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Adversity to Action: A Case Study Analysis of Crisis Leadership

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ADVERSITY TO ACTION: A CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF CRISIS LEADERSHIP

by

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ABSTRACT

ISABELLE GRACE WEATHERINGTON: "Adversity to Action": A Case Study
Analysis of Crisis Leadership (Under the direction of Dr. Joseph Holland)

This thesis examines leadership through crisis contexts. I aim to answer two

research questions. (1) How do crisis management frameworks intersect with the

leadership strategies and characteristics of the person in charge? And (2) How must a

leader adapt their natural leadership style and characteristics according to the nature and

level of the crisis at hand to ensure leadership effectiveness? To answer these, a

comparative case study analysis was performed on the following cases: Winston

Churchill and World War II (Case one), George W. Bush and the September 11th, 2001

terrorist attacks (Case two), and Thad Allen and Hurricane Katrina (Case three). The

above studies were analyzed using Pearson and Mittroff's (1993) 4-variable crisis

management framework, specifically focusing on adaptability at each crisis phase.

Through analyzing the case studies, I found that during a crisis, certain traits, roles, and

behaviors become more relevant to leadership. Adaptability, coalition-building, strong,

consistent messaging, confident decision-making, and promoting communication and

collaboration are the most important tools in a leader's toolbox during crisis.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The date is September 11th, 2001. President George W Bush is sitting in a 2nd-grade classroom at Emma E. Booker Elementary School in Sarasota, Florida. Bush is listening to the students complete their reading lesson when White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card steps next to the President to deliver a message: "A second plane hit the second tower. America is under attack" (*9/11: The Steel of American Resolve*, n.d.). Knowing he cannot acknowledge the situation, Bush sits quietly for the rest of the lesson. He has only a few minutes to gather his thoughts before addressing millions of Americans for the first time in a classroom next door.

In a fleeting moment, Bush switches from his day-to-day activities as President of the United States, advancing his educational policy agenda by visiting young school children, to responding to the millions of scared citizens looking to him as Commander-in-Chief for answers and solutions he does not have. President Bush must make a dramatic shift in his tone, demeanor, and leadership style. At this point, he switched from his natural leadership style to his crisis management leadership style. In times of crisis, effective leaders must employ unique strategies divergent from those they routinely employ, highlighting the dynamic nature of leading and influencing by circumstance. In this thesis, a fundamental framework for effective crisis leadership can be identified by recognizing shared strengths and behaviors exhibited throughout each phase of a crisis. While leaders are all unique and have varying strengths and weaknesses,

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certain key behaviors and traits appear more relevant to successful crisis leadership. These behaviors amplified during a crisis include adaptability, coalition-building, strong, consistent messaging, confident decision-making, and promoting communication and collaboration.

Leadership can be defined in simple terms as the act of influencing people and organizations toward common goals (Vroom & Jago, 2007). From a role as simple as a sports team captain to high-profile positions such as diplomats and Presidents, the core of leadership is the same: leaders work to shape their followers' actions and principles to achieve growth and progress toward collective goals and aspirations. However, the idea of leadership is, in reality, much more profound. Leadership is highly circumstantial. Many consider leadership to be solid and unchanging; however, the situations leaders and followers encounter make their experience much more fluid. Organizational goals can evolve as smaller steps of a big goal or change entirely to be goals oriented towards fixing a problem that stands in the way of the overarching aspirations of the organization. Leadership can only be defined in a grey area, and among the many factors that characterize the topic (environment, followers, leadership styles, organizational structure, relationships, etc.,) the circumstance and level of crisis the leader faces must also be considered.

For the purpose of this paper, a crisis is defined as an intense difficulty or threat that affects the fundamental operations of a leader's country or followership, imposing an increased level of risk. A crisis or disaster requires urgent and careful decision-making and has a high possibility of negative consequences (Riggio & Newstead, 2023). The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) defines a "large-scale disaster" as an

event that has resulted in extensive property damage, deaths, and injuries that exceeds the response capability of the local jurisdiction and requires assistance from a higher authority (*Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning*, 1996). A number of variables play a part in each emergency, such as the number of people involved, whether it is domestic or international, acute or ongoing, etc. A leader must be adaptable and navigate their response, even though it is impossible to plan for every possible variable and unknown situation.

The most important variable of a crisis situation is the response of the followers. This is because the followers are how one gets the title of leader: "leadership can only occur if there is followership—without followers and following behaviors, there is no leadership" (Uhl-Bien et al., 2014). While leaders have the power to build the crisis response the way they see fit, they must do so in a way that maintains trust and camaraderie with their followership. Using the 2020 COVID-19 Pandemic as an example, there was an unprecedented emotional response to the initial stages of the pandemic, including feelings of panic and denial (Jo Nurse, 2023). These "deeply maladaptive" responses from citizens worsened the external effects of the pandemic, like economic decline and social isolation. (Jo Nurse, 2023, p. 38). With mixed messages from different countries, politicians, health officials, and news anchors, it is understandable that many people experienced confusion and reacted in fear in the face of the pandemic. "The leader's challenge during a crisis is to inform the public effectively of known risks, and how to avoid them, without inciting panic" (Kahn, 2020, p. 142). A strong leader must act quickly to quell the fears of the public and confidently share their vision to solve the problem before emotions get in the way.

A successful response to any crisis is follower-centric. It is vital that the focus of a leader is on gaining and maintaining the trust of their followers. It is not enough to be trustworthy; leaders must show they deserve the belief their followers have placed in them by growing a culture of trust and accountability (Covey, 2022, p. 114). This level of trust is vital when all eyes are on the leader in question to handle a high-stakes situation. Leaders must carefully curate their communication with their followers to ensure trust is built. Leadership strategies to build trust include communicating humbly and showing compassion (Soderberg & Romney, 2022).

Previous literature has sought to understand leadership in the context of multiple theories, strategies, and styles. The studies have thus far failed to report on the challenges that leaders in high-level crises face compared to those who are leading under less stressful circumstances in their organization. Leaders handling large-scale problems must employ different strategies to influence their followers and continue progress, compared to leaders completing their everyday work. Current research identifies many potential leadership theories, but very few acknowledge the differences in circumstance from one leader to the next. The situation of a country or organization is critical when evaluating the performance and actions of a leader.

The following questions can fill this aforementioned research gap:

(1) How do crisis management frameworks intersect with the leadership strategies and characteristics of the person in charge? Furthermore,

(2) How must a leader adapt their natural leadership style and characteristics according to the nature and level of the crisis at hand to ensure leadership effectiveness?

These questions can help us understand how emergent situations often require a modification in behavior from both leaders and followers.

The proposed research will contribute to the current academic body of work on the topic of leadership by building upon Pearson and Mittroff's 1993 Crisis Management Framework. Utilizing this framework, a comparative case study analysis will be performed. The 4-point framework will be analyzed in conjunction with an adaptive leadership theory. The policymakers chosen for the case studies each handled high-profile crises successfully during their time in office. The case studies were chosen for several factors, including the various time periods where the events took place, the high-profile nature of the event, and the abundance of pre-existing literature and archival material on the events and leaders. The case studies included in this thesis are as follows: Winston Churchill and World War II, George Bush and 9/11, and lastly, Thad Allen and Hurricane Katrina. Each of these leaders' reactions and responses to high-level crises will be analyzed on how they adapted to each phase and variable of Pearson and Mitroff's Framework (1993).

The above framework will allow assessment of a leader's role in a crisis management situation and determine how the leader may adapt their leadership style through various phases of a crisis. In analyzing the study's results, I hope to create a profile of leadership effectiveness that can be applied in any number of situations beyond the habitual leadership styles utilized by leaders in non-crisis scenarios. Additionally, I hope to better understand leaders' past decisions, learn from mistakes, and streamline crisis management responses in the future.

Crisis Leadership is a vastly important and underrepresented topic. Most traditional leadership theories do not take into account the variables leaders face in a large-scale crisis. Understanding leadership and its implications on societies and public policy is vital for maximum effectiveness in crisis response. Crisis Management strategies and theories comprise a relatively new field, which has gained increased traction in recent years due to impending threats such as terrorism, increased prevalence of devastating weather-related events (Ebi et al., 2021), the likelihood of more global health-related events (Haileamlak, 2022), and more. Researchers are beginning to reflect on these preceding disasters and call for change to better prepare us for the future. More recently, with the COVID-19 Pandemic, there has been a renewed call for the government and private organizations to review and revise their existing crisis management protocols. In the wake of the crisis, local state and federal governments alike realized the need for systemic changes in their response to a crisis, evolving from an inefficient linear model to a model that can be applied flexibly to a fast-changing crisis scenario (OECD, 2020).

National and worldwide crises are impossible to avoid entirely. No matter how prepared a leader is or how extensive an organization's crisis-management plan is, there will always be unknowns and situations that slip through the cracks. What is important is the leader's ability to handle these unknowns. Wars, pandemics, economic depressions, and natural disasters are all woven like threads through our history. With the additional threats of terrorism, global environmental challenges, growing technological threats like artificial intelligence, and more, it is vital for elected leaders and policymakers to

understand how to communicate with their followers during unanticipated challenges like these.

In the next chapter, prominent literature on the evolution of traditional leadership theories (trait, behavioral, relational, situational) is reviewed to illustrate how each theory can be applied to the field of crisis management. Additionally, chapter two will introduce crisis management frameworks and other key topics relevant to the study. Chapter three describes the methodology of the study and builds an empirical framework for the analysis using Pearson and Mitroff's Crisis Management framework. Chapter four discusses the findings of the three case studies in detail, focusing on how each leader adapted their natural leadership styles to the particular circumstances and phases of the crisis they faced. Chapter five analyzes the outcome of the case studies and makes conclusions by comparing the case studies against each other.

Chapter II: Literature Review

While the academic study of leadership has only seen an increased interest within the last century, the concepts of leaders and followers can be traced as far back as ancient Egyptian hieroglyphs (Bass, 1981). Over the last several decades, many theories have emerged on the various facets of leadership. This literature review will take a thematic approach to analyzing current research on multiple key topics to summarize the field and provide a baseline for the remainder of the paper. The key topics include the evolution of leadership theories, crisis management strategies and frameworks, and previous works on the intersection of leadership strategies in the face of crisis.

Evolution of Leadership Theories

Over the last century, the idea of leadership began to develop and separate into various theories. As society grew and changed, so did the definition of a leader. Many of these theories are not separate entities but build off one another. Peter Northouse divides the prominent theories into five categories: trait theories, behavior theories, situational theories, relational theories, and new and emerging theories in his publication *Introduction to Leadership* (2021). Each year, more leadership theories are developed, but most of them can be traced back in the timeline of leadership evolution to one of these four umbrella theories. This section will survey the literature on each theory and analyze how these traditional theories apply to crisis management ideas.

Trait Theories

Beginning with the early stages of leadership research, the trait theories of leadership date back to the 19th century. Developed and popularized by Thomas Carlyle, trait theory was the first theory of leadership that remains popular today (Northouse, 2021). Trait leadership describes the inherent qualities of a person that make them a leader. It is the idea that we are either born with the capacity to lead or we are not (Northouse, 2021). Examples of traits pertinent to the trait theory of leadership include self-confidence, drive, charisma, conscientiousness, extraversion, etc. Nearly any positive trait found in historically relevant leaders that can be identified in people would qualify as a 'leadership trait' under trait theories. The trait theories of leadership only identified a list of common leadership attributes, it paid no attention to any change in circumstance that may affect the expression of these 'traits.'

Albert King thought trait theory models were "too simplistic," and they were eventually abandoned for theories with more clear-cut ideas (King, 1990, p. 46). Without a defined list of leadership characteristics, this theory leaves much to be desired in terms of application. A hypothesis of specific traits that influence leadership was needed to study trait leadership theories further. Many researchers turned to the Big Five Personality Traits model. Developed in 1949 by D.W. Fiske, the model measures extraversion, agreeableness, openness to experience, conscientiousness, and neuroticism (Fiske, 1949). Fiske's theory was initially hypothesized as a model to indicate correlations between personality traits and academic success. The Big Five trait model became a commonly referred to theory under the trait leadership theory umbrella.

Trait theories, including ones conforming to the Big Five model, show mixed results in empirical studies. One 2012 study that aimed to reconcile these mixed results found positive results in the extraversion and openness to experience traits and leadership when both self- and observer-rating methods were used rather than just one (Colbert et al., 2012).

In contrast, other empirical studies reported no significance of traits as leadership indicators (Brocato et al., 2011). In *Do Voters Get it Right? A Test of the ascription-actuality Trait Theory of Leadership with Political Elites* written by Madeleine Wyatt and Jo Silvester in 2018, an empirical study was conducted to test a correlation between leadership traits and leadership emergence and effectiveness for elected political leaders. The study found that while certain personality traits could be associated with political emergence, the Big Five Personality Traits did not correlate with leadership effectiveness (Wyatt & Silvester, 2018). Despite hundreds of studies on the subject, there remains no concrete consensus in the field about whether traits prove significant indicators of leadership. Some believe this is because trait-based theories are based on what people consider essential leadership traits rather than traits with demonstrated efficacy in leadership (Englebert & Wallgren, 2016).

While the trait theories of leadership have primarily been replaced by newer methods that are more likely to apply to a modern organization, some researchers still think there may be some merit to the trait theory when it comes to leading in crisis. In a 2011 study measuring traits of influential crisis leaders, a survey was taken of emergency planning field experts with at least 20 years of experience. Survey participants were given a list of leadership qualities and asked to identify those most critical for crisis leadership.

72% of respondents indicated the ability to remain calm, 67% indicated decisiveness, and 65% indicated adaptiveness as a quality of an effective crisis leader (Murawski, 2011). Notably, the same survey had only 55% of respondents mark experience, and only 47% considered collaboration as an essential trait for crisis leaders.

Other leadership theories along the lines of trait leadership include the "Great Man" theory (Carlyle, 1840) and emotional intelligence (Salovey & Mayer, 1990).

Behavior Theories

Following trait leadership came behavior-based leadership theories around the 1950s (Benmira, 2021). These theories focus on the actions and behaviors of leaders and how they can be modeled for others, hence the name. Proponents of behavioral leadership theories denounce the idea that leaders must be born with innate qualities to have leadership capacity; instead, they believe that the behaviors exhibited by leaders can be modeled and copied by others (Northouse, 2021). Therefore, anyone can learn to be a leader; they only need to act like one.

Behavioral theories split positive leader behaviors into categories to describe specific types of leaders. A common behavioral taxonomy suggests that leaders can be Task-oriented (clarifying, planning, monitoring, problem-solving), Relations-oriented (supporting, recognizing, developing, empowering), or Change-oriented (innovative, advocating for change, facilitating collective learning) (Yukl, 2012). There are many taxonomies for behavioral leadership theories, each slightly different from the next. Theories that fall under this umbrella include Theory X vs. Theory Y (McGregor, 1960), Transformational vs. Transactional Leadership (Bass et al., 1987), or multi-factor models,

including one developed in 2003, which includes directive and empowering leadership behavior types in addition to the two suggested by Bass (Pearce et al., 2003).

Derue et al. found in a 2011 study found that leadership behaviors were more indicative of leadership effectiveness than leadership traits when conducting a meta-analysis. However, the same study recognized the potential for integrating the two theories, noting that personality traits likely influence leader behaviors (Derue et al., 2011). Conversely, a study by Edwin Fleishman and Edwin Harris found connections between leadership behavior and employee grievances and turnover. Leaders who scored very low in consideration behaviors (trust behaviors, two-way communication, warmth, respect, etc.) and higher in structure behaviors (planning, task assignment, managing production, etc.) had increased negative group outcomes (Fleishman & Harris, 1962).

Critics of the behavioral approach believe its application to be limited, preferring models that include multiple indicators for leadership effectiveness. David Day found behavioral leadership theory limited in its scope, focusing mainly on training leaders to mimic the behaviors and actions of those who came before them to solve known issues. Day argues that contemporary leaders often face unprecedented and complex problems where there is no prior model of successful behavior (Day, 2014).

Looking at behaviors through a crisis management lens, some studies have suggested potential positive behaviors of crisis management teams while actively dealing with a crisis. A study on crisis management teams' response to COVID-19 critical incidents identified effective behaviors of managing an organization in crisis, including creating and maintaining structure, making quick binding decisions, prioritization and goal-oriented action, anticipating problems, and assigning responsibilities (Thielsch et al.,

2020). A different study tested the effects of directive leadership behaviors (giving instructions, taking charge) vs. participative leadership behaviors (allowing the group to express ideas and take on responsibility independently) on decision speed in crisis management. The teams with directive leaders had faster decision times in both familiar and unfamiliar emergent situations (Post et al., 2022). This is a significant finding, as quick decision-making could make a difference in a time-sensitive crisis.

Researchers are split on whether behavioral leadership theories can stand independently or if effective leadership behaviors can be explained better by personality, situation, or other looming theories.

Situational Theories

The model of Situational Leadership, developed by Dr. Paul Hersey and Dr. Ken Blanchard in 1969, provided a more fluid take on the definition of leadership. In Situational Leadership theory, a leader adapts his or her leadership style to best match the situation and followers involved (Northouse, 2021). King's *Evolution of Leadership Theory* article states, "The Situation era made a significant step forward in advancing leadership theory by acknowledging the importance of factors beyond the leaders and the subordinate" (King, 1990, p. 47).

The model gives a sliding scale of directive and supportive behaviors to allow leaders to customize their style. Directive behaviors are focused on building competency while supporting behaviors are focused on building attitude. The result is four styles of leadership (High Directive/Low Support, High Directive/High Support, Low Directive/High Support, Low Directive/Low Support), each with a corresponding level of follower maturity or performance readiness (Hersey & Blanchard, 1969). This is the first

theory developed that focuses more on the followers than the leaders themselves, as people employing the situational leadership theory can adjust which of the four styles to use based on each individual's actions, strengths, and competency level. Critics of the model question its validity due to the lack of empirical research (Northouse, 2007).

An offshoot of situational leadership is adaptive leadership. The model was developed in 1998 by Dr. Ronald Heifetz in his book *Leadership without Easy Answers*. This framework is particularly applicable to crisis leadership because it is specifically geared towards leading through an "adaptive challenge" or, as Heifetz states, "when the application of known methods and procedures will not suffice" (Heifetz, 1998, p. 125). Unlike the Situational Leadership model, which suggests changing leadership style and behaviors based on follower competency and motivation, Adaptive Leadership suggests changing leadership style and behavior based on the dynamic environment.

Victor Vroom and Arthur Jago agree with the above theorists that the situation does affect leadership. They identified the roles a situation plays as follows: organizational effectiveness is affected by situations outside of leader control, situations shape leader behavior, and situations influence consequences of leader behavior (Vroom & Jago, 2007). This way of thinking challenges situational and adaptive leadership theories by proposing that most situational variables are beyond the leader's control, and even adaptable leadership will not affect the organizational outcomes (Vroom & Jago, 2007).

Other common situational leadership theories include the contingency model of leadership effectiveness, which states that leadership style is difficult to change, so

leaders should be chosen to take charge in situations best suited for their leadership style (Fielder, 1964).

It is easy to see how situational leadership theories apply in crisis. When a crisis hits, it involves a change in the status quo and environment, and often, difficult decisions need to be made, as seen in the adaptive leadership model. Followers may need adjustments in the level of directing or supporting behaviors exhibited by their leader to adjust to a crisis, which is a direct application of the Situational Leadership Model.

Relational Theories

Relational leadership theories came more recently. They emerged in the 1990s as an offshoot of popular behavioral leadership theories. This theory finds that those who prioritize making and maintaining relationships during their leadership have better leadership outcomes. Proponents of this theory believe that those with a better personal relationship and understanding between leader and follower will interact better in the workplace (Northouse, 2021). This particular theory examines the power structure of a typical leader-follower relationship. Relational leaders would be attuned to the needs and expectations of their followers, show empathy and genuine care for the personal well-being of their followers, and be open to listening and hearing everyone's point of view (Northouse, 2021).

One particular relational leadership theory, charismatic leadership, appeals to followers' emotions to elicit a positive response (Sy et al., 2018). In a crisis, public response and perception are a vital component of management. These charismatic leaders inspire trust in their relationships with followers, making them more inclined to follow directions and listen to safety guidelines in a crisis.

While relationships have been proven to be an essential aspect of leadership, they are far from the only facet of successfully running an organization. As established in the behavior theories of leadership section, most leader behaviors that are effective internally within an organization during a crisis are directive or task-based. However, research suggests that citizens expect empathy, compassion, and flexibility from leaders after a crisis (Margheritti, 2023). These are considered relational behaviors.

Crisis Management

Crisis management aims to prevent crises from reoccurring and mitigate their adverse effects (Crandall et al., 2009). The overarching field goes beyond leadership to encompass the whole structure of the organization and all of its interactions. The purpose of the field is to inspire organizations to put strategic plans in place to handle unknown, high-risk situations efficiently and with as little resulting damage as possible.

A large part of the study of crisis management is preparation for crises and mitigation strategies that work to diffuse a crisis before it begins. Unfortunately, many leaders do not attempt to prepare their organizations for crisis situations and even go as far as to ignore warning signs of an impending disaster (Boin & Lagadec, 2000). Crisis management frameworks have identified steps that can be taken to minimize risk and damage following a crisis event if the organization puts them in place. Examples of these behaviors include Creating a strategic crisis management plan, creating a crisis task force, providing crisis training, improving communication chains, etc. (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993).

The frameworks and theories of Crisis Management would be meaningless without indicators for success and failure. The following is a definition of Crisis

Management success provided by Allan McConnel: "A crisis management initiative is successful if it follows pre-anticipated and/or relevant processes and involves the taking of decisions which have the effect of minimising loss of life/damage, restoring order and achieving political goals, while attracting universal or near universal support and/no or virtually no opposition" (McConnel, 2011, p. 68). McConnel describes success as a sliding scale, with his definition being the ideal 'durable' form of success.

Framework

Many frameworks seek to explain the necessary steps of crisis management to predict success. The article *From Crisis Prone to Crisis Prepared: A Framework for Crisis Management*, was published in 1993 by Christine Pearson and Ian Mitroff. The study develops a framework for crisis management based on the crisis response procedures and results of over 200 companies. This framework was initially developed to evaluate the crisis preparedness and capabilities of organizations in the business sector.

Pearson and Mitroff's framework (1993) details four specific variables for crisis management: the Type of crisis, which is any of the different crises an organization could face; the Phases of a crisis; the Systems in place to help mitigate the crisis; and Stakeholders, which is everyone affected by the crisis in any way.

Variable 1 is Types, which is simply the specific type of crisis faced. The authors recognize that the types of crises faced are 'limitless,' but in an attempt to categorize them, they created a scale. In this framework, crises are assigned a location on the Technological/Economic vs. Human/Social axis, which intersects a scale of Severe vs Normal. The following figure gives examples of which crisis types would fall under each quadrant of the axes.

Figure 1

Crisis Types

Technical/Economic

External Economic Attacks

Extortion
Bribery
Boycotts
Hostile Takeovers

External Information Attacks

Copyright Infringement
Loss of Information
Counterfeiting
Rumors

Mega Damage

Environmental Accidents

Effect   Cause

Breaks

Recalls
Product Defects
Plant Defects
Computer Breakdowns
Poor Operator/Errors
Poor Security

Occupational Health Diseases

Severe   Normal

Psycho

Terrorism
Copycats
On-site Sabotage/Tampering
Off-site Sabotage/Tampering
Executive Kidnappings
Sexual Harassment
Rumors

Perceptual

Damage to Reputation

Human/Social

Exhibit 1

Source: (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993)

The Types variable, according to Pearson and Mitroff (1993), is defined by the cause of the crisis. This means if an event were to register on the scale as a human or social crisis, the main cause of the crisis must be attributed to human actions; in the case of a technical or economic crisis, the crisis is caused by monetary constraints or systems outside of human control. The horizontal axis of Normal vs. Severe is explained simply by the definitions. Severe crises are farther reaching and create more damage, while a normal crisis is something that could be encountered on a 'normal' day.

Variable 2 is Phases. This refers to the five phases of crisis management shown above in Figure 1 and specific actions to be taken in each phase. Phase 1 is Signal

Detection. This is the first sign of trouble that a crisis may be inevitable. This stage could be a number of things, including radar information on weather events, initial signs of an impending market crash, or even expert opinions warning of trouble, like in the case of the Challenger explosion (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993). Phase 2 is Prevention and Preparation. These are any steps of mitigation you can take before the onset of the crisis after you receive a warning to lessen the damage caused. Actions in this phase will vary widely based on variable 1. Examples could include setting up relief teams, initiating crisis training, informing the public, setting up weather shelters, etc. If Phase 1 and Phase 2 are done exceptionally well, the organization may be able to avoid crises altogether. Sometimes, even given an organization's best efforts, a crisis is inevitable. This variable looks at a crisis as a process that must go through every phase of the cycle to be complete.

That leads to Phase 3, which is Containment and Damage Limitation. Any actions taken during this phase are to contain the current crisis and prevent it from worsening. After the crisis event has passed, phase four, Recovery, focuses on getting back to normal operations and handling residual and secondary effects. Lastly, phase 5 refers to the Learning stage. In this stage, the leaders of an organization or government can reflect on their response to a crisis and learn from their mistakes. Crisis management plans may be updated and refined for a better response at the next crisis event. The Phases variable in Pearson and Mitroff's framework looks at a crisis event as a process where each step must be passed through in order to move on.

Figure 2

The Five Phases of Crisis Management

Signal Detection → Preparation/ Prevention → Containment/ Damage Limitation → Recovery

Learning

Exhibit 3

Source: (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993)

Variable 3 is Systems, which refers to the organization's resources available at any crisis stage. Pearson and Mitroff separate the systems variable into five parts: (a) technical, (b) human factor, (c) infrastructural, (d) cultural, and (e) emotional/belief. This variable looks into each of the five sub-variables affect on the crisis and how they can be managed (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993).

Lastly, Variable 4 is Stakeholders. These are the people in play at any stage of the crisis. They can be both internally involved in the response or simply a bystander. Everyone in this category has the ability to make a crisis more likely or to mitigate it. Examples could include business or political competition, news outlets, employees, management, etc. "Organizations which are well prepared recognize that a crisis has the potential to affect not only themselves but the broadest array of potential stakeholders: consumers, competitors, suppliers, and members of the general environment" (Pearson & Mitroff, p. 57, 1993). This variable also considers stakeholders as the archetypal roles to

be cast in any crisis. Those outside looking in need to identify the villains, the heroes, the victims, the allies, etc, to perceive the situation in their own way.

Most competing frameworks only provide the phase variable as a way to explain crisis management, or the framework will only include 3 or 4 phase steps, like the Prepare, Execute, Recover, Repeat framework for Crisis Management (Cole & Verbinnen, 2022). This is opposed to the five we see in Pearson and Mitroff's framework. The fifth phase of crisis, according to their framework, the Learning phase, is a strength of their framework over the others. No other major framework includes a phase of the crisis to reflect and improve on crisis management plans before the next inevitable crisis occurs. With the growing number and intensity of sensational crises, it is vital that organizations never stop learning and preparing.

Related Studies

Crisis Leadership is a vastly under-researched topic. Very few studies have sought to determine what makes an effective crisis leader. Preliminary research on the topic has indicated that there may be a connection between crisis leadership and emotional intelligence (Yuste, 2021). Many traits associated with emotional intelligence (influence, problem-solving, assertiveness, social responsibility) can assist in leading during a crisis.

A study similar to this research paper is the development of the C-LEAD scale for crisis leadership. Based on leader characteristics, the study aimed to create a framework that predicted crisis leader efficacy and crisis motivation and performance for public health and safety crises (Hadley et al., 2011). The study found that scoring high in C-LEAD items had a significant correlation with confidently making difficult crisis decisions (Hadley et al., 2011).

Another study, titled *Leading in the Paradoxical World of Crises: How Leaders Navigate Through Crises,* examined the complex paradoxes leaders face that are necessary to get an organization out of a crisis. The researchers claim: "Given the mindset that a crisis is a highly contradictory situation, our participants adapted their behavior by relying heavily on paradoxical leadership behaviors to meet these opposing requirements" (Förster et al., 2022). Through extensive interviews, the study identified three paradox pairs of crisis leadership: (1) Strategic v. Operational thinking, the paradox of being required to think strategically long-term about the effects of the crisis, coupled with the operational thinking required to solve an acute problem at present, (2) Optimism vs. Realism, or the challenge to stay positive and keep followers motivated while keeping a realistic viewpoint about the situation's negative aspects, and (3) Rationality vs. Intuitiveness, the paradox between acting based on previous solutions but remaining open and adapting to new information (Förster et al., 2022).

The above theories can all be used to piece together a mosaic of the ideal crisis leadership response, depending on the leader and the details of the crisis. In the subsequent chapters of this paper, the research methodology and case studies will be analyzed and discussed.

Chapter III: Methodology

There are many different contexts of leadership, from small businesses to large international organizations, from well-defined internal activity to activity that demands collaboration across organizational boundaries, and from routine day-to-day operations to crisis. It is in this last context, in a time of crisis, when a leader's behaviors and actions can be viewed most critically. Although leadership styles vary widely, a fundamental framework for effective crisis leadership can be identified by recognizing shared strengths and behaviors exhibited throughout each phase of a crisis.

This chapter introduces the research method for the qualitative case study comparative analysis of the necessary adaptations a leader must make during times of crisis. This study seeks to answer the following research questions:

(1) How do crisis management frameworks intersect with the leadership strategies and characteristics of the person in charge?

(2) How must a leader adapt their natural leadership style and characteristics according to the nature and level of the crisis at hand to ensure leadership effectiveness? This chapter will justify the use of a comparative case study analysis, discuss the research design, data collection, and analysis methods, and discuss the scope of the research as well as its validity and any limitations.

Research Design

　　The approach of this study is fundamentally qualitative. By observing the reactions and responses of several leaders in a high-level crisis context and examining the results of their leadership actions, I intend to identify areas where each leader excelled in their crisis response and where they may have faltered. Additionally, the research aims to illustrate how each leader adapted their behaviors and actions to mitigate a crisis and whether these adaptations enhanced leadership effectiveness. The study will utilize Pearson and Mitroff's Crisis Management Framework (1993). Initially, this framework was developed to evaluate the level of crisis preparedness of business sector organizations. However, for the purpose of this study, the framework will be adapted to compare the crisis response of three leaders recognized as successful in crises.

　　A comparative case study analysis will be performed to satisfy these research aims. This strategy follows a top-down deductive approach by testing the hypothesis against three chosen case study subjects. A comparative Case Study Analysis is a sufficient approach to answer the research questions as it can account for historical, cultural, social, political, and economic factors (Vavrus & Bartlett, 2022), making it ideal for social research. The Case Study Analysis design also allows for a multi-faceted exploration of a complex issue (Crowe et al., 2011), such as leadership, where many factors and contexts coexist.

　　A longitudinal time horizon is necessary to capture the adaptations of leaders in crisis adequately. Each case study subject will be thoroughly observed and analyzed in each of the 5 phases of crisis as denoted by Pearson and Mitroff's framework (1993). This

will more accurately depict the timeline for leadership adaptations and behaviors in each stage of a crisis and will allow for a more straightforward presentation of results.

Case Selection

The number of potential case studies to examine is prohibitively large—it is simply not possible to conduct a qualitative analysis of the entire body of evidence related to leadership in crisis. In addition, individual cases will vary significantly in context: different historical periods, different cultures, the significance of the crisis, the relationship of various actors in the crisis, and more. For these reasons, the selection of cases is critical to the research outcome.

The research analyzes three case studies: (1) Winston Churchill during World War II, (2) George Bush and 9/11, and (3) Thad Allen after Hurricane Katrina. These cases were selected for the study using the following criteria: (A) Case subjects must have held a position of power and influence during at least one crisis phase (B) Crisis must fit FEMA's definition of a "large-scale disaster" as outlined in chapter 1 (C) Cases must represent a variety of different crisis events; (D) Collectively, cases must remain culturally similar to each other in nature; and (E) Each case much have an adequate quantity of source material on the subject.

The first two criteria for case selection were added to streamline the broad definitions of leaders and crises. Criterion A states that case subjects must have held a position of power and influence during the crisis. While a position of power is not required for someone to exhibit leadership behaviors and strategies, it is required for this study. This is to enable research on crisis leadership in a government setting. Next, criterion B states that the subject crisis of each study must fit FEMA's definition of a

"large-scale disaster" as outlined in Chapter 1. By utilizing the FEMA definition, we can ensure each case has a sufficiently large enough impact to be compared as equals.

Cases were chosen with the idea that they are a representation of different crisis situations. Case one, Winston Churchill and World War II represents an International War; The case of George W. Bush and 9/11 represents a Terrorist Event; and lastly, the case of Thad Allen and Hurricane Katrina represents a Domestic Humanitarian Disaster. This variance in circumstance was designed purposefully to broaden the scope of research. By adding specific crisis situations as a variable, the study became representative of a larger pool of crisis leadership cases. This allows the results to be compared and contrasted without being confined to a singular type of crisis event.

Another pre-requisite of case selection was cultural similarity. One variable the research will not explore is the effect of cultural contexts on leadership and handling crises. Studies have discovered differences between cultures regarding leadership styles and behaviors (Smith et al., 1989). To limit any potential for cultural disconnects in the case study analysis, two of the three case study subjects are United States citizens handling a crisis in the United States. The second case study, Winston Churchill and World War II is from the United Kingdom, which has many cultural, political, and economic similarities to the United States in relation to their identification as a part of 'Western Civilization' (Mac, 2023). This reduces any potential cultural disconnects in the results that would have arisen had the selection of cases been more culturally diverse.

The last requirement for case selection was that the crisis had ample source material available for study. Each of the chosen cases is historically noteworthy enough to provide adequate primary and secondary source material, which is necessary for a

comparative case study analysis. This was an essential excluding factor, as conducting a case study with inadequate evidence will result in unreliable results.

Case study one is Winston Churchill and World War II. World War II lasted from 1939 to 1945, during ther last five years of which Churchill was British Prime Minister. During the war, Britain faced harsh conditions with economic problems, food rationing, and frequent air raids that left over 60,000 British citizens dead and thousands more injured (Imperial War Museums.) This case was chosen because of the leadership challenges of handling a domestic crisis during an international war. Churchill had to balance the care and interests of his constituents while leading the fight to end the war on the world stage.

Case study two is George Bush and 9/11. September 11th, 2001, was the instigating crisis that launched the U.S. Global War on Terror, which continued for several decades. Nearly 3,000 American civilians died in a terror attack directed at U.S. landmarks. Different from the first case, 9/11 is a single crisis event rather than a drawn-out timeline of a crisis. Additionally, President Bush had the added consideration of strong media presence and coverage when addressing the attack, altering the necessary adaptations of his leadership.

Case study three is Thad Allen and Hurricane Katrina. Admiral Thad Allen was placed in charge of the federal response to Hurricane Katrina on September 9th, 2005. The storm hit the Gulf Coast of the United States just days earlier and left devastation behind, killing approximately 1,300 people. This case was chosen because the Hurricane Katrina response is widely considered a failure, although Admiral Allen is often recognized for his capable leadership during the response. It was a catalyst for crisis

management research and spurred a renewed effort to modernize crisis planning in organizations and within the government. The leader in this study is the least recognized out of the three. The Katrina/Allen case met all case selection requirements, including ample primary and secondary source material.

Data Collection

The source material for the case studies was collected from archival data in the University of Mississippi Library databases. The content of archival documents and journals was analyzed for each of the three cases, including historical documents of each event and subject, leadership profiles and existing case studies, and primary source newspapers and interviews.

A wide variety of sources will be utilized for the case studies to inform a well-described crisis leadership profile for each case. Each case study will utilize historical sources to examine the circumstances surrounding the crisis event. These sources provide an extensive picture of the nature and timeline of the crisis and the leader's actions and gauge public reaction to leadership actions. Existing leadership profiles and case studies were gathered for further analysis and cross-checking research claims. Primary source data was collected from the three leaders through interviews and recorded speeches. This data gives insight into the minds and thought processes of the leaders themselves, which is a vital point of the study.

Data Analysis

The three chosen case studies will be analyzed against Pearson and Mitroff's 1993 Crisis Management framework. The framework was developed over the course of five years of research. Over 500 interviews were collected of individuals with crisis

management responsibility for their company, and large-scale surveys were conducted encompassing nearly every industry in both the private and public sectors. The results were a simple four-variable interdependent framework. The variables are Types, Phases, Systems, and Stakeholders. The aims of the framework were originally to identify crisis management strategies, study organizations that had prepared in advance for crises against those that had not, and identify a need for individualized crisis management protocols for organizations. Person and Mitroff's framework will be used in a different capacity for this study. Each case study will be analyzed and compared in all four variables, focusing heavily on variable two and their responses during each crisis phase.

This framework was chosen for multiple reasons. First, it is one of the more popular frameworks for crisis management; it builds upon earlier frameworks to create a model more applicable to the modern world. Second, the framework remains simple enough that it can be adapted to fit a wide variety of situations. While many crisis management frameworks, including Pearson & Mitroff's, were developed to apply to business and corporate situations, their design is broad enough to apply to government crises in our studies. Additionally, this framework considers outside factors and human perception, which is important for the leaders in the three case studies as all of their crisis events were very high profile and made very public. Lastly, it is the only crisis framework with the additional time phase after Recovery, Phase 5, the Learning phase. This phase is vital because organizations that have experienced a crisis of any kind are better equipped to handle it in the future (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993).

For analysis, the study will look at each of the variables of the case studies, paying particular attention to variable two: Phases. The leaders' overall responses,

behaviors, and actions will be analyzed critically through an adaptive leadership lens to see how each leader changed their leadership style over time to accommodate the changes of the crisis. These results will be compared to the remaining case studies. The data collected on each case will be synthesized with the remaining cases. Similarities and differences in each leader's response to crisis will be identified and discussed. Patterns, themes, and trends among the leader's responses will be identified and discussed in the results of the study. Additionally, discussion on a leader's ability or inability to adapt their natural leadership style at each phase of the crisis management framework will be used to draw conclusions on the broader theme of crisis leadership. The results of this analysis will be detailed in Chapter 5.

Validity and Limitations

Multiple techniques were used to ensure the validity of the following study. First, data triangulation was employed, which ensured that sources that differed in author and time were used for each case study. This provided multiple accounts of each case that were analyzed to present a complete, well-rounded picture of each leader and crisis event. Ideas on leadership are highly personal, so this tactic increases credibility and reliability by ensuring no researcher affects the study's results through their subjective views on leadership.

As with the vast majority of research studies, the above design is subject to limitations. While every effort was made during case selection to choose cases that are well-representative of the entire sample body of crisis leaders and situations, the study acknowledges the possibility of limitations due to sample size. With the limitless variables in a crisis situation, it can be assumed that this study may not be representative

of all of them. Due to the sheer size of the available sample, conducting a qualitative analysis of the entire collection of pertinent cases was not feasible. To minimize this limitation on the study's outcome, cases were selected purposefully with variations in time period and type of crisis event to make the results more representative of the pool of cases in which this research could be applied.

Additionally, it must be acknowledged that the nature of a qualitative case study analysis leaves room for interpretation by the researcher. The researcher's thoughts and observations are affected by their unique worldview and life experience. Their subjective reality is contributed to the research process and analysis of the studies.

Summary

The qualitative research methodology employed for this study revolves around a longitudinal comparative case study analysis approach. An in-depth analysis will be performed on three model cases of crisis leadership, giving extensive insight into the complexities and various contexts of leadership. Data will be derived from archival records, mainly document analysis of existing accounts and historical sources of the events and leaders that are the subject of the case studies. Each case was carefully chosen for its high-profile nature and its similarities and differences from the remaining cases. The resulting data will be analyzed using a combination of Pearson and Mitroff's Crisis Management Framework (1993) and an adaptive leadership model. The study emphasizes the unique strategies and adaptations required of leaders in dynamic crisis scenarios. In the next chapter, each of the three case studies will be discussed in depth, with particular consideration given to how the leaders adapted to the changing field in each crisis phase.

Chapter IV: Case Studies

The following three case studies are model examples of crisis leadership with ample existing research accounts. With a concept as complex and multifaceted as leadership, the research approach must be dynamic. Analyzing these cases gives real-world insight into the implications of the ever-changing crisis leadership theories.

Each subsequent case will briefly introduce case facts and statistics and discuss each of the four variables in Pearson and Mitroff's (1993) Crisis Management Framework. A table at the end of the chapter summarizes the findings as they relate to the framework.

Case I: Winston Churchill

The first case is Winston Churchill, who was named Prime Minister of Great Britain after the onslaught of World War II. The Library of Congress calls it the "largest international event of the 20th century" (*Research Guides: World War II: A Resource Guide: Introduction*, n.d.). The event owes its spot to the sheer number of lives lost, as well as the broad effects of the war on everyday life in Great Britain. The day-to-day lives of citizens were greatly affected, with over 60,000 civilian deaths, the harsh rationing of food, clothing, and household items, blackouts, air raids, and economic downturn (Imperial War Museums, n.d.). It is safe to say that the war affected every

aspect of life. The war officially lasted for six years, making it a unique leadership and military challenge.

This war quickly spiraled to crisis level due to a lack of preparedness by the British Government. The Appeasement policies of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain allowed the Nazi Party to grow stronger unchecked. Churchill was an outspoken and often controversial leader, never afraid to share his opinions whether to the benefit of or at the expense of his political career (Kershaw, 2022). After Prime Minister Chamberlain stepped down, Churchill stepped up. Historical profiles describe Churchill's leadership as "tailor made for the emergency conditions of the war" (Kershaw, p. 149, 2022). Churchill was authoritative, determined, and unrelenting; He never shied away from the brutal truth that Great Britain was facing a difficult battle they were unlikely to win (Sandys & Littman, 2003). During his time as Prime Minister, Churchill gave inspiring speeches and employed expert diplomacy. Though ultimate victory in the war rested on the contributions of many, Churchill's persistent voice certainly played a significant role in building and maintaining the coalition needed to win.

Type

The specific type of crisis faced is an International War. When applying Pearson and Mitroff's framework, World War II would fall on the severe side of the x-axis. For a crisis to be deemed 'normal' by the framework's standards, it must be an everyday occurrence that spiraled into crisis and is limited in severity (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993). An International War is not a regular occurrence, particularly a conflict of this magnitude and duration. This means that it certainly falls on the severe side of Pearson and Mitroff's (1993) crisis-type axis (Figure 1).

In alignment with Pearson and Mitroff's Framework, this case study must also be assigned a place on the Y-axis of the typology. The main causes of the war's devastation were due to human actions. The choices made by the people involved resulted in nuclear weapon usage, genocide, and bombings, among other things. Hitler and the Nazi revolution acted in a way incongruent with typical human behavior by invading Poland and continued to act this way for the duration of the war. Since Pearson and Mitroff's framework uses the cause of the crisis in order to define it in terms of type, this would place World War II on the Human and Social side of the axis.

Phases

Phase 1: Signal Detection. Throughout the 1930s, the Nazi Party of Germany grew stronger in political influence and followership. For most of the decade, Churchill had no official position within the government, yet he continued to publish books and articles (International Churchill Society, n.d.). Many of his published opinions centered on his warning that Great Britain should prepare the military against German forces and warning that the Nazi Party was growing too strong (*The Finest Hour - Churchill and the Great Republic*, n.d.). Several notable events occurred during this period, including the passage of the Enabling Act, which fortified Adolf Hitler's dictatorship; the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, which allowed the expansion of the German military; and the Munich Agreement, which gave Hitler more territorial control over the region.

The British government largely ignored Churchill's continuous warnings, with Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain opting instead to appease aggressors in hopes of avoiding a major war (Lellenberg, 1995). Churchill appealed to the German embassy about Nazi power before Hitler became dictator, lamented the Munich agreement in a

speech delivered to the House of Commons, and thoroughly condemned the entire Nazi movement throughout the decade. The British government chose not to heed Churchill's warnings in an effort to avoid war, but Churchill's beliefs finally became a reality when Nazi Germany invaded Poland on September 1st, 1939.

Phase 2: Preparation/Prevention. Phase 2 began on September 3rd, 1939, when Great Britain declared war. The same day, Winston Churchill was given the government title First Lord of Admiralty to advise the British Government on all naval affairs and naval war strategy (*The Finest Hour - Churchill and the Great Republic*, n.d.). This marks the start of the Preparation period as the war had just begun, and the British Government had much catching up to do in terms of catastrophe prevention after ignoring the growing threat of the Nazi Party for nearly a decade. During this period, Great Britain evaluated their defense strategies and built up military strength.

After France fell to Germany on May 10th, 1940, Churchill knew there was no longer time to prepare for war, as Britain would have to face German aggression in the near future. On the same day, Winston Churchill officially became Prime Minister of Great Britain. In a now-famous speech given to the House of Commons in the weeks after he stepped into his role, Churchill spoke of the inevitable war and the great responsibility that now fell to Great Britain:

> The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us.
> Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this Island or lose the
> war...But if we fail, then the whole world, including the United States,
> including all that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of
> a new Dark Age made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by the

lights of perverted science. Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties,

and so bear ourselves that, if the British Empire and its Commonwealth

last for a thousand years, men will still say, "This was their finest hour."

(*Their Finest Hour*, 2021).

Though Churchill's speech was grave, he seemed to greet the inevitability of the coming

conflict with a somber reality and the urgency of a great leader.

Phase 3: Containment/Damage Limitation. This phase signified active war

between Britain and Germany, now synonymous with the Nazi Party. Much of the

six-year timeline of World War II falls under the Containment and Damage Limitation

phase. For a large portion of the war, Britain was on the defensive. Trying desperately to

avoid an invasion from Germany, many actions were taken to try and mitigate the harm to

Great Britain.

The event that signaled the beginning of phase 3 was the beginning of the Battle

of Britain. One of Germany's most devastating tactics was the 'Blitzkrieg' or 'Lightning

war', which referred to the relentless air raids over Great Britain starting in August 1940

(Timeline of World War II, 2005). The attacks gave a grim outlook on the reality of the

British position in the war, but Churchill fulfilled his role as a leader stubbornly unwilling

to accept anything other than victory and inspiring his people to do the same; "In this

long, dark phase of the war it is difficult to imagine that any British politician could have

been capable of matching Churchills' ability to stimulate and uphold the will to fight"

(Kershaw, p. 160, 2022).

Churchill's involvement in strategic military decisions is only speculated. While

the decisions were his to make in his role as Prime Minister, there are rumors of

disagreements between Churchill and his many military advisors. While some early

defeats of the war could possibly be attributed to Churchill's stubbornness in choosing his

opinions over the actions recommended by others, there were times when his orders and

novel ideas gave Britain a great advantage. For example, Churchill decided to destroy the

French fleet of ships to prevent Hitler from attaining more naval power (Kershaw, 2022).

He is also credited with the idea for the Mulberry Harbours, floating concrete blocks to

protect supply ships that aided in several operations during the war, and he was a staunch

supporter of creating and managing a British air force that could challenge the Germans

(Kershaw, 2022).

Churchill's most vital contribution to the war was his diplomacy. Churchill knew

victory was unlikely unless the United States entered the war, and he relentlessly pursued

their involvement with President Roosevelt (Harvardi, 2010). Though the United States

did not formally join the war until 1941, after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the U.S. did

send supplies and aid at Churchill's request (Harvardi, 2010). After the United States

formally joined WWII, many of the vital decisions leading to the end of the war were

made between the alliance of Churchill, President Franklin Roosevelt of the United

States, and Prime Minister of the Soviet Union Joseph Stalin. Churchill's willingness to

make compromises and collaborate with the alliance was a vital show of leadership many

would not have expected from the leader, who was often described as self-confident,

opinionated, and authoritative.

Phase 4: Recovery. The war ended victoriously for the Allies on May 8th, 1945.

Churchill addressed the exhausted citizenry after six long years of fighting: "So we came

back after long months from the jaws of death, out of the mouth of hell, while all the

world wondered. When shall the reputation and faith of this generation of English men and women fail?" (*VE Day- 8 May 1945*, 2021). In his victory speech, Churchill made very little mention of the exhaustive recovery needed to return to pre-war Great Britain. Instead, he said that the job was not done and that Great Britain must continue to fight against Japan.

Winston Churchill was voted out of office a couple of months later. The public regarded him as a wartime leader, focusing too much of his efforts on foreign affairs rather than the recovery of Britain (Harvardi, 2010). Churchill was surprised by his defeat. His surprise shows his failure to adapt his leadership style to apply to the situation. "Britain, exhausted by six years of war and faced with rebuilding the country and economy, recognizes that the very traits which had made Churchill such an effective leader during conflict – his single-minded bulldog spirit – are unfit for times of recovery" (Mumford, 2021).

While Churchill no longer had an official role in government and could not aid Great Britain in its recovery from the war in that fashion, his tendency to focus on world affairs paid off when it came time for the recovery of international relations. Uniquely, in this case, the recovery period of the war occurred simultaneously with the crisis itself. Once Great Britain and their allies had turned the tide of the war in their favor, Churchill and Roosevelt had already begun thinking about what would happen after the war was over. Churchill's goals included enticing the United States to remain a part of world affairs and not to return to its pre-war isolationist policies (Ikenberry, 2001).

As early as 1941, Churchill began coming to Roosevelt with ideas of an international organization aimed at providing member nations security (Morris, 2013).

Roosevelt and Churchill fleshed out the details of this organization throughout the war. Churchill began advocating for a 'supreme security council' in 1943, which consisted of the United States, Great Britain, The Soviet Union, and China (Ikenberry, 2001). This idea became the backbone of the later created United Nations Security Council. In October of 1945, the United Nations had been officially created, an organization promising peace by social sanction (Morris, 2013). Churchill's role in establishing the UN cannot be understated, nor can the organization's role in the recovery of international relationships after the war and throughout its existence.

Phase 5: Learning. Since the end of the war in 1945, much has changed in the way many nations handle foreign policy and relations. We have all the lessons learned during World War II to thank for that. The UN General Assembly President, Sam Kutesa, said in a press conference commemorating the end of the war 70 years later: "We must never forget the international community's responsibility to stand up to tyrants, despots and all those that attempt to suppress the enduring nature of the human spirit" (United Nations General Assembly, 2015). Even 70 years later, the lessons of avoiding war and standing up to countries showing aggression remain fresh in the minds of policymakers. Winston Churchill can be thanked for his tireless effort to warn the world of the impending Nazi crisis before its onset and encourage Great Britain to ditch its appeasement policies to stand up to the aggressive German regime.

Systems

The main systems employed in this case are the infrastructural and cultural systems. Winston Churchill utilized every resource at his disposal to turn the tide of the war, even creating an Air defense branch of the royal military from scratch.

Culturally, Churchill appealed to countries with common cultural interests in defeating Germany. He skillfully worked with the Soviet Union and the United States, countries that shared common goals and interests in seeing Germany defeated. The three leaders each had to make sacrifices and compromises, knowing the best chance at winning the war came through collaboration between the Allied Powers. Additionally, Churchill used his spectacular public speaking abilities to appeal to the emotions of his country and inspire his citizens not to give up in the face of the difficult hardships that accompanied the war. His persistence and stubbornness to never give up trickled down from his position as a leader to his advisors, soldiers, and citizens.

Stakeholders

Looking through the archetypal lens described in Pearson and Mittroff's study, the major stakeholders in World War II would include British civilians as the victims, Axis Power government leaders as the villains, Axis Power soldiers as the enemies, and the Allied Powers as the Allies. There are infinitely more subgroups that may qualify themselves in some way as a stakeholder of WWII, including neutral states and British homefront volunteers, but the stakeholders listed previously are the most important, with the most considerable chance to impact the tide of the war. For this case study, British civilians are the undisputed victims since Winston Churchill was Great Britain's Prime Minister at the time of the war.

Case II: George W. Bush

Case two is George W. Bush, the United States President during the 9/11 terrorist attacks. On September 11th, 2001, 19 Al Qaeda terrorists boarded transcontinental flights on a suicide mission to send a message to the United States. The men hijacked four

commercial aircraft to fly at prominent U.S. symbols. Nearly 3,000 people were killed in the surprise attacks that would become the trigger of a decades-long War on Terror. Two of the four planes crashed into the North and South towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, while the other two planes headed toward Washington D.C., one crashing into the Pentagon and the other into a field in Pennsylvania after passengers fought to regain control of the aircraft.

Scholars note that President Bush was the first president to have an MBA and he chose to run the country like he would run a business (Pfiffner, 2007). Bush had to choose the specific leadership roles and tools he would use during recovery from the crisis, much like a CEO would have to. Key leadership trademarks of President Bush's style include a small, tight-knit group of advisors, fast, confident decision-making, and a tactical top-down management style (Pfiffner, 2007). Bush is applauded for bringing the country and its citizens together in the aftermath of the crisis, a historically difficult task. He became a rock for the entire nation, projecting a vision of strength, calm, and determination, feelings that trickled down to the rest of the country.

Type

The crisis faced in the George W. Bush case was a terrorist attack. This crisis lands at the intersection of Severe and Human/Social on Pearson and Mitroff's (1993) crisis-type indicator. On the Horizontal axis, the events of September 11th would fall within the 'severe' category because the trigger event was unexpected and not a regular occurrence that turned into a crisis scenario. Since the 9/11 attacks were not a typical event gone wrong but a highly lethal political statement with a "deviant cause," the event remains on the severe side of the crisis spectrum.

The crisis falls on the Human/Social side of the vertical axis. The crisis

framework assigns positions on the axis in relation to the initial cause of the crisis.

Therefore, since the initial cause of the crisis was abnormal human behavior and social

breakdown caused by extreme differences in culture and beliefs, the crisis is considered

on the right side, or the Human/Social side, of the spectrum.

Phases

This section follows a timeline compiled by the Final 9/11 Commission Report on

the incident.

Phase 1: Signal Detection. The 19 Al Qaeda hijackers successfully made their

way through security checkpoints and boarded the planes. Though many of the 19 men

were identified for additional security measures, the measures raised no further red flags,

and all were cleared to board (Kean et al., 2004). The four planes carrying the attackers

took off between 7:45 and 8:10 AM from various locations on the Eastern Seaboard. At

this point, any early warning signs of what was about to take place went largely

unnoticed.

The first indication that anything was going wrong was a phone call to American

Airlines reservation services at 8:19 AM originating from Flight Attendant Betty Ong on

American Airlines flight 11, where she alerted them of the hijacking. Additionally,

Boston Air Traffic Control was made aware of the situation at 8:26 AM when a hijacker

on flight 11 pressed the wrong button on the aircraft communications system,

accidentally broadcasting a suspicious message meant for the passengers to Air Traffic

Control instead (Kean et al., 2004). The second plane, United Airlines 175, was not

returning New York Air Traffic Control's requests for contact beginning at 8:51 AM, and

subsequent calls from Flight Attendants and passengers confirmed the plane had been hijacked as well (Kean et al., 2004). The suspicion that a third aircraft, American Airlines Flight 77, was in danger came at 8:54 AM when the aircraft made an abrupt change of course and failed to respond to multiple attempts to make contact; later calls again confirmed the hijacking (Kean et al., 2004). Lastly, the FAA became aware of the fourth and final hijacked flight, United Airlines Flight 93, at 9:28 AM after receiving a transmission suggesting unauthorized entry into the cockpit.

During this time period, President George W. Bush was reading to a classroom of schoolchildren in Sarasota, Florida. Due to the rapidly evolving nature of the crisis at this point, Bush could not take many actions outside the immediate actions and protocols executed by military and FAA personnel. When White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card informed the President of the attack at 9:05, he stayed seated and continued to read the story. Bush knew at the time there was no action he could take and remained stoic, not to upset the children or civilians in the room (Kean et al., 2004).

Phase 2: Preparation/Prevention. In this case, the first clear signal of trouble came when multiple hijackings were underway, leaving very little time to prepare for the following stages. Only 37 minutes passed between the first contact with American Airlines Flight 11 and the time it hit the North Tower. Unlike the other two crises discussed, the surprise element of the September 11th attacks makes it unique. The United States was left scrambling to piece together information about the attacks as three of the four planes hit their targets.

Phase 3: Containment/Damage Limitation. The containment phase involved two distinct routes: ground efforts at the crash sites and air efforts to locate any rogue

aircraft. It was unprecedented that United States airspace would face multiple hostile

takeovers, all within the span of two hours. At the time of the attacks, protocols for

hijacked aircraft were geared toward persons taking over a plane to use as a bargaining

chip to promote terrorist causes rather than hijacking an aircraft to turn it into essentially

a guided missile (Kean et al., 2004).

When the FAA, along with United and American Airlines, realized the scale of the

attack, they employed a few key actions in hopes of containing it. United Airlines began

issuing warnings to transcontinental planes about cockpit intrusion, United Airlines and

American Airlines issued ground stops for their aircraft departing out of the Northeast,

and finally, the FAA shut down all civil air space at 9:45 AM, telling all airborne flights

to land at the nearest airport, and diverting international arrivals to Canada and Mexico

(Kean et al., 2004). In the interest of thwarting additional attacks, US airspace remained

entirely closed for commercial flights for two days before systematically re-opening with

heightened security measures already in place.

After the first plane hit, most people saw no reason to think the event was

anything more than a tragic accident. Those occupying the South Tower began to

evacuate their offices after watching the first plane make its impact on the North Tower.

At this time, nobody thought there was a second plane, and announcements were made

telling occupants to return to their floors as the South Tower was secure (Dwyer, 2004).

Receiving no warning of the impending second plane, many returned to their workspace,

complicating the later rescue efforts. First responders worked desperately to evacuate the

occupants of the buildings and the Pentagon, where the third plane hit. Hundreds of fire

and EMT units were quickly mobilized to maximize the number of civilians brought to

safety before the collapse of the towers at 9:59 and 10:28 AM, respectively. Search and rescue efforts would continue for ten days following the attacks.

National crisis management efforts began at this time with White House advisor teleconferences and senior military leaders at the Pentagon. These calls were an effort to unify government response, as up until this point, each agency had been acting alone, and their actions sometimes contradicted each other (Kean et al., 2004). For example, orders had been issued from the White House allowing military planes to shoot down any aircraft that did not respond to attempts to make contact, but the order had not been issued to the fighter planes (Kean et al., 2004). The President wished to return to the White House and address the unfolding situation from there, but with the uncertainty over the number of planes affected, he was urged not to (Kean et al., 2004). Bush and high-level advisors continued to work from safe locations in the hours following the attacks.

Phase 4: Recovery. Back in the White House att 8:30 PM on 9/11, President Bush addressed the nation to begin the recovery period, mourning alongside all US citizens but determined to present the world with strength and dignity in the tragic aftermath. In the short five-minute speech, Bush lamented the loss of life, thanked rescue workers, acknowledged ongoing emergency efforts, and detailed plans for finding those accountable. Additionally, he also assured the world that US agencies and financial institutions remain strong, "These acts shattered steel, but they cannot dent the steel of American resolve" (*Statement by the President in Address to the Nation*, 2001).

During the recovery, Bush had to find the right balance among his potential roles. One of these roles, and perhaps the one he was best at, was as a communicator to the

American people. The time following the attacks was filled with great uncertainty for the United States and its citizens. Bush constantly reassured the country and the world that the United States was strong and unshaken. On the ground in New York City, President Bush visited Ground Zero to thank the masses of rescue workers still working search and rescue and addressed the nation again from the National Cathedral: "Just three days removed from these events, Americans do not yet have the distance of history. But our responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil" (*President's Remarks at National Day of Prayer and Remembrance*, 2001).

Bush repeatedly captured the nation's attention with passionate speeches, rallying their shock and anger toward the cause of finding those responsible and holding them fully accountable. Bush's early response to 9/11 garnered significant bipartisan support, a difficult feat to achieve in the 21st century (Nadeem, 2023). It was a sign of his leadership that he could harness the varied emotional responses of all citizens and inspire a sense of unity and patriotism in the face of adversity.

Bush also had to direct military action and see to his role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. No matter someone's feelings about the war, they could not deny President Bush's superb diplomacy skills in the wake of the crisis. In the aftermath of the attacks, he met with the leaders of 51 countries to garner support for the war on terror (*The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days*, n.d.). Bush was excellent at presenting a shared vision. The same skills he used to unite the American people he used to unite a strong coalition of countries ready to back the United States on their crusade against terror.

Phase 5: Learning. As President in the post-crisis era, Bush was tasked with agenda setting. He worked with numerous federal agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency, Department of State, Department of Defense, and Federal Bureau of Investigation to create a path forward in understanding who was responsible for the attacks. The Bush Administration passed many reforms in conjunction with Congress to improve the United States' crisis response. Bush showed outstanding commitment to facing past mistakes and rectifying them.

President Bush signed legislation that allowed for a Joint 9/11 investigative committee to review the triumphs and failures of the 9/11 crisis response. The final report detailed each failure of the system and suggested reforms.

First, the attacks unearthed a greater need for communication during crisis protocols. In a large-scale event such as the September 11th attacks, many organizations must work together harmoniously for the most efficient response. Breakdowns in communication were seen at every level of the immediate response to 9/11. For example, first responder organizations on the scene were not relaying vital information to each other (McKinsey & Company, n.d.), and the FAA did not warn military authorities about a hijacking until the first plane was just nine minutes from hitting the North tower (Kean et al., 2004). The insufficiencies of communications unveiled through the attacks showed the need for updated protocols and a new chain of command if a similar situation were to happen again.

In accordance with the commission's recommendations, several new federal organizations were created to aid crisis response and mitigate terrorism. The creation of the Office of the Director for National Intelligence (ODNI) encouraged communication

of information between intelligence agencies to avoid future attacks. The Department of

Homeland Security (DHS) was created as an established branch of government focused

solely on counterterrorism. Additionally, the Transportation Security Administration was

created to meet the need for a more substantial airport security program. These

organizations, among other reforms, show the federal government's commitment to

preventing future attacks.

Systems

Many varied and complex systems came into play during the events of 9/11. The

primary system hindering the crisis response was infrastructure. While each individual

responding organization had crisis protocols to follow, none of the organizations knew

how to coordinate their efforts. Breaks in the chain of communication wasted precious

response time at all levels and phases of the crisis. A breakdown in communication like

this falls upon a breakdown in leadership.

The cultural system had a positive impact on the recovery and response to 9/11.

The nation and its citizens were united by their sadness and came together like never

before to guide the country into recovery. Citizens wanted to do whatever they could to

help. Many off-duty first responders showed up for work, civilians lined up to give blood,

and more. President Bush did an excellent job of leveraging the cultural system in the

United States to aid in emotional recovery after the incident.

Stakeholders

In this case study, the 'Villain' role is held by the party responsible for the attacks:

Al Qaeda. Intelligence and Defense Agencies would be considered Bush's allies in this

instance because they were the first line of defense in investigating the event and

launching counterattacks. The leaders of the respective agencies would also have been close by to give Bush advice and expert insight. The apparent victims in the 9/11 attacks were those present at the World Trade Center or Pentagon at the time the planes hit. First Responders were also stakeholders as they had the opportunity to tremendously aid the crisis mitigation phase and save lives by organizing evacuation from the falling towers.

This case study brings about a number of additional stakeholders that do not have a perfectly fitting archetypal role in Pearson and Mitroff's framework but had the ability to change the course just the same. News outlets and coverage allowed quick dissemination of information. Within hours of the attacks, the whole country had tuned in for information and instructions. Due to the emotional impact of this crisis, families and general United States citizens could also be considered stakeholders, as their reactions could have affected the situation as a whole.

Case III: Thad Allen

The last case is Vice Admiral Thad Allen, who took over as FEMA's Principal Federal Response Officer (PFO) during the response to Hurricane Katrina. In August 2005, a category four hurricane made landfall on the Gulf Coast. The devastating storm proved overwhelming for existing infrastructure and challenged the initial responses by states and the federal government. Most of the damage occurred in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, especially in low-lying areas such as New Orleans. It is estimated that 1,392 deaths can be attributed to the hurricane, making it one of the deadliest hurricanes to hit the United States (Knabb et al., 2023). In addition to the hurricane's death toll, the estimated damage caused amounted to 125 billion dollars in

2005 (not adjusted for inflation) (Knabb et al., 2023). Estimates suggest that the primary

recovery period after Hurricane Katrina took 18 months (BuildFax, n.d.).

Vice Admiral Thad Allen was Chief of Staff of the Coast Guard at the time of the

storm. When the federal response failed to meet expectations, Allen was tasked to serve

as the Deputy Principal Federal Response Official, the second in command over the

entire response to Hurricane Katrina (Kearns et al., 2013). Over a week after the storm,

FEMA appeared unable to get a handle on the chaos. Allen was then asked to step into

the Principal position and lead the response effort after Michael Brown was relieved of

his duties (Kearns et al., 2013).

Allen reportedly has a collective leadership style. A strength of his is inspiring

others to act and lead independently (Kearns et al., 2013). This was very important for

turning around the failing recovery effort. Allen knew he could not be the sole leader of

the project; he needed everyone to be a leader. Described as an excellent listener, Allen

was skilled at hearing the concerns of people affected and, instead of assigning blame,

explaining a plan and vision of recovery (Kearns et al., 2013).

Type

The crisis faced in the third and final case is a natural disaster. This falls under the

Severe, Technical/Economic quadrant of the Pearson and Mitroff (1993) type axis (Figure

1). While the horizontal axis, in this case, is slightly more ambiguous than the previous

two cases, Hurricane Katrina will be categorized on the 'Severe' side of the typology.

While some natural disasters could be a regularly occurring event turned crisis and

categorized under the 'Normal' side of the spectrum under Pearson and Mitroff's

definitions, Hurricane Katrina was not an everyday storm. Pearson and Mitroff place

"Environmental Accidents" on the severe side of the spectrum due to their tendency to cause high levels of damage.

Another difference between this case and the previous two studies is Hurricane Katrina's position on the Technical/Economic side of the vertical spectrum. As mentioned previously, the determinant for this factor is the initial cause of the crisis. Natural storms are not initiated by human action, and in the case of Hurricane Katrina specifically, the devastation was worsened significantly by policies and failed infrastructure.

Phases

Phase 1: Signal Detection. According to the National Weather Service, Katrina was first detected on radar systems on August 23rd, 2005. Intensifying quickly, it became categorized as a Tropical storm on August 24th and a weak hurricane on August 25th. The storm made landfall as a category one hurricane at the southern tip of Florida, prompting the Governor of Florida to declare a State of Emergency (DeLozier, n.d.). The National Hurricane Center and National Weather Service mapped out the predicted path and strength of the hurricane to help shape the response.

Phase 2: Preparation/Prevention. After passing through Florida, the storm rapidly strengthened over the Gulf of Mexico (NOAA's National Weather Service, n.d.). The White House began to employ crisis protocols on August 26th, mobilizing the National Guard and ordering FEMA and DHS to prepare for its arrival on the Gulf Coast (DeLozier, n.d.). The Louisiana Governor declared a State of Emergency to prepare for the storm's landfall. On August 27th, the National Hurricane Center Director called the Mayor of New Orleans to advocate for a mandatory evacuation order. At the time, National Weather Service predictions showed a 45% chance of a Category 4 or 5

hurricane coming directly for New Orleans (DeLozier, n.d.). Later that evening, New Orleans Mayor Nagin declared a state of emergency with a voluntary evacuation order, and Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour declared a State of Emergency with mandatory evacuation for counties closest to the coast (DeLozier, n.d.).

On August 28th, federal officials were made aware that New Orleans levees may overflow or break due to the anticipated storm surge, and emergency preparations ensued (DeLozier, n.d.). Local and state agencies took the following actions to prepare for the impending storm: New Orleans issued a mandatory evacuation order, The Superdome in New Orleans and nine other locations were named "refuges of last resort" for those who could not leave, the City of New Orleans created traffic plans to reduce evacuation times on highways, Alabama declared State of Emergency, FEMA staged supplies in affected areas, and some cities enacted curfews.

Phase 3: Containment/Damage Limitation. Early in the morning on August 29th, the hurricane made landfall as a category four hurricane off the coast of Louisiana. Within a few hours, a New Orleans City levee broke, flooding a large portion of the city (DeLozier, n.d.). Around 24 hours after the storm, a second levee broke, leaving 80% of New Orleans flooded, with some areas reaching up to 20-foot water depths. New Orleans Major Nagin warned that pumps to get water out would shortly fail (DeLozier, n.d.). Tens of thousands of New Orleans residents were stranded in the Super Dome, the city convention center, or on roofs of buildings. Search and rescue was quickly overwhelmed, and officials requested anyone with a boat to aid the rescue response (DeLozier, n.d.).

Beginning on August 31st, 25,000 refugees in the Superdome were evacuated by bus. The Texas governor offered the Astrodome in Houston for the refugees; the

evacuation took several days (DeLozier, n.d.). Violence and looting broke out in New Orleans, distracting from search and rescue efforts. On September 1st, the Department of Defense deployed Navy ships with medical supplies and increased the National Guard presence to 30,000 (DeLozier, n.d.). The situation in New Orleans continued to overwhelm police and National Guard presence; over 200 New Orleans Police Officers quit. President Bush deployed 7,200 Active Duty troops and 10,000 additional National Guard (DeLozier, n.d.). When the President visited the Gulf Coast on September 2nd, he stated that the government's response was not acceptable (DeLozier, n.d.).

Phase 4: Recovery.

On September 5th, 2005, Allen arrived in New Orleans, where he was to serve as the Deputy Principal Federal Response Officer and focus his efforts on storm recovery in New Orleans and surrounding counties, which had been hit the hardest by the storm (Allen, 2005). Allen established a local incident command and began coordinating federal response groups from the scene. On September 9th, 2005, 12 days after the hurricane made landfall, Admiral Thad Allen was informed by the Secretary of Homeland Security that Allen would be relieving Michael Brown as the Principal in charge of the federal response and would lead the entire recovery effort moving forward (Kearns et al., 2013).

Allen remarked that he knew when he arrived on the scene that it was a different type of disaster. He considered it a hybrid event, one part hurricane damage recovery, the other part recovery from the back flooding and damaged levees in New Orleans (Allen, 2005). Damage from the broken levees was so bad that Allen compared it to "a weapon of mass effect being used on a city without criminality" (Allen, p. 6, 2005.) Without

specific protocols to handle a situation as dire as this, Allen proved himself an adaptable leader and adjusted the typical hurricane response to better fit the hybrid situation he was facing.

One of Thad Allen's strengths in handling the crisis was understanding that not all situations are the same and that organizations cannot simply rely on prescribed protocols because those protocols cannot anticipate everything.

When I arrived in New Orleans, rather than dealing with traditional hurricane response functions, which would be individual assistance, public assistance [and] taking care of resource needs that had gone beyond the city, the parish, or the state, we actually became involved in current operations. By that I mean there was still search and rescue going on. We were attempting to [remove water from] the city. We were moving into the remains removal-that's a very sensitive, delicate issue- and trying to restore pumping capability within the pumping systems in the city. It was a much different environment than FEMA or the US government, quite frankly, is traditionally used to dealing with under a natural disaster paradigm (Allen, 2005).

He used the same approach to address the regional challenges faced in the crisis area. Allen understood that the different contexts required different responses. In Mississippi, the damage was primarily hurricane-related, while in New Orleans, much of the damage resulted from the failed levees. Allen had to adapt his response to each challenge. For example, he helped create the state morgue of Louisiana, which did not exist prior to Hurricane Katrina (Allen, 2005). Additionally, Allen came up with creative response

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solutions for the rural populations and people below the poverty level who were unable to find accommodations (Allen, 2005).

Another focus for Admiral Allen after taking over the recovery effort was bringing unity and synchronization to the response of previously independently working agencies. Throughout the crisis, he was often heard repeating the phrase "Unity of effort, not unity of command" (Allen, 2005). This phrase acknowledged that they may answer to different leaders, but their efforts should be unified toward common goals. As a part of coordinating the response efforts, Allen frequently met with General Russel Honorè of the Army, who was in charge of the Department of Defense response to the hurricane. Allen reports they were very collaborative and discussed matters on the phone 30-40 times a day for several weeks (Allen, 2005). In addition to coordinating the federal response, Allen also worked closely with state agencies and governments. He met with the governors of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Arkansas, Tennessee, and Texas at various points in a vast multi-state effort to address the recovery of displaced individuals.

Throughout his entire time heading the response, Allen worked to keep recovery workers and volunteers inspired and motivated. He asked volunteers to treat those needing help like their own families and not worry about overserving their needs (Kearns et al., 2013). His team took an individualized response to all the displaced citizens of Louisiana and Mississippi. Workers compassionately worked one by one, trying to find families a place to stay for the holidays (Kearns et al., 2013). Allen diligently worked to get the Gulf Coast region back on its feet until January 2005, over four months after the catastrophe. He is credited with saving the federal response to Hurricane Katrina, which was criticized heavily before his appointment.

Phase 5: Learning. The most valuable lesson to be learned from this case is that even when organizations rely on well-developed crisis protocols, leaders must be willing to deviate from that and devise their own plans. No crisis management protocol will be foolproof or cover every possible scenario. Leadership must adapt and make efforts to understand the situation in its entirety to demonstrate an adequate response effort.

Another lesson to be learned is the value of collaboration. While each organization has a job to do, they need to remember that every organization in a catastrophic scenario like Hurricane Katrina has the same end goals. Thad Allen did an excellent job reminding them to unify their efforts and work together.

Systems

The main system to note in this case is the failure of the technical system. Particularly in New Orleans, the damage was intensified by the levee systems' failure to hold back the water from flooding the town. When the pump systems failed next, leaving the town underwater for days, the situation grew even more bleak. Another failed technical element occurred when the city radio systems stopped working after the incident, leaving New Orleans police with no way of communicating with each other and their command centers.

Another failed system is the human/emotional system. Due to the government's initial response not being up to par, the crisis spiraled further out of control, with people turning on each other. Stranded New Orleans residents let their fear and anger take over and got violent with each other, forcing police to focus on matters of violence and looting rather than search and rescue. There were even isolated reports of shots being fired at military evacuation helicopters (DeLozier, n.d.).

When Allen took over the response, he had to address the initial problems of hurricane response and those created by poor initial government response (violence, low morale, etc.). He leveraged the cultural system well by appealing to the organizations and volunteers to work with a sense of unity and to treat survivors with compassion like they were their own family.

Stakeholders

Unlike the previous two cases, it is difficult to pinpoint any person or group as the 'villain' or 'enemy.' Some stakeholders may be viewed in this light during various parts of the response effort (congress, state agencies, etc.) However, the main culprit, Hurricane Katrina, was not a living being. That is why this case is considered Technical/Economic on variable 1.

The response to Hurricane Katrina was complex and involved many separate parts of the federal, state, and local governments working together. The Federal Emergency Management Agency, The U.S. Coast Guard, Congress, City and State Governments, etc., all had to utilize tools and systems in place to recover, making them collectively a primary stakeholder and allies amongst themselves. Those who had homes, properties, or businesses destroyed, or those who had their livelihoods affected by the storm, are the clear victims. First Responders on the scene, as well as news outlets and relief organizations such as the Red Cross, played a part in the recovery as stakeholders.

Chapter V: Discussion and Conclusion

The case studies were compared using Pearson and Mitroff's crisis management framework (1993). The framework details four variables (Types, Phases, Systems, and Stakeholders). The leader's behaviors, actions, and dominant traits are analyzed at each crisis phase through an adaptive leadership lens to identify how leadership styles change with each phase of the crisis framework. Comparing the above case studies yields several conclusions. Although leadership styles vary widely, a fundamental framework for effective crisis leadership can be identified by recognizing shared strengths and behaviors exhibited throughout each phase of a crisis. Among those essential skills to a leader's toolbox are, first and foremost, adaptability, followed by coalition-building, strong, consistent messaging, confident decision-making, and promoting communication and collaboration.

In the first phase of Pearson and Mitroff's framework (1993), signal detection, leaders and organizations receive early warning signals at the earliest sign of trouble. Winston Churchill spent this phase relentlessly publishing opinions on the growing strengths of the Nazi Party and urging government action. Without an official leadership role, very few were listening. In the case of George Bush, the initial signals of distress from the flight crews never reached the appropriate level of escalation. While that in itself was a failure in the September 11th crisis, Bush was unaware of the unfolding crisis at this time. However, prior to the attacks, U.S. Intelligence agencies had received

fragmented reports about potential terrorist threats; Bush was made aware of these at the time (THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, n.d.). It is probable that U.S. Government agencies were working towards uncovering and thwarting these plots as they were made aware, meaning phase one was not ignored by the administration. Similarly to Bush, Thad Allen was not yet serving in a leadership role under FEMA and could not take direct action; the initial signal of the impending crisis was Doppler radar, days before the incident.

In this first phase, leaders must work to understand the context and facts of the crisis in order to formulate an effective crisis management plan. Another important tool is communication. Adequate communication at the first sign of possible trouble is vital for the crisis process. In the case of 9/11, the crisis response got off to a rocky start due to a breakdown in communication chains. The 9/11 Commission report noted that the FAA centers were not closely following the notification procedure to alert the U.S. military of plane hijackings (Kean et al., 2004). This resulted in a delay in military involvement, effectively closing the already small window that was available to stop or divert the planes.

Next, in phase two, Preparation and Prevention, leaders and organizations are tasked with doing everything within their power to prevent a crisis from occurring and, if the crisis is inevitable, composing a plan to manage the event effectively. In this phase, Churchill focused his efforts on preparing the Navy for battle. He advocated for increasing military strength to match Germany and beginning to map out war strategy. He also took over as Prime Minister during this phase, a job nobody seemed to want given the daunting war ahead. In the case of 9/11, phase two was remarkably short. Bush was

informed of the crisis during this phase when the second plane hit the tower. Knowing he was not in a prime position to act while reading to a room of elementary schoolers, the President remained calm and trusted those responding to the crisis. Allen had not yet been appointed to lead the response to Hurricane Katrina in this phase. However, the appropriate agencies prepared for the storm by informing the public and allocating resources. Additionally, as commandant of the Coast Guard, Allen took steps to ensure forces were prepared to support a federal response if needed. In this phase, the leaders focused on the crises and devised effective crisis management plans. Both Bush and Churchill remained calm in this phase despite the formidable events taking place. This was vital to assure the American and British populations knew their governments were still functioning and working towards a plan.

In phase three, Containment and Damage Limitation, the goal is to limit the effects of the crisis and prevent it from spreading. Churchill focused on keeping morale up by addressing the public in a series of inspirational speeches. Additionally, the man known for being independent and stubborn turned to diplomacy, recruiting France and the United States into an alliance. Bush addressed the nation for the first time from the Sarasota elementary school; he ensured the world that the American government was still functioning and the situation would be stabilized. He spent the hours immediately following the attacks on teleconferences with White House advisors and federal agency leadership to determine the next steps. Together, they took actions to mitigate the threat, but uncertainty remained. Bush made calls to the leaders several other countries to update them on the situation and assure them that the sudden mobilization of U.S. military forces was not an act of war against those countries. Thad Allen was still serving in his previous

role for the Coast Guard. While he was unable to act in the capacity of FEMA director, he continued to posture the Coast Guard to respond to the crisis.

Using evidence from the case studies, collaboration is the most important or helpful tool at this crisis stage. Both Bush and Churchill looked to others for answers and advice in order to tackle the problem together, Bush in the form of White House Advisors and Churchill in the form of international allies. Even Allen would have known the value of collaboration, with his employer working closely with FEMA and the government at this stage. Another job of the leader in crisis is to prevent the spread of panic and chaos. In the midst of uncertainty, leaders must remain calm and inspire confidence that the situation will be resolved. In Bush's first address, he showed no sign of fear. His resolve and leadership trickled down to the American people, allowing them to begin processing the crisis, mitigating panic, and potentially saving lives.

Additionally, it is important to note that while Winston Churchill, Thad Allen, and George Bush were all highly regarded crisis leaders, they did not know everything. Each of these men was surrounded by advisors and had to listen and collaborate to make these high-impact decisions. Leaders must be adept at surrounding themselves with diverse perspectives, actively listening to suggestions, and recognizing the limitations of their own experience. A good leader is not required to know everything, especially in a crisis, but a good leader should be able to ask questions and take the initiative to find the best answer.

Phase four, Recovery, is often the most prolonged phase and involves the short-term and long-term operations employed to return to the status quo. Churchill was not chosen to lead Great Britain in the recovery after the war. He failed to adapt his

leadership style to a post-war era and was voted out. While not involved in Britain's economic and infrastructural recovery, Churchill redoubled his efforts in diplomacy and focused on the recovery of the international order. Through his influence, the United Nations and the UN Security Council came into existence. Post-9/11, Bush maintained a confident front for the country. He addressed the nation and repeated messages of unity and strength, assuring citizens that justice would be served. Bush also focused on diplomacy, discussing financial and military alliances with countless countries. The recovery phase was the first time Thad Allen was able to act officially in the capacity of a leader. He saved the federal response to Hurricane Katrina after it had been mishandled in the first phases of the crisis. Allen adjusted the prescribed response to a hurricane to better fit the needs of the situation, coming up with creative solutions to both acute and long-term issues caused by the hurricane and levee disasters. FEMA served as the lead federal agency in response to Hurricane Katrina. Allen's role as director meant he was responsible for coordinating all the federal agencies involved and presenting a unified response. Additionally, Allen is credited with being an inspiring leader who worked to keep up morale between first responders and volunteers in the aftermath of the storm.

The central theme in phase four of the crisis process is adaptability. Unlike the first few phases, where collaboration is vital for an efficient response in a large-scale crisis, phase four requires a varied response based on the situation at hand. A good example is Admiral Allen adjusting the typical response protocol for Hurricane Katrina because he recognized it as an atypical situation following the breakdown of the New Orleans levee system. It is impossible to plan for every crisis, so the ability to adapt is a necessity for a successful crisis leader. The leadership failures shown early on in the case

studies (Britain ignoring growing Nazi strength, thousands stranded in unsafe conditions after Hurricane Katrina, and slow initial response to hijacked planes) can all be partially attributed to rigidity in established procedures and unwillingness to adapt to the current situation.

Collaboration remained an important theme for each leader throughout the recovery phase. All the leaders took the time to build a team to face the crises. A good leader knows they cannot do everything on their own. Churchill recruited The United States and befriended their leader, President Roosevelt. From that relationship, he forged the allied powers alliance that won the war. He continued to utilize this alliance to promote recovery for the international community in the recovery phase. Bush reached out to our friends and allies, speaking to the leaders of 51 countries to build a mega coalition to go against Al Qaeda and pledge to take a stance against the War on Terror. Lastly, Allen built a team out of domestic allies. Federal organizations came together to form a coalition where he fostered a sense of collaborative unity. Each leader shows they can build and project a vision enticing others to join a cause.

Lastly, phase five, Learning, is arguably the most critical phase in the sequence. It involves reflecting upon the crisis response and analyzing what went wrong and what could have gone better. In Churchill's case, he knew that future conflict could be avoided through better international institutions and governing bodies. Reflecting on the issues that started the war in the first place, Churchill collaborated with President Roosevelt to create the UN, a solution that has stood the test of time. President Bush did an exemplary job promoting reflection and learning in the aftermath of September 11th. He worked primarily as an agenda-setter to guide federal institutions to improve upon existing

policies and ensure mistakes made during 9/11 would not be made again. Through his guidance, the Transportation Security Administration and Department of Homeland Security were formed, making significant changes to airport security practices and the intelligence community. Allen's recovery response to Hurricane Katrina set a framework for future federal crisis management. He advocated for interagency collaboration, better communication between state and federal agencies, and a more flexible response protocol.

For a leader to effectively utilize the fifth phase and complete the crisis process, every action taken during the crisis process must be critically reflected on. Leaders must also have an open mind, be willing to accept change, and learn from mistakes. All three of the leaders exhibited these behaviors during the crisis process.

Some key things to note about Winston Churchill and the case of World War II are that his main leadership traits include his relentless perseverance, self-confidence, and an unbridled tendency to express his opinions. These key personality factors won him the top job during the war and also prevented him from returning to it afterward. Winston Churchill was considered a wartime leader and failed to adapt his leadership toolbox to an after-crisis situation. His interests and skills lie in foreign affairs and diplomacy, and that was not the leader needed for Great Britain after the war had ended. He still managed to serve and lead, but in a different capacity, through his role in creating international organizations like the United Nations alongside President Roosevelt. His personal leadership nature was not best suited for handling the secondary crisis that was the state of Great Britain after the war.

As for leading through the crisis itself, Churchill did well. He had to step up at the preparation phase of the crisis when he was asked to fill the role of Prime Minister. Through the third phase of the crisis, where Churchill's actions were most profound, he fulfilled the role of diplomat. He stayed on top of morale with several now-famous speeches urging soldiers and citizens alike to keep fighting. When the crisis moved into the recovery phase, Churchill was not chosen to continue in his role. However, he did adapt to a new leadership role when he focused on healing the international community.

In the case of George W. Bush and 9/11, Bush's natural leadership characteristics included being skillful in delegation, clear decision-making, and a firm conviction when talking about the policies he believed in. His highly managerial, top-down leadership style worked out well for him during the September 11th attacks because so many military, intelligence, and emergency agencies were involved that it would be impossible to police all of them.

Bush excelled in the recovery phase of the 9/11 crisis. His natural leadership skillset served him the best in that stage. He gave speeches with strong conviction, reassuring the public and pledging his cause to the War on Terror. In times of uncertainty, people look to a leader for answers and to know everything will be all right. Bush's public persona after the attacks was one of his strongest skills. Additionally, out of the three cases discussed, President Bush led significant reform and strides in the learning phase of the crisis. His excellent agenda-setting after the attacks led to reflection on the failures of the government response and showed opportunities for improvement. In this case, more than the others, you can see the tangible effects of the learning phase, primarily through

the creation of government organizations such as TSA and closing the gaps in information-sharing between U.S. Intelligence Agencies.

In the last case, Thad Allen and Hurricane Katrina, he utilized a less authoritative leadership style when handling things compared to the other two leaders, who had remarkable similarities in temperament. Allen led collectively, where he appreciated other's thoughts and empowered them to make decisions independently. This key difference from the other two cases shows that no one style is ideally suited to crisis leadership.

Allen assumed the role of leader after the original crisis had already occurred, so we see the best examples of his leadership in the recovery phase of the event. Allen worked diligently to spur collaboration among all agencies working on the recovery effort. He also led with compassion, both for the rescue workers and victims.

This study's findings align with previous literature on crisis management and leadership theories. It uses ideas from a combination of leadership theories, including trait, behavior, and adaptive leadership theories, to identify a basic framework for crisis leadership.

The study's findings show that certain traits and behaviors are helpful for leaders in a crisis. This is adjacent to the Trait and Behavior leadership theories popularized early on. While the Trait theory of leadership focuses on a set of inherent traits best suited for leadership (Northouse, 2021), it varies from this study because these traits can be learned and improved upon. This idea is contrary to the original essence of trait theory. With this study, the leaders learn and improve throughout the crisis process and are not inherently skilled or unskilled at managing a crisis. The findings suggest behaviors associated with

crisis management success, but they do not quite fit with traditional behavior theories, which leave little room for flexibility. Traditional behavior theories suggest leadership can be replicated using a set of leadership behaviors (Northouse, 2021.) It is not enough to copy certain behaviors employed by influential leaders. The problem with this theory is the lack of flexibility in applying certain behaviors to situations or phases of the crisis. The traits and behaviors alone are not enough to explain outcomes. Crisis leadership can only be understood through the situational context and adaptations made by the leader in response.

While traits and behaviors alone cannot be used to understand crisis leadership, they fit nicely with situational leadership styles, specifically adaptive leadership theory. The creators of the adaptive leadership theory suggest changing leadership behaviors based on the dynamic environment (Heifetz, 1998). This is very similar to the findings of this paper, the slight difference being the addition of the crisis phases. The findings of this paper suggest that different actions are more relevant to different phases of the crisis process. This theory is the most applicable to crisis leadership since it acknowledges how situations outside of leadership control can influence a leader's behavior and the consequences of a leader's actions (Vroom & Jago, 2007).

The first common strength identified is adaptability. Leaders must be flexible and willing to adjust plans and goals to manage a crisis scenario effectively. In a survey on crisis leadership traits, 65% of respondents identified adaptive as a quality of an effective crisis leader (Murawski, 2011). Due to the ever-changing nature of a crisis and the impossibility of planning for every crisis, adaptability is a vital trait for effective crisis leaders. In the case studies, we see the effects of leaders adapting and failing to adapt. For

example, the ability of Bush and federal organizations to adapt their protocols to fit the unprecedented scenario of plane hijacking turning into essentially guided missiles at U.S. symbols. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, the state and federal governments failed to adapt their protocols and behaviors upon the breakdown of the levee system.

Previous studies have connected emotional intelligence and leadership (Yuste, 2021). Many emotional intelligence traits go hand in hand with the coalition building and promoting communication and collaboration tools. Each leader adapted these tools to their personal leadership style for more effective implementation. Allen favored a highly collaborative leadership style, empowering others to make decisions. Additionally, he enthusiastically encouraged collaboration among government agencies while coordinating the response. Churchill and Bush both heavily favored a top-down leadership style. Bush chose to receive information and advice from the coalition he had built of White House advisors before ultimately making an informed decision. Churchill may have been the least collaborative among the three leaders, with mixed reports saying he had a tendency to ignore advisors' suggestions and make his own decisions. However, he excelled in the coalition-building factor, using his international diplomacy skills to build the allied powers.

All of the leaders in the case studies played a crucial role in keeping the public informed through strong, consistent messaging. Despite the high-level crises faced, none of the leaders let the public perceive any fear or doubt. In a severe crisis that involves the loss of human life, such as the three studies, a follower-centric response is necessary. Anytime a leader addresses the public after a crisis, they must curate a message of confidence and compassion and work to build trust. This aligns with a study that

considers the optimism/realism paradox a crucial part of crisis leadership. The study notes the importance of staying optimistic and keeping followers motivated while still being realistic about the negative aspects of a crisis (Förster et al., 2022). Each of the leaders excelled in boosting morale and fostering a sense of unity after their respective crises. This was especially necessary because people turn to leaders to reassure them in the face of uncertainty. This is consistent with the literature that suggests a leader's job is to calmly inform the public of threats and risks and do so without inciting panic (Kahn, 2020). Other studies have sought to understand the feelings of followers in crisis and found that widespread panic can worsen the effects of a crisis (Jo Nurse, 2023). Leaders who actively work to quell the public's fears and advertise their plan to solve the problem may be able to mitigate any negative effects induced by panic.

Confident decision-making is a tool that is necessary for crisis leadership due to high stakes and time constraints. Leaders have to think about a crisis response on multiple planes, both in short-term management and crisis mitigation, and also think about the long-term effects of their actions on crisis recovery. A study on crisis paradoxes describes this as a dichotomy of strategic vs. operational thinking during a crisis (Förster et al., 2022). In a survey of influential crisis leadership traits, 67% of emergency planning experts identified decisiveness as essential (Murawski, 2011). The effects of indecisiveness are seen in the case of Hurricane Katrina, where in phases one and two, indecisiveness plagued the decisions to evacuate areas with a high chance of hurricane presence. The decision to order an evacuation in New Orleans came too late for many after several days of going back and forth.

Given the above information, I have identified adaptability, coalition-building, strong and consistent messaging, confident decision-making, and promoting communication and collaboration as relevant to success in crisis leadership contexts. These tools provide a basic framework for effective crisis leadership. This study helps close the crisis leadership research gap. The findings here can be applied to leaders of all types when facing a crisis.

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