Date of Award
1-1-2016
Document Type
Thesis
Degree Name
M.A. in Philosophy
Department
Philosophy and Religion
First Advisor
Timothy P. Yenter
Second Advisor
Steven Skultety
Third Advisor
Donovan Wishon
Relational Format
dissertation/thesis
Abstract
Most Berkeley commentators agree that Berkeley’s theory of self-awareness depends on some type of direct introspective access to the self. In this paper, I challenge this consensus view, arguing that Berkeley’s theory does not claim that there is direct introspective access to the self until after his first publication of the Principles of Human Knowledge in 1710. The first edition of the Principles, as well as Berkeley’s Philosophical Notebooks, reveal a significantly different, perhaps more “Humean,” perspective concerning self-awareness than his works after 1710. During this period, Berkeley thought that the self cannot be encountered directly through introspection, but is in fact knowable only by means of an inference which integrates a crucial causal maxim. Further, I argue that Berkeley thought the causal maxim which grounds his argument for the existence of the self is itself grounded in experience. Berkeley’s early position on self-knowledge interestingly anticipates Hume’s criticism of the introspective availability of the self while denying any skepticism concerning causation.
Recommended Citation
Harkema, Scott, "Berkeley on the Source of Self-Knowledge: Introspection and Causal Maxim" (2016). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 1211.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd/1211