Fall 5-13-2023

# When God Gives You Tomatoes, Don't Import them from Italy: A Case Study on the Impact of Supranational Institutional Policy on the Ghanaian Tomato Industry

Kaci Wilcox

# WHEN GOD GIVES YOU TOMATOES, DON'T IMPORT THEM FROM ITALY: A CASE STUDY ON THE IMPACT OF SUPRANATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL POLICY ON THE GHANAIAN TOMATO INDUSTRY


By Kaci T. Wilcox

A thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for completion
Of the Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies
Croft Institute for International Studies
Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College
The University of Mississippi

University, Mississippi
May 2023

Approved:

___________________________
Advisor: Dr. Joshua First

___________________________
Reader: Dr. Zachary Kagan Guthrie

___________________________
Reader: Dr. Patrick Lewis

## Abstract

Supranational organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the European Union (EU) have impressed market liberalizing policies upon developing countries for decades in efforts to stabilize their economies and introduce them to global markets. While these programs and the resulting popular scholarly debates are typically geared toward macroeconomic indicators, the way those policies affect industries on the micro level has been somewhat overlooked, especially when considering how such policy over time could affect an individual industry. This thesis studies how supranational organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the EU contribute to the decline of small-scale, domestically focused industries by studying the Ghanaian tomato industry's experience with the IMF and World Bank led Economic Recovery Program (ERP) and the EU led Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). It is theorized that by utilizing their positions as powerful actors in the global economic sphere, the IMF, the World Bank, and the EU have successfully promoted policy that has been very influential in diminishing the ability of the Ghanaian tomato industry to compete within domestic and international markets. The study found that the ERP led to the closing of three tomato factories that had been crucial to the livelihoods of many Ghanaian farmers and that the effects of the EPA that followed priced the farmers out of markets that soon became flooded with foreign tomatoes and EU-subsidized tomato paste.

## Acknowledgements

I'd like to thank my advisors Dr. Joshua First, Dr. Zachary Kagan Guthrie, and Dr. Patrick Lewis for all of their help and guidance throughout this process.

Thank you to my parents, Doug and Kim Wilcox, for their love and support throughout this entire process of developing my thesis, the last four years of college, and all of the years before college.

Izzy Manzi deserves a special thanks for asking me to explain a paper I was writing during my semester of study abroad in Rome. To my half-joking response, she responded, "That would make such a great thesis title!" I obviously agreed.

Finally, I would like to thank my close friends Caroline Cuddy, Landry Woodward, and Maddie Pipech for listening to me talk about tomatoes non-stop for the last year and for loving and supporting me anyway.

# Table of Contents

# List of Figures

## Abbreviations and Acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| ACP | African Caribbean and Pacific group of states |
| AoA | Agreement on Agriculture |
| CAP | Common Agricultural Policy |
| CET | Common External Tariff |
| CMO | Common Market Organization |
| CPP | Convention People's Party |
| EC | European Communities |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of West African States |
| ECSC | European Coal and Steel Communities |
| EEC | European Economic Community |
| EFTA | European Free Trade Association |
| EPA | Economic Partnership Agreement |
| EPADP | Economic Partnership Agreement Development Programme |
| ERP | Economic Recovery Program |
| EU | European Union |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| IBRD | International Bank for Reconstruction and Development |
| iEPA | interim Economic Partnership Agreement |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| IOM | International Organization for Migration |
| ITO | International Trade Organization |
| NLC | New Liberation Council |
| NRC | National Redemption Council |
| OPEC | Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries |
| PNDC | People's National Defense Council |
| RMSM | Revised Minimum Standard Model |
| SAF | Structural Adjustment Facility |
| SAL | Structural adjustment Loan |
| SAP | Structural Adjustment Program |
| TYIP | Three-Year Investment Program |
| WTO | World Trade Organization |

# Introduction

The state of the Ghanaian tomato industry since the late 2000s has been characterized by widespread poverty. Many of the farmers that have worked on tomato farms their entire lives are finding themselves unable to make ends meet without sending the men in their families abroad to make more money. Many farmers stay in the surrounding countries, but others decide to make the much longer journey through the Sahara Desert, across the Mediterranean Sea, and into countries like Italy to find work in order to provide for their families at home. The northern journey across the Sahara alone is extremely dangerous, and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) reports that since 2014, upwards of 2,000 people are recorded to have died on some part of that journey.[1] The trip across the Mediterranean Sea, however, has been proven to be much more dangerous. Over the years, the sight of immigrants stuffed into an overcrowded boat has become much more common than it once was. It is estimated by the IOM that over 20,000 people have died at sea since 2014, yet that statistic is uncertain because most of the men and women who have passed on this journey were aiming to enter Europe illegally for the opportunity to work.[2] Records of their deaths are, therefore, much harder to account for.

For the men and women that do manage to survive the journey, the hardships do not end. Since they are undocumented, they are not protected by European Union (EU) law or that of the country which they enter into. Many enter Italy due to the country's position in the Mediterranean and find themselves working on plantations picking tomatoes. There, the immigrants enter the "caporalato" system under which a "usually non-Italian caporale," or

[1] "Migration Within Africa," Missing Migrants Project, accessed February 23, 2023, https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/africa.
[2] "Migration Within the Mediterranean," Missing Migrants Project, accessed February 23, 2023, https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/mediterranean.

"caporali," employed by an Italian businessman offers migrant workers long or short-term employment, and their passports and other documents are likely to be taken as insurance.[3] Without a passport or any legally binding documents, these workers' lives are entirely in the hands of their bosses. Their meals are taken out of their already incredibly low wages, and whether or not they receive any pay is completely subject to the caporali's whims since they have very little protection from the law. In many instances, they are made to live in "shanty towns" which are makeshift communities of shacks built with spare wood and tarps that lack running water, electricity, and almost any other modern convenience.[4] Many of them send almost every cent they earn home as soon as they can, so building wealth or bettering their living conditions is out of the question.

In 2019, the death of 12 migrants working on a tomato plantation from a bus crash hit the Italian news, but it was not an isolated incident as not even a week before, 4 other migrant workers had died in a similar fashion.[5] These incidents brought the nature of the agricultural working conditions in Italy's tomato industry to light, but the conditions on those plantations and the treatment of those migrant workers are only part of the unfortunate reality held up by those plantations. The tomatoes that the migrant workers picked made their way to processing factories which transformed that produce into processed tomato products like tomato paste. It is reported that "roughly 90%" of the "5 million tons" that the Italian tomato industry produces each year are exported, and one of the many countries in the world that receives those exports is Ghana.[6]

---

[3] Tobias Jones and Ayo Awokoya, "Are your tinned tomatoes picked by slave labour?: How the Italian mafia makes millions by exploiting migrants," The Guardian, June 20, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/20/tomatoes-italy-mafia-migrant-labour-modern-slavery.
[4] Jones, "Are your tinned tomatoes picked by slave labour?"
[5] Jones, "Are your tinned tomatoes picked by slave labour?"
[6] Roberto Forin, "The Tomato Conundrum," Mixed Migration Centre, September 13, 2018, https://mixedmigration.org/articles/the-tomato-conundrum/#.

Since those products have such a low production cost, given the low wage paid to the migrant workers at the base level of the production chain and the incredibly hefty EU subsidies for Italian tomato products, exported products are able to be sold at incredibly low prices in comparison to similar Ghanaian products in Ghanaian markets.[7] The result is that Ghanaian producers of processed tomato products and even tomatoes themselves are priced out of their local markets, and locals would rather buy the processed version because it lasts longer and is worth more to them in the long run.[8] Lucky tomato farmers can sell their products at their production cost to "Market Queens" that act as the middleman between them and large urban markets, but many sell to the queens for less than their production cost while others have been forced to turn to other produce in order to survive.[9] There are even accounts of farmers taking their own lives once faced with incredible debts and no opportunity in sight to turn their luck around.[10] Of course, others make their way to surrounding countries or across the Sahara and the Mediterranean in an attempt to provide for their families in that way. Those that find themselves working on tomato plantations in Italy are somewhat ironically, by working for incredibly low wages to produce the very tomato products that uprooted their own businesses and lives, contributing to a self-perpetuating, vicious cycle.

The obvious solution to this problem is to increase import tariffs on tomato products being imported into Ghana, but that is not an option due to a trade agreement between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which Ghana is a member of, and the

---

[7] Forin, "The Tomato Conundrum."
[8] Theresa A. A. Nyamekye, "Production Efficiency and Building Marketing Strategies for Smallholder Tomato Farmers in the Adaklu Anyigbe District of Ghana: Linear Programming and Parametric Linear Programming Approach," *Journal of Developments in Sustainable Agriculture* 6, no. 2 (2011): 231.
[9] Nyamekye, 233.
[10] "Plummeting Profits Drive Tomato Farmers to Suicide," The New Humanitarian, April 17, 2009. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/83980/ghana-plummeting-profits-drive-tomato-farmers-suicide.

EU. By raising tariffs on imported tomato products, Ghana would be breaking their Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the EU. This agreement ensures that the country is able to export their own goods at equally low tariff rates to EU member states and other ECOWAS nations. Breaking the agreement would critically injure the entire Ghanaian economy and damage the country's reputation and relationship with not only the EU, but also the rest of the global economy.

Another potential solution to this problem would be to invest in Ghanaian companies that produce processed tomato products, and that has been an aim of many Ghanaian governments dating back to the years following Ghanaian independence in 1957. In the Seven Year Development Plan of 1964, Kwame Nkrumah, the country's first president, and his party, the Convention People's Party (CPP), invested in the founding of three separate tomato processing facilities.[11] However, over the years, due to political strife, mismanagement, and economic woes, the facilities did not perform well. Following the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) of 1983, spearheaded between the Ghanaian government and officials from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, there was an increase of policy reforms aimed at "improving the domestic terms of trade in favour of the rural sector" which resulted in a reverse of previous migrations tends that favored migration from rural to urban areas.[12] However, as more people began to move to rural areas, the amount of government funds allocated to the agricultural sector, most of which was targeted at export crops like cocoa, began to decrease, and "urban bias

---

[11] Elizabeth J.Z. Robinson, and Shashi L. Kolavalli, "The Case of Tomato in Ghana: Institutional Support," (GSSP Working Paper no. 22, Institute for Poverty and Land Research Group, Accra, April 23, 2010), 2, https://gssp.ifpri.info/files/2010/08/gsspwp221.pdf.

[12] John Anarfi et al., "Migration From and To Ghana: A Background Paper," (Working paper No. C4, Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty, Brighton, 2010), 15, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/253408103_Migration_From_and_To_Ghana_A_Background_Paper.

policies" meant "to protect the interest of organised urban-employees" resulted in unfortunate consequences for people in rural areas and those that worked in the agricultural sector.[13]

Eventually, much of the progress in migration from urban to rural areas was lost as it was once again economically advantageous to migrate to urban areas. Also, since most of the ERP's agricultural investments were oriented toward increasing exports, sectors that did not fit that goal were not given the attention necessary to grow, and the country moved away from self-sufficiency. The reality of those choices along with the implementation of large-scale market liberalization methods ensured that the Ghanaian economy would become part of the global economy, and that it did. The Ghanaian tomato industry was focused primarily on production for domestic markets rather than international markets, so becoming part of the global economy was unlikely to broaden its customer base to a great extent. However, becoming part of the global economy also meant welcoming competition from foreign producers in domestic markets as well. All three of the Ghanaian tomato processing plants closed following the introduction of the ERP, and subsequent attempts to reopen the plants have repeatedly failed due not only to internal problems and governmental mismanagement, but also because the plants' products cannot compete with the price of the imported goods, regardless of the confounding issues.[14]

While much has been written about the Ghanaian government's failures and the influence of neighboring industries, the combined influence of supranational organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the EU on domestically focused sectors of the Ghanaian agricultural industry, such as the tomato industry, has not been studied as comprehensively. That is why, while keeping outside determinants in mind, this thesis will focus more narrowly on the

[13] Anarfi, 17.
[14] Nyamekye, 231.

connection between those organizations and Ghana’s tomato industry. My research question is as follows: How have supranational organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the EU contributed to the decline of the Ghanaian tomato industry? I theorize that by utilizing their positions as powerful actors in the global economic sphere, the IMF, the World Bank, and the EU have successfully promoted policy that has been very influential in diminishing the ability of the Ghanaian tomato industry to compete within domestic and national markets.

# Chapter 1

## *To take aid or not to take aid, that is the question*: Understanding the theoretical debates surrounding international aid

The economic policy of developing nations and in the fashion in which supranational organizations such as the IMF, World Bank, and EU should be involved in the creation and implementation of such policy has been a highly debated topic among scholars for decades. The ways in which those different forms of development-driven, economic policy have dealt with trade have also been debated tirelessly. This chapter is explicitly focused on popular literature regarding the IMF and World Bank's use of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) as vehicles for development aid and the EU's use of EPAs as a means to liberalize trade between itself and other regions. Though these topics have been tirelessly studied, there is a gap in the literature regarding the combined effects that these policies have had over time on individual industries. This thesis aims to begin to fill that gap by studying the Ghanaian tomato industry's experience with the multiple supranational organizations over the course of several decades.

### Structural Adjustment Programs

Beginning in the 1980s, in return for loans, the IMF coerced developing nations to implement policies that it posited would properly structure their economies for survival and success. However, over time, many aspects of the plans have been debated. Beginning debates surrounding what model of development was best for deciding policy in the mid-1950s transformed into debates over the practicality of the use of such models. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the debate was focused on the effects of IMF and World Bank structural adjustment plans on the countries that had adopted them. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, at-best questionable results forced the institutions to defend their plans, and while some scholars agreed, others began to hypothesize about why the results had been so disappointing. Some blamed the countries on the receiving end of loans, others blamed the specific policies of the institutions, and a few began to question the theoretical basis in which the SAPs and therefore the institutions had been founded.

In a 1957 IMF Staff Paper titled "Monetary Analysis of Income Formation and Payments Problems," Jacques Jacobus Polak released an economic model "designed to be usable in every developing country" that involved using standard variables to "determines policy targets consistent with explicit macroeconomic objectives."[1] This model became the foundation of the IMF's stabilization programs focused most on "the relationship between internal and external stability."[2] In practice, if a country was experiencing a deficit with their balance of payments, the IMF would most likely recommend "reducing government spending, increasing taxes, and reducing domestic credit creation."[3] According to Ngaire Woods in "The Globalizing Mission," early in the use of the Polak model, it gained criticism for "too much austerity with too little attention to the social consequences." Those criticisms only gained steam over time as "Fund conditionality was applied to debt crisis countries and accused of increasing poverty and curtailing growth in those countries."[4]

In 1989, under the National Bureau of Economic Research, Sebastian Edwards released a working paper titled "The International Monetary Fund and the Developing Countries: A Critical

---

[1] Wioletta Nowak, "Development of the Polak Model," *Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics* 2, no. 1 (2014): 28.
[2] Nowak, 35.
[3] Ngaire Woods, "The Globalizing Mission?" in *The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and Their Borrowers*, 1st ed., (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 40.
[4] Woods, "The Globalizing Mission?" 41.

Evaluation" in which he examined many aspects of SAPs. He noted that the IMF had been using the Polak model for around 30 years without any update on the program, though he stressed that the program is not used as "rigidly" as some of its critics believe which allows for less judgment of the institution's steadfast relationship with the model.[5] However, throughout that time period there were many "important developments" that "changed the way economists think about economic policy" that were all but ignored by the economists behind IMF policy.[6] Edwards makes a connection between that choice and the downward shift in influence of the Research Department beginning in the 1980s as "research became less related to policy work" to introduce an explanation for why the institution could have possibly ignored the "revolutionary changes" in its own field of expertise.[7] Overall, the paper contends that at the time of writing, "in a narrow sense" the SAPs were successful as "on average, the external situation of program countries improved relative to the situation prevailing before the program."[8] Regarding other statistics that viewed SAPs in a more negative light, Edwards pointed out that "adequate comparison benchmarks" did not yet exist, but he acknowledged that "rates of compliance" with policies had been less than originally hoped for and that criticisms over increased political influence were valid.[9]

While Edwards mostly questioned the IMF's refusal to update its programs, other scholars became more critical of the use of a model in general. In a 1992 article called "Some Unconventional Implications of Conventional Stabilization Policies," Amit Bhaduri questions

---

[5] Sebastian Edwards, "The International Monetary Fund and the Developing Countries: A Critical Evaluation," (working paper no. 2909, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA., March 1989), pp. 4, 6.
[6] Edwards, 13.
[7] Edwards, 18.
[8] Edwards, 46.
[9] Edwards, 47.

“the link between economic theory based on a simplified 'model’ and practical policy in the 'real' world."[10] He argues that regardless of intent or basis in economic theory, “policies can be considered well-designed only if they manage the transition successfully.”[11] In the end, he argues that traditional thought regarding “dynamic implications” of stabilization policies might differ from reality as “*both* demand and supply are affected simultaneosly,” but the point of the paper is not to directly challenge the policies it questions. [12] Instead, Bhaduri wishes to point out that “conventional stabilization policies,” such as those of Khan and Polak, “cannot be accepted uncritically until the underlying dynamic processes of demand and supply adjustment are more clearly spelt out.”[13]

In 1994, the World Bank published a report that called SAPs “an essential step to getting on a poverty-reducing growth path.”[14] The report stated that the reforms were working, but they could not be the only contributing factor to the development and that their effective implementation must continue once they are instituted for the results to show. The reforms were meant to completely reform the state of the developing nation so that it could create the “necessary foundation for the resumption of growth.”[15] Sustained reform on such a level is a difficult task, but it is a necessary precursor for lasting change. As less than exciting figures began to emerge toward the end of the decade, the World Bank was forced once again to defend their policies. In another report issued in 2000, the World Bank maintained its sentiment that “

---

[10] Amit Bhaduri, “Some Unconventional Implications of Conventional Stabilization Policies,” *Indian Economic Review* 27, (1992): 129.
[11] Bhaduri, 129.
[12] Bhaduri, 133–134.
[13] Bhaduri, 134.
[14] World Bank, *Adjustment in Africa: reforms, results, and the road ahead (English)* (Washington, D.C.: Oxford University Press, 1994), 219. https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/219981468192845881/adjustment-in-africa-reforms-results-and-the-road-ahead.
[15] World Bank, *Adjustment*, 219.

good economic management must be sustained for some time to have a substantial effect."[16] The report also said that positive results had been seen in countries that had met that requirement even though the problem was not yet completely solved. Two years later, another World Bank report by Luc Christiaensen, Lionel Demery, and Stefano Paternostro echoed sentiments from the 1994 and 2000 reports. However, it included four main qualifiers that affect the success of reforms: "the importance of economic reform and political stability for poverty reduction", "the role of location and remoteness" in regards to distributions, "the significance of private endowments," and "the need to account for shocks in understanding distributional outcomes and poverty changes over time."[17]

However, other scholars interpreted the data from the late 1990s in a different fashion. In 2000, in their article, "What Explains the Success or Failure of Structural Adjustment Programmes?", David Dollar and Jakob Svensson argue that the success of SAPs depends on the political economy of the developing country because their study found that the use of political economy indicators can "predict the outcome of an adjustment loan successfully 75% of the time."[18] However, they are not saying that blame for failure should be held solely by developing countries. Instead, they argue that "the quality of reform" solutions is the most important factor.[19] Rather than forcing economic and political reforms upon unwilling actors, investors should work with the existing framework to reach realistic goals. While this view does not necessarily disprove of SAPs or foreign aid, it differs from the first view mentioned because

---

[16] Alan H. Gelb and World Bank, *Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Publications, 2000), 35.
[17] Luc Christiaensen, Lionel Demery, and Stefano Paternostro, *Growth, Distribution, and Poverty in Africa: Messages from the 1990s* (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank: 2002), 48, http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15215.
[18] David Dollar and Jakob Svensson, "What Explains the Success or Failure of Structural Adjustment Programmes?" *The Economic Journal* 110, no. 466 (2000): 911.
[19] Dollar, 913.

Dollar and Svensson do not believe in the complete reformation of the state. They also seem to draw criticism toward the World Bank and IMF officials designing the reforms.

Franz Heidhues and Gideon Obare's article "Lessons from Structural Adjustment Programmes and their Effects in Africa" concurs with Dollar and Svensson's conclusions. Building on Dollar and Svensson's belief in the importance of reform quality, Heidhues and Obare argue that an understanding of the workings of local institutions in developing countries is essential in formulating models for development.[20] Further, they argue that the neoliberal approach on which SAPs were founded was never going to work without sound governmental institutions already in place.[21] Therefore, the goal of SAPs should have been to shape local governments into "facilitator[s] of, rather than [obstacles] to, development."[22] Again, this differs from the World Bank's view on state overhaul as it emphasizes the importance of collaboration in reform structure. Moreover, Heidhues and Obare seem to point to an inherent logistical flaw present at the forefront of the reforms in the economics of IMF and World Bank implemented SAPs.

In 2003, Henk Meilink released a working paper titled "Structural Adjustment Programmes on the African Continent: The Theoretical Foundations of IMF/World Bank Reform Policies" for the African Studies Center that criticized IMF and World Bank SAPs far more than Heidhues and Obare or Dollar and Stevinson. Rather than criticizing specific initiatives of SAPs or focusing on the depth of reforms necessary, Meilink focuses his critique on the "theoretical

---

[20] Franz Heidhues and Gideon A. Obare, "Lessons from Structural Adjustment Programmes and their Effects in Africa," *Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture* 50, no. 1 (2011): 62.
[21] Heidhues, 61.
[22] Heidhues, 62.

underpinnings of the SAPs" and the institutions themselves.[23] The underpinnings that Meilink is referring to are the Polak Model from 1957, the Revised Minimum Standard Model (RMSM), and the Harrod-Domar Model of the 1940s.[24] According to Meilink, the IMF's theoretical foundations lead to Polak's 1957 analysis which was "based on a number of assumptions that are far removed from real economic conditions on the African continent."[25] Essentially, Meilink argues that the designer of those plans did not realize that their economics might not hold up in situations different from theirs. Due to that ignorance, factors such as "the loss of import capacity and the related reduction in output resulting from external shocks" and "the existing fragmentation of markets and the severe inflexibilities in African economies" that may have a large influence on the success or failure of economic development and reformation are ignored.[26] Meilink has similar qualms with the World Bank whose underpinnings can be tied to the RMSM and therefore, the Harrod-Domar Model.[27]

In the later 2000s, the overarching debate surrounding SAPs began to rest on this point, that those algorithms were not the saviors they had been previously thought to be. Regardless of where criticisms were aimed, whether they were critical of the vehicle used to create the programs or how the receiving governments carried out those plans, discussions over SAPs eventually came to an understanding that even the best of the programs were not perfect. In fact, Ghana is seen to many as one of the more positive outcomes of all of the SAPs that were

---

[23] Henk Meilink, "Structural adjustment programmes on the African continent: the theoretical foundations of IMF/World Bank reform policies," (ACS Working Paper no. 53, African Studies Center, Leiden, NL, Dec. 2003), 3, http://hdl.handle.net/1887/9458.
[24] Meilink, 3.
[25] Meilink, 24.
[26] Meilink, 24.
[27] Meilink, 24.

implemented.[28] However, as time passed, the popular opinion regarding SAPs and, more specifically, the Ghanaian ERP has shifted toward a less positive outlook. Where these debates become relevant to the tomato industry is when discussing the intersection of all of them in regards to how SAPs affect smaller industries. The Ghanaian government has continued to receive praise for its commitment to the implementation of the ERP, and, for the most part, the program performed as it was predicted to.[29] The economic indicators such as gross domestic product (GDP) growth and inflation rates that the ERP was meant to target and improve did show massive improvement. The algorithms worked as they were programmed to. However, others have argued that the Ghanaian SAP was not a complete success and pointed out that, among other things, it did not benefit poorer populations as much as it was meant to and that it had a "tendency to neglect the small-scale food farmer except where export crops are involved" in Ghana which is an incredibly relevant argument regarding the experience of the Ghanaian tomato industry.[30]

Of course, these debates only came after years of wondering if the plans were even producing success. However, for the time in the middle, the waiting game had legitimate consequences for people and industries in affected countries, and while many were still analyzing the results of SAPs to understand what went wrong and why, the EU began dealing with many of the countries that were still picking up the pieces.

---

[28] IMF, "IMF Staff Completes Seventh ECF Review Visit to Ghana," September 27, 2018, https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/09/27/pr18364-imf-staff-completes-seventh-ecf-review-visit-to-ghana; Lumengo Bonga-Bonga and Ferdinand Ahiakpor, "Assessing the Detreminants of Economic Growth in Ghana," *The Journal of Developing Areas* 50, no. 4 (Fall 2016): 155-156.
[29] "Ghana: IMF Program Helps Restore Luster to a Rising Star in Africa," IMF, May 2019, https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/GHA/ghana-lending-case-study.
[30] Stephen R. Weissman, "Structural Adjustment in Africa: Insights from the Experiences of Ghana and Senegal," *World Development* 18, no. 12 (1990): 1625,1632.

## Economic Partnership Agreements

In the early 2000s, the establishment of an EPA between the EU and African states became one of the most popular topics of discussion among scholars in the study of economic development. Previously, under the Lomé Conventions, African nations "enjoy[ed] protected markets" locally while also benefiting from special considerations in EU markets.[31] What this means is that those countries were allowed to impose and control their own tariffs on imported goods which stopped imported products from entering their own markets at prices low enough to compete with local goods or even at all in some cases. At the same time, African nations did not have to pay much or sometimes any tariffs when importing their own goods into the EU. Under the Cotonou Agreement formed in 2000, that set-up would change. The new agreement mandated that members begin to liberalize almost all trade barring a percentage of industries "on the basis of protecting local industries and agricultural production but also in order to mitigate fiscal revenue losses."[32] In theory, these agreements would remove barriers that had halted trade in the past and allow for more regional and external trade that would make up for the loss in revenue caused by the lowering of tariffs.

In the article "Trade Liberalization and Poverty: The Evidence So Far," L. Alan Winters, Neil McCulloch, and Andrew McKay argue that the relationship between trade liberalization and poverty is not straightforward. However, they state that economic theory and the results of their study show that the implementation of trade liberalization can realistically lead to long-term success and alleviation of poverty. While there may be other more personal solutions that would better address the issue, they say that trade liberalization policies like those in the EPA

---

[31] Maria Persson, "EPA and Fiscal Transition in ECOWAS Countries" (master's thesis, Lund University, Sweden, 2009), 8.
[32] Persson, 19.

mentioned above could be “one of the most cost effective anti-poverty policies available to governments.”[33] Another study by Simplice G. Zouhon-Bi and Lynge Nielsen agrees with Winters, McCulloch, and Mkay that the EPA is not perfect by any means as there are downsides to trade liberalization such as the fact that there would be significant losses in revenue over tariff liberalization for some countries while others saw significant gains in revenues.[34] However, considering factors such as “product exclusions” which refers to the percent of imported goods that can still be taxed by developing nations, slow policy implementation times, and domestic tax reform, among other possible mitigating factors, that revenue loss would not be unmanageable given the right preparations.[35]

In 2000, in regards to the potential Ghanaian participation in an EPA, Theophilus Acheampong, Michael Omane-Achamfuor,and Nii Anang Tawiah argued in favor of what they called a “win-win developmental relationship” due to the opportunities that would become available to Ghanaian markets.[36] Similar to Zouhon-Bi and Nielsen, the authors state how special products will still be excluded from liberalization, and they propose that those percentages which were to be capped at a maximum of 20% could be negotiated to higher rates with EU approval.[37] Author also lists many preparations that should be managed before implementing the EPA to

[33] Alan L. Winters, Neil McCulloch, and Andrew McKay, "Trade Liberalization and Poverty: The Evidence So Far," *Journal of Economic Literature* 42, no. 1 (March 2004): 108.
[34] Simplice G. Zouhon-Bi and Lynge Nielsen, "ECOWAS–Fiscal revenue implications of the prospective Economic partnership agreement with the EU," (Policy Research Working Paper no. WPS4266, World Bank Africa Region, Washington, D.C., April 2007), 20, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/145171468136788251/The-Economic-Community-of-West-African-States-fiscal-revenue-implications-of-the-prospective-economic-partnership-agreement-with-the-European-Union.
[35] Zouhon-Bi, 16.
[36] Theophilus Acheampong, Michael Omane-Achamfuor, and Nii Anang Tawiah, "The economic partnership agreement between Ghana and the European Union: a developmental game changer?" (MPRA Paper no. 66232, Ghana Growth and Development Platform, 2014), 8, https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/66232/1/MPRA_paper_66232.pdf.
[37] Acheampong 7-8.

ensure that its aims are met such as “reforming the business environment especially the supply side constraints many businesses grapple with on a day to day basis.”

Other scholars, like Maria Persson, were not as confident in the viability of a potential EPA. In “EPA and Fiscal Transition in ECOWAS Countries,” Persson argues that it will be much more difficult for developing countries to “[cope] with fiscal revenue losses and the restructuring of economies” than Zouhon-Bi and Nielsen pose.[38] She agrees with them that preparations such as institutional changes would need to be made before EPA policies could have a positive effect on developing nations. However, since the EU had only offered support for lost revenue in terms of financial compensation instead of any institutional investments, “the evidence points to a significant negative impact for West African countries.”[39] In regards to claims made by proponents of the EPA that developing countries would favor imports of regional partnerships which would boost regional integration, Perrson refers to previous import rates that highly favored EU countries.[40]

Another aspect of this debate is whether or not the preferences given to developing nations in the form of allowances for certain industries to maintain higher tariffs for key products were actually effective. Theoretically, the ability to maintain higher tariffs on certain products would protect those industries so they would still be able to compete with industries in other countries. Some, such as Miriam Manchin, argue that preferential tariff rates given to specific industries actually did play a “significant role in improving market access to the EU in almost all sectors” when it came to the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) group of states that were

---

[38] Perrson, 46.
[39] Perrson, 47.
[40] Perrson, 22.

included in Manchin's study.[41] Another study that analyzed how preferential tariff agreements had affected the exports of developing countries in the decades leading up to the introduction of EPAs found that those policies had resulted in large increases in exports for the industries they applied to.[42]

On the other hand, other scholars like Mahadevan and Asafu-Adjaye argue that many industries were constrained by "supply-side constraints" such as a "lack of microfinance programs for agricultural investment," "the absence of an integrated system of formal property rights," and the lack of "well established markets and procedures for buying, selling, and improving quality of nonsugar agricultural produce."[43] These are similar to the institutional problems that Acheampong et al. were referring to, and they had recommended that those issues be addressed pre-EPA signing though Mahadevan and Asafu-Adjaye argue they were not. For those reasons, whether or not the opportunity to increase exports was available or not was not important in many instances.

One of the central tenets of the EPA is the steady lowering of most of the preferential tariff rates from the previous trade agreements as a way to slowly integrate developing nations into the global economy as equals. The logic behind this is questioned by Matthew McQueen in "The EU's Free Trade Agreement with Developing Countries: A Case of Wishful Thinking?" While there was success in some areas with increasing exports because of the preferential rates, their benefits were not as dramatic as many had hoped. McQueen points out that the likelihood

---

[41] Miriam Manchin, "Preference Utilisation and Tariff Reduction in EU Imports from ACP Countries," *World Economy* 29, no. 9 (2006): 1263.
[42] Maria Persson and Fredrik Wilhelmsson, "Assessing the Effects of EU Trade Preferences for Developing Countries," (Working paper no. 2006:4, Lund University Department of Economics, revised June 26, 2006), 21, http://ideas.repec.org/p/hhs/lunewp/2006_004.html.
[43] Mahadevan, R. and J. Asafu-Adjaye, "The Implications of European Union Sugar Price Cuts, Economic Partnership Agreement, and Development Aid for Fiji," *Contemporary Economic Policy* 28, no. 1 (2010): 62.

of countries that could not prosper with the tariff protections prospering without those protections is not high.[44]

In a study on disparities in EPA negotiations over many regions, James Nyomakwa-Obimpeh cites Gavin Fridell's thoughts regarding the removal of preferential rates in the banana sector to prove that "trade liberalisation among partners that are not equal in economic and development terms is not in the interest of the weaker countries as their economic development and growth could be jeopardised."[45] Fridell's papers detail how the banana sector has suffered greatly due to the loss of its tariff protections with the EU. He also describes how the banana sector's decline has negatively affected the entire region. [46] A 2015 paper by Parisa Aghajanzadeh-Darzi, Cecilia Bellora, Jean-Christophe Bureau, and Anaïs Goburdhun agreed with Nyomakwa-Obimpeh's findings. The study focused on assessing the possible results of the removal of preferential tariffs for many different developing nations. They argue that removing preferential status for certain industries in developing nations would lead to many negative outcomes including the reduction of exports that they say "provide export opportunities and contribute to higher incomes."[47]

Much of the greater debate on the topic of EPAs hinges on whether or not countries like Ghana would even be capable of achieving the outcomes that, according to economic theory,

---

[44] Mathew McQueen, "The EU's Free Trade Agreement with Developing Countries: A Case of Wishful Thinking?" *The World Economy* 25, no. 9 (2002): 1369–1385.
[45] James Nyomakwa-Obimpeh, "Explaining the Outcomes of Negotiations of Economic Partnership Agreements between the European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Regional Economic Communities: Comparing Eu-Cariforum and Eu-Ecowas Epas," (PhD diss., The University of Edinburgh, 2017), 47, http://hdl.handle.net/1842/22996.
[46] Gavin Fridell, "The Case Against Cheap Bananas: Lessons from the EU-Caribbean Banana Agreement," (CERLAC Working Paper Series, Pub, 2010), 299.
[47] Parisa Aghajanzadeh-Darzi, Cecilia Bellora, Jean-Christophe Bureau, and Anaïs Goburdhun, "Assessing EU Trade Preferences for Developing Countries' Development and Food Security," (FOODSECURE Working paper no. 35, European Union, 2015), 1.

should occur. The point that many of these countries don’t have the infrastructure necessary to capitalize on those theoretical gains is repeatedly questioned. When the debate becomes sector specific, it is even more clear that if the infrastructural foundations necessary to increase exports to make up for the loss of revenue on the import side are not up to par, the sector will suffer in foreign markets. However, the literature is less comprehensive when discussing how an increase of imports would hurt industries in their own markets and whether or not the state of existing infrastructural foundations would be adequate enough to compete with foreign imports. Further, there is a lack of existing literature on how EPA effects were coupled with the aforementioned effects of SAPs in the decades before in regards to overall economies and specific industries. This study hopes to begin to fill that gap by studying SAP and EPA effects on smaller sectors of the economy by using the Ghanaian tomato industry as a case study.

# Chapter 2

## *This is why we can't have nice things*: Historical background relevant to understanding the relationships between Ghana, the IMF and the World Bank, and the EU

To fully conceptualize the ways in which policies from supranational organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the EU have the ability to affect individual economic sectors such as the Ghanaian tomato industry, it is important to understand the frameworks that support their interactions and the history that shaped them and has continued to guide their actions. The histories behind the organizations form the interests that are fundamental to all of their relationships and deeply affect how they utilize their influence. It is important to conceptualize the time period in which the organizations interact with Ghana and its tomato market not only to account for conflicting factors, but also to put their interactions into perspective for building understanding and allowing for nuance. It is also important to acknowledge the history of the specific sector, the Ghanaian tomato industry in this case, to understand the infrastructural foundations present before the implementation of any supranational policy that would either aid or hinder its ability to compete locally or nationally.

### Emergence of a post-war global system

Following the second world war, the global economic, cultural, and political worlds went through massive shifts in structure, and as the world had become more interconnected than ever, new supranational organizations aimed at dealing with that new order arose. The beginnings of the World Bank and the IMF took root even before the war was over. In 1944, in anticipation of the end of World War II, 730 leading economists acting as delegates from the United States, the United Kingdom, and 42 other countries met in Bretton Green, New Hampshire. Through an "unprecedented cooperative effort," the delegates created "a new international monetary system known as the Bretton Woods system" that could be used to solve many problems that existed before and had arisen during the war.[1] One of those problems was that Europe had been destroyed physically and economically during WWII and "needed to be reconstructed" which required large funds and serious planning.[2] Another was that during "the interwar period, governments not only undertook competitive devaluations but also set up restrictive trade policies that worsened the Great Depression" because they were protecting their own economies instead of the global exchange rate.[3]

Eventually, from Bretton Woods, two new institutions, the IMF and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), emerged with agreement from 44 different countries, and in December of 1945, nations began signing on to their Articles of Agreement. According to their first articles, the IMF would "facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade" and the IBRD, which eventually became known as the World Bank, would "[facilitate] the investment of capital for productive purposes."[4] Essentially, the main objective of the IMF would be to "monitor financial restraint" while the IBRD, would be primarily focused on "promot[ing] growth."[5] To ensure that no country would have a monopoly of power in the institutions' decisions, many safeguards dealing with funding the institutions and ensuring a

---

[1] Sandra K. Ghizoni, "Creation of the Bretton Woods System," Federal Reserve History, last modified November 22, 2013, https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/bretton-woods-created.
[2] Ngaire Woods, "Whose Institutions?" in *The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and Their Borrowers*, 1st ed., (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 16.
[3] Ghizoni, "Creation of the Bretton Woods System."
[4] United States, Department of Treasury, *Articles of Agreement, International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,* (Washington, DC: U.S. Treasury, July, 1944), pp. 1, 51.
[5] Walden Bello, "Global Economic Counterrevolution: How Northern Economic Warfare Devastates the South," in *50 years is enough: the case against the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund,* ed. Kevin Danaher (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1944), 17.

voice for smaller countries were put in place in the beginning, and in the early years, actions that could have boosted larger countries' share of the power were barred.[6]

Undoubtedly, the cornerstones of Keynesian economic theory were eventually impressed upon the global economy through the implementation of the Bretton Woods institutions, and the growing importance of free trade would create lasting consequences for many in the following decades.[7] The importance of free trade was underlined throughout the Articles for both the IMF and the World Bank, and Article VII of the Final Act of the conference clearly maintains that sentiment. However, it stated that "the complete attainment of this and other purposes and objectives stated in the Agreement," in reference to the fight for free trade, would not be achievable through the efforts of the IMF and World Bank alone.[8] In fact, there was even supposed to be a third pillar called the International Trade Organization (ITO) which would focus on fighting for the previously mentioned precursors necessary for the success of its counterparts.[9] The ITO failure stands beside many other struggles that the IMF and the World Bank faced following their implementation as their attempts at spreading free trade and neoliberal reforms around the world were not successful overnight. The institutions' attempts to aid in reconstruction efforts in Europe were disappointing as the U.S. led Marshall Plan was more popular because it allowed for aid to be given quickly and for broad projects, something

[6] Ghizoni, "Creation of the Bretton Woods System,"; Woods, "Whose Institutions," 18-24.
[7] Woods, "Whose Institutions," 21.
[8] United States, Department of State (Ed.), *United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference: Bretton Woods, Final act and related documents*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1944), p.15, http://www.cvce.eu/obj/final_act_of_the_bretton_woods_conference_22_july_1944-en-2520351c-0e91-4399- af63-69e4b33ef17a.html.
[9] Joseph Gold, "The Relationship between the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank," *Creighton Law Review* 15, no. 2 (1982): 499.

IMF and World Bank rules did not allow.[10] This is one reason they began creating plans themselves in later years for general aid projects.[11]

Around the time the IMF and World Bank were making a foothold in the international community, another supranational organization, the EU, began to take shape. Similar to the Bretton Woods institutions, the EU, or the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as it was originally named, was created in 1951 to tackle issues pertaining to WWII, specifically the destruction of the continent. The ECSC bonded the coal and steel industries of six countries: Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. By releasing some control over those industries, the nations were able to ensure that none of the other members would use their materials to wage war.[12] The 1957 Treaty of Rome further united those 6 countries through the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC), and in 1960, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was created between the EEC and a group of non-EEC European countries including the United Kingdom and Switzerland, among others, "to promote free trade and economic integration between certain countries not in the EEC."[13] While the non-EEC countries were not afforded the same privileges as the member countries, this move did allow for more integration throughout Europe at a time when other regions were posing threats to the global order.[14] Unlike the IMF and World Bank, the EEC's involvement with countries outside of the EFTA or the original 6 did not begin in a real sense until later in the 1960s.

---

[10] Bruce Rich, "World Bank/IMF: 50 Years is Enough," in *50 Years Is Enough: The Case Against the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund*, ed. Kevin Danaher (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1944), 6.
[11] Rich, 6.
[12] "History of the European Union 1945-59," European Union, accessed February 23, 2023, https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/history-eu/1945-59_en.
[13] "History of the European Union 1960-69," European Union, accessed February 23, 2023, https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/history-eu/1960-69_en.
[14] "History of the European Union 1960-69," European Union.

Meanwhile, one of the countries that would eventually form an intimate relationship with the IMF, World Bank, and the EU had just gained status as an independent nation. After gaining independence in 1957, most of the world expected Ghana to prosper. Instead, the decades that followed were characterized by political instability and economic disappointment. At one point during the 1900s, Ghana was the leading global producer of cocoa, but the country was still under British control. Neither the farmers nor the Ghanaian government reaped the rewards of that success in the moment or when they would need it most: post-independence.[15] This is due to the fact that the year Ghana gained independence was also the year that the global price of cocoa dropped rapidly, and though exports did continue to rise over the following years, the global supply of cocoa rose faster. Falling cocoa revenues forced the government to turn to reserves to fund the country, but even that money was eventually depleted through investments in poorly contrived development projects.[16] Those projects were part of Kwame Nkrumah's plan to rapidly industrialize the country in order to catch up with the rest of the world because he was of the opinion that Ghana and other newly-independent countries had to catch up in a "generation" if they wanted to "survive."[17]

Despite knowing the grand cost necessary of carrying out his progressive development plans, Nkrumah, Ghana's first President and the man who led the country to independence, was notoriously against dependence on foreign aid and preferred socialism over capitalism which was, in his words, "too complicated a system for a newly independent nation."[18] However, he

---

[15] Robert Addo-Fening, "Ghana under colonial rule: An outline of the early period and the interwar years," *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana* 1, no. 15 (2013): 53–54.
[16] Roger Gocking, *The History of Ghana* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2005), 118-119, ProQuest Ebook Central.
[17] Kwame Nkrumah, *The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah* (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons LTD, 1957), x.
[18] Nkrumah, x.

constantly had to compromise those ideals in order to reach his goals.[19] There was little chance of the rapid industrialization that Nkrumah envisioned coming to life without foreign investments, but instead of choosing sides as many newly independent countries were doing in lieu of the Cold War, he was "determined to get as much help and financial support as possible for Ghana from both sides."[20] For the most part, these loans were not contingent on specific policy implementations or any liberalizing actions. Instead, they were for specific projects. However, Nkrumah's affinity for non-alignment upset Ghana's partners in the West, and it instilled deep distrust in leaders at the IMF and World Bank who had a very difficult time working with Nkrumah's government.[21]

While attempting to undergo swift industrial progress and urban development, Ghana was also facing a massive problem which became known as the "food deficit" in the years following independence.[22] After independence, the population of Ghana boomed, and the country was not structurally prepared to provide food for all of its people. Therefore, it was necessary to import food, but that came at a high cost which forced prices to rise and was followed by requests from workers for higher wages needed to buy the products. Higher wages equate to higher production costs, and the effects of the deficit hindered many different Ghanaian industries from competing with their foreign counterparts.[23] The previous Colonial government implemented a development

[19] Boni Y. Gebe, "Ghana's Foreign Policy at Independence and Implications for the 1966 Coup D'État," *The Journal of Pan African Studies (Online)* 2, no. 3 (March 2008): 166, http://jpanafrican.org/docs/vol2no3/GhanasForeignPolicyAtIndependenceAnd.pdf.
[20] David Rooney, "Lurch to the Left" in *Kwame Nkrumah. Vision and Tragedy*, (Ghana: Sub-Saharan Publishers, 1988), 221.
[21] Rooney, 229.
[22] Government of Ghana, Office of the Planning Commission, *Seven-Year Plan for National Reconstruction and Development: Financial Years 1963/4-1969/70*, (Accra: Office of the Planning Commission, 1964), 56-57, https://ndpc.gov.gh/media/Ghana_7_Year_Development_Plan_1963-4_1969-70_1964.pdf.
[23] Government of Ghana, *Seven*, 56-57.

plan in 1951, and Nkrumah's government extended it to 1959.[24] Ghana attempted to carry out the plan without British financial help, but the combination of the ineffectiveness of the colonial development plan and the poor administrative skills of the Ghanaian government did not bode well for its citizens. As Ghana entered the 1960s, the nation's reserves were utterly depleted, and during this time of increasing desperation, there was no choice but to turn back to foreign aid for help.[25]

## The Cold War in the Third World

In the 1960s, the Cold War's effects began to reach more deeply into the workings of many global entities, and the ongoing fight for power between the East and the West was felt by individual nations as well as supranational institutions. During this time, the World Bank began receiving more money from countries it had loaned to than it had loaned them to begin with. As a result, the Bank decided to "increase the volume of lending to the same countries, thereby piling on more debt."[26] Between the 1960s and the 1980s, global changes would create suitable conditions for that increase in loans. Across the globe, newly independent nations were entering the world scene, and the Global South arguably had substantial success in banding together "to press for a fundamental redistribution of wealth on a global level" at the same time that the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) had huge successes in gaining control over the price of oil.[27] The potential partnership that could have been created between the two regions sparked northern fears of a new global power balance.[28] Coincidentally, that shift

[24] Akua O. Britwum, "Post-Independence Development Planning in Ghana and Tanzania: Agriculture, Women and Nation-Building," *Africa Development / Afrique et Développement* 47, no. 1 (2022): 113.
[25] Gocking, 118-119.
[26] Rich, 8-9.
[27] Bello, 15.
[28] Bello, 16.

occurred around the same time as measures meant to enhance the autonomy of the IMF and the World Bank were being chipped away which led to "an increase in bilateral and selectively multilateral influence control over bank lending and a decline in straightforward delegation to the Bank."[29] Consequently, the institutions' interests became more aligned with wealthy countries like the U.S. and the U.K than they were at their inception.[30]

Following the end of World War II, many of the EEC countries' colonies began to gain independence, but the European powers did not want to lose the economic trade privileges that they had enjoyed for decades. By 1963, all of the EEC's former African colonies had gained independence, yet 18 of them still wanted some connection to their former colonial counterparts as they worked toward economic stability as independent states. For these reasons, a provision in the Annexe of the 1957 Treaty of Rome pledged $581 million, "completely separate from any bilateral aid the six Community countries individually were devoting to these purposes," to the economic and social development of their former colonies.[31] Therefore, the Yaoundé Convention was signed between the EEC and 18 of its former colonies in 1963. The agreement allowed for the newly independent nations to have complete access to EEC markets, free of import tariffs on their goods, while the African nations were allowed to maintain their import tariffs and other trade barriers so long as all of the EEC nations were given the same barriers. The Convention also guaranteed around another $800 million in aid for the African countries from the EEC.[32] While the successors of this agreement would have far-reaching effects on Ghana's history in the

---

[29] Woods, "Whose Institutions," 27-29.
[30] Woods, "Whose Institutions," 32.
[31] "Partnership in Africa: the Yaoundé Association," *Community Topics* 26, European Community Information Service, (1966): 5.
[32] "Partnership in Africa: the Yaoundé Association," 5.

long term, the fact that Great Britain was not a member of the EEC at this point meant that the Yaoundé Convention would not yet apply to Ghana.

At that time in Ghana, the need for foreign aid that had been paramount leading into the 1960s had decreased through the procurement of development projects like the Volta River Project in 1962, so the Ghanaian government began a dramatic shift toward a new socialist ideology, effectively moving the country away from the United States and the EEC along with the institutions that the West had created: the IMF and the World Bank.[33] Under their new socialistic veil, Nkrumah and his administration attempted to tackle many issues including the previously mentioned "food deficit" by replacing the previous colonial development plan with the Seven Year Development Plan in 1964.[34] The broad goals for the new development plan included increasing "support for peasant farmers, setting up cooperative and state farms to undertake large-scale farming to feed agricultural industries and produce cereals and meat for the urban market, and turning marketing bodies under state-control."[35] In theory, it should have bolstered the Ghanaian agricultural industry's ability to produce and distribute at a rate that would allow Ghanaian products to compete with imported products.

With regard to the tomato industry, this plan aimed to allow opportunities for small farmers to create standing relationships with large factories to ensure a reliable source of income to farmers and reliable suppliers for factories. Tomato production as a serious agricultural industry began to grow in the 1950s, and it eventually became normal for tomato farmers to have difficulties selling their crops in markets. "Market Queens" were known to illegally import fresh tomatoes from surrounding countries like Burkina Faso and were able to price local farmers out

[33] Gocking, 131-132; Rooney, 230.
[34] Government of Ghana, *Seven*, 56-57; Gocking, 134-135.
[35] Britwum, 116.

of the largest markets, but even farmers who could or would sell to "Market Queens" may not have gotten a fair price for their products.[36] Not only did these traders control what farmers could make when selling their products, but they also controlled whether or not they could harvest tomatoes in the first place. In the earlier decades of the 1900s, the use of expensive agricultural technology and soil additives was not a common practice, but after the 1950s as the government began to invest in large scale agricultural production, the cost of producing tomatoes began to increase.[37]

Farmers that could afford to keep up with the technology necessary to produce tomatoes quickly became the ones who could obtain larger profits on their produce, but those who could not afford the technology were left to fall behind. Some farmers struck deals with "Market Queens" for loans and set prices for their tomatoes in order to keep up with their competitors, but eventually those loans would have to be repaid.[38] To avoid beginning a cycle of debt, some farmers traveled to smaller markets that were not worth the time of the queens, but the potential profits in those markets were not as high as potential profits in larger markets. Also, the choice to sell their own products to avoid traders did not guarantee that the farmers would sell all or even most of their product because a large number of people in their communities also produce tomatoes.[39]

Tomato production times vary from region to region in Ghana, but in the months of August and September, many of the regions find themselves producing at the same time.[40] This

---

[36] Theresa A. A. Nyamekye, "Production Efficiency and Building Marketing Strategies for Smallholder Tomato Farmers in the Adaklu Anyigbe District of Ghana: Linear Programming and Parametric Linear Programming Approach," *Journal of Developments in Sustainable Agriculture* 6, no. 2 (2011): 233.
[37] Mohammed Issah, "RIGHT TO FOOD OF TOMATO AND POULTRY FARMERS: Report of an investigative mission to Ghana," Foodfirst Information and Action Network, Nov. (2007): 15.
[38] Nyamekye, 233; Issah, 14.
[39] Issah, 15.
[40] Issah, 13.

presented problems for farmers because competition began to rise to new heights as more farmers entered the field. One solution to this problem was to enter into a partnership with a tomato processing factory where farmers could have much more success in selling all of their tomatoes and would gain a sense of security. The way the Seven Year Development Plan aimed to work on closing the food gap while benefiting farmers by providing them security was through the creation of 3 separate tomato processing plants: "the GIHOC cannery at Nsawam (Eastern region), Pwalugu Tomato Factory at Pwalugu (Upper East region) and the GIHOC Tomato Cannery -TOMACAN of Wenchi (Brong Ahafo region)."[41] Also, selling the tomato paste that the factory produced locally or exporting it would have diversified the agricultural sector by lessening the need to import the product from abroad, thereby working to close the "food deficit."[42] Had this initiative worked as well as it was intended to, it could have benefited the economy locally and nationally.

Sadly, arrangements involving these factories and many other sections of Nkrumah's development plan were rendered ineffectual in early implementation stages due to the lack of existing technological infrastructure and wide scale mismanagement of time and imported materials, so most farms did not reach their production goals.[43] There were also criticisms over the choice to invest in the creation of such state led farms instead of focusing on "agricultural technical support and incentives to small private farmers."[44] However, even with that mismanagement, farmers have reported that "low prices offered by traders started in the

---

[41] Elizabeth J.Z. Robinson, and Shashi L. Kolavalli, "The Case of Tomato in Ghana: Institutional Support," (GSSP Working Paper no. 22, Institute for Poverty and Land Research Group, Accra, April 23, 2010), 2.
[42] Republic of Ghana, *Seven,* 56-57.
[43] Britwum, 118-119.
[44] Nyamekye, 230.

1980s."[45] Before then, even without constant stability from factories, the farmers were more likely to make a decent profit on their tomatoes. However, as the global cocoa market-price crashed, Ghana began experiencing shortages due to the fact that the CPP had begun importing most of its goods from the Soviet Union.[46] Though there were management and implementation issues, the long-term results of the initiatives may have been different if not for the political turmoil that began to plague Ghana in the late 1960s when a coup in 1966 removed Nkrumah and the CPP from power less than two years after the implementation of the Seven Year Development Plan.[47]

Meanwhile, in 1962, the member nations of the EEC were also implementing new agricultural policy in the form of a trade agreement named Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Under this new agreement, the countries worked together to provide food to its citizens, and the policy worked as it was intended.[48] So much so, in fact, that the result was a large production surplus. The product that made up the surplus was then either wasted completely or "dumped or sold off at heavily subsidised prices on the world market."[49] In response to pushback in member states and other countries whose domestic producers could not compete with the cheap produce that had flooded their markets, the Mansholt Plan of 1968 called for CAP reforms in the form of "the reduction of the labour force in the sector and the creation of larger more competitive farm units."[50] Also in 1968, customs duties, or taxes on imported goods, between the 6 original member countries were removed, and the countries began adhering to the same import duties, or

---

[45] Issah, 14.
[46] Gocking, 134–135.
[47] Ama B. Biney, "Kwame Nkrumah: An Intellectual Biography" (PhD diss., SOAS University of London, 2007), 295, ProQuest (10672987).
[48] Eric Davies, "Information Guide: Common Agricultural Policy," European Sources Online, Cardiff University Press, 2, 2013, http://aei.pitt.edu/75450/3/Common-Agricultural-Policy.pdf.
[49] Davies, 3.
[50] Davies, 4.

tariffs, for imports from countries in other regions which signified the groups growing dedication to trade liberalization and collaboration.[51] The group was also centralizing its administrative facilities during this time as the EEC combined with the ECSC and Euratom in 1965 to form the European Communities (EC).

A year later in Ghana, under the New Liberation Council (NLC) and its Chairman, Lieutenant General Ankrah, many of the Nkrumah-era state farms were quickly closed, but the land that had been taken from rural Ghanaians was not returned. The "new regime, after all, faced many of the same challenges as the CPP," and under the NLC, the Nkrumah era, soviet inspired State Farms Corporation (SFC) "obtained formal land titles and continued to operate under the next several governments."[52] However, for almost two years after Ankrah and the NLC took over, no new state mandated farms were created as their regime was primarily focused on "stimulating more agricultural primary exports (cocoa and timber) and cutting back on direct state involvement in agricultural production."[53] Essentially, they were focused on supporting massive farms that already existed and produced crops that were profitable to export, and since the tomato industry was less developed than other export industries and was not a prolific exporting sector, it was ignored. More broadly, the previous government's goal of decreasing the "food deficit" by reducing food imports was abandoned.[54] It is worth noting that these positions were taken under advisement from the IMF, who, along with the NLC, "sought to rapidly liberalize Ghana's economy, drastically cut government spending, and scrub away legacies of

---

[51] "History of the European Union 1960-69," European Union.
[52] Keri Lambert, "'It's All Work and Happiness on The Farms': Agricultural Development between The Blocs in Nkrumah's Ghana," *The Journal of African History* 60, no. 1 (2019): 43.
[53] Samuel Benin, "Public Expenditure on Agriculture and its Impact," in *Ghana's Economic and Agricultural Transformation: Past Performance and Future Prospects*, eds. Xinshen Diao et al. (New York, NY: International Food Policy Research Institute and Oxford University Press, 2019), 175.
[54] Government of Ghana, *Seven*, 56-57; Benin, 175-176.

Nkrumahism from all corners of the country."[55] Along with his party, the Progress Party, Ankrah's successor, Dr. Kofi Busia, maintained most of those policies and made little progress toward closing the "food deficit."[56]

Following another coup in 1972, General Ignatius Acheampong and the National Redemption Council (NRC) took control of the Ghanaian government, and along with their successors, Lieutenant General Frederick Akuffo and the Supreme Military Council, Acheampong and the NRC initiated Ghana's "first agricultural-specific initiatives" which were named Operation Feed Yourself and Operation Feed Your Industries.[57] The former of the programs was created to attack the "food deficit," and the latter was created to maintain the previous government's attempts to supply Ghanaian industries and boost productivity.[58] In fact, policy intended to revitalize the Pwalugu factory was included in both of those initiatives.[59] However, Akuffo was removed from power via coup in 1979 due to "widely acclaimed economic mismanagement," and the succeeding People's National Party and its leader, Dr. Hilla Limann, had little time to support their proposed "Action Programme for Agricultural Production" for 1980-1981 before the administration was removed from power less than two years after entering office.[60] Even though many of the regimes mentioned following Nkrumah attempted to run the tomato plants the Seven Year Development Plan had spawned, the poor planning and execution of the plans by Nkrumah's government coupled with problems of the

---

[55] Lambert, 43.
[56] Gocking, 157-158; Government of Ghana, *Seven*, 56-57.
[57] Benin, 176.
[58] Government of Ghana, *Seven*, 56-57; Benin, 176.
[59] Emmanuel Frimpong Boamah and James Sumberg, "The long overhang of bad decisions in agro-industrial development: Sugar and tomato paste in Ghana," *Food Policy* 89, no. 101786 (2019): 5.
[60] Benin, 177.

same vein in the following administrations did not fare well for the long-term success of these plants leading into the mid-1980s.[61]

**The Unravelling of Idealism**

As the 1970s ended, OPEC did not unite with the south, and "the fall in raw-material prices to their lowest point since the 1930s" aided in ensuring that the Global North would remain in charge of the global hierarchy.[62] In the 1980s, as the global south endured the debt crisis resulting from their reliance on raw-material industries, IMF and World Bank objectives began to change. That systematic shift can be delineated through an observation of the change in the type of aid given by the institutions. In the beginning, the World Bank only gave loans "for the purpose of specific projects of reconstruction or development," but in the 1980s, the World Bank expanded its involvement with developing economies by introducing its new "structural adjustment loan" (SAL), also commonly referred to as an SAP.[63] The SAP provided developing governments with large loans, free of stipulations in regards to "specific project[s]", but in return, the governments were made to "carry out a drastic program of liberalization."[64] Specific contingencies "included reducing the state's role in the economy, lowering barriers to imports, removing restrictions on foreign investment, eliminating subsidies for local industries, reducing spending for social welfare, cutting wages, devaluing the currency and emphasizing production for export rather than for local consumption."[65]

---

[61] Nyamekye, 231.
[62] Bello, 15-16.
[63] Woods, "Whose Institutions," 25; Bello, 16.
[64] Bello, 16.
[65] Bello, 16

At first, there were very few countries willing to agree to such stern measures, but due to the debt crisis, many were eventually left with no choice as they were failing to pay banks back for private loans they had taken in the 1970s. In fact, many of the Northern banks that had granted those private loans "made the adoption of the World Bank structural adjustment program essential to debt rescheduling," citing the World Bank's opinion that the implementation of liberal reforms would promote "efficiency" and ensure developing countries' ability to repay their loans.[66] As more countries begrudgingly entered into SAPs with the World Bank, the IMF became increasingly involved with the World Bank's actions. The creation of the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) in 1988 further integrated the institutions in efforts to "closely coordinate" their "surveillance and enforcement activities."[67]

The man responsible for empowering Limann in 1979 and removing him from power in 1981 through two separate coups was Lt. Jerry Rawlings. After taking power, he attempted to "[establish] a state monopoly on export-import trade, [eliminate] corruption in the allocation of import licenses, and [try] to reorient trade away from the West."[68] At this time, he was known as somewhat of a "socialist revolutionary."[69] His party, the People's National Defence Council (PNDC), was known to hold strong socialist views, but its leader was less concerned with the economics of it all, even saying once, "I don't know any law and I don't understand economics, but I know it when my stomach is empty."[70] When it came to economics, he trusted his advisors, most of whom were "uncompromisingly leftist."[71] However, it soon became clear to Rawlings

---

[66] Bello, 16-17.
[67] Bello, 17.
[68] Jeffrey Herbst, "Ghana in Economic Crisis," in *The Politics of Reform in Ghana, 1982-1991*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 28.
[69] Frank Gerits, "Anticolonial capitalism: How Ghana came to embrace market-led development theory (the 1970s-1990s)," *Southern Journal for Contemporary History* 47, no. 1 (2022): 5.
[70] "Rawlings the Legacy," BBC News, December 1, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1050310.stm.
[71] "Rawlings the Legacy," BBC News.

and his advisors that implementing policies built from similar foundations to those of regimes past and using the threat of physical violence to enforce such policies was not working.[72] Faced with the fact that the Soviet Union had stopped providing aid, there was an intense drought in 1982 that seriously affected agricultural industries, and that Nigeria had exiled around a million Ghanaians that the country was in no position to support, there were few viable options for Rawlings other than to completely change course.[73]

Despite the fact that Rawlings and the PNDC had always been "strongly opposed to any kind of liberalization program or to relations with 'imperialist' agencies such as the World Bank or the IMF," given the dire circumstances of the time, the less radical members of the party decided to meet with the IMF.[74] In 1983, those discussions resulted in the reveal of a new budget that "suggested a fundamental break with not only the PNDC's previous policies but also from the thrust of economic practice since independence."[75] This collaboration was named the Economic Recovery Program (ERP), and its objectives included "devaluing the exchange rate, increasing real interest rates, and decontrolling internal prices" while "[reducing] the fiscal deficit sufficiently to eliminate the need for printing money to cover it, thus, reducing inflation."[76] Based on the principles that the IMF and the World Bank were founded by, the plan also included the goal of "encouraging markets to function freely" by "[liberalizing] the economy, including the foreign sector."[77]

---

[72] Herbst, 28-29.
[73] Herbst, 29.
[74] Herbst, 32.
[75] Herbst, 29.
[76] Phillip English, "Recovery is not Enough - the Case of Ghana," (Working paper no. 37149, World Bank Institute, Washington, D.C., 1999), 3, http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01006/WEB/IMAGES/WBI37149.PDF.
[77] English, 3.

In regards to the experience of the tomato factories in the 1980s, once they were no longer under government control, there was not much interest from the private sector, and all three closed within a decade of the ERP. To be clear, there were definitely issues with the way the tomato sector functioned before the ERP. A large part of the reason that the factories consistently failed to meet production goals was "because of technical ineffectiveness, poor financial management, lack of spare parts, outmoded equipment, and poor marketing."[78] From Nkrumah's government to Rawlings's government, many efforts were made in hopes that these tomato processing plants would be successful, but the governments never effectively invested time or money into making sure that farmers could logistically produce tomatoes at the speed needed for the price that could be paid. However, on a community-based level, these factories became essential parts of local economies. At the height of the Wenchi factory's production capabilities, over 1000 people were employed by the factory, and even though it did not begin operations until 1973, the Pwalugu factory was said to have become a major blessing for tomato farmers and their communities.[79] According to one farmer, tomato farming became even more popular and profitable than cocoa farming in the towns surrounding the Pwalugu factory until the early 1980s.[80] At its height, the Nsawam cannery was also said to have been very effective in solving the tomato farmers' problems by "[absorbing] the excess tomatoes during" busy months.[81] Therefore, the closure of the factories was detrimental to many of their lives, and that loss coincided with the IMF and World Bank led liberalization policies. Without the factories to

---

[78] Robinson, 1.
[79] Biiya Mukusah Ali, "Revive Wenchi Tomato Processing Factory – Traditional Council," Graphic Online, April 9, 2022, https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/revive-wenchi-tomato-processing-factory-traditional-council.html.
[80] JoyNews, "Pwalugu Tomato Factory now a 'ghost house' - The Pulse on JoyNews (16-10-18)," Youtube, October 16, 2018, news video, 1:28 to 1:40, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UmqlUG_fhqQ.
[81] Issah, 14.

absorb the tomatoes, farmers were not able to sell in markets or to traders for competitive prices, and the growing supply of tomatoes coupled with the influx of tomato paste to ensure that Ghanaian farmers would have a difficult time competing in their domestic markets.[82]

At this point in the 1980s, after finding footing in the international sphere in the 1960s and 1970s, the IMF and World Bank were in the perfect position to lend money to countries like Ghana that had come to an economic impasse. By removing program-specific contingencies for loans, they could stipulate broader reforms that could boost the overall economy in a quicker fashion and impose them onto countries that were in desperate need of immediate economic help. This was also when their interests became more aligned with Western countries who were pushing for market liberalization, so that was one of the biggest stipulations attached to SAPs. The foundations of the Ghanaian tomato industry pre-SAP were not impressive by economic standards a macro level, but they had been offering support to tomato producing communities nonetheless. The effect of the SAP on the tomato industry is therefore a fair study, carried out in chapter 3, on how the average industry and its people coped with the introduction of the SAP reforms. Following the 1980s, the EC would continue to incorporate more of Western and later Eastern Europe, and as the group's economic and trade relationships grew closer and more intertwined, their efforts to form partnerships with other regions through EPAs grew as well. The study of how the EPA affected the Ghanaian tomato industry will be carried out in Chapter 4. Together, they will show the combined effects of these supranational policies on a specific industry.

---

[82] Robinson, 1; Gertrude D. Torvikey, "Ghanaian Tomato Producers and Traders Struggle with the State under Covid-19," Institute for Poverty, Land, and Agrarian Studies, (last modified May 14, 2021), https://www.plaas.org.za/ghanaian-tomato-producers-and-traders-struggle-with-the-state-under-covid-19/.

# Chapter 3

## *What do you get when you give a Ghana a Structural Adjustment Programme?* The Ghanaian experience with the Economic Recovery Program

The rising economic, social, and political tensions in the years leading up to talks between Ghanaian officials and IMF officials that have been mentioned above were compounded in 1983 when over one million Ghanaians were exiled from Nigeria. The country also experienced a drought that lasted through 1983 into 1984 as well as wildfires that wreaked havoc on the Ghanaian landscape.[1] Political tensions combined with social unrest resulting from the Rawlings administration's harsh rule and the sharp economic decline the country was experiencing; Rawlings and his government were spiraling and in desperate need of help. As chapter two explains, Rawlings's administration's shift from socialism to World Bank capitalist neoliberalism was a dramatic policy shift for Rawlings and the PNDC administration at the time, but there were few other options.

After months of planning and negotiating with IMF and World Bank officials, the Rawlings administration emerged with an agreement, the ERP, which was implemented beginning in April of 1983. The Ghanaian administration had very few other options at that point, similar to the experience of many other countries who formed their own SAPs with the IMF and World Bank throughout the 80s and 90s. This study does not take issue with the decision of the Ghanaian administration to agree to this SAP. Instead, it wishes to use it as an example to show how even Ghana's SAP, seen by many to be one of the most successful of its type, had unintended consequences for smaller, local industries that would then be left

---

[1] Jeffrey Herbst, "Ghana in Economic Crisis," in *The Politics of Reform in Ghana, 1982-1991*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 29.

vulnerable in the years leading up to and following the implementation of the EPA. This chapter will use an analysis of the text of the ERP of 1983 along with many broad and sector-specific economic indicators to assess how the ERP affected not only the overall economic situation in Ghana, but also the situations of smaller aspects of the overall situation such as the tomato industry.

The introduction of Volume I of the "Economic Recovery Program 1984-1986" report outlined the main goals for what it named the "Three–Year Investment Program" (TYIP) in the introduction:

> The main objectives of the TYIP include the restoration of appropriate incentives for increased productivity and production especially in the agricultural and export sectors, reducing the rate of inflation to more tolerable levels through the pursuit of prudent fiscal, monetary and trade policies, rehabilitation of the nation's productive and social infrastructure and structural reforms aimed at improving the efficiency of the economy and elimination of monopolistic and other market imperfections which have plagued the distribution system.[2]

The section on agricultural policy starts by making the goals of the plan in regard to agriculture clear: "Agricultural policy and programming are aimed at increasing the production of food, selected raw materials and export crops."[3] The sections following that statement focus specifically on policy implementations focused on the larger sectors of the Ghanaian agricultural industry such as cocoa and timber. Finally, the policy section finishes by promoting its goal to rehabilitate infrastructural sectors that have caused harm to the agricultural industry in the past, encouraging outside investment for the seed industry, and incentivizing the production of

---

[2] The Republic of Ghana, *Economic Recovery Program 1984-1986*. Volume I, Accra-Tema, Ghana: Ghana Publishing Corporation, October 1983, 2.
[3] The Republic of Ghana, *Economic Recovery Program 1984-1986*. Volume I, 21.

important food products that aren't domestically produced at a rate comparable to that of the population.[4]

The overall objective of the program is to reduce dependence on foreign actors, which is where the overall goal of rehabilitation comes to play. Chapter 4 of the ERP focuses directly on rehabilitation over many different sectors of the economy and lays out how the funds from the ERP are to be dispersed among those different sectors. It starts by stating that this section of the ERP, the economic rehabilitation program, "is designed to increase the foreign exchange earning capacity through increased exports and to save foreign exchange through efficient import substitution."[5] To do so, the foreign investments made are to be invested in troubled areas of the economy to remove "bottlenecks in the various stages of productions" and ultimately lead to much higher efficiency rates over all industries.[6]

Volume II of the ERP, published at the same time as Volume I, outlines the background, constraints, and expected benefits of ERP policies for 10 of Ghana's largest economic sectors, and it goes into deeper detail on the smaller sectors within each of the larger sectors.[7] As the agricultural sector was Ghana's largest sector at the time, it is Chapter 1 in Volume II. In that chapter, the main constraints of the agricultural sector are laid out:

- Seasonal shortage of agricultural labor;
- Inadequate management capacity;
- Inadequate and untimely supply of inputs;
- Inadequate extension and research services;
- Lack of replanting of aged and diseased tree crops, especially cocoa;
- Bottlenecks in the transportation and storage of produce; and
- Inadequate producer price structure for major crops.[8]

---

[4] The Republic of Ghana, *Economic Recovery Program 1984-1986*. Volume I, 22.
[5] The Republic of Ghana, *Economic Recovery Program 1984-1986*. Volume I, 24.
[6] The Republic of Ghana, *Economic Recovery Program 1984-1986*. Volume I, 24.
[7] The Republic of Ghana, *Economic Recovery Program 1984-1986*. Volume II, Accra-Tema, Ghana: Ghana Publishing Corporation, October 1983, 1.
[8] The Republic of Ghana, *Economic Recovery Program*, Volume II, 1.

The three tomato processing plants that were started during Nkrumah's administration closed following the implementation of the ERP. The Wenchi factory actually closed for the first time in the years following Nkrumah's removal from power, but after being reinstated in 1972, the factory closed again in 1987 due to the "lack of the right quantity of raw materials for its operation."[9] It was not reopened for operation until 2003.The Pwalugu factory did not initially begin operations until 1973, and by 1985, it had shut down and would not be reopened until the mid 2000s. There is no record of the Nsawam factory ever reopening after it closed down around the time of the closing of the other two factories.

The three plants had been state led and funded, so while the successful operation of the plants was at the mercy of the Ghanaian government and its management woes, the fluctuations of the global markets had much less of an effect on prices paid to farmers before the ERP. After the ERP, the tomato market became liberalized, and many new producers entered the market. However, from the mid 1980s to the early 2000s, there were no processing facilities in Ghana, so the tomato farmers were forced to sell all of their tomatoes in markets themselves or through a trader. This resulted in a large number of tomato producers competing against each other in unstable markets without a factory to sell the excess to, so the prices that traders could give for tomatoes went down because the supply in the markets was insanely high.[10]

In one town, Kumawu, lands destroyed by the wildfires of 1983 were repurposed for tomato production following the ERP. Traders, or "Market Queens," would meet farmers at the

---

[9] Biiya Mukusah Ali, "Revive Wenchi Tomato Processing Factory – Traditional Council," Graphic Online, April 9, 2022,
https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/revive-wenchi-tomato-processing-factory-traditional-council.html.
[10] Mohammed Issah, "RIGHT TO FOOD OF TOMATO AND POULTRY FARMERS: Report of an investigative mission to Ghana," Foodfirst Information and Action Network, Nov. (2007): 12.

fences of their properties and negotiate prices for their tomatoes.[11] When market conditions were favorable, the farmers could make large profits, but when they were not, prices could fall quickly from around $30 per box to less than $2 a box. Sometimes they dropped to levels that were not high "enough to pay laborers to pick their tomatoes and carry them to the nearest road-let alone recover any of the money they'd spent on labor or chemicals earlier in the growing season-and many left their tomatoes to rot in the fields."[12] To finance tomato production, many farmers turned to local banks that were "part of a nationwide network of community banks established under the aegis of structural adjustment" rather than to their local traders like tomato farmers from the past had been known to do.[13] These banks were "governed by local boards of directors and required to operate without government subsidies," so when it came to providing loans, there were not many given to small tomato farmers.[14] Instead, as growing exports was a goal of the ERP, many loans were given to cocoa farmers from the new community banks, and to ensure that loans were paid back, "the amount of the loan would be deducted from the value of the crop" to end the transaction.[15] However, farmers began to cheat the system by claiming that the "crop had failed" while turning their cocoa in under a name different from the one on the loan.[16]

Eventually, in Kumawu, the Bank began only lending to government officials, and a joint scheme by the Ghanaian government, the Yugoslavians, and the Kumawu Traditional Council, that was funded by Japan to grow maize, another lucrative export, failed and was replaced by "a

---

[11] Theresa A. A. Nyamekye, "Production Efficiency and Building Marketing Strategies for Smallholder Tomato Farmers in the Adaklu Anyigbe District of Ghana: Linear Programming and Parametric Linear Programming Approach," *Journal of Developments in Sustainable Agriculture* 6, no. 2 (2011): 233.
[12] Sara Berry, "Tomatoes, land and hearsay: Property and history in asante in the time of structural adjustment," *World Development* 25, no. 8 (1997): 1231.
[13] Berry, 1231.
[14] Berry, 1231.
[15] Berry, 1231.
[16] Berry, 1231.

cooperative for local farmers, under the joint management of the Rural Bank and an Interim Management Committee of Kumawufoɔ."[17] Many of the members of this cooperative were board members of the bank and began to plant tomatoes. However, their wishes to use the remainder of the Japanese loan meant for the failed Yugoslavian scheme to buy equipment to enhance tomato production for the joint collective were denied by the Ghanaian Ministry of Agriculture who also said the bank was still responsible for the Japanese loan.[18] The disagreement brought production to a standstill, and no one benefited. This story shows how the ERP instated farms and banks were inconsistent with the existing nature of the societies and production schemes that they were meant to enhance.

## Results and Discussion

In the years immediately following the roll-out of the ERP policies, there was general consensus around the feeling that Ghana's SAP experience would be touted as a success, and there was good reason for that when relying on broad economic indicators. Such indicators are useful when attempting to compare results for different countries or when attempting to ascertain the overarching effects of the SAP. However, relying on broad indicators can lead to neglect for smaller industries and what the effects might have been like on the level of the everyday person. While the initial results did look promising, at least on a broad scale, as years passed and the initial benefits from the program wore off, troubling trends started to emerge.

---

[17] Berry, 1232.
[18] Berry, 1232.






Figure 3.1, “GDP Growth (annual %) - Ghana 1978-2000,” (World Bank), and Figure 3.2, “Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) - Ghana 1965-2000,” (World Bank).


Figure 3.3, “Exports of goods and services (% of GDP),” (World Bank).

As the graphs show, the years leading up to 1983 were abysmal for GDP growth and inflation rates, and the percent of GDP related to exports was steadily dropping. Figure 3.1 shows the annual % of GDP growth for the overall economy in Ghana from 1978 to 2000. The first fall on the graph can be traced to when Rawlings led his first coup in 1979 which left Limann in power. The larger drop from 1980 to 1982 can be tied to his second coup, the one that left him in charge of the country, Figure 3.2 shows the annual inflation rates for the years 1965 to 2000. The graph shows that inflation rose slowly until around 1975 when it began to climb rapidly. The three tallest points on the graph, and therefore the highest inflation rates, are for the years 1977, 1981, and 1983, respectively meaning that prices of goods and services rose at incredible rates those years. Figure 3.3 shows the percentage of the GDP that exported goods and services accounted for. In the years leading up to the ERP, while GDP growth itself was stunted, exports were beginning to account for less of that dwindling total.

For many in Ghana and around the world, the results from the ERP seemed to be incredibly positive. As figure 3.1 shows, GDP growth boomed to almost 6% the year the ERP was implemented and steadied around 4% in the following years. Even though it didn't level out as neatly as GDP growth did, the highest inflation rate, shown in figure 3.2, in the years following the ERP, 60% in 1995, was less than half the highest inflation rate in the year the ERP was instated. Figure 3.3 shows the % of GDP that the export of goods and services accounted for, and the graph shows that, after a somewhat steady decline until 1983, that measure began to rise steadily after 1983. This shows that one of the goals of the ERP, to increase exports, was clearly accomplished as exports grew to account for a much larger portion of the GDP which itself was steadily increasing. The percentage of non-traditional exports also rose following the ERP from 6% in 1984 to almost 21% in 2000.[19] This means there was obvious progress being made toward the goal of diversifying Ghana's export industry. Additionally, the overall deficit as a percentage of the GDP went from -16% in 1975 to only .2% by 1987.[20]

To this day, many still agree that Ghana's experience with structural adjustment through the ERP was positive due to the performance of those economic indicators in the years following the reforms. While some of those indicators would maintain their positive nature, others either flattened out or returned to their previous levels, so the long-term effects of the ERP, were not seen in as positive a light as the short-term effects.  For example, while the ERP was supposed to

---

[19] Charles Ackah and Ernest Aryeetey, eds., "Ghana's Trade Policies Between 1957 and 1983," in *Globalization, Trade and Poverty in Ghana*, (Legon-Accra, Ghana: Sub-Saharan Publishers, 2012), table 5, https://www.idrc.ca/sites/default/files/openebooks/736-0/index.html#ch02tab5.
[20] John Loxley, "Structural Adjustment in Africa: Reflections on Ghana and Zambia," *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 47 (1990): 9.

reduce poverty and raise the standard of living for the poorest citizens, in rural areas the rates actually rose in the following years.[21] While income levels were somewhat redistributed in favor of the poor, the dramatic devaluation of the Ghanaian cedi left people with very little purchasing power, and over 31% of the population was living below poverty in the early 1990s.[22] Moreover, by 2005, that measure was up to 31.9% for the entire country and 43.7% for rural areas.[23]

Nevertheless, Ghana is still viewed as one of the countries with the most positive experience with structural adjustment. However, for some of the smaller sectors, such as the tomato sector, the broad economic indicators do not tell the entire story. For example, it may seem positive for the entire agricultural sector that "in 1993, cocoa, timber and gold accounted for 80% of the value of Ghana's merchandise exports," but the reality behind that statistic is somewhat less positive.[24] While it is positive that exports rose, the fact that those three exports were still accounting for the vast majority of Ghana's exports following the ERP means that the export sector was not effectively diversified. Curiously, the amount of the annual budget allocated to agriculture went from 10% between 1981 and 1982 to less than 4% between 1988 and 1990.[25] It is evident that investing in sectors that were not primarily focused on export goods was a lower priority than investing in those that were.

---

[21] Kwadwo Konadu-Agyemang, "The Best of Times and the Worst of Times: Structural Adjustment Programs and Uneven Development in Africa: The Case of Ghana," *The Professional Geographer* 52, no. 3 (August 2000): 480.
[22] Konadu-Agyemang, 475.
[23] Ghana Statistical Service, *Ghana Living Standards Survey Round 7: Poverty Trends in Ghana - 2005-2017*. Accra: Ghana Statistical Service, 2018, 13, https://www2.statsghana.gov.gh/docfiles/publications/GLSS7/Poverty%20Profile%20Report_2005%20-%202017.pdf.
[24] Berry, 1226.
[25] Jon Kraus, "The Struggle over Structural Adjustment in Ghana," *Africa Today* 38, no. 4 (Fourth, 1991): 27.




Figure 3. 4, "Import Quantity of Tomato Paste: Ghana (1961-2021)," (FAOSTAT).

In regards to tomatoes, the amount of imported tomato paste increased rapidly following the implementation of the ERP. As figure 3.4 shows, tomato imports fell in the early years of the 1960s, seemingly due to the implementation of the Seven Year Development Plan and Nkrumah's other socialist policies, and subsequent jumps in imports leading up to the years 1967, 1971, and 1978 correlate with times of intense political turmoil that would eventually relate in the coups of Nkrumah, Busia, and Akuffo, respectively. The jump and following decline around 1974 could connect to Akuffo's previously mentioned initiatives focused on reducing the "food deficit" that went into effect around this time.[26] The lead up toward the next jump would correlate with the economic troubles that eventually lead to Akuffo being removed from power. This is also the time period in which the Wenchi and Pwalugu factories closed. While the amount of imports remained relatively low in the years immediately following the implementation of the ERP in 1983, they began to rise quickly following 1989. This jump would correlate to the implementation of the second and third phases of the ERP that were implemented

[26] Government of Ghana, Office of the Planning Commission, *Seven-Year Plan for National Reconstruction and Development: Financial Years 1963/4-1969/70*, (Accra: Office of the Planning Commission, 1964), 56-57, https://ndpc.gov.gh/media/Ghana_7_Year_Development_Plan_1963-4_1969-70_1964.pdf.

in 1987 and 1993 respectively. The second phase intensified existing reforms and pushed for further liberalization while the third and final phase focused on "accelerated growth" and more "private-sector development."[27] Curiously, the dramatic fall in 1996 happened directly after Ghana joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, and while it is unlikely that membership in the WTO caused that fall, Chapter 4 will argue that the large jump in imports that happened in the following years can be tied directly to such trade deals.

### Conclusion

While the ERP was clearly not Rawlings or many others' first choice as an avenue toward Ghanaian stabilization and growth, it was, if not the only option, arguably the best option available at the time. After its implementation in 1983, the data shows that there were undoubtedly some positive effects. GDP grew steadily, inflation fell to more manageable levels, exchange rates became more favorable, and the deficit shrunk. These and many other indicators have been used many times before to show how the ERP affected Ghana in a positive way, and those impacts are undeniable. However, a deeper look into the data as it panned out after the first couple of years showed that the economic benefits were limited in scope. Further, those indicators did not account for the way that more specific sects of the economy were reacting to the new policies.

The scholarly debates surrounding SAPs hinged on criticisms of the economics behind the policies, how the policies were implemented, and whether or not they were actually successful in the years following their implementations. While SAP criticisms grew as time

[27] Eboe Hutchful, "Macroeconomic Policy & Performance," in *Ghana's adjustment experience: The paradox of reform*, (Oxford, James Currey Ltd., 2002), 57.

passed, Ghana was still seen as a success in some way. As unexpected as the shift was, Rawlings and his administration were eventually more than eager to implement the policies, and the growth Ghana achieved after implementing those policies did not disappear entirely. Those conditions make it all the fairer to study how SAPs affected smaller industries within developing economies through a case study of Ghana.

Exports did grow, but only truly significantly in certain industries that had been Ghana's main export leaders to begin with, new farmers and other actors that were spurred to enter newly liberalized markets had to then deal with large quantities of imports. The fact that the imports were growing did nothing to help reduce the "food deficit" that had been plaguing the country since its independence either.[28] Specific to the tomato industry, this was the period that large sums of processed tomato imports began to enter Ghanaian markets, and the three tomato factories from the Nkrumah years failed to compete or gain private support. While market liberalization is supposed to spur competition and boost industry, its other more structural tenants acted as hindrances to competition in real life situations for many people. More accessible markets lead to more competitive markets and better innovation, but they also expose producers in those markets to fluctuations of local and global markets. Larger corporate producers have more protection from these hurdles, but smaller producers who entered markets due to the new accessibility are not protected. Without the support of the government or private investors, the tomato factories could not compete in local markets, and once the Ghanaian factories closed, imported tomato paste did not have to compete with local goods. Liberalizing policies then pushed a growing community of Ghanaian tomato farmers into flooded markets with no security or support.

[28] Government of Ghana, *Seven*, 56-57.

Therefore, this chapter has shown that although the reforms implemented by the SAP had some arguably positive effects in the short term and long term, though less so, on the overall economy, the long-term effects specific to the agricultural sector were limited to certain export-focused raw materials like cocoa and timber while other areas, such as the tomato sector, that were aimed at providing food for Ghanaians were disregarded in favor of imports. This resulted in long-term negative effects on the tomato industry which is shown through the closing of the factories. The experience of the Ghanaian tomato industry in this case shows the unintended consequences of structural adjustment policies on a local scale. It represents an industry that was not prepared infrastructure-wise to compete with foreign and private interests in its own markets as well as one that was given very little support in efforts to compete with those interests. In the following decades, as industries began to feel those unintended consequences, the introduction of the EPA would lessen their abilities to compete even further.

# Chapter 4

## *An invisible hand is the EU's playground*: The Ghanaian experience with its Economic Partnership Agreement

The Yaoundé Convention that had given former EEC colonies preferential access to the EEC's markets was updated once in 1965, but in 1975 the Georgetown Agreement and the Lomé convention were signed.[1] These agreements came following the oil crisis of the early 1970s as many of the ACP countries relied on oil or another singular export to support their economies.[2] The Lomé Convention introduced the Export Earnings Stabilisation System which provided a sense of security to those nations. In 1995 Ghana became a founding member of another supranational organization, the WTO, and was thereby "bound by the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) which … makes the use of non-tariff barriers illegal and obliged developing countries to reduce the average of bound tariffs for agricultural tariff lines by 24 percent from 1995 to 2004."[3] However, even though the ceiling for Ghanaian tomato paste imports was technically 99%, Ghana maintained tariffs for imported tomatoes at only 20% while tariffs for imported tomato paste were even lower at 10% because tomato paste was not considered a finished product.[4]

Following 4 subsequent revisions, the Cotonou Agreement replaced the Lomé Convention in 2000. The policies under the Yaoundé Convention and the Lomé Convention that had previously ensured that the ACP countries would be allowed to import their products to the

---

[1] "History of ACP - EU relations," ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, accessed February 24, 2023, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/acp/en/about/history.
[2] "History of ACP - EU relations," ACP-EU Joint parliamentary Assembly.
[3] Mohammed Issah, "RIGHT TO FOOD OF TOMATO AND POULTRY FARMERS: Report of an investigative mission to Ghana," Foodfirst Information and Action Network, Nov. (2007): 8.
[4] Dennis Baffour-Awuah, "Put tomato processing in the hands of farmers," Love for Science, April 11, 2020, https://loveforscience.com/2020/04/11/put-tomato-processing-in-the-hands-of-farmers/.

EEC without duty fees while still maintaining their own duties toward EEC products, the relationship preferential treatment refers to, were eventually ended under the Cotonou Agreement which was meant to usher the ACP countries into forming EPAs with the EU.[5] From the years 2001 to 2007, the ACP countries would continue to receive "duty-free treatment on nonagricultural, processed agricultural, and fishery products" from the EEC which became known as the EU following the signing of the Maastricht treaty in 1992.[6] However, when this agreement came to an end in 2008, that treatment would cease and Ghana and the other ACP countries' "unilateral preferences [would] be replaced by reciprocal economic partnership agreements (EPAs) between the EC and individual ACP countries or groups of countries."[7]

For Ghana, negotiations for an EPA with the EU began in 2002. Five years later, in 2007, the interim EPA between Ghana and the EU was signed. In theory, the EPAs were supposed to be negotiated between the EU and regional groupings of the ACP countries, and the regional group that Ghana belongs to is the West African region. Negotiations between the West African countries through their organization, ECOWAS, began two years after Ghana's own negotiations. In order for a region to negotiate an EPA with the EU, it had to have a common external tariff (CET), meaning that the region maintains the same tariff levels for trade with countries in and outside the region.[8] ECOWAS's CET was agreed upon and signed on January 12, 2006 and went into effect on the first day of 2008. Under this agreement, the tariff for processed tomato products stayed at 20%, the level it was previously under the WTO agreement,

[5] "History of ACP - EU relations," ACP-EU Joint parliamentary Assembly.
[6] WTO Secretariat, *Trade policy review: Report by the Secretariat: Ghana*, (World Trade Organisation, May 17, 2022, Report No. WT/TPR/S/427), 17, retrieved from https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=Q:/WT/TPR/S194R1-02.pdf&Open=True.
[7] WTO Secretariat, *Trade policy review*, 17.
[8] Issah, 9.

but the option to increase the tariff level as needed was no longer available.[9] While Ghana was able to agree with the EU on terms for their EPA, other nations in ECOWAS found it more difficult to reach an understanding with the EU as the 16 countries had very different circumstances.[10] In fact, the official EPA between the EU and ECOWAS, which was initially agreed upon and opened for signature by all members in 2014, never technically went into effect. However, Ghana signed its own interim Economic Partnership Agreement (iEPA) with the EU on December 13, 2007 as Ghana either would not have qualified for many of the other trade deals available, and the industrial development that spurred from the ERP was contingent on increasing exports of "non-traditional" products that would not have been covered under any other agreement available.[11]

The main goals for the iEPA are clearly laid out in a communication brief from the Republic of Ghana's Ministry of Trade and Industry:

> • Duty-free quota-free access to the EU for all imports from Ghana except arms and ammunition.
> • Asymmetric and gradual opening of 80% of Ghana's market to EU goods, taking full account of the differences in levels of development between Ghana and EU.
> • Commitment by the EU and its Member States to fund the EPA Development Programme (EPADP).
> • Strengthening of administrative and customs cooperation to facilitate trade development.
> • Prohibition of export taxes
> • Trade defence with bilateral safeguards allowing each party to reintroduce duties or quotas if imports of the other party disturb or threaten to disturb their economy.
> • Safeguards for food security.
> • Sanitary and PhytoSanitary (SPS) measures to help Ghanaian exporters meet EU import standards.[12]

[9] Issah, 9.
[10] "History of ACP - EU relations," ACP-EU Joint parliamentary Assembly.
[11] Gbedoah Richard, "Trading Preferentially: An Analysis of Ghana- European Union (EU) Trade under the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA)" (master's thesis, KDI School of Public Policy and Management, 2016), 26-32, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3106442.
[12] European Commission, "Interim Economic Partnership Agreement between Ghana and the European Union - Factsheet," dist. by the European Commission, 2.

While efforts aimed at closing the "food deficit" in Ghana were unsuccessful in the 1960s and 1970s, the same cannot be said for the European efforts aimed at feeding their population.[13] The European CAP that was created in 1962 overperformed in the decades following its creation so much so that it became known as "one of the most protectionist regimes in the world," and after many attempts in the "1970s and 80s to reduce agricultural expenditure and surplus production," the MacSharry reform of 1992, "the first major reform of the CAP," aimed to "[cut] back guaranteed agricultural prices and [restrict] the overall CAP budget."[14] Although this reform "was generally regarded as successful," further pressure by the WTO forced the EU to make more reforms in the 2000s, and in 2003, there was an intense reform of the CAP that aimed to "make EU farmers more competitive and market orientated, while providing the necessary income stability" while "Severing the link between subsidies and production."[15] Regarding tomatoes, the Common Market Organization (CMO), the "framework for the market measures provided for under the CAP," specific to processed tomatoes and other similar products was created in 1978 and was organized so that "growers were subsidised through the processing industry."[16] After being reformed in 2001 so that instead of going through the processing industry, they went directly to farmers, the EU began heavily subsidizing Italian "tomato production" in 2001.[17] However, regardless of the reform, "Both the 1978 and the 2001 subsidy schemes are associated with substantial overproduction."[18]

---

[13] Government of Ghana, *Seven*, 56-57.
[14] Eric Davies, "Information Guide: Common Agricultural Policy," European Sources Online, Cardiff University Press, 4, 2013, http://aei.pitt.edu/75450/3/Common-Agricultural-Policy.pdf.
[15] Davies, 4, 6.
[16] Frank Bunte and Pim Roza, *Peeling tomato paste subsidies: The impact of a revision of the CMO for processing tomatoes on European horticulture*, (The Hague: LEI, 2007), 9.
[17] Bunte, 9; Mathilde Auvillain and Stefano Liberti, "The Dark Side of the Italian Tomato," Aljazeera, accessed September 4, 2022: https://webapps.aljazeera.net/aje/custom/2014/italiantomato/index.HTML.
[18] Bunte, 9.

Similar to how Ghana was in a compromising situation in the early 1980s leading up to the signing of the ERP, Ghana also had little choice but to sign the new EPA with the EU. A large part of the country's GDP was dependent on the export of materials like cocoa and timber, and without an EPA, Ghana would lose a large part of that revenue that the country was so reliant on. Additionally, since the food gap had not been properly addressed, Ghana was still importing large amounts of foodstuffs as well as other products that were not able to be manufactured at home. Not only was it necessary for Ghana to maintain good trade relations for the country's own exporting sectors, but it was also important for Ghana to be able to import things such as food for its people seeing as the country was unable to produce enough for its people.

The effects of structural adjustment from the 1980s from the previous chapter left the tomato industry without the three factories mentioned in the previous chapter that had supported the tomato farmers for decades. According to the 4th installment of the Ghana Living Standard Survey for the years 1998 to 1999, of the 40% of people that lived in poverty in Ghana at the time, 70% were farmers of food crops.[19] According to the same farmer mentioned in the last chapter, by this time, the "Market Queens" had stopped coming to his farm, instead favoring cheaper, imported tomatoes from Burkina Faso, and without the factories that had supported him and his family in the past, there was no choice for him but to switch to other crops while many others chose to leave farming altogether.[20] Despite the benefit they provided to the farmers the reason that the factories closed was due in large part to the lack of a steady stream of tomatoes

---

[19] ABK, "What led to the closure of Pwalugu Tomato Factory?" News Ghana, December 14, 2015, https://newsghana.com.gh/what-led-to-the-closure-of-pwalugu-tomato-factory/.
[20] Nyamekye, 233; JoyNews, "Pwalugu Tomato Factory now a 'ghost house' - The Pulse on JoyNews (16-10-18)," Youtube, October 16, 2018, news video, 1:10 to 3:40, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UmqlUG_fhqQ.

as, depending on market conditions, farmers could usually find a trader that would pay a higher price than the factory.[21] The factories could not compete. However, once the factories closed, the tomatoes that would have been sold to factories were instead sold at markets which in turn became flooded once again.

At the same time, the ERP introduced the popularization of private investment partnerships with the Ghanaian government as a common way to invest in many industries. By 2007, the Pwalugu factory was reopened through private investments and renamed the Northern Star Tomato Company Limited. However, anything that was produced in the factory was sold directly to another processing factory located in Tema called Trusty Foods Limited which was partnered with a larger Italian company named Italian AR Industrie Alimentari S.P.A.[22] Not only did Trusty Foods buy previously processed tomato products from the Pwalugu factory, but the company was also one of the factories that imported tomato paste from other countries such as China in large amounts.[23] The reason that this became such a popular practice for Ghanaian tomato factories, the majority of which were owned in some part by foreign companies, to import and repackage tomato paste products was because doing so ensured their products would be able to compete.[24] As mentioned above, despite the WTO's 99% tariff ceiling, the tariff for tomatoes in Ghana even before the EPA was 20% while tomato paste was even lower at 10%. It was cheaper for the factories to pay to import foreign tomato paste to repackage with their brand than it was to pay local farmers for their crops, so the Ghanaian farmers did not see the benefits

---

[21] "Defunct Wenchi tomato factory to be revived," GhanaWeb, April 30, 2015, https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/business/Defunct-Wenchi-tomato-factory-to-be-revived-272594.
[22] Issah, 12.
[23] Issah, 12.
[24] Cephas Larbi, "Ghana's new Tomato Processing Factory," GhanaWeb, August 24, 2015, https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/Ghana-s-new-Tomato-Processing-Factory-377314.

from those schemes.

Despite receiving investments and government support two years after reopening in 2009, the Northern Star plant closed once again in 2011.[25] A large part of the problem was that the 3 vacuum seal machines necessary to store excess tomato puree during peak tomato in order to support the factory in the off season were broken and had never been replaced.[26] As for the Wenchi factory, another public-private partnership was formed between the Ghanaian Ministry of Forestry and Agriculture and Ghanaian and German private companies to re-open the factory in 2006. As previously mentioned, in its prime, the factory had employed over 1000 people, but following its reopening, it employed less than 200 people.[27] However, the plant was not even in operation for a year before closing once again in 2007.[28]

The EPA took Ghana and other developing nations' abilities to set and control their own import tariffs away. Of course, this led to an influx of all products, including processed tomato paste, in the decades directly following the SAP fallout, not that its effects cease to play a role. The relaunch failures of those factories exemplified both the causes and the effects of the deterioration of the Ghanaian tomato market as they pertained to tomato farming communities. The CAP was lowering production costs for Italian tomato farmers and therefore tomato factories by providing subsidies that led to an excess supply of tomato paste that Italian companies could afford to dumb cheaply into the markets of countries like Ghana. In Ghana, the factories that did manage to compete on a local scale would use technicalities in WTO and later

---

[25] ABK, "What led to the closure of Pwalugu Tomato Factory?"
[26] "Northern Star Tomato Factory: The vision must flourish," GBN, October 19, 2012, https://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2012/10/19/northern-star-tomato-factory-the-vision-must-flourish/.
[27] Francis Owusu-Ansah, "Wenchi Chiefs call for revival of tomato processing factory," The Chronicle, April 21, 2021, https://thechronicle.com.gh/wenchi-chiefs-call-for-revival-of-tomato-processing-factory/.
[28] Emmanuel Frimpong Boamah and James Sumberg, "The long overhang of bad decisions in agro-industrial development: Sugar and tomato paste in Ghana," *Food Policy* 89, no. 101786 (2019): 6.

EPA trade policy to import those cheap, processed tomatoes from places like China and Italy that they would then resell on local levels. This meant that they were not buying from local producers nearly as much as the Nkrumah era factories had while they were simultaneously crowding Ghanaian markets with cheaply produced tomato products. The Ghanaian farmers could not consistently sell to factories or traders who preferred tomatoes from Burkina Faso either. In fact, in more recent years, Ghana has begun to import over $99.5 million worth of tomatoes each year from Burkina Faso alone.[29] The tomato farmers grew increasingly exposed to markets following the ERP, but in the years leading up to and following the EPA signing, they became incredibly vulnerable to market fluctuations if they could even sell their tomatoes at all.

## Results and Discussion




Figure 4.1. "Import and Export Quantities of Tomato Paste: Ghana (1996-2021)," (from FAOSTAT).

[29] "Ghana imports 99.5 million worth of tomatoes every year from Burkina Faso," GBN, May 26, 2018, https://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2018/05/26/ghana-imports-99-5m-worth-of-tomatoes-every-year-from-burkina-faso/.




Figure 4.2. "Export Quantities of Tomato Paste: Ghana, Italy, and China (1996-2021)," (FAOSTAT).




Figure 4.3. "Import Quantities of Tomato Paste: Italy, China, and Ghana (1979-2021)," (from FAOSTAT).

Before 2014, the only truly significant years for export quantities of Ghanaian tomato paste were 2005 and 2007. After beginning to ascend in 2014, the numbers begin to fall back down. After an initial boost around the late 1980s, import quantities for tomato paste in Ghana began to rise more rapidly in 2003 before beginning to fall again in 2015 though they have yet to reach the levels they were before the 1980s. The quantity of tomato paste products Italy has exported has grown steadily since around 1980 until 2003 when that number dropped slightly only to jump even higher the next year though there was a bit of a dip between 2004 and 2018 though it did begin to rise again after. Italian imports of tomato paste products also saw a shift around 2004 before beginning to return toward their normal rates. However, they are slightly more up and down. Finally, as China became another foreign influence in the Ghanaian tomato market, it is important to note, China's import numbers began to increase quickly around the year 2000, and they began falling slowly around the year 2012. The notable years when referencing China's import behaviors regarding tomatoes are around 2003 to 2004, 2007 to 2008, and the years around 2014.

Before analyzing the interesting trends between the three countries' industries, the fact that the highest number regarding Ghanaian exports is just short of 12,000 tonnes while the highest for Italy is over 750,000 tonnes and China's highest almost reaches 1.2 million tonnes shows that competition within the export market is not a logistically sound goal for Ghanaian producers. However, Ghana's tomato paste exports do increase a few times in the years leading up to the EPA signing in 2007. In fact, 2007 most successful year listed for Ghana at 11,988 tonnes of tomato paste exported. Following the EPA, Ghana's exports continue to rise before beginning to flatten out in the years leading up to 2020. It's reasonable to assume that Covid could have played some role in negative results that year as China and Italy both experienced drops in exports those years as well, but their losses were nowhere near as dramatic.

In regards to imports, Ghana's first increase in the late 1980s can be drawn to newly liberalized markets from structural adjustment. Both China and Italy's imports do rise over time similar to Ghana, but the difference between Ghana and the other two countries is the sheer amount of tonnes of tomato paste that Ghana imports. In the highest year of imports recorded for Ghana, 2013, the country imported around 110,000 tonnes of tomato paste while it exported less than 4000 tonnes. In 2004, Italy imported over 350,000 tonnes, but its exports more than doubled that measure at over 750,000 tonnes. China had an even better ratio in 2013, the year it imported the most, 32,500 tonnes, when it exported over a million tonnes.

The debates within the existing literature covered in Chapter 1 stem from whether or not economic theory that states revenue losses from lower tariffs will be made up from revenue gains due to growing exports is actually applicable to developing economies. Some scholars like Winters, McCulloch, and McKay argue in favor of that theory, and others like Zouhon-Bi and Nielsen agree with them based on the added stipulation that "product exclusions" be included. However, tomatoes were included as Ghana's accepted product exclusions, and the rate stayed at what it had been set at before the signing of the EPA. In this case, the fact that tomatoes were considered to be excluded from total liberalization did not help the industry in the long run. Some scholars such as Acheampong, Omane-Achamfuor, and Tawiah say that the EU should work with governments on shifting insufficient rates, while others like Persson argue that the EU had not given any support outside of strict financial compensation that the lower rates would not work. Some like Mcqueen go so far as to question the logic that assumes an industry or economy that had not prospered with protective tariff rates would somehow prosper without them.

Those debates are all seen in the Ghanaian tomato case. The industry was not prospering before the EPA as evidenced by its export rates and the history of those 3 tomato processing plants that had all closed in the late 1980s. With the influx of all of the Italian and later Chinese processed tomato products after the EPA, there was very little chance that the industry would compete at all in the export sector. In the local markets, the cheap tomato paste left no room in the market for more expensive Ghanaian tomato paste, nor did it exist to only challenge processed products as eventually, tomato paste was preferred by many over even fresh tomatoes. Being able to shift the tariff rates based on the sector's performance might have been helpful to the Ghanaian tomato industry, but even then, considering the low production costs of the sector's competitors, a very large shift in the rate would be necessary to provide meaningful support which is not likely under the EPA that Ghana signed.

## Conclusion

The EPA was created between Ghana and the EU over years leading up to the end of the long-standing period where Ghana and other ACP countries were given preferential tariff rates. Even with those preferential rates that allowed Ghana to set import tariffs as high as it needed to protect its local producers like the tomato farmers, those sectors were not succeeding as they should have. The effects mentioned in the previous chapter from the ERP combined with the lack of infrastructure and institutional support left the tomato sector in a sad state of affairs. Many scholars thought that since economic theory promotes lower import tariffs in exchange for an increase in export revenues, developing economies would implement this on the large and small scale. However, the Ghanaian tomato industry's experience in the years after the implementation of the EPA tell a different story.

Exports did increase, but they were nowhere near high enough to make a difference against Italy and China, the powerhouse producers. The data shows how stark the difference is between those two industries and the Ghanaian industry. The influx of tomato paste from those two countries that flooded the Ghanaian markets left no room for the Ghanaian farmers to compete in their own markets or abroad. The EU CAP allowed for the Italian tomato imports at the set 20% rate to be incredibly inexpensive to the point that there was no way for most Ghanaian farmers to compete. Therefore, this chapter has shown that the tariff reforms implemented by the EPA along with the EU's CAP related Italian tomato subsidies resulted in an incredibly hostile market that Ghanaian producers were not able to compete in. This result shows how the industries of crops or other goods that operate primarily in domestic markets can be affected by trade liberalization policies like the EPA. Increasing exports to account for revenue loss on imports due to tariff liberalization might work on the macroeconomic scale, but for sectors that rely heavily on local markets, the influx of imported goods could force local industries out of their markets just as the Ghanaian farmers were. On a microeconomic scale, the economic theory is not compatible with the reality of a subsistence farmer

## Conclusion:

### *Lost in the [tomato] sauce*

The existing literature regarding the effects of neoliberal economic policies pushed by supranational organizations revolve around their macroeconomic effects. The same could be said for the literature regarding the effects of trade liberalization agreements. Both topics lack a significant amount of information regarding the effects of each on a microeconomic level, regardless of macroeconomic performance, but the gap that this thesis aimed to begin filling is the microeconomic effects of neoliberal economic policies that are followed shortly after by intense trade liberalization agreements.

This thesis aims to begin to fill that gap by using the Ghanaian tomato industry as a case study because it was affected by both development policy the IMF and World Bank structural adjustment policies and trade liberalization from EU trade agreements. This thesis aimed to prove that the IMF, the World Bank, and the EU used their positions as supranational actors to promote policy in Ghana that detrimentally affected the ability of Ghanaian tomato farmers to compete within their domestic tomato industry. The tomato industry in Ghana was fair to use as a case study on how a domestically focused industry would be affected by policies aimed at macroeconomic indicators. Before liberalization, tomato production was done to feed communities and those in Ghanaian cities through Ghanaian traders. While the Ghanaian cocoa industry was always oriented towards exports, the tomato industry was designed and geared towards local needs.

In order to study how the Ghanaian tomato industry was affected by supranational policy, import and export data regarding tomatoes in Ghana and other relevant countries such as China and Italy were analyzed within historical and theoretical contexts to allow for nuance and to account for confounding factors. By contextualizing the political and economic backgrounds before and during the implementation of the IMF and World Bank led ERP and the agreement to the EU's EPA, this thesis was able to connect significant changes in tomato import and export data to specific policy implementations regarding the ERP and the EPA. The stories of the tomato factories that have been significant to the Ghanaian tomato industry since the 1960s provided a way to show how those changes affected the tomato industry on the local level given the absence of more detailed, regional empirical data.

This thesis found that the supranational policy studied had a very significant effect on the ability of Ghanaian farmers to compete within Ghanaian markets. Following the implementation of the ERP and its market liberalization policies, three previously state-funded tomato factories that had acted as a safety net to farmers for decades by purchasing tomatoes that would have otherwise gone to waste closed due to a lack private investment. While the ERP pushed funding toward popular agricultural exports, its market liberalization policies opened the door for an influx of imported tomatoes and processed tomato paste. The domestically focused tomato industry was left at the mercy of the markets which soon began to flood without factories to absorb the excess. In the following decades, as the Ghanaian government partnered with private, foreign companies in attempts to reopen the factories, it became clear that the factories could not even compete with traders' prices. Paying higher prices to farmers was not an option because, even with low prices, their products could not compete with Italian companies that could produce and import tomato paste while still maintaining lower production costs due to the EU's CAP subsidies and EPA tariff limits.

Essentially, this thesis concluded that policies implemented by the ERP damaged the vitality of the Ghanaian tomato market and introduced liberalized markets to an industry that was not compatible with such a framework. Once the EPA anchored tariff limits to levels that allowed CAP subsidized Italian tomato products to flood Ghanaian markets, there was little that the farmers could realistically do to compete. Therefore, the IMF, the World Bank, and the EU implemented policies through the implementation of the ERP and the EPA that detrimentally affected the ability of Ghanaian tomato farmers to compete within their domestic markets.

This case study exemplified the inability of domestically focused industries to cope with the introduction of supranational policy in the form of neoliberal economic policy and trade liberalization. Theories that these policies should increase exports and benefit countries in a macroeconomic sense may be true, and in many cases like Ghana, there are very few other viable options to take in the face of economic collapse. However, the way that domestically focused industries are structured is incompatible with the framework that is necessary to compete in the context of global markets.

# Bibliography

ABK. “What led to the closure of Pwalugu Tomato Factory?” News Ghana. December 14, 2015. https://newsghana.com.gh/what-led-to-the-closure-of-pwalugu-tomato-factory/.

Acheampong, Theophilus, Michael Omane-Achamfuor, and Nii Anang Tawiah. "The economic partnership agreement between Ghana and the European union: a developmental game changer?" MPRA Paper 66232, Ghana Growth and Development Platform, 2014. https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/66232/1/MPRA_paper_66232.pdf.

Ackah, Charles and Ernest Aryeetey, eds. “Ghana’s Trade Policies Between 1957 and 1983.” In *Globalization, Trade and Poverty in Ghana*. Legon-Accra, Ghana: Sub-Saharan Publishers, 2012. https://www.idrc.ca/sites/default/files/openebooks/736-0/index.html#ch02tab5.

ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly. “History of ACP - EU relations.” European Parliament. Accessed February 23, 2023, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/acp/en/about/history.

Addo-Fening, Robert. “Ghana under colonial rule: An outline of the early period and the interwar years.” *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana* 1, no. 15 (2013): 39–70.

Aghajanzadeh-Darzi, Parisa, Cecilia Bellora, Jean-Christophe Bureau, and Anaïs Goburdhun. “Assessing EU Trade Preferences for Developing Countries' Development and Food Security.” FOODSECURE Working paper no. 35, European Union, 2015. https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/285278.

Ali, Biiya Mukusah. “Revive Wenchi Tomato Processing Factory – Traditional Council.” Graphic Online. April 9, 2022. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/revive-wenchi-tomato-processing-factory-traditional-council.html.

Anarfi, John, Stephen Kwankye, Emmanuel O. Ababio, and Richmond Tiemoko. “Migration From and To Ghana: A Background Paper.” Working Paper No. C4, Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty, Brighton, 2010. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/253408103_Migration_From_and_To_Ghana_A_Background_Paper.

Auvillain, Mathilde, and Stefano Liberti. “The Dark Side of the Italian Tomato.” Aljazeera. Accessed September 4, 2022. https://webapps.aljazeera.net/aje/custom/2014/italiantomato/index.HTML.

Baffour-Awuah, Dennis. “Put tomato processing in the hands of farmers.” Love for Science. April 11, 2020. https://loveforscience.com/2020/04/11/put-tomato-processing-in-the-hands-of-farmers/.

Bello, Walden. “Global Economic Counterrevolution: How Northern Economic Warfare Devastates the South.” In *50 years is enough: the case against the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund*, edited by Kevin Danaher, 14-19. Boston, MA: South End Press, 1944.

Benin, Samuel. “Public Expenditure on Agriculture and its Impact.” In *Ghana's Economic and Agricultural Transformation: Past Performance and Future Prospects*, edited by Xinshen Diao, Peter Hazell, Shashidhara Kolavalli and Danielle Resnick, 170-209. New York, NY: International Food Policy Research Institute and Oxford University Press, 2019.

Berry, Sara. “Tomatoes, land and hearsay: Property and history in asante in the time of structural adjustment.” *World Development* 25, no. 8 (1997): 1225-1241..

Bhaduri, Amit. “Some Unconventional Implications of Conventional Stabilization Policies.” *Indian Economic Review* 27, (1992): 129–34.

Biney, Ama B. “Kwame Nkrumah: An Intellectual Biography.” PhD diss., SOAS University of London, 2007. ProQuest (10672987).

Boamah, Emmanuel Frimpong and James Sumberg. “The long overhang of bad decisions in agro-industrial development: Sugar and tomato paste in Ghana.” *Food Policy* 89, no. 101786 ( 2019): 1-10.

Bonga-Bonga Lumengo and Ferdinand Ahiakpor. “Assessing the Detreminants of Economic Growth in Ghana.” *The Journal of Developing Areas* 50, no. 4 (Fall 2016): 153-172.

Britwum, Akua O. “Post-Independence Development Planning in Ghana and Tanzania: Agriculture, Women and Nation-Building.” *Africa Development / Afrique et Développement* 47, no. 1 (2022): 105–34.

Frank Bunte and Pim Roza. *Peeling tomato paste subsidies: The impact of a revision of the CMO for processing tomatoes on European horticulture*. The Hague: LEI: 2007.

Christiaensen, Luc, Lionel Demery, and Stefano Paternostro. *Growth, Distribution, and Poverty in Africa: Messages from the 1990s*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank: 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15215.

Davies, Eric. “Information Guide: Common Agricultural Policy.” European Sources Online, Cardiff University Press, 2013. http://aei.pitt.edu/75450/3/Common-Agricultural-Policy.pdf.

Dollar, David, and Jakob Svensson. “What Explains the Success or Failure of Structural Adjustment Programmes?” *The Economic Journal* 110, no. 466 (2000): 894–917.

Edwards, Sebastian. “The International Monetary Fund and the Developing Countries: A Critical Evaluation.” Working paper, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1989.

English, Edward Philip. “Recovery is not Enough - the Case of Ghana (English).” Working Paper No. 37149, The World Bank Group, Washington, D.C., July 5, 2005. https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/856421468249923809.

European Commission. “Interim Economic Partnership Agreement between Ghana and the European Union - Factsheet.” Distributed by the European Commission. https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/february/tradoc_155314.pdf.

European Union. “History of the European Union 1945-59.” European Commission. Accessed February 23, 2023. https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/history-eu/1945-59_en.

—. “History of the European Union 1960-69.” European Commission. Accessed February 23, 2023. https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/history-eu/1960-69_en.

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. *Export Quantities of Tomato Paste – Ghana, Italy, and China (1996-2021)*. Distributed by FAOSTAT Statistical Database. Accessed February 21, 2023. https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QCL.

—. *Import and Export Quantities of Tomato Paste – Ghana (1996-2021)*. Distributed by FAOSTAT Statistical Database. Accessed February 21, 2023. https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QCL.

—. *Import Quantities of Tomato Paste – Ghana Italy, and China (1979-2021)*. Distributed by FAOSTAT Statistical Database. Accessed September 15, 2023. https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QCL.

—. *Import Quantity of Tomato Paste – Ghana (1961-2000)*. Distributed by FAOSTAT Statistical Database. Accessed September 15, 2023. https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QCL.

Forin, Roberto. “The Tomato Conundrum.” Mixed Migration Centre. September 13, 2018. https://mixedmigration.org/articles/the-tomato-conundrum/#.

Fridell, Gavin. "The Case against Cheap Bananas: Lessons from the EU-Caribbean Banana Agreement." *Critical Sociology* 37, no. 3 (2011): 285-307.

Gebe, Boni Yao. "Ghana's Foreign Policy at Independence and Implications for the 1966 Coup D'État." *The Journal of Pan African Studies (Online)* 2, no. 3 (March 2008): 160-186. http://jpanafrican.org/docs/vol2no3/GhanasForeignPolicyAtIndependenceAnd.pdf.

Gelb, Alan H., and World Bank. *Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?* Washington, D.C.: World Bank Publications, 2000.

Gerits, Frank. “Anticolonial capitalism: How Ghana came to embrace market-led development theory (the 1970s-1990s).” *Southern Journal for Contemporary History* 47, no. 1 (2022): 4-26.

Ghana Business News. “Northern Star Tomato Factory: The vision must flourish.” October 19 2012. https://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2012/10/19/northern-star-tomato-factory-the-vision-must-flourish/.

—. “Ghana imports $99.5m worth of tomatoes every year from Burkina Faso.” May 26, 2018, https://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2018/05/26/ghana-imports-99-5m-worth-of-tomatoes-every-year-from-burkina-faso/.

Ghana Statistical Service. *Ghana Living Standards Survey Round 7: Poverty Trends in Ghana - 2005-2017*. Accra: Ghana Statistical Service, 2018. https://www2.statsghana.gov.gh/docfiles/publications/GLSS7/Poverty%20Profile%20Report_2005%20-%202017.pdf.

GhanaWeb. “Defunct Wenchi tomato factory to be revived.” April 30, 2015. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/business/Defunct-Wenchi-tomato-factory-to-be-revived-272594.

Ghizoni, Sandra K. “Creation of the Bretton Woods System.” Federal Reserve History. Last modified November 22, 2013. https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/bretton-woods-created.

Gocking, Roger. *The History of Ghana*. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2005. ProQuest Ebook Central.

Gold, Joseph. "The Relationship between the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank." *Creighton Law Review* 15, no. 2 (1982): 499-521.

Government of Ghana, Office of the Planning Commission. *Seven-Year Plan for National Reconstruction and Development: Financial Years 1963/4-1969/70*. Accra: Office of the Planning Commission, 1964. https://ndpc.gov.gh/media/Ghana_7_Year_Development_Plan_1963-4_1969-70_1964.pdf.

Heidhues, Franz, and Gideon A. Obare. "Lessons from Structural Adjustment Programmes and their Effects in Africa." *Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture* 50, no. 1 (2011): 55-64.

Herbst, Jeffrey. “Ghana in Economic Crisis.” In *The Politics of Reform in Ghana, 1982-1991*, 17–37. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993. http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft2199n7n7/.

Hutchful, Eboe. “Macroeconomic Policy & Performance.” In *Ghana's adjustment experience: The paradox of reform*, 53-66. Oxford, James Currey Ltd., 2002.

International Monetary Fund. “Ghana: IMF Program Helps Restore Luster to a Rising Star in Africa.” IMF. May, 2019. https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/GHA/ghana-lending-case-study.

—. “IMF Staff Completes Seventh ECF Review Visit to Ghana.” IMF Press Release, September 27, 2018. https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/09/27/pr18364-imf-staff-completes-seventh-ecf-review-visit-to-ghana.

Issah, Mohammed. “RIGHT TO FOOD OF TOMATO AND POULTRY FARMERS: Report of an investigative mission to Ghana.” Foodfirst Information and Action Network. November, 2007.

Jones, Tobias and Ayo Awokoya. “Are your tinned tomatoes picked by slave labour?: How the Italian mafia makes millions by exploiting migrants.” The Guardian. June 20, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/20/tomatoes-italy-mafia-migrant-labour-modern-slavery.

JoyNews. “Pwalugu Tomato Factory now a ‘ghost house’ - The Pulse on JoyNews (16-10-18).” Youtube video, 7:32. October 16, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UmqlUG_fhqQ.

Kraus, Jon. "The Struggle Over Structural Adjustment in Ghana." *Africa Today* 38, no. 4 (Fourth, 1991): 19-37.

Konadu-Agyemang, Kwadwo. “The Best of Times and the Worst of Times: Structural Adjustment Programs and Uneven Development in Africa: The Case of Ghana.” *The Professional Geographer* 52, no. 3 (August 2000): 469-483.

Lambert, Keri. “‘It’s All Work and Happiness on The Farms’: Agricultural Development between The Blocs in Nkrumah’s Ghana.” *The Journal of African History* 60, no. 1 (2019): 25–44.

Larbi, Cephas. “Ghana’s new Tomato Processing Factory,” GhanaWeb. August 24, 2015, https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/Ghana-s-new-Tomato-Processing-Factory-377314.

Loxley, John. “Structural Adjustment in Africa: Reflections on Ghana and Zambia.” *Review of African Political Economy,* no. 47 (1990): 8–27.

Mahadevan, R. and J. Asafu-Adjaye. "The Implications of European Union Sugar Price Cuts, Economic Partnership Agreement, and Development Aid for Fiji." *Contemporary Economic Policy* 28, no. 1 (2010): 52-64.

Manchin, Miriam. "Preference Utilisation and Tariff Reduction in EU Imports from ACP Countries." *World Economy* 29, no. 9 (2006): 1243-1266.

McQueen, Mathew. "The EU's Free Trade Agreement with Developing Countries: A Case of Wishful Thinking?" *The World Economy* 25, no. 9 (2002): 1369–1385.

Meilink, Henk. “Structural adjustment programmes on the African continent : the theoretical foundations of IMF/World Bank reform policies.” ACS Working Paper no. 53, African Studies Center, Leiden, NL., December 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/1887/9458.

Missing Migrants Project. “Migration Within Africa.” International Organization for Migration. Accessed February 23, 2023. https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/africa.

—. “Migration Within the Mediterranean.” International Organization for Migration. Accessed February 23, 2023. https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/mediterranean.

The New Humanitarian. 2009. “Plummeting Profits Drive Tomato Farmers to Suicide.” Accessed April 25, 2022. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/83980/ghana-plummeting-profits-drive-tomato-farmers-suicide.

Nkrumah, Kwame. *The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah*. Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons LTD, 1957.

Nowak, Wioletta. “Development of the Polak Model.” *Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics* 2, no. 1 (2014): 28–35.

Nyamekye, Theresa A. A. “Production Efficiency and Building Marketing Strategies for Smallholder Tomato Farmers in the Adaklu Anyigbe District of Ghana: Linear Programming and Parametric Linear Programming Approach.” *Journal of Developments in Sustainable Agriculture* 6, no. 2 (2011): 230-237.

Nyomakwa-Obimpeh, James. "Explaining the Outcomes of Negotiations of Economic Partnership Agreements between the European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Regional Economic Communities: Comparing Eu-Cariforum and Eu-Ecowas Epas." PhD diss., The University of Edinburgh, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/22996.

Owusu-Ansah, Francis. “Wenchi Chiefs call for revival of tomato processing factory.” The Chronicle. April 21, 2021. https://thechronicle.com.gh/wenchi-chiefs-call-for-revival-of-tomato-processing-factory/.

“Partnership in Africa: the Yaounde Association.” *Community Topics* 26, European Community Information Service, 1966.

Persson, Maria. “EPA and Fiscal Transition in ECOWAS Countries.” Master’s thesis, Lund University, Sweden, 2009.

Persson, Maria and Fredrik Wilhelmsson. "Assessing the Effects of EU Trade Preferences for Developing Countries." Working paper no. 2006:4, Lund University Department of Economics, Revised June 26, 2006. http://ideas.repec.org/p/hhs/lunewp/2006_004.html.

The Republic of Ghana. "Economic Recovery Program 1984-1986." Volume I. Accra-Tema, Ghana: Ghana Publishing Corporation, October 1983.

—. "Economic Recovery Program 1984-1986." Volume II. Accra-Tema, Ghana: Ghana Publishing Corporation, October 1983.

Rich, Bruce. "World Bank/IMF: 50 Years Is Enough." In *50 years is enough: the case against the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund*, edited by Kevin Danaher, 6–13. Boston, MA: South End Press, 1944.

Richard, Gbedoah. "Trading Preferentially: An Analysis of Ghana- European Union (EU) Trade under the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA)." Master's thesis, KDI School of Public Policy and Management, 2016. 26-32, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3106442.

Robinson, Elizabeth J.Z., and Shashi L. Kolavalli. "The Case of Tomato in Ghana: Institutional Support." GSSP Working Paper No. 22, Institute for Poverty and Land Research Group, Accra, April 23, 2010. https://gssp.ifpri.info/files/2010/08/gsspwp221.pdf.

Rooney, David. "Lurch to the Left." In *Kwame Nkrumah. Vision and Tragedy*, 236–250. Ghana: Sub-Saharan Publishers, 1988.

Torvikey, Gertrude D. "Ghanaian Tomato Producers and Traders Struggle with the State under Covid-19." Institute for Poverty, Land, and Agrarian Studies. Last modified May 14, 2021. https://www.plaas.org.za/ghanaian-tomato-producers-and-traders-struggle-with-the-state-under-covid-19/.

United States, Department of State (Ed.). *United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference: Bretton Woods, Final act and related documents*. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1944. http://www.cvce.eu/obj/final_act_of_the_bretton_woods_conference_22_july_1944-en-2520351c-0e91-4399- af63-69e4b33ef17a.html.

United States, Department of Treasury. *Articles of Agreement, International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development*. Washington, DC: US Treasury, July, 1944. https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=7JVQAQAAMAAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA19&dq=International+Bank+for+Reconstruction+and+development+articles+of+agreement&ots=aaSGQcLjof&sig=5JsBZNCywM2zo-d9RnR3r3RXbIY#v=onepage&q=International%20Bank%20for%20Reconstruction%20and%20development%20articles%20of%20agreement&f=false.

Weissman, Stephen R. “Structural Adjustment in Africa: Insights from the Experiences of Ghana and Senegal.” *World Development* 18, no. 12 (1990): 1621-1634.

Winters, L. Alan, Neil McCulloch, and Andrew McKay. "Trade Liberalization and Poverty: The Evidence So Far." *Journal of Economic Literature* 42, no. 1 (March 2004): 72-115.

Woods, Ngaire. “The Globalising Mission.” In *The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and Their Borrowers*, 1st ed., 38–64. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006.

—. “Whose Institutions?” In *The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and Their Borrowers*, 1st ed., 15–38. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006.

World Bank. *Adjustment in Africa: reforms, results, and the road ahead (English).* World Bank Policy Research Report. Washington, D.C.: Oxford University Press, 1994. https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/219981468192845881/adjustment-in-africa-reforms-results-and-the-road-ahead.

—. *Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) - Ghana 1960-2000.* Distributed by The World Bank Group. Accessed February 21, 2023. https://www.data.worldbank.org.

—. *Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) - Ghana 1965-2000*. Distributed by The World Bank Group. Accessed February 21, 2023. https://www.data.worldbank.org.

—. *GDP Growth (annual %) - Ghana 1978-2000*. Distributed by The World Bank Group. Accessed February 21, 2023. https://www.data.worldbank.org.

WTO Secretariat. *Trade policy review: Report by the Secretariat: Ghana.* (World Trade Organisation, May 17, 2022, Report No. WT/TPR/S/427). Retrieved from https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=Q:/WT/TPR/S194R1-02.pdf&Open=True.

Zouhon-Bi, Simplice G., and Lynge Nielsen. "ECOWAS–Fiscal revenue implications of the prospective Economic partnership agreement with the EU." Policy Research Working Paper no. WPS4266, World Bank Africa Region, Washington, D.C., April 2007, 1-55. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/145171468136788251/The-Economic-Community-of-West-African-States-fiscal-revenue-implications-of-the-prospective-economic-partnership-agreement-with-the-European-Union.