Date of Award
5-1-2026
Document Type
Thesis
Degree Name
M.A. in Philosophy
First Advisor
Timothy Yenter
Second Advisor
Donovan Wishon
Third Advisor
Robert English
School
University of Mississippi
Relational Format
dissertation/thesis
Abstract
The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) states that for everything that is the case, there is a reason for it being the case. The PSR has been a widely used principle in philosophy dating back to Parmenides (~500 BCE). While many philosophers are commonly associated with the PSR, none are as strongly associated with it than Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. This paper derives three surprising implications for Leibniz’s PSR from Leibniz’s claim that God, an unlimited mind, does not engage in reasoning while limited minds, like humans, do engage in reasoning. The implications are: A distinction between the PSR qua a fundamental truth and the PSR qua a principle of reasoning, that current interpretations of how Leibniz grounds the PSR are incorrect, and that the PSR itself offers Leibniz a way to avoid Spinozistic Necessitarianism.
Recommended Citation
Omiecinski, Josiah, "Three Implications for Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason" (2026). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 8859.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd/8859