Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Date of Award

2013

Document Type

Dissertation

Degree Name

M.A. in Philosophy

Department

Philosophy and Religion

First Advisor

Steven Skultety

Second Advisor

Timothy Yenter

Third Advisor

Robert B. Westmoreland

Relational Format

dissertation/thesis

Abstract

In intention, G.E.M. Anscombe sets out to examine the standard ways in which we use the word "intention". To this end, she also examines desire and how desires play a role in our intentions. In the process, she divides desire into two distinct categories, those of weak and strong wanting. This distinction is quite different from ancient and modern views of desire, which are briefly discussed as a means of comparing Anscombe's view to her predecessors. After she has made this distinction, Anscombe tries to establish what is required of this new category of strong wanting. These requirements include knowledge of the existence of the thing, movement towards it, and so forth. This thesis then seeks to examine whether Anscombe's view is either well-developed or convincing. Through examination of Anscombe's requirements of desirability characterization and utilization of practical reasoning, the conclusion appears to be that her view is neither thoroughly developed nor adequately supported.

Included in

Philosophy Commons

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