contracts for Goma, Zaire, just between April and December of 1994. Between July and October of the same year, the UNHCR alone spent around $115 million (Lischer: 90). I'll go into more detail about the spending of certain aid organizations later, but these two figures alone paint the picture of how much aid and money was being funneled into these refugee camps. In 1995, Human Right Watch reported that the "militant elements benefited from the resources of the international aid effort through direct assistance from aid agencies" (Lischer: 90). Lischer gives a general list of four main ways that aid can be manipulated during a crisis: feeding militants, sustaining and protecting militants' dependents,

supporting a war economy, and providing legitimacy to combatants. I will be applying all four of these ways to the Great Lakes crisis.

First, food is the most basic way to provide aid for a group, no matter what the crisis is. Typically, militants can hide among refugees and obtain food aid this way. Obviously the less time they spend trying to find food themselves, the more time and money they have for other activities. Here, I would add that medical aid provides the same amount of relief for the militants. With food as well as medicine, militants have an opportunity to monopolize the aid and make a profit. Or, as Lischer suggests, if militants did not receive aid, they would simply steal it from other refugees (Lischer, 7). With the Rwandan refugees, the ex-FAR needed the refugees to be as healthy as possible in order to return to Rwanda and engage in combat. In refugee camps, aid organizations can function as the infrastructure that provides food, health care, sanitation, education, and other services to the state in exile (Lischer: 90).

Second, sustaining and protecting the militants' dependents can indirectly support their efforts by providing for their families and supporters. Especially in the camps in Zaire where the ex-FAR needed the refugee population to remain safe to be available for the return home, the humanitarian space of a camp provided a haven for soldiers' wives and children. Like with food and medical aid, helping the militants protect and provide for their families took the burden off their shoulders and allows them to focus on fighting.

Third, aid can unintentionally support the war economy that it is working against. Militants can manipulate the organizations to finance the conflict itself by actions such as levying war taxes on a refugee population; therefore a portion of money automatically goes to the militant leaders. Leaders of the camp often have a hand in aid distribution

itself in order to have the ability to divert it. In fact, Fiona Terry in her book *Condemned to Repeat?* gives an organized chart of how aid can be manipulated in different scenarios. This shows more clearly how humanitarian aid "contributes to the war economy of belligerent parties, in both legal and illegal ways" (Terry: 35). She uses the example of taxation to describe how a normal, legal act could be used to put money in the hands of the belligerents.[3]

One tactic that refugee militants use to divert aid is to inflate the population of the camps. Armed refugees can prevent aid workers from conducting a census of the refugees and, therefore, agencies must rely on refugee leaders for population counts. Lischer points out that Alain Destexhe, secretary general of Doctors Without Borders (MSF) said, while discussing the Goma camps, that "food represents power, and camp leaders who control its distribution divert considerable quantities towards war preparations" (Lischer: 7). For example, the original figure for the Goma camps in Zaire of 1.2 million was revised, based on aerial surveys taken by the U.S. and French military, to 740,000 (Terry: 187).

Another tactic that is often used by armed groups is raiding warehouses and international compounds. According to Lischer, "thousands, if not millions, of dollars of relief resources, including vehicles and communication equipment, are stolen every year" (Lischer: 8). Therefore, the resources that the militants in the refugee camps were getting from the aid organizations, aid that they were stealing from the organizations, and resources that they brought to Zaire from Rwanda created a significant stockpile of equipment, money, and necessities.

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[3] See Appendix III for table of the contribution of humanitarian aid to the economy of war.

Finally, providing legitimacy to combatants is not a tangible resource that can be physically stolen or misrouted, but it does weigh heavily on the scale of what militants are able to use for their cause. As stated before in identifying who the refugees were, the story of the Rwandan refugees is one that drew large amounts of attention all over the world. It is almost necessary that aid organizations oversimplify the story of a crisis in order to raise money from the West (Lischer: 8). Aid organizations often paint pictures of needy victims in order to obtain funding, although this is not always the whole truth. The way in which aid organizations present the victim has a strong hand in shaping international opinion of the actors in the crisis.

Legitimacy is also granted in another way: the very presence of aid organizations can be used to bolster a county or group's political goals. Legitimacy is increased when aid organizations are "forced to negotiate with unsavory rebel or government groups. The very act of negotiation solidifies the reputation of such groups as powerful and legitimate" (Lischer: 9). This also gives them more access to international media. In the case of the Rwandan refugees, militants used this legitimacy and attention to bolster feelings of pity in other countries, thereby increasing their aid supply.

My second set of variables will include aspects of the work of humanitarian organizations and how these actions contributed to the crisis itself, along side the aforementioned outside factors. This set of variables aims to answer the question: What did humanitarian organizations do or not do that created an environment in which aid could be exploited and camps could be militarized? There are four main factors that I will be looking at in this set of variables: the number of organizations and non-state actors that were involved during the crisis; what humanitarian organizations did that

allowed their aid to be exploited by militants, specifically security within the camps; lack of extensive knowledge about the people and region, their history, and the conflict itself; and the lack of accountability within the aid organization to uphold their founding principles. These four factors were derived mainly from three main authors: Michael Barnett, Fiona Terry, and Mary Anderson. All of these authors have written extensively on international aid organizations, some specifically about the crisis in Rwanda and Zaire. I will explain the authors themselves and the main works that I will be using, as well as extract specific aspects of their work and relate that to the case study.

The first author I will be looking at is Michael N. Barnett, the Harold Stassen Chair of International Relations at the Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs and Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, as well as a previous worker at the U.S. Mission to the UN in Rwanda during the Rwandan genocide. His book *The International Humanitarian Order* is a series of essays that discuss an 'order' that has developed since the Cold War. This new order of the last half century is "a complex of norms, informal institutions, law, and discourses that legitimate and compel various kinds of interventions by state and nonstate actors with the explicit goal of preserving and protecting human life" (Barnett: 1). These essays describe the relationship between the international order and the United Nations, but also look at the practiced ethics within the order.

Barnett describes this new order as one that includes a large number of various types of organizations. I will be using this specific point that he makes as one of the factors within this set of variables. Nongovernmental organizations, such as Doctors without Borders, the ICRC, CARE International, and Oxfam, are intertwined in this order

as they aim to reduce suffering among vulnerable and neglected people (Barnett: 1). These organizations have been around for decades and have therefore assisted in the making of this order, creating norms among international actors. Other international organizations help NGOs in their missions; some examples are the United Nations and its programs, such as the World Food Program, UN peacekeeping, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNICEF, and the World Health Organization. Along with these organizations, states have become increasingly important actors on the scene by providing monetary and military aid to citizens. On the opposite side of the coin, states can also provide military assistance or legitimacy to belligerents during a conflict. Even those in the private sphere who are looking to demonstrate some sort of social responsibility seek to integrate charitable aspects to their businesses (Barnett: 2).

This large number of actors has had a major impact on the world of humanitarian aid and has caused the order to expand significantly over the last two decades, according to Barnett. The number of actors inevitably makes the aid process more complicated; while two heads are better than one, hundreds of opinions cause confusion.

Barnett also argues that the post- Cold War world has created more complex humanitarian emergencies, mostly due to the shift in the concept of international stability. During the Cold War, it was widely assumed that stability came through deterrence and military balance of power, whereas after the Cold War stability was sought after in international peace and security (Barnett: 8). This helped to create the expansion of the international humanitarian order and increased the supply of actors in the humanitarian field. Actors in the international order, those in the 'international community', therefore assumed more responsibilities; ideas such as 'the responsibility to protect' and

conditional state sovereignty began to emerge and the concepts behind international relations began to change. This expansion and the confusion it brings is a main component of the disaster of Rwanda. So many organizations were involved in the crisis, which brought about several disagreements, even within organizations such as Doctors Without Borders, whose French section left while others decided to remain.

Barnett dedicates an entire essay to "the UN Security Council, indifference, and genocide in Rwanda" (111). Barnett was a political officer at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations assigned to cover Rwanda, as well as being primarily responsible for the peacekeeping operations in Rwanda, Burundi, and Mozambique. Therefore, much of the focus lands on the UN's reaction to the genocide in Rwanda, what was, and more importantly what was *not* done, to avoid the conflict or reduce the suffering. His insight is extremely helpful in understanding the international community's reaction to the genocide, specifically in regards to the concept of intervention and the indifference shown by the UN during the crisis. The UN, in an attempt to not stir the waters more so than they were already, stood by and did little. Not because the UN was aiming to do harm, but because its sheer size did not allow a collective decision on this touchy subject. Not to mention, the UN did not have the manpower in the form of volunteer soldiers to send enough security assistance.

Barnett does not write directly about the Great Lakes refugee crisis. His theory on the international humanitarian order, however, helps to detect the various actors and factors that could have been involved in the militarization in the refugee camps. Lischer lists several aid organizations who were involved in the Great Lakes crisis, namely the UNHCR, the World Food Programme, the ICRC, and NGOs such as CARE, Doctors

Without Borders, International Rescue Committee, Oxfam, American Refugee Committee, Caritas, and Médecins du Monde (Lischer: 90). Just this short list provides an idea of how many agencies were involved and the number of projects that were taking place simultaneously. An evaluation was done by the Danish Ministry of foreign affairs, along with 19 OECD-member bilateral donor agencies, plus the European Union and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD; nine multilateral agencies and UN units; the two components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (ICRC and IFRC); and five international NGOs. This report is extensive in its reports on aid to Rwanda during the crisis. It estimated that at least 200 agencies were involved in the repose to the Rwandan genocide (Borton:3).

My second source is Fiona Terry, who was the head of the French section of Médecins sans Frontières, or Doctors without Borders, during the Rwandan genocide in the early 1990s. Her book *Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action* attempts to explain why humanitarian action unintentionally prolonging conflicts and suffering while trying to alleviate them. The side effects of humanitarian aid often include negative political consequences and moral ramifications by inevitably aiding one side over the other or putting lives in danger due to a failed policy. Although this is not what my thesis specifically analyzes, it is useful to note that Terry, as an experienced aid worker, highlights problems within aid appropriation. In fact, Terry implies that aid organizations were *too* impartial during this crisis and therefore had to withdraw from giving aid entirely. In contrast, I am stating that aid organizations did not adhere to these principles as they should have, thereby aiding a side that should have never received aid from aid agencies in the first place. I will more thoroughly present this argument in the

next chapter, where I present specific documents relating to organizations that worked during this crisis.

Terry uses four relevant cases to examine these negative side effects of humanitarian aid, including the Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire from which MSF withdrew as a reaction to its aid being used to strengthen those responsible for the genocide (Terry: 4). Terry states that two questions spurred debates within MSF in the refugee camps: To what extent was MSF responsible for the manipulation of humanitarian aid in the camps, and how could they best assume such responsibility (Terry: 3)? This debate eventually led to the withdrawal of MSF France, along with other organizations, such as CARE, Save the Children, and Oxfam. Terry states that MSF France left the Great Lakes region because they felt a large amount of responsibility, and they assumed this responsibility by leaving. The militarization of the refugee camps had caused many to question the concept of aid and is still fresh on the minds of those involved. Despite the fact that militarization of refugee camps is not a new concept and has had serious implications for "regional peace and security, refugee protection, and humanitarian action, the issue has received surprisingly little attention in the international relations, peacekeeping, or refugee literature, beyond being recognized as one of several security implications of refugee flows" (Terry: 7). In fact, Terry notes that only two other works have been published that analyzed why and how refugee camps benefit belligerent forces by becoming useful assets in guerilla struggles to gain political control over civilians (Terry: 8).

Overall, Terry's main argument is that humanitarian sanctuaries, or humanitarian spaces, provide three main advantages to guerilla factions: First, refugees have protected

status under international law from which combatants illegally benefit by mixing among them. Her second and third points have already been discussed previously in this chapter: refugee camps attract humanitarian assistance that provides guerillas with an economic resource independent of external patrons and provide mechanisms through which guerilla movement can control the civilian population and legitimize its leadership (Terry: 9-10). The dilemma of militarized refugee camps is part of a bigger picture of "changes in the nature of conflict coincided with the rapid expansion of the international aid regime" (Terry: 13).

It is important to point out here that Terry challenges Barnett's opinion that the post-Cold War environment is more complicated than that of the past; in fact, she says that it is the international response that has become more complex (Terry: 5). However, Terry states that the post-Cold War world has been one in which aid has become integrated into conflict in regions that were previously off limits to international organizations (Terry: 13). She also challenges the assertion that "aid is becoming a major factor in the continuation of conflicts" (Terry: 5). It is obvious that it is difficult to determine the exact effect of aid on any given conflict, but Terry claims that there have been "few attempts to back up such claims with the assessments of the impact of humanitarian aid in comparison to that of other political, economic, and military resources available to belligerents (Terry: 5). Her book therefore goes into great detail about the effects of aid and circumstances in which aid might prolong conflicts. Her works helps my thesis incorporate factors that are broader than the actions of the aid agencies alone.

Under the broad category of what the aid agencies did to stimulate an environment of manipulation and militancy, I have chosen a specific aspect from Terry's writing that I believe to be the most important: protection and safety, both of the refugees and the aid workers. First, it is important to note that refugee camps are meant to be "humanitarian spaces", one that is characterized by its civilian and neutral aspects. In the absence of these characteristics, it is much easier for belligerents to use the space for military purposes. According to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977 discussed in Chapter 2, civilians are entitled to protection under IHL, as long as they do not take part in hostilities. Furthermore, IHL requires that militants distinguish themselves from civilians. However, on the part of the humanitarian organizations and other international actors involved, there was no assurance that militants would distinguish themselves from civilians, making the refugee camps particularly complicated environments.

Terry argues that humanitarian organizations cannot be held responsible for the militarization of the refugee camps because "it was neither their task nor within their capacity to ensure the civilian character of the camps" (Terry: 17). However, I should point out here that it is organizations, such as the ICRC, who have the political and legal backing of the international community and therefore should assume such responsibilities, especially in dealing with civilians. As Barnett mentioned in his description of the involvement of the UN, its mandate and will to act was severely lacking. Particularly in regards to providing security to the camps, there was a lack of assertion by the UN to adequately supply resources. As we will see in chapter four, the UNHCR was a prime example of Barnett's observation of the lack of resources and

political will. Therefore, it is right to note that humanitarian organizations like MSF and CARE should not be held directly responsible for the safety of the camps, and their difficulty to enforce compliance with international law is noted. However, as Terry points out, "humanitarian assistance is necessary only once governments or combatants have been unwilling or unable to shoulder their respective responsibilities" (Terry: 17). From this I can only derive that at the failure of the UN to provide protection for the refugee camps, it was the humanitarian organizations that should have assumed responsibility before becoming voluntarily involved, as they are responsible for not getting involved in situations that are not protected.

The safety of the aid workers themselves also contributed to the dilemmas. This came into play most often when aid workers attempted to distribute aid to the most vulnerable refugees, often resulting in threats and intimidation. Terry uses the experiences of relief agency CARE as an example of this tendency. During its attempt to control traffic into the camp, several death threats were issued to CARE staff members. Thirty-five of the Rwandans that were hired by CARE were murdered and replaced by armed militia members. CARE eventually announced its withdrawal in October 1994 (Terry: 176). It goes without saying that the failure of the UN, states, and relief agencies to provide security to these camps resulted in violence such as this. Security in the camps could have contributed significantly to the prevention of the militarization, as well as the general well being of the refugees and aid workers. Overall, Terry provides a strong argument that there was a the lack of security within the camps, and her direct account of the dilemma in the refugee camps in Zaire provides an insider's point of view on the potential consequences of humanitarian aid, despite well-intended aid organizations.

Mary B. Anderson, author of *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace- or War*, also contributed to Jonathan Moore's book *Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention* with her article "You Save My Life Today, But for What Tomorrow?" She takes a broader yet still helpful analysis about the dilemmas that humanitarian aid organizations face. Anderson suggests that aid agencies have a tendency to exacerbate conflict, when aid somehow makes a conflict worse or adds factors that extend the conflict. The main point is that aid providers should always start from the recognition that "victims" have capacities and that they are already coping with their own crisis before aid arrives (Anderson, You Saved My Life Today: 142). Anderson's sociological approach to sustainability suggests that when agencies build on the strengths and abilities of the community in which they are serving, it eliminates the tendency to create dependency by helping the victims with the immediate threat, as well as encouraging their own self-sustainability. However, reliance on the locals can become detrimental, especially in a case like that of the Great Lakes where the local authorities had goals to misappropriate and abuse aid.

In the case of conflict, however, dependence on the locals is far more complex. In these instances, aid organizations must analyze the ways that rebels may misappropriate aid resources and develop strategies for avoiding these, as well as developing skills for identifying and supporting local capacities that are genuinely for peace (Anderson, You Saved My Life Today: 145). Locally effective strategies have been created to avoid dilemmas that arise during conflict, regarding, for example, scheduled delivery times and quantities of supplies and dispersal techniques. Anderson argues that despite the presence of war in a region, there are certain systems and structures of daily life that

continue to connect individuals, and those can be used to the advantage of aid organizations, such as religion, community roles, and family norms. Specifically during times of war, Anderson says that the main question that humanitarian organizations should ask themselves is, "If humanitarian assistance were channeled to reinforce the things that connect people rather than divide them, could it not only meet immediate needs but also help buttress and enlarge the 'connecting space' and 'voice' for people to disengage from war" (Anderson, You Saved My Life Today: 147).

She states in her article that "well-intentioned assistance often has negative consequences in relation to conflict" (Anderson, You Saved My Life Today: 141). While reliance on locals might be an ideal situation, it is the responsibility of the aid organizations to identify legitimate local capacities. During the crisis is Zaire, "whole villages arrived together with leadership structures intact so that early decisions about how to allocate and distribute food seemed easy" (Anderson, You Saved My Life Today: 145). It seems that aid workers automatically assumed that these leaders were reliable and trustworthy. Therefore, one of the major mishaps within aid agencies was too much reliance on locals and not enough background checking on their legitimacy. Anderson further suggests that aid providers should recognize ways in which belligerent refugees could misappropriate aid and "develop skills for identifying- and supporting- local capacities that are, genuinely, for peace" (Anderson, You Saved My Life Today: 145). Again, it is important that scholarship such as Anderson's be looked at because it has been influential in the development of aid policies and can explain why a reliance on locals is so strongly encouraged.

Along with a "capacity assessment" to understand the abilities of the local population, aid providers should also analyze the underlying causes of the crisis itself in order to be more effective in their aid distribution. Whether this assessment is performed by using experts in the area or going into the area for further analysis of the situation before implementing a policy, Anderson suggests that those in charge of organizing aid programs should be more informed. Knowledgeable planning could have helped buffer the problems that were experienced in Rwanda, and we can see that aid providers should "recognize that the needs they address are only manifestations of deeper circumstances that cause people to be vulnerable" (Anderson, You Saved My Life Today: 142-143). It is important that the aid workers be aware of the circumstances that surround the crisis and recognize the ways in which their actions could worsen these circumstances or reduce the damage done. Therefore, the second factor that Anderson provides is simple: knowledge on the part of the aid organizations about the situation they are going into, and reasonable expectations about how aid can be manipulated, especially within conflict situations.

All three of these theorists offer a unique perspective on humanitarian aid and the dilemmas that are faced while attempting to provide assistance. Barnett's approach gives a conceptual idea to how and why the international community has developed, giving background to the factors that have effected events such as the Great Lakes crisis. He reveals how the amount of humanitarian organizations can be and often is a major problem. Terry's first-hand experience speaks more specifically about this crisis and the consequences of the militarization of the refugee camps. The factor I have drawn from Anderson is that aid organizations do not provide appropriate security, neither for the

refugees nor the aid workers themselves. Anderson offers a broad framework on avoiding dilemmas and what aid agencies can do in order to avoid them. This theory of 'do no harm' can be applied to the Great Lakes refugee crisis, most notably in bringing awareness to the abilities of belligerents to misappropriate aid and recommendations of how to avoid this misappropriation. She highlights the dependence that aid agencies have on local populations and how that can at times be detrimental. She also points out, in a broader sense, that the lack of base knowledge that organizations have of the crisis itself it harmful and counterproductive; despite the reoccurrence of the manipulation of aid, humanitarian organizations do not effectively plan for these hurdles. The research done by these three authors highlight these indicators that contribute to how the militarization of these refugee camps came about.

In conclusion, this chapter provides us with two important sets of data: a set of factors that tells us more about the elements that effected the crisis that the organizations could not influence- the identity of the refugees, the role of Zaire, the resources of the militants in the camps, and the tactics used by those militants to manipulate aid- and a set of factors that tell us more about the direct role of the aid agencies- the number of organizations working in the aftermath of the genocide, security within the camps, lack of knowledge about the crisis itself, and the lack of accountability within and among organizations. These two groups will be combined with the data I report in the next chapter: the programs and policies of some major aid organizations that motivated their actions. These three sets of factors, including the background that I gave on the principles of humanitarian aid in chapter two, provide the backbone for this paper. The next chapter of this thesis will provide the final piece to the puzzle. Now that we have

addressed these factors, we can see more specifically the actions of some aid agencies and the connections between those factors and the principles of impartiality and neutrality.

Chapter 4: Programs, Policies, and Actions of Humanitarian Aid Organizations

Now that we've seen the events that led to the Great Lakes crisis, the actions of the refugees inside the refugee camps, and some fundamental characteristics of humanitarian organizations at large that negatively effected the crisis, we will now look more specifically at a several organizations, namely Doctors Without Borders (MSF), The World Food Programme (WFP), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). This chapter's purpose is two-fold: to provide tangible examples of the mistakes made by aid organizations during this crisis and to see how these mistakes relate to the principles of impartiality and neutrality.

I've chosen these organizations for several reasons. First, the French section of Doctors Without Borders was one of the first organizations to leave the Great Lakes due to the moral dilemmas it faced regarding aid distribution to those who had committed genocide. MSF was largely a supplier of the medical aid that went into the Great Lakes region, and we have discussed how medical aid can be manipulated. As an offshoot of the International Committee for the Red Cross, it is interesting to see how MSF reacted to dilemmas involving these principles, particularly in light of why MSF established the organizations in the first place, which we will discuss later. Second, the World Food Programme, as the largest humanitarian agency that deals specifically with hunger issues, was the main provider of food to the refugee camps. From there we move on to talk more generally about the UNHCR. The UN was particularly important during this crisis, especially in the matter of security. The United Nations represents the attitude of the larger international community and, in my opinion, sheds light on humanitarian

operations as a whole in response to a global opinion. Collectively, these organizations paint a clear picture of the actions of the international community as well as specific aid organizations.

As this chapter is the core analysis of my thesis, it is important to note the framework and method that I will be using. Each section of this chapter will consist of four parts: first, I will explain the individual organization, its history, and what it contributed to the Great Lakes crisis. I will begin each section of this chapter describing the organization or international body as a whole. This is to highlight the foundation of the organization, particularly its principles; this will include mission statements, codes of conduct, and the like.

Second, I will look directly at the program documents of the organization. These documents will reflect the actions of the organization and their approach to aid during the crisis. We will then look more specifically at program policies that are enacted on the field. I will be using primary sources whenever possible, including program documents written by organizations during the time of the crisis, as well as financial statements, mandates, and activity portfolios. These include agenda items and evaluation reports from the World Food Programme, policy papers and evaluations from the UNHCR, research papers from MSF, and general information that can be found on all of their websites.

I would like to point out that the documents from some organizations are closed to the public; the International Committee for the Red Cross is one example. During my research for this project, I ran into some significant hurdles regarding the public access to other documents. Although I am not sure about the specific reasons that these documents

are not available, it only raises my suspicion that these documents reflect work that these organizations are not proud of. This is the main reason that, although the ICRC was a major actor in the Great Lakes crisis and instrumental in humanitarian action in general, I will not be using it in my analysis. However, that does not change the point from chapter two that it helped establish these humanitarian principles and has been influential in the aid community.

Because I will be limited in the resources that I have access to, there are several secondary sources that I will be relying upon. Fiona Terry, as the director of the French section of MSF during the time of the Great Lakes crisis, is a reliable source from which I will be gathering much of my information.

Third, after I discuss the organization itself, its overall policies, and specific programs and actions related to the Great Lakes crisis, I will begin drawing connections between those actions and the factors that were described in chapter 3. We will see if these factors- the number of organizations and non-state actors that were involved during the crisis; what humanitarian organizations did that allow their aid to be exploited by militants, security within the camps; lack of extensive knowledge about the people and region, their history, and the conflict itself; and the lack of accountability within the aid organization to uphold their founding principles- correspond with these documents and actions of the organizations. As one might expect, some organizations will relate more strongly to certain factors than others.

Finally, I will establish a connection between the actions of the aid agencies and the founding principles of impartiality and neutrality, which were discussed in chapter 2. I expect to find that when the programs and the actions of the aid agencies were not

driven by these principles, they were more likely to create a space in which their aid could be manipulated, specifically in the aspect of militarization. Therefore, the aim of this chapter and the thesis as a whole is to establish those connections, especially during major humanitarian crises such as that in the Great Lakes. This thesis not only highlights fundamental humanitarian principles, but also addresses their wide-ranging effects on the actions of aid agencies and how they, through the programs and policies that are implemented, can strongly affect a crisis negatively or positively. While there has been extensive writing on this humanitarian crisis in particular as one of the largest in the 20th century, few scholars relate the dilemmas that aid organizations experienced to their adherence or non-adherence to these principles. That is the purpose of this project.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

The first organization we will look at is the UNHCR, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. This organization was created by the United Nations and therefore represents a more global approach to crises. It was established in 1950 after the end of World War II in order to help refugees displaced by the conflict. Since its birth, the organization has been vital in events such as the fall of the Soviet Union, the decolonization of African countries, and refugee crises in Middle Eastern countries like Afghanistan. The UNHCR has expanded at a rapid rate, now with 7,190 staff members working in 123 countries. As of 2011, its budget is more than $3.23 billion, and it is required to deal with 36.4 million people that are of concern to the UNHCR (*UNHCR*).

Because the UNHCR is such a large global actor, its activities are wide-ranging. According to its website, they are divided into nine main categories: advocacy,

assistance, asylum and migration, durable solutions, emergency response, environment, fund-raising, global needs assessment, and protection. Its work ranges from working within the structures of a government as a voice for refugees, asylum seekers, international displaced persons, and stateless individuals to helping those individuals find homes and jobs after being displaced. It also maintains an environmentally friendly conscience when supervising refugee camps and settlements. The UNHCR runs mainly on direct, voluntary contributions, so fund-raising is vital to the organization, as is its assessment of the needs of those it aims to help (*UNHCR*). The two areas I will be focusing on are emergency response and protection. These two areas are the focus of this section, and I will be showing the aspects of security, which I find to be the most important mistake of the UNHCR during this crisis.

The UNHCR recognizes that sudden emergencies that require immediate response occur in the world today. Therefore, aid agencies including the UNHCR must be able to rush aid and experts into the effected areas as soon as possible. Being able to provide aid immediately to an at-risk population is essential in providing long-term rehabilitation and protection. According to their website, teams within the UNHCR are specialized to be ready for deployment at a moment's notice. It has also organized emergency stockpiles of food aid in Copenhagen and Dubai, and has standing agreements with logistics and shipment companies. The UNHCR is part of a "global network of suppliers, specialist agencies, and partners" (*UNHCR*).

The UNHCR's data tell us that the organization is able to provide aid to an emergency that effects up to 500,000 people at any given moment, including being able to mobilize 300 workers within 72 hours. The organization claims that its preparedness

and capacity are derived from the training of its workers; a Workshop for Emergency Management is held four times a year to prepare workers for an emergency, including aspects of operational planning and security (*UNHCR*). It is clear from the organization's statements that it has taken many steps to ensure its ability to assist refugees in an emergency situation; what that also tells me is that the organization's inability to be successful in certain emergencies, like that of the Great Lakes crisis, is due to something larger than mere preparation. Logically, if an organization's preparation and ability alone can result in a successful mission, this crisis would have been dealt with in a more profitable manner. However, that was not the case, and I hypothesize that it was the approach to aid that was problematic.

The second aspect that I want to look at is protection, especially since security was one of the most pertinent issues within the Rwandan refugee camps. Because refugees and displaced persons have inevitably lost the protection of their home state, they are in particularly vulnerable situations. According to the UNHCR, its core mandate is to protect uprooted or stateless people. The organization does this by "ensur[ing] the basic human rights of uprooted or stateless people in their countries of asylum or habitual residence end that refugees will not be returned involuntarily to a country where they could face persecution" (*UNHCR*).

These sections of activity are broad descriptions of what the UNHCR does on the field. Now that we've narrowed their work down to that which is applicable for the Great Lakes crisis, we can look more specifically at its policies for protection. "Operational Protection in Camps and Settlements: A Reference Guide of Good Practices in the Protection of Refugees and Other Persons of Concern" was written by the UNHCR with

cooperation from the NGO community. This paper specifically addresses camp security and the maintenance of the civilian and humanitarian character. According to the "agenda for protection" that is contained in this paper, "addressing security-related concerns depends first on the commitment of the country of asylum but may also require the involvement of the UN Security Council, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and organization with specific competence in situations of armed conflict, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross" (*Operational Protection*: 38). In other words, responsibility first and foremost lies with the host nation (Zaire in this case study), but it is clear that the host country may not be able or willing to provide said protection. In that case, the UNHCR's Statute and Article 35 of the 1951 Refugee Convention provide UNHCR with a mandate to monitor and assist states in their primary obligation to refugees. The physical safety that is supposed to be ensured to these refugees also requires that "the living environment of refugees should be peaceful, humanitarian, and civilian, free of violence and criminal activity, and conductive to the realization of human dignity" (*Operational Protection*: 39). This includes organized armed criminals, errant military and police, non-state armed parties to a conflict, anxious local populations, and other refugees. More specifically, it recognizes refugee leaders as a source of insecurity for camps (*Operational Protection*: 39).

Despite the fact that the UNHCR clearly recognizes the need for security, as well as sources of insecurity that might present a challenge to its mandate, it still considers "empower[ing] refugees and host community leaders to have a role in security" to be a good practice for security within camps (*Operational Protection*: 40). While there are certainly times when the local population can be used to help provide security to the

camps, to assume that as a "good" overall policy is dangerous. As with the situation in the Rwandan refugee camps, refugee leaders used this trust to manipulate the population as well as the aid they were being given. This paper also tells aid workers to "work with host governments to provide security personnel" (*Operational Protection*: 41). Again, making this a broad statement to provide protection to a refugee camp is risky. In fact, as we discussed, Zaire was an ally to the militant Hutus in the camps.

Other policy changes are made or reiterated in this UN paper; for example, it says that camps' security should be monitored on a regular basis (*Operational Protection*: 41). However, if the camps are not secured in the first place, aid workers tend to become targeted when security is attempted, thus driving aid workers away from the camp itself out of fear. This was the case in Zaire, and aid workers could therefore not monitor security on a daily basis, simply because they were not physically present often enough.

Another issue that the UN paper addresses is the maintenance of the civilian and humanitarian character within refugee camps. It focuses mainly on the presence of armed elements, incursions by militias, cross-border raids, and recruitment from the camp (*Operational Protection*: 42). The principles of neutrality is reiterated here, when the paper specifically says that "international refugee law and the protection it confers is premised on the principles of neutrality and, more specifically, on the peaceful humanitarian character of asylum" (*Operational Protection*: 42). As such, *all* actors have an obligation to cooperate in ensuring that this character is maintained, even though states have the *primary* responsibility. This includes efforts to curtail the flow of arms into the camps and identify and separate combatants from bona fide refugees (*Operational Protection*: 42). Accordingly, the neutrality of camps should never be taken for granted

and always monitored. If the actors involved do not ensure this neutrality, it can have disastrous outcomes, as we have seen in Zaire.

Identifying and separating combatants from the civilian population is one of the most basic strategies that an aid agency can use to ensure this protection and security. In fact, this paper gives very specific definitions of *combatant*, *armed civilian*, and *armed element*. These definitions are very similar to those in the Geneva Conventions that we discussed in chapter 1. It is obvious that this is not the easiest of tasks, and often there is resistance to separation, as well as difficulty in labeling an individual in any of these groups. Nevertheless, it specifically points out that it is the obligation of the UNHCR and the diplomatic community to overcome this reluctance to ensure safety (*Operational Protection*: 44).

The UNHCR gives a "ladder of options for maintaining security in refugee camps." These are: first, the soft approach, which includes preventative measure that support the host state in maintaining security within refugee-populated areas. Second, the medium approach, which uses international civilian or police monitors to provide expertise and support, including training, mentoring, and monitoring. The third is the hard approach, which uses direct force such as peacekeeping or peacebuilding operations to maintain security. This is typically the last resort and requires UN Security Council authorization. The Great Lakes crisis went through all of the rungs of this ladder, and we will now discuss the final operation that was conducted: the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR).

UNHCR was a particularly interesting case during the Great Lakes crisis. First, not only was the UNHCR working with all of the organizations, governments, and

institutes involved in the crisis, it was responsible for managing the overall activities in regards to the refugees. According to the UNHCR Statute,

> The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, acting under the authority of the General Assembly, shall assume the function of providing international protection, under the auspices of the United Nations, to refugees who fall within the scope of the present Statute and of seeking permanent solutions for the problem of refugees by assisting governments concerned, private organizations to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of refugees of refugees, or their assimilation within new international communities (United Nations: 6).

Therefore, the number of organizations that the UNHCR had to work with was overwhelming. As mentioned before, all of these organizations, over 250 according to Terry, were under the oversight of the UNHCR. It was literally impossible for the UNHCR to regulate all the activities that were taking place in the affected countries.

Second, the physical security of refugees is an essential part of refugee protection. Under international law, as well have discussed, the host state is responsible for ensuring the protection of all persons within its borders (da Costa: 38-39). However, the UNHCR's Statute and Article 35 of the 1951 Refugee Convention mandates that the UNHCR monitor and assist states in this primary obligation of protection (United Nations, *1951*: 31). The UNHCR has a uniquely mandated role in the protection and security of refugees, and therefore the issue of security, or lack thereof, is particularly interesting. From the very beginning of the crisis, the UNHCR was presented with a host of security complications, but "few of them were addressed in the early stages of the emergency" (*Lessons Learned*). It was due to a lack of early consensus that the poor security in the camps escalated. The UNHCR could not or did not separate the combatants from the rest of the refugee population, much less disarm these combatants. The weakness or absence of government law enforcement agents, which are supposed to

be supported and monitored by the UNHCR, were part of the insufficient preparedness of the Zairian government as well as the international community (*Lessons Learned*). As discussed above, the UNHCR's policy to rely heavily on the local population for social structures was also detrimental.

Security in these refugee camps was, in my opinion, one of the UNHCR's greatest failures. After all, it is this agency that is the self-proclaimed protector of all refugees. Especially in a major crisis such as the Great Lakes crisis, security should have been its number one priority. The lack of security compromises the ability for impartiality and neutrality to exist by creating an environment in which the application of these principles is nearly impossible to monitor. Therefore, UNHCR should have had the experience and expertise to predict that security would have been one of its biggest issues. Its lack of clearly defined conditions for involvement from the outset should not have prevented it from doing one of the most basic activities that its mandate demands. According to the UNHCR Statute, it has the function of "providing international protection, under the auspices of the United Nations, to refugees who fall within the scope of the present Statute" (United Nations: 6). This includes "assisting governments concerned, private organizations to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of refugees, or their assimilation within new international communities" (United Nations: 6). Ensuring that the humanitarian space that is provided is impartial and neutral, for the safety of the refugees, should have been an immediate response. Especially in its reliance on the locals for information and security structures, UNHCR fell short in its obligations to other organizations and, more importantly, the refugees themselves.

We can see that the UNHCR had the mandate to provide security for the camps, and there was a valiant effort made to do so. However, resources were severely lacking, particularly in respect to the manpower in the form of soldiers or security personnel. The fact was, the UNHCR needed those soldiers in order to carry out their responsibility of protection. It is clear that the organization had done preparation measures and some type of organizational network to enact the mandate, but there was a severe lack of will power on the part of the states to supply them with the resources to do so. In response to this, a suggestion might be for the UNHCR to have its own personal set of deployable soldiers for crises such as this. Giving the UNHCR a mandate and having it depend upon the actions of states must be unreasonable and frustrating for the UNHCR workers. If there is one organization that is in charge of ensuring the international protection of refugees, it should consistently and reliably have the resources to do so.

Surprisingly, I could discover very little assessments that the UNHCR had done on the crisis before intervening. Obviously, the organization has had some experience in dealing with refugee crises. However, there was little security assessment before hand, as well as little expertise about the specific refugees that the crisis involved. Especially given that the country of Rwanda had been in such turmoil since the late 1980s, the area should have been a hot spot that the UNHCR was monitoring. As stated before, the refugees that fled to Uganda before the Rwandan civil war in 1990 should have sent up a red flag for the international community, especially the UNHCR. This knowledge would have led it to establish a more effective way of responding to the crisis, which would have included major security strategies that assured the neutrality of the refugee camps.

In regards to the security issues that the UNHCR had to deal with during the Great Lakes crisis, the principles of impartiality and neutrality played a significant role. Its statute specifically addresses the "non-political character" of the UNHCR, and the work that it does should reflect those principles. In not having adequate resources to implement its responsibilities, it does not ensure the neutral character of the humanitarian spaces of refugee camps. Because these principles are foundational for the UNCHR, they should be in the backbone of their planning and implementation. If it is mandated with the responsibility to ensure the safety of refugees in neutral, humanitarian spaces, it should guarantee its resource supply. Although it is the responsibility of the UNHCR to ensure the protection of refugees and uphold these principles, it is also important to see that it is the responsibility of the international community, namely the United Nations, to provide the UNHCR with the tools to do this task. The entire international community fell short in this conflict, and as a consequence the UNHCR could not fulfill its duties. This lack of security affected the entire refugee crisis and the works of other organizations, as we will see in the following sections.

The World Food Programme

The second organization I chose to analyze was the World Food Programme. The World Food Programme (WFP) is part of the United Nations system and therefore represents a global effort to combat hunger. It is self-proclaimed as the world's largest humanitarian agency fighting hunger worldwide. WFP was established in 1962, and its

vision is that "every man, woman and child has access at all times to the food needed for an active and healthy life" (*WFP*). Along with the WFP, there are two sister branches: the International Fund for Agriculture Development and the Food and Agriculture Organization. It works in more than 70 countries and has more than 10,000 employees (*WFP*).

WFP's mission statement tells about its principles and its actions. It claims that food aid should be oriented towards eradicating hunger and poverty in light of addressing food security (WFP). Intervention in a crisis is determined by the level of poverty that a population experiences: the poorest people are unable to produce enough food or do not have the resources to otherwise obtain food that they and their households require for active and healthy lives. In this sense, WFP enacts a principle of universality and, like MSF, determines aid recipients based on need. Its aim is to use food aid for social and humanitarian protection by providing a basic need to those who have experienced an emergency (*WFP*).

WFP plays a major role in emergency relief: in its programs, it gives priority to supporting disaster relief, preparedness and mitigation and post-disaster rehabilitation activities. In this, it claims that it will "make all necessary efforts to avoid negative effects on local food production, consumption patterns, and dependency on food aid." In this vast aim, it includes both neutrality and impartiality as principles. Because WFP has a multilateral character, it aims to work everywhere in the developing world, "without regard to the political orientations of governments, and to provide a neutral conduit for assistance in situations where many donor countries could not directly provide assistance." Also, as was mentioned above, it concentrates its efforts on the neediest

people and countries. This level of need is determined by the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes (CFA); this committee was later replaced by an Executive Board. The CFA's decision was to "provide at least 90 percent of WFP's development assistance to low-income, food-deficit countries and at least 50 percent of its developmental assistance to the least developed countries by 1997 (*WFP*).

From the research that I've done on the work of WFP during the Great Lakes crisis, the main problem that I see is their lack of knowledge about how its food aid could be manipulated by these refugees. Yes, WFP has extensive knowledge about the delivery of food aid to a crisis, how to assist in agricultural projects that provide communities with food, analyzing the vulnerability of populations and providing food security, and evaluating how much food is needed and the nutritional value of the food that is provided. Resources are largely based on needs, of course, but there are no requirements beyond biological needs. Again, the belief that food aid is less likely to be manipulated probably prevents WFP from seeing the necessity of this type of evaluation. Its documents point out that food aid "can make a major contribution to economic development through the creation of assets and the construction and maintenance of infrastructure" (*Agenda Item 7*: 17), but it seemingly fails to see that those contributions could go to militants or combatants within a needy population.

The document from which I obtained the most information about WFP's policies during the time of the Great Lakes crisis was a review of WFP's policies, objectives, and strategies, published in May of 1994, just one month after the refugee crisis began. This document is particularly important because of the time in which the review took place, as well as what it says about WFP's perspective about the consequences of food aid. It is

clear by this document and reviews that the organization focuses heavily on providing food aid to the most needy and eradicating hunger on a global setting. Interestingly enough, this document contains a section specifically for refugees and displaced persons (*Agenda Item 7*: 14). However, it still does not contain warnings or precautions for the manipulation of food aid within humanitarian crises involving refugees. Although I've found no WFP document that records a known manipulation of food aid during the Great Lakes crisis, secondary sources such as Terry's account tell us that food was a large asset to the militants by providing aid for soldiers. This observation is confirmed by the fact that original population estimates that were provided by militants were significantly larger than the actual population of the camps, as was previously discussed in chapter three.

This lack of knowledge about the crisis beforehand emphasizes the need for the principles of impartiality and neutrality not only to be enforced but strongly emphasized. I want to highlight here the fact that WFP documents specifically say that "food is less likely to be diverted than any other form of assistance" (*Agenda Item 7*: 8). Despite the fact that this is a relative statement, comparing food aid to other types, it reflects a mentality that food aid is somehow exempt, at least partially, from misappropriation. This is a huge point to the topic of this paper, because if an organization does not recognize the potential for aid to be manipulated, it will not create safeguards that ensure that the aid is neutral and impartial. Not only is it a *gross* mistake to make, it is a bold statement to say that food aid is somehow exempt from manipulation. Clearly there are situations in which aid is manipulated, to a very high degree. In fact, as a basic necessity of life, it might have a higher chance of misappropriation. Also, the fact that WFP

documents recognize the fact that food can serve as an economic advancement to populations might lead one to believe that it also sees that food can serve as an advancement for militants and combatants. This is clearly not the case; otherwise, the previous statement would not have been made. Furthermore, had WFP had more information about these refugees themselves, it would have recognized the increased potential for any type of aid to be manipulated. Not only did WFP need a more thorough knowledge of the crisis itself and the possible effects of the aid that it would distribute, more broadly speaking it needed a recognition of the possibility of food aid manipulation in general.

Security in the camps was also a major issue for WFP during the crisis. The increased need to deliver food aid to civilians caught in areas of conflict has brought about difficulties in establishing equitable food aid distribution systems as well as an increased dependency on special international arrangements to protect and security the delivery of humanitarian relief (*Agenda Item 7*: 10; Executive Board: 6, *Lessons Learned*). This same agenda reports that there were sufficient arrangements for an assured food pipeline to effected areas; however, there is no report that there was an assured distribution system after the food arrived to the area. Again, this is most likely because WFP believed at that point that "food is less likely to be diverted than other forms of assistance" (*Agenda Item 7*: 8). We know now from Terry's account in Zaire that food was explicitly used by the militants in the camp to control the population. Because of this belief, militants could more easily manipulate the population amount and needed ration sizes in order to receive more aid. Combatants in the camps could simply take advantage of this naivety and provide WFP with unreliable information.

Unfortunately, my experience in researching aid organizations has taught me that aid agencies, including WFP, are hesitant to provide information that reveal mistakes they made on the field, including the lack of precautions before intervening. Therefore, as stated before, WFP does not provide a document that specifically details how combatants took advantage of this food aid. I am relying on the policy documents that are provided for that time period, as well as others' observances during the situation, namely the experience of Terry and the research by Lischer. Both of these authors address the manipulation of food aid, as we discussed in chapter three.

Because of this lack of knowledge and security of the food pipeline, there was little if any attempt made to create a neutral food aid distribution systems. Of course, as we discussed earlier in this chapter, it was ultimately the job of the UNHCR to secure the camps, as well as monitor the actions of other organizations working in the refugee crisis. Nevertheless, the food pipelines of the WFP should be secured by the WFP. If these distribution systems had been monitored down to the last stage, it would have ensured that the food aid was not being misappropriated. The fact that the population and ration sizes were falsely reported by combatants in the camp, discussed in chapter three, only re-enforced WFP's inability to enforce neutrality; there was no validation of the information it was getting and thereby not assurance that these policies were not playing into the hands of belligerents.

Especially since the WFP deals *specifically* with food aid, it should be able to ensure that the food that it provides is not being manipulated to benefit combatants. In fact, this Agenda 7 of the policies, objectives, and strategies of WFP also reports that there was a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 1994 by WFP and UNHCR that

states that WFP had "full responsibility for mobilizing and transporting all basic food for refugee operations involving more than 5,000 beneficiaries, including repatriation, in developing countries" (*Agenda Item 7*: 10). This memorandum gives the responsibility of the food mobilization and transportation, which includes food pipelines. Because WFP adheres to these humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality, it is its responsibility to ensure that this mobilization and transportation is done in a neutral and impartial manner. The WFP did not follow through with this responsibility, and did not ensure the neutrality and impartiality of the food aid; this was a result, I argue, of the lack of knowledge that the organization had of the refugees themselves and the ability of the food aid to be manipulated by the refugees.

Médecins Sans Frontières, Doctors Without Borders

Lastly, I will be evaluating Médecins Sans Frontières, or Doctors Without Borders. According to the organization's website, it was founded in 1971 in France by doctors and journalists. Since then, it has evolved into a major aid agency that assists over 60 countries "threatened by violence, neglect, or catastrophe, primarily due to armed conflict, epidemics, malnutrition, exclusion from health care, or natural disasters." Since MSF works mainly as a source of medical attention for individuals effected by these circumstances, its employees consist of doctors, nurses, logistics experts, administrators, epidemiologists, laboratory technicians, and mental health professionals who assist people during crises (*Doctors Without Borders*).

MSF is particularly interesting because of its connection with the ICRC: the doctors and journalists who established MSF had previously worked for the ICRC.

During the Nigerian civil war, the aid workers there experienced a moral dilemma of sorts. The Nigerian government had established a blockade against the southeastern region of the country Biafra and civilians in this area were subject to attacks by the Nigerian government. Because of the ICRC's understanding of neutrality, it did not criticize the Nigerian government. The French doctors who were working for the Red Cross, particularly Bernard Kouchner, heavily criticized the Nigerian government and the Red Cross itself for their seemingly complicit behavior (Brun: 62). Kouchner resigned from the ICRC and founded MSF, saying that the Red Cross's "silence over Biafra made its workers accomplices in the systematic massacre of a population" (Kouchner, as quoted by Brun: 62). The debate over neutrality was key in this situation, and its role was a driving force behind the establishment of MSF. These doctors who challenged the work of the Red Cross, along with others who had worked in Pakistan would eventually establish what is now Doctors Without Borders. According to author Elliot Leyton, this organization quickly became the world's largest private, independent emergency medical relief organization. It now has six major sections: Holland, France, Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, and Luxembourg (Leyton: 57) with an annual budget of $250 million (*Doctors Without Borders*).

Because of their branching off of the ICRC, MSF has a similar set of principles but one that would allow it to move beyond the confines of political and religious boundaries. Its main principles are as follows: medical ethics, impartiality, independence, and neutrality. It establishes itself as an organization that brings "quality medical care to people caught in crisis regardless of race, religion, or political affiliation" (*Doctors Without Borders*). It also works completely independently from any political,

military, or religious agenda. Not only do they work independently from these institutions, but they also have a neutral financial source. "Ninety percent of MSF's overall funding, and 100 percent of MSF-USA's funding, comes from private sources, not governments (*Doctors Without Borders*)." Under its neutrality aspect, MSF aims to be neutral in conflicts, providing care on the basis of need alone (Charter).

MSF uses an independent assessment in order to determine whether or not it will intervene in a crisis. According to MSF, this assessment is "based solely on people's needs, not for political, economic, or religious interests," and is determined by the amount of medical care a population does or does not have access to. In a description of their financial information, MSF's website describes how programs are chosen and implemented: Medical humanitarian needs are determined by performing these assessments on the ground. These assessments include "the condition of the affected people" as well as their "vulnerability to a crisis." "Local medical professionals are important sources of information" that MSF relies upon. Another factor that goes into the intervention equation is the position of local authorities: "the local authorities' acceptance of MSF's action and adequate safety conditions for our volunteers are critical prerequisites for any intervention" (*Doctors Without Borders*).

After MSF has decided that it will intervene in a crisis, the project is outlined in detail before it is launched; these projects are evaluated throughout the operation. During the project, MSF claims that it directly manages all aspects of the program and does not delegate management responsibilities to third parties. Every year, MSF implements more than 4,700 aid assignments (*Doctors Without Borders*).

Now we can look at the specific policies that MSF used during the Great Lakes crisis. MSF has a collection of special reports on major crises around the world. One specific special report published in July of 1995 on the deadlock in the refugee crisis describes MSF's work in Zaire reports the following:

> In the eastern Zairian province Kivu, MSF works in the Rwandan refugee camps in and around Goma and in the partly Rwandan, partly Burundian refugee camps in Uvira. In Goma, two MSF sections are presently working with 2,100 national staff and 25 expatriates. MSF provides aid to an estimated 300,000 refugees in three field hospitals as well as in many health posts and dispensaries. The MSF activities also include water and sanitation and mental health care. In Uvira, MSF is undertaking medical, including 4 hospitals, and water and sanitation programs for approximately 55,000 refugees (*Deadlock in Rwandan Refugee Crisis*).

The factor of security in the refugee camps was a major problem for MSF. MSF relied heavily on larger organizations like the UNHCR and state actors to provide security within the camps, and rightly so as that is their mandate, as discussed in the first section of this chapter. The arrival of the Rwandan refugees into Zaire was undoubtedly overwhelming; yet at the same time, aid organizations saw some relief in seeing that the basic authority systems that were established in Rwanda were still in place in the refugee camps. Aid organizations could seemingly rely on these structures and focus on other issues. We know now that that was not the case at all, but that was a sense of stability for aid organizations, including MSF. These assumptions that the security structures did not need to be reinforced were detrimental in the long run. Terry makes it clear that attempts to separate the refugees from combatants after the camps had already been settled could have been extremely dangerous to the aid workers and the other refugees (Terry: 176). Therefore, although it was not the direct responsibility of MSF to ensure the security of the camps, there was also no attempt to separate the refugees upon arrival. Upon the failure of the UNHCR to provide adequate security, all branches of MSF should have

followed the policy mentioned above. MSF itself states that it will not intervene if this security is not provided.

Because the UNHCR was not ensuring the impartiality and neutrality of the camps, MSF could not ensure that their work was incorporating these principles either. Therefore, MSF as an aid agency unto itself should have withdrawn its assistance due to the lack of security provided. MSF-France did exactly this; the other MSF branches did not. When MSF-France realized that these principles were not being adhered to and that it was assisting belligerents who were militarizing the camps, it withdrew. Based on the evidence in this study, the other branches should have withdrawn as well. Not only were the camps themselves insecure and unprotected, the actions of MSF were as well. The aid provided was not re-enforced to ensure that it was assisting those who were legitimate refugees and not those who were combatants. The overall insecurity of the situation only made the militarization of the camps that much easier for these militants.

The division within MSF itself shows that there was no coordination even within organizations themselves in regards to security and its provision as a prerequisite for MSF's intervention. Terry reports that although the French section decided to withdraw from the crisis, others remained and the organization split. She points out that had all sections stayed or left together, it would have "strengthen[ed] the impact of MSF's stance and might force governments to respond to questions which they preferred to ignore" (Terry: 4). Instead, the leaving of MSF-France made waves in the aid community, among donor governments, and in the press. Likewise, the lack of coordination of aid organizations as a community during a crisis can lead to similar results from the international community.

Most importantly, MSF is a great example of the lack of accountability within the organizations. As stated before, MSF branches did not reach a consensus regarding their actions in the Great Lakes crisis. According to Terry, the debate within the organization came down to two questions: To what extend was MSF responsible for the manipulation of humanitarian aid in the camps, and how could it best assume such responsibility? Some argued that the very participation in providing aid implicated the organization; its very presence in the area and the provision of resources that were lost made it a direct accomplice in the belligerent actions of the militants in the camps. Because there was such a moral dilemma about what was just, the least it could do was not participate in something that was blatantly unjust. Thus, the only option for these people was to withdraw completely from the situation (Terry: 3).

Others MSFers argued that the impact of MSF and its medical services was negligible compared to major organizations that were in charge of, say, food distribution. Even so, the responsibility to monitor what happened in the camps was with states that had the capacity to intervene but so far had done nothing. There was no reason for MSF to feel responsible while others had failed to prevent the militarization. Not to mention, there were genuine refugees within the camp that needed the help of MSF, and it had an obligation to stay and help. At the very least, they believed that MSF should stay to document the negative effects of aid and speak to the international community about such matters (Terry: 4).

Clearly the two sides never came to an agreement, which highlights the lack of accountability that organizations can experience among members. However, the differences of opinion should not have effected whether the organization as a whole did

or did not follow its own policy. Especially in light of this study and the principles of impartiality and neutrality, which are also foundational principles of MSF, these should have been adhered to by *all* sections of the organization, and those who left should have held the others accountable to adhering to these principles. Moreover, as stated before, the direct intervention policy states that security must be provided.

This concept is largely important for organizations like MSF that have several branches working in the same crisis. The organization as a whole should abide by the policies that it has set up and hold other partners, branches, and members accountable to those policies. In the case of MSF, security was a larger problem because it was not guaranteed when MSF intervened. On top of that, MSF branches did not keep one another accountable for the policy that demanded the security in the first place. As stated before, when the security was not provided, all branches should have withdrawn, if for no other reason than it was abiding by its own policy. That policy ultimately ensures that MSF's work is impartial and neutral, acknowledging that security is a precursor for neutral and impartial aid. Both security and accountability have direct links to the principles of impartiality and neutrality: security ensures a protected environment in which the actions of aid organizations can be monitored and regulated, thereby monitoring that the actions are being impartial and neutral; accountability ensures that the workers themselves are abiding by these principles.

Overall Trends

We can now see specific examples of how organizations and those they attempt to assist are effected by the principles of impartiality and neutrality. First, the UNHCR

failed to uphold its responsibility to the refugees and other organizations that depended on it to provide security. This led to the contamination of this humanitarian space of the refugee camps and inevitably counteracted any attempt by other aid agencies to be neutral and impartial. Second, the WFP confronted the Great Lakes crisis with a blind perspective on the consequences of aid. The lack of knowledge that it had about the refugees and the way the food aid could be manipulated led to a policy in which there was no focus on impartiality and neutrality. Third, MSF was completely reliant upon larger organizations, namely the UNHCR, to provide security; when the UNHCR failed to do so, MSF subsequently failed to withdraw from the crisis entirely, being divided over the moral issue of staying or leaving. This compromised MSF's attempts at impartiality and neutrality, ones that had already been dismantled by the lack of security. It is important to my research and to the aid community in general to see these connections and bring these principles into more focus in policies and programs.

These are just three organizations that were assisting during the crisis; keep in mind that there were over 250 NGOs present in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide. All three of these organizations are strong, heavily respected organizations that do admirable work all around the world. However, during a massive crisis such as the Great Lakes crisis, it is fundamental that they stick to the guiding principles. These principles were established at the birth of humanitarianism for good reasons, and they should be respected and adhered to while making and implementing policies and programs that directly effect the lives of individuals. As aid agencies, it is their responsibility that they have willingly assumed to wisely provide aid to those in need, and this innately includes adhering to these principles.

Chapter 5: Conclusions

The purpose of this thesis is ultimately to connect the principles of impartiality with programs and policies of aid agencies that have negative consequences on the population they aim to assist by answering the research question, What factors led to the militarization of the Rwandan refugee camps in Congo from 1994 until 1996, and what role did impartiality and neutrality play in creating an environment in which these factors could exist? As we've seen, there are several authors who have detected crises in which aid was manipulated and highlighted the potential destruction that aid can cause. However, this paper aims to take a step further than that research and show that these faulty programs and policies that cause aid manipulation were founded in a non-adherence to impartiality and neutrality. I use the Great Lakes refugee crisis in Africa as a case study for my argument, and within that case study I look first at overall trends of aid agencies' actions that cause more harm than good. Then I look specifically at three organizations that assisted during the Great Lakes crisis: Doctors Without Borders, the World Food Programme, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. I use these organizations, their overall policies, and specific actions during the refugee crisis to make connections to these fundamental principles.

Within chapter two, I lay a broad historical foundation for humanitarianism in general, beginning with the establishment of the ICRC and the birth of formal humanitarian work. That allows us to more specifically explore the foundation of the idea of formal humanitarianism by looking at the fundamental principles that were established from the outset of the ICRC. I focus specifically on the principles of

impartiality and neutrality, and therefore highlight their evolution and impact over time. The timeline that I create shows clearly how these principles have gotten more and more specific through global experiences and lessons learned. One example of these experiences is the use of guerilla warfare, especially during wars such as that in Vietnam. I include a description of guerilla warfare as a bridge to my case study: the Great Lakes refugee crisis that occurred in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide.

Chapter three begins with a description and brief history of the country of Rwanda, particularly describing the country post-independence and the events leading up to the genocide and refugee crisis. Then I look at four specific factors that effected the refugee crisis, those which were outside the control of the aid agencies: the identity of the refugees, the role of the host country Zaire, the resources that were available in the camps, and the tactics that militants in the camp used to manipulate the aid that was provided by aid agencies. Each of these factors is explained to paint a clearer picture of the crisis and the situation in which the aid agencies were working.

The second half of chapter three is devoted to a general analysis of the actions of aid organizations, particularly the ones that tend to have a negative impact. I derive these factors from three main scholars: Michael Barnett, Fiona Terry, and Mary Anderson. I give a brief description of the scholars before explaining the factor(s) that each one contributes to my study. These factors include the amount of aid organizations that assist in humanitarian crises; the actions of aid organizations, specifically in regards to security; knowledge of the population in crisis before intervening; and accountability within and among aid organizations. Each of these factors is explained, and I give specific examples of the role of each in the Great Lakes crisis.

Both chapters two and three set the stage for the analysis that I perform in chapter four. I chose three organizations that I believe reflect the aid community as a whole: Doctors Without Borders, the World Food Programme, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Each of these organizations represents a different level or specification among aid agencies and therefore creates a more well-rounded view of what happened during the crisis from all angles. For each of these organizations, I highlight the factor that I believe to be the most important: with the UNHCR, it was a matter of security; with WFP, knowledge of the refugees and aid's ability to be manipulated in that situation; with MSF, security and accountability were the main contributing factors.

I would like to reiterate here the difficulty that I encountered while trying to find the program and policy documents for aid organizations. For example, the records of the ICRC during this specific crisis are not open to the public. What is most interesting is that most of these organizations have statements on their website that lead one to believe that they are open, transparent, and available to the public. However, during this process I have found quite the opposite to be true. The aid organizations that I've looked at were surprisingly closed off to my wanting specific documents. The ones that seemed to take inquiries only responded with a general statement about how to navigate the organizations' websites. Especially in regards to the Great Lakes crisis, organizations tended to be uncooperative.

Therefore, for the organizations from which I could obtain information, I chose the ones that had information available of the agencies about assistance during this crisis. I describe these programs, and then offer my own analysis on how their relationships with impartiality and neutrality. What I found was that each of the programs, in its own

way, reflected the adherence of lack to these principles and that a stronger observance of the importance of these principles would have been helpful, to say the least. In the case of the Great Lakes crisis, we have seen that a stronger adherence to these principles could have provided a greater amount of security to the area, corrected an ignorance about how food aid can be manipulated, and helped maintain accountability and security within individual organizations. These connections confirm my belief of the significance of these principles and the vast impact that they have on aid agencies' programs and actions. The lack of adherence can, as this thesis shows, result in poorly formulated programs or policies that can cause more harm than good (or, at the very least, as much harm as good).

As stated at the beginning of this thesis, the interpretations of impartiality and neutrality presented in this thesis are my own. With specific examples from the Great Lakes crisis, this research promotes and supports those interpretations. The stability of these principles is evident through the documents that I have presented throughout this thesis and through the evolution that they have undergone. Recent documents define more clearly the obligations of combatants and the international community and the rights of civilians, refugees, and non-combatants. Therefore, it is clear that the perceptions of these principles have changed along with global complexities of warfare. In light of these changes, I interpret these principles to mean that organizations will be impartial by providing aid to those in need, not discriminating on the basis of race, religion, gender, ethnicity, or ideology. Organizations will also be neutral by not taking sides in a conflict or discriminating based on political affiliation. In that, however, organizations are not to support or give advances to either side of a conflict. Both of

these principles are not meant to allow organizations to be indifferent to human suffering or war, nor to blindly provide aid for anyone before determining their potential contribution to suffering or war. Impartiality in the case of the Great Lakes crisis would have meant that aid organizations would have distinguished between combatants and non-combatants. In this way, organizations could have ensured that they would be giving aid to those truly in need that would not have used it launch attacks on a rival population. The lack of these principles is evident in organizations' lack of planning and resources.

The principles that were established at the very beginning of formal humanitarianism have proven effective and necessary, and the lack of acknowledgement of their role in aid distribution can be dangerous. Although there is extensive scholarship on Rwanda in general, as well as the Great Lakes crisis, there is very little on the manipulation of aid during this crisis. Moreover, there is no scholarship that I found that was specifically on the connections between foundational principles and the manipulation of aid. The original contribution of this thesis is, therefore, the connection between these two aspects, along with extensive examples. Specifically, this analysis aims to point out that a lack of adherence to these basic principles of humanitarianism can lead to gross mistakes, as I have demonstrated with these three organizations. I have seen throughout this research process that there are times when aid agencies strongly adhere to these principles and in doing so accomplish great goals. However, this paper highlights some of the circumstances in which organizations have not followed these principles, resulting in criticism from the international community and, more importantly, the endangerment of refugees. As was one of my main points in chapter three, the growing amount of aid organizations makes this topic all the more important.

In conclusion, this paper has several major goals: To identify the importance of humanitarian principles that were established with the birth of formal humanitarianism, to reiterate the scholarship that shows how aid can cause harm as well as good, to use a modern and significantly large humanitarian crisis as a case study to make the observations relevant, and to draw connections between these principles and the work of aid agencies. This work raises to the surface a significant problem in the aid community. To be clear, I have a large amount of respect for the aid community and its goals to protect, support, and assist those who are in the most need around the world. I also recognize the magnitude of the responsibilities that aid agencies possess. Nevertheless, it is because of their goals and responsibilities that they should ensure that these very basic and fundamental principals are adhered to. Overall, we can now see that there is a strong connection between the actions of aid agencies that have negative effects and the principles of impartiality and neutrality and the necessity to more intentionally integrate these principles into the actions of humanitarian aid organizations.

Policy Recommendations

Humanitarian aid has continually developed since its origin with the Geneva Conventions, and the complexity of today's world is forcing it to continue to change. Crises like that in the Great Lakes is becoming more and more common, and aid organizations should be prepared to handle such situations as best as possible. Most importantly, a higher level of professionalism within the aid community should be demanded. Aid agencies have a high level of influence in the international community as a whole, shaping the way crises are dealt with and the laws that dictate the actions of

those involved. As such a significant actor, humanitarian aid institutions should be held accountable for their actions and the consequences of such. The following are some recommendations to the three organizations that I analyzed in this thesis.

First, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has an overwhelming responsibility in most major crises. As stated before, its duty is to oversee all actions dealing with refugees, which encompasses all actions of other aid agencies. Within that vast realm, there is the responsibility to ensure the safety of those refugees. This, obviously, is a difficult task to manage. We can see now that during the Great Lakes crisis, safety was a primary issue for the UNCHR, and its inability to provide such security had disastrous results for the refugees and other aid organizations.

The main problem with security during this crisis was lack of manpower, or willing countries that could provide security and military personnel. Therefore, the most important policy recommendation I can make for UNHCR is to have its own security department. This would require cooperation from the United Nations, and all participating countries would have to agree on the provision of these personnel. I would suggest that every participating member of the United Nations be required to provide a certain number of soldiers to UNHCR. Ideally, countries could rotate annually in this provision of soldiers, so no one country would carry the burden for an extended period of time. The United Nations currently has 192 members (United Nations). If five randomly chosen countries were to donate soldiers every year, each country would donate soldiers approximately every 38 years. The number of soldiers, of course, would depend on current global status. If the world were experiencing no crises, then these soldiers would not be needed. However, these soldiers would be on reserve in case another major crisis,

such as the Great Lakes crisis, occurred. This, of course, would have some stipulations: countries that were involved in wars of their own could be exempt, for example. Providing a reserve of soldiers would ensure that the UNHCR had enough security manpower to carry out its duties.

Second, I criticize the World Food Programme in this research because of its lack of knowledge about how food aid can be manipulated. This is a much easier problem to solve than that of UNHCR's. Recognition by the WFP that aid, even food aid, can and will be manipulated would build a solid foundation for further research on its part about this issue. Independent research about food aid specifically would tell WFP where its aid can and has been manipulated in the past and how to avoid it in the future. For instance, closer examination of food pipelines could lead to adjustments that eliminate misappropriation of food. It is important that WFP look at its own policies and programs in light of this new recognition. Initiative on the part of WFP would help any progress be specific to its particular programs. Especially because WFP is a leader in food aid, it is important that it invests in this area. Like the UNHCR, WFP relies heavily on the United Nations for support; therefore, it will be up to the international community as a whole to reinforce this progress.

Lastly, Doctors Without Borders is an interesting case because of its *lack* of reliance on the United Nations. In regards to the Great Lakes crisis, MSF failed to abide by its own policies that required safety to be ensured before intervention, thereby compromising its principles. The first step for MSF would be to ensure the adherence this policy, despite temptation to ignore it. MSF's policies are, in my opinion, reasonable and secure, especially the policy to only intervene in a conflict if security is guaranteed

and it has the support of local authorities. These pre-requisites ensure the safety of the workers and, to a certain extent, the success of the projects. However, it is obviously an issue for MSF to, first, adhere by its own policies, and, second, to make a collective decision. If this were a policy that was instilled in all MSF workers, it would have not been debated in the first place. Unanimously agreeing upon this policy and how to enact it is the first step for MSF. Agreeing upon this issue would solve the second problem that MSF experienced during the Great Lakes crisis: dependence upon larger organizations to provide security. Firmly establishing when and under what conditions MSF will intervene in a crisis would promote better communication with those whom it relies upon, such as UNHCR. By setting up a procedure by which MSF can determine the status of these pre-requisites, the organization can avoid dilemmas and disagreements during the crisis itself.

For all of these organizations and the aid community at large, this thesis concludes with a demand for more professionalism in this field. This could start with more education and training for the aid workers themselves. In particular, the principles that were discussed in this thesis, impartiality and neutrality, should be clearly defined in this training and education. This would eliminate any confusion about the interpretation of these principles or how to enact them. More broadly speaking, education would prepare aid workers about the situations where they will be working and the types of dilemmas they could encounter. More thorough training can allow workers to be prepared for complicated situations like that in the Great Lakes.

Obviously further research should be committed to education and training strategies. However, one suggestion that could both improve education and training and

provide a higher level of professionalism would be to install a licensure system for aid workers. This could regulate the type of training and education that is taught, as well as test and standardize the requirements for working in a crisis situation. This larger institutional change would require a significant budget and collaboration in the international community. However, I believe this influential branch of the international community will eventually demand this level of maintenance and structure.

As stated before, the best policy recommendation that can be made is for organizations to adhere to their own principles. While these foundational principles were established over 150 years ago, they are still very much applicable during today's crises, as we have seen. Ensuring that these principles are followed during all aspects of an agency's policies is crucial and can determine the success or failure of such. Taking every step to assure the adherence to these principles can eliminate several of the major issues that organizations face during major crises such as that in the Great Lakes region, and learning from this experience can better prepare aid agencies for crises in the future.

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Appendices

I. Summary Table

	Actions during the Great Lakes crisis	Relation to Impartiality and Neutrality
UNHCR	During refugee-related crisis, the UNHCR is responsible for overseeing the actions of other aid organizations, as well as ensuring the protection and security of the refugees themselves. In the Great Lakes crisis, security was the main issue for the UNHCR. Because of the lack of manpower and willpower to provide this security, the UNHCR failed to ensure the safety of the refugees involved. This essentially had a ripple effect on the work of other organizations that relied so heavily on that security.	Without security, these principles cannot be guaranteed. The militarization of the refugee camps during the Great Lakes crisis was a result of the lack of security, which was a result of a lack of adherence to these principles. If an area or region involved in a crisis is not secure and civilians are not protected, this compromises the neutrality of the aid that is being given and the impartiality of the way it is being given. Ensuring the UNHCR's ability to provide security during crises would heighten its ability to guarantee impartiality and neutrality.
WFP	The World Food Programme is well known as the major food aid supplier during major crises. During the Great Lakes crisis, its policy did not recognize food aid as being able to be manipulated. This was a crucial mistake for the organization, as food aid was widely manipulated during the refugee camps in Zaire. A lack of recognition of the ability of food aid to be misappropriated led to the organization's not paying attention to food pipelines and how the food was distributed once it arrived at the camps.	The WFP's misunderstanding of aid manipulation has a direct connection to these fundamental principles. In its belief that food aid is unlikely to be manipulated, the organization fails to ensure these principles, simply because it believes that there is no chance of the aid *not* being impartial or neutral. This, we can see, is a grave mistake. Impartiality and neutrality are not innate characteristics of any type of aid and must be monitored and ensured by the aid agency.
MSF	Doctors Without Borders is an independent organization and not a branch of the United Nations, unlike the UNHCR and WFP. Because of this, it has set up pre-requisites for its involvement in a crisis. These pre-requisites include security in the area and support from local government. During the Great Lakes crisis, the safety of the region (being the responsibility of UNHCR) did not meet MSF's standards. When the organization did intervene, it encountered several issues in the camps and disagreements among its members.	Accountability within MSF was the major issue during this crisis. These pre-requisites were put into place in order to ensure MSF's impartiality and neutrality. Because MSF failed to follow its own policies, it also failed to provide impartial and neutral aid to the refugees. This was partially due to the lack of security, and MSF had no way of monitoring who received aid. Despite its good intentions, MSF could not have effectively provided aid in a neutral and impartial way. Had the organization been accountable within itself, it could have recognized this risk.

II. United Nations current map of Great Lakes Region. Source: www.un.org



III. Chart of contribution of humanitarian aid to the economy of war. Source: Fiona Terry, *Condemned to Repeat?*

Table 1. The contribution of humanitarian aid to the economy of war

Type of Contribution	Level		
	Macro	Meso	Micro
Legal	Import taxes	Housing rental	Assistance to local authorities
	Immigration fees	Car rental	
	Warehouse rental	Truck rental	
	Purchase of food	Purchase of locally manufactured products	Purchase of local raw materials
	Taxation of salaries	Taxation of salaries	Taxation of salaries
	Airport/port charges		
	Administration fees		
	Exchange rates		
Gray Area	Obligatory employment of certain staff	Obligatory employment of certain staff	Employment of guards
		Taxation of recipients	Taxation of recipients
Illegal	Government misuse of aid	Checkpoint extortion	Checkpoint extortion
	Bribery and corruption	Looting materials from aid agencies	Looting recipients after distribution
	Black market purchase and currency exchange	Protection rackets	Trading in looted goods
		Inflated population numbers	